tv Government Surveillance Privacy Conference - Panel on Surveillance... CSPAN December 30, 2019 6:26pm-8:03pm EST
oversight. an restriction of these efforts. so that is not dangerous to the body politic. you won't be able to get rid of those functions because they are necessary to sustain these concepts. his stomach with, we conclude our first battle. i want to thank all of the panelist and cato for putting this on. we'll take those 15 minute break. refreshments are available in the winter garden. located on the first four. refreshments are located on this loophole. left of the elevators on the lower loophole. july for new. in 15 minutes, we'll have our second right panel. thank you. [background sounds]
>> will come back to the auditorium. both those president here and watching at home. i am again senior fellow, burried pleased to welcome you to the second panelist of the 2019 institute surveillance conference. this continues the theme, focusing on oversight. with respect to two controversial programs. surveillance on section seven oh two of foreign policy and a provision of section 215 that provides for a burried large scale automated collection of phone records. both of these programs have had some serious complaints. that come to live over the past
year. and so we thought it useful to examine how those arose, what the nature of the problems of the discovery is and how the intelligence community is responding to them and whether the response is adequate. so the discussion will be headed up by prize-winning port reporter, charlie savage. his book power wars is probably the best portrait of nast national security policy making. in a presidential ministration. i will pass you on to charlie savage to introduce you to the second panel. >> so good morning everyone. both you and the auditorium and those watching at home. will here 792 and 215 i am going to briefly introduce the con
ducked behind this panel. then we will turn to this burried diverse and interesting group of minds to talk about it. i'll introduce you to them and turn as i asked the first question of them. left two hours of questions one focusing on 215, and one focusing on summative worries freight you are in the weeds. i'll explain that in the moment. and we will go to the audience questions. but also, if i should phil free to breakout of the mold if you think of something that you want to just single signal as will be spontaneous about it. obviously there's lots of surveillance programs. people talk about problematic surveillance. they are necessarily talking about any program. the concept that emerged in the public view in the governments before that, after the snowden think that i for the leak of the
wiretapping program. the notion is regimented and regulated overseen by a quote system of certainly surveillance where the fisa quote is setting roles and supervising a chunk of the government and usually the nsa or the fbi. in the performance of wiretapping or collection of data that went out necessarily signing off on whether individual targeted people are illegal. which is the traditional wiretap order on this mafia figure. instead, his whole program, here's what you can do with it. here the limits. here's what has to be done here is the oversight. a sneak most like the portrait or quote acting manager rather than an adjudicator. so this emerged and forgive me for those of you again, who are in the weeds but those who
aren't, after the 911 attack, the motion ministration created a secret surveillance both data collection program called solar wind. different aspects, would aspect allows the government to intercept americans international e-mails and phone calls about a warrant, are talking to, a terrace or in another element involved about collection of her from internet phone companies of but dana who was coming home. tabasco but not what they were staying. and all this was being done unilaterally. that went out oversight and based on burried strange theories about why it was lawful. and over time the bush administration, came to live until it comes out worried about how they were maybe sustaining legal jeopardy by anticipating this elements of this will moved on statutory authority brought on the fisa score, that the
foreign intelligence oversight and the quote issued broad rule and then supervised how those rules will being carried out. in the sand or something. just emerged into what we now know of as similar to which is a selection of e-mails and phone calls from american companies like google at&t, the and targeted companies abroad. what can happen to that data especially what the government can do what is looking within this repository, or information about americans that will selected that went out a warrant. in the other big category that came out of this which came to live was known as patriot act. collections of systematic collections from phone companies that their customers calling records. showing domestic phone calls and every [applause] between people in the united states and a social map of whom in which the
nsa used elation three to try to find hidden associates of militant terrorists. in that program would it came to live, actually was ceased to be problematic surveillance as i described it because one of their forms the obama administration made you unilaterally initially satan will now have each approved. so before you can dip into the scotus you need to be able to show a judge that there is a reasonable suspicion that this particular person who is universe of contacts you are looking at, has a tie to terrorism. in 2015, congress abolished that program with the freedom act and created a new system where the data will reside from companies we could still access with the judge news permission by the nsa. some will going to talk about first, the legacy 215 program in the book data access to phone
records and then we'll talk about seven oh two, the legacy with surveillance program. it is still operating. okay. so that is the landscape. we start turning to my colleagues here. to start with, at the burried end with ben. he is the rep. of the government voice here. his new allison jewell who for those of you have come here previous cycles. he is the chief civil liberties of privacy officer at the director of national intelligence overseeing the intelligence agencies. across the federal government and e.u. staff a sneak moral but one subfloor at the cia. and then he entered the private sector after many years in june. he moved up to six him. what is that like. how is it different.
>> is good. for my colleagues, i would see. [laughter]. is the different role as far as at cia, obviously much more operational. so the privacy and civil liberties, more of the duties there, require looking at the particular individual actions are programs whether we work going or not going to do them. there's so certainly that role over them because there with their centers. with the role, or the work is about the overall community approach in integrating that approach and also setting those rules for all of these intelligence communities and how the handle it. >> let's start with a think that is most news within this world. which is the fate of the essay freedom act system in the legacy
of phones and accessing data systems became out of the 315 program. most of you probably know this,. [inaudible conversation] [background sounds] similar the law that authorizes the freedom act and that allows the messiah to tap into the records, all of the companies. that was set to expire december briefly ended. [background sounds] >> it was briefly extended to march. but it's still upset into law and will die and blessed it was extended and the system has been shut down. it had problems in ceased to operate in the question then arose should the government
asked congress to extend the legal authority for a system that is no longer in cases also problems and they can turn it on again. or should congress allow the law to lapse just because it's not being used anyway. could you walk us through the argument i'm not asking you to take those position but could you articulate and internalize with the government about first of all, explain why the system was shut down. then what are the two points of view they came into issue about weather the executive branch should ask congress currently not using. [background sounds] >> of course envoy to take those complex topic and make a more complex. just because it will help you understand the program better. so is the fundamental done difference. it's because of the freedom act between the prior program and the program is in heaven. post- 2015, until.
