tv Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nuclear Deterrence Discussion CSPAN July 16, 2019 6:11am-7:47am EDT
good to see you all here and in with nuclear deterrence this is not a topic that you find online cable television or political shows or presidential debates or if you are lucky at your summer barbecue but it is an important topic and for a number of reasons and then with the nuclear deterrence is so important and underappreciated man whose job it is to manage those nuclear weapons and conduct operations and for what they are asked to do that is legal and
legitimate society owes them those so it's not so simple but that legality may be distinguished from the legality of using nuclear weapons. and those that prevent you from having to do it. and a whole different set of legal considerations and that this kind of question and to be glad that it is being addressed here to be a part of this discussion and also to
point out that is likely to become more salient over the next few years which again reinforces the idea between the excellent paper he has written on the legality of nuclear deterrence that is produced by the national laboratory for global security research. it is free. you can download it from the website. last night i googled it i look up legality of nuclear deterrence and the first thing that popped up was the advertisement for today's discussion and if you click on that there is a link. that would be an efficient way to do it. with a very long and
distinguished career from the state department 2001 through 2017 with that legal office that dealt with that proliferation and arms control and with the essence of their analysis and i'll make a few comments then open for discussion. >> thank you to carnegie. also brad roberts of the national laboratory to provide me in producing for this opportunity to present my paper. 122 nations have nuclear weapon 69 declined to participate in the adoption of the treater - - treaty and
and with that political justice the legality of nuclear weapons. and with that decision to pursue the topic. and with the use of nuclear weapons they all rode a separate or dissenting opinion. but only half of the judges supported the final opinion of the court and to the two critical elements of that finding, the first is a threat that is generally contrary to the rule of national law and by rules of international law there referring to war or international humanitarian law. in the second key finding was
that the threat would be contrary to the law but that threat with a lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstances and with those findings the first i want to focus on is the key was the law of armed conflict. but those two critical elements been to bree - - be proportional then to distinguish between combat and a noncombatant and that concept is known as discrimination. i would get into that further later.
that second key element where it cannot quite decide if it is lawful or unlawful. and under extreme circumstances it would be at stake. the third element is that main topic is that defining of illegality with both actual use and with that practice nuclear deterrence. and with those key elements i would like to find the elements they did not find. first of all to acknowledge that there is no nuclear weapons in international law. there is no treaty that bans nuclear weapons all together
and then those that possess a nuclear weapon in addition no prohibition against nuclear weapons under international law. it is similar to common-law and a legal context and those that believe as a matter of legal requirement. what is that subtle practice? that would suggest nuclear weapons are indeed legitimate those allies that possess nuclear weapons and with that deterrent and that substantial
minority if you count the allies as well as the actual state. but in addition they represent a huge percentage of the population the landmass of the planet as a whole. but during that nuclear era none of that purports to weapons all together. and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty that foundation allows for five states to continue with nuclear weapons that is provided for in the treaty. and there is a number of nuclear weapons in particular
parts of the rural latin america, africa, asia, all of these have protocols because they also contemplate they can possess nuclear weapons and it's very important to get assurances that they will not use those nuclear weapons against them. and those with nuclear stockpiles. with those three key elements but indeed the law of armed conflict with the threat or use of nuclear weapons was generally contrary to law.
so this includes the united states and russia agreed that is different from the other types of weapons so mentioning earlier and those that are most applicable is proportionate which means the perspective harm of an attack must not be excessive to the military advantage gained from the attack. so that is the one of the mechanisms. and so with that military advantage that discrimination that the attack must be capable for the population.
so this cannot be targeted as such. this does not mean there cannot be collateral damage. in with the military target. so now look first at the application of the principles of the law of work to the actual use with those nuclear deterrence. and then this raises a few eyebrows but the actual use of nuclear weapons would be very difficult to square with proportionality and any actual case that nuclear weapons are used to be disproportionate to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. under the obama administration it was directed to ensure the nuclear use plan provide with
the international humanitarian law and the plan with those populations per se but nevertheless without question they are doing the absolute best job that they can that certain concerns but first that nuclear use plan generally would be implemented in a hasty situation with incomplete information and under the circumstances the ability to choose which option best comports with the law of war. but second legitimate military objectives are not limited to the armed forces of your opponent or waging capacity.
