tv Politics Public Policy Today CSPAN December 12, 2014 3:00pm-5:01pm EST
we were talking about earlier. i bought a fit bit and i didn't think about all the places that that data would be. i don't really care who has the data and how many steps i take, but we quantified self last year that looked at the data and all the different places and the different vulnerabilities that we go through. when you start getting into other health characteristics and who knows how they will be used. until you have people being aware of it and raising concerns. it will be hard to get traction to come up with solutions because there is not going to be that outside force driving it. people need to understand even what they are giving off with their phone. who has read an entire thing when they clicked accept on an
app? i'm not banging them, but we need to get people focused on the data going out there. >> this is two-fold. what was brought up, does the fcc have the capacity to manage the prioritization and distribution of the spectrum or are they thinking about the issue? to what degree the governance play with the global nature of iot? >> i will take a step. it's usable and on time. some shouldn't exist at all.
everybody is here and i think that's technically true although they have enforcement and improper use and so forth. there these passes set aside for shared use and technology knows how to hop around and it detects interference and finding unused portions and any systems that have a certain resilience. i don't think that is necessarily going to be a big thing in terms of solving the problems, but others may have other perspectives on that. >> the prioritization with a couple programs around the federal partnership with communications as well as the 50 net program looking at when we instrument these up, how do we understand and provide allocations through for example, the first responders. everyone is at the scene of the fire streaming that video back up to you tube where as the fire
department would like to stream it back to the inbound truck. how do we ensure that there is proper allocation to places where potentially it could provide the most good or should there just are a separate set all together. this is still in a research-development phase of discussion and deployment right now. >> hi. we talked a lot about capability. i'm wondering who is leading on the issues of data ownership through the life cycle of the data and liability. who are those star lawyers that are helping you along the way to build that in like you need to build security in. >> i'm not a lawyer, i'm an engineer, but it dove tails from the question earlier. from that perspective, we are interested in can we provide
are you a lawyer? that's better than the usual rate. >> i never practiced a day in my life. do i get credit for that? >> yes. i can't say that. >> right now it's really extensive with the internet privacy. i haven't seen it and i may have missed it. let's look at the ownership of stick with my date as it moves around the world. i think that's coming. all of this is i i i feel like we are at the leading edge of technology and policy on this. >> [inaudible]. >> there was a debate among economists and one famous
economist said that we saw information technology everywhere but in the productivity statistics. the good news is he was wrong. the people buy things for a while. you don't see a benefit. because they have to figure out how to use them and innovate. then you got a burst of economic growth that drove the u.s. economy for about a decade. i'm hopeful that we can get this stuff right and it may not be as distinguishable as the it revolution, but we see a similar fufrt. this was an increase to income. with that, that's the goal here for us. thinking of all the issues we talked about, security privacy standards and international cooperation, but i think we are on the path to maybe do this. i found it to be an excellent panel. i don't know about you, but i
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firstname.lastname@example.org. join the conversation. like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. >> wednesday the committee held their second public hearing on diplomatic security. assistant secretary of state greg star provided an update saying the department implemented 25 of 29 recommendations made bite accountability review board. they also said that the installations are safer today, but that security risks remain. the state department inspector general also provided testimony. representative gowdy chair this is two hour and 40 minute hearing.se
>> we have two witnesses and everybody else who has been waiting. blame me for the delay. that would be the quickest and easiest thing to do. we apologizet and i will do my best to start on time. this is hearing number two reviewing efforts to secure u.s. diplomatic facilities and personnel. the committee will come to the order. the chairman notes a forum ommit taking testimonyte pursuant to e number and house rule number. i will recognize myself and the gentlemen from maryland.tember o in september of 2012, americans were kill and others were lled injured in an attack on our facility in benghazi, libya. shawn smith and woods and chris, stevens died under the
circumstances most of us cannot gather om. >> i wanted to ask my colleague. to even not just to the words, but having to live through or die through the experience.11 on september 11th 2o 12 at 9:45 p.m., 20 or more men engaged in the mission. several members have been embas identified among this sygroup.la the attackers were armed with ak 47 rifles and rock-propelled s. grenade launchers. they were set onfire fire. the fire set during the attack led to the deaths of ambassadorn stevens and remaining personnelt escaped to a nearby facility. and also came under attack and continued throughout the early i morningch hours of september 11
12th, culminating in a mortar . attack with tyrone woods and doherty. it's the now official position of the government. filed in u.s. district court by the department of justice with the that will stand trial. wea thepo weapons of war are terrort groups and it is interesting to note the use of the word terrorist so rarely used in the days and weeks by people in ry r positions of power. charging the very defendant ell accused ofam tilling our four t fellow americans. th ien terrorists resulted in death. that's the official charge, theg officiale, position of the unit
states. in the days after the attack, the word terrorist was changed t and nowhe they use the word haz attack. in the days after, they edited a out and changed the word attack. it's one thing to have it initially and effectual low geti it right. it's another thing to change i so that it is wrong. i remain keenly aware that thost questions have been answered.s r there is nothing left to do and no more do you means to review. it is worth noting that the samn folks didn't think they should have been looked at in the first place.gree. i disagree.not t i don't think we should move on
until there is an understanding of how the security environmen described by our own government. and court documents was allowed to exist. i don't think we should move on until we understand why we werel told special precautions should be taken prior to the anniversary of 9/11. what precautions were taken? where? by whom? why were we told the facility was secure when we now know that was false. it wasn't true. we should not move on until there is a complete understanding of why asks for security were denied and by whom and why an ambassador trusted us in a dangerous land was not trusted to know what security he needed to do his job.
it has been two years and you know the request for additional equipment were denied, but we ad don't have a full understandinga and weve did not move on until there is a complete until understanding. andle why the official position of our government is so different today than in the days and the weeks after benghazi. the facts and the evidence has not changed. it changed a lot.a this hearing will ensure the recommendations made after the o effects are implemented and i will process worthy of the memory of the four who were n bg killed and worthy of the respece of our fellow citizens.but i pledge that we are going to keep asking questions until we have a complete understanding of what happened. to that stend, we will have hearings in january, february, h
and march and until that leaves access to all the do you means and all the witnesses with knowledge. this committee will be the last. best hope for answering the kwesz sounding the attacks.nd u we my wind up answering questions more than once. we may risk answering a question twice.ven an that seems like what others have given and are currently giving. that i would recommend. you, >> thank you very much. for holding the hearing and our he was hearing on this topic and 3r0 posed my congressman.
these demonstrate and continue with both democrats and republicans to make our embassyc safe. as i have often said, this is our watch. this is not about today or tomorrow. so we all take this assignment seriously. over t the course of 18 months investigations, first by the byt independent accountability and then by what changes from the diplomats overseas. as we have also when it comes to benghazi, too many people are n
unaware that questions have been answered or are unwilling to accept answers. our ben gazao the record, they centralize in one place these answers. since we met, the house from the committee on intelligence public low released the bipartisan unanimously adopted report. as we explain, this report and the nearly two years of what they reflect is meant to serve on the intelligence communitiesr activities before before,
during, and after that caused the deaths before brave americans. and the quote. they join the previous conclusions of the se armed republican-led house armed services committee by the military's readiness and responses and attacks.e to our committees view and accept the findings as we do not think there is a reason for this reine committee to revrth these facts. repeated by the republican and democratic colleagues and kwander millions of hardworking dollars that come from hardworking taxpayers. appre we appreciate they decided to focus on the constructively an reform. instead of the same ground theya
investigatedte. investigated in a way that perhaps one would look at it er under a high powered microscope. we urge them to keep the focus on these efforts and not be lured off by politics. we are p bigger than that and better than that. i appreciate you for the discussions where you have agreed by the end of the year to give us the scope and the scopee of what we will be looking at and come to conclusions so we can focus on what needs investigating. you agreed with the rules of the committee and you and i agre tes it's nice to u have structure because it helps to deal with issues that may come up.