>> in the entire program. [background sounds] effectively a target market. the control and that, is would it can be passed accurately. [background sounds] [background sounds] >> it allowed effectively for certain type in a new dive boat business records request, different than other business route record request british and that in a more typical request, the fbi might go to a provider and see i would like to find out all of the call detail records for ben, which would-be all of the instances in which my phone
number, my specific phone number called another phone number. and that record we will talking by the detail records is only that. this number called that number. at this time. and for this. it's not include content or names or financial information pretty does not include gps information. none of those are a political. a bigger wall. different request is often referred to as to help. so instead of just getting, forgetting all of the calls between the target phone number, my phone number, and the people that i contacted that would-be the first hop let the second half would-be all the calls, between that outer layer and the
person they called. so a second topic if you will. the not more than that. this fundamentally different than the program prior to the sa freedom act. >> in early 2018, the nsa panelists noted that some technical regulators and some of the data that they were receiving from the telecommunications providers. and i can go into extensive detail on that. they are concluding the review. so more will be coming out. it is burried frustrating for oliver palace but there will be a lot more coming on this. it's okay to see, some of the information coming from the providers, from that first talk was inaccurate. it did not accurately indicate the phone number a was in [applause] with phone number
pretty. and because of the two talked nature of this program, that meant, and impartially there's nothing on the records to indicate that it was inaccurate. that means it took that record, and went and got the second talk. and if that first one was inaccurate and they got the second one, then those will records that will not authorized to receive. it was only authorized to receive that first information. but that all the information came in the second half would-be over collection. and certainly with compliances. and that is a problem. from a privacy perspective and the nsa having records are not supposed to have it. but at the david is inaccurate and doesn't actually have over indicate an actual connection between two individuals. that is not terribly useful from the intelligence perspective. there is a third problem which was as it said earlier, it's not immediately a parent from the
records itself, that the information wasn't accurate. so there is no easy way to determine which ones will overproduced and which ones work. and in 2018, the publicly announced to move to try to correct some of these issues. they also deleted all of the underlining data in the program from what began in 2015, until the program and these issues will identified. the program did continue for quite some time but it was also reevaluation. in looking at the complaints incident, factoring into it but they aren't the only factor. if i took a holistic look at the clients issues and the data integrity issues for how accurate that data was. and how much and how useful the information was. what was the cost of the program. and compare that to other programs that they around,
effectively, mayday business issue position. and we wanted to exit this program and not continue to have a reflection actually delete what they had. >> is is it too much of a headache. there's much capability from other programs that do work better. just turn it off. within the law will expire raising questions dewey asked for it to remain in the books. one of the two points at one end to that question. >> the two points. the first.of view was the subprogram the day and provide as much value as folks might've helped. this around into some compliance integrity issues. it was effectively an experiment. would that didn't work out as intended. so let that authority expire. and then we'll move on. for not using it. move on. that was sort of one of those
articulated issues on that. and the other articulated position on this is this is an estate where we never want our intelligence community to use a tool just because they have it. we want them to judicially use the program would it is appropriate. and to not would it's not appropriate pretty and that was not applied in this case. in a tool was the town that is not necessarily mean that is not useful tool in the future. i have plenty of tools mantle cat. but every three to five years, it's not my hammer they use won't a week. they're useful would they are useful. so that's the other argument that the tools may become useful in the future. >> let's be clear, it doesn't mean they immediately hit access to all of this information. they would have to go back to the quote, get authorization, and to restart the program. that would-be a significant program change. they would have notified congress as well that they are
restarting the program. it smacked so you probably can't fill this in for the audience that trust has been that the intelligence community wanted to go with option a. other authorities, will not using it, let it die. it's is it too much else is going on. let the white house, we can't safely explain why the national security advisor and white give up power since will not currently using it. no make that position. however, let the intelligence community and the senate house, and forward draft bills that would help in this authorization. so the writing seems available especially would other things happening in congress there pumping up the oxygen for a lot of debate this programs legal authority mayday sin. as with that, want to - phil free to jump in and correct me
if i need. >> i'm not going to comment. there always robust. >> let me turn now to the robert gates senior fellow, and she's also a former senior national security lawyer at od and i as well. >> this looming thought that raises the question we keep having these surveillance issu issues. there's a freedom act coming up. we also have some of to back in 2012. and so forth. why is it that we have to keep having these cycles. does make sense for the country to be second current debates on the same issue. what is the purpose of sunset.
can you talk a little bit about really surveillance programs that have a chef live. >> so the history of these senses are tingly as it to a foreign intelligence surveillance act. truly a post 911 area of national security law. prior to september 11th 2001 ended in october of 2001, the u.s. patriot act was passed, which was amended a number of surveillance was will made into permissions. ten pretty good around. it seems fairly consistent so as originally passed in 19798. it was in a substantial amendment to the law until 1994 would the search provision was added. that was a permanent authorization of the time. it did not have one of these temporary sunset things building. congress and it considered it. the law was passed 94 that was it. so with the lighter amendments in the late '90s, pertaining
to authority. and it was the patriot act where we started to see the beginning of these preventatives of sunset. where the law would-be authorized with certain sunset day. what they did was the practical matter the forces the policy community and the legislative considerations to take another look after these provisions will passed. i tend to think that part of the reason for that was because of the quick nature with the patriot act was passed in 2001 so the attacks also obviously quote september 11th is about six weeks later the really substantial legislative package went through congress and burried little legislative history if you go back and look and there has brought in a sense of a record because it was and a heightened threat environment. the compromise that a number of
provisions had a sense and that is really now carried for the left. about 19 years i've surveillance history in five minutes after opening. that history has continued pretty there are pros and cons to whether or not the senses are valued. from the government perspective backward night was in government, there will some at the operational loophole of frustration with the sunset program provision. often times up because people within the government will necessarily opposed to the sunset and the legislative debate, because it always runs in congress handling of these sins that it runs up to the 11th hour. here we are december, these particular provisions expire at the end of december. it doesn't seem to be, i'm not hearing from the intelligence
community publicly with this debate that they are particularly concerned about that 215 program about expiring from a national security threat prospective but i do remember in years past, in the mid to thousands. would these would come up, they would really be operational worry that a lot more and expire and that would require that the operational loophole, not the surveillance program to be or have to turn on a dime. that is not a good way to conduct the national security business of the united states. >> what i'm hearing you see the nose behind the sunset is in islam for periodic consideration by congress of care for careful deliberative debate of what the rule should be glycerin this. that's all well and good in the abstract. in practice, congress is well know, is continually a train wreck and they don't have any debates.
and they try to get jim through. it really does work. >> right. so that prevents operational challenges. again i'm not hearing that this year for this particular aspiration but that certainly was an issue in prior years. on the other hand the census do provide a function to have a policy debate. so in this particular case, if there wasn't the sunset, would the program just sort of continue because there wasn't that debate and requirement that leaders from the intelligence community shop and justify it a sneak national security nasa necessity to conquest and on the other hand you see that value in this periodic legislative debate because it forces the conversations that might not otherwise happen. >> asserted pushback.
