tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN April 7, 2016 5:00pm-7:01pm EDT
hard. we brought all the people from gender ministry -- all -- there are two or three per minister. we had a huge meeting and we discussed things and we kind of made a summary at the end of things that were not working well. and after that, we followed through. i helped her follow through, for example, i got to the -- to the organizational structure and to sit with her and to write ters for the unit. this is obvious what we need, but it's not obvious in afghanistan. so we did the ters and eventually after that, i let go because i saw she was really taking the reins. she was going to do it. it's her project, her ministry. i'm glad that she came to me for some advice and i was able to help her in a small way. but that was essential. so, yes, i do the same with ministry of counternarcotics. i also have some dealings with ministry of higher education, but not really much. ministry of education wanted me to be an ambassador for literacy. but they are undergoing a very big reform. that has been shelved. so it probably -- you probably will hear that i'm doing the -- i mean, all i'm doing is talking when i see people, telling people the way i see it and hoping that somebody will pick
up the project and run with it. >> great. please, yes. give her the mike. please stand up so they can see you to give you the mike. >> i'm the executive director of the u.s. afghans council at georgetown university. we are so grateful you are here and i'd like to publicly thank you for staying up in the middle of the night. very quietly, i don't think people know this. and you have been sending us support and at times when you don't have the staff to do it. we're so grateful for reaching out to us here in washington, d.c. i'd like to ask specifically if you could talk further about one of the myths that you brought up. the myth of the afghan male, the afghan man as being uncivilized. part of why i the about that, in my work, what i found is with all of these successful, beautiful, talented afghan women that you talk about, there is always usually a strong and supportive and feminist and wonderful father, husband, brother, cousin, uncle. that i think we don't always hear about. so if you could talk a bit about the beauty of the afghan man in this struggle. >> that'll take a lot of time. >> no, no.
that's okay. >> take all the time you need. >> i think in that respect, afghanistan is not very different from other countries in the world. >> hold it down over there. >> i will give you the example, we have a hotline that's called 6464. that is a hotline for the resolution of family problems. it's a hotline where people can call anonymously and ask for
advice. it's of course addressed to women basically because it's the women who have problems. but i found out that 70% of the calls are initiated by men. fathers, brothers, sons, uncles, who are worried about a situation in which a woman dear to them finds herself in. and so they will call and make sure that it is legitimate and all that and once they are reassured that it's a good place for that person, they give the phone to the person and she calls. so i -- this is i think the best confirmation that there are men that care about women. i don't -- and i think i'm not
saying anything that's untrue when i say that there is no father that does not love his daughter. they love their daughters so much, they really cuddle her and are very close to their daughters. but eventually, with the cultural norms and all the distance, and from afar you think maybe, they don't care for their daughters. they do care. >> thank you. thank you for that. >> yes, all the way in the back, please. [ inaudible ] >> thank you. >> ken meyer. what is enrollment rate in primary and secondary education and does afghanistan have enough resources to educate both the boys and their girls?
>> the numbers are not precise. i do know there were articles at the beginning of last year's academy which is about now that 1.3 million young people join the first grade last year. now i don't have any confirmation. i read that in the newspaper. our education system was extremely strong and has produced people like ambassador and my husband and other people. it was because we had a very -- i can't see the word. very forelooking, forth looking queen. the queen was in charge of education. she was the minister of education. and she made sure that a lot of
people got scholarship to go and study abroad. but she insisted there she was prescriptive. she insisted that everybody should study education. i had a friend tell me that her father wanted to become a doctor. but, no, the scholarship was only for education. so he came back and he became a teacher in a school or university. so we had some very highly educated people who are running our schools and our universities. we had a very strong educational system. and i'm sure the ambassador will confirm that all of them that came to the american university of beirut performed very well by comparison to the other students at the institution. because they have very solid grounding. so i think we can do it. i don't think we have reached that point yet. i think at this point we have a
very -- a ministry that needs to be reformed totally. and we have to let alone. we need to know how many schools we have. i mean, you read the reports that said that some schools are only there on paper. we don't know how many schools we have. we don't know how many children attend. we have too many schools in kabul that have three shifts which means the first shift starts at 6:00 in the morning and finishes at 11:00. then what does a child do afterwards? and then the last shift finishes at 9:00 in the evening. there is a lot to be done in education sector. but i'm confident that we can do it because it was done in afghanistan. we do have the experience. >> you mentioned the queen. have you studied her and are
you -- you take some inspiration from her role? >> what happened is that when i became a public person, you know, when i became a first lady that the public could reach out to, a lot of people compared me to her. so, yes, i tried to understand what her role was and what she was doing. she was much more involved than i am. she was a minister in the cabinet. she was -- she went everywhere with the king and all. this i don't do that. i'm not interested -- i mean she was young and maybe it was she felt it was her role and her responsibility. i feel my responsibility is to be there and to listen. i feel my responsibility is to be like a little bit like a go between. i never scold them. i scolded one group of students.
they had come and they wanted me -- they said we don't have a road. we need a road. a paved road so that we're not so -- this is a province that is in the center of afghanistan. it's quite isolated. i said, that's it. the other one, they said we have three years to have electricity produced out of the rivers. i said fine, perfect. i'll convey your messages. and then they said, we don't have schools, i mean we don't have roofs for schools. in winter, we have the schools next to the wall that gets the sun. and in summer we go to the wall that gets the shade for the schools. we need a building. and i looked at them. they were a group of 25 or 30 strapping young men. and i said, come on. you get together for one day or two days and you can build the one or two room schools.
