tv Federal Aviation Officials Testify on Boeing 737 CSPAN May 15, 2019 8:03pm-11:17pm EDT
. >> thank you and now we can get started. good morning and thank you for the discussion on the 737 max. 346 people died on ethiopia airlines flight and the flight from jakarta indonesia. congress has an obligation and the victims of these accidents and their families to ensure air travel. the public does not feel safe about flying then they will not fly if they don't fly than airlines donated by airplanes that they don't need to be built and then we don't need jobs in aviation.
therefore it is clear that it is safety and they will continue to maintain safety to have the tools at its disposal to reduce the likelihood of this happening again. so on the committee's work to date to be engaged with the faa ntsb the stakeholders and others to request the department of transportation inspector general assess the approach to certify the 737 max the oversight and investigation team continues to work with the records request on the certification and third a by partisan request and the international
standards. and then as a third-party review of boeing and then to establish a joint authority review with the advisory board. j atr independent review will have thorough oversight as a global standard in aviation safety and in addition the national transportation system center with an independent review with the mass flight control system and those to personally continue to monitor the situation and that is available for any questions surrounding the investigation as they become available. i hope to hear from witnesses
today from the minister elwell the subcommittee understands they cannot be publicly assessed as those investigations are ongoing but there is important information that they can learn in today's hearing ergo i look forward to hearing more of the certification of the 737 max. and without risk assessment with those key safety fissures with that angle of attack and then to be designated as safety critical and with that faa review to have proper oversight and that it is not
working as congress intended. with that rule those opportunities with the engagement and additionally i'm interested in the j atr and establish safety oversight as mandated and finally what steps the fa will take between now and the 737 max is can - - permitted to fly again. it has a credibility problem and has a fixed credibility problem. they will work with the faa to rebuild confidence because our job is oversight in the committee will take this seriously. with the ntsb collaboration on that preliminary course and
et's three oh two accidents. congress must find answers to ensure the safety and they must take steps to maintain the aerospace systems in the world today's hearing comes in the investigative process to be a series of hearings on the max and then to fully understand all issues surrounding the 737 max and they will not hesitate to ensure the safety of the aviation system. and the ntsb and then look forward to address those issues and i call the ranking member and now for an opening
statement. >> into the full committee and for the opening statement. >> semi thank you chairman larson. i want to extend my condolences and then to understand to get the 737 max safely back in the air. safety is a highest priority and to find out the faa process is to blame. and with that certification to could act. to be based on fact not just a
desire to do something looking at the ethiopian reports i feel strongly about sharing my thoughts of this committee based on my experience and perspective as a pilot. first there were flight control problems recorded why three-- prior to the accident flight. the day before they experience identical issues with the autopilot off for more than an hour flying it manually but unfortunately does not appear they reported those problems so that prepared by the ethiopia authorities to follow proper procedures and to predict that conclusion. it accelerated throughout the entire flight the pilot never
pulled the throttle back after takeoff. and then between 460 and 500 knots which is beyond maximum certified speed of 340 not that fundamental air had a domino effect on what happened and followed on after that. a faulty sensor cause the plane's nose to pitch down the pie listed follow procedures and tried to manually steer the airplane but they were going too fast to manually turn the plane imagine driving down the road with a car going 100 miles per hour trying to push the door open. the pilots who are both in their twenties less than 160 hours total time combined in the 737 max reactivated the automated system the plane
went nose down again and they could on one - - they were not able to recover the aircraft no procedure i have ever heard of directs a pilot to reactivate a faulty system. they desperately tried to save their passengers. but the report reveals one of the factors in this tragically fatal accident they failed to see the forest for the trees. to developing the software fix but we can never eliminate every risk or anticipate all scenarios no matter how much technology. failures will occur that's the reason why the most important safety feature you can have in any aircraft is a well trained pilot to fly the aircraft
regardless of what the investigation concludes airlines have to be sure the pilots are trained to handle the aircraft they have to be able to fall back on their training to fly the plane not just fly a computer. the action report reaffirms my belief pilots trained in the united states would successfully have been able to handle the situation. my concerns about quality training standards are in other countries that's wife asked the attorney general to look international pilot training this is irrefutable us aviation system is the world safe just one - - safest despite the sensational reports the international standing is in question our faa is the gold standard for safety in the united states.
with nearly 7 billion passengers or 90 million flights. this includes 57000 flights with the 737 max eight but one loss of life is too many that is a remarkable safety record we can be proud of here in the us and one reason is a collaborative process between faa pilots mechanics and everybody up and down the line this decades-old system has worked so well we overwhelmingly voted the agencies process and then to blame that process to jump to conclusions to erode confidence in the us aviation system and the aviation record speaks for itself we do not
have the final reports or the investigative report but what we do know that system makes air travel the safest mode of transportation in history. semi thank you congressman we recognize chair defazio. >> thank you. i don't want anyone to think we are here today with all the answers. we are not. we are in the beginning of our investigation. the faa has only begun to turn over documents which we requested a couple months ago but the secretary assures me they will be fully cooperative. boeing has yet to provide a single document but i'm hoping they will provide them voluntarily and in the
not-too-distant future. this is a very complex issue. and it has raised questions worldwide through the faa and certification process and we have to get to the bottom of this. i want to recognize those who are here today of the 24 -year-old and i am sorry for your loss. that should not of happened. they deserve answers and accountability as to the flying public and the united states worldwide the subcommittee chairman led through the investigations to begin and ask for and they are ongoing.
only after the value jet tragedy this committee had rejected my amendment to strip the faa of the authority left over from the time at the beginning of the fight for cry have been defeated in committee so where would we put the provision in the bill clicks it's not in the senate bill. i was surprised but they put it in the bill and we took away the promotional authority. for years i questioned the number of hours required in the second seat in the cockpit and i pointed out it took three times as many hours to be a hairdresser in the state of oregon to be copilot in a commercial aircraft. and only after that did we change the rules.
we should have to have tragedies to change the rules if the rules need to be changed. now we have another tragedy. the question is what are the factors clicks the ranking members say things that i agree with him regarding training but i have a question. why until the plane went dow down, the first plane why? it wasn't even in the manual this automated system even existed. that is odd because that is a redundancy how the hell do you have redundancy if you don't know something quick's yes i'm a commercial pilot but i will tell you if you are low altitude than the plane pitches itself down every ten seconds there will be a lot of people have trouble dealing
with that. why was it that known? in fact, also the light issue it was disabled now we hear that was an accident software problem but the light was there they did not know it wasn't inoperable that boeing new for more than a year the disagree light did not work unless you body optional package which a lot of other people did not buy. how do we have a single point of failure on a modern aircraft? a single point of failure one faulty sensor sheared off by a bird or whatever happened in ethiopia, one faulty sensor installed fraudulently, whatever happened in indonesia. how do you have a system
critical safety system certified access so we have to answer going through this process i will not go to the whole list because i want to get to the witnesses. but i have got to say we should not have to be here today. and i heal back the balance of my time. . >> i recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee. >> mister chairman thank you for holding this hearing today. this is about people i don't think any of us need to lose sight of that i express my sympathy for your loss and all of the victims this is about people not politics, and emotio emotion, this is people and we need to take every single lesson we can extract to make sure we learn from them and apply them
because is the safest form of transportation we should not rest our laurels we need to continue learning find out every mistake that was made and make sure it does not happen again. with the 737 max grouted since march 13 following the second international incident in five months. while the investigations into both crashes continue and we understand all those factors that have been contributed it does appear to be a factor in both accidents now they are working on a software fix we are waiting submission for certification there are multiple investigations underway by the department of transportation, inspector
general and others. as those continue, it is important we set the record straight. it's important we learn and make air travel even safer it's been very concerning watching many folks. it takes thousands of hours to get to the flight deck of the united states and with the exception of sam, the ranking member of the full committee not many of us have an extraordinary amount of experience flying planes. this is a technical issue. a lot goes on behind the scenes in a very technical process. we need to be very careful to make sure we are not acting on emotion or making this political and operating on
facts and truly taking steps to improve aviation safety to make sure every single lesson can be extracted and applied. nobody gets applause when the plane lands safely so that baseline for commercial aviation is zero fatalities and zero accidents it took a long time to reach that level of safety and sadly many others that came after accidents so now looking at how it occurred and how to prevent it in the future but i want to be clear. those reforms that we make in the wake of these accidents are based on fact and must reserve the essence of the aviation system that has led to the unprecedented level of safety in the united states.