>> director of liberty national security program. author of many studies about surveillance. also formally government counsel to russ feingold. before that, in the isle, you are in the justice department. what is it like from going from defending to attacking. >> i should see that apparel program, would the defense agencies crosses a range of areas. handles all different types of areas. believe it or not, i'm not one of those people to believe everything the government does is bad.
i it's been all of us eight years in a federal program. i never worked in the case where i felt like any sort remote bad about the opinion we will defending. sue and i just didn't take the ones that i didn't agree with. >> the whole idea of u.s. freedom act of 2015, momus first this noted. the collection of americans phone calls, and the notion of setting up vast amounts of records on an activity that is been targeting specific people of attracted or had some literal relevance to a particular investigation. we can go hunting for the need needle. he is the freedom was supposed to be in that practice, so four years later, what is your verdict. it is 16 on its own terms.
>> let me just take those step back let me sail a bit more about what it is. for his past the government was able to require certain categories of the records. and actually didn't include records. if it had reason to believe and could persuade the fisa quote that the subject of the record was a foreign agent or foreign power. section 215 dramatically expanded the authority allowing the government to obtain any tangible think. not just this. on a relevance to it outside foreign intelligence investigation but what we learned in 2013 is that the government was actually obtaining all of the phone records. american phone records. by major phone companies then approve this, based on a theory that any of the vast majority had no relevance to any investigation, there will a small number of relevant buried
within that. the essay freedom act in 2016, which turned onto sunset and there was a year or two of debate leading up to it. that's a section that proves the rule of the importance of that. that was congresses and it to the collection program but more generally to prohibit on 215 and on authorities. not by going back, to the own foreign power centers, but by requiring request for collection to be tied to something called a specific collections term. on ssp. just by what it sounds like, specific collections term has brought a unique identifier. would we're talking about sections 215 authorities generally, not the special phone records program for the will talking about. the general authority, the definition includes a term that identifies a person account but
with a personal device or other specific identifier. that may sound in a row until you look at the admission. a person is defined as the individual group, entity, association corporation, or foreign power. the term address in the usa freedom act explicitly includes it addresses which can be shared with thousands of people. for special cult detail program. that is just one part of 215. national collection has to be somebody who is suspected of terrorist activities let the government can then get the second hop which is the phone records of anyone who calls or did cult by the terrorist even won't. so at the time, in 2015, many of us have some concerns of because of the open-ended nature of the ssp definition and the second hop, and occult detailed programs. the collection might end up
being, if not technically collections, said to be literally indiscriminate. in the sense of pulling in a lot of information about innocent people. based on the transparency provision of the freedom act, we actually have insights to this concern. how they have played out. so congress required the government to report the number of targets of collections but also the number of unique identifiers used to communicate information, a burried tortured way of staying people news communications records will threatened. for the call detail records program, between 2015 and 2018, the government reported fewer than hundred targets of the questions. at same time, and reported that more than a billion records will collected including information on more than 19 million phone numbers. if you know how many phones the american has, that is about
14 million americans. so hundred targets. 14 million americans. suspect this is because of the exponential growth of the second hop. a hundred people each will call another hundred people so one target needs to invest here of people around the target. >> they are clearly hitting that second hop. pretty much across the board. >> that's how the whole.of the program) >> ongoing rather than a one time it's pretty so the section 215, in general but just call detail records, there is no tech second hop yet yet, the number of unique identifiers whose information is incorrect, or been collected. so in 2019, 60 targets of collection on traditional to 15 more than 200,000 unique
identifiers of information was weapons of what that tells us, is that the government is choosing ssp news and or targets, that encompass hundreds or thousands of people in our choosing references that includes information about hundreds of thousands of people in doing so, the government is inevitably sweeping in large amounts of information that has no relevance to any off-site investigation. and that's the definition. so i do, have the evidence to see that the freedom act has brought working certainly as i would hope it would work, and as congress reported. >> first wanted turn so that you can't respond to both of these. so anemic, juliana giuliani, as counsel for the american civil
liberties and she previously worked at the chief of staff office at the part of the homeland security hudson training on national security and civil rights issues. one of the persons traveled the world. i would like to authorize you to pick up on what you have so far but in particular, what it was addressing whether usa freedom succeeded in her view, and the bulk collections. can you talk a little bit about weather it succeeded in the other goals associated with that legislation. . . . the nsa have been collecting phone records of every american. and that not only had they been doing that but the pfizer
report had signed off on it for nearly a decade. a lot of people were shocked and saw that as an indication that the pfizer court was not fulfilling its role and providing effective oversight. and then evens go beyond that, men name members of congress, when the stories came out about this program, expressed outrage that they had not known about the program. and they hadn't known about the program even in years where they were asked about on whether to reauthorize section 215. and certainly from a public perspective, the public never had a robust debate on the phone record program, and the extent to which it would affect people's liberties and whether there were alternatives. and we were all essentially kept in the dark. and probably likely would have never known about it with no disclosures. and so goal for the freedom act was to really add dress
this breakdown. to one, put in place a better mechanisms to make sure that there was more robust review, within the fisa report. and two, to have transparency so that if there was another collection program, the public would know about it, members of congress would know about it, will there be a debating we could do something. and so from my perspective, many other reforms and the 2015 bill for improvements, but were not all the way there. and so to focus on two in particular. one is a big change from the usa freedom act was creating what they refer to as an amicus. and the idea was the fisa court, at his discretion could appoint this amicus to have a novel and unique perspective for cases that came before the court. and they could provide a perspective. nm sunk cases a perspective involving greater protection and priority of civil liberties. based on what we know from
some of the disclosure since 2015, there have been cases where they have been appointed and there been cases where they have argued for greater privacy and civil liberties protection. in many cases where those arguments have been rejected, when the court said thank you we hear these arguments, but we are not necessarily going to adopt them. there've been other situations or perhaps these arguments have shaped up and improve the decisions coming out of the court. and so is this better than we were pre-2015? sure. is it where we should be? absently not. i think that one of the concerns that has come out with some of the opinions in cases where the arguments have been rejected, they don't have a mechanism to force a review. they can't say well, the lower court has rejected my view, i would like to appeal to the district court of review. and i think that is something aware, it appeared there is a proposal to do that, but it appeared in prior versions of