you're not going to wait for the government to come and build you your school. don't be lazy. so we laughed. so i do scold people but very very seldom. so i think my role is much more to be -- a place where people feel safe to come, safe to be able to say whatever is on their heart. sometimes i have answers like i have answers sometimes for your questions. but at least they feel they have been heard. that's my role. it's not more than that. >> you've been first lady now for -- >> 18 months. >> 18 months. and you've talked a lot of afghans. if you had to identify one thing that the government -- i don't want you to get new trouble, that the government needs to -- >> you're not going to get me in
trouble. >> they need to pay attention to in terms of empowerment of women, what would that be? and the second question and this will be the concluding, what is your message to the united states now that you've had a very, thanks to you, a very positive conversation, uniquely positive today? >> thank you. >> and what would -- what would your message be to the united states if we could conclude on that. >> sure. as i said in my speech, there is still a lot to do for women. but we are in the right. we're going in the right direction. that's what i feel. i think it's probably very difficult for people outside the government to understand how much work is on going within the government.
it's -- i don't get to see my husband very often. he leaves usually early in the morning and comes back sometimes at 10:00, 10:30, 11:00. but he has all the people around him. i mean, it's really very interesting because the pps, the guards within the -- within the presidential palace have had to change shifts because he starts very early and he's up very late. so that they can cover him. but anyway, i think the government is trying very hard. and whenever i see a a detail or a place where there is an affirmative action thing. i raise it. and i see whether they do something or not. so, yes, there is always room
for improvement. it has been only now, you know, it's only been one year because it took six months to get the unity government. it's only been one year of functioning. and i think for one year we've done quite a lot. and as far as the message to the american public, i'm very tempted to say don't believe what they say in the newspapers. >> there's a lot of skepticism towards the media. >> the administration itself knows what we're doing. but the american public, just remember that we're people like any other people. they have dreams. and maybe their dream is to be
able to live in a country where there is peace. i just have been in morocco a few days ago and i've been in morocco now in my mid 20s. and morocco and lebanon at the time i didn't know afghanistan, morocco and lebanon were really at the same level. and i was presideleasantly surp but also very sad when i went to work there only for three days, but i could tell how much morocco had developed. how much life was pleasant in morocco. how people seem at ease and pursuing their own goals.
their ministers were well trained and everybody was very happy anticipate very hospitable. and i thought, my god, this is exactly what lebanon would have been had we not had the war. so maybe this is what i'm feeling these days. "real i really understand the cost of war. war destroys and then it's very difficult and it takes very time consuming to build again. but the people of afghanistan want peace and want to be able to live in the villages and city. they want to have good schools in there. they have the same dreams as everyone in the world. and i do hope that we'll be able to give it to them. thank you. >> you're welcome. >> thank you very much. that is a very positive and engaging conversation.
freedom. >> wheaton college professor tracy mckenzie on the evolving war goals on the civil war. and then on real america -- >> how was it possible for america to achieve such production? and amazingly ports came in to the united states. 20% of american industry and manpower was woman power. legions of women were stepping to aadvance across the world forsaking the round of -- [ inaudible ] >> this 1944 war department film documents how women in world war ii helped the war effort, eluding that hidden army of american women working in war manufacturing is the main reason that germany won the war. we visit the daughters of the american revolution museum to
learn about an exhibit marking the 125th anniversary of the organization. >> one thing that stands out is this imagery of the old concept. it goes back to ancient times where a warrior is made god like by lifting him up and celebrating him. >> it's worth highlighting assets of them especially those while they occupied the white house. >> james madison who followed jefr t jefferson owned over 100 slaves, holing a large percentage while he occupied the white house. he is responsible for composing and expanding the compromise
which guaranteed the south held a disproportionate influence bonn congress to preserve and uphold slave owning interests. >> tyler perry, african-american studies professor at california state university fullerton on a 12 american presidents who were slave owners. eight of them while in office. >> secretary of state for arms control verification in compliance says much has been done to improve nuclear security for america and its allies under the obama administration. frank rose joined a panel discussion at the wilson center. this hour long event took place as president obama's nuclear summit was about to begin in washington, d.c. >> good morning. i'm jane harmon, the president and ceo of the wilson center and delighted to introduce very
important national conversation on the nuclear submit and beyond, progress or regress. like to welcome some of the smartest people in washington to this audience but also welcome many who are watching this by other means, many of which are against the back of the room. seven years ago, president obama delivered a speech promising to fight for a world without nuclear weapons. to get the work done, he brought leaders from around the world to washington. hosting the first nuclear security summit here in 2010. south korea then took the baton in 2012 and the netherlands in 2014. this week in 2016, the summit is back in washington, d.c. and it's time for a status report.
to manage the nuclear file, the united states needs to walk and chew gum to recall a comment about former president gerald ford. the threats aren't one size fits all. we have to keep our eyes on great powers like russia. we need to watch regional pariahs like iran and north korean' we need tone sure that terror groups never get their hands on nuclear material as isil, so we read, hope to do in belgium. the conventional wisdom looks a lot more like did it in 2009 when president obama launched this conversation. many believe the risk of a planet destroying exchange has gone down while the threat of a single attack by kim young un or others has gone up. i don't think we can rule out major conflict. what keeps me up at night is the risk of miscalculation.