immediately after the attack, they conducted a pliftering examination of what went wrong i and identified 29 recommendations for reform. secretary clinton accepted every one of them. they expected the that the department waste no time.during during the first hearing three r months rago, assistant secretar star testified that the department imposed 22 of the rb's 29 recommendations. since then, the department has continued making steady progress. i'm pleased to hear that.m plea it closed three more recommendations and continues to make progress on the remaining
four. the department has delivered fire safety equipment to all buo one high threat post and it affirmed compliance and safe area in overcities facilities. a they have all but one high but threat posts.irmed it affirmed compliance with the safe hachs. they fount that of the last one may have contributed to the tragic consequences that night. i hear that the department has completed this recommendation since our last meeting and endai closed theon recommendation forc increasing diplomatic staffing identified by the arb.e new mr. star's testimony indicates
that the department intends to complete all of the remaining new hires by early 2015. they also instituted the threat or training for high risk postsp andos created a working group t develop joint risk management forces further addressing shortcomings that the arv identified with regard to the r training and expertise of the department personnel.look f ior am looking forward to heari about the work that remains to be done. we are joined by inspector living in a september 2013 report. his office made several commen recommendations thatda overlapp to a large degree with the recommendatio
recommendation. ics six are now closed. they have weather the they made the changes and they are communicating effectively and k decision making authority is centralized and clear. regarding due process, the general's office examined the 12 convened following the 1998 embassy bombings through the benghazi attacks. they concluded that they operats independently and without bias to identify vulnerabilities in g the security programs. the inspector general recommended and it was my mmenda understanding that they had those recommendations that are ongoing.as i c as i close, one of these recommendations was for the department to amend the foreigna affairs to kmugzallize the
report that noticed and i quote, the panelling of benghazi represented a significant departure from the previous norm in that secretary clinton took charge of the implementation process. the inspector general found thal the high level attention devoted to this and i quote, establisheo a model for how the department should handle future mr recommendations. i am interested in. hearing fm you about the recommended change. to that end i yield back. >> the gentlemen from maryland.> the committee will receive testimony from the witness panel. the firstnk will be gregory b d star, the assistant secretary at the department of state.onorable the second will be the honorablo inspector general for the department of state.general welcome to both of you and apologies for you having to wait
on me. you are recognized for the-minute opening.you wi thell light what is they and traditionally mean in life. >> thank you, chairman and ranking member and distinguishe members. thank you for updating me on the accountability review bort. the inspector worked closely with the bureau on many issues,a some of which they highlighted for discussion today. i am focussed on the benghazi i issues, i hope there insights m into howe the report works to . improve security around the world. the task of keeping u.s.
personnel overseas is dynamic dn and an evolving process. we work to protect our practices andour our people.t it's an important tool towards the goal and today we are safer and more secure because of the recommendations of the benghazie panel and other it is.ogress o >> the progress is punishable and many of the lessons are further incorporated into of t policy. of the 29, we closed 25 of them. that includes we closed since septemb september, my last testimony. we are committed to finishing m that workk, y and teto do so on final four recommendations and will not lose sight on the improvements that have been fewx implemented. d like to highlight what
has been done since the attacks of benghazi. we have more security and department defense personnel ont the ground onme thent facilitie today. we have increased the high nts y threat course. we have expanded the foreign affairs counter threat because x we recognized that the value of these skills extends to all service personnel or other employees that are posted overseas. they'reas. skills to make us sa and make them safer. there broader and more proper attic changes, that i discussed is the launch of the validationp process and the short hand is bp 2. the state department asked itself hard questions to balancr the risk and the benefits at the highest threat posts. the end result is a clear eyed c
risk assessmenlet of whether th u.s. should operate in the locations and if so, how do we operate? where the process determines at that u.s. national interests requires us to operate at dangerous posts, they prioritizz them toes do so. the steps we have take tone implement the recommendations underscore an important point. our porn policy demands we send our people to work in places that are perilous. we cannot eliminate risk.reats the threats evolve.itie the works of securing the facilities and safeguarding the people is never complete. we we are committed to the recommendations and meeting the newo challenge ns and threats
they develop. the best assets are our people. the highly trained officers and security personnel are out in the field every day executing th theye policy.ks for t they deserve the credit that they do on our behalf. it's our job to do what we can o to reduce what we face as the assistant secretary for face. security, i am committed to keeping our people as safe as possible. i know the committee as well ask the inspectors general office shares our commitment in makingm that aktrue. as keeping our people as safe as possible. with that i would be happy to answer questions about the implementation of the arb. m >> thank youem for the opportuny to testify regarding our are yoi view of the process and associated work we conducted in recent years on security-related
matters. the efforts related to rity, inspection and targeting . security matters. we inspect posts and use matters at each one. my comments today, i will each addresson the process and discu findings based on the other security-related work. in september 2013, oig publishep the report on the review of the accountability process. by the process by which they are m' staffed and conducted. the special review examined the manner in which they track the f implementation of the o recommendations. we found that follow-through on long-term security program improvements with physical security, training and intelligence sharing lacked oversight by the department's principals. theby lack of follow-through ou explains in part why a number of
benghazi recommendations mirror previous arb recommendations and concluded that the recommendations worked best for the secretary of state and other department principals take ownership of the process. oig special review made 20 oig formal recommendations in may of 2014. i notified the deputy secretary of state with the status of the recommendations and provided additional suggestions intendedv to enhance the effectiveness of the arb process. although some of recommendations related to the review in my latest suggestion that remains unresolved president. they found evidence that they made progress in addressing the security concerns. during fiscal year 2o 15, we will be conducting a formal cer. follow-up review on compliance p with our own recommendations anr with benghazi arb recommendations. in addition to the arb review process, oig issued a variety of
reports covering significant security matters. i take this opportunity to highlight. of the first relates to physical security deficiencies.de they demonstrate that the department is at increased lisc because it lacks the processes and planning to ensure that the department fully understands that the security needs and ient priority that is it posts around the world. if they cannot identify the vulnerabilities, it cannot plan budget for or implement solutions. in 2012, oig conducted a serieso of audits and posts located in europe, latin america and africa that identify deficiencies and one consulate that require one immediate attention and a numbee of these were designated high threat. oig auditors found that they were not in compliance with the department's physical and procedural security standards.md security deficiencies common nda among the postt included amongn othersda the failure to meet far
perimeter requirements and eet properly conduct inspections before entering posts.entering the most egregious programs identified in recent inspections isfi the use of warehouse space and other remote facilities for offices that do not comply witho standards and places personnel at great risk.es the second area of concern involves exception and the waivers granted from compliance standards.s. oig said they had not maintained exception in waiver records. in addition, oig found that the bureau of security was not atics monitoring post to determine e h whether they were obtaining waivers from deviations from e a standards.rtat remeetiating that condition at this time.concer >> then 30 is stove piping security issues although the bureaus of diplomatic security and the building operation share responsibility for ensuring physical security needs.s they don't adequately
coordinate. the fourth issue of concern relates to vetting of local guards. local guards are a critical part of security overseas. they are posted outside or inside the embassy and responsible for searching vehicles. none of the contractors ully performed to what was specified. they secured the personnel overaccess. security issues have been and p continue to be a pop priority from my office.ov i want to thank my staff for professionalism and commitment. i look forward to engage with the department in the matters to mitigate risk and avoid future incidents like the attacks that occurred. the chairmanhe and ranking memb cummings and members thank you again for the opportunity to
testify today.g i look forward to your commit questions. >> thank you.ok the chair will recognize the f gentle lady from indian a zes ms. brooks.airman >> thank you both for appears and your service to our country. as the inspector general and all inspector generals for all agencies, would it be correct tk say that generally you are to charged with ensuring and in this case that the state t department is effectively managed and accountable for itst decisions.ha is that what inspector generals do? >> yes. >> uk talked about h theea way do that is conduct audits and l evaluations and inspections.havn you just mentioned some of those. is that correct? >> you are like the police department for an agency and for the state department not