the freedom act. but as part of that process was dropped, because of that we have it better than it could be. i also think the fact that the appointment is discretionary and only a novel and significant cases limits the ability to impact a broad range of cases where you may not even have guests to participate in provide that.of view. so i think that is one reform, the second really has to go to transparency. the u.s. freedom act dealt a lot with transparency. one of the most significant was requiring disclosure of novel and significant fisa opinions. and the idea with that, is the fisa court was going to take sort of a view of the law that was not consistent with what lawmakers had intended or what the public thought. we also know about that. civil me think back to the collection program, part of what allowed that program to
continue was really this interpretation of a what relevance meant. that none of us thought was what congress intended. the government argued that relevant meant everybody's phone records. and that was really inconsistent with what relevance had been interpreted in the past. and what members of congress thought when they pass a lot to begin with. so we've seen some disclosures as a result of this provision, but we actually don't know how these laws had been interpreted prior to 2015. right? so prior to 2015, what was the government's interpretation of what records they could have. what was their interpretation, and what cases would they maybe have to take additional protections when it came to minimization. the government interpreted this disclosure provisions only the prospective, and because of that we do not have insight into prior interpretations of the law. and to what extent prior
determinations could be creating surveillance practices that raise concerns. >> it is the case of government declassified gigantic stacks of fisa reports before they been thought of it. so could you explain a little bit more when you say we don't know how they, we don't know how the fisa rulings work? >> sure, we don't have all of the classification of novel and significant fisa reports. we have some d classifications that were made in response to public pressure or other request, or litigation. but what we don't have is a full picture of how these authorities have been interpreted by the governments and what they believe the scope of these authorities are. and i think that goes to some of the questions that emergently think of how different section 215 is from the way fisa operates prior to the patriot act. and so i think what we need to understand, is what is the full scope of how section 215,
legal authority has been interpreted by the government and what does that mean going forward? particular's technology involves and other practices are involved. questions are going to come up like can you collect location information with a section 215 order? can you clutch other sensitive information? understand the legal interpretation of section 215 is critical for the public to understand the scope of the authority is. >> alright, i'm going to try to speed things up as we have about 20 minutes left. then, was there anything from the critique of the freedom act, those call records were beyond, that you wanted to respond to? >> there is a lot. but to try to narrow it a bit, i do think with respects it was unquestionably was part of the process to look at insignificant and novel issues. i think of one of the reasons it was structured as an amicus, because of article
three. if you structured someone so they had the ability to appeal, or that they were a required element, that you would run into some standing problems and respect article three. and so that was a driving concern for some members of congress in terms of what that degree is going to be changed and that will be in the end be some litigation. there was really an effort with the freedom act two how do we thread that needle, to have amicus they are, in this significance cases where they are going to be most useful. and i think that is the other aspects. but we are very much focused in the panel and overall and some of these big cases, these questions of how you interpret a specific selection turn into 15 and 702, all have amicus involvement in. your everyday fisa case has
very few matters of law involved. it's just an application effects that any sort of warrants would be. so probably would not make sense to make one in every instance. with respect to opinions, we are down to a handful. of one's who have not been released. in 2003, will he really started tracking significant opinions. eliza has done some really great work on this, with her secret law report. but through a mix of proactive disclosures, responses to previous cases, and the vast opinions have been released at this. we are still working through some others as well, and we will release those as we talk about in the second period with respect to the 702 program. i will stop there. >> okay thank you. we are good and move now to 702, the program is still operating and keeps growing and gets more information than ever. i think according to the most recent transparency report, we are up to about 165,000
foreigners abroad, those are being targeted or things like their e-mails and text messages from services like gmail and facebook, and so forth. the number of people being targeted through this surveillance program, keeps growing and it doesn't seem to show any time that is ever going to be turned off in the way that the phone records program is dying. maybe in a faster way than you had originally been planning, ben, could you sketch the three most important parts to understand about programmatic oversight of the 702 program that people should understand. >> sure, so programmatically, and for 702 with the court approves or not individual targets. the court is improving three things at this. some of the things but there are three sets of targeting
procedures. what are the rules by which the nsa is going to be able to start collection on a particular target? what do they have to show, because they may only target someone who is a non-us person, reasonably believes to be outside of the united states for us specified purpose that the attorney general identifies. in addition to that, they're what i referred to minimization procedures that control access of the use, the dissemination, how long you can retain all that underlining information. and newly, there are now special procedures called quarrying procedures that looks out when can the government look into that collection looking at the identifier. especially identify every u.s. person and to search the record and find what is there by the u.s. person. so that is only are talking about programmatic that's over talk about. with respect to the oversight, the oversight very much starts within the agencies themselves. and so you have robust
programs in each of those agencies that are looking at individual decisions with respect to retention or dissemination, but respected targeting. i know mr. snowden at one point said that he could've walked in and been targeted a federal judge. that was not true, that was never true. i had never been the case that anyone analyst could go in and put someone up on collection, under 702. not only to the program not allow it, from a procedure stand part but the technology did not allow it either. so that starts internally. there is also a very substantial, and within the executive agency oversight program, that is a joint program between the department of justice and my office at the director of national intelligence. they look at every single one of those targeting decisions. they look at those all those that are made. they look at the disseminations that are made when they involve u.s. persons information's rights. if you are sharing permission outside of your agent to eat c
to another agency, that is called dissemination and that involves a u.s. person and as reviewed. they look at the retention decisions, and importantly was we will get into, they look at the queries. those instances where they are looking for specific u.s. persons information. that would say operates a little bit different between the agencies it looks up every single of the inquiries. that is not possible at the fbi, so instead the department of justice goes out to about 26 field offices a year, and reviews the queries of agents and analysts in the field to see how they are using the program in that manner. >> i'm going to ask lies in a moment to talk about local and regional in the fbi's problems with these procedures. but before i do, fisa their rules, there are people reviewing who got targeted, what reports are being put out, let's talk about external oversight, carrie can you talk a little bit about
congressional oversight. the two intelligence communities are also supposed be looking over the agency shoulder on this, they also have their own problems and particularly right now. it's not a happy normal place. what is that mean in the world of oversight? >> has been described there is a robust internal department of justice, dni, so when the provision was initially enacted, one of the important things that the government was able to safeguard with oversight was this surveillance authority has oversight conducted by all three branches of government. then describe the internal executive oversight, the second piece was the role of the fisa court which does not in look at the individual target but has an annual review reviewing all of the procedures under which this collection is authorized and used.