the accidental clash between the u.s. and russia perhaps over syria or pakistan and india that escalates. many regions are ready to blow. use of a theological weapon of any kind in syria could become an international crisis overnight. and if the world's responsible nations, grown-ups in the situation room condition the manage these risks, then that's the ball game much as usual, wilson center is ahead of this problem. nonproliferation is one of our clanz lanes of excellence. and today's conversation is led by the top leader on the issue. he is our vice president for scholars. he hand thld file on bill clinton's national security council and he's the author of iowa r-- "iran's nuclear chest."
he mod rates wierates with good and very good friends. i want to welcome bob galuchi, frank miller with whom i serve on the defense policy board and then assistant secretary of state frank rose for joining us. frank, back in the old days, was a member of the staff of the house intelligence committee where i served for eight years. he was a member of team harmon. can you join team harmon any time you want but you can never leave. sow may think he works for john kerry, but actually, not so much. in addition to that, he used to work for fringeank miller, go figure. we're delighted you're here. you know a lot more about this subject than most people. i got sat guy who knows the mest
is the moderator, please welcome rob litvac. >> thank you. good morning to all of you here and those viewing on c-span and other networks. the format will be that i'll ask our panelists a set of questions covering major topics for a half hour or so. and then we'll open it up to the audience for your questions. let's begin with an overview. it's now been almost seven years since president obama's landmark prague speech. he laid out an ambitious arms control and nonproliferation agenda. but to day's world looks very different than that in which the speech was delivered. how do you in hindsight view the objectives of the speech and its legacy? let's start with frank rose. >> rob, thanks so much for having me here. it's a real pleasure to be on stage with frank miller and bob
galucci and yourself and thank you congresswoman harmon for having me. it's like the howe hotel california. i think over the last seven years, if you look at the balance sheet, we have done a lot to improve nuclear security for both the united states and our allies. for example, in 2010, we signed the new strategic arms reduction treaty with russia. and i'm happy to say that despite all the challenges that we have with russia today, implementation of the new start treaty continues to go well. on sight inspections in both the u.s. and russia continue. we continue to exchange notifications of the movement of our from a teestrategic impleme issues.
we continue to meet and continues to work through difficult implementation issues. through the recent joint comprehensive plan of action with iran, we have cut off iran's path to a nuclear weapon in a verifiable manner. and through the nuclear security summit process, we have locked up significant amounts of nuclear material. i saw one estimate through the efforts of the nuclear security summit. we have locked up or secured enough nuclear material to create 150 bombs. so on the positive side of the ledger, i think we have made good progress. however, we do have some real challenges. as congresswoman harmon noted, the relationship with russia is fundamentally different. in 2009 when the president took office, we had hopes of developing a strategic
partnership with russia. i think those hopes are no longer there. additionally, russia has been using increasingly harsh rhetoric with regards to nuclear policy. and that is very, very concerning. and third, this is where i've been spending a lot of my time, russia has violated the intermediate nuclear forces treaty. which was ratified by the u.s. senate and russia and soviet union, excuse me, in 1988. that limits the production and testing of intermediate nuclear weapons, missiles, excuse me. and what we determine two years ago is that russia over the past several years has conducted several tests of a ground launch cruise missile that are prohibited by the treaty. now, we have been spending a lot of time over the past several
years to try to bring russia back into compliance with the inf treaty through diplomacy. but to date, our efforts have not been successful. however, we continue these efforts. however, we have made it clear to the russians and to others that we will not allow russia to gain advantage from its violation of the treaty. so overall, i think we have made good progress. but i think we have significant challenges, especially with regards to russia and the compliance with the intermediate nuclear forces treaty. >> how do you view this balance sheet seven years after the prague speech? >> i basically would agree with frank. i think that the signing of the new treaty was important not because of the numbers, but because if you look at the numbers and the bomber counting rule that was exhumed, the new star treaty allows more weapons than the bush administration's treaty of moscow.
but because it re-estabilshed the basis for verification and when you do verification, you increase transparency. and that increases stability. the nuclear security summits and the focus on loose nuclear material is terribly important work. and the j.c.p.o.a., fit continues successfully into the future has been a tremendous gain to start to diffuse a very dangerous situation. where i would fault the administration is that it was very late to recognize that with the exception of the united kingdom, the other nuclear weapons states did not buy into the prague agenda. it took several years for the administration to get its thinking around that. and there are parts of the administration that still don't understand that. second, a failure that's in conjunction with the first point i made to push back against putin and the nuclear saber-rattling. third, despite frank's very val
yen -- valiant efforts, he's undercut by seniors that he's pushing to get the russians back into compliance with the treaty are saying really we're ready to talk about a new strategic arms treaty, thereby signaling it may not than important. finally, the administration shares blame with the congress and the budgets control act for failing to do anything seriously about modernizing our strategic forces for the bulk of the administration. if you look at the fact that the strategic modernization programs have been delayed fairly significant and the russians and chinese are fielding systems, that creates a series of problems. >> we'll return to the modernization issue. bob. >> >> excuse me. thank you, jane. thank you, rob. it's a pleasure to be here with my colleagues.
