tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN September 28, 2015 11:00am-1:01pm EDT
presidential daily briefs lyndon johnson received early in the vietnam war. that's the old model. the cia long went through a procedure of annual review at the white house that basically said, is this operation -- is the data we are getting out of this operation, this effort worth what we are dpeting if it got disclosed tomorrow morning on the front page of "the new york times" and "the washington post"? they went through that processest. what we learned during the snowden period is the nsa never went through that process until post snowden time. go one more beat about how that is changing, what you are seeing happen in the culture. is there an underlying assumption that even the deepest secrets may only have a shelf life of a couple of years and
how does that affect one's thinking about how to measure risk? >> well, if you still go back to sources and methods, which is what we most importantly have to protect, i still think there has been an overreliance on technology. even though it is changing rapidly and we have to continue to improve how we use technology and data, you have to rely on it. there is nothing greater than good old-fashioned human intelligence gathering. it is going to be more difficult. a lot of times it is the human intelligence that enables better technologies, new technologies or discovery of what ad vversars are doing. >> i think the allegations
regarding angela merkel's cell phone, i can only say allegations, were a real tipping point in terms of compelling policy makers and members of the i.c. to think long and hard about the risk have os disclosure, the risks of relationships with allies, the risks obviously to sources of information most acutely human sources of information from disclosure. # but to think in new and different terms about the cost/benefit analysis, one of the things that has changed post snowden, the conversations that have taken place between the media and the intelligence community, when the media has a story and they go to the i.c. and say, we are going to run with this story and there is a discussion about what impact would that have?
the newspaper's willingness to effectively self-sensor or not public out of public interest, i think that dynamic has changed. you may be in a better position, i am sure you are, than i am, to speak on this. my perception is that post note is such a rush to public. if we don't run with this, some other paper will. we'll get scooped. it's a very different dynamic now. from the press perspective that may mean, that may be ascribed to less confidence or trust in what the government represents or do damage to the government. the bottom line, i think, for the intelligence community is a much greater explanation that things are going to be published. of course, the celebrity for lack of a better word that's been attributed to snowden encourages other people to make disclosures. this is a grave challenge. we can't have an intelligence
community where people can unilaterally make the decision even when something is lawful that they disagree with the policy and they are simply going to make it public. it is a tremendous challenge. it does affect what the i.c. does. it does affect our expectations about how long things will remain confidential. it puts real constraints, some which may be useful and others which may ultimately be harmful in terms of national security. >> i think those conversations between the "times," "the post" and other communities, i find myself in the midst of them, those haven't changed all that much. there is still a very good dynamic back and forth. there are many more media players back and forth. the times or the post of "the wall street journal" my call or have a serious conversation with the cia or others about whether
publication, something would result in sources and methods being revealed. wikileaks isn't going to have the phone call nor a blogger and probably wouldn't get that phone call returned. there are sort of games being played at a far more complex level than i think it probably was in the old days. you raised at the end there the concern that some in the intel community have about whether they do this in and out of channel. one of the questions we have gotten up here early goes direct to that, which is to ask you both a comment on the news reports, which appeared in the times about a week ago. i'm sorry, on monday, that intelligence assessments of isis have been altered at various points. this was mostly within the d.i.a., to down play their strength. when i read that story the other day, i was thinking to myself,
this is the same debate that played out during the pentagon papers in 1969. where history of the vietnam war suggested that the government had overestimated our success against the vietcong. we are seeing this played out now in real time with the isis struggle. so when you read something like that and maybe you have already had some discussions with the intel community on that, tell us about that dynamic. >> obviously, we're clearly concerneded about the politicization of intelligence. there has always been accusations. i have never viewedal chi al q on the run. it makes for good political rhetoric or giving the american people, who don't want to be
fighting wars, it makes them feel good. at the end of the day, we still have enemies out there and enemies are growing. so i wasn't surprised actually by the story or -- i was surprised actually it sounds like now there are whistle blowers that are coming forward. >> an i.p. investigation, i think is what he said. so that's going to be of interest to both of us to try to figure out what that's all about. what adam and i have tried to do, we want to have an open avenue for whistle blowers to come forward. it has not been easy in the past for whistle blowers to come forward. >> in this particular case, some of the whistle blowers came to my colleagues at the time. was this a case where the whistle blowers did come to the committee or could have come to the committee? >> absolutely. we have a process in place for whistle blowers to come forward. anyone in the intelligence community has the right to come to us.
we actively -- sometimes it is not even whistle blowers. i think both adam and i, we meet with people when we travel or even here in washington. so i think our doors are always open to people within the i.c. to come with complaints. >> i would like to say on that, first of all, thanks for the refresher on the pentagon papers case. i took a class from daniel else burg in college but it was at 8:00 a.m. so i slept through most of it. >> that's what most people are doing right now with our discussion. >> we started at 8:15. we gave them 15 minutes of caffeine knowing you guys were going to be out here. >> excellent, excellent. i think the chairman's point is exactly right. we have made every effort to make it possible for whistle blowers not only to communicate with us but to have avenues within the i.c. to raise concerns so that they don't feel they need to leak information to
be heard. that's not to say that on policy differences, we are necessarily going to agree with someone that disagrees with the policy of the intelligence community. we do need to make sure that there is an avenue available for dissent and for any concern over a wrongdoing or failure to adhere to the guidelines or politicization of intelligence. many have concerns over that with iraq and none of us want to see that happen with respect to isil or any other challenge that we face. there have been cultural changes within the i.c. that have encouraged dissenting opinions that develop alternative analysis that really question assumptions. that really seems to be part of the ethic of the intelligence community in a way perhaps more than the past. i will say this. this is obviously not a perfect
science. the analysts obviously can reach very different conclusions. we want that to be reflected in the work product we get but the members, impressions of intelligence can also be very different. i mentioned this just to highlight within the last 24, 48 hours something that i think is telling in terms of the perspective we all bring reading the same intelligence. just this week, all of the republican members on our xhe y committee have come out against the iran agreement and in part of their basis of the reading of the intelligence. all the democratic members have come out in support of the agreement. obviously, we are reaching contrary conclusions reading the same intelligence. i know the director spoke yesterday. it was interesting. john negroponte spoke earlier about the impressions of what he
had to say. i read them in the paper today. i wasn't present yesterday. i had one interpretation of what he said in terms of our capability of catching iran if they were to cheat but people who heard him, they have a completely different impression of whether it was likely or not likely we would catch them. this isn't obviously a perfect science. we do want to hear those range of opinions within the i.c. and what level of confidence the i.c. holds. i have a lot of confidence we do get that range of opinion? >> you have provided us the perfect segue into just that topic. i was out in vienna for the end of the iran talks. with he spent a lot of time with secretary moniz, the energy secretary, who you have heard a lot from. who ran the nuclear science department at m.i.t. for many
years and has come to you with a fair amount of credibility as a result of that. his public assessment is if the iranians are engaged in can activity involving nuclear materials, our chances of catching them are extraordinarily high. the technology of finding even trace amounts is now so good. it is hard to hide that. if, on the other hand, they are going back and doing what the iea is supposed to be sorting out with with them, weapons design, triggers, the kind of work they have done at parchen, that is much harder to sus out. it doesn't leave a radioactive trace. you have to get to the human beings. you have to get inside the university labs that are being used for these purposes. as you look at these intelligence assessments, i know the two of you are in very
different places on this. let me start with you, mr. chairman. give us your assessment about what kind of thing we would likely be good at catching, what kind of thing you are worried about and how you balance those two as you came to your determination to vote against this deal? >> well, i think you have to do is back up and say, should we ever have been at the negotiating table to start if part of being at the negotiating table meant that the iranians were going to keep any of their nuclear weapons at all or any of their nuclear capabilities at all? my answer would be no. if they wanted to come to the table and agreed to immediate inspections always and completely getting rid of all nuclear capabilities, then i would have went to the table to negotiate. would that, i wanted to see more
sanctions. i realize that to are point on technologies are always changing and perhaps the technologies are better than they once were ten years ago in north korea when we thought they weren't going to have a nuclear weapon and then they did develop a nuclear weapon. i guess it has been more than ten years. technology changes for the bad guys too. we don't know what technologies they are developing. >> you think the original sin here was abandoning the bush administration rule, which even the bush administration varied from in the last year, that not one centrifuge can spin? >> that's right. that would be my opinion. most of the republicans who are against this proposal, that would be their position. >> i think i would go further to say that we really see this as a
gamble. if you look at what president obama, i think would, if i understand his position, it is that we are a lot better off having these folks at the table, having some inspections and that perhaps over time us discussing and being at the table with the mulas, is going to open and lead to some down fall of the regime. i think it is a big gamble to take. >> so congressman schiff, the administration response you have just heard from the chairman, yes, in a perfect world, we would like to see not a single centrifuge spin. with he don't live in a perfect world. we are much better to get 15 years with a small number spinning and had the bush administration not stuck to that, you might have had a deal in 2005, 2006, to have a few
hundred spinning and we would be in a lot better shape than we would today. i am asking you the same question. you look at the same assembly of risk and intel picture. where do you come out on that? >> i start out from a different perspective. as you point out in the early bush administration, they had 160 centrifuges. had we gotten a deal then that required them to diminish that number by two-thirds, they would be down to about 50 centrifuges instead of 5,000 with this deal. non nonetheless, my hope at the beginning of this was if iran was allowed to have an enrichment capability, it would have been token for the purpose of producing medical isotopes. the fact they will have fast and efficient and legitimized capability after 15 years is a bitter pill for me to swallow.