and there isn't just one as we all know those two accidents we are discussing today did appear to have multiple factors that were included to ultimately determine what exactly contributed but we believe there are multiple steps it's also important to look at those factors with the operations the pilot training programs and how those factors may have also applied or affected the outcome. the way the checks and balances are needed to be adhered to in these disasters. today is not an investigative hearing. we are a long way from the completed investigations but we are here to learn more about the nation's response in the next steps before the 737
max possibly returns to service. i want to commend the faa acting director elwell for your leadership and accessibility for go while we await the senate confirmation of a new administrator i do know the faa is in good hands. we want to hear about those investigations in the technical advisory board , technical review but be clear, i have not seen anything to date and to ensure we have all the facts and i yelled back. >> now we move to questions of our witnesses.
i will change the orders we can talk about the investigations and then acting administrator accompanied by lawrence director aircraft certification of the faa and he is here for technical support and answer questions in the and was brought in by the national safety director of the ntsb and to give the testimony and director scholz is available to help with technical questions without objection the full statements are included in the record your written testimony has been made part of the record please limit to five minutes you are now recognized for five minutes for my thank you and good morning chairman , ranking member graves and sherman defazio and the
subcommittee. >> thank you for allowing the ntsb to testify this morning with me as the acting director of the ntsb office of aviation safety. as you are well aware, during the recent five-month. two crashes involving the 737 max. tragically they have claimed 346 lives and i say this next statement with all sincerity but our thoughts and prayers go to the families of those victims. unlike the ntsb involvement of domestic aviation accidents with the statutory responsibility to investigate every accident that occurs within the us, our involvement with international investigations is vastly
different. the ntsb role for those that occur outside of the united states as the convention on international civil aviation that the these are signatories that the investigation be led known as a state of occurrence and then to be the investigation and that ethiopian act to lead the investigation into the ethiopian airlines crash the aircraft that the ntsb appoints the accredited representative. and those whose purpose is to coordinate the input of all
interest of ntsb and companies such as the manufacturers and others to provide technical expertise. it is important to note controlling the release of public information from that investigation not the ntsb. that said the participation enables access to the data with information made by the faa, the manufacturer or the operator to address those deficiencies as well by the ntsb to issue safety recommendations when necessary. b work closely with those involved to be sure we receive the information we need to sufficiently address safety deficiencies. last year's lion air crash we
dispatched investigators to indonesia to participate the ntsb investigator stationed on one of the search vessels to help identify recovered aircraft components the voice recorder was recovered in january even with those that were furloughed during the shutdown their role was to download an analysis we responded immediately to the ethiopians crash sending a team of investigators to ethiopia once they were sent to our counterparts in france , we dispatched investigators to france to assist with the download in the readout. within 30 days the authorities issued a preliminary report regarding their investigations. ntsb provided technical
comments for each report. last week mister schultz traveled to meet with ethiopian officials and in the coming weeks the same team will return to work with those authorities. because the us design that certification we are also examining the design certification process as a part of our participation in the foreign led investigations if we uncover safety deficiencies we are prepared to quickly issue safety recommendations to correct such deficiencies. our government the traveling public and especially those families affected by these deaths is to bring all of our experience and expertise in support of the international effort to determine why these accidents occurred and to ensure these don't occur again
were happy to answer your questions. . >> now recognizing acting administrator elwell. >> chairman and ranking member thank you for the opportunity today to discuss aviation safety and the issues surrounding the 737 max. i also want to take this opportunity to express my spirit - - sincere condolences on behalf of the entire faa to the victims and their families of both ethiopian flight and lion air flight. i want to emphasize at the outset the faa welcomes scrutiny as it helps to make us better. that is how the global leadership in the airspace will and do her. the faa grounded the 737 max
on march 132019. that decision was based upon crash site findings and data that together indicated some similarities between the ethiopian and indonesian accidents that warranted further investigation of the possibility of a shared cause. i will focus today on events since the grounding and in particular the ongoing reviews of the process and the work done to safely returning the 737 max to service. our commitment to safety with data-driven decision-making is the guiding principle in all of this. after the grounding, several reviews were initiated regarding the faa process not with any particular technical fix of the 737 max secretary chao asked the department of transportation inspector
general with the goal specifically to compile the objective and detailed history of the activities that led to certification that is ongoing. the cooperation of the faa. secretary chao announced the establishment of a special committee to review faa procedures for certification of new aircraft including 737 max. as an independent body whose finding recommendations will be submitted directly to the secretary and faa administrator. on april 2nd launching a joint authority technical review to review the sever on - - certification automated flight control system chaired by former ntsb chairman to comprise a team of experts and international authorities.
737 max returning to service is not contingent on these reviews but rather toward systemic improvements for the future. now talk about the faa to return to service here and abroad. as the faa discussed boeing has been working that was specify the installation of new flight controls of operational program software developing flight crew training on april 12 meeting with safety representatives of the three us-based commercial airlines flying the 737 max as well as the pilot unions for those airlines at this unprecedented meeting was an opportunity for the faa to hear individual views from operators and pilots they
recently solicited public comment on a draft report prepared by the 737 max that we use to evaluate the training associated with the proposed software enhancements of the 737 max. on may 6 to initiate a multi agency technical advisory board to review the software update and system safety assessment that have includes experts from nasa, air force and the faa and none of these experts were in the original certification these recommendations are directly informing our decisions on the return to service. next week on may 23rd the faa will host a meeting of directors general civil
aviation authorities from around the world to discuss the faa activities to ensure the safe return of the 737 max to service. this is part of the efforts to work with other civil aviation authorities to address specific concerns related to the 737 max to keep the faa long-standing cooperation with our international partners as our work continues, want to offer this assurance. in the us the 737 max will return to service only when the faa analysis of faxon technical data indicate it is safe to do so. this concludes my reit prepared statement. >> thank you. now we will move to member questions. each member will be recognized for five minutes i will start by recognizing myself.
mister elwell this week the "wall street journal" reported the faa internal review determined senior agency officials did not participate or monitor critical safety assessments with the 737 max also noted they differed the early classification subsequent analysis as were performed with limited oversight. is that report accurate? if so what explanation does the faa have falling down on the job quick. >>. >> thank you for that question. think you're talking about the "wall street journal" article yesterday. we take all those articles and
charges or reports seriously but frankly there's nothing in that article that led me to anything new that i am aware of so we will see what we can find out. i will ask my colleague if he is aware. >> so the article reported your own assessment determined that agency officials were not involved. >> i'm not aware of the internal assessment. >> i am not aware of the internal assessment the article refers to. >> then we have some homework. if it does relate to the next set of questions with regards to the oda and the process it was reported that you stated a full certification of activities would be 10000
additional inspectors am not here to argue it is one more or one must, but has the faa considered moving back to the previous system away from the ar system? and what does that cost quick. >> chairman, i don't know what that cost would be. i know there are a number of investigations as several opening statements have pointed out. it is designed to look at the process. i also know our risk-based data-driven systems approach has stated the safest in history or in the world. i am very careful to make sure the results of increaser
investigations bring actionable information. and we welcome those to make us better but at this point to say we are willing to go back to something then i am not prepared to say that. i really want to see what they have to say about the process that current system with authorized representatives has oda participants reporting to managers as opposed to engineers and with the system the oda is reporting to engineers? so looking at that change who can monitor versus those managers and whether that
process needs to be changed? is that part of the blue ribbon commission quick. >> i am not aware of any limit. we will look at everything. that designation authority as it exists today is a process with oda in one form of another since the beginning of the faa delegation since 1927. but in my mind if we have robust oversight and all the protections in place to guard against conflict of interest or undue pressure, but it can always be made better. >> but the point i guess
putting the face of the evolution of the system isn't a positive assessment just because it has evolved since 1927 that it should be or perhaps it is overhauled in this case so with that i yield five minutes to the ranking member from louisiana. >> thank you mister chairman. how many have a pilots license in this room? raise your hand if you have been flying a plane when the sensor has gone off?
what if you kept going? thank you. mister chairman i just want to make note the reason i asked that question is in both accidents the planes did not turn around and i find that interesting that in this case it does not turn around. there's a lot of confusing information regarding what happened and then to be referenced to sell certification can they sell certify their own aircraft quick. >> no. we don't have that program of certification and for those
that have the oda program to have certain tasks by the authority we oversee. not something we did lately. but it is a privilege. we have about 79 or 80. it is important to note the vetting required of the individuals is very thorough and robust we don't ever state that that is safety related so i have two my right our resident expert on oda.