generally when you think about the topic, nuclear security topic, i think we think in three boxes if we're thinking analytically. the first box is sometimes called vertical proliferation. and that's the arms control stuff that has traditionally gone between united states and soviet union and now the united states and russia. second box has been horizontal proliferation and that is essentially the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries, think north korea and think iran. the third box is nuclear terrorism which usually has not much to do with nation states. okay. in the first box, if you accept my three boxes, if in the first box i defer to my colleagues. i look at this and see that we had made significant progress with the last major arms control agreement. it was a good deal for us, a good deal for the russians, a good deal for the planet. and i see the politics as overwhelming further progress in
that area. that is shorthanded for putin. i do not -- i don't know what one does at this point with respect to. that i don't think we're going to make much progress as long as the political relationship with the russians is as it is. but that's not bad. i'm teaching at georgetown now. so maybe that is an a minus, pretty good grade. the second box, the proliferation box, iran, for me, many, many things wrong with iran deal. but there are many more things right with it. it's way better than not having a deal. and i give a solid a there. notwithstanding the fact that we legitimatize enrichment in a country that should not be getting uranium. but compared to where we would be without that deal which is i think looking at iran with nuclear weapons or essentially a
con fwlikt in the middle east, there is a lot better. and the president deserves and secretary of state great credit for that. again, pretty high grade on that first half. the second half of the second box is north korea. not so good. the north korean case, as we say, it is not like fine wine. it doesn't get better with the passing of time. it actually has gotten worse. the north korean case is -- does not look like pakistan in the sense that north korea has tends to 100 nuclear weapons. it doesn't. it may have eight to 12 nuclear weapons. but that's a significant number compared to none. and it is accumulating material. it will build more weapons. it will eventually make the delivery systems, even delivery systems with an intercontinental range. this is not good. when they ask, are they not deterred by america's nuclear
weapons. yes, they should be. problem is we actually don't know what this young man who runs north korea thinks or if he thinks about nuclear deterence and whether we should have any confidence that he understands the limits. so i worry about the north korean case. north korea policy has failed. it's failed beginning in the clinton administration. i had something to do with that. it failed to the bush administration. it failed on the obama administration. failed in a sense we have a nuclear armed north korea, accumulating weapons and ballistic missiles and sort of unapologetically, the third box, the one i spend more of my time on is the nuclear terrorism box. and on that, i'm something of a critic. i'll stop after making a simple point that there are generally speaking, two kinds of materials one uses to make a nuclear weapon. one is highly enriched uranium
and the other is plutonium. the administration has focused over these summits on enriched uranium. they have not focused on plutonium. plutonium is accumulating and may accumulate in a set function way with the introduction of preprohe pr reprocessing plants f that happens, it will be a game changer in terms of the long pole and the terrorism, the ability to acquire the materials. so i worry mostly now about that third box. >> thanks, bob. that laid issues, vertical, or zantal, terrorism. that is very useful. the linkage that the complex and subtle linkages between the levels is underscored by this conventional wisdom that jane mentioned in the opening remarks, namely, that after the cold war, you had this conventional wisdom that risk of great power and nuclear weapons exchanges had decreased
substantially. but that risks that rogue state or terrorist group might obtain and use a few weapons increased. and let's discuss both sides of that equation. does that conventional wisdom still hold? frank miller? >> i think first bob's point about kim jung u nchl n. we don't know. we hope he understands nuclear deterence. fwhaut is a huge question. but that is a huge question. unfortunately, the very rosey predictions from the global zero group in 2012 and the notion of a u.s.-russian war was virtually unthinkable. they have not come to pass. that's gone quite bad lit other way. the rise of putinism, the statements emminating from putin and his closest circle, the dangerous military activities using strategic bombers to fly into other countries, airspace, the exercises which simulate
openly using nuclear weapons against his neighbors and really massive modernization programs that the russians are involved in along with this highly touted and questionable escalate the deescalate strategy. suggests that the russians view nuclear weapons differently than we do. you recall this nuclear torpedo that was leaked a few months ago. as a terror weapon. again, it's not the way we think about deterence. so one has to worry about how the russians think about nuclear weapons. and one has to worry about putin's propensity to use nuclear forces at short notice. the actions in crimea and in eastern ukraine and indeed the use of military forces in syria show that he reaches for those. so i think that is a question we have to deal with again. >> let's get at this question.
let me turn to frank rose and building on what frank miller said. to look at the strategic nuclear piece of it which is really the centerpiece of your portfolio at stake. a year after the prague speech, the treaty was concluded. cutting the number of nuclear warheads to 15 and also reducing launchers. since then, as frank miller referenced, there's been a down turn in relations with russia and china. both of these strategic competitors are engaged in vigorous modernization programs. so the question is does -- do these develop dg ments signal the end of great power arm control as we thought about it? >> rob, let me start by saying this. it is this. russia did not sign the new stark treaty in 2010 because they believe in a world free of nuclear weapons. in my view, the russians signed the new stark treaty for two primary reasons.
a first and foremost they needed to maintain strategic parody with the united states. given their economic situation in -- around 2009, they could not afford to maintain the levels in the 2002 moscow treaty. secondly, like us, and this is a point that frank mentioned in his comments, they value the verification and predictability. >> right. >> so i think it's really important to note that they never kind of bought into that vision for further reductions. furthermore, if you look throughout the last 25 years at democrat and republican administrations, we've had an overarching objective of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy. the exact opposite has been the case for russia.