that begins to look good when you compare it to the alternative. the alternative is, with he go ba we go back to where we were before the agreement where they had thousands of kilos of enriched uranium and close to 20,000 centrifuges, no limits to when when they could bring on a new generation of centrifuges and reaching that modern, fast sooner than 15 years. i do think with respect to secretary moniz's comments, that that analysis is exactly right. if you are iran, it is going to be very tough for you to create a covert path to enrichment all the way from new uranium mines to centrifuge development and spinning. i don't think they can develop an alternative pathway of enr h
enrichment. we have to be on guard that they would seek to get the material from outside the country. >> mostly north korea? >> or elsewhere. that is still a very difficult proposition from iran but not as difficult as creating the entire covert pathway of enrichment. where they are much more likely to cheat in my view, unless they make the decision, we are going to break out, which i don't think they will make that decision. where they are likely to test us and cheat is in the nonradioactive weapons development, the computer modeling of what a nuclear explosion would look like and the development of the warhead itself. they may do this in ways that they believe they can argue is not prohibited by the agreement to try to take advantage of ambiguity in the agreement. they may do this in sites we
would be less likely to be watching, whether it is at universities rather than military sites. so i think they will test and push. there are two time lines, the enitchment timeline and the timeline to develop the mechanism of the bomb. after 15 years, the enrichment timeline will go down to a matter of weeks. so they really don't need to cheat in terms of the enrichment to reduce that timeline where they may try to cheat and we will have to train all our resources in detection, is in that weaponization work that may be hidden in that 24-hour period where they can play ropy dau. feechb they would have given up the entire enrichment capability, we would have that challenge. we would have the challenge of making sure they didn't get it from elsewhere and that they
weren't dual millitarization work. we have had better capabilities than in the past but we are not omnipotent in our ability and, therefore, there is risk. like many things, these agreements are a balancing of risk. it is a risk with we can mitigate but not a risk we can make go away completely. >> there is a theory afoot in the intelligence community that the supreme leader in iran is going to have to buy off the iogc for the fact that if this agreement goes through, it seems likely, they are going to have 15 tough years on the nuclear program, whether they cheat or don't cheat. their activity will be restricted and brought down to 300 kilograms, assuming they stick with it, and that they will take some of that money and effort and put it in support of terrorism. they may also take a chunk of it and put it into their cybercore,
on the theory that the supreme leader could say, you can use the cyber web and you can't use the weapon in the end. we have already seen some skill, saudiaramco. sheldon's casino in las vegas and the attacksen on the bank although somewhat crude. how do you assess this risk? we are now going to see iran move from an incipient nuclear power to an incipient cyberpower as a result in part to the agreement? >> when you look at iran, i am not too worried about them having to buy off -- the mulas having to buy off the irgc, because essentially, they are the same people. this is a ruthless dictatorship. one of the most ruthless in history. there are very few making the
decision within that regime. i think you bring up a good point. where are they going to spend this money? they are the largest funder of terrorism globally. it is always important for people to understand. i troo i to define it as this jihad triangle, al qaeda, isis and the mulas in iran. people think they are always fighting because they are different religions. in fact, we know for a fact that at times, the iranians have actually harbored al qaeda and sheltered al qaeda. in the last few days, you are seeing all qaeda seeing al qaeda is talking about a need to work with isis. i think at the end of the day, the jihad das, no matter what secretary they are, when they say they are going to kill the west, i think we should believe them. >> first of all, i probably
wouldn't use the word incipient to describe iran's cybercapability. i think they are already there. already a danger and a men as and increasingly sophisticated. i do think you have this tension within iran between the ayatollah and the mullahs, who as recently as yesterday were talking about how there isn't going to be any accommodation with the great satan and we are not going to work with the great satan on other issues. you here roe ha any saying, we are open to working with the rest of the world on syria and combatting isil. there is tension within the iranian society. the ayatollah will try to immediate that tension. there is only one directive, the per pep weighs of the rule by the ayatollah and the mullahs. they must view this agreement as a way to let off some of the
steam of the younger demographic in iran that is plugged into the rest of the world and knows what's out there and wants it and doesn't like what they have. i guess i wouldn't be surprised to see initially after the irgc flex their muscles to show this isn't going to be a sweeping change in their philosophy. the revolution isn't over. we are going to have to push back hard. what i've been advocating with respect to the agreement is rather than reject it, we need to figure out how we can strengthen the constraints on iran in the agreement and mitigate the risks in the agreement. i think that means forming a much more effective alliance with the gulf states. iran spends about $15 billion on its defense. the gulf states spend about $130 billion. they don't spend it as cost effectively and in ways that are effective in pushing back
against hezbollah and hamas and the proxy forces. i think we have to work with them to much more effectively do that. >> let's turn to a few more of the very good questions we have gotten here from the audience. a few cards. we have about 15, 20 minutes left. if you could discuss the threshold by which your view shall the intelligence committee would share and declassify intelligence information with industry on cyberthreats, this is a big part of the cyberbill you have been trying to get through, but this flnot only requires declassification, it requires huge speed at doing this. you have to do this at network speed, not at declassification speeds, which is causing a lot of hard ache in the intelligence community, as you can imagine. you have to assume that as soon as you spread this information out to the industry, a lot of it
is going to appear in public. maybe in industry publications. it is going to make its way out faster than stuts net as it began to spread in 2010, got out and led us to understand that american and israeli operations. so tell us what that threshold should be? >> well, when we looked at how do you develop cyberlegislation, this has been ongoing now for the fifth year, the first thing that the committee started with, let's not make it worse. let's not get the government involved and make it more complicated and more complex. you have seen how hard it is just to get even with all the cyberattacks, daily growing cyberthreats. you mentioned sony pictures earlier. we have had two major health care companies just in the last six months get compromised. you had opm get compromised. you would think that there would be the political will to get
something done but even in the house, we have actually worked pretty well. we have moved this legislation quickly. in the senate, it is still hung up. marginal over privacy concerns. the reasons are, at some point, there will be a tipping point. i think we have already reached that point. i don't think people understand how bad it really is. >> why wasn't opm at that point? you have had a state-attack and you should believe everything you read in "the new york times." it affected, while it was an act of espionage, it affected 22 million americans, including everybody with a security clearance, which probably means most of the people in your audience here today. why wasn't opm that tipping point? >> maybe because it was only the government employees or people that had worked in government.
i don't know. when we look to finish this up, if you look at what we are trying to do. we are only trying to get to that first stuff of just allowing company to company to talk, company to government to talk. >> let me take the very good question we got and turn it the other way. frequently, when i see intelligence community warnings on an intel threat and i go out and talk to the people in industry who look at this, david, you are calling me now on this, it is september. we were dealing with this in may. where have you been? where has the intelligence community been? >> i think often that is exactly right. by the time there is a public dissemination of information, it was on cnn four weeks ago and -- >> jpmorgan was dealing with it. >> and "the new york times" five weeks ago.
yes, we are very slow to move. in terms of sharing information on cyber threats and malicious code, that can often happen in classified channels. it can happen in unclassified channels and happen very quickly if we have the mechanism established which we are trying to do through this legislation. there are going to be times, though, where we learn about the source of an attack in such a sensitive way where we are not going to want to share the information or we are going to want to share it in ways that don't tip-off the generator of the attack that we are aware of where it came from or the nature of the code. just to merge two topics here, this is going to be an issue very much with respect to our iran work as well.
the iaea will discover what it discovers. we may well discover more through our intelligence capabilities than they do with their eyes on the grown. we will have a deilemma which w can anticipate where we will catch iran cheating, using a significant capability or human or significant net or whatever. we will have to decide, are we really willing to burn this source to make the public case that iran is cheating? this will be a difficult constraint and a difficult debate. >> but we have had it before. the laptop that contained many of the data that led to the iaea's 12 questions to iran came out in 2005 and a year before it was shared with the iea. that was a year or so delay. >> this is one of the challenges that we are going to face.