specifically? >> yes.pointed >> you are not appointed by the? secretary of state? >> i was appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate? >> when. >> september of 2013.ber >> you have complete independence, don't you, from the state department and the t decisionshe they make. >> we are independent. >> before that as i understand, we are focused on fraught. >> i was for 16 years. >> in your finding that you nd n under took of the arb, it's my a understanding that you felt and this is quoting, your most in important finding that the oversight of thendin arb recommendations must be at the highest levels with them in the department. is that correct? >> that's correct.rrect. >> what highest level were youf referring to.eris. >> at least at the deputy ? secretary level. >> in your opinion, is that
where this implementation of the arb stands at this point? >> that remains an unresolved recommendation. we did receive ededrevisions to foreign affairs man mull and ok looking at them now. t >> so in that recommendation, t that was made by the ige and the man mull should state to other employees that they will be undertaken at a minimum secretary of state or the deputy secretary? >> that is correct. >> so you stated that in fact they provided that to you recei yesterday. >> yes, we did receive a revision to the foreign affairsn manual, but have not analyzed it yet. it remains unresolved. >> let's talk about closed and e findings whe the inspector ynl o makes recommendations and brings
sporting their findings, they are in comfortable categories, is that correct?cate >>go that is correct.t's >> unresolved, closed, resolved. >> exactly. yes.re >> can you share what unresolved means. >> there two buckets.means open recommendations and closedo recommendations.cl open recommendations can eithern come in two forms. they can be resolved or unresolved. if the departmentsolv agrees wi recommendation that will be opeo and resolved. it will not be closed until the department proves to us and and verifies that it has been implemented. open recommendation which is unresolved means the department disagrees with the oig and we don't have resolution on that. ' it remains open as well. approximately how many open and
unresolved recommendations are there? >> in the arb report? >> yes. >> at this time there seven unresolved and like i said, a couple of theam might change. that means we are going to th another inspection to see our recommendations.n >> is that common extra that do you reviews of your recommendatio recommendations? >> we don't also.er it's resource intensive and typically what would happen is the department would say here's documentation showing that e implemented it and we close it.fol it's alo different animal becau we do a separate audit and do interviews and test whether or a not implementation occurred.oc it is not something we do
frequently. we do it where we recommend them and they are significant or felt that the com clins. >> when you do the review, do e you look into recommendations that have been closed?tions th >> yes. we look at all of the the recommendations. from soup to nuts to see where they stand. just because we closed them because we have documentation, we are going to go behind that documentation and verify whether in fact it has been implemented you aware as to whether they did what they are doing with yo respect tou' physical security c our embassies. >> i believe our office has donb compliance and follow-up reviews. >> i a a number of them were also in the nairobi.bi >> absolutely. we did see a number of repeat
recommendations from training to enhance the marine security guard program to inner agency eg and sharing and so forth. ob >> there have been when arb recommendations are made with cn the state department closed or agreed with the recommending as and we had the same problem. >> that's correct. >> in 2012.s >> that's correct. >> with respect to the close and there a number of closed t do y recommendations, what do you expect to happen -- what does closed mean? we talk about open and unresolved. what does that mean? >> closed means they provided documentation to prove that they have complied with the they' recommendation in the compliance follow-up review, we will interview and lock more closelyd and drill down to see whether or not it is in fact closed. so closed is a preliminary d conclusion if you will about thi status of the recommendation.
>> in fact when would you have received or made the decision that something was closed or not closed? >> we would make that decision after our compliance follow-up team. we have a team that does this di and reviews the documentation ha and then determines whether tham documentation meets the intent of our recommendation.ntent >> as late as june of 2014, you just mentioned physical security deficiencies, exceptions in pind waivers, stove piping and vetting of local guards are still unresolved and are notnd closed. >> those were recommendations from o other reports. in other words, so we have done the arb review and focused on process and focused on how they implemented the recommendations and issued a number of other ret reports that capture lack of compliance with standards that capture inadequate vetting of
local guards and there is a whl bunch more with the reports andt they are at various stages of closure, etc. >> the best practices panels most important, you are familiar with the best practices panel that happened after the arb. are you not? >> i am indeed. >> in fact it too indicated thaf elevating the importance of security and making diplomatic security an equal partner was ei the most important that recommendation. is that correct? >>ct i believe that was the recommendation number one.hat >> yet we learned at the last hearing theyej rejected that recommendation. has there been a change from the last hearing to today? >> we are not monitoring compliance with the commen recommendation. i don't know the answer to that do question. >> do you know with respect to the exact recommendation and nd that is the fact that we believe
and that panels have made the t, recommendation that in fact all of the implementation of the various recommendations should be made aton one of the highest levels. these are the principals, is that correct? the principals? under the secretary of state? >> yes, that is correct. >> in fact the oversight in thet implementation is being made ine the office of management policy is that correct? >> they are tracking the implementation. >> that's actual low what mr. star said. tracking just means is it being done. is that correct? >> we think that the deputy t t ought to take responsibility fo the oversight of the tha implementation that she take responsibility for making sure that those recommendations are followed through and that there' is funding to make sure they are complete and adequately shared t among the state department stat communities. everybody knows whatco they are
and why they are important. that's what we are seeking witha our particular recommendation. t >> do you know who at the state department at the time that thet rejected that recommendation and that recommendation was rejected, do you know who at th state department made that decision to reject that reject recommendation? >> the sullivan recommendation m or our recommendation? >> both. the recommendation to reject that the deputy secretary should be the level responsible for of implementing all of these s recommendations. >> i don't know who if anyone rejected that. i know the deputy secretary is considering our recommendation and in fact i believe like i il said there is a revision to the foreign affairs manual which apparently does embody that.embo we haven't closed that yet because we haven't had the opportunity to analyze and assess it. >> do you know who made that tie
decision at the time? >> i don't believe that there was a decision not to comply with the recommendation. two things. one, it was the secretary himself who ultimately decided that we did not need the under secretary after consideration e through various levels of the department.in in terms of the implementation of the arb, the paperwork that we put forward to modify does see this it is the deputy secretary for management oversi resources who will be the for oversight officer for arbs. me if you would permit me for a second, this is a change to the fans. i have been in multiple meetings since the arrival of deputy puty secretary higen bottom and i wat in multiple meetings where the deputy wasto taking direct char of the oversight of the ect implementation of the arb
recommendations. the fact that the managed mpri group is the staff that is tracking them and bringing these up and presenting them to the deputy secretary. we have had m meetings where myself, major embassy officers from all the major bureaus, the deputy secretary heading the meeting, s plus the cti, plus the other bureaus have been involved, i think it is very clear that the deputy secretary in the highesti levels have been involved in thi implementation of the arb. what we are doing now is making sure it is codified in the fams. ab thank you, mr. chairman, and i would like to add, it is aboue time. >> thank you, the chairman now recognizes the gentlewoman from california, mrs. sanchez. >> i want to follow up on this line of question with respect to the physical security of ssy a embassies and missiondn facilities. two of the past arb
recommendations that remain open if i'm not mistaken are from th9 1999 nairobi arbs. and in the arbs they recommend that physical security upgradese be made immediately. and that state work to obtain sufficient funding for buildingn programs, because that was a f need that was identified.need and as a result of those recommendations, the capital security ccost-sharing program was initiated to pay for the of cost of building new embassies and consulates.t is c is that correct? >> that is correct. >> with funding constraints and other challenges delaying efforts to better secure its facilities how is the state faci department addressing the need to provide necessary security at this point? >> congresswoman, i want to thank you for the question. congress has been extraordina extraordinariextraordinar
extraordinarily generous with the department. weombing in nairobi we've constructed major facilities around the world.adet we have doneo major upgrades te our facilities around the worldt that we could not replace right at the moment. there is not a post out there that doesn't have anti-realm pra walls and guard gates and forcet entry doors and windows, shatter-resistant window films.. now after the additional implementations, we have been considering since 1985 and increasing the programs. i think that the funding that wl originally got under the capital cost-sharing program was about $1.3 billion a year. and by 2012 and 2013, instead of the original six or eight 013, facilities that we were buildin a year we were building perhaps one or two. build perhaps three because of ere