and there is a lot more emphasis and that emphasis has grown on nuclear capabilities. and, you know, i was asked why is that? and i said -- i tell people, sometimes you need to take a step back and look at russia's overarching strategic situation. quite frankly, it's not a great place to be in. they have friends and allies all over the world. second, conventional capabilities have gotten better as we've seen demonstrated in syria. but their capabilities are not on par with the united states or our allies. >> third. they no longer have the strategic weight of numbers. if we look throughout history, we talk about the russian numbers steam rolling through europe. they're losing several hundred thousand people a year in population. one of your colleagues here has
written quite about this demographic challenge with russia. fourth,en that is a big deal. i would say they don't have a modern 21st century economy. when you think about russia, think about what they export besides oil and gas. not much. then on top of that, they have a very robust china on their southeastern flank. so the question comes, given that strategic situation, what do they have to maintain their security? i would argue nuclear weapons. and so again, given their strategic situation, they are the view, i believe, and i think the record very clear that nuclear weapons play a key role in their deterrent strategy, much larger role than us. so the question is are they prepared to move forward with additional reductions?
i think the jury is out. now, one of the challenges that we will have when we talk to the russians in the future, because i really do believe that despite all the challenges in our relationship, at some point we will come back to the table and talk about strategic stability with russia. that doesn't necessarily mean we will move forward with another bilateral arms control treaty. i think it's in our interests as frank mentioned. for me, the reason why i support the new stark treaty isn't as much about the actual reductions. it's the transparency, verification, and predictability. so i think we will come back. it may not be in this administration but we will. however, one of the challenges out there is this whole issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
sthe use to give the advice and consent to a treaty. it says very, very clearly that the next time the executive branch comes to the senate asking our advice and consent on a nuclear arms reduction treaty with russia, it needs to take into account nonstrategic nuclear weapons. quite frankly, i think the russians expressed very little if any interest in the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons transparency or nonstrategic nuclear arms control. now in his speech in berlin in june 2013, predent obama proposed that we, one, seek up to one-third reduction in u.s. and russian strategic nuclear
arsenals. they also may put on a proposal for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. i would say at the time the russian response was less than enthusiastic. so we'll have to see. i do think at some point we'll come back to the table with russia on strategic stability issues. it's not likely to happen in the near future. >> i think if i can jump in, the russians can stand in violation the inf treaty but of cfe and the nuclear initiatives and the kmem ca chemical convention and istanbul agreement. so there is a wide range of treaties they decided not to participate in.
there is a political change that says we need to re-enter into the agreements that we signed up to previously. i think it's part of larger point. whether that happens, i don't think so. >> i can just come back and to follow on to what frank had to say? i think the fundamental challenge we see right now is this -- at the level of kind of strategic nuclear arm control, russia believes that in its interest and because of that, it continues to implement the new stark treaty. however, kind of the point that frank made with regards to the euro atlantic security architecture, my personal view is that russia no longer sees value in that architecture put in place at the end of the cold war. and when we look back, starting in 2007 with the unilateral
suspension of the cfe treaty, what we've seen is a broader picture. they are slowly but surely taking out the key building blocks of the euro atlantic architecture put in place in the late '80s and 1990s. if you watch the russian media. and that narrative is this. in the late 80s and early 1990s, the united states took advantage of the soviet union and russia. therefore, we signed these treaties and agreements when were weak. therefore, there is no need for us to continue to maintain those treaties. so again, you got a dichotomy. strategic nuclear arms control, they're in a good place. but the euro atlantic security architecture, that will be a big challenge. >> so this conventional wisdom and we see an increasingly
assertive russia and increased reliance on the strategy in time of stress. that is limiting the ability to cut the initiative that's is under the cooperative threat reduction program that had been a major leg of the bilateral relationship between the united states and russia. and with that, i'd like to pivot to the other side of the conventional wisdom at the end of the cold war about so-called rogue states and nonstate actors, terrorist groups. this week in washington, there's the nuclear summit. in the prague speech, president obama said that the nuclear terrorism was the most urgent and immediate threat. clearly, the three proceeding summit meetings and their addressing it in tandem, but there is a disjunction between threat and response. you telegraphed this in the opening comments. i'd like you to develop that point a bit further. >> i'd love. to let me say something about box one first.
i'm seeding to my colleagues. but maybe with a slight lack of seeding. so the concept that here we have a look at nonstrategic nuclear weapons which are tactical weapons and we warrant want to look at those and the russians don't, they're a lot more than we do. and the idea that the russians, you know, are weaker and the conventional area so they need to put more of their bucks down on the nuclear side. got that, too. but there's something else going on here. it has to do with strategic nonnuclear weapons. it has to do with prompt global strike. it has to do with the incredible, unique american capability to project force anywhere on the planet, prompt, global strike. and the prompt part is the part woor worki we're working on now.
