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tv   Hudson Institute Discussion on Nuclear Arms Control Part 1  CSPAN  June 7, 2019 1:17am-2:01am EDT

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. >> good morning welcome to the hudson institute i'm a senior fellow specializing in missile-defense and nuclear to tarrant deterrence and proliferation i have the
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privilege of hosting the director lieutenant ashley and following this particular portion today there will be another panel of senior us officials directly following so please stick around me will take a 15 minute break to get refreshments for quite like to introduce the director and then i will turn it over to him and allow him to make remarks then we will have a conversation the 21st director of the intelligence agency on octobe october 13 serving as the army deputy chief of staff for all aspects
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of intelligence and counterintelligence and security general ashley is a career army intelligence officer and has commanded battalion squadron and brigade levels in iraq and afghanistan i could go on and on and he has a very illustrious career his bio is included that i want to get to the point we would like to have a conversation about the chinese and russian missile nuclear program so with that i will turn it over to you. >> good morning. good morning everybody. [laughter] make sure you are with me.
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first thank you to the hudson institute for giving me the opportunity to speak today about the russia and chinese modernization trend we are tracking with the nuclear capabilities at the forefront of the intelligence community and the intelligence agency in particular, this is why the mission is to understand foreign military capabilities to provide the advantage for senior leadership. so let me start with russia. after working together for decades to achieve inductions is upgrading the nuclear forces the nuclear stockpile grows significantly over the next decade this is primarily driven by entries in the number of nuclear weapons and
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to add new capabilities for stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons aircraft and ground forces the nuclear warheads include systems that russia relies on to deter for a conflict. as stockpiles nonstrategic nuclear weapons large and diverse to be modernized with an eye toward greater accuracy longer ranges and to suit the potential we assess russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed are in development they include but are not limited to ground missiles including the nine m 729 missile which the us government determines violates the intermediate range or the
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inf treaty as well as anti- submarine missiles as well as depth charges so for comparison in the united states currently has a single nonstrategic nuclear weapon system russia possesses up to 2000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads not covered by the treaty and because of the lack of transparency we have uncertainty in our understanding of the scoop on - - scope and disposition of the stockpile after accounting for these nonstrategic nuclear weapon weapons, not only complicated by the lack of transparency but the capability though systems lack external features to allow the observer to differentiate between conventional and nuclear variance reductions have existed with the inf
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treaty or the 1992 initiative united states assesses that russia this is intensified by the development of the ground launched cruise missile and by 2015 russia had completed a comprehensive flight test program consisting of multiple test of the nine m 729 missile for fixed and mobile launchers purposely designed to disguise the true nature of testing activity and true capacity of the missile. all this compliance is determined by the inter- agency policy committee i want to clear up the role of the intelligence community to analyze those activities with
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the implications for countries international obligations they do not use the word compliant but to characterize actions that our inconsistent with the intent of such treaties using those assessments in the interagency process so from the interagency standpoint the us has determined russia's actions have strained architecture including the chemical weapons open skies treaty, vienna documents and the treaty on conventional armed forces in europe. in addition to anticipated growth russia claims to be developing new warhead designs for strategic systems for the earth penetrating warhead to attack targets like the us allied and chinese command-and-control facilities.