there is a very detailed procedures and monitoring of compliance us. so that was the second branch that was involved in oversight. the third branch is important too. and the third branch is supposed to be the congressional intelligence oversights, that conducts the next level of oversight. and that includes getting reports from the executive branch, getting reports from the agencies, getting briefed by the agencies, being reported to when it comes to significant compliance issues that are rising. and that's the job of the two intelligence communities, one in the senate one in the house. they are supposed be doing this work. one of the issues i think is of current concern, is whether or not that intelligence oversights process is still functioning as it should be. and these committees were again going back to the late 70s, there oversight is supposed to be independent oversight by the third branch of government which provides an important check on the executive ranch of activity. on the senate side, which has
continued to operates in this political environment on a continued bipartisan basis. they have done a substantial investigation pertaining to recent events, muller wrote the same issues that were the subject of 2016 election interference, but there has been, at least my perception and observing the committee from the outside, as they have also been able to continue their substantive oversight work. the hips he because it has become so intensely parted them, so intensely politicized, they are always, of a political nature. but the intelligence committees were always a little bit more insulated as the hyper- partisanship of some other committees and other work that was going on. what i'm concerned about her mike and intelligence oversight perspective is because the hyper partisanship that is taking place
currently, including frankly the role that they found themselves in as being a central place for the impeachment investigation to take place, is a question i had is what has that done to these substantive intelligence oversight that is supposed be taking place. we don't know really the answer to that question. whether there is one part of the committee that is able to continue doing the work that we are seeing in public and if there's another group that does the intelligence oversight, but effective oversight needs to be pipe partisan. when the chairman have questions, when members have question, when they pose those to the intelligence community, the intelligence community needs to know that congress is unified and wanting to conduct that oversight. it doesn't mean everybody is going to agree on the policy, or the root results, but the facts of doing oversight is
more effective when it is done in a bipartisan way. >> okay, so that is amazing's institutional structure breaking down. >> there is a high degree of stress. >> it is been described as an aspirational growing way of the internal structures are robust. but he also reference the fact that there is been some recent crossfire of fisa court opinions that talk about the fdi implementation of those new rules for querying the surveillance for american information. and liza could you walk briefly, walk the audience through what did we learn and what does that show about if the system is working in practice. >> so i do have to be a short background but were trawling 702 to allow the government to obtain communication of foreigners oversee, including their communications with americans without getting a
warrant. in order to do that the government has to certify that the target, the person they are interested in is a foreigner and not an american. and they also have to minimize the use, retention, and sharing of the americans data because it is only incidentally collected. minimization requirements have been interpreted remarkably to allow the nsa to share ross 702 data with the fbi and to allow the fbi to comb through all this data looking specifically for americans communication to use and truly domestic criminal investigations. for the most part, and this is the u.s. persons query, the majority of cases only substantive information is the query has to be reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. and that is an internal fbi procedure. there is also now a procedure
role requirements that came in 2018 that the fbi keeps a record of each query. but we learn from the opinions as fbi had been in violating both of those requirements. so procedurally, the fbi was keeping a record of all of this queries, but it was not indicating which were u.s. queries. because it argued it was just too difficult and burdensome to figure out. fortunately, the fisa court did not buy that argument and neither did the florence intelligence court a review on appeal. the fisa court found that the fbi procedures in practice, not on paper, but in practice violated the fourth amendment because the fbi was conducting large numbers of u.s. person queries that were not reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. this included multiple one-off incidents of agents letting getting information accidentally or for impersonal
reasons. it's not relative trying to figure out why you can search for judges but not your relatives. and also systemic problems a phenomenon called batch queries where the government was running up to 70000 queries at once. for u.s. persons. based on this idea that even though most of these were not going to return foreign intelligence information for evidence of a crime. it was in aggregate, they were likely to return a hit. and it sounds familiar, it should. is basically the same rationale the nsa tried to validates bulk information. these have to be reviewed in historical context which is a long-standing failure of the government to comply with the rules governing 702 collection. in 2011, the fisa court learned that the nsa had been handling data in a way that
violated the fourth amended. so the court imposed certain rules for handling the data. five years later the fisa court found that the nsa had been regularly doing it. now these opinions tell us that in the year following that, the fbi had proceeded to violate the fourth amendment for ten years the 702 program has been operating in violation of the fourth amendment. often when people say, hasn't been the use of the program, the government's position is always the davidson violations were unintentional. but now we know they were. but if they weren't unintentional than it is not abuse. if u.s. me, at ten year pattern of constitutional violation rises to a level of negligence that constitutes abuse. but the more important question after asking this question of abuse on many times, it has occurred to me by far the most important question is whether not the privacy of americans as being
adequately protected. in the answer to that question is clearly no. and so it's one of the reasons i support requirement for the government to retain a warrant before running these queries. >> i would like to jump in really quickly because you had a factual issue with ben. i think come and stop me if i'm wrong, there is an apples and oranges should hear where your critique of snowden saying he could walk in and look at a judges communication and you said no he couldn't because it takes more than one person to target. which should mean to put in their e-mail address or phone number to start collecting against that in the first place. your critique of people searching for the relatives was querying the database when the information is already been collected and you can do that and that's how the two statements are consistent. >> that is accurate. >> i was can ask you to jump into the issue of notice of fisa information in criminal cases, there's only four and half minutes left, rather than
try to take on a wholly new complicated topic, is everything you'd like to build on, leaving time for ben to rebut? >> don't think i'll know that the fbi for years said they could not report the number of u.s. persons query. and now we know they will be able to report it. so i think that raises questions whether the agencies are going to publicly release that number so we can honestly have this debate over really how often they are doing this. from my perspective they showed and they should do this throughout their observations. >> putting on your government cap, what you say to these critiques? >> so couple of things, with respect to the fbi query issue i think you accurately define those as two separate issues which were how is the fbi tracking and the procedural aspect and the summative standard. the subject have standard it has to be likely to return
them for intelligence information. there is only one that had someone querying their family or relative. there's a couple instances where somebody mistakenly queried themselves. >> and fbi called a mistake. >> what the court said and that's going to the second issue. the second issue goes to instances where whether a query was reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information. and we look at this referencing there is instance where there's a batch query noted in the results were reviewed with the court itself was conducted of people who have fbi colleagues that have access to fbi's buildings or facilities. >> ironically it's a gigantic privacy issue against everyone at the fbi. >> it was in respect to the fbi, folks, it was large as it was tens of thousands e-mail addresses. at ultimate privacy impact
might be more limited since those results were never reviewed. the query was conducted but no human ever looked at the quarry. >> but something is still unexplained about that. the fbi general objective happened anyway. so something is off. >> this is a compliance is incidents, i don't walk around this it is an incident and it was identified. to remedy that, after litigation of court, the fbi is now implementing that it did not have before are twofold. one is to require any time there is a query of the u.s. person identifier to have a temporary nance justification for review and including my office in terms of doing that auditing. but that also requires them to make some sort of determination, contemporaneously on whether it's u.s. person or not. and what they were doing before, was they weren't
answering that question. they were defining that more broadly and said they had to be reasonably likely to read turn that information regardless of whether as a non-us person. i'm not go to try to use resources to try to figure out citizenship on the quarry against. i'm just gonna run the quarry when it's appropriate to run that. >> the back-and-forth that ben is explaining between the courts and the fbi, has to do with the court responding to each individual instance of when an agency is doing this particular thing wrong or that particularly things wrong and so now we have to sit there where the government and the court are working out very, very minute details of how procedures actually work. and the bigger picture issue that is not being resolved through this process as i think what liza is getting at which is at what points is a
history, and a continuation of a variety of different types of compliance problems make it look as if the system just system can't function properly. and i'm not quite sure how that bigger picture issue is going to be resolved. because the court in the agencies are actually not going to work that piece out if it's required higher level policy engagement and legislative engagement. >> that is a fantastic take away thought and resignation web what the first part of this decision. and that was to shut down after one of these after a lot of compliance headaches. but this other one doesn't look like it's going to get shut down, so it will continue for next year. i will be have the next conference when julian puts an unpaired right now i want to say thank you all very much for listening to us. thank you for two the panel for the great thoughts of the back-and-forth which was quite interesting. and i think we are out of time. we are done.
