tv CSIS Forum on U.S.- South Korea Relations - Panel 2 CSPAN June 25, 2019 5:45am-7:01am EDT
[inaudible] if so, before i proceed, let me show you what we are trying to achieve at this critical juncture of history in the korean peninsula. peninsula. i would ask you to recall what happened in 2017, particularly the second half of this year, and also the beginning of 2018. there was a heightened threat of war, not a central thread, but they crafted a nuclear war and a son and both leaders of the united states and north korea of course initiated first saying [inaudible] and donald trump saying i have a bigger one and or powerful.
at that moment, particularly those people living in the korean peninsula were frustrated at those remarks by the leaders who treat nuclear weapons just like children's playthings. it formed a consensus among people that never again. enough is enough. we try to deal with the fundamental pressure of how to make it. we are almost resolved to deal with the root cause of the problem and how to dismantle when it was long overdue, more
than seven decades long. that is what we are trying to achieve. i want to make a few points. we need to have a third summit in the united states and north korea, but the third summit should be a success otherwise there will be serious setbacks which we don't want to see it again. another point we had in those
with the mismatches that we experience in hanoi in the sanction understanding the concept of sanction and as a policy to a it's not even give and take, they regarded the precondition for the real give and take because sanction is regarded as towards north korea. the sanction is regarded by north koreans as a symbol of trust. a symbol of obsessing resistan
without that i think they would be giving us a very hard time. another point with regards to reasoning the third summit has to be also has to do with what happened in hanoi. we are getting this information from the united states and north korea that the full account of exactly what happened, why and how did it stalled halfway, because of the process and what they had in hanoi for instance and finally, let me share with you the photo of the letter and
together. the photo was taken before the discussion among the six info we all know that there is a criticism and recourse involved in the negotiations and reporters with other issues they didn't try to get into because it is left to the authority of the it has its own version of the national security council
needed. >> thank you. i will keep my remarks brief. you are doing a lot of really good work and focus more on the european component. this is how i want to frame my remarks. i would consider myself more on north korea and what can europe do anything provide to the process that we are looking at because we have two processes one of them is denuclearization iand second is reconciliation process which is both with north korea and president clinton, i know he was in europe and a couple of weeks ago was talking about a european model of self
that there are three and south korea and the us. and that is quite relevant. but we need that process we need that to people process. so that the military - - military confidence in the measures between the us and north korea. that is the greatest risk but the fact that we don't have this process of one of the two parties and continue the
meant to come up from different places with the korean government to have the conversation of the process of the regular community that has been linked to the european coalition of the 19 fifties. it's good to have this working level process, but once we had the economic cooperation, it became very difficult to have that with any other country. and then to engage in north korea and that is the right approach. and as the us for example with the european leaders and with that you quit on - - economic
development and with that expertise. with that process and north korea the last one that i want to make for my opening remark is looking at the korean peninsula there is a lack of trust within north korea and it is quite clear but it is a lack of trust in north korea. so with these types of features in europe with the north korean peninsula to for those policymakers north korea
has already signed those in the past and then thou weapons for national security and with the process moving forward but on this particular issue it doesn't change the behavior but to start with us and south korea and this is something that is the process with that approach that we have mentioned before between the different leaders and also
because they don't have to deliver the nuclear weapons for the united states but south korea there with nuclear weapons. so in the negotiation process how much they can tolerate with the nuclear weapons and what we should think about what north korea really wants for negotiation but this is also with the nuclear capabilities and that
important to have the nuclear capability how maturity are they ready for with the negotiation? the international community's acceptance and we have to think about the international community with israel or another iran or other d prk in the future. is not ready to accept these kinds of conditions for the full d prk and if d prk accepts the denuclearization.
and then issue to confirm and then to follow with the implementation. however it will be a long process and very painful. because the d prk nuclear program has been around several decades and they are very diversified. and when your production and with those facilities are we fighting and with those enrichment facilities and just
like the production and they already have some capability of producing the centrifuge. so for that production they produce the centrifuge or they have plans with the chemical production. and to those capabilities they have those production facilities and then we have to verify if it has really disabled so this process and we have a case in south africa