but also that sustaining activity like electric supply resources and other types of industrial facilities with that war effort without ability to sustain an attack. so with that broad range permissible targeting to have some part of that collateral damage that is permissible. and not to engage in the attack if that's too excessive and always has been some collateral damage. and those that would seek to limit the amount of nuclear exchange there is always a
risk by one side or both sides leading to much greater devastation. despite my belief that in most of these realistic scenarios very likely to violate the law of war and it is possible to say that every possible use definitely violates the law and in the absence of a legal basis i think the court was correct for making that blanket finding from that decision in 1966. and that second key alum line - - element is the exception to be identified by the court.
and then not dispense you much time on this but in brief with no legal support for that exception. and in addition to that it's not clear what they mean by surviva survival. is that the survival of the state as a political enemy or a government? is that in control of the state so which of those you cheese could - - jews could have it in effective what that consist of. so would be better off to stop at say we cannot determine nuclear use is illegal in all circumstances and not try to
figure out that might constitute a possible exception. so that the - - the third key element of nuclear deterrence the icj is the thread of nuclear use and that is consistent with international law and treated with the use of force. therefore in conclusion the use of nuclear weapons generally would be illegal to apply to the - - nuclear deterrent if that's a threat through nuclear weapons. even the us judge said most of the findings of the court concluded if it did not used
in deterrence that they would not deter. that does constitute a threat. so nuclear use where is contrary to humanitarian law as long you want nuclear deterrence that is the conundrum of the court was grappling with sodas that constitute an illegal threat clicks again that was the main thrust of my paper. clearly it is possible to make a nuclear threat that does violate if russia threatened ukraine to use that nuclear weapon as part of the territory that is a violation it is coercive and specific and a direct threat. but in my view that is not
representative of the nuclear deterrence and the most important goal is to deter the impact. and then trying to ever and nuclear catastrophe. and if we are attacked there are a wide range of options in that option to use that in response to an attack. it is highly attenuated and contingent the state relying a nuclear deterrence and contingents so in those ways
in my view nuclear deterrence is distinguishable from conventional weapons. and the station forces overseas and again to deter attack and then into regions of conflict to deter attack. on all of those have a contingency act. it was some of those they are more specific but those examples generally are not viewed as contrary to war and nuclear deterrence.
in addition if you're assessing the applicability of war with nuclear deterrence it has to be based on facts so what is the nature and scope of the attack that you are responding to. on your side of the ledger what is the number of weapons that you use what step might you take to minimize collateral damage cracks all of that is highly factual it's very difficult to do an assessment on humanitarian law. is one of my colleagues wrote is difficult to accept the legality of the hypothetical use of a nuclear weapon of the hypothetical threats. and finally the principle
assume would be the north koreans that would have a massive retaliation. so to sum up i do agree that it is disturbing that a handful of countries either by miscalculation or stupidity it is disturbing and not just likely in reality that clearly the advocates are very dedicated so therefore it's fair to assume not to just rely solely on the treaty to delegitimize and that could be the actual justice.
and you never know what that outcome might be. and in my view if they found that nuclear deterrence is a legal. but then that led not comport with the actual reality of nuclear deterrence in the world but the mandate to interpret the law and attempting to make law and the decision to be lowered and criticized by the major powers. and even without nuclear weapons the elimination of the nuclear weapons requires hard work of treaty negotiations that shows the best nuclear
likelihood and that could be catastrophic. and then it would be much better to have less weapons involved so my question is but just in general why do we focus more on how to spell it with conditions in terms of the sizes of the arsenals the type of weapons they are targeting cracks that would lower the probability of violating the laws causing humanitarian disasters.