>> i would like to build one. two the chairman larson's comment we don't have engineers reporting we have engineers reporting to engineers and they all have to be approved and vetted. so oda is an engineer with those skills and experiences that has to be approved by faa engineers as well. . >> a lot of interesting articles regarding the potential and grounding. can you describe the steps the plane has to go through to be able to fly again quick. >> it is important to lay the
groundwork. we grounded the us fleet when we had the data to establish a potential causal link between the two accidents. that is the justification. it is important to establish that because then you have what you need to mitigate or remove that prohibition order. so we will receive boeings application for design modification and thoroughly evaluate that with the safety analysis, the training required to bring back to certify that a new software system. once we made the analysis and consulted which by the way a
third party set of eyes this committee recommended a month ago and then once we are absolutely convinced returned to service than we will do that. >> yes or no do you believe procedures on the preliminary reports quick. >> i apologize but i'm having difficulty hearing the question questions. >> we will come back. recognize chair defazio. >> administrator elwell we were both in the air force my understanding is it has a
minimum of two angle sensors does that sound right to you ?-question-mark different numbers. >> as far as i know. . >> is this critical in your own opinion quick. >> i did not make that designation but it seems it is. >> then why would it be a single point of failure? isn't that standard. >> a single point of failure of that part of the aircraft
and to be safety critical. with a very experience 737 pilot and at the completion of two full cycles it is at or very down to the point of travel they don't have the elevator authority knowing it will continue to fall and then to characterize as high potential of a drastic and abrupt maneuver. that sounds radical. so in this case the pilots are
supposed to correct the system but the pilots did not know it was installed. correct? and they also did not know the disagree light did not work unless you bought the optional package and then those digital gauges. >> so when did the faa become aware that was on all previous models going back to the 737 max i was 737 pilot in my
commercial days but i did find them a month ago and i would offer the mechanics that if you did not command it to do that then you do another procedure called runaway i will not take issue with his comments of what it might do but. >> that's elapsed time period of 20 seconds. . >> that is pretty quick if you are a low altitude but let's go back when the faa was informed by boeing.
bowling new i believe about one year before they informed the faa the disagree light did not work. >> we have looked at this and software engineers discover that anomaly that is tied to the mcat software. >> i get that. that the point is one year elapsed before boeing told the faa what actions did the faa take at that point? did you see that was inappropriate behavior quick. >> we are looking into that and we will fix that. once we learned it was not operable learned it was not safety critical display there are no actions the pilot takes. >> it would alert them.
>> actually dad is tactile and that is by definition it is by the advisory. >> if you get the disagree light in-flight you know, check one of these it is not calibrated correctly. . >> and then tell people the system was in the play not that the disagree light. >> i think that's an issue it should not take a year for us to find out that discovery was mad made. >> i appreciate that and i want to know the answer. in fact, this is off of a tape
recording pilots talking after they found out there was the mcat system and the plane talking to a boeing engineer and said why wouldn't you tell us about the system? i don't know if that would have changed the outcome and a million miles maybe you would fly it once you would ever see it we try not to overload the cruise with information that is unnecessary. do we really think that is unnecessary? that it wasn't even in the manual and they did not know about it? . >> there's a lot of stuff in the manual you do not need to know. >> i cannot comment on a conversation but when i first heard about this i thought there should have been more in the manual i agree. >> in response you said can the engineer to which the
report is rendered also be a manager at boeing? . >> they would be a manager of the organizational delegation spigot they have managerial status and paid by boeing. >> correct. >> we have had, put up on the screen flight deck. i thought we could when you think of there it is no now, different airplanes. computer screen screens, gps, everything digita digital, analog and
this is 14 variations later. we have to question the system if you took the 737100 and compared that you would say they are different types but then to keep moving through these variations and never determined it would have to go through a more rigorous process. doesn't that raise questions. >> i would remind that to amending that ng if you had that in the max side-by-side you can see the similarities because they are so close.
>> but wasn't that amended from the 900? is there a questionnaire we should look at quick. >> as we said in the beginning, beginning, we welcome that examination. if there is something wrong with the extension of a family , that something the 737 max has multiple iterations to certify. >> and then to indulge the chair. 's now we look at the ranking member. >> look at the screen.
to keep focusing on the angle of attack but on the right the 737 max that screen what the pilot and the copilot that is that primary that is your artificial horizon. every aircraft out there has to have that to be certified. . . . . airlines incident, you can look outside. that is a critical indication right there. look outside the airplane and you can tell if you are in a
critical angle because you will be getting close to the situation. those are the two attack indicators first of all flying the plane and the second of all the horizon. i guess my first question is for the administrator and at this point we know there are so many things to look at in these investigations not just the certification activities but many other things and what i want to get to is the preliminary report shows there are a lot of misidentifications of what is occurring in the aircraft and applications in the safety procedures and training itself, and as a pilot i want you to talk to us as a pilot if you can provide some context as to what actions or inaction by the pilot or the airlines for that matter also require a close
examination in the course of this investigation. thank you for that question. as a pilot, i mentioned a little bit earlier that in the u.s., training focuses on manual flying. flying. there are parts of the world others focus on. there's a false indication of a stall and immediately recognizable as a false indication because one was shaking and the other wasn't.
what concerns me about the data is the apparent lack of recognition, runaway staff trend is taught in the earliest stages of aircraft and it is so important to the chair mans point about the last time it's so important that you don't put out a check list you don't open and look at if it is memorized and you are tested on it all the time and turn off those voters. in the accident it's significant that even though the airplane was pitching against the pilots command this classic runaway staff trend voters were never turned off. and i think you made a poin thet in your remarks in the case of the flight they did turn them
off although they didn't adhere to the emergencies they put out on november 8 they did turn them off, but they never controlled the airspeed and then subsequently about a minute before the end of the flight, they turned them back on. both of those things are unfortunate obviously and i have to point out in deference to my colleague, these investigations are ongoing and as you said, there are so many pieces to any accident. i've never looked where there were not three or four any of which if it hadn't gone wrong the plane would have survived so we know that this is going to become and there are factors but if you ask me that is what i saw the lack of control and speed we
keep coming back and forgetting. you will take your foot off the gas. that is what most people would do. they accelerated right through the certified maximum speed and kept on accelerating throughout the entire process. when you get those kind of pressures against control service that makes it very hard to do manually into this comes back to so many times this is what worries me more than anything else, and i hate to disparage another country that that is what scares me in all
this. it's what they have to go through to get to that point and i think it just bothers me here we are and continue to turn on our system based on what happened in another country, to other countries in particular given the qualifications and what we are learning about in the training standards. the.
i'm sure you are concerned that this is then processed i was shattered as a preface of the hearing as your answers to help us if we can restore confidence in a system that by the way most members, maybe except me use every single week to go back and forth to the congress so that this confidence despite this wonderful ten-year record seems to have been shattered so let me ask you a question. most members on the public would have said that's unusual how
does it take so long compared to other countries after the ethiopian airline accident, in fact. it's the importance that somebody should speak up the public should be interested in the hearing how does it take so long after the airlines accident. explain that to the committee. >> the f. a. a data-driven
risk-based systems approach to all things safety. in its directive. that is the difference between you and the countries. >> i can't speak to the decision-making of other countries. i can tell you there are a number that are grounded in the 737 fleet if looking at the real-time evidence even if it may have contradicted the data are you still as relying on the data as we were then compared to other countries today would you be relying only on the data fax
we had the data to link the flights but we were not waiting for the flight data recorder. we were examining what's going on with our fleet and we drew the data on 57,000 flights if we were talking constantly with our neighbor to the north. from the first accident through the raphael -- the fleet that i am responsible for regulating, are they experiencing any anomalies and there were zero in the 57,000 flights. we see reliance and i would say perhaps overreliance on data.