inflation costs.s t after benghazi, congress was again, very con generous with t department and has authorized almost another billion dollars.a and we are now again on an enhanced building program, enhac building about six or seven newr facilities a year. so i would say that while that recommendation remained open technical technically, the department, with the help of congress, has done an amazing job enhancing the safety and security of our people through the years.he i will notanty and say that it perfect. clearly, i'm here and my job is to implement reforms after nt benghazi and lessons that we've learned. we've made mistakes there. but for the vast majority of places i would tell you that the recommendations that came out of nairobi bombings, we have f carefully been trying to those implement those and congress hao been very helpful. >> could you give me an itm, mr. star, because it is a big job te go baccak and renovate faciliti
and bring themo up to modern nd security standards. could you estimate the amount of facilities you're talking about in terms of dealing with the success and security of those buildings, ballpark figure? >> there are 275 embassy consulate and consulate generals. there are approximately ten other missions. the facilities that make up those missions number over a thousand different buildings. >> it is quite an undertaking to consistently be upgrading their facility. would that be a fair statement? >> i think that is a fair statement. >> now, the benghazi arb found that they must work with congress to restore the cautionary security program at its full capacity. could you talk about the history of the funding and why congress needed to restore the full level capital cost sharing? >> thank you, congresswoman. as i alluded to just a moment
ago, the original costs coming out of the nairobi and darsalom were approximately $3.1 billion level a year. and in 2000 and 2001 as we geared up the program, that gave us the ability to work with eight or nine facilities a year or individual buildings at least and do security upgrades. but that funding level was constant until about 2012. and increased building costs, inflation and other things had reduced what we could do with that $1.3 billion. so we were hopeful and as i say, congress was very generous in recognizing that that number had been eroded by inflation and after benghazi and i think in line with the arb recommendation worked with the department and
added nearly another billion dollars so that. so we're currently approximately under the $2.3 billion cost-sharing program for the year which has allowed us to replace and work on unsecured facilities. >> thank you, it is important to note that they're playing a role in making sure the facilities are secure. i would like to ask you about temporary facilities. during our previous hearing a number of members had questions about the diplomatic facility in benghazi, whether it was a special mission compound or temporary mission facility and whether the term used meant less stringent security measures applied to that facility. that issue was investigated by the arb and numerous congressional meetings over the last two years. and in our last meeting you quoted, whether it is temporary
or interim or permanent that we should be applying the same security standards that the lspb has put in place is that still your understanding of how the department is applying these standards today? >> yes r, that is a very hard lesson that we learned after benghazi. i can tell you that in one particular location of the world, i won't say it, where we have had to have operations where we were under great pressure to put people in and establish a facility, i turned that down and said we would continue to operate on a tdy basis until such time as we can identify a facility and bring it up to the level of a security in order to declare it a facility and meeting the standards for that type of facility. i got no pushback from the department and in fact got a tremendous amount of support from this. i think you have correctly identified that the benghazi, whatever you call the temporary
facility or the special mission facility, despite efforts to do security upgrades to it, we know that it did not meet all of the standa standards. and we want to avoid a situation like that going forward. >> i just want to point out that mr. lennock, in his written ritn testimony noted in a march 14 audit on funding, that an diplomatic security and the operations bureau have different interpretations of what the required physical security wha standards are for those overseas facilities. and the same ig report notes that in january 2013, the 2013 department clarified that a single standard applies to all facilities. in june, 2013, the department s furthe clarified that the ospb standards set forth the minimume requirements. have there been better communication now between the department and the diplomatic security and overseas building
operations. and finally, sort of an agreed upon standard for what those physical standards should be? >> there is no disagreement on t what thehe physical security y standards should be. those standards are in our rd so foreign affairs manuals and are foreign affairs handbooks, approved by the overseas they security policy board and there is no disagreement on the no standards. we do have different standards i for a -- let's say a stand-alon building or a building that is -- or an office that is a tentative commercial office space, but obo is very clear an understands what those standards are. there isnd no misunderstanding that the standards are what they are, and are there. th i do think that the inspector e generals' inspections have beenv very helpful to us in many wayse although sometimes i will disagree with some of the open recommendations and as steve alluded to we may have some ul
areas where we disagree, tion ultimately we come to an the v agreement on the vast majority of them. in terms of what the inspectors found in some of their reports it is my job as the head of security, when we find security deficiencies that the ig may te find to make sure we're sure addressing them as fast as possible. and the inspectors in one instance did find we had significant differences between obo and ds at a post overseas. i met two days after the inspectors came back with the head of obo. we resolved those differences and made a settlement on the c areas where we need to work.eeta we've taken recommendations vert seriously. >> appreciate your testimony , e yield back. ck >>. thank the gentlelady from rn california, the chair will recognize the gentleman from georgia, mr. westmore.
>> thank you, when had they use the term closed on the recommendations, that does not c mean they are completed, correct? >> i didn't know it was that ia hard a question -- >> as steve alluded to, there is resolve, there is closed, we do our best when we get a da recommendation to look at it. c >> but closed does not mean then recommendation hasda been fully implemented, right? >> closed -- in most cases it means we have in fact effected the change to meet that recommendation. there are some recommendations, i would say, sir, there are that evergreen recommendations. if we put the policies and icie procedures and have to go edures through they may g io on for a longer period of time. >>f ti thank you. you were the diplomatic security from the state department secur through it1980 through your 198t retirement in 2009, is that correct? >> yes, sir,et i was an agent.
>> and from then you went to th head of security for united ritf nations? >> correct, sir. >> and at the u.n. you were thei undersecretary for safety and security, correct? >> yes, sir. >> is it true your office of ir diplomatic security or the ds r and the bureau of overseas secr building operations or the obo are the two offices within the state department that have the e primary duty to ensure the safety and security of these overseas facilities? >> that is an accurate a statement, sir. >> according to the foreign affairs manual, your office is especially charged with responsibility for ensuring thai all new construction and major renovations comply with physical security standards, even thoughl the obo does the actual ob construction, is thato true?ue? >> correct. >> and under which undersecretary is the ds? >> i serve -- i am under i secretary kennedy, the under
undersecretary for management -- >> and who is the undersecretary -- obo? >> yes. >> >>also. and the undersecretary for management, mr. kennedy, has been in a position since november of 2007, i believe? is that correct? you don't know? >> i believe so, sir, but i'm not certain. >> okay, has mr. kennedy been as fare state department as you know from the early '70s >> ide think pat came in, in abt 1975. >> okay. fact, when the east african ene embassies were bombed in 1998, y mr. kennedy was in your position, is that correct? >> at the time of the bombings, sir, mr. recommendation is that we had a vacancy in the position -- he was -- the acting. >> and although you returned toe the state department after the benghazi attacks you are aware that virtually each and every
finding and resulting g recommendation in benghazi arb i centered on the special mission compound or facility being a high threat post. sorely lacking in personnel, and physical security. is that correct? >> i am aware of those . recommendations in the arb, yese >> are you o aware that your ow inspector general, mr. lennock, since benghazi has conducted physical reviews or audits at overseas posts, particularly in these high-threat posts?>> >> yes, y i am, sir. >> are you also aware that the ig issued two other reports, one that looked at how you manage your local guard program and another that looks at how you manage your marine security? l >> yes, sir, i am. >> let's take a look at the ig report issued in june of 2013 l that looked at how you comply n
with the physical security standards at five specific erse overseas posts that are considered high threat. do you recall that report? >> yes, sir. >> as i understand it, that report only looked at embassiest or consulates that were constructed after the year 2000, is that correct? >> i believe so, sir. so after the east african embassy bombings, in 1998, where an arb was sharply critical of o the thenf existing physical phc security standards, is that correct? >> i would say that the inspector general pointed out that there were some deficiencies in not meeting some of the standards. >> that means they were all heye built after congressre passed a secure embassy and construction
counterterrorism act, to improv those security facilities ysical overseas, correct? >> correct. >> so they looked at the it security posts that had a high threat level, and the audit team looked at such things as the height of the perimeter walls, the outside boundary, how far the buildings were from those outside walls. look at the anterim barriers, procedures, or other resistant e doors, whether other guards wer properly abinspecting.ly whether there were safe havens in the building and the like, ie that correct, sir? >> yes, sir. >> so lethe me ask you how the s five embassies or consulates did. embas did any of them comply with all.