>> that's a fair question. is there is said of prescriptions you can come up with that make it much more likely the use of nuclear weapons and be consistent with national law? so what you are suggesting that would be a more achievable goal but i defer to and that they may increase the risk and that's worth the study if they have that expertise to engage in.
>> and then those are questions are addressed in those terms. the lowest is north korea and then the highest is russia with a big spectrum between their. and with that propensity. >> and with the nuclear weapons but as i mentioned earlier the range of popular one - - possible options it would be a very wide range from what you are talking
about . . . . strategic command in charge of operating forces and a major role in developing and targeting plans and operational plans for that and very explicit that they do all that as you said with the law of conflict. they have lawyers involved who are very serious going through all this. so we say that the guidance for
employment of nuclear weapons should follow but was there ever a kind of review of that or kind of you know, back and forth as would have been in a legal argument on the same team, but for the purpose of saying we are going to borrow these principles but how would you do that here or there, does that ever happen? i signed in my paper and article by general keller former commander of the strategic forces who goes through what he viewed as a big change in their nuclear planning that they were starting to take into account and think hard about all these issues in having their lawyers involved in a way they hadn't previously.
an interesting article i would recommend to everybody, but there's also been critiques of that approach to say as i mentioned earlier you can have those plans to be as compliant as possible, but when push comes to shove how capable would you be exercising th the response ia way that does comport with the walls in situations that are in no doubt going to be taxing to say the least and where you have a wide range of options how do you consider those in a timely fashion so those are legitimate questions to ask in addition even though they comport with the wall of the war there are and i was simply a very broad targeting and permissible targeting rules of engagement and when you talk about nuclear
weapons engaging with the armed forces and capabilities like the weapons plan and sustaining capabilities the results could be the complete devastation of a country and the ability of the t country, that society to function and the impact on the population could be huge. from the other side for the last several years public opinion surveys and using nuclear
weapons to get perspectives. let's say the willing respondents were to see the u.s. used nuclear weapons against for example north korea where when given a chance of one set of casualties that would be caused by the use of nuclear weapons versus a much higher set of of casualty is a surprisingly large numbers that do the higher casualties. it exists within the body politic as you are mounting up. given what might have been the precipitating attack on the political momentum could be
quite different and so these kind of conversations with people if they heard about it would say what, we have lawyers talking about this? there would be huge pressure if they had one u.s. city there would be pressure to respond in a massive way and that applies in other scenarios as well. i've grappled with the question if the u.s. sees a significant attack coming, but as the locality of a counterstrike are we trying to detour future strikes beyond that or do we simply want to retaliate because if you hit us we are going to hit you back, retaliation isn't a legitimate objective, but what's the reality in the political matter when you are engaged in that kind of
while it may be important in cleaning up the legal niceties after that kind of catastrophe, it is extremely secondary to primary goal of how do we get gt the societies functioning again after such a cataclysm. >> that leads me to the last question i want to ask and then i will open up. >> but wha >> but what is written over decades about the legality there have been books written about this and there is always from the prospective point of view would it be illegal and they wonder why isn't there more discussion and why haven't the states done more to set up mechanisms to richard tait's
we've got almost all of the states that possess nuclear weapons, certainly the u.s., uk, france, they all said they would follow the wall of the armed conflict. number two, they all say that responsible they treat these weapons very seriously and they say they are not the aggressors they only have been from the coe purpose of deterrence and defense and they also trust us with them. we are not going to give them up even those of you that are pushing for us to get rid of them pr responsible about them which seems to me to invite the question okay if all of that is true then if you ever did use them, would you accept in advance international education to make sure your conduct was as responsible and law-abiding and everything as you said. i think they know what the answer is going to be, which is maybe on another planet, but i'm
curious to get your views on it and to hear the debate. some of the responses could be it doesn't do any bit the same people say we could use nuclear weapons in a way that wouldn't cause humanitarian disaster and violate international law if that is the case if you can manage escalation and bob cause humanitarian disaster than you will be around to be accountable or someone will be around to be accountable so why not accept that kind of accountability? >> i don't have an answer to that. >> my first response is what you already said.