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russia's development of these new warhead designs and stockpile management has been enhanced by the approach of nuclear testing. the united states believes russia currently is not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent of the standards our understanding of nuclear weapon development believes the activities would help improve the nuclear weapon capabilities the united states by contrast uphold a standard with the ongoing comprehensive strategic nuclear forces is made possible to prioritize investments of development and the production of infrastructure. by 2013 to develop and modernize dozens of
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experimental facilities and the budget increased roughly 30 percent in real terms between 2010 and 2018 to support these and other operations and in contrast the united states during the past decade has improved and expanding its complex which has the capacity to process thousands of four heads annually. and an increase of the stockpile is not the only source of concern stemming from the broad base modernization program within the confines of the new start treaty calling the overhaul of forces is roughly 70 percent complete every leg of triad is modernized and in a new strategic system putting this silo -based inter- continental ballistic missile submarine
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launched an upgraded bomber and a strategic air launched cruise missile. they have greater warhead capacity than what they are replacing. the aging ss 25 icbm carries a single nuclear warhead while its replacement can carry multiple warheads providing russia significant capability to upload additional warheads into a strategic delivery system. russia's aging heavy icbm carries ten nuclear warhead all the president claims that its replacement can carry even more and is also capable of carrying the hypersonic vehicle. and while we assess russia is adherent to the limits of
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warheads the upload capacity will give russia the ability to increase warheads at a time of crisis. rush is also pursuing novel nuclear delivery systems that create a strategic challenge for the us and difficult to manage under the current arms control agreements in march 2018 putin unveiled the systems which include the intercontinental range nuclear capable underwater internet intercontinental missile and a ballistic missile and continues to modernize automated nuclear command-and-control watch systems the high profile announcement march 2018 makes it clear russia continues to prioritize investment in nuclear forces at a time of domestic constraints for go
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the new nuclear capabilities come at the expense of other russian defense priorities such as the development of a new aircraft carrier one - - carrier how it handles the nuclear weapons and the ultimate guarantee of the country survival and to direct the resources to the modernization effort. the quantitative and qualitative improvements to the arsenal had security implications and for our allies large and diverse stockpile with the doctrine that envisions course of use of nuclear weapons. russia assesses the threat of escalation or first use would de-escalate a conflict on terms favorable to russia. russia defense officials have spoken publicly about de-escalating a conflict through limited nuclear use
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and it is a fact the russian military has prepared plans and is well trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use to compel an end conflict. perceptions they could terminate a conflict on terms favorable to russia increase the prospect of miscalculation so let me turn to china as it is a strategic competitor's over the next decade china will likely double in size of the stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion of the nuclear arsenal last year china lost more ballistic missiles to testing and training than the rest of the world combined expecting the modernization to continue in that trajectory
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consistent with china's president's vision for china military which was laid out at that congress had stated china's military will be fully transformed into a first-tier force china has developed a new icbm, new multihead version and a new submarine launched ballistic missile. because of the announcement china will get his own version of a triad with its commitment to expand the role of nuclear forces of the military aspirations. and also looking to look at those precision strikes based on that experience in the
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effort required with the rapid expansion of the capabilities. and then to operate but it speaks directly on the nuclear force. some of those chambers at the nuclear test site and then to joy in russia with the language of the p5 statement of zero yield testing. and with that lack of transparency of nuclear activities and to achieve some progress in consistent with the test ban treaty. and then with that modernize
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forces it with those that it would that superiority and maritime domain. and with those strategies have highlighted as a geopolitical reality. that has embraced the mindset to guide that approach to nuclear modernization investment and therefore remain a critical area of analysis as we work to provide leadership. >>. >> what caught my ear is the
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russians have been conducting test in the understanding if we talk more about that to explain the implications and how that benefits the program. >> i cannot get into the details but the protocols and the way they can operate 40 yield so that has that capacity to operate and as my closing statement with the p5 that we are not willing to affirm that they actually adhere to that and how we have operated since. and china as well. . >> and in the think tank with
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the approach it with that concept they may be willing to escalate. there is no official documentation but if you can talk about the assessment of the cia it is a fact that they are testing in this manner we are confident it is russia's approach to why they organize their entire arsenal this way and the strategy to lower the threshold. >> and it goes back into the nineties and to see that as an ability and to escalate to