of the security standards that s were reviewed? >> no, sir, none of them are nef perfect, but if i may, sir.may, every one of those facilities y has police and guards on the outside. every one of those facilities -- >> my question was had all of them been met, and your answer was no. >> no, sir, i want to make it clear though, that most of the things thethouos inspector gene were found were minor, do not present major vulnerabilities to us. our philosophy v of concentric ring and security -- and i don' expect that any inspector general team going out are not a going to findny some things tha can be improved. understand, but your answer was no? >> correct, sir. ems >> once the problems were identified, took some sort of action to correct all the deficiencies, but you said they were very small deficiencies, i? that correct? >> in relation to what
vulnerabilities they poseed, yes, sir. >> so at least at some of these facilities the problems have been fixed is that correct? >> it is my job to see -- e we s >> are theyee fixed? - >> yes, they- are, they are resolved. >> did the inspector general ask that you issue a directive to all of your posts worldwide to o see whether other posts have thp same problems? >> for some things, yes. >> okay. >> did you agree to do this? >> no, i did not. not. >> okay.okay. i want to follow up on another i review of the physical security-related posts overseas. i understand that your office hired an outside company to review how the state department processes these requests and prioritizes the requests for the physical security upgrades?de >> yes, sir. >> when the auditors looked at
this, did they find a comprehensive list of all of these reports of the deficiencies? >> they didn't find a comprehensive list of security e needs andhe request for securit needs at posts around the world. >> so they didn't find a list o> what may have been called in or asked for? or >> they did not find a list. di >>d okay. were the auditors able to revief a list of these funding requests or lists of which requests were denied or granted?ich >> there was not a list. >> so there was no list. . >> no. th >>ere from ds. no lists? >> we did not find a a comprehensive list of security -- >> mpreobo, no lists? >> no, but i understand that they're working on that now. >> okay. is it true that the auditors isi found that the ds and the obo did not coordinate with each other to department which area i
should be given the priority? >> they did find that in two respects, one, there was eement agreements about the standards which has since been remediate, which mr. star had mentioned. >> so the fact that mr. star anr the obo get together once a wee or month or whatever it is they still have not come up with these lists that could be at cou combined that could beld looked at? >> i don't believe we have seen a comprehensive list, but i'm not entirely sure of that.ack i would have to get back to youo >> do youw know of a type of comprehensive list that would vb have been put into the planning for the long-term future security of the requests that es has been made from these posts? >> i know that the department has agreed to do it and so that recommendation has beendo and resolved. but it still ishat open. >> thank you. i yield back, mr. chairman. y
>> thank the gentleman from georgia. we're going totl now try to go the gentleman from washington, mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i really appreciate the opportunity to -- just a couple can of questions. first of all, one of the allegation is that we have had attacks on our state department, or there have been reports -- basically in the same place. i don't think that is quite accurate.r i think there actually have been improvements in regard to the previous attacks. what improvements have been
made? whatica. responses were made tot to improve our state department facilities abroad?e >> adam, i may get you to act like you're mad and yell a li little bit, i think -- we can t hear you pretty good, but not u great. so if you could just act like we're talking and you're yellino at me. ust >> can you repeat that? >> do you need me to repeat what i just asked?sked >> yes, sir, i think the s witnesses are kindir of leaningr forward. if you could just yell as loud l as you're willing for do it, t, adam. >> i will dm?o it. i'll repeat the question, my question was there have been attacks -- one of the allegations is that after those attacks like the embassy bombing in africa, we issued a report and we just sort of groundhogged that. we don't makee improvements, wep
don't respond. in my reading of what has ed sin happened since some of those previous attacks i don't believs that that is accurate. i was just wondering if the gentleman could outline, i means just taking as one example, the 1998 embassy bombings in africa, what improvements were made as a result of the study of that problem, how much more money wat spent. how are facilities upgraded.p you know, what has been done. first of all prior to benghazi, to actually improve security at our overseas facility. >> congressman, thank you for the question. this isthe greg star. i recognize that there are some similarities in the types of ts recommendations that were made going back through the years on arbs. but i, like you, find it difficult to accept the premise that it is groundhog day, that e we're just revisiting the same
things. as i saidas i before, a tremend amount of progress was made through the years in building new facilities. in training different personnel. in adding local guard programs.u much of this work was done in concert with congress, congress has been very helpful my many ways in terms of funding and oversight. from 1988 to 1992 after the original inman commission, we built 22 new facilities. but then after the cold war thed money sort of dried up and ran out even though we wanted to e build more than a hundred. after the bombings in 1998, the money flow for building new facilities was given to us by ns congress very v generously. and we have replaced a tr tremendous amount of facilities we've never had to give up one of those new facilities that we built yet.ciliti i think the increases we've done
in training for our personnel, additional marine detachment. things like more armored cars and the things that we've done after benghazi.he the better and much closer lose relationships with there tellig intelligence community and the d dod, i think some of those i things youth can say well, were you doing those things after nairobi? weren't some of thoseou things said in the arbs. and there are some similarities. but i think the types of thingss that we're facing are similar as well. and i believe we'll see some ofs the similar types of attacks. and you may get -- even in the future the need for more han training than we're even doing now. so i appreciate the comments that -- because i believe like e you do that while there may be some similarities, this is not ground hog day. we have not -- we have made significant progress since nairobi and dar salom, there are very few recommendations through
all the arbths that have been lt open and the few that are open p we're still looking to close.wet so thank you for the question, sir. >> one ofse. the big issues ab benghazi, not all state department facilities are the same. i mean, when we think of our e state department presence overseas i think you know most people typically imagine our embassy on the main facility. but as everybody knows we have l number of different facilities v wheree people are located s throughout the country. one of the most dangerous place that i went to was the shower where we had a consulate in pakistan a few years back.co very dangerous place, very high security. now, when you are determining oe what security to provide when e, you go to these information facilities or to the anne xes o consulates, how would they fall under the new rules of some of the attacks or understanding how
to properly provide security with two facilities like the ones that were in benghazi, lis which were not traditional embassies or even consulates for that matter. is this something that had been contemplated previously, and ifi so whats was the discussion on how to properly provide security for these different types of facili facilities? >> unfortunately, sir, i'm at a little bitilitun of a loss as o the congresswoman has pointed s out, that while those discussions were taking place oe what was going to happen for o benghazi i was at the united nations. i do knowns that we have all t accepted the recommendations from the arb that perhaps there is a little too much confidence in the chief and what he was he saying. that we knowhat we did not meetl the osb standards, when for either of those two locations, o either the special annex, or tht
special mission. in analyzing that we have no thd temporary facilities at all. and should we have to have those types of facilities we will have a very long, hard discussion about what needs to go into the and make sure they're as safe ao possible before we let them be occupied. i'm just at a little bit of a it loss. i can't comment on b things tha happened when i was not here, sir. >> we talkent about two other think huge issues when it comes to providing security at our ou overseas facilities. number one is money.ty is particularly at this point.partc and i might also add, i particularly at precisely the ps moment that benghazi wasel zi attacked i don't imagine that there have been too many time e news t -- times in the history of our e country when we had as many d as facilities throughout the globe that could not have been threa
perceived to be a threat level.l first of l,all, it was the anniversary of 9/11.l, we ha secondly, the days prior we had had had attacks on embassies, and i forget how many countries, certainly the embassy was attacked and close to a dozen others we had that. the number one issue, i'll an mention them both, the number one issue is simple resource.mbr in a world full of incredibly dangerous places how do you in decide how to properly allocate resources between a benghazi and a cairo and a peshawar, all of these different places.ou what role -- as you said congress has been generous, there are still finite resources.bu number one, how do you make the, decisions when there are n so my places to attack?
and secondly, one issue i have encountered. the chief emission, some have said that he or she should not. there are many, many members of the state department out in other countries who feel that their hands are being tied. c inou fact, i've heard this ing complaint now from a large inted number of state departments, people referring to it as the benghazi effect. that they can no longer do theiv job because we've gone back the other way and decided to be toot cautious. those are dif two very difficul issues. resources and the conflict between a member of the state department out in a foreign country in a dangerous place, trying to do his or her job, versus meeting the security. how do those two things get t balanced throughout the state ba department and throughout all of you're security? >> adam, before they answer, oc,
this is trey, but given the technical difficulties i'm going to let them answer the question in full and there is another question, given the i difficulties. but i want to let k you know in terms of time. >> right, that is my last question. >> answer as long as you need to. >> thank you, congressman. on the question of resources, r. yo u are correct. while congress has been very ngs generous with us i am not going to sit here and say that it is solely a question of resources. every year we look at the actions of the committee in concert with the realities and e bureaus and we rate threats for civil disorder. for terrorism, for crime, and o for a couple of other things.thr and we rate them critical, highr medium orit low threats. those ratings help us determine how to best allocate resources.