did the president make this call where did the faa makes the call? >> the faa is the regulator. >> you were prepared to make that call your self after the second accident. >> fm. >> they preempted you. the data told you after the second accident. could i ask you do they mandate on all of its systems in which this was news to me in which the pilot is considered the redundancy for the systems failure most of us didn't know this. >> i won't take that question for the record and recognize
mr. mitchell for five minutes. >> the effectiveness of the system is based on safety reliability and transparency decision-making in terms of the certification of aircraft, qualifications and audiences. the recalled last week there was a break for the members of the committee on the 737 act of certification. i asked the question what they had done in the process of reviewing the system and i got what they did and didn't do but i didn't get an answer to my question at no point did i and they were greeted by this article so i will ask the question again and i will ask it for the record and ask you to set made in writing to the committee over the steps taken reviewing the system.
i don't have a pilots license, not enough time but you then navigate and communicate so it's interesting. i am concerned because the pilot commander 29-years-old is recorded to have the change hours of flight. here are some examples. close friend of min friends of e commercial pilots from the corporations 58 to 17 hours and 63-years-old this 20,000. the first officer had 361 hours. do we not have concerns with the training of pilots and other
nations o but the reliability of the wall to try to claim any in each 29 how many do we know that have 8,029 years of age? >> i don't know anybody 29-years-old with that but i'm not going to say that it's not possible. the answer to your question is do we want to examine and take a very hard look at the training standards globally, yes absolutely. we've been involved, we've lead on pilot training for many years, and we do that at the international civil aviation organization, the body that provides the guidance for standards around the world. >> clearly with the disparity is concerned to me one question i would also ask you to submit for the record a reference to a colleague's question part of the
reason for the delayed response is we've got the data from canada. >> indirectly, yes sir. >> the same specificity that canada had because we don't have access to that system. >> but it came from a company that the air traffic services in canada -- >> thank you sir. one last comment i believe we have the most advanced aviation system in the world and the factors that contribute to the tragedy one of which we didn't see things come up sometimes with a crystal ball but when you certify this aircraft i will be among the first to buy a ticket to fly the plane because i have faith in aviation system and in bowling and the aircraft to make the point we have to trust the aviation system.
>> thank you mr. chairman. sitting here in front of the family of the victims looking at the pictures of the victims it is crystal clear the responsibility out the committee is right now. we need to get to the bottom of what happened so we can do whatever we can to ensure the safety and from what we know so far it seems to me at least now that there may have been other factors come into seems something went wrong with the safety certification in 346 people died. we need to figure out what went wrong. whether it was a certification
process itself we need to fix it to avoid a repeat. it is the problem with the lack of compliance in the process and we have to hold accountable whoever it was that was not compliant and the faa were going and in addition, further steps must be taken to ensure compliance. this isn't a legal proceeding and i know we are in the early stages oearlystages of the invef the crashes and certifications, but the stories we've heard about the process of certification so far are troubling. the guiding principle of the f. a. a. and manufacturers must be safety, not getting the highly valued plan out more quickly. the question was raised earlier by chair amanda fazio about why
it wasn't required to get its own type of certificate. to me this is very troubling. it could move more quickly through the process. now i'm not a pilot and i would give her to the committee when it comes to issues of their experience as pilots, but i am a mechanical engineer. i know that this plane needed to compete and in order to have a more efficient plane, they put new engines on the plane, the engines have to be put further forward and they have been aerodynamics that caused the need for the mcat system into seems to me that it fundamentally changes the way the 730 sevens lies.
how was this not a major change that required a new type of certificate? >> thank you for that question. i'm glad you asked this because i and i appreciate that you are an engineer. actually, it was put into the 737 so it doesn't make it different it was designed to make it fly and feel exactly -- >> but it was a fundamental change how it flies. i understand there was to try to make it fly the same way, but the system itself was changed. this was added to a system that is called speed tram system and i am not an engineer, but it is a layer below the speed system
and as you said it was put in because they brought it a little bit forward on the airplane and demonstrated that in the high-level regime, it didn't feel the same to the pilot. they pushed it over so the controllability would be the same and the flight test pilots deemed that it was identical and the board of pilots which were actually line pilots that we enlisted to fight both planes came to the same conclusion. i am hopeful that this was not a situation where can i would poini would pointout it wasn't e safety was not the priority because that must be the priority. i said for the faa manufacturer,
safety must be the priority. i understand how important it is as an american company. but safety must always come first. >> i couldn't agree more. thank you. >> representative span over five minutes. >> before i begin i want to extend my sincere condolences and regrets that members of the family that are here thank you for being here and very grateful that you are here. the first question, can you help me understand, describe in a little more detail the delegation authority, what are the things we delegate and we don't delegate, how do they oversee the actions of the designees? >> the key word in the question begs after i introduced i would
like to hand off the detail to the resident expert. i will start by saying the organizational designation authority as it is come to be known as is a long-standing principle in certification and is the way in which they leverage the expertise within the manufacturing entity. it's important that we understand without leveraging the engineering expertise, it would be virtually impossible to have the system that we have today. so, as far as the details -- >> i think that the public would like to know so that they can have a level of confidence that they are doing the job that we expect them to do. what is delegated and what is not, how do we oversee its?
>> thank you for the question because i think there is a lot of misunderstanding of the delegation process, and i would like to simplify the process into four areas. first and foremost is setting the standards were far above rules and requirements for any designed to meet. next, another layer of test protocols and standards so it's how you are going to show compliance. the third level is the doing of the test and calculation and then forth is the overview of the results in the approval. only in that third level the actual doing of a test is where the delegation is used. it is fully responsible for setting the standards all tests must comply with, and setting the standards for the minimum safety for the aircraft had been reviewing it all at the end. we never give up that authority. we take advantage of the
expertise of the people that are building and designing the aircraft to assist us in revealing those tests and procedures particularly on things that have been done over and over again in many years. it took us five years and over 110,000 hours to certify the 730 sevens backs. i don't think that was a quick process. we applied the same standards on whether it is a derivative design, and i am proud of my team for their abilities analyzing any sort of a certification project. >> next question for the cherubim if you would just help us, help me understand over the last maybe two or three decades, what's the state of commercial airline safety in the united
states, gives a brief sketch. >> generally speaking the airline industry has gotten increasingly safer and safer. as it was pointed out earlier we had one fatality in the past decade. one is too many and we have the families from last year i there were 50 lives lost so it's good. what's good is not good enough. >> one final question that's been mentioned but we don't, we can't control necessarily some of the pilot training particles abroad. are there any mechanisms that we have at our disposal to ensure that other countries do have or do require their pilots to have the training that we feel is
appropriate and if so, what are those mechanisms? >> the international civil aviation organization outlines standards and recommended practices for the member states develop trade 193 state that our subscribers and signatories. >> you can get this information on that as well through the subcommittee that we ask through the bipartisan letter at the aichi for the international pilot training standards and information as well to share with the whole committee. representinrepresentative callie minutes. >> i'm sad at the loss of the individuals to be present. i believe it was a free country grounded the max before we did.
and free country. is it because they were too quick to draw conclusions from two airplanes going down in similar circumstances and realizing that it should be protected in their countries, or was it because we were just so much better at using the data and not being concerned with the fact that there were two identical or close to identical? >> as i mentioned earlier, the faa is data driven risk-based because it is critically important that that is how we operate. you mentioned we were the last as far as we know, and we've talked to these countries to grounded their fleets, we were
the first because of the data is linked which is important i must say canada also waited until we had the data and it wasn't available until the radar was refined to suggest evidence be found on the ground that links the two flights. so the opposite is common sense. the others acted on the common sense that this is a common connection and a reason to think to airplanes full of sky and crashed with similar problems with keeping the plane under control after takeoff at high speeds, and that's because you don't have the data yet. you are jeopardizing another. it just seems like they should have taken control. the data is fine but sometimes it is just right before your eyes. there was a story in an article
written that the pilots of planes that didn't crash kept noticing the same basic pattern of behavior that suspected to be behind two crashes, a dallas morning news review that reported the database. all safely disabled and kept the planes in the air but one of the pilots reported it to the database that was unconscionable for the manufacturer at the fda and the airlines would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training or even providing available resources have sufficient documentation to understand that the highly complex systems that differentiate the aircraft in prior models. how can it be we don't tell them about this to be aware of it in a situation this was the system that was put into a while arguably a new airplane to compete with airbus and we
didn't tell the pilots. >> it's a reporting engine that type safety reporting system in the 50,000 flights we had 24 reports that mentioned some sort of anomaly. none of those reports were related. and as i mentioned, we scanned and filter every one of those flights for evidence that there was an anomaly in the fleet. that is what they need to do. it's what we did. there were no reports of the anomalies reported on the max. >> if they considered requiring that the pilots that fly jet simulator training fax
>> in the future anybody that buys a 737 that there be a simulator and it may be trained in the simulator? >> we need to wait for the application of the fix once we have the official application we will be able to determine if, and exactly what sort of training will be required. >> one last question media reports show the capability but the magnitude of four times the faa only found out about from the notice to the airlines as finding them after the line of accident for the record can you please confirm this account in default corrects, please clarify. >> i will get an answer for you on that. i'm not familiar -- >> i will yield back the balance of my time.