[applause] [background noises] [background noises] >> i now want to move to a first set of flash talks for the days. these are shorter presentations on a wide variety of targets because it's not time to have a panel on everything that deserves covering and the broad universe of surveillance issues. and so alan butler who is a general counsel is going to look at the question of how often prosecutors use the
courts to track people using location surveillance orders. the answer could disturbingly be or just not sure. but they are working on to dislodge some of that information. >> thanks julian and thanks cato for hosting me. as they mention the privacy information center has been working on surveillance oversight issues for many years and one thing that i have focused on my time is location surveillance. to get kind of a brief background on the issue, generally, over many decades, law enforcement has used a variety of methods to track the location of individuals and we have seen those methods change over time. but we've also seen questions arise over the ensuing decades
of her wet legal and technical standards and restrictions are in place and should be in place after that type of investigative activity and surveillance. so for example in the 1980s and a pair of cases the supreme court asked the question of what the legal standard would be for law enforcement action to track individuals using beepers that were kind of the old school type of surveillance you might see in that tv show dragnet, that literally wore small radio devices that would be implanted in a physical item that was either placed in a car, or they knew would plate be placed in a car. and then have a separate radio device that actually reads the signal and strength, and follow a car as it drives from point-to-point periods of the supreme court in those cases decided that there is no expectation of privacy and the transiting of public roads. but that actually have the car with the beeper and it pulled
into a private residence, law enforcement was not allowed at that.to track where that beeper went. but the techniques involved and got more sophisticated over time, and in fact in the 1990s, law enforcement began developing special technologies to track cell phones and other mobile devices and cellular devices. these were originally developed in the military context and then deployed by law enforcement and the united states. their commonly referred to ini's catchers, stingrays, these devices were deployed without warrants. they are being deployed really without knowledge of most people, certainly not those who were subject to them, or even of the court. they are being authorized generally under an application for a pen register, which of the 1970s men in order to get logs of the calls to and from a particular phone number. but that was being used in the 1990s at all and on to authorize direct phone using
special radio hardware that could identify nearby devices and even measure their distance or their triangular their location. but through the 1990s and into the too thousands, law enforcement began to use other forms of target location in surveillance including physical gps devices that they may actually attached to vehicles or other items. that was dealt with in the u.s. versus jones case and the supreme court and it was heard in 2011 and 2012. there the supreme court ultimately decided that the attachments and use of gps device to track the movements of a vehicle was an issue under the fourth amended to stinky was singly earlier cases in the 1980s and reinvigorating the law of the fourth amendment standards around location surveillance. but, throughout the late '90s into thousands and into today, the most prevalent form of location surveillance is actually the collection of data from cell phone companies
about typically the towers that a phone is connected to. so this city like washington d.c., there is a huge number of cell phone towers that is necessary to support all the devices we all use every day. and so the density of towers is quite hi, what that means is knowing which tower a particular phone is connected to, is the strongest nearby tower, is a very good piece of information to know where that phone user is located at a time. and so historically, what it developed in the two thousands was a method where law enforcement was getting both historical and real-time cell phone location data, using a hybrid of the pen registry century that allowed ongoing monitoring of phone call data and then was was referred to as a 2703d orders which are under the electronic orders
privacy act. orders that allow the collection, of subscriber records and service providers like cell phone companies. the combination of these two authorities, the d.o.j. asserted gave them both historical and real-time location data related to specific cell phone. there was a push by magistrate judges around the country to call into question this insertion by the d.o.j. which had that.been scrutinized by any other courts. magistrates from the front lines of this because they get the actual application. and another magistrates including in texas and new york called into question this legal authority. ultimately that question resolved by the supreme court with the carpenter case which was a criminal case that was tracked by the collection of cell phone data in the supreme court ultimately ruled that the collection of cell phone location data is a search, subject to the warrant requirement. so that happened in 2018. but prior to the carpenter case, and the lead up to
carpenter. they filed a series of requested department of justice to try to get a handle on how prevalent this activity actually was. how many of these orders are out there? and so we solve their quest seeking the disclosure of these 27d location warrants with the department of justice, and we ultimately had to sue because they had not responded. in this case to the issue of generally surveillance oversight. which we fundamentally do not have public transparency of oversight of location tracking or broadly in the context of the collection of electronic records, e-mails and otherwise. contrast that with the scheme of the wiretap act which is the recording and the reception of communications and real-time. that's where we have a very robust reporting regime, congress enacted in the 1960s and carried out to this day, the administrative office of the u.s. courts that compiles is very comprehensive
report, and releases it every year, it's epic and other groups have historically assessed, reviewed, posted, made available these reports. it really allows us to scrutinize the use of wiretap authority including figuring out what types of crimes are being investigated using wiretaps. how expensive are the wiretaps? how often to lead to convictions? and the like. we simply don't have that type of data when it comes to surveillance. including penn registry, gps tracking, cell phone location data, imsi catchers, we do have actually a lot more information ironically about fortin intelligent surveillance because again there special authority requirements there that there be annual and semi end of reporting activity. so what do we do when we don't have these transparency reports? epic is trying to find out as much as we can about what's actually happening, so we use the other tools at our disposal. the freedom information act,
just a quick note, i mentioned on carpenter, that following the carpenter decision, the department of justice actually does not at that data with that order, they do have to go get warrants. but again we don't know how many location warrants they are getting. so we have to file the new request after court arbiter that is involved in our case as well. so we have these surveillance applications, orders that are being sought by the federal and state prosecutors and being issued by the federal courts. so we focus on the federal level in the department of justice. we know that because they are seeking these applications and ultimately getting surveillance orders that records of this activity. and so we focus on surveillance orders issued in 2016, 2017, and now our new request in 2018, and 2019. emily asked the executive office of the attorneys to give us a copy of every order that was issued for location
surveillance. we spent more than a year litigating this case and the answer so far has been we don't know. the department of justice says there's nowhere to search for these things. and we tried beyond the answer that was originally given that said they couldn't find it to from the general database. they never disputed that they actually have the records, the surveillance orders are obviously used by the prosecutors who are executing their cases. and so we pride further and said well can we focus on a particular office. maybe the most sophisticated offices in the country like the u.s. attorney's office here in d.c. or the southern district of new york. let's look at them how what is their method for tracking. both of them came back and said basically know, we don't track this at all. and also we can't search our electronic files because we have so many files and if we search them it will break our computer. so we can't do our work.