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de-escalate in terms of escalation control with a low yield nuclear weapon would bring those powers in the conflict where they could control that escalation they see that as an opportunity and in strack, which he does is if you see something in the language it's important you look at the common says it is stated in russian to escalate to when? so we use that terminology. >> sticking again with russia
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and to talk about that capability with arms control to the counter capability. and to have transparency in that way. and in the context of russia. doing so with the new start treaty and to be sure the russia is in compliance those warheads that are deployed and then there is a subset of that if you look at the triad and then with a strategic bombers and then not have any more than 700 platforms deployed over the 100 that are not deployed subject to the
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regime. and with those delivery systems to have that capacity for additional warheads in the time of a crisis or a conflict you can quickly move beyond that limit in a time of crisis. >> and then the last one on russia it's interesting how the forces are to deter or defeat if they came to that? and you also say china or russia quick. >> so how russia views china in this context quick. >> in terms of competition we
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look at every other nation as a potential competitor so you would not singularly say there is an alliance i would describe it as more transactional but when russia or china ignores the capabilities it's in such a way that is irrespective and i just have that in the context as a possibility as well. >> i'll switch to china then we will take questions. you said the chinese have tested quick. >> in one year time quick. >> in recent times. . >> my understanding is so with
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the missile program, can you talk about that they are in violation with the inf range missiles that was 80 or 90 percent. and they have been a party to that. >> with that strack calm commander to talk about 90 percent i didn't make that determination but with that intermediate range ballistic missile or the 21 which is medium-range, that could be used in that context of the south china sea with the inf
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treaty. a large part would be subject to a future treater one - - a future treaty and i have to go back and check they signed it but i don't know if they have ratified it. . >> see your analysis is that the chinese were modernizing the nuclear forces in a way inconsistent with the desire to comply with the standard that we would be comfortable with quick. >> that is our belief. look at where china was. the first icbm developed in the seventies the first with
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1999. so parts of that rapid growth is the capacity that russia has had that is significant investment in terms of catching up capacity over the last 15 years. >>. >> "wall street journal". i heard you say that the russians are set up at their test site in a way they could
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but then you say they are already doing this but in fact, they have been for some time spirit we believe they have the capability. >> you believe they are actually doing that quick. >> they have the capability to do that. >> there are many types of activities that exceed a zero yield some are experiments that could be a few pounds that would get you arrested like the eisenhower administration. to provide context so these activities could be a few panels are something more substantial.
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>> i cannot quantify but going to the issue of zero yield compliance if you go beyond that just shows that your concerns are viable. >>. >> [inaudible] with the nuclear forces that are separate from the military
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maintaining this arsenal despite the. concerns. i am wondering if you see a trend away from this classical chinese approach that only keeps for retaliation vertigo is that no longer true that is the basis of the booked act and defense he compartmentalizes unlike russians are north korea. >> that's a good question in terms of the intent and the context of what they have done some estimate the number of warheads the chinese have is in the low couple of hundreds. we anticipate that will double over the next decade. bay has stated they have a no first use policy they have also stated they would not use them against a nonnuclear power but at the end of the day as an existential threat
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is difficult to say if that is not something because it is not specifically stated. >> we also think of countries either investing heavier with nuclear weapons with a military strategy or the united states continues to try to move away but real world events ensure that we have to mean flexible incredible nuclear deterrent but that trendline is not positive with the chinese reliance of nuclear weapons in a military strategy. >> those lines are increasing not just nuclear but all the means to modernize military across aviation and not the subject of this but space and counterspace aspect approaching more fighting from
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every domain on the nuclear forces. >> thank you very much for doing this i am from the newspaper and at the risk of asking too much of a policy question and went to go back to the future of the inf so based on your analysis of the posture there is a positive way forward through the pursuit of a new inf treaty including russia and china and who would they be quick. >> that's more of the policy side but i do understand the comments made by the chinese they are less likely to be interested in a multilateral
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and that's on a much more bilateral basis. >> just to remind you we will have a really great policy conversation so please stick around for that. . >> with the armed control situation about your statements about compliance or noncompliance. first of all, if you can clarify word you say that russia has violated the ctbt or the facilities capable of conducting experiments? or that russia has resisted that its share of the