if you have a question please raise your hand, we will call on you and then please introduce yourself. >> this discussion is the appropriate debate in the process implemented with a strong debate in congress right now. on the one hand you have analysts and scholars who say lowelowered the weapon didn't me them more credible and ethical deterrent and if we were in a situation we had to respond to nuclear used to prevent someone from using more weapons it would probably give you a better chance of getting caught up in the high yield weapon in o and e other hand you have prominent members of congress who say
that's crazy been preparing for a limited wathe limited war is . we shouldn't do that and they are not following the logic that they are arguing for th targetie massive retaliation strategy which based on the analysis i'm hearing here sounds that could be less consistent with the armed conflict so i would be interested in both of your views on that issue. >> there was a great paper written recently on kind of future of arms control on the situation but merely u.s. russia and china. those of you inclined to speak to learn more about these issues, i can't recommend the paper, they are holding a copy of it. it is a free spot, not a paid commercial. >> i addressed the nuclear weapons a little bit in my
paper. i can't say that i'm persuaded thai am persuadedthat they woult the situation. i would go down as a skeptic if they improved deterrence which is the theory behind them that if our adversaries were thinking about the possibility of using the weapons and the situations it would be better if we had the weapons we could respond with and i honestly am a bit of a skeptic but they would change their evaluation of the likelihood of the weapons between strategic and low yield. it would pose a horrible risk of escalation and all the things you want to avoid.
these are not cost free exercises you've are spending money on other elements of the program potentially so, i have seen the discussion of the vote not as an advocate for low yield weapons but in lieu of any strategic weapon he was posing the possibility it's fair to say at least in theory it gives a chance of complying because you could target them more narrowly, the damage would be less, etc.. you could read my paper. i don't come down on the side of it is a good way for us to go.
>> it seems to me that there is a matter of principle and policy that one should seek to use the lowest yield possible to destroy whatever legitimate target as, especially if it could have reduced harm on the competency e and the environment they would be wrong not to do that. that has since been necessarily the approach and i think there is this legacy if we have the legacy of the things that actually are much higher yield because the delivery systems were not as accurate when they were deployed so you have more yield to destroy the target and now a there may be some extent
or other difficulties and that becomes a policy issue, but i think it is a matter of principle worth stating to the extent that it's possible to switch over yield options that should be done and having that debate internationally. maybe we will have that debate here. >> the school for conflict at george mason and also the convener of information. i've been to many of these kind of discussion since i've been in dc and there is a kind of level
of absurdity like to kill an innocent person and destroy the fragile planet because we have terrible leaders. it does not as my understanding that allow for the nuclear weapons that they are committed to negotiate towards the disarmament but anyway, it is a theory that it holds up under some conditions and it breaks down under certain conditions and puts into spiral theory and there's a lot of work done on that and social science.
>> physicians for social responsibility we understand this sort of weapon should be illegal. my question is about the kind of laid out the legal foundation that included amputee. if i understood you said that allows for the nuclear weapons, and i think that the u.s. allows for the five nations have nuclear weapons temporarily and i also would prefer it that the majority of the signers understand it was very.
the 62 nations of the un calledd for total elimination of the weapons. they were transferred into force, so how temporary. that is a long temporary arrangement and we have still a lot of dangers of this i question how do you square this idea that the npt allows five nations to permanently possess nuclear weapons, i think that does not square away with the vast majority of the people that are party to the treaty. >> there is a commitment in the article by all the states including the five nuclear weapon states under the treaty to pursue negotiations if there
what did they really expect in terms of the timetable nor could they because yo you can't sit ya timetable realistically to compel the states to agree to something as complicated as one of the provisions going to be for elimination and how are you could verify it and in the extremely intrusive verification measures i think that it would have to be understood at the time. i wasn't at the negotiations, but it has to have been understood at the time that they would need to be some fundamental changes in the international security environment that would allow for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it doesn't occur within the nuclear weapons states it is further complicated in the problem that i don't want to minimize that there is the obligatioanobligation and i woue
that it is not easy in the current circumstances for the proposition that the parties are pursuing in good faith negotiations towards the nuclear disarmament. it is a problem. >> thank you. to the woman in front. right there. thanks. >> thank you for being here. i am with the american enterprise institute. i read the paper on south asia nuclear crises. other than military conflicts or flareups are there any other trends that guide research for example played development of nuclear power flick with both technologies were perhaps when countries invest heavily in the nuclear energy or are those separate from what you do? >> they will answer that.