so we can't find those files and we are currently challenging. they say there's no way to search the electronic records of the prosecutor's office, the federal agencies. but we also went further, we said do these large sophisticated offices can't search their electronic files because there is so many, how about the smallest u.s. attorney office and the whole u.s. and that is in oklahoma. they also basically said no we can't search that due to litigation, we have been worn that that office have a grandson total of 1 terabyte of files. and that's from its prosecutors and they can't search it. so currently we hope to get an order, federal order that will force them to go through some of these records and identify some of the orders that they do have. we know that prosecutors in some of these offices have been beginning to integrate these files into their case management and other database systems. and simultaneously there is been an effort in d.c., by
jason leopold and the committee for the freedom of the press to unseal old surveillance orders for closed cases, and as a result of that, i case it was brought around the same case as ours, there is now an agreement between the district of columbia retro court and the u.s. attorney's office in the d.o.j. here, to issue basically unsealing orders and reports twice a year that categorize all of the surveillance applications that are filed. so you can actually find these now on the district of columbia district court website. understanding orders that you can see a list, for example if you look at the report that was filed last april you see a list for six month. of every surveillance application that was filed in federal court in d.c. that includes information about whether it's an order for cell phone location, if it's an order for e-mail records or whatever the like.
so again, there is no question these orders exist, we're just trying to uncover them to add to the public information about surveillance and how prevalent this activity is. because we frankly just don't know enough about how often these authorities are used. and the bigger conversation about what legal restrictions should be in place over these different types of surveillance. i think it is critical to have that type of information. but i did note earlier that we did learn through our earlier case the day it was issued the computer crimes division of d.o.j. issued guidance to all that are a prosecutors that says you do have to obtain warrants to get this type of cell phone location data. you can find more information about this on our firstname.lastname@example.org. there is also a case in france and other materials if you want to learn more about it. thank you. [applause]
[background noises] >> thank you and before we had to lunch, our second flash talk is going to be from gabriel at the committee of freedom of the press. those who are old enough right to recall may remember that once upon a time it was fairly unusual for a leak in classified information to record porters. to result in a prospects fusion of a laker. it is understood that this was a way of doing business in a society where function sometime required that classified information would make its way into the newspapers. but over the last decade we have seen an explosion of the use of the espionage act that was passed to target spies. used as a way of going after the press. reporters trying to track that
and will provide some detail of that explosion of prosecutions. >> thank you julian, and thanks for having us here. we are here to talk about the treatment of journal sources as spies under the law. the reporters community is an honorable organization were legal services organization were our attorneys provide pro bono services for journalists across the country. primarily an open records cases, and court access cases, that we were formed almost 50 years ago in response to an unprecedented wave of subpoenas to journalists seeking to compel them to disclose the identity of anonymous sources. and the reason why that is important to newsgathering, is pretty obvious. if you can't confirm, if you can't assure your source of
confidentiality, then they won't be your source. the sources dry up, and newsgathering as a whole is hard. and so this particular issue, the use of spying laws, is specifically that 1917 espionage act that was passed shortly after america's into world war i against journalistic sources is a core component of this mission to protect newsgathering and to protect reporters source confidentiality. i don't have a lot of time, so i'm going to be pretty high level. but i was going to do, you can see this is one of a few resources we have put together on our websites at our cfp.org. you can go to the tracks, the plural for ration of these cases over time and specifically over the last decade. there's this, there's also a
comprehensive chart that we put together that lists all of the media leak cases, not just under the espionage act, but going back to the founding of the country. cases where there has been a confrontation between the press and the government over efforts to disclose the identity of confidential reporting sources. so we urge you to please look at that. talking with the f spin on jacks, we are talking about something relatively specific. as i say the espionage act was passed in 1917, there was express debate during the congressional deliberation and before passage of that law over whether it would apply, or confer power to the president at that.retro wilson, to actually block the publication of the national defense information and newspapers exponentially
punish it after the fact. congress expressly rejected those provisions. but the law has evolved over time to include provisions that apply to traditional spying. the transfer or sale of military defense secrets to hostile foreign powers. but the ultra provisions that read in isolation, simply applied to either the transfer by a person with authorize access to military defense information, or person with unauthorized access to defense information to a person not authorized to receive it. and those provisions, as i say when in isolation and literally would apply to the lake of military defense information to a reporter. historically, prosecutors have forewarned from using these laws in that way. throughout the entirety of the
cold war, there were a smattering of cases, the vast majority were unsuccessful. you can see in this chart, starting around world war ii, there were two cases that were actually expressly contemplated against the press. one of them a grand jury was convened in chicago to potentially prosecute a war correspondent and the chicago tribune for publishing a story about the battle of midway. the grand jury in that case and refused to indict because ultimately the navy would not provide code breakers to testify in front of the grand jury because of proof possible harm they did not indict in that case. this second case resulted in much reduced chargers. in 1957 there is a case, against in the first express cage under the espionage act
against an army colonel involved in jupiter missile program. again his case was resolved under much reduced charges and he was permitted to continue to serve. and then in 1971 you had the most well-known case the pentagon papers prosecution of daniel ellsberg and anthony russo, and again that case read was an dismissal because of government misconduct. and then finally in the mid- 1980s there is a case with samuel morrison and that resulted in the conviction, but after lobbying campaign after he had served his sentence, his conviction was upheld on appeal. in the late 1980s, after he had served his sentence, senator patrick lobbying clinton for a pardon, nothing because it is notorious in the case but because of the singularity of his conviction and the leaks happen all the time and prosecution at that.were exceedingly rare. then in the early to thousands', you had a couple
of cases that sensibly involved leaks, but they were not pure, they were not exactly like the morrison case. yet one case involving an american israel committee, two plays there an alleged conspiracy with the pentagon analyst to disclose information about iran. there were allegations in that case of disclosures to the press, that case also resulted in much reduced charges for the insider, the pentagon analyst. and also for the two employees. and then there was the valerie claim disclosure that resulted in the prosecution of scooter libby and that case started as a leak case and are not the espionage act but under a law that i will briefly touch on in the second that is specifically applies to the disclosure of the identity of undercover intelligence officers.