particularly if it is not graphic, overt cheating. the iranians will take advantage of any ac bmbiguity in the cased when you see how russia has diss dissem believed is the polite work for it or what's going on in ukraine or the activity in syria or the whole russian position on who was using chemical weapons. some of the p-5 plus 1 are going to be strongly predisposed to adopting and accepting whatever the iranian position may be. that's going to be a considerable challenge. >> i take you to another very interesting question we got from the audience. does the committee have concerns with the proliferation of drones as both tools and threats to the i.c.? you spent a lot of time on the question, do you want to use
this as a tool? does it create more terrorists than it eliminates and so forth. this question is asking you to go beyond that and think about the threats, the drones may pose to the intelligence community and i guess to the couldn't interest i country as a whole. >> it is an issue that is being looked at by the entire congress. with drones flying around everywhere? in my hometown, you see a drone, one of these little 3 x 3 drones flying around. this is an ongoing problem. somehow there will have to be regulation brought in. tas relates to the intelligence community and the use of drones, i have cautioned people that using drones for counter intelligence and counter terrorism, i should say counter terrorism measures, i think, is just a tactic but it is not a
strategy that ultimately leads to success. there has to be many more tactics with good strategy in order to ultimately defeat this kind of jihad problem that we are facing. >> i would just like to talk about what the chairman said in california we see quite vividly the pros and cons of expanding drone use. with all of our wildfires, we are having emergency responder aircraft have to be grounded, because there are drones flying overtaking pictures. the aircraft can't operate in the same air space. if one of those drones got sucked into an engine, it could literally bring the aircraft down. so we have had numerous occasions now, no the only with problems with drones at airports and problems with drones interfering with fire fighting efforts. in terms of the intel world, one thing i think we have to be very mindful of is obviously we may have been the leaders in this technology but we are not the only ones utilizing it now, which poses not only challenges
to our own intelligence community but it also tells us that we have to be very aware of the fact that whatever rules we establish with our own use of drones, we have to be able to hold up to the rest of the world in terms of their use of drones. you can easily see how this technology might be terribly misused by other nation states both in terms of surveillance but perhaps even more pointedly in terms of a platform for lethal fire. >> a question directly to you, mr. nunes, you mentioned that human intel is the most important and difficult to gather. as far as the isil aq threat goes, what is the intelligence community doing to increase the ability to gather this intel? this is a very difficult issue.
frequently, what he with have had to do is rely on partner agencies to do this and so you always run into the potential curveball problem. >> i think the bigger challenge, though, is digital desks. back in the old days, you kind of just from the movies, somebody can throw on a mask and sneak into a country and maybe they speak a foreign language. nowadays, in between your cell phone device, that pretty much anybody can track with enough money and technology, whether you are on facebook or twitter or whatever, everybody has digital desks. so just whole kind of big picture problem with how do you even identify and meet and develop new human intelligence sources, it is becoming more and more difficult. i think you actually hit it,
david, where we are going to have to build these relationships with allies and partners to try to leverage contacts within countries and people who have access into very difficult places leak the middle east. >> we have a number of questions about the organization of the intel community and in some cases a number of questions about the disorganization of the intel community. one of the more interesting ones here makes the point a number of agencies do intelligence domestically, tsa, customs and border patrol, and so forth, but they are not included in the formal i.c. of course, they are part of homeland security, right? this enhances fragmented oversight and it enhances budgeting fragmentation and makes more difficult executive branch management. the question is, could you support moving those entities
into the i.c. giving jurisdiction to your own committee in developing a unified congressional panel to authorize oversight on all intel budgeting? of course, this would require mr. chairman for you to get out into an arm wrestling match with fellow chairmen who are overseeing other parts of the intelligence community and probably don't want to give up that privilege. >> it is actually one that we have actually taken head-on and have come up with some solutions. so to the question, most agency's missions are under homeland security and we are actively involve specially as it relates to what the intelligence committee focuses on. we focus on anything that's outside of the united states. steams, it becomes a gray area, because you have terrorists that come in or attacks or things of that nature, cyberattacks. what we have done on our
committee now to deal with these jurisdictional fights, we have essentially eliminated them at least on the house side. if you look at the areas we cover, we cover the intelligence committee and the defense appropriation committee and the arms services committee. for the first time now, we have had the chairman of armed services committee and the ranking member read into our committee. they are active participants, nonvoting members and active participants. the same with the defense appropriations chairman and the defense appropriations ranking member. so that's how we are dealing with getting past these jurisdictional fights that are very unhealthy, don't lead to good oversight of what's going on out in the i.c. and surely don't allow us to get anything done if we are fighting amongst ourselves in congress. >> since our time is short, we
are down to another five minutes. let me throw to you the next one. >> the u.s. is a precious equity that needs to be protected. wouldn't it be wise to ebb sta an industry defense mechanism that would effectively create a fusion of effort that would eliminate this information-sharing problem? let me add to that question or add to the complication of it. we just wrote the other day about two major american companies, microsoft is one of them, apple is another, that are basically at war with the u.s. government on the question of enkre enkrip shun. they know if they can't protect and encrypt their user's data, they are not going to be able to sell abroad. this has caused great angst at
the justice department and the intel chiefs. could i ask you to address both sides of the question? is there a way to do a fusion of the i.c. and the industry and for some of our most companies, intels, the microsofts, google apple, wouldn't it be in their interest to stay as far away from the fusion with the i.c. community as they possibly could, most of which are in your state? >> it is a great combined question. i guess i would probably want to talk with the author of the question more about what they have in mind in terms of a fusion between industry and government. there are certainly areas where we need to work much more closely hand in hand. i think it is very shrewd of our defense secretary to establish a presence in the silicon valley and really trying to combine
forces and bring our heads together to solve some of these challenges. i was just in the silicon valley last week, a meeting with i.d. people from facebook and google and twitter, to deal with a couple twin challenges, the one that you mentioned, which is both the enkrip shun of communications as well as the enkripgs of devices, which form two parallel problems. as well, the extensive use that isil has now made of social media for the purposes of recruiting and des sem nating information and help generate attacks within the united states to talk about how are we going to deal with thee encryptian issues? about how to recall the
so-called going dark problem. i do think that certainly on the one hand, there is a need for us when we can attain legal process and make the requisite showing to get access devices to the content of communications on the one hand. and, on the other hand, it seems to me very compelling that even if we succeeded in encouraging american companies to build in a dekripgs capability, it still doesn't answer the question of the fact that there will be other providers provided the enchrypted applications. you could have users migrate to do that do their nefarious work and that argument seems equally
unasailable to me. i have two equally unasailable arg arguments. i'm not sure where this leads. it is going to be a tremendous challenge going forward. we don't want to chase this business out of the united states. we need it economic cali. there are national security advantages to having these companies in the united states. so i think we are at the stage of looking at this broad issue. i can't begin to tell you how it is dgoing to be resolved excepti think it is extraordinary unlikely the congress will try to provide some sort of legislative mandate. it doesn't seem politically feasible even if it were desirable. so, one of the things i found fascinating, just to conclude on this, in discussions i had at silicon valley, they framed it and with some discomfort, as the i.c. is coming to us and saying,
you are brilliant. you figure it out. why don't they give us a proposal and let us weigh in on it? that's an unusual argument for me to hears as a legislature. we often hear the opposite. let us come up with the answer. here, the attitude is quite a bit different. >> they don't want to hear the answer? >> well, you know, i think that, look, there is an economic alignment of their philosophy and business here. i don't think they would be to be in the position to have to come up with a solution, because it is not in their economic interest to do so. this is a phenomenal challenge. it makes the metadata debate that we just had look trippal by comparison. >> chairman, i want to give you the last word on this. i know you both have to make it