the global strike part has been there for a while. that is ability to but leej alton precision anywhere on the globe within 24 hours. that's pretty impressive. maybe impressive to theimpressi audience, it may be impressive to us. i can tell you it's very impressive to the russians and the chinese. i'm not saying we should be doing that and i don't carry any grief for beijing or moscow here but i think if you're going to talk about why do things look the way they look right now, we ought to look at what we ato de-emphasize nems. we're not deemphasizing nuclear weapons and breeding more doves, we're deemphasizing nuclear weapons and getting new missions for conventional weapons to take on strategic missions and we have to be aware of the implications if they can't match it. the same thing in ballistic missile defense and they believe they need to respond, will, we may believe they don't need to respond, you have to understand
their psychology about that. >> the only thing you should say as well -- >> would you like to interrupt? >> yes, i would. they're doing prompt global strike systems and we are still producing powerpoint. >> as someone said, for years they produced ss-18s and we produced view grass, i get that. okay to get back -- i'm going to pivot back to threat and response. so there are two issues here. and they are as you said before related. that north korea case which we may worry about because of what jane said in her opening remarks that she worried about miscalculation. well, yes. and is under worry about miscalculation when you think about the leadership in north korea not understanding that because they have a few nuclear weapons it does not mean that they can engage in provocations
whether they be at sea in the dmz wherever without a response on the republic of korea or the united states because they can deter this response. that's a huge misreading of what nuclear weapons are good for. from our perspective, that's a huge misreading. i don't know whether it's a misreading from their perspective. we should worry about that. there's a huge area for miscalculation. there's another problem with north korea, of course, and that is that they will not understand that it is threatening to the united states uniquely for them to transfer nuclear technology, weapons or material. so when they engage in an activity as they did in 2007 and bill a plutonium production reactor in syria, you remember syria, it used to be a country and now we find this situation one in which the north koreans have not learned -- we don't
have any reason to think they have, anyway -- that this is not a good thing to do. that building a plutonium reactor in a country in the middle east that sponsors terrorism is uniquely dangerous to the united states of america. i don't have any reason to think as i said the north korean understand that is not an act to be repeated. that facility does not exist thanks to the israeli concept of nonproliferation but in the future we need to worry about the transfer of material, of weapons, of technology. we need to because that could lead to the thing i care about most and worry about most too answer one of rob's questions and that is the nuclear terrorism issue. when we think about nuclear terrorism, it's the thing that every president and presidential candidate will say they worry about most in answer to the question they get with what do you think, mr. president? is the greatest threat facing the united states of america,
they will say nuclear terrorism. and they should. at the same time, they will not take obvious steps as president to do something about the key fa factor. it piece not a trick any longer, a challenge any longer to design a nuclear weapon. not a simple one, anyway. to get the high explosives, not so much of a problem. the big problem with nuclear weapons is getting the fissile material. this administration -- not alone, but this administration and the ones before it -- have made great strides in locking up highly enriched uranium and, indeed, blending it down. the measure, i would say to frank, is not how much we've done that, how many tons we've locked up or blending but how much is left. and there's still a lot of that left. but i would say we're in the hunt on the highly enriched
uranium. on plutonium, the other material, we're not. and the reason we are not, simply put, is because it's politically difficult because the plutonium comes? two kinds of places. it comes in the weapons areas of states, the nuclear weapons countries and other countries that have acquired nuclear weapons have plutonium. but it also is used in the nuclear fuel cycle of some countries. the commercial nuclear fuel cycle and that means when you say commercial, think large scale. think tons of plutonium. when enough plutonium -- this is classic to do it, but the amount of material it would take to utterly destroy this city would fit in this glass. now -- and i'm talking about tons of this material in circulation in countries that
have plutonium fuels as part of a fuel cycle. fortunately not too many countries do. france does. russia does to some degree. other countries have stopped but what is starting is the possibility that japan if it starts a reprocessing plant next year we have an 800 ton plant that would be producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium and that plutonium would be cycling all around japan fuelling reactors all over the country. what could go wrong? and when we think about china buying an 800 ton plant similar to the japanese plant from the french we can see that happening all around china. again, huge quantities of plutonium in circulation. we are not addressing this problem. we're not addressing it because it's, frankly, politically difficult. it's politically difficult to tell the french you shouldn't
sell this, tell the chinese you shouldn't buy this, tell the japanese you shouldn't start th this. it's hard but it should be done and to say you're serious about the nuclear terrorism issue when there's a game changer like plume in the nuclear fuel cycle we are not addressing is to me very misleading. >> in the prague speech, the president talked about a terrorist group stealing, buying, or building a nuclear weapon and your last comment pointed to with the increased amount of fissile material, that opens the door for non-state actor potentially, though there's a divide on what the capabilities of non-state actors to build a weapon are. but there are pessimists and optimists in that debate. but looking at the other two routes, steal or buy, which points to leakage or transfer, with all the bandwidth we've had
in this country on iran, with reason, in the last two years, when one thinks about leakage and transfer, iran's not the first country that comes to mind. what comes to mind is on transfer north korea and you alluded to that problem and leakage we think russia and pakistan. you overawe the negotiations with north korea in the '90s that bottled up activity in their plutonium program. a critique of the obama administration is that it has not brought the creativity and focus that it brought to the iran case to the north korea case which seems caught in this tension -- policy tension between north korea asserting we'll only come back to the nuclear table if you accept us as a nuclear weapons state and the united states saying we'll never accept you as a nuclear weapons state and not getting past that impasse. and on pakistan one see which is many people identify as the
nexus of terrorism proliferation, one seems them moving into a destabilizing area of tactical nuclear weapons. so on those last set of round of questions before we turn to the floor, i'd like to get first bob on the iran' north korea and you mentioned the role of deterrence, like don't even think about transferring it but is the door open at all on -- is there any possibility for an arms control component to at least freeze, say, their heu program? and frank and -- frank, if you want to weigh in on the pakistan piece and follow on we can do that. bob? >> you asked a lot of questions, i don't know if you noticed that, rob. >> it's a merved question, you're right. pick out which piece. >> right now i probably would rate the pakistan situation as the most dangerous for us. pakistan right now is the country building the most nuclear weapons the fastest and delivery systems actually quite
diverse to go with those weapons and it has both uranium enrichment and plutonium separation for weapons. and pakistan is pakistan. by that i simply mean that it is a complex country. it has the most radical interpretations of islam running loose in this country. there have been attacks on military facilities and we should worry about this and the pakistani response which is to worry more about us, sort of an osama bin laden raid on their nuclear facilities than to worry about the terrorist internal threat and that has consequences so thes case is a uniquely difficult painful one for the united states because we have a lot of history with pakistan. the iran case i think -- i would say for a while, provided by we watch very carefully, may be in cryogenic arrest.