>> did you come in mr. tremaine and i would like to give my condolences to the families that are here. thoughts and prayers are with you. thank you for being here today and this important hearing. there are currently 79 aircraft certification. are you of any organization standards or recommended practices that directly conflict with the faa use of the organization delegation authorization program? >> i am not aware. i will tell you that the oda is a practice shared by all countries who do certifications. in some countries they use it much more than we do, but if you would let me defer to my colleague that is the specificity of the question. >> it is used universally throughout the certification
process and all countries and i guess i would highlight the 730 sevens max is a dual certification with the european safety organization and the faa so all of the decisions and review of the publication and activities was conducted by both of those agencies at the same time so i think that shows the reinforcement and got comfortable miss of another authority and how we use the delegation to assist. >> you state any party they regulate remains responsible for the compliance with the faa regulatory standards and they do not hesitate to take enforcement action when it is warranted. can you provide examples when the action is taken as a result of noncompliance and how they were able to discover the violations of the regulatory
standards? >> there are examples when we've had to take enforcement actions in particular is that several actions taken with the oda. i believe we have denied the authority on at least one occasion and then the oversight will occasionally discover somebody in a following. you have to understand the organization itself is run by a manual that is written specifically for the activity that they are allowed to do and when that's the manual isn't followed, the oversight will step in. in. but is there an amplification on both? >> to build a little bit on the comments there, we have removed
one, but there are multiple findings. we audit every single one of these on an annual basis, and in for the direction of the kennedy committee and to the authorization bill. you asked us to stand up a new oversight office, and we signed off on setting that up in april. that will change us to not just waiting for an annual basis. it will transition us to a constant overview of data flow so we constantly monitor and not just rely on annual audits to reinforce data t that to an even greater extent on oversight. >> thank you both very much. i yield back my remaining time. >> thank you mr. chair. i represent las vegas and about half of the 42 million people
come by plane so having the highest safety standards is very important. when this first happened i am back and forth on the southwest every weekend i called to see if the plane that i scheduled was one of these that's in question and i realized if i'm scared to fly on that i don't want my family, friends, constituents or visitors to fly on a plane. so it's very important that we get to the bottom of this and i would thank the chairman for having this hearing. about the oda and the emphasis on the data being the reason you grounded a plane that all sounds fine, but the public perception is that it took so long for us to do it. we were the last ones to do it because they were too cozy. you were in bed with those that were supposed to be regulating the practice and test in what we need to deal with. now the emphasis shift bond from the grounding that the un-
grounding. i would ask what process you are going to use two on the ground plane. i knows you've created some new organizations in the agency. i think on the second you announced the formation of a joint authority technical review team that includes the numbers from othemembers fromother coung ethiopia and indonesia for the certification process. last week he announced a multi-agency technical advisory board to review the software fix. these don't have regulatory authority but i wonder are you going to use the decisions before you move to the un- grounding or have their consensus, what is it going to click to the public if you ignore them and they just become a windowdressing, would you address now the next step? >> thank you, madam for that question because it is very important. we have established the safety
records that we have by giving just what yo with you eluded to, listening, getting feedback, getting suggestions. we've been incredibly transparent throughout the process, and that's what we are with all of the countries we deal with and with all the stakeholders in the aviation industry. the tab that you mentioned earlier we will listen and the fact that they are reviewing right now we've already received a couple of suggestions were also as i mentioned in my opening remarks we invited 57 countries that grounded the max and invited the civil aviation directors to come and talk to us
and us to them explaining to them exactly the process of our safety analysis. we will not allow the 730 sevens flight until it is absolutely safe to do so and we will use every tool, every data gathering capability we have to ensure that is the case. you have that as a personal commitment and a commitment of 45,000 professionals in the faa. >> what role were going to play in this process? >> they will suck at their application for the update to the software. the formal and finals -- and we expect i don't know over the next week or so, and at that point able to test flights and an analysis and present it to the tab to look it over. we will do a thorough and robust safety analysis and determined
based on software fix that they give us will determine the level of training required of the 730 sevens max pilots had been once we have established all of that, and internally the review says the 730 sevens max is safe to fly, then the probation order will be lifted and we will present whatever mandates are tied to this new software. >> you believe you have the resources and expertise depending on them to provide the final oversight and guarantee that it's safe to fly again? >> yes ma'am i do. >> how do you reassure us of that? >> i point to an organization, the faa diligence and safety that has produced a record that
is in many ways remarkable in the u.s.. i also point out as i just said a more dedicated organization of safety professionals. everyday i come to work they are amazing and i won't call you in a little bit worried about the morale right now to be honest with you. it's critically important to me that we had this to the world and the u.s. do we get this right but it's important for public confidence because like you said, it's important for the morale of the great professionals doing the work to get airplane safely back in the air and we are not going to do it until it is safe.
i recognize the representative for five minutes. >> i would like to widen our focus a little bit and talk about the type of data that we collect, how we collect it and what we do with it after it is collected not just in the use particular incidents that others because i find it odd that two weeks or 30 days after, they are still having speculation and guessing about what to play with it and how did they react and we don't know. probably everybody in this room has a camera in their pocket and earlier in the hearing was a picture of the 1967 flight deck of a 737 and versus the 2017. i understand why there were not cameras in the cockpit. can you explain how they would answer these questions we are still speculating about?
>> thank you for that question. they have in fact recommended that i'm talking about for commercial flights of course. >> it should be required for commercial flights, airline flights. we've made that recommendation and it is not acted upon. >> why hasn't it been acted upon? >> that is a great question that the regulators should answer. do you have a thought on that? >> vs aa works with our colleagues very closely, and we take every recommendation they make and examine it and evaluate it for safety of flight and that is our first and foremost consideration. we've always disagreed on all of
the recommendations, but i think that we would both say that the symbiotic relationship that we have has been part and parcel of where we are today into the safety record we have today. >> let me ask about the way that we collect the data can you explain to my constituents why y for $10 they can get internet on a flight from flight, yet we are still chasing down a physical blackbox to find out what happened in the cockpit and the data in this day and age why is all the data lost if we can't find the blackbox? >> thank you for the question. >> i'm not advocating that we get rid of it. >> sure. i think the industry has been looking at this from a technical
standpoint to understand what is technically feasible, but that is something that would be an important backup to the equipment on the aircraft which is still a valuable tool for us to understand what was going on on the aircraft and in the cockpit. >> it's hard for me to explain to their constituents why it's not technically feasible. i know why it wouldn't work in every situation, but let me go to my third question which is what we do with the data after we retrieved it. why don't they publish all data immediately upon retrieval? >> we do eventually publish that. that. let me point out that they use a party system so when we have the data the manufacturer has it, with anybody who needs it to be
able to understand the circumstances so they can make an immediate safety decisions. >> you said eventually. if we are talking about public release of the information, that's a become available when we open up the public docket. what benefit is conveyed upon society by withholding that data from the manufacturer, the person that actually made it to equipment. the difference between immediately and eventually because the lives could be lost eventually. >> let me make an important clarification. the manufacturer and the fda has access to that information immediately when the habit.