up to the hearing. when the nsa oversight committee reported to the president 18 months ago, the u.s. intelligence community should support industry in strengthening enkrip shun. it shouldn't be building in the back doors. there were people that came out at senior levels. do you agree with that? >> i'm not going to -- i haven't read the report or i don't remember reading the report. >> so many reports go to you. i will say dealing with this issue on enkripgs, it is the holy grail for the i.c., specially when you look at the fbi trying to track criminals all over, not just terrorists
but other criminals, it is really a challenge. it is one of the -- it is very complicated on how do you come up with a solution. that's fascinating they were actually asking us or for the government to provide them that solution. that's the first i've heard. it will be something we have to grapple with and very complex for the congress to come up with any solutions. >> i thank you both. i thank all of you for your excellent questions. i appreciate your taking the time. look forward to your hearing on cyberissues in just a little bit later on this morning. i appreciate your views. chairman nunes and ranking members, thanks for participating and for postponing your hearing. david, thanks for leading a great discussion. when you look at the role that the supreme court is playing in our society now, our
history series has to have relevance. we thought of what we can do to give relevance to the current programming, a series on the court made all the sense in the world. >> the court is an equal branch of government. it is the third branch of government. it still has fundamental impact on americans lives. >> inside this elegant building is a courtroom where cases are heard and decisions are made that impact all of our lives. there are so many incredibly interesting cases in the court's history. we have all heard about roe versus wade and brown verse us e board of education. what we really want to do is talk about not only the legal side of the cases but the people involved in these cases. they are human beings who felt so passionately that they were being wronged or their rights were being abridged they brought their cases to the court. >> i think what people will find
most fascinating about these cases are the personal stories. one of my personal favorites is matt versus ohio in the story of dollree mapp. when people hear this personal story of this woman and this situation, that they will fall in love with these cases, that they will feel passionate about what happens in the courts and why they matter and why you should care. >> picking the 12 cases was a really difficult and arduous task. it was fun because we learned a lot. those 12 cases represent really our evolving understanding of rights in america, when you tack a look from dred scott all the way to roe versus wade. you learn about the history in the country and the evolving rights in america. >> landmark cases, historic supreme court decisions produced in cooperation with the national constitution center delving into 12 supreme court cases that
significantly influenced our nation's story and our understanding of rights in america. at 9:00 p.m. eastern beginning october 5th on c-span and c-span3. as a companion to our new series, landmark cases, the book, it features the 12 cases we have selected for the series with a brief introduction into the background, highlights and impact of each case, written by veteran supreme court journalist, tony moro, published by c-span in cooperation with congressional quarterly press, an imprint of sage. it is available for $8.95 plus shipping and handling. get your copy at c-span.org/landmarkcases. congress returning this week to figure out a path forward on a testimony pour rather spending measuring funding the government avoiding a government shutdown. the house will take up a bill that will give states more flexibility in denying medicaid contracts to providers that are
involved in abortions. you can see the house live on our companion network, c-span. the senate gets to work on its version of a temporary spending bill known as a continuing resolution. a vote to advance cr is scheduled for 5:30 eastern today. the senate you can see on our companion network c-span 2. >> next, a look at current and potential policies for trading data between federal agencies and at the state and local levels and abroad. the discussion was moderated by former homeland security secretary michael chertoff. it's about an hour. [ applause ] well, good morning. i'll be brief. i don't think anybody ever left a conference and said, man, that
paid corporate panel introducer was awesome. but i'm andrew marine with ibm safer planet. many of you know ibm has america's foundation global technology corporation. some of you may not know how much ibm does to support our u.s. intelligence community and professional. for those of you in the community, it's a lot more than the cute emoticons you see. more recently, you may not know how much investment has been made in the enterprise sight analysis protecting an advanced analytic solution to provide principal director of sullivan's eyesight and for helping war fighters long into america's future. i know i speak for all of us in the blue family when i say ibm is extremely proud to serve as a supporter of this national security summit. i do encourage you to visit us and hear from the great ibmers i
work with about enterprise sight analysis. this is a great congressional panel. yesterday's defense intelligence panel also truly outstanding. and i know our next session will be just as incredible as we take an in-depth look at the state of the homeland intelligence and domestic security. as many of you will recall, in the immediate wake of 9/11 was the hot button issue of whether the united states should create a stand alone security agency. ultimately that was not the course chosen. the intelligence groups were left within their offices and intelligence agencies for greater information sharing and intelligence collaboration was created. our next panel is the people who are in the forefront of this collaboration. frank taylor is the fbi executive director along with
eric valez. and the deputy director of the national counter terrorism center john mulligan will discuss homeland security over the past decade. this panel will be moderated by one of our most distinguished puber public servants, michael cher chertoff. our gracious panelists agreed to forego individual introductions to move quickly into the substance of these important issues. we thank you them for that an without further adieu, please join us in welcoming our panelists and the honorable secretary chertoff. [ applause ] well, thank you for that kind introduction. let me just, to put a little context on this before we begin with a brief statement by the panelists, we're obviously coming up on the 14th anniversary of september 11th. now, you'll remember in 2001
there was no homeland security department. there was no nctc. all of these structures did not exist. at that time the department of justice owned the responsibility exclusively of dealing with domestic terrorism. and at the time i was the head of the criminal division, brand new, almost as new as the new fbi director, bob muller, and in the wake of 9/11 we were confronted on the fly in trying to put together an intelligence response to carry out the mandate from the president not to let this happen again. and under that initial crucible we ultimately delivered a series of structures, some of which evolved over time. for example, the t-tech became the ntct. there was a terrorist financing group that morphed into something else. and now we have built up a lot of additional structures. at the time of the debates as you recall was the mi5 in the
united states and wisely in my view we decided not to do that and we kept the responsibility for both domestic intelligence and the domestic enforcement at the fbi. but we're now looking back, i say, with about 14 years of retrospection. we still have a terrorist threat, but frankly it has morphed. and now we are seeing more and more concern about lone wolves, people who are recruited and inspired to operate in place. and there was just a story in the paper today that al qaeda is now imitating isis by suggesting a list of targets for their own set of lone wolves. and that creates new challenges for the intelligence community as you deal with low signature types of terrorist activity. so with that as kind of some background, let me turn first to
paul for some insight. >> well, thank you. it is great to be here with my partners. my lane is safeguarding in the essence of national security and public safety. for me it is about distributing coordinated collaboration. so my assessment is that we have made amazing progress in the last 14 years and in the last year, but we have miles to go. why? because the domestic architecture is inherently fragmented, that's the constitutional design in our country. it's a feature, not a bug. let me give you some examples of some progress we have made in the last year. with our partners at the federal level, our state and local partners. particularly exciting for me is progress on a lining field base intelligence of information and sharing entities. things like the risks that came up in the '70s, the combat regional crime, what came up in the '80s and the '90s, war on drugs. and more recently the fusion
network, jttfs and so forth. and operational example of that alignment is connecting law enforcement conflicting systems and we have done that in the past year. pretty amazing progress. as i think about the priorities that we have, they fall into several categories. number one, we really want to build on the incredible open government platform that we have built over the last number of years. based on transparency, participation of non-federal partners, collaboration with partners and partners in the private sector. we want to continue to develop and scale the ise. some examples, the agency based i.s.e. has done a tremendous job that way, the main specific information sharing environments is the work that the maritime community has done with the government and state and local partners. and finally state and local
sharing environments. states are trying to build groups under their own frameworks to plug into the national architecture. and finally, privatize and mature the capabilities and shared services that enable this progress. you know n the partnership side, we have partnerships and that's really the key to the progress i'm describing. at the federal level, with federal agencies, with our state and local partners, we have the department of justice with dplobl sharing initiatives. global sharing initiatives. with the structures and the existing work with the fbi, dhs and the state and local partners, we work with the i.t. industry through the standards coordinating council. we work with our international partners. so it's a lot of progress but a lot more to do. >> eric velez, fbi. >> good morning. i can't tell you what an honor it is to be here.