we have worked on various aspects which i think is what you are referring to. in fact we did finish it and work with all of the vendors and the companies where 13 of themselves and nuclear power plants to develop a voluntary code of conduct for the export. one of the things that have been subsequently is the nuclear power industry is very, very bad shape. they don't have a license reactor. the south koreans are doing okay, russians are very active internationally the domestic market has dried up so one of the things you look at
internationally is that there isn't much demand for nuclear energy because the cost keeps scooping up and no one knows how long it takes to build a nuclear power plant. the specialized labor that is basically aged out as the people but bogeys on the list in the 60s and 70s or not there to companies have a hard time getting the skilled labor and the united arab emirates have a program that's where they brought south korean companies develodevelop our plan for the t of which is nearly done but it's two years behind schedule because they haven't been able to train them to do the regulatory work. so kind of everywhere it's been very problematic. that is to say that there couldn't be a revival somehow for the climate change purposes or other ways, but right now
it's a very difficult situation and why it went on at that point, i think the implication people that work on the nonproliferation haven't explored yet and that is one of the motivations for developing countries especially to go along with nonproliferation to promise not to acquire nuclear weapons and to help export controls and intelligence sharing and prevent proliferation, one of the motivations was they would then get access to nuclear energy and they would get from obligation and hope to acquire the nuclear energy, so as long as i was attractive, i have a really good motive to not require because i was going to get something in return. tim still being asked to participate that is happening at
the same time as others pointed out for the nuclear disarmament. though from the standpoint of the countries in the developing world that don't have nuclear weapons now don't find nuclear energy attractive into the nuclear disarmament but that is not happening they are kind of saying what's in it for us we are kind of getting screwed here we at least don't want to reinvest in this system and so i think that is something they are going to see more of the my expectation. >> my perspective from the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle comes in that if you do negotiate a treaty that includes understanding many people would not onl only have to create the verification of weapon complexes for the inspections of the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle
facilities and of course the five nuclear weapon states those are state that don't currently have the high level of inspection of their facilities. we have to take that into account it would be a large task to ramp up the activities. a corollary of that is that some people urge those with advanced treaty for the internationalization or the restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing spent easier to assure additional seats aren't pursuing materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. it's an interesting idea. buthat would have to be reconcid with article four of the treaty that says it won't impinge on
more compliant with international law pico i don't think a whole lot of work has been done and again it gets down to much of what you just said it is a strategy for co- what are the reasons behind if so to deter what? insults to the leader? so you have to break that down in a specific way posture and structure and those delivery systems there are ways you can deliver with an easier recall with an attack that you
started. or to be structured in a way to minimize collateral damage with that sort of approach. it gets factually complicated and with the nuclear planners lawyers and probably in a similar way what they had to do to make plans as consistent with national law. with those strategies we have in place with a weapon system we have in place. so we can look even further how do you change that cracks that is the agreement within
word nexus between those peaceful uses and at some time to be around all the activity. so do you think what you are doing has the effective with that different outlook of the prospects that isn't the only clear quote peaceful use and what are those implications peaceful uses and those related activities.
