tv CSIS Discussion on Iraq War History Panel 1 CSPAN May 13, 2019 9:06am-10:31am EDT
society role but they had, it seemed to be a patchwork of what a visit general petraeus, that was one with the a doing it. general corelli was injuring another way to do it. and there are each working reach out to the local tapestry of committee groups such as had been allowed to exist under saddam taken by people willing to take these jobs. >> so that was absolutely true. we have started to correct some of our intelligence capabilities of finding the right people we needed to be meeting with the cubs after me with the monkey larry lessig some of the negative aspects that could cause. the interagency started sending people out to assist the military, police start doing reconstruction operations under the office of reconstruction any mentoring assistance. and then a lot of those people even if they didn't stay found counterparts they could relate information to after they
departed the country. the state department started sending foreign service officers in in 2003. i remember working, to work with the provincial level covets in iraq, and military units would partner with, they were called reconstruction prevention sheaves of the time. i think there comes government support teams. in august through september 2003 is when i started he started to filter in. as far as i i know most units d a productive working relationship. the problem again going back to what kim said is we didn't have a good understanding of what was going on. that contributed to make a lot of mistakes and helping a standup and promulgate these local governments. >> great. i want to thank both of you. thank you kim dozier, thank you jeanne godfroy very much. >> thank you. [applause] [inaudible]
[inaudible conversations] >> live this morning here in c-span2 at the center for strategic and international studies we will be hearing about a new report on the iraq war. it was published recently by the u.s. army. we will be hearing more from the authors of the report as well as former government officials and journalists. taking a short break in the conversation. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] >> and again we will be returning to this discussion about the new report on the iraq war which was published recently by the u.s. army. just taking a break at the center for strategic and international studies in washington, d.c. also to let you know live later today in c-span2 will you he be hearing from air force secretary heather wilson and army
[inaudible conversations] >> and again here taking a break in the discussion about the new report on the iraq wars put together by the u.s. army, a two volume report, journalists and others have been discussing this morning for about the last hour and half or so. expecting the conversation to resume shortly. also we will be hearing from the secretary of the air force and the secretary of the army later today about modernizing the armed forces. that would be live here at 1:30 p.m. on c-span2.
this evening on c-span congresswoman alexandria ocasio-cortez and others will talk about the green new deal at a rally this evening. that would be live at 7 p.m. eastern on c-span. you can also watch online at c-span.org, listen live on the c-span radio app. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
>> taking a break here in this discussion. a team of authors was convened by general odierno to write a study about the operation of iraqi freedom, the two two on report, volume one -- volume two was completed about three years ago but not authorized for release until early this year. we are hearing about this report this morning. while they are in this break will take a look back at some of the opening remarks from one of our earlier sessions. >> thank you very much. thank you very much, seth, thank you to the members of the operation iraqi freedom study
group who here. i think half the audience is members of the team, but it was certainly an honor and a privilege to help to lead this project. origins of the project live in a conversation that general odierno and general often had around christmas time 2012 where they then as the chief of staff to the army and the centcom commander having both been three-star and 4-star commanders in iraq remarked to one another that the army needed to capture the lessons and the history of those campaigns while it was still fresh on the minds of army leaders. they themselves were just a couple of years they knew from moving on out of the army, and so while they were in a position to bring it about they wanted to establish a history project. general austin was particularly
well-placed, because centcom was the hold of the archival records of the iraq war and, of course, general odierno as chief of staff of the army was well-placed to use the arby's institutional resources to try to produce this history. it was something they conceived of in tandem. general odierno asked me to his office in early 2013 and explained this to me, and also explained that he believed the army had not done something similar for the vietnam war, nor had captured the lessons of the counterinsurgency campaign in the vietnam war, in an institutional way. and so he wanted to avoid that mistake and have the army do some self reflection, especially since he believed that the conflict in iraq and in the greater middle east was not over.
and so it was important to, rather than to wait the standard 15-20 years that the army tends to do, to try to capture something more quickly so that it could be used in the armies staff colleges, war colleges, and so on for leaders who might be expected to go back out into the same theater of war. his thinking about was prescient of course because it involved 2014 2014 the army was redeployed back to iraq essentially to fight the same in me but this time in the cuts at the islamic state of iraq and syria. now, what was our charge? we felt that tactical history would be useful, but the more useful would be something that army leaders could use, the leaders were in between the tactical level and the strategic level. we also felt the tactical stories would not tell the story of the war own those operational
level, those theater level lessons that the generals wanted to learn and reflect their own experience. the strategic level and the policy level, general odierno and the rest of us felt had already begun to be covered, that could be covered by great historians such as michael gordon and others who had dealt with the story of the iraq war as it took place, as a played out short inside the beltway in washington. so we did want to rerun that story. we wanted to do something in between at the operational level or at the 4-star and three-star level commands in iraq or occasionally in tandem to explain how strategy and policy translated into tactical actions on the ground or how tactical events on the ground translated into the strategy and policy process, or didn't, for good or for ill. that was our charge. that was the scope of these histories. that's why you find us as
historians tried to put ourselves in the shoes of the 4-star and three-star command, mostly in baghdad. to see the situation as they sought to understand how they responded to decision points as if vince unfolded. there was also, we had the overarching charge i think of explaining why the events that transpired after 2003 didn't flow uninterruptedly from the decision to invade iraq in 2003. that the collapse of iraqi state, for example, in june 2014 wasn't as i sit a direct consequence of the decision to invade iraq the u.s. in 2003. in 2003. that were many, many strategic and operational decision points after the invasion of iraq that had a greater impact on the course of events and the decision to invade. as significant a decision as that was. there were some major, i think,
historical findings that are new or -- the newest i would say historical ground that our team broke covered, for example, 2005 i think in our narrative which is mostly the research work of frank sobchak here, really comes out as a pivotal year for the entire iraq war. that's the year when the theory that the invasion could lead to elections which would defeat the legitimate government which would naturally cause the stabilization, would lead to the stabilization of iraq. that was proven incorrect for writing of reasons, one of which is that in 2005 that's the year the syrian regime and the iranian regimes kicked their interference, their intervention