i have so much to tell you and so little time. so we'll get to the highlights. first and foremost, everyone in this room and in this country should be extremely proud of your fbi and how far we have come along with regards to our intelligence program. contrary to belief, the intelligence program is not something new to the fbi. it's something that we have been doing since the creation of our organization. when you look at intel, what is it? it's information that we need to make better decisions, better informed decisions. so a street agent who is going to execute an arrest in a house needs to know information about who is in that house, do they have prior arrests? what should i be looking out for? that's intel. this is something that we have been doing a long time. what has changed, really, is making sure that we as an organization understand it. it's a tremendous capability that we have to get information. because that's really what we are very good at doing. that we're leveraging that, in order not only to help ourselves and to push our investigations forward, to collect evidence, for example, but to help our partners. to help the folks throughout the
intelligence community who also need that information as well. so it's nothing new and a lot of folks think it was a transformation of our culture. our culture is a very good culture. our culture is a culture of people who come in 24/7 who work tirelessly to prevent terrorist attacks. we want to preserve that culture. it is just the way that we think about the threats. and making sure that we're leveraging every capability we have. integration is a big word these days. i'm sure you heard director clapper, one of his parts is integrating the community to make sure all the agencies come together as a unified team. so integration for us and the fbi is one of our director's prior initiatives and you'll hear from him later this afternoon. but for us, integration has several aspects. one, we want to make sure we are integrated within. that our special agents and our analysts are working as one cohesive team. it's not that this is what intel does and this is what we as agents or operators do. one of the most significant
accomplishments we have made is tomorrow i'm going to the graduation prior to this year when agents went through quantico at the new agents training, they went through a separate training. they were sworn in and got creds when they graduated. we have changed that. director comey has an integrated class. then the agents and panelists are sworn in together as a team and they graduate as the same class. when they go out to the field, that starts immediately from when they come into this organization. so you're getting it from the top and the bottom and from leadership. when they go out, they know they with one team. that's an initiative we do to drive integration. integration with the community to make sure i'm present, the fbi is present at various meetings and bringing our skillset to the table. i see a tremendous number of patriots in this room, either your prior patriots or are one of our strongest partners, and
that integration is better than ever. and then integration with our state and local law enforcement and other federal agencies. i want to commend shomander paul. general taylor and dhs. john mulligan and ctc. tremendous partners. we have had great partnership with state and local law enforcement and building upon that to translate what the community needs and work with our state and local partners in a way that we can make it relevant to them and bring them to the table. that's another key part of integration. so like i said, i could sit here for hours talking to you about all the things going on with the fbi, but obviously i don't want to take up all the time. but i all of your questions. oh, and before i go, can i -- special plug. i simply have the benefit of picking up the baton from somebody who i admire tremendously. maureen boginski, the first executive director of the fbi's intelligence program. and i get -- what she laid was the foundation of the fbi a
still there as far as our intelligence program, and i'm just pushing that forth. so thank you so much, maureen, for everything you do and continue to do for us. >> hear hear. john mulligan and ctc. >> thank you, mr. secretary. joining my colleagues, i'm happy and grateful to be with you folks here today. i'll talk for just a few minutes about the optic of counter terrorism and how we stand right now in our efforts to date. as many of you are very aware, we have seen a real change in the landscape for our counter terrorism over the last 19 to 24 months. with the rise of isil as both a successor and peer competitor to al qaeda. like many of you, we have worked over the last several years to develop, i believe, an excellent partnership across the community. and with industry to try to develop the means by which we develop effective counter terrorism measures and now up find ourselves challenged by the environment that is a lot more broad, a lot more diverse, the
challenges, their ability to leverage modern technology. it is just a much different and more complex environment. what does that mean for us? what does -- how does that affect our planning and strategi strategies? well, our priorities remain the same. we really need to do an extremely effective job of identifying, of developing and articulating details and providing that information to our nation's defenders so that they can execute their mission as effectively and efficiently as possible. what does that portend for our requirements? i will suggest three things. you will hear a lot of this resonate with my other colleagues. the first is the people we have working the missions base. as you would suspect, most of the people who work counter terrorism are extremely motivated. it is a compelling mission space. so we generally don't suffer from morale and motivation. sometimes we suffer from working people very, very hard. so we have to ensure we are able to maintain a diverse and
effectively trained workforce that is ready to rise to the new challenges that are constantly being presented to us. we also have to have folks flexible enough to be moving from one target to another as the threats ebb and flow, which i can assure you they do. the second piece is the technology piece. as you are acutely aware, we have had a lot of success leveraging technology over the years to provide advantage to our nation and its counter terrorism fight. the challenge that we have is that the commercial world now offers broad array of technology and commercially available applications and tools to many of these terrorist elements. and the current generation of terroris terrorists, many of whom are a much younger demographic than we had seen previously, are very technologically astute and able to leverage those tools to their effect. the net result is that we are working in a much more compressed environment in which
the variety of threats appear and the time with which we have to counter those threats is greatly reduced. how then do we approach our efforts and improve our performance? it goes then to my third point, which is about organization. and i think that is a large part of what we are here to discuss today. and it is the fact that we need to leverage our organizational skills and our organizational relationships. and the strengths that we have working together. and i think that is really going to be the challenge that we face in the very near term, is we have made great strides in terms of both working together, among the interagency and pushing information through vertical integration down to those folks at the state and local level who have to deal with these threats as they appear on the domestic landscape. i think we have made really good strides in that regard, but i think it also is an area in which we need to continue to work. and i'm sure many of you will have some questions in that regard. >> frank taylor, to my old
department. >> thank you, mr. secretary. it is an honor to be on with my partners and colleagues, but more importantly, my friends. we have worked for so long and over so many years. the dhs -- our priority as given to us by congress and legislation is to ensure that intelligence information from the isc is translated into a way that it can move to our state and local partners. there are 18,000 police departments. 800,000 sworn officers around this country. i'm reminded that tim mcveigh was caught by an astute oklahoma police officer and that at some point i read that mohommad attah, one of the 9/11 hijackers was stopped by a local cop who was not empowered with intelligence information to potentially understand who he was dealing with. so our challenge is getting
information to our state and local fusion centers and that information out to our cops on the beat so they understand the nature of the terrorist threat that our nation is facing. and in their daily operations are able to use that knowledge to engage potential threats for information from the jttf, information from our watch listing and all the other systems we have put in place in the last 14 years to help us better understand this phenomenon and how it is manifesting itself in our country. the second part of our mission is to work in our field and structure of ina with my intelligence officers in my field of work with the fusion centers to generate intelligence from the fusion centers to right i.r.s that are relevant to the intelligence community for further exploitation. certainly we do that in concert
with our partners at the fbi on a day-to-day basis. but there's a tremendous amount of information and data that is created out of fusion centers. there are about a thousand analysts sitting in all sort of fusion centers across our country. and they have great expertise and knowledge that we want to be able to take advantage of at the national level. and the final piece of our mission is probably the most exciting piece for me. eric and i were talking about the experience that the fbi is trying to work with the data that sits within dhs. that we collect in our daily business that has intelligence value and translating that data into intelligence reporting or analysis that fills gaps that are existent in the community. and so using dhs data to help our intelligence community
partners and others to find new knowledge that didn't exist before. john spoke about organization. one of my initial thrusts as new secretary was to tell dhs/ina we do not compete the fbi. we want to create a unique niche for us that no one is particularly working on that can be our responsibility for the inc. so we build that partnership for the fbi and getting the intelligence that our department and others need in translating that intelligence out to our partners in the field. let me make one final comment about the homeland security information network, our cio and my team, my information sharing team along with a lot of help
from the i.c.e. have created a robust platform for sharing information. we call it the hsin. we have lots of things riding on this backbone. and we as a department are committed to ensuring that that becomes the backbone for communication of critical intelligence and other information. that is of value to our state and local partners. i'll stop there, sir, and look forward to the questions. >> we have some questions already. and some of them are particular to particular agencies, but i'm going to start with some general questions and throw it open. given the fact that the intelligence community and law enforcement have a different set of authorities, restrictions and rules, under the constitution and under our statutes, what are
the issues that you face collectively as part of the intelligence community but also as part of the law enforcement community in terms of your ability to work together and where are you constrained still by the existing set of authorities? >> well, that's a great question. and i think when you think about the domestic environment, law enforcement and national intelligence, you have to go a little deeper and understand the rule of criminal intelligence. right? and state and locals don't do national security. they do public safety. they don't do national intelligence. they do criminal intelligence. there's a rich and robust framework in this country around criminal intelligence that dates back to the '70s and abuse that is occurred at that time. and there's a tremendous amount of case law, tremendous account of engagement with advocacy communities, training, compliance around that sort of thing. so that's a critical, critical dimension and at the heart of
our architecture, frankly, in what we have been doing over the last 14 years. kind of a second point is, why the information sharing environment works, why our domestic efforts work is we put the premacy of a local control. local control makes all the difference in our ability to share information. so those are a couple of points and i could go on but i'll hand it over. >> he's the expert in this arena, but by the point i would make is, yeah, different states have different rules on retention of information, privacy laws. but the key point to make when it comes to the initiative of national security, we are going to get that information into the hands of the state and local partners that need it. and we have to be cognizant of these, but when it comes to these threats, it's about getting information to them and making sure that's happened in a way that's very agile. we don't have any issue right now, if there's ever a threat to go on that we cannot share this
piece of information with our state and local partners, that simply will not happen. so we are cognizant of the different laws around the states and we are very respectful of that, but when it comes to this threat, it's about getting information to the people quickly. >> just to echo those points, i stand in complete agreement. the challenge we also have is that we need to ensure that each of the agencies are aware and mindful of the controls that are required of each of the partners. i completely agree with the observation that the local control of data is critical and essential to this piece. and again, it's an issue of continued transparency and continued aggressive engagement whenever we do fit. and we do occasional face the occasional obstacles. >> i think about this and i have -- it may not look like it, but i come from the church commission when the defense went through the information
collection reforms and those things. it's understanding the rules and what the rules authorize you to do. and within the rules, the privacy, civil liberties, civil rights, one, two, triple three, there are great opportunities. there are more opportunities than we exploit. so it's understanding the rules, applying the rules in a way that allows you to see what you need to see and to get it into the right hands. but within the rules of how it is collected and how it should be used and for what purpose. and i think that's our great challenge moving forward, is to get beyond the discussion of that into really basically understanding those rules and applying them to our information sharing processes and making those processes work more effectively. >> so let me -- i want to go down on this a little bit because we have a number of questions that deal with aspects of this. and i want to focus on the collection as much as the
sharing. and i'm going to combine two questions and ask you that, ask you to respond to them. they both deal with revising our existing architecture. for decades we have lived with the model in which there's the away game, that's war intelligence. and there's the home game, that's criminality. and there's a set of rules that apply to the away game and a set of rules to apply to the home game. but in the overseas world adversary, it's not trying to send foreigners into the u.s. but is actually trying to recruit in place an operational of americans. does that work anymore and do we revisit those differences? that could have impact in terms of collection. the flip side of that which was presented in the second question is, in the wake of the snowden leaks, you know, snowden not only talked about what we are
collecting in the u.s. with metadata, but he raised the issues about collection against foreigners overseas. and the current administration talked about an initiative to provide non-u.s. persons with the kind of privacy protections u.s. persons have. now the implication of that would be that just as we're rather restricted in collecting against u.s. persons, those kinds of restrictions in collection and retention would apply to foreigners and even when we collect overseas. i mean, imagine how ecstatic putin would be if he thinks he has privacy rights against the united states. so considering these issues, the development of lone wolves the u.s. and this impulse to extend u.s. person restrictions overseas, how does this effect or how do you see this affecting your collection jobs and your protection jobs going forward?