they are part of the party process in the room reviewing the data in a bst with us. >> i'm glad to have your assurance on that. i have some that have experienced different results. >> thank you. i recognize representative stanton. >> we are here today because of the loss of 346 lives and the tragic crash of the ethiopian flight 52. the aviation system these accidents have shaken the public confidence and trust. we owe it to the people whose lives were lost and their families to get to the bottom of what happened and address any issues within the certification process to ensure the safety of not only this aircraft, but the system as a whole. it should be returned until the safety is assured by vs aa and its operators. back-to-back crashes demand the
responses that are underway and we need to get to the bottom of why a single point of failure was permitted. commercial aviation especially in the united states is safe in large part because of the safety redundancies. these supplemental reports into single point of failure appears to have played a significant role in these tragedies. there've been reports of certain optional safety features of those that were sold as extras come and my question is is it common to have safety features offered as optional and not mandatory? >> any safety critical component to the certification of an aircraft is not optional. it's part of the certification of the aircraft. >> have they made a difference in identifying the system?
i think you are referring to disagreed. >> should these be required features? >> i would like to defer to mr. lawrence. >> the indicator was not on the original. it was first introduced on the model that is a maintenance alert so we do not consider it part of our critical items. not aware of which aircraft may or may not have it. >> what are the plans to incorporate view these on all oe boeing aircraft? my understanding is that it's in the other aircraft it was just
in a manner that it was displayed. >> useful this process. can you describe the modifications that you would accept and how confident are you that these will reduce another incident including the stabilizer trip event? i will let them get into more detail but we are expecting the formal application of the data software update soon. we do know the basic parameters of the three pieces to that fix that would once established in one spot on airplanes would render the scenarios that were perpetrated.
i will attempt to elaborate further on that. >> the software version has been submitted to us and the reason is tha so we can stick it in the stimulator to test it and look at the system safety analysis and see whether it will address it. the key thing the new software does is look at both the angle of attack indicators to assure a single failure will not cause the system to initiate any future changes. >> the u.s. air force academy pilots are in operation desert storm with a combined 6,000 flight hours. it's a very impressive experience to you think they should have mandated training for the system for pilots knowing what we know now?
>> thank you for that question. the investigations into the audits and reviews currently underway are going to make the recommendations. i'm going to answer you the way you ask the question as a pilot, someone has devoted my entire life to safety. i at the beginning when i first heard of this fault that they should have been more adequately explained in the office manual, absolutely. in our emergency directive that we added explanations and also reminded our own operators in the world in the document we reminded pilots that went to engage the runaway procedures,
and we added a note to those instructions and we complete the overview and safety analysis i expect we will have amplified descriptions in addition to anything else but me think and we find is needed to make pilots more aware and respond better. >> we are going to proceed with questions and then if there's members of the republican party does best questions i will get more at the appropriate time. thank you mr. chairman. i want to address the need to express my condolences to the family members that are here today for the lives that were lost.
as you may know before i came to congress, i worked in a similarly regulated space the medical device industry where one malfunctioning defibrillator or pacemaker could result in an innocent life lost. we heated strict compliance and reporting to the reporting requirements for the functions to the government to the adverse event reporting system. this aftermarket reporting was and continues to be justified. with that in mind i would like to learn more about the manufacturer aftermarket reporting requirements that allowed vs aa to be notified about certain failures, malfunctions or defects because according to media reports, they first discovered the software was malfunctioning a few months after delivery of climax in may of 2017. at that time they learned via
disagredisagree wife wouldn't wk unless airlines have the optional indicators and therefore 80% of the pilots flying believe in the indicator lights would show an infected with not but it wasn't until october of 2018 over a year later that they finally notified them the planes were flying with software malfunctions. furthermore they reported yesterday the pilots from american airlines asked the executives to work urgently on a fix and in a closed-door meeting they even argued that they should push authorities to take a measure that would likely result in the grounding of the max. so, with that i have three yes or no questions and then i have a fourth. if building have an obligation to report the aftermarket software malfunction to vs aa? >> the boeing software engineers did write a pr, performance
report or problem report and followed the procedures because the disagree wife wasn't a critical safety display advisory only for the maintenance records and it languished, and i am not happy with 13 months gap between finding about anomaly and us finding out about it. we are looking into that and we will make sure that the software anomalies are reported more quickly. >> that was a yes. did they have an obligation to report this aftermarket to existing airline customers for them to be aware of and a service difficulty reports if necessary? did they have that responsibility yes or no?
did they have an obligation to report this aftermarket software malfunction to existing airline customers, is there an obligation on their part to report to the consumer's house while? >> they respond to the procedures and i'm going to defer to whether or not it requires that. the obligation is to evaluate the anomaly to the standards and procedures for looking at that if those procedures indicate that it is then that i am then yes it would have to be reported to the other airlines and vs aa and in this particular case, the approved procedures designated the risk of this item not being in a working condition did not
require immediate action it did require action and that's what we were talking about we would like to see quicker action. >> can you confirm that they continue to deliver planes with a nonfunctioning disagree light even after the discovery that was only operational with add-ons and even after the accident? >> i believe that it was delivered after the software engineers discovered that anomaly, yes. >> finally do you believe the current aftermarket reporting requirements are adequate to protect airline passengers? >> we have a report the panel of the special committee we have the data that we formed. we have this committee's investigation has been initiated and we are gathering the data.
all of the reviews are going to look at the process top to bottom and come back with recommendations. i fully expect that when this is all done we are going to have recommendations that will make us better. an additional people continue to scrutinize the process and make sure that it doesn't take 13 months to find out that there was a software anomalies. but let's not make it disagree like the issue. the light is an advisory and the disagree wife wouldn't have changed in either accident. i want to make sure everybody understands don't make something that isn't a critical safety i am a critical safety item because there are enough items for us to focus on. ..
i take the constitutional duty of oversight very seriously that safety and because of that, you mentioned how often and talk about the process is reevaluated. and we have new standards that might be developing. . >> thank you for that question. the organization is constantly collecting data and the safety
management system approach. it is never static we pull data and review and analyze data internally and externally. i don't know how far you want me to go into this but the commercial aviation safety team formed in 1987 to gather all stakeholders from commercial aviation ecosystem to collect that data voluntarily. we have generated over 100 voluntary safety enhancements and they use those to this day and reducing the fatality rate
from analyzing the process and gathering data implementing those solutions and evaluating the results of that implementation. >> with the exchange of information and earlier you mentioned that when the ntsb looks at the previous accidents as a recommendation to include video recordings , how often who is making the decision which recommendations
are adopted into the safety protocol? and talk about what that process looks like. and then to accept those recommendations. and then to issue those safety recommendations and of course, the faa in this case. >> we see the ntsb recommendations then we go through that process to evaluate those against the whole system.
and then to look at a single issue. we take every recommendation in its totality and that is why we could do - - continue to collaborate to determine if they can be implemented. but that unifying theme between ntsb and faa is the unshakable desire to improve this system to make it safer. . >> i want to express my condolences to the family who is here today my daughter lived and worked in africa the last five years living in a
couple different places she lived in nairobi, and with that particular crash this hit me hard in my gut. . >> so none of those are made public because it doesn't come to congress? . >> with those recommendations however when congress asks for input we do in fact, provide a list of all open recommendations. and then into legislation. >> with the faa agrees with the recommendations.
>> but i don't think so. . >> in your testimony mister elwell you talk about any party regulates possible for compliance with those standards of the faa does not hesitate to take enforcement action when warranted. was there ever a time through the 737 max certification enforcement was warranted? . >> the 737 max certification began in january 2012 ending march 17. >> i will look specifically. >> i do not believe we took any during that five years
what would have happened with that certification activity we wouldn't have had any concerns or any of the engineers and we would address them right said before that final certification. >> in terms of that self certification process there is never a need to take enforcement action? . >> not for these particular ones. >> also in your testimony with those safety standards regarding certification so from your perspective does the buck stop with you? . >> yes ma'am. it does. >> thank you.
you talk about the process for certification included 297 certifications and then some of which encompass the mcat function how many times that was tested? you gave the number for the overall process. >> 297 flights 233 we flew or we contributed in some way for the others i don't know the number we would have that and give that back to you. >> also to talk about the last
department inspector general when will that be available to the public? . >> are you talking about the ig report? i don't want to set a report. >> and then announced and with that certification to be presented to the faa administrator what about to the public and congress. >> and that special committee for lack of a better term is a blue ribbon panel and those results are often made public but i will not speak how those results will be disseminated.