we start with a base position that every one of our facilitie should meet the minimum ospb me standards, and as steve has pointed out there are sometimesd where we have problems even s wh doing that. when we find them we upgrade tm them as fast as we can and make sure that they're there. there are many posts where we have to go far above the minimum standards because of the minim specific nature of the threats and the threats can differ.st at a place wherean it is a thre of a car bomb we're looking fore additional setbacks and look barriers. when it is mobin attacks we mayr looking at additionalri reinforcements in terms of the k military on the ground. but we look at those threats a s least for every single post in a formalized manner every single e year. and i start my day every single morning with a threat round-up and looking at what is out there and make determinations on whether or not we need to reinforce or do something at ous embassies.
as you pointed out, there are areas where we have officers where they feel they can't get out. we also have places where we have to balance getting the jobb done with an officer's a individual security and what thr threats are. i think that is a healthy tension.nsion. i want foreign service officers who want to get out and get the job done. and i want posts that are looking closely at what the cls threats are and whether they ae should get out. at our highest threat level posts, i think you will find that our officers may be frustrated sometimes because thi security has to be overwhelminge in many ways, has to be very ng strong. in the restve ofry our posts ars the world our people are getting out, engaging, foreign service officers are building democracy. the rule of law programs, justice programs, usaid ograms. programs, humanitarian programs and they're fulfilling those requirements. it is a balanceem anden a dance agree, but it is an important one and the tension is good. >> congressman, this is steve d
linnick, just a couple of comments to add on to that. we have not looked at resourcesa sort of efficiencies in resources. but our work confirms how the resources are prioritized.depart does theme department know whats prioritized. doat requests are made, do they know t how to prioritize acrosso the board. that is really the point that we issued that is referenced, it has been referenced already.thas and if the departments cannot make a determination as to which projects are high priority theno it is going to be difficult to solve problems and develop budgets. as to the p second question on e benghazi effect, you know, i think ultimately this comes down to good risk management. and the arbs first recommendation discussed the need for the department to make sure there is a mechanism in sue place the way a policy concerns
against risks. one of our recommendations was r that this is so important this h should beat elevated to the highest level of the department so that someone who is in a position of weighing policy namely ations, maintaining presence in certainly i dangerous areas can make that determination, and also be responsible when they have to sign on the dotted line and put people at temporary facilities or wherever in high threat posts. or >> i'll just quickly follow up on that last point and then i'll be done. poi because i think the problem, be when you say take it up to thatn higher level, once you have u sy taken it up to that higher level, isn't that person furthe away from the specific understanding of a given country? orfi a given area? and in some ways if you're going up to someone who is at that ann deputy level, they are more distant from the problem and in some ways probably less
qualified, making the call on whether or not you know, a given action is proper with the security. isn't that one of the reasons as the state department has been reluctant to implement that t t specificto recommendation? >> i'm not sure or not whether or not they have been reluctant to adopt that recommendation.ck i know they have their bb-2 rise management system. they ha and i don't know to what extent, that answers the question of i raising risk management at a ex higher level. answe i guess i would say that we kno that some of these decisions involve competing interests at f the lower levels, you have your policy folks and then security folks. somebody has to be in charge of reconciling these -- you know, i some of these competing ese interests. because we know our policy folks want us to be in places. they want us to be out doing t d diplomacy. and our security folks want a minimal risk.and so what we're saying is there
needs to be somebody managing this competing interests and then taking responsibilitygiing those decisions. >> all right, thank you very much. thank you for the committee for allowing this. >> adam, thank you for participating. take care of yourself and we'lls see you in january. >> thank you. >> with that, the chair would now recognize a gentleman from ohio, mr. jordan. >> i thank the chairman.e mr. star, safety is critically important and i appreciate what you said in your written testimony. want to keep our people safe and will continue to do everything we can to support and protect othem. shouldn't be a partisan issue, e should it? a republican, democrat, shouldn't matter? >> i don't think that is a ? partisan issue.ocrat i have never had a problem with that as an issue. >> i was not insinuating that.ig i was just saying these people put their lives on the line.li doesn't matter whether you're republican, democrat, where youu come from, the simple test should be are the policies and s actions we put in place keep people safe, you would agree?>>y >> yes. >> f
>> the secretary said this was a breach, my guess, she said the this, my quote, even a score ou. of 99 out of 100 is a failing grade. that is a pretty strong statement. and i understand wea don't live in a perfect world.tand w you talked about that.world. we live in a dangerous world, a. you have to balance diplomacy ly with security and safety erns. .hecerns but the tenor of her statement is what we just talked about.l. we should do everything we can o to make sure our people are cou safe. you would agree with that wouldn't you, mr. star?agre >> i neede to try to do that, t sir, but i will just add one poy inflexi oi inflection on anthis, the primav goal is the safety of the et people. >> i get it. mr. star, the number one question i get back home about benghazi, number one question in
get, why were we there? why wereth we there? it seems to me it is a ntal fundamental question in light oy the very dangerous security st situation that existed in benghazi. and frankly some other key facts. we have talked about this fact before, but mr. star, the state department has its own standards for security. the overseas policy on standards, were those followed with the benghazi facility? >> no, sir, they were not met. >> and when you did he haeviate they followed? >> no, sir. proc >>es and the state department h had a specialthe designation fi the facility, isn'tgn that correct, mr. star? didn't you guys call it the temporary mission facility. >> i think temporary mission mi facility or special mission facility. >> and was thiils a term create solely to do an in-run around u
the standards and waiver process? >> sir, i don't believe anybody intentionally tried to run around the waiver or standards process. i think that it was a question --aiv an embassy or consulate, think -- >> if i could, mr. star, mr. kyle testified here just three o months ago sat right there beside you, served 23 years in t the embassy, he said in talkingo with people, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the standards, let me ask it this way -- >> well, i would disagree with mr. kyle. >> well, he has a pretty good record like you do, mr. star.str how many facilities, diplomatic facilities at the state deputy do they have around the world? >> 275 embassies and consulates, and generals, comprising about a thousand buildings. >> your website said u.s -- >> 275, and approximately ten t?