again, i will just throw it open there. >> yeah, that's great. one of the flagships of successes that we have all done together, actually, fbi, doj, dhs, is suspicious activity reporting. see something, say something is the public awareness component of that. and we essentially have neighborhood watch for the nation. key to making that work is privacy policies across all 78 fusion centers, every state with the exception of wyoming. every federal agency has these privacy policies in place. they train officers against these policies, analysts, they have compliance procedures, performance metrics, it all works pretty well. and the key to it is it is integrated into our domestic architecture and the culture of how public safety works in this country. the domestic part, the home game doesn't work unless we have full integration of our partners, the american people, the private sector. and so that's kind of critical to how the -- how we operate.
and i think a real success. >> how much would it impair what you do if all ability to collect against foreigners overseas, let's say syria or iraq, were suddenly overlaid with a set of requirements similar to what we have to do before we collect on u.s. persons? would that have a real impact on your ability to see things that are threatening the homeland? john, let me put that over to you. >> well, formally, i no longer work for a collection agency. i'm feeling liberated about that. but let me go to your point, michael, and just change the discussion point just slightly. i think that a lot of these elements have already found legal sanctuary by their use of u.s. service providers. because as they operate on u.s. service providers, that immediately places legal restrictions on u.s. collections. and it does then become a -- i mean, it becomes a -- it takes
the collection into a different span of effort. so what i would deposit is there are a lot of inherit legal rights that the practitioners are already enjoying. i would also suggest that within that discussion that has tabled, it isn't about the entirety of foreign nationals and joining u.s. persons rights. it's about specific perhaps partner nations enjoying the u.s. persons rights. so again, that's where the discussion is going to need to continue. >> the other thing i need to think about, too, is in our engagement with our foreign partners, increasingly our foreign partners are under the same pressure that we're under in terms of how they share information, how their information is going to be used, who is going to use it, who is going to get access to it. so i think we are living in a world where the challenges of exchanging information with partners, collecting it, are going to be even more
challenging. and i get back to the point that says we have to understand the rules and we have to make sure that as we understand the rules we apply our best minds in terms of how we use those rules to get the data that we need. but this is a phenomenon that is going to continue to challenge us. the privacy laws in europe and in the eu are even stronger than here and information exchanges with our partners there have to take account with the new laws. so i think this is the reality that we all have to deal with going forward. and we just have to be nimble enough to address it and not allow it to undermine our ability to do what we have to do every day. >> i can take that. the first part of that question about the home game, i don't think this the issue is the collection part of it. i mean, there's state and local
law enforcement officers and other federal agents out there who do their work every day and do it well. they are out in the communities and investing and doing what they do well. it's about getting that information that they have, making sure they understand the relevance and importance of that information to the broader usg, and getting that and doing that in a way that is seamless, efficient and fast. but it highlights the point you made as to whether these threats or this particular actor may be in the united states who is not communicating with somebody overseas. who is reading online, he's not in direct contact but being inspired to go out and do something. that highlights the importance even more. because reality, that person's first contact is not going to be with an fbi agent. it just isn't. it's either going to be with a state and local law enforcement officer, cbp officer, a citizen within this community, so when they get that -- they need to know what we need to know and
get that to us. so as far as the home game, i think that part of it, i think we are in good shape. and a lot of work that dhs has done over the years with the fusion centers, the jttf and the fbi have come a long way to make sure that information flows seamless. >> that's a really good point and i really want to second what eric is saying. it's always been recognized, the 9/11 commission even highlighted this, there's huge amounts of information that's already existing and collected as part of the police management systems, across the 18,000 police departments. 90% are ten or less officers. the real opportunity is not the enhanced collection site but sharing that information in an effective way to connect the dots and glean operational intelligence both to solve crimes and protect communities and protect our nation. >> let's turn a little bit to a different topic, which is the subject of at least a couple of
questions that came up here which has to do with cyber security. obviously, an element of that is part of protecting the homeland. and i guess -- combining a couple of questions, have we finally settled on a structure in terms of the home upland intelligence enterprise for dealing with cyber threat information. both within the u.s. government and between the u.s. government and the private sector and among the private sector. and is that -- now maturing to the point that we are actually going to see an increase in the speed and the breath of the information collected. i think a lot of this goes to the bureau and then to frank at dhs. frank? >> i'll start off. certainly cyber security is not in my fort foportfolio but the intelligence aspect is. but the administration and our department i think made great
strides with our partners, the fbi, d.o.d., nsa, in sorting through the collection of information about dotcom threats and .gov threats. dhs has been designated to be the focal point for information sharing, but the private sector and our nppd team is now working with our private sector partners along with the bureau and with nsa on how we can do that at a machine speed level. it's not there today. it's our goal. because in the cyber environment, it's about nanoseconds as opposed to days and minutes. and i would really say that the cyber security community within
our government has never been more united then i've seen it today. and there's another structure that's coming into place under the dni called the ctic, that allows the dni to do the strategic policy analysis that doesn't get in the way of our day-to-day operations but gives a broader national perspective for policymakers. so i think in the course of all that's happened in the last year that the actors in this space have really come together with the plan and now we are waiting for some legislation to codify this. and we hope that will pass in the not-too-distant future with congress. >> i want like to address information sharing in the private sector. i look at it this way. back 14 years ago, almost to
this day, terrorism really changed the way that we looked at the way information was shared between federal government and state and local law enforcement. it was almost the pathfinder, if you will, that started to challenge a lot of policies and ways we did business keeping us from sharing information. you saw issues with classification. you saw issue with the clearances and really because of what was happening, everybody came to the table. and we really attacked a lot of these different things that were keeping us from being more efficient and more fluent with information sharing. i feel cyber today is what terrorism was back then. cyber is causing us to look at the information sharing in the private sector in new ways. and looking at what are those policies and those things that are in place to keep us from sharing information with the private sector. because it is such a true threat that it's bringing us to the table collectively. i remember once when i was in los angeles, we were doing an exercise at the port of los
angeles, it was one of these exercises we do, the wd scenario, and we had a whole room of folks, men and women from all over the law enforcement enterprise and d.o.d. enterprise. and we had some from the private sector and were sitting in the chair that said private sector that represented the person who was from -- who represented the different companies along the ports. and, you know, we as law enforcement officers, our tendency is to run and help. how can i help you? how can i help you? and we were always thinking this way. and this gentleman said, excuse me, with all due respect, we are not the damsel in distress here. we have a tremendous amount of capabilities that we have built because we need to protect our businesses. and i can tell you right now what is in all those cargo ships if you want to know on my ships, for example. so i appreciate that you want to come and help us and rescue us, but we would rather be with you because we have a lot -- and
that's always stuck with me. and i think this is the environment right now that we need to challenge a lot of the things that we do, the way we do business and really take a hard look at that. because what that -- those partner miss the private sector, they bring a tremendous capability to us to attack our adversaries. >> along those lines, another question raised the issue about whether the intelligence community traditional culture of classifying everything is really impeding the ability to share information. it's true in the cyber area as well in the counter terrorism area. because it gets difficult to clear people. particularly in the private sector and particularly when you get to the issue of suitability. and do we need to maybe elevate the importance of information sharing so we balance the impulse to overclassify with an impulse to share. i know this has been discussed for many years, it's not a new problem, but the snowden stuff is ratcheted back, but how are you seeing this going forward?