. >> i yelled back. >> he recognized for five minutes. >> thank you mister chairman also to the panel i represent dallas with southwest airlines that is most heavenly in our area and i recognize the investment made with the grounding of the 737 max but our role on this committee to make sure the airspace is the safest in the world and we are the gold standard for safety. so my question and then
as a lifelong pilot that includes the airplane that you fly. and then to imagine there were heightened emotions in that meeting and i will tell you when i was briefed to explain that data and i told it was not explained in the manual my pilot juices started to flow so we need to look at it. i don't discount what was reported in the meeting. but i cannot comment what was said.
. >> should those requirements be placed? . >> and that question would be the manufacturer the faa has regulatory oversight with that critical safety it should be made known to the faa. . >> and the regulatory requirement. . >> after one crash the major american and airlines that should have been raised that
and ethiopian government and with those investigations and we have been in business for a long time and i'm not bragging or condescending statement but it is a fact. and very cautiously and deliberately. . >> thank you for the question with the ethiopian government and that was critically important to the faa also to air other air lies one - - airlines flying the aircraft. so to understand all the factors.
>> and the ethiopian government is following the standards and practices? . >> just in ethiopia last week. >> yes. they are following the ms 13 practices and the state a manufacturer as part of the investigation to reinforce support and our participation at this point to go forward and following the process of evil continue to walk through in all areas. . >> and that it takes to get a final report out and that it
thinking that we have it has been mentioned several times for those or larger it is our hope to fix the process in a way that we are used to internationally. we are collaborative when that happened it was not collaborative process sunday night through wednesday morning despite our best efforts to have conversations from the on grounding and then
to answer the questions and then at the end of the day literally a daylong agenda my hope is they have the confidence of our work and analysis of where the discussion is. that's important to have a level of confidence. >> and in fairness the set of questions unless they are kind enough to let us go to those other members.
>> thank you mister chairman. and to be aware of this, you do have to respond when they do submit to you you can say yes or no but you do have to respond if you send things over you cannot ignore them. you should be getting at least a yes or no when you send things over. . >> you are right i didn't realize that was the question but whether we are doing it or not doing it or why. >> just to clarify. so my understanding is originally european and
brazilian say retraining the pilots was required and later for whatever reason is that incorrect? . >> that's not my understanding. >> what about brazilians? . >> that's not my understanding. >> 40 or 60 things that they had that they thought were significant differences? . >> actually have an e-mail here from the brazilians that was a mistake. >> those that would require that these are discussions when we evaluate aircraft. >> fine. but that is something to look into i have asked the brazilians and europeans to respond when or how they
change their mind in this process. now to the administrator, administrator, amended by certificate with an artificial system the mcat which makes it fly like the earlier version. now if we have neuter that you just pull on the yoke doesn't now fly the same as the earlier planes? so it is still amended or is that now a new type? . >> mister chairman, actually pulling back the yoke. >> this will not include that yoke pullback cut out. >> the staff was under that impression. so this is the modification
and the only major change? and will only trigger once. >> i can imagine a scenario where this would happen but and then that is receiving the signal that it needed to engage so to reach the point where they did not have yoke authority. so if it re- engages more than once and it would have to completely reset so even if it is powered several times to
have yoke authority. >> talk about the training standards i would point out congress had to mandate the change i have been trying for many years and this was initiated before your time before this is mended at congress and members get a first round. >> in the last several years and then to speed up the certification process. and to be determined if there are enough engineers to provide adequate oversight the
organizational authority oda that you referenced was not put in place to speed up certification with that robust certification process to happen with collaboration with the manufacturer of design and the detail about that. >> i believe your question was about oversight and how we maintain that. there are multiple programs type of oversight whether manufacturing, oversight or limited design. we evaluate that on an annual basis to make sure we have sufficient resources and then
influenced by other factors such as a financial status and what resources we have on the oversight. >> there is no standards that take the number of engineers or inspectors. the standards don't articulate a ratio with oda with a specific number of our resources or their resources. what the standards dictate as we have the individuals necessary to do the oversight. the reason it isn't a one-size-fits-all with the way they are structured and when it comes to boeing it is so
critical to have a specific boeing oversight office to go day in and day out between oversight with the other manufacturer manufactured that to make sure the boeing performance meet expectations. >> october 2015 department of transportation office of inspector general concluded faa had the approach by adopting new evaluation criteria the inspector general testified this is still open. . >> and with that valuation
that the committee offers every time we love to do something new and reach that level of faith. and that recommendation you refer to it with that strict inherence that as much into the way we do our oversight and that is much more data-driven or risk-based or performance-based so we have the freedom to inspect the oda five times in a year if we need to. . >>.
>> and it's not because it takes a period of time to implement fully and we are grateful for those and they are guiding us going forward. . >> a long does it take to implement? . >> the last one is tied into implementation and with that delegation office. and then take the summer to restructure to get in place and i'm hoping by the end of this calendar year we will have completed the final recommendation.
. >> thank you mister chairman i ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement written by the parents of who was just 24 years old when she was killed in a march 10th crash of a boeing 737 max while on a mission to help others with health care in low and middle income countries. her parents are tirelessly advocating for greater airline safety and of course, during the duration of this hearing today. >> so ordered. >> i will leave my statement as this pertains to the hearing that mister elwell please confirm that proper operation was a critical
safety feature in your certification of the 737 max aircraft? . >> that was certified as a critical safety product of the total certification of the aircraft. >> would be certified without i it? . >> that is too subjective for me to answer. i cannot give you an answer for the record on that. >> the teetwelve system with the handling characteristics that was the method that boeing chose to meet that requirement they didn't have to to do that through teetwelve which could've been a structural change.
>> and with those managers serving as the outside evaluators? . >> please repeat the beginning of the question. >> which of these were delegated to boeing engineers / managers? i will defer on the specifics of that question. >> referring to the organization all delegation and and with the structure that they are all approved are the reviewers and with that
third set of eyes and so to answer your question? . >> i think so. let me change gears and then in these crashes have you considered the adequacy of your review of any other critical equipment on the 737 max airplanes? . >> that is what the ig will look at directed by the secretary that joint authority tech review would look at the flight control computer system and that certification and the
special committee or the blue ribbon panel will look at the process we used to certify the teetwelve and 737 max process at large. these are the audits of the investigation because they have been helpful to make us better and look forward to the recommendations. >> do you think the outcome of the investigations that our ongoing will result in greater training of pilots from other countries? . >> that's hard to say. and then that is up to the
regulator. but the chairman was asking the engineers reporting and managers and for me what that raises is the independence of the engineers of compliance of those components in the aircraft. and the investigation around the shuttle explosion that engineers and employees raise concerns that were not taken into consideration by
management nasa and faa are different but my concern is this could be another example of a management failure not necessarily an engineering failure. sometimes managers are influenced by factors other than safety and quality with large organizations public pressure to deliver something. i would like to ask about those mechanisms in place engineering software and labor concerns the faa is responsible for ensuring products brought to market at the core of this function is the independence what process
does the fda one - - of a have in place to ensure that environment and to be valued. >> this is exactly and those efforts to instill from its inception that is a freedom of the members to come to the faa with any and all member before the member is approved such as professionalism and experience or certification.
i would point out not only has oda been a refined process but also endorsed by congress to expand to increase oda. that is indispensable to the safety of the system those that have been initiated we will follow with great interest and take the recommendations and the findings. >> i appreciate that but in the course of evaluating the safety of the 737 max during the certification where there any concerns raised during the flight?
is the process set up where the engineer may set up to raise that independently to the faa? . >> did that happen? . >> i don't know if we have record of that. . >> we do not have a specific record and then to reinforce there is dialogue with boeing engineers through the whole process they do express concerns with technical debate that is a normal part of the process and that faa sets the standards and as you are articulate they cannot change the standards.