>> in the issues that you are talking about that don't really spill over for the peaceful purposes. >> but if the concern is somehow it is not a preoccupation but to the legal issues and then to make us more restrictive of nuclear cooperation that doesn't happen so much. i think. it's not the legality of deterrence. but that proliferation issue.
would not be generally supported by those forces of the south china sea can you unpack that strategy or posture or delivery quick. >> another example is cruise missiles you don't know if it's a warhead or a conventional. and in that nuclear context it is not an unusual situation or that analysis of co- location of military forces sometimes the way they grew up or the way they deter the other side
and those are those complexities that make it so difficult and with that nuclear context. but even more so. with the more supportive activities. sold many targets. and as this entitlement takes place the only country right now that has a first use policy is china. everybody else reserves the right to use it potentially in
circumstances that are other than nuclear weapons. so with that command and control structure will blind the nuclear forces from becoming ineffectual. so you get those problems we don't limit the actions and we have certain types of things that we use that are vital with his nuclear reviews and is that concept for other
governments as well. those expanded areas of concern are very highly entangled with those populations overseas with our allies what is very complex and to do this in a vacuum without a specific act. >>. >> on the ground with the arms control earlier you talked about the application of article six as a predicate on the notion at that time there were no favorable conditions for disarmament for the near
future and recently that idea was we visited with this administration for the environment of the nuclear disarmament initiative. so what is your view on the efficacy? is at the only realistic way in the future for the national security environment to achieve disarmament quick. >> i don't thank you necessarily have to have a complete elimination to tackle nuclear disarmament but there is certainly areas you have to resolve if you really want to get to the nuclear weapons the middle east is one so until you have changing the security environment to be willing to
give up their nuclear weapons that you have to go parallel to work out security arrangements between the us and russia and china where we are comfortable giving those up. i don't think it is the unachievable objective but one that is difficult and will take time. i don't think we are close to that honestly in the current environment. so part of what it would require is very unnatural so if nuclear weapons are especially attractive but facing potentially stronger countries with the us and
allies think in terms of russia extending the deterrence to japan so generally the logic is to be overmatched by that bigger power if we didn't have nuclear weapons that requires bigger powers to do things not only to reassure those but beyond the good intentions to physically reduce the advantage. who does that cracks but imagine the u.s. congress to say okay we have an advantage that's reduce the advantage in order to get rid of nuclear weapons.
i like to live in that world even just to watch the debate but it's not the one we're in now and if that's the case here then i could take you to estonia and other places that are closer to it. but other than anything to address the issue but if you see it with its more basic terms it is a real challenge. >> this is a medical question but what's the possibility
that hyper velocity with that maneuverability in the impact could take the place of low yield nuclear weapons in these theoretical scenarios quick. >> i can think several people in the audience to better answer that question than myself. >> i don't know if they want to answer it? i would answer it in a political strategic sense that is something president putin was very worried about going back a decade to provide that conventional capability to exploit strategic targets to leave them without a defense. but i would just add that
whatever the physical capability of the systems there has been a whole other psychological political dimension that is different and then they are mixed in because precisely because of the different psychological effects wrapping around conventional weapons that putin is saying they can really use these but they don't cover all of those. they could use them and it could hurt us so it cuts both ways and that psychology cuts both ways. >> you still have to introduce yourself. >> i have had a pleasure working with you on this and to expand the conversation
that it seems to me that we all have bad experience to know someone to show that common vocabulary that is different from each other and i have the impression of proportionality with the injury done some think about the injury prevented that is a matter of conjecture but if we adopt the former definition what were hiroshima and nagasaki proportionate to? it wasn't the last japanese attack that immediately proceeding attack maybe not
even pearl harbor but an entire war strategy in the deployment was in service of a particular war goal that was unconditional surrender. i just invite you and may be to set aside that nuclear topic to explain why international law means with the topic of proportionality and how that differs from retaliation. that is not moral or legal so what is that all about quick. >> i agree that the difficult topic and if you read the us law manual they even look at those differing views on how you assess the proportionality. in the us view and the
predominant view that the goal is not to have extensive damage as compared to the legitimate military objective so it is somewhat subjective because what is your military objective cracks does that have to respond to previous attack? mentioning the kuwait example it has not only dislodged the iraqis that made sure the attacks could not occur. so to measure proportionality based on the military objective that can include whatever is legitimate in the context of that war that goes to the example of world war ii
i think. without getting into a debate of that particular use was permissible, the ella terry objective was to end the war. that is what military objectives are all about for either party. doesn't mean it has to be equal force or calculate those same attacks that be measured on a very broad military objective that is justified with those circumstances again without getting into the specifics of hiroshima or nagasaki. because of that, proportionality has that much flexibility is actually a - - actual use of nuclear weapons it has to have that much of nuclear deterrence
where though whole goal if you are successful is no casualties and no attacks. that's where i come down on proportionality but it is a complicated topic. >> i want to jump in on this because i get why brad made the important point for what we normally think of proportionality but on the other hand the perspective that one party would give is obviously objective so what i think is my requirement to end the war with the use of nuclear weapons i want to do
it in a fairly limited way but i also want to limit the damage you could do to me so i will have some weapons and end up being a very large nuclear strike to achieve in the sense that i say that because i need to limit the damage. looks very portion it but is not by proportional to what i have to do. so that is out for adjudication. so then they argue why this is proportionate and then to say you just devastated the country i get it.