>> well, it's a reasonable concern and i know i have heard from the private sector partners about concerns along these lines. but the area where i can maybe add a little value to the conversation is talking about our state and local partners and what we hear from them. and as it relates to cyber security. and the key message we get from them, and it alines with what eric and frank have talked about, is they want to leverage the national investment that we have made over the last 14 years in counter terrorism as it pertains to advancing cyber security information sharing. there's a lot of issues, state and local law enforcement don't always have the same level of capacity. so the general will say he's being modest. we did a project led by dhs to extend the policy framework around the fusion center network with our state and local partners on lead so that now there's baseline capabilities to run cyber security information
sharing. and the ippd were out in front of that. along with the work at the fbi, they have done tremendous work around investigatory referrals with our state and local partners. again, leveraging the fusion center network. critically important against the cyber crime component of the cyber security mission. also work around protecting networks and things like that so they can maintain the integrity of the process. going back to the original question of overclassification, those are issues at counter terrorism we have chipped away over the years. so with our state and local partners, it is not outsized compared to just something we keep working on. >> you know, one of the things, i think, the ctic will allow us to do, and i think the points are very critical, 99% of the information needs to go to the private sector about these threat factors and those things but do not have to be
classified. it's the attribution piece and other sorts of things we do that make classified. so the extent to which we can develop our system to make sure the information about the signatures, the information about attack factors and all those things remains at a level that they can be used very quickly and not be overclassified is really the approach that we're trying to take. there are some classified aspects of what we do from a cyber security perspective. but that probably can remain in other parts of the government, not in the information sharing piece. i often would comment on the terrorism side that one of the most effective information sharing vehicles in our government with regard to terrorism is osac. what osac does with u.s. embassies across the world with u.s. companies all unclassified.
all unclassified. so that's our challenge here, to make sure that we don't put the classification piece creep in to what is essentially a day-to-day exchange of data about threats and risk networks that operators can take action on. on when that information is available. >> i want to turn to something that's been very much in the news lately. the migration crisis in europe. and you've got literally hundreds of thousands of people ywar-tomorrow cm region, many from syria. really overwhelming europe. there's been a fair bit of argument that the u.s. needs to step up and bring in refugees from the area. but as we know historically that can also create a pathway for people to infiltrate. and that's something that i think people are starting to get concerned about with respect to isis and similar groups. do we have a mechanism, assuming
that we are going to wind up taking more people, do we have a mechanism to process them in a way to give us a reasonable assurance that we are not admitting people who are going to be a threat to this country? and can we scale that to the level that we are going to need if we're actually going to lend a hand to the europeans in dealing with this migration flow? >> i guess this is to me. >> sounds like it. >> one thing is -- it's a challenge. it's the challenge we experience with refugees coming from war-torn areas where individuals have lied on their applications and we have learned later with great help from the fbi and others about their fabrications of data and that sort of thing. the cis has learned a significant amount of -- learneded a lot about how to do
this. we have a strong partnership with the isc and the fbi in terms of screaming. the challenges is you only know what you know. and i think we have robust screening mechanisms but our intelligence coming out of that region is not necessarily what we need. we are working on that. but the cis is acutely aware of the challenge. and has committed to working very close with our intelligence community partners to make sure that the vetting that occurs for that population or any population is trying to come to our country is this robust and makes use of quality available information that we may have on individuals for regions going forward. >> i would add, community engagement is critical.
so obviously frank went through some of the processes of screening and making sure all the information is available to the folks before they come into this country. and the vast majority that come into this country are coming in looking for a better way of life. but the engagement with the communities and making sure that we as law enforcement, we are not alone, the fbi, dhs, others are engaging these communities. we have to do that early. we have -- a lot of these countries, the impression they have of law enforcement when they are approached by an fbi equivalent, is not a good experience for them. so that our work that we do in community engagement is assuring them, welcome them to our country. you are a part of this country now and this is what we do. in helping to create that environment that if they were to see somebody who did sneak in through this process, that they would feel comfortable enough to call either their law enforcement partners who do a lot within their communities or
to an fbi agent or anybody else. and i think that part of it is very important as well as the screaming. >> i have another question that came in, are you concerned that the threshold for reporting suspicious activities is too low. and that therefore you run the risk of alienating the community because people then have interactions based on very thin predication? and part of that is -- again an article i saw in the newspaper today is about a particular case in which the claim was an individual who had essentially decided not to participate in a supporting isis overseas and come back, but were nevertheless being investigated. we heard this argument, just to frame it up, we have heard this argument for well over a decade, that too many individual cases the bureau brings is the case
where an informant is in there, they have spurred that up and left their own devices, many of these people would have never really wound up carrying out a terrorist attack or really taking any concrete steps. is our threshold too low? or is this simply a recognition of the fact that we're not living in the world of television and you don't wait until the last minute for dramatic effect. you want to nip things in the bud. >> this is an environment of very limited resources. we are all constrained. it is not looking any better. so every person that we have out there working is working on what we feel is something they should be focused on. the information gets to us about a potential threat to this country. we are going to work that case. at the end of the day, what we do with regards to these individuals who end up getting arrested for conspiring to
commit some terrorist act, the courtroom, the judicial system will actually be the ones who will show the american people exactly how it works. we are very transparent. when somebody wants to execute these types of acts and are very interested in doing it, we're very careful how that happens. we obviously know the issues of entrapment and what that could be, but the per sis tense of these individuals who are looking for weapons, looking for the means to do this and are contacting an undercover agent, that can't be ignored. and at the end of the day, the courts will show and we will show to the american people what exactly happened. and as far as the threshold of sharing information, and the threshold with regards to state and local law enforcement, a lot of suspicious activity reporting programs that were done, i think the best weapon a police officer has is his or her gut. that's going to tell them something is not right. they know what is going on. and when they feel something is
not right, they report that. there's not like it has the characteristics of 15 and 14, whatever, they know to bring this to the jttf and we work those. >> so a question for john related to fusion centers, those have been in existence now pretty much since shortly after 9/11. originally they were very narrowly focused on terrorism. they really broadened in many respects to be all crimes and all incidents. do we think the fusion centers have gone too much in that direction? should they be more focused? or is action your benefit in having a broader mandate? and if so, what else needs to be done in order to get the best out of our fusion centers across the country? >> yes, the fusion centers came up as an organic response to major urban areas, states after
9/11. over the last number of years and decade-plus there's been a real push to get the fusion centers to come together as a network. many years of assessments done by dhs, the general taylor saw it. the majority of the cost of fusion centers are born by the state and local partners. they are not really all crimes but priority threats as determined by the local stakeholders. i think it's critical because terrorism is one of these local probability/high consequence events. who can afford a purpose filled infrastructure in this day and age? meanwhile, you have to operationalize the benefits of information sharing and safeguarding. so you need to train officers one way. and you need to have consistent policies. as it turns out and this relates to the suspicious activity reporting earlier, the majority of sars admitted are dismissed.
and then the ones that go forward, the vast majority of them are gang-related. gangs, violent crime, narcotics, human trafficking. and in one state there's as many ongoing investigations related to human trafficking, some domestic, some transnationals, as there are terror related cases based on suspicious activity as a predicate. it works. it is key to the success and is designed that way going back to the 2002 national criminal sharing plan that was really coming from the state and local partners. >> so i would completely agree. and i think that there's tremendous benefit that we continue to derive from that partnership. it's both information flow and in both directions. i would also suggest going back to what he said with the fact that many individuals involved in human trafficking are the same types of individuals that are going to try to facilitate terrorist fighting. so we should be very open to the full range of options that are available to working with these
local entities. >> i might add that the fusion centers continue to evolve. and what has most impressed me is how they want to work together. because events that happen, let's say in boston, have interest in san francisco. and they move that information very quickly. to their partners that are tracking events around the country. a tremendous asset within our fusion centers really are a thousand analysts. so we are looking for ways to exploit the analytical capability as a local focus to answer national questions. working with the bureau, working with our state and local partners. so this capability is maturing. it is very effective and they are continuing to demand more
info sharing capability to allow them to reach the level of the effectiveness that their states require. and all that's helpful to the u.s. government and the federal government when they do that. >> can i add just one thing? so i think one of the most important parts of any intelligence organization, whether it's the fbi or whether it's the state and local-run fusion center, is that the intelligence it produces has to be relevant. it has to be relevant to the customers that they serve. there's not a sheriff or a police chief who wouldn't say that terrorism is relevant to them. they want to know that. and they get a lot of reports that are giving them information passing along to any to potential threats. but they are seeing a lot of gang violence and people dying in their cities. so when the fusion centers transition from the national security to an all crimes, all hazard, what i like about that is that what's happening there is that these analysts in these centers are starting to work with the police departments. they are starting to get the
buy-in and the expotion that the fusion center needs. so if we do have a terrorist event, these folks aren't meeting each other for the first time. so getting the buy-in from the fusion center to the own state and local partners to say, hey, this is something we can provide to you. having that ability to give them intelligence that helps them on the day-to-day crimes they see is very important to kind of keep the wheels greased, if you will. >> listen. thank you very much for a very illuminating session. we can go on for another hour, but there are other panelists waiting. and so we appreciate your participation. thanks a lot. >> thank you. >> thank you. [ applause ] today the house rules committee meets for discussion on the women's health and safety act. a bill taken up tomorrow to give states more flexibility to deny medicare contracts to health care providers involved in abortions. we'll have the mark-up meeting
live at 5:00 eastern time here on c-span3. president obama is among the world leaders addressing the united nations general assembly today. also remarks from russian president vladimir putin and others. we'll show you their remarks tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on our companion network c-span. also c-span's road to the white house coverage continues today with donald trump. the frontrunner for the republican presidential nomination. he'll detail his tax proposal today. watch that in its entirety tonight after the u.n. speeches also on c-span. tonight on "the communicators," we'll talk to the internet corporation for assigned names and numbers or ican, the president and ceo fadi chehade on how the government works. >> the governments have an advisory role in icann. they do not directly make policy, they cannot have a seat on our board of directors.