they evaluate whether they are meeting those standards and then we require them to have a whole reporting system. and then a process to evaluate those concerns. . >> we have continued first-round questions. . >> thank you for holding this hearing and the witnesses for your help. mister lawrence, the issue around the sensors and the fact with those press reports that the purchasing airlines were not aware in term of your own investigation with those
airline accidents? . >> i believe you are referring to the angle of attack. and that is to the discovery that is an item under those software standards that did not have to be reported it was not associated that pilot action since there was not the associated action to take in that is required to update and not required to report that at that time. . >> going back to the bifurcation between the faa responsibility versus to
designate back to the manufacturer is that something that if it were a core faa function that information that literally the airlines themselves would have gone under scuppered if it had been a critical safety it would have been immediately reported and it took too long. you don't need that id investigation committee to tell us 13 months is too long to find out there was a software anomaly and that you
have our commitmen commitment. >> and with that designation authorization where the faa hands off those responsibilities in my mind there is a symmetry of technological ability that i'm worried about. and regulatory chapter if you will. under the oda it says that only noncritical matters specific to boeing to hear the full committee chairman say this is a single point of failure.
in retrospect do you agree and for this responsibility? . >> thank you for the question. we are going to wait for the investigation for that analysis to engage on that certification and in general we delegate to the manufacture with a new and novel aspect. >> i will reclaim my time and i fully respect that.
as the numbers who have said that already my heart and prayers go out to all the victims and their families. but this cannot happen again. this cannot happen again. and so the planes taking off from logan and boston under the circumstances one minute 40 seconds out landing in densely settled neighborhoods and it would be devastating. we have to get this )-right-parenthesis i trust you will do that. . >> we will continue second roun round. >> thank you very much mister chairman. and on behalf of ranking
member how does us operations and safety programs differ from non-us airlines? . >> each day is responsible for its own safety programs we have a set of standards as they said earlier 193 nations and then to those standards with all aspects of aviation ecosystem those minimums must be met and then to fly to the
country it is up to each country and when those minimums are raised in the us clearly. in almost every category too far exceed is not to say in any area they are not necessarily to low. and if we had not raised the important thing. and to be proactive nationally for decades and is chairman defazio mentioned one of the things he championed and added in large part and we made the
case this was accepted that additional training should be the international standard. it is that simple globally. . >> the ntsb has nothing to add. >>. >> there are certification of the 737 max was rushed how long did that take? . >> the certification began january 2012 and ended with fda administrator march 2017.
the whole process took five years somewhere between three and five. i certainly wouldn't characterize it as rushed. we adhere to the principle that certification has done and that criteria used for the 737 max. >> thank you. so the european union aviation safety agency certification fix? . >> do they have an average? . >> but with those projects we have been involved it was
three years. >> i yelled back. >> the chair recognizes from kansas for five minutes. >> thank you mister chair. a little bit more about this distinction the life or the sensor to differentiate of that disagree light. that is something and with that teetwelve or teethree system actually engaging. that is the system maybe it is the canary in the coal mine, i don't know but the bigger issue is the system engages
and pilots have to respond or are forced to respond, the training to notice that might be the case that there is a disconnect of members of the committee. what prompted the emergency airworthiness that was issued november 2018? i know the tragedy happens and then the directive was issued but is specifically called for operators of the trans- 16 to emphasize to the flight crews how to recognize that trim movement so what prompted that
directive? . >> thank you for that question. soon after that accident it was apparent after lion air it was the mcas event. it's important to note that it was designed to if it engages when it is supposed to with certain angles of attack and under certain conditions do not even know that it's operating. and this is what happened in both cases. and that analogy that makes sense and then to administer
the heimlich it's exactly the same when they feel that going over he is trained from the beginning that's not to say international or not and when the mcas kicked in when it was not supposed to it drove the nose over so looking at that data shows that procedure was not done to know that this needs to be emphasized. to say remember if you get a pitch overactivity and you did not tell the airplane to do it
then run the runaway pitch trim procedure. we also added that before you run that procedure and still to trim the pressure off and then to fight that so it is from a neutral state and that became critically important with the ethiopian accident. so what is the process on the emergency directive? and to be sure to send out that directive.
>> but when we, the faa issued the supply to an aircraft and to be married up with a manufacturers directive and then to notice to international community and also distributed globally. once we do that to oversee their airlines and their training to make sure that manufacturers that are adhered to. . >> thank you mister chair.
mccafferty you characterize those ongoing communications with ntsb and as indonesian investigators? board is it your intent they would indeed the decision to ground the macs on intel they were implemented? >> it is my intent to have any recommendations off with a ultimately the decision rests on me and the faa are not going to
sit here today and put responsibility that i shouldn't but the reason that we created it and they are working with us and the process right now is so we can benefit from their expertise. >> i want to give both the witnesses a chance to add anything they would like to start with. >> thank you. i think we've heard questions about pilot training and there may be different standards throughout the world. i think it's important to point out if an aircraft manufacturer is going to sell airplanes all across the globe it's important that the pilots who are upright and goes in those parts of the globe know how to operate them and i think that's important. just to say that the dress standards are very good this
might be a problem with other parts of the globe. i don't think that is part of the answer and i hate to use this term but the airplane has to be trained to the lowest common denominator. >> thank you. first i want to say again how sincerely aggrieved we all are at the loss of lives and prevent these accidents. it's the reason why we do what we do is to present facts so when it happens it is poetic and drives us. if i could leave this committee, the public with anything it's 45,000 professionals and the secretary and this committee we
are all united in the goal to make sure that we look at everything possible, and that's why all of these investigations and reviews are so critically important because we are going to learn from them and honor the people who have these accidents and we are going to make it better. >> no further questions from the subcommittee and i want to thank the witnesses take the testimony. contribution has been informative and helpful and i ask unanimous consent to record the open and hold such time as the witnesses have provided answers to any questions that will be submitted to them in writing and unanimous consent to record the remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and information's headed by the members are witnesses to be included in the record without objection, so ordered. if no other members have
the pilots to speak? >> the will have subsequent hearings. this is for the next caring for consumers and perhaps the pilots and it does a lot of good right now. it will give us a better pathway to develop answers to questions. [inaudible] >> i think it's been raised how we will cover proprietary information which is legitimate.
[inaudible] it's a matter of negotiating the proper handling. we will add voluntary compliance and we are capable of protecting the proprietary. i've been involved in issues that previously had served on the homeland security and handled intel so we can do that. they are just wondering about the discussion of the proprietary status.
[inaudible] officials as part of your ongoing investigation? >> we haven't asked for any yet. it's a key part of the decision-making process. we haven't made any specific requests yet. >> based on the timeline of the reviews going on, they will move ahead on the decision whether -- >> i thought they said today they wouldn't act before giving the recommendations and information that's why it exists so it's something different that requires more of a process.
we told them to create an additional steps to help make decisions. >> he declined to say categorically that he would accept every recommendation. does that strike you as consequential? >> it made sense to me the administrator said the final decision rests with the administrator. we haven't given any delegation authority. but i also heard that they will be taking recommendations. it is a process developed to provide and explain the recommendation and they may say this is why that particular way
won't work if we will negotiate how to make it work without stepping in the middle of the. i do believe we ought to ourselves have transparency as to what it's recommending to the faa. [inaudible] i'm not certain how good i would hope the recommendations certainly available to the committee and i think available publicly we have to take every step possible to restore if the plane is going to fly it again. >> he must have used it as an answer 15 or 20 times in the process by which you restore confidence. what are you cooking for specifically? are you going to make any demands based on --
>> we asked them to create a separate entity outside of their organization that would act independently. they've done that so that is a good first step into the next step is when they will make recommendations. >> what you want to help them address they wouldn't have had to create a blue ribbon commission. there are attacks they recognize a. [inaudible] >> i think what i heard him say
they are looking at the blue ribbon commission to help define a situation that is also one of the targets. >> using of offenders spend time talking about the critical safety systems. the f. a. a. has been all over the map in terms of what they consider critical. does that concern you? >> i'm very definitive that it was safety critical so that raises a whole question about the process that went through a level of scrutiny because it is a safety system. that again will be part of our investigation. >> i like your tie. [inaudible]
senate confirmation hearing of t he faa administrator nominee answered question about the certification of the boeing 737 plane and air traffic control modernization. the hearing of the senate commerce science and transportation committee is two hours. >> mr. dixon i would ask at this point you make your way to the witness table. the committee now convenes to consider the nomination of stephen dixon for the position of administrator of the federal