and then to say that would have been judged as a war crime if you look at those pictures with hiroshima and to say this was a uniform factory and is a military target. so it does ask for somebody other than the winner to preside with those arguments and then and with the prohibition treaty but those arguments especially in
countries it would not be belligerence and is possible with the radiation and then to harm them but there's nobody even to evaluate. but then they reach for these other instruments but then if we just say tough we have our lawyers nobody will even hear your lawyer. and then to sustain going forward. eyesight the oil platform case and then to look at that issue
civilian. >> i don't really want to get into that debate but discrimination is a problem. and i will grant that the low yield with that issue discrimination potentially but there is a risk of escalation and no yield could increase the chances there would be a nuclear exchange. right now since 1945 against the use of nuclear weapons on those occasions they could have been used in various conflicts and today were. and i worry if we go down this road is not that bad if one side uses one and with a tactical nuclear weapons i worry about that.
but discrimination no question is a problem. and in particular. >> and from that question there are already years firebombing that is not a remotely satisfactory answer to your question but already there is disruption from europe including that by japanese forces. so with the use of biological weapons and then to learn from
that at the same time to be vigilant that the world has developed more international law since then precisely for that reason. runs before world war ii started there were declarations about not targeting civilians and then yes we have international law. how quickly it could be produced and then to do public opinion is relevant. but we should imagine how quickly they could be discarded and what we need to do and then to have this discussion.
>> following up on what you just said, first, is there a difference from the standpoint of civilian casualties or discrimination? and then the question nagasaki was the last use of nuclear weapons with an impressive run for nuclear deterrence what is the moral and legal sentiment making it easier for conventional war quick. >> without the threat of nuclear weapons if eliminated quick. >> i touch on that a little bit and virtually every issue
that arguments are on both sides as to whether that is responsible for historically though. people dying with the war between the great powers and those who feel it's other factors it wouldn't have been any other way. and to assess those benefits of engaging there is no answer to that question and to think about if that is the case the fear of use of nuclear rough - - weapons to keep the countries are taking bad
additional step with vietnam or korea and then it turns into a great power conflict but as for the difference between, with the law of for every state that participated in the icj decision agrees so are you engaging in warfare in a way that allows you to discriminate? >> okay. please join me to thank our guest. [applause]
[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> here is a look at our live coverage tuesday. on c-span, the house returns at 10:00 a.m. eastern for general speeches with legislative business at noon, members will consider a resolution condemning president trump for recent tweets and comments he made about 4 freshmen members of congress. on c-span2 the senate is back to vote on judicial nomination for the third circuit court of appeals and begin consideration of series of tax treaties that
would amend existing agreements with spain, switzerland, on c-span3, 9:30 a.m. eastern, defense secretary nominee has confirmation hearing before the senate arm's services committee, followed later in the day by senate homeland security and governmental affairs hearing on preparations for the 2020 census judge panel at dc court of appeals heard oral argument in trump, congressional subpoena for president trump's business financial records. house oversight and reform committee chair congressman elijah cummings of maryland issued subpoenaed in april, this is about 2 hours.