this is very much, in fact, a triumph of showing how a private sector-led institution that has the government as an important advisory body, but that it has a broader base of decision making that is private-sector led, including input from the tech no logical society, et cetera. but that's advice that informs the policy and the board activities that are anchored in the fact that governments are continuing to play an advisory role to what we do. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern and pacific on "the communicators" on c-span2. coming up next, panelists from government and federal agencies discuss access to information and the implications of the data act on the executive
branch. this is hosted by the dated transparency coalition here in washington, d.c. it's about 50 minutes. good morning. welcome back from the break, everyone. it's great to be here with you all. my name is bryce pickert and a principal with boon hamilton for federal clients. i'm very pleased to be introducing and moderating this panel on the future of data and the executive branch. we heard earlier from daryl isa that if laws are not implemented and enforced they are meaningless. and that implementation often requires very hard work. the data act requires the publishing of details spending information in the federal
government for all the spending life cycle, from appropriations to line item payments. that's equivalent to representing 20% of our gross domestic product with one set of views to navigate from the highest level of the economy to the lowest level. that perspective on our federal government spending is going to be very powerful and transformational to how we think of allocation of resources in managing our government. but the data act implementation is not the open data initiative at work in our government today. our government is publishing tens of thousands of new data sets within the past couple of year. and our panelists today are helping lead the executive branch in our open data initiatives to transform our government and unlock value for our society. as booze allen we are helping our clients connect in a digital world. we are helping clients to orient their .gov sites and are
delivering strategies and capabilities to unlock the value of data sets currently held within organizations. we see a future of public and private partnership to unlock creation and get more effective and efficient allocation of resources for organizations and across our economy through better open data exchange. over the past couple of years and today, our executive branch is focused on open data and digital transformation initiatives. we have a policy today where data is open by default. this has been a big change for us. we have shifted from closed environments where we hold on to our information to now exposing it as our default mode of operating. but the policy and strategy shifts only have their intended outcomes and they are coupled with good execution and
implementation and a focus on the usage of data and value creation. today's panelists have great perspectives on what's happening in the executive branch to implement these policy changes and execute them. i'm very pleased to introduce you to our panelists. first, cory zeric is at the white house office of science and technology policy. she is responsible for designing and implementing u.s. policy on open government issues, and she is coordinating domestic efforts with the global open government partnership of a 60-country coalition that promotes collaboration, participatory and transparent government working with all of our federal government agencies to develop and implement open government initiatives. prior to this, she was the attorney adviser for the office
government information services, where she served as the freedom of information act om budsman, responsible for assisting requests and agency resolving disputes. next we have vicky mcfadden, deputy chief customer officer at the general services administration. she helps the agency to make data-driven decisions on people, processes, technology and policies to improve the customer and citizen experience with our government. prior to this role she served as senior adviser to the gsa administrator where she developed the acquisition and performance management strategies for the agency. before that, she was a financial management analyst in the gsa office of travel, motor vehicle and card services. and time finally, dave liberick is with us. he is the assistant secretary for the united states treasury, responsible for developing policy and overseeing
the operations of the financial infrastructure of our federal government in payments, collections, debt financing, accounting, debt delinquent collection and shared services. he served as the first commission are of the bureau of fiscal service, established with the consolidation of the bureau of public debt and the financial management service. prior to his service at fms, he was at the u.s. mint and served in the capacity of deputy director and acting director where he was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the world's largest manufacturer of coins. we have a panel with great perspectives on things happening across the government to open our data sets, make them available for public use and unlock value for our society. i'm pleased to introduce them and please join me in welcoming them. [ applause ] first up we will hear from frina from the white house office of
science and technology policy. >> good morning. thanks for having me here and thanks to the data transparency coalition for putting on a great event. there is an amazing lineup today. i'm really excited to be part of it. let's start with a little background. you will hear in more detail from some of my colleagues about some specific of what's going on in data transparency and the data act. let's start with the big picture. so as you a heard, i work on the administration's open government portfolio. in 2009, on president obama's very first day in office, he issued a few memos that pertained to open government. one of them we refer to it as the open government mem row, directed at our executive branch agencies to be more open,
participatory, transparent and collaborative in the work that we do. now, of course open government is nothing new. we have been working in the pays space for decades. the freedom of information act will turn 50 next year. it's probably our original open government law. but really capturing open government in a collective, thoughtful way for inviting all of us this work together to push this effort forward, something that was a little bit new and has been a big part of this administration's work. the open government directive followed the open government memo. it really spelled out what the administration meant by being more open and participatory and collaborative. the open government directive was also the beginning of our work in open data. part of that asked agencies to begin identifying data sets that were seen as valuable that they could begin releasing to the public. back then i was at the national archives.
i remember we got that directive. we were all puzzled about what a high value data set is. it is exciting to see that work grow. i checked data.gov yesterday and there are more than 160,000 open government data sites open and active on data.gov. huge thank you to that team. i think i see some of them in the room. gsa manages it. you may hear more about that in a minute as well. so the open government work also involves our efforts not just domestically but around the globe. and in 2011, president obama and seven other heads of state launched the open government partnership, which is a global collective of countries and civil societies working together to push more open and accountable governments. and we'll come back to that in just a minute. am i on the right slide? yes. we also have a whole slew of open data initiatives. i will talk about a few of those
this morning as well. but since 2011 we really began focusing on the open data efforts. we have been working to expand this work across all sectors. health, education, energy, finance, others. we have prioritized identifying data sets. more than just the initial three high value data sets. and government agencies, as you heard really stemmed by the dozens. following on that and really capitalizing on the great work, happening in open data, in 2013, president obama issued an open data executive order. this eo declared that open and machine readable is the new default for government information. and that has been a very new way for a lot of us to work. a lot of us have come up in government for some time, working in very paper-based environments. so to have this open data eo and the open data policy that followed it, helped us move forward in managing our information as data assets.
so let's take a second and talk about the open government partnership. i mentioned this was founded in 2011 by president obama and seven other heads of state. the great thing about the open government partnership is it's not a partnership of these member countries. it is between the deposits of these countries and their civil societies. so what started with eight countries and a double civil society organizations in 2011 now foyer years later is at 66 countries and hundreds of other civil society. the ogp, we like acronyms, the ogp together has created thousands, couple thousand new open government commitments around the world pushing governments to be more open and transparent, curb corruption, increase accountability and be better xwomgovern dancance stru.
it includes the open data efforts. so countries that are members of the open government partnership publish national action plans every two years that detail very specifically commitments that the countries will take, again, in partnership with civil society to be more open and transparent. those commitments cross all sectors. they are related to transparency of agriculture data. certainly commitments in the financial transparency space. the last national action plan in 2013 was just a little bit too soon for the data act efforts. we did have fiscal transparency commitments. we did end up doing an update to that plan and included specifically in it commitments related to carrying out the mandates of the data act. we'll hear more about that in just a few minutes. but capturing all of that in our open government plans is incredibly helpful because it allows us to track the work
we're doing in a centralized place and allows us to advance it and enhance it onto the world stage so we can be global leaders and share that with other countries. the open government partnership really does have a strong focus on open data. you can see from the image on the slide, so many commitments that our own plan and other countries' plans have included are in the open data space. it's really just the way we work now. the open government partnership has an open data working group. that brings together members of the open data community from all over the world to collaborate and share practices on the on work they're doing. i know some of our gsa colleagues represent the united states on the open data working group for the open government partnership. the ogp has a big summit each year where countries come from all over the world and deliver any national action plans due to be presented a