and again that case resulted in the conviction of libby under false statements. but it wasn't a purely leak case. since 2009, starting with a case against fbi linguist that ramped up in 2010, there has been 18, what i am talking pure source cases in the sense that these cases have not all resulted in conviction or ultimate charges under the espionage act, but they are all based on the public disclosure of government secrets through the press. rather than what we would consider traditional spying. those 18 cases include the names that we have talked about already including chelsea manning, edward snowden, they also include for instance general david petraeus, who accepted a plea
agreement, but also in a leak case. and so those cases break down pretty equally between two administrations. which is kind of an important.to make. this is not limited to the trump administration, the investigation that led to the cases since 2009 started under the bush administration. but under the obama administration, you son nine or 11 of these cases again depending on how you count. so again i would urge you to go to the website because i will not get into the numbercrunching, it can be kind in the weeds. but we are basically talking about 18 pure source cases and then to other cases that looks slightly different in that they involve public disclosure of these secrets. not traditional spying but not in the journalistic context. why this case they'll talk about it in his second period so you had 911 cases under
obama, the trump administration's continues to bring these cases. there's a couple of things to note. if the obama administration had several direct confrontations between the press and the government. there were a number of subpoenas issued to reporters, not just the day verizon subpoena which is probably the most well-known. there was also an associated press subpoena that covered more than 30 phone lines used by potentially more than a hundred reporters and it results in a search warrant that was sought in the chain for the gmail of a national security reporter in another case. became case. both of those instances resulted in changes to internal guidelines of the d.o.j., governing lane and prosecutors can investigate the price. so the obama administration had that and then the trump administration there's a number of these cases brought at this. they're 18 or 20 depending on
how you count. if there are 11 or nine under obama, and the rest are under the trump administration. but there is one case and or the trump administration where records are sought directly from a reporter. and that's the james wolf case the former secretary director for the intelligence committee. so that's the record as we have it now. as i said, i don't have a lot of times let me quickly touch on the two cases that are worth watching. both of which have been brought into the trump administration. the first is the prosecution of daniel hale. he is a former contractor and the intelligence community. and he is being charged under the espionage act and under provision of the espionage act that specifically applies to it signal intelligence he has
been linking information about drone information. so for the first time in a number of years, hale is seeking to dismiss his indictment expressly on first amendment grounds. but he is making arguments that haven't been made before. in the morrison case, in the mid- 1980s, there is only one case. and mr. morrison made arguments seeking to dismiss the charges against him. both the district court and the appellate court in the fourth circuit, rejected this argument saying that the effect on newsgathering from charging journalistic sources, was effectively hypothetical. mr. morrison i'm sorry mr. hale now is arguing that we now have a record since 2009 of these cases being brought and then being one, but it did not exist during the morrison case. it remains to be seen whether that will be successful, but is a live argument and live prosecution of one of these cases.
the second case but i should cover is the indictment of julian, the founder of the wikileaks. this case poses complexities, he was indicted initially under one count of conspiracy to hack into sipper nets, this secret level classified network maintained by the department of defense. that charge is complicated because it included, it's a conspiracy claim and the increments of underlying that is solicitation of classified information. but it requires the government allege and prove an overactive service of that and that was to crack a password. it was a chink in the door. in that case. however, that one charge was then supplemented in an additional indictment last may with 17 charges under the
espionage act. the 17 charges are not based on the password cracking allegation, and further three of the charges, and this is really what is relevance, three of the charges are based on what i have called a true publication theory. at the little legal, but what i mean is the government needs to show a guilty act. something that you do that triggers liability under the espionage act. that act in three of the charges in this case is simply the posting of classified information online. it's the first time that the federal government has successfully obtained an indictment under a pure publication theory. and the government has tried to distinguish it by arguing that the case is different because wikileaks when they publish the chelsea manning material, failed to redact the names of assets and informants -- u.s. assets and informants. that is true they said is an
at the : practical distinction between wikileaks and the other news organizations that reported on the same material. it is not a legal distinction and there is nothing in the way the government has pled these charges that would preclude bringing charges under similar theory against a news organization for publishing classified information. so i have 13 minutes left, i have ten seconds left. [laughter] so let me just conclude by appointing into our website are cfp.org where we have a number of resources both deep dives analyzing cases in the initial indictment of the superseding indictment. we have a chart which is at this.hundreds of pages long. there's a lot of cases from the 19th century involving congress of all things, and you can find that's on our website as well. and then the project is a
weekly newsletter that follows these cases and probably excruciating detail. so it urge you to subscribe to that as well. thank you very much. [applause] >> thanks much gabe, it is now time to feed our bellies as well as our ravenous intellects with lunch. which will be held upstairs in the george m gager conference center. and you will find second floor restrooms beyond right there. and then as we return here, we will start with our afternoon block of flash talk in the auditorium at 1:00 o'clock p.m. so for those here in person, please try to be back here by one. for those watching at home if you either want to come join us in person you can or if you want to turn your stream back on c restart at 1:00 o'clock eastern time. and thank you again for joining us here.
[background noises] congress returns to work the first week of january. here's what's ahead. the houses yet to decide on impeachment managers and send the articles of impeachments over to the senate. eventually, the senate will sit as a jury to hear the case against president trump. we also expect the senate to take up the u.s. mexican canada trade agreements, know as usmca which the house approved before leaving for the holidays. and congress will hear president trump deliver the state of the union address on february 4. watch the house live on c-span and the senate live on cspan2. :
[inaudible] >> one thing or issue i would like to see the upcoming presidential candidate address is the current injustices that are going on in our country whether video was placed on instagram or even in the white house or even by people in the current office but i feel like those issues need to be addressed. >> the issue important to me for 2020 is climate change because i want to be able to visit coral reefs in my lifetime and not have them be beach. >> something i want the candidates to thing about is the
lack of funding and the lack of actual issues in our government and how we are just as important as the universities [inaudible] >> the most important issues right now are both healthcare and on campaign finance and government. healthcare i do think we should move towards improving [inaudible] we are not fully seen the vision of universal healthcare and making it simple and more affordable and i like to see that extended to some single-payer, medicare system and campaign-finance system to make addresses [inaudible] >> voices from the road on c-span.