the nuclear part of that, i mean, we should be monitoring that deal. we should wamp it very closely. one of the problems with the north korea deal implementation was we didn't afterwards watch were much closely, pay that much attention. your point about north korea is well taken. the administration has been very concerned that the north koreans are not serious about any negotiation that would involve giving up their nuclear weapons. i'm -- i would not be prepared to say that. i think under some circumstances if we can meet north korean security needs in an overall settlement of some kind it might be possible. it's all worthwhile trying. >> frank miller? any comment before we go -- >> let me just go back quickly to a point that bob made about chinese and russian concerns
about american strategic capabilities, i would agree with bob as we think about strategic stability in the future we need to factor in these new strategic capabilities. cyberspace, missile defense, conventional strike. while i don't think any of those capabilities fundamentally alter the nuclear equation, i think they impact it, the united states has been very transparent about its missile defense, space, conventional capabilities. russia and china have been less so. we have made it very clear that we are prepared to have a discussion with both russia and china on the full set of strategic capabilities, one of the issues with regards to russia that i have been involved in for three administrations now is missile defense cooperation and there have been numerous
proposals for cooperation in transparency that we have put on the table and the russians have rejected all of those proposals. we have been trying to engage china in a dialogue on strategic capabilities. the very concerns that bob mentioned but there has been a clear reluctance on the chinese behalf to talk. so bottom line, bob, i agree with you, we need to factor these issues into our strategic diggs cuss, however, our russians and chinese colleagues have been less than, i would say, enthusiastic about engaging in those types of discussions. >> and i'll make three points very briefly. one, i worry very much about the pakistani case. in addition to and taking full account about what bob said the fact that there are elements in the pakistani government which believe their nuclear deterrent allows them to carry out acts of terrorism on a large scale and
be protected from that and that's a very dangerous assumption. second i think that the -- with the young leaders' father there was probably a better chance to come up with some sort of the deal and i think with the young leader i'm just not so sure. the third point isn't that important. >> let's open up the floor for comments and questions. i'll first go to jane harmon. we have a microphone coming to you, jane. and if speakers could please identify themselves and their affiliation. >> i'm jane harmon. [ laughter ] and bob was giving grades to various things. i'd like to grate this panel an a plus. i think each here not only learned a lot but enjoyed this. so finally rob got around to asking the "p" question about pakistan at the end and i want to exand in to p+i, india. i mentioned one of the
miscalculations could be this endless feud between pakistan and india. and the fact that both of them have nukes and the fact that at least paz now in addition to having nukes may have small nukes. so -- which are just as dangerous or could be and certainly could create the chance of miscalculation. so what about p+i? >> well, that's what i was talking about that. really worries me because the indian response to yet another major terrorist attack will be some sort so conventional action which the pakistani army says it would meet with nuclear weapons. and while neither side may actually believe that that would happen, once the events get into play it could be the august 14 scenario. that one truly worries me and it's outside our control. >> the pakistanis are emphasizing nuclear weapons to make up for conventional asymmetry in south asia.
bob was a former dean at the school of foreign affairs at georgetown where -- >> we forgive him for that. >> in the classes they distinguish between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial and we talk about deterrence by denial, don't think about doing that. we also talk about deterrence by denial which requires a modicum of cooperation. and the question n dealing with the hard cases like pakistan is how do you find of modulate policy where you have a deterrent threat to focus their attention like don't even think about doing it but you don't sort of overshoot on the punishment side to the extent that they will not cooperate with you to do some prudent things to secure their weapons. >> so there was this great professor in national affairs, ken waltz, kenneth n waltz didn't like this denial deterrence and punishment det deterren deterrence. he said stop that, there's only one kind. and if you are going to deny
access, that's defense. it may work psychologically but that's not deterrence. and this is a matter of definition. >> but he was a structural realist who viewed the world a certain way. >> you know too much. [ laughter ] >> so the issue here is that the -- the pakistanis are -- the question is red line. red line has gotten a bad name since our president from my perspective misused in the the case of syria but red lines can be useful if they're drawn correctly and what pakistanis have tried to make clear that a compromise of their sovereignty by indian armor, for example, would be crossing a red line. and they believe using nuclear weapons on their soil should not bring a retaliation from the indians. this is a scenario we worry about. the indians don't believe that simply crossing into pakistani
territory with conventional forces should trigger a nuclear response. it's in that kind of thinking of back and forth that, we all worry about the miscalculation going on and i don't know how one unscrews that problem except by approving relations between these two countries which has a lot to do with having the civilian narrative in pakistan prevail over a military narrative that the only threat the indians -- the pakistanis face comes from india. in fact, probably the only opportunity pakistan has comes from the indian economy. so it's very hard to fix this proble problem. >> this gentleman in the middle. please just identify yourself and your affiliation. >> my name is jeremy pierson,
former aaas congressional fellow. question specifically for ambassad ambassador ambassador g ambassador galucci. we know there are many ways to make a nuclear bomb, there's also the question of a dirty bomb. my question is regard to your comments, bob, with recycling and reprocessing. from what i understand when you take high burnout fuel, ice topic ratios may not be as amen to believe making an effective bomb. so i'm wondering if that's something we should be concerned about and maybe thoughts on where we should be putting our attention. >> let me -- thank you for the question. there is a -- it's almost conventional wisdom. the conventional wisdom goes like this. there are two types of design