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definition of what they prohibit of the zero limit test man. >> my understanding there is not an agreement to what that means. >> we are not aware april 2017 there was a public action saying they'd prohibit no matter the yield quick. >> i have not read that. >> i can point that out to afterwards. >> it almost doesn't matter on that particular point if they have assessed they are still acting in a way without zero yield i can deduce that means they do not share the same understanding of the united states which is zero. . >> talk about how russia and
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china are increasing their development of nuclear weapons to modernize with a great power competition but to what extent they are reacting to the united states modernization beginning with the development of the stockpile stewardship program for the billions poured into that more the modernization of nuclear warheads and what goes on right now the massive us modernization program so to what extent are they reacting to catch up with the united states or is this just something they undertook independently of where the
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united states has been going quick. >> they will see us as competitors they want to make sure we have capabilities that can deter those operations so that is a natural evolution and that it isn't just the nuclear side of the house but maritime and space / counterspace with those investments we have seen. >> a whole modernization we have been involved in the fight and they have watched us and they saw those capabilities and they took great note to where they saw those weaknesses spread the director commented in his
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initial remarks these modernization efforts are happening now even though we don't see the fruit from that for years. we mentioned those gravity bombs compared to what the russians and chinese are having. i hear that a lot in response but in my view with that sense of urgency to compete credibly with what the russians in particular are doing are the chinese as well. >> general how much is the current russian doctrine is a continuation of soviet
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doctrine and how much is evolution and their hypersonic program how they interact so the capability with the us deterrence. >> and then you saw a lot of the into tens comments in 2018 looking at what they want to build a manned nuclear capable where they could launch from. and that is part of the hypersonic's so now the icbm under development through the next couple years they are looking at hypersonic is one of the applications to use that. but then they get back to
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space or counterspace so the technology that is available to think how do they shore up in that space? and from that standpoint were a full law enforcement would be a very problematic find one - - fine. >> i know that this topic focuses on china and russia but i want to get some brief comments. so since there is no major and i said if they are late with a clear and as a result quick.
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>> and there were a few by north korea. thank you. >> i will compartmentalize but the core mission is to understand foreign capabilities. so though you can pause but we still look and assessed to understand the capability that kim jung-un exists on - - possesses and then we watch that closely and look for indications of the new systems i could get into all the details but it has not changed our focus because it gets back
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to making sure whenever senior leaders go into these negotiations to have as much information of those capabilities, in a public forum and what we may understand is not disclosed. >> time for one or two quick ones. >> board member of the arms control association. can you tell us about the arming of the 729 ground launch cruise missile to have a conventional mission that are deployed in the eighties and destroyed under the inf treaty. >> so either with the nuclear capability the challenges is no discernible markings on
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that missile to let you know, if we see it if that is conventional or nuclear but it is. >> i am a journalist so following up on the north korea issue you said they are briefing on the capabilities of what are the capabilities and what are they doing? and to what extent do they receive from russia and china? and cooperating with iran on nuclear development quick. >> thank you one of the biggest challenges from what you can say and what you cannot but that is not what i cannot say an open forum but i appreciate the interest i can only assure you that we watch
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that but you are asking me things i cannot disclose an open forum but i appreciate your question. . >> one last question over here. . >> good morning general thank you for being here. my name is julian kyle lewis the american university in washington. during the cuban missile crisi crisis, president kennedy and the attorney general at the time really had to sit down and strategize how they would incrementally reassure the american public of our ability to protect the homeland. i was hoping you could illustrate for us our strategy as leaders in the united states to reassure citizens
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still go to football or baseball games and live the lives that we can enjo enjoy. >> i will punch that question to the next panel because that is what they do and somebody says why do you get up in the morning i exactly for what you just talked about. every morning i come to work because my kids are your siblings or your parents to enjoy your rest of time at american university without any concern that that i have done for the last 35 years and gtegy on the policy side hopefully you can ask that for the next panel but thank you for pointing that out. please join me to think that director. [applause]
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[inaudible conversations] oversight and reform subcommittee on civil rights and civil liberties. this is three hours. >> without objection the chair is authorized to declare a recess.


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