special missions -- >> okay, of the 275 or 85, whatever number up want to use are any of those today missi designated a special mission mio facility or special mission compound? >> no. >> none of them. ne >> no. >> which sort of brings me back to my question, mr. star, what was so important about benghazi that we didn't follow our own standards. we didn't follow the waiver process. we created a term that is not used at any of our facilities, any of the 285 today t,y of spe mission compound or temporary la mission facility, not used anywhere else today. what was so important that we dy all that to be in benghazi, we do all that to be in a place where four americans were killed? >> sir, i would have to refer you to the results of the arb, f which i think addressed that. . >> no, no, you're the witness yo from the state department.ment. i'm asking you. you. >> i was not here when those
determinations were made, sir, and today i do not and we do not have facilities like that. have >> well, no, no, i'm asking you, as the representative from the state department, tell me what was so important that we don't follow the standards or waiver s process. we create a new term out of thin air and none of the facilities w today, we're the united states r of america. state we have more facilities probably than any other country in the ot world he285 and none of that usa that designation today. io >> correct. >> so telln me, why -- we weren tripoli, why did we have to be in benghazi? >> i would have to refer to the arb. >> let me add tosir. it. this will help you think about u giving us an answer. us an in the 13 months prior to the attack on 9/11, 2012, there wer 200 security incidents in libya. ieds, rpgs, assassination attempt on the british th ambassador. i mean, these were the wild, wild west.ur repeated requests from our
personnel at the security. they said we need more help, in fact. you did not send it. in fact, it was reduced. so the situation, perhaps the most chaotic situation in any s. facility, skirted the waiver process, why were we there? >> sir,wh i think the arb point out that there were mistakes made. i think it is very obvious that we had had a tragedy that hink occurred. obv and i am not denying to a occurr tragedy occurred. i' >> none of us are denying that. we're trying to get answers. >> trying to learn from that lesson -- i'm not the witness. >> you're the state department e witness at the hearing on the select committee to find out te whatto happened.ened. the most fundamental questions, why were we there in the first place. >> i am answering what we put ia place since the arb -- >> do you happen to know the name of the government that wash in place when we had those 200
security incidents in the 13 ovm months leading up to this t tragedy. do you happen to l know the nam of the government that was in place when we had the ied attacks, what wasas the name of the libyan government at the time? >> i don't know off hand. >> the transitional national council. not exactly a title that inspires confidence, screams stallwort stability, does it, mr. star, and yet we just had had to be et there. we just had to be there. now, this committee is going to try to find out the answer, since you won't give it to us . hazard a guess, we'll find out. but we'll keep to the conversation we're talking about and that is the safety of our erve people that serve abroad.ng c there is one good thing. they said we'll have a best arb. practices panel and that best t practices panel made 40 recommendations and the most important one is the one that
mr. lennock talked about earlier. the number one recommendation, many of the other 39 hinge upon said we need to create at the us undersecretary level, and undersecretary level for the diplomatic security, is the state department going to do that, mr. star at the secretary level? >> a decision has been made not to implement -- how ma >> how manyny secretaries are there at the state department, r mr. star? >> i believe there is seven. >> i think there is six, based k on the chart you just gave us, . undersecretary for political affairs, for economic growth and environment, undersecretary for armed control and international affairs, for security democracy and human rights and the for undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs. and yet, we can't have an undersecretary for people who s risk their lives every day you around this land.und you know, the undersecretary fof public affairs, and diplomacy, o
you know what part of that job description is foster cultural exchange and international ultue broadcasting. now, i'mxcha not saying it is n important, all i'm saying is ths safety of these 235 people who serve at these facilities should be justsh as important.here, and you're going to say no, we're going to keep you down here, you're f the one, assista secretary, as mrs. brooks n't yo pointed out you're way down on the charts. from why don't you want to move from the kid's table to the adults table, to undersecretary.d you a did you make that case and say the security is important enoug i should be at the under undersecretary level.se did you make that case?>> t >> the case that i made to the secretary was that in any instance i needed to get to the secretary and the access that i needed with him, the deputy tar secretaries or the assistantan e secretaries, i had to have the access necessary to do my job.
today, i have that access. whether i'm an undersecretary ot an assistant secretary, and i i have been the undersecretary general for safety andsafe secui at the u.n., and that is a different organization, i can tell you that regardless of whether i'm the undersecretary e or the assistant secretary -- i don't have the control -- i havd the control and access i need to fulfill my duties. >> i will tell you this, thanksgiving, the argument was easier to make the argument. i would rather be there. i think it is a great idea, buti i'm not alone.reat clear back in 1999, secretary allbright said the same thing. she thought we should have this at the undersecretary level. todd kyle, the best practices p panel thought we should have it at the undersecretary level. you and the guy sitting beside you thinks we need to elevate it at the highest level.t this c so i guess we have two
questions, why won't the state e department do whatpa everybody s knows needs to be done, elevate this position to the highest level that we can, make it equa? with cultural exchange and international broadcasting, andc then the big question.interna again, that i hope we get an answer to in this committee, why were we there? why were we there with these facts and circumstances? that is a fundamental question that people want to know, and the family of these four like individuals who gave their lives. with that, i yield back. r now >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. first ofngs. all, i would like , thank our witnesses for being here today and particularly i'm going to thank you, secretary rr star. i listened to what was just stated and asked. but my concern and i'm sure it w is the concern of this entire committee is that when all the dust settles, that the request e
of every single family member that we met -- when the dust es settles, i hope this is carried out. and that is that our facilities are safer so that things are not like this unfortunate incident does not happen again.epartm the department's updates still continue strong progress towards the implementation of the arbs recommendations. as the benghazi arb reminded alc of us, and i quote, the total elimination of risk is a non-starter for u.s. diplomacy given the need for the united states government to be presento inve places where stability and security are often most profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimess
minimal to non-existent, end of quote. nonetheless, we owe americans serving overseas our best effors to keeps, them as safe as rseas possible. mr. star, i want to commend you for dedicating your career to achieving that goal.thank i have noyo doubt that you are e committed and determined to see the implementation of these recommendations through. y according to your testimony ony, since september 17th, that hearing we held that day, the department has closed three more benghazi arb recommendations.arb one of the three that you close involves a hiring of additional diplomatic security personnel, is that right? i think that was recommendation number 12. >> yes, sir. >> and your october letter said that you had filled 120 of those -- 151 newly created spots.
do you still expect to complete. your hiring by early 2015? >> we're on track to do that, sir. >> and what is entailed in that is it hard to find some people? >> in some>> cases, because it e hard to find people, and some positions are technical, we have had some difficulties. like but i would like to point out th the recommendation wase to get increased diplomatic security personnel for high and criticali threat posts and for additional mobile security deployment add teams. the 151 positions asked for additional people for positions beyond those two things. we have already created every one of the positions in msd for the mobile security teams and ao our posts overseas, taken agenty that were already on board, filled those positions in thoset locations. and what we do is back hire nowo
to fill the positions that we t took those more experienced ts agents out and put them there. so we have fulfilled the f recommendation of whatul it is t even though we continue to hire some additional personnel.>> i i think we more than fulfilled that recommendation. >> so you still are missing soi people, ssthough, because you'r moving people? >> right, we're still hiring toi fill the people that we put in behind there, although the alto agents have all beenug hired it. a couple of technical specialties that we're filling in behind. >> you also closed the close recommendation related to risk o management courses and enhancedd threat training for personnel, at these high risk posts. how will this training better prepare our diplomats in regions? >>hi we have increased the foren affairs counter threat training that we offer to our foreign service personnel, now, not jusr people go to our high threat high risk posts.h every one of them has to go po through that training.e of the and prior to this, we did not
quite have the capacity to do ha that. we're nowto d increasing that ew training to everyone in the yoni entire foreign service over ther next four years. additionally, the foreign dition service institute has putal courses in that are complimenting our skills based training, courses like how to conduct diplomacy in a high-threat environment, which s trains officers, brings back officers in tough places and p shows best practices on how you accomplish your job when you are faced with things like sometimes travel to the mes ther ministry. sometimes there are different g types of security requirements. so we address itas throughed sk based training and foreign service training, before they gn into these high threat environments, how do we best do our jobs?hrea >> and sot the third closed recommendation was to procure to fire safety equipment at high threat posts. mr. star, is that complete?
>> it is complete with one exception, sir.e po i have one post where the equipment is sitting a specific type eqf respirator masks, and we have had difficulty in getting g that finished.fi but were have conducted trainin to all of our high threat posts around the world. >> would you give us the notification when you have completed that one thing you just said? >> i will, sir. omp >> so theylete are receiving th training. everybody has received the training on this equipment? >> we have worked closely with the fire department to identify the equipment and then when we ship the equipment out there isw traininge programs on the th equipment. and then there are other thingss that obo has done in terms of fire safety, as well. s >> with the closure of those three recommendations that le leaves four recommendations th still open, is that right? >> yes, yosir.