for a simple weapon, a gun pipe design, the weapon that was used on hiroshima and an implosion device that was used on nagasaki. the first requires highly enriched uranium and cannot be made successful the second can be made with highly enriched uranium and plutonium. the first proposition that comes from this conventional wisdom is that trices can only do the first type. so that means terrorist canning only make a weapon, a true yield weapon, not a dirty bomb, a yield weapon with highly enriched uranium second, if they don't have plutonium 239 and instead must suffer through the handicap of designing a weapon with even isotopes 240 and 242,
they will get spontaneous neutrons emitted and they will get preignition and it will be terrible. and therefore since high burnup fuel has more of the isotopes in it, the kind of fuel that would be reprocessed in japan or in russia or in the commercial fuel cycle, that's the only kind of stuff available so at the end of the day the conventional wisdom says the weapons design and high burn up fuel, this, the plutonium thing is self-limiting. it can't be used the problem here is, that is technical nonsense. apart from that, it's fine. [ laughter ] would you like me to explain why it's technical nonsense? i can't. [ laughter ] >> i want to address the second
and third -- >> can you identify yourself, please? >> my name is dave freeman, i'm the former chairman of the tennessee valley authority. but my real claim to fame is i'm a friend of jane's. in the second and third buckets, you mentioned the political difficulties but isn't it time to use plane english and face up the fact that there is no such thing as a peaceful atom and that the nexus of our problem we promise people nuclear power plants, we advocate nuclear power in this country. when will we include in the discussion of this subject the fact that her woised by our own petard when we continue to advocate the path way to the bomb, which is an atomic power plant. >> well, there's this dilemma that a source of scalable low-carbon energy this half of the century will come from
the -- nuclear people peace of it. we had secretary of energy me knees ta -- moniz talking about that >> why can't we offer people all over the world cooperation in solar, wind and storage instead of nuclear power? >> that's one way the go. the other is to access to full fuel cycle and reprocessing that could make it safer. >> look right now nuclear energy provides maybe 19% of our electrical generating capacity in the united states and it will provide something like that for a while. my own personal view is if we didn't have to have nuclear energy that would be great. it is carbon-free. i have been on a different track than the one you suggest, giving up on nuclear energy and saying
i want to give up on that which is clearly uneconomical. thermo recycle, current generation of reactors that closing the back end of the fuel cycle is crazy. it's crazy in economic terrorists. there is no such thing as a peaceful atom. you get energetic depends on you organize that energy from fission, that's what we're talking about here. so i'm with you on that but i find it -- i find -- the argument i make is politically difficult. it becomes much more difficult if i come out against nuclear energy, too. i mean, i'm willing to say that you don't have certain problems if you can have energy from we newable sources. i get that, that's fine with me. i'll go as green as we can support but in the meantime if
we're going to have nuclear energy make up a quarter of our electrical energy production and in places like france it's 80% of their electrical generating capacity, you are not going to throw that out tomorrow morning. so in the meantime i want to say let's "enjoy" nuclear energy in a way that's safest as possible and is not economically crazy. that's all. i think that's an easier argument to make. i don't have any problem with you making that argument. it's not going to be mine, though. >> there's one issue i wanted to get to which has to do with this question of a nuclear force modernization or not in this country. under the stockpile stewartship program the united states is refurbishing its nuclear arsenal. critics claim this program will make nuclear weapons more usable by decreasing their yields and increasing their precision. the administration steadfastly resist this is characterization claiming it is maintaining existing capabilities without testing.
it's not developing new capabilities but i want to start with frank rose. give us the -- clarify this issue of modernization versus refurbishing. >> thanks for that question. let's go back to 2009 with the president's prague speech. one of the lines that people forget about is that president obama in that speech made it very clear. he said and i quote "as long as nuclear weapons exist the united states will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. and this is important for a couple of reasons. one to reassure our allies around the world who don't have nuclear weapons that they don't need nuclear weapons and secondly to maintain strategic stability with countries like russia and china now, following
on the president's speech, the administration published the nuclear posture review. and in the nuclear posture review it was very clear that we will not develop new nuclear weapons. we would refurbish exist iing warheads like the b-61 but we would not provide them any new military capabilities and that remains this administration's policy. i would argue if you look at the refurbishment program, it is fully consistent with the 2010 nuclear posture review. now, with regard to the delivery vehicles, this is the new submarine, the new bomber as well as the new ground launch missile. here's the challenge. most of these platforms have been operating well past their service life.
therefore, in order to maintain a secure and effective arsenal, we are going to need to modernize these platforms we don't have a choice. as admiral heaney, the commander of strategic command mentioned in his speech a couple weeks ago at the center for strategic and international studies, we have run out of time. therefore i believe the modernization of our delivery platforms are fully consistent with the 2010 nuclear posture review as well as the president's 2009 prague speech. >> people conveniently forget that the way the deal to get new start ratified was that the president also endorsed the modernization program. that was critical to getting sufficient votes in the senate to ratify new start. second point. i won't go through the laundry list of systems but the chinese and russians are putting new systems in the field right now,
land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, submarines in the field, in the water. the new u.s. submarine will not hit -- the first replacement submarine won't hit the water to 2028. the new bomber late 20s. the new icbm late 20s. so there's a lot of catching up to do and we are not pro vehiclivehicle i -- provoking china and russia. from 1985 to 2001 i directly oversaw -- i directed