>> your october letter said witg the targetet dates of the comple implementation of the final four recommendations, are you on ck track to complete those comple recommendation insist. >> we are on track, sir, the one that will stretch the longest is the implementation of a new type of cctv camera at our posts overseas. the technical requirements associated with that have been have more difficult than we first decided. we have a schedule to do it. i hope to have it done by fall of 2015. i'm leery that it might go wrong with that.m one of the things i'm saying isn we'llg absolutely be done but ty summer of 2016. we're pushing to get it done. >> the other three, when will they are complete? >> i believe the recommendation concerning the waivers will be done within -- probably two months. the recommendation concerning assignment directions for high threat posts, we have have
essentially fulfilled that recommendation. we are working with congress to look at something called a dualg compensation issue so that if ed necessary we can bring back highly talented officers. i believe that we can close that recommendation regardless of li whether or not we get approval for the dual compensation waivers. so i think we'll have an answero in terms of closing that recommendation within two months, as well. and there is one further cost to that recommendation that we're on track to close but i would hn prefer not to discuss it in this hearing. >> as i said in the previous hearing i want to make sure sai things get done.aring, and so i -- i want you to get bk to us exactly when you expect -- i would like to have that in writing. these things to p be done.the and provide that committee with that information because we want to hold you to that, all right? >> as the inspector general hasg said there also has been a review of our compliance as
well. so it is not the use or the -- e >>ct we'll call it double coverage. >> exactly, and i'll get back to you on that. that >> all right. now, mr. star, the june 2013 audit was discussed that took tn place before the kraeks creation of the high threat program thatn found some securityal s deficies that posts had examined, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >>r. mr. star, and the inspectg general's office released a 2014 report on high threat programs directorate. one of the inspector general's key findings in that report is that this newly created body was quote, helped create a culture e ofat shared responsibility for u security within thelt departmen. and has forged strong
relationships with counter parts in regional and functional bury rose as well as within the thinh inter-agency community. i think it is an extremely positive finding given the fact that the accountability review f board considered the lack of responsibility around the security issues to be systemic t failure, just two years ago. mr. star, could you how you you think the creation of the high threat program has created a ed culture of shared responsibilitd and state department s -- and m final question to tell us how does this culture of shared sha responsibility that the ig praises and approved the improvements of the agencies abroad. >> thank you, we have addressed this in many different ways.jusb the high threat directorate
itself, we concentrate on looking at the top 30 posts, the ones we look at the most. the vp-2 processes that we conduct for looking at the posts. the fact we've looked at every y senior officer's job description and every office, the state department, we look to security. i have attended the meetings ofy the bureau every single week, in some cases every single day. and when we look at the program we're also talking about the pra security implementations therefore, i think have highlighted the fact that none n of us can operate independentlys of considerations of security a. this point.there i think there has been a culturn change in the department. i think having to weigh the importance of our programs and t why we're in very dangerous places under the vp-2 process has brought a laser-like focus on why we're there, what the
real threats are, and have a a clear understanding of the threats, not ignoring the ing th threats, what we've donee to mitigate the threats and then a decision at the what i just read is the now official position of the u.s. government. filed in u.s. district court by the department of justice in a motion to detain the one defendant who has been captured
it becomes a part of your dna, the dna of the state department. >> yes, sir. the officers that are reaching the senior ranks of the department today, in many cases have spent significant amounts of time over the last decade in places like iraq, pakistan, afghanistan, yemen, cairo, other places where we have true security problems. the officers i work with today, every single day at my level and above, are keenly aware that security must be balanced with our program implementation. they've lived it. >> thank you very much, chairman. >> thank the gentleman from maryland. the chair will now recognize the gentlelady. >> are you familiar with the
1997 oig recommendation with the need to prioritize using a methodology based on the ospb security standards? >> i'm vaguely familiar with -- i wasn't here in 1997. >> were you aware it was closed in in 1998? >> i think that's right. i think that's right. >> and wasn't -- to the extent you can answer this, it was closed because the department amended its memorandum of agreement with the marine corps to include procedures for establishing the size of existing detachments and procedures for activations and deactivations, is that correct? >> i don't recall why it was closed without looking at documents. >> well, in 2014 your office again looked at whether -- at where and houma reason security
guard detachments were being utilized at the state department post overseas, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> were you able to determine whether there is a methodology for prioritizing and assigning new msg attachments to overseas posts and whether that methodology was effective? >> our auditors found in that report that there were no formal procedures to select or identify posts. they couldn't show how the marine security guard units compared with other posts. there was no formal plan for expansion. they simply just didn't have the processes and procedures that one would normally think you would have. >> so, you weren't able to make -- figure out how ds makes the determination of where these marines go? >> we were not. >> okay.
and it's the same or similar issue, to your knowledge, i know you don't seem as familiar with the 1997, but the inspector general then told ds to create a process or methodology to select posts, so this is a similar situation, correct? >> i'll accept that premise. >> so, how can we on this committee have confidence that recommendation 11 from the benghazi arb made just two years ago that the department and dod will provide more capabilities at higher risk posts? how can we have the confidence that that will be fully implemented? >> well, that's the challenge of closing recommendations. we have a compliance follow-up group that, i can tell you what they do now. they do look very closely at the actions that the department takes to close recommendations. they wouldn't close it unless they felt that there was significant progress. >> mr. starr, i'm going to follow up with you on this point. according to the oig, only 40% of the new msg detachments have been assigned to posts with high or critical rating for political violence, terrorism. in light of your last statement in the previous questions, you said you've never seen security
taken so seriously in the past two years. well, how does the fact that only 40% of the high-risk, high-threat posts have these marine security guard detachments, how does this satisfy the arb recommendation 11 expand that program to provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts? >> thank you for the question, congresswoman. there's actually a very clear, very simple answer for this. most of the posts that are high-threat, high-risk already had marine security guard detachments at them. that's why the 40% number is there. of the 30 posts that we ranked as our highest threat, highest vulnerability, 19 of them
already had marine security guard detachments. we've added two to those. of the remaining nine posts, five of those posts, there's no one there. the post is in name only. we don't have people on the ground. mogadishu, harat -- >> let me interrupt you for a minute. mr. linick, do you agree with those numbers? >> i haven't confirmed those numbers, so idon't know. >> and there are several other posts. there's about four posts in that high-threat list where we would like to put marine security guard detachments. the host government has not allowed us to do that. >> okay. >> okay. so -- >> but the reason that figure seems very strange is that in the vast majority of cases, we've already got marine detachments at those places. >> let's be clear about this, mr. starr. how many current high-risk threat posts do not have msg
detachments? >> of the 30 highest risks, highest threat level posts, 9 do not, but 5 of those 9 are not functioning posts. they're closed, so four. >> do you agree with that mr. linick, or do you not know? >> i don't know. >> is there a timetable, mr. starr, in place for assigning the msg attachments to the -- you say four posts. is there a timetable? >> i would like to do it tomorrow, but i will tell you, i find it unlikely that i'm going to be able to assign marine detachment to those posts. >> you say because host nation problems -- >> host nation problems. >> when i talked to you last time three months ago, it doesn't seem like we've made much progress, but i asked you, you know, what's your plan with the ones that you don't, if you've got host nation problems, are there other ways to get security there? and you said in your testimony, if we find that we don't have those types of protections, you listed adding ds agents, several other mitigating things. but you said, if we don't find that we don't have those types of protections or we think those risks are too high, then we won't be there. so, why have we not made progression on those four posts
that you are stating now, we still don't have those protections in place? >> the host nation has stood up and given us high levels of protection. in some cases, i have a tremendous amount of other resources there, including diplomatic security agents and armed contractors that meet the threat. in some cases, we have made a determination that the host government is standing up and fulfilling its responsibilities. while we'd still like to have marines there, the fact we don't does not mean that we cannot continue. this is some of the things that we're looking at as we do this vp2 process. when we weigh why we're at a post, what the threats are, what resources we have overall. and as i say, marines are one tool in our tool kit. >> mr. linick, i want to take mr. starr's answer and follow up with you. do you think that's sufficient? >> my question is along the lines of the report. what are the plans, where are the plans, where's the method methodology? what plans are there to negotiate with host governments
unwilling to take us? those kind of things. >> and you have not gotten a clearance from ds on exactly how this is going to be handled, correct? >> all the recommendations are open at this time. >> all the recommendations are open. and based on the questions from ms. brooks earlier, open means they're unresolved and there's no evidence there that they're doing anything to make it better? >> well, actually, there are a number of open resolved recommendations, in other words, the department has agreed in principle to comply. but there are two recommendations which are unresolved which means we just disagree. >> of the six, there are four unresolved -- >> no, two -- >> excuse me. four resolved and two unresolved. >> that's correct.
>> of the six, there are four unresolved -- >> no, two -- >> excuse me. four resolved and two unresolved. >> that's correct. >> but even the resolved, you've just gotten them to say that they want to do something, but you have no actions to back up their words. >> so, we still have, according to mr. starr's testimony, we have four places, very dangerous places of the world, where american lives are at stake because we don't have the proper security in place. >> congresswoman -- >> wait, this is for mr. linick. is that correct? >> i mean, have i to accept that that -- those facts because i don't know independently whether that's true. >> recommendation 6 of your report recommends that ds marine security guard program conduct a staffing and resources assessment and then judiciously allocate appropriate resources to facilitate compliance with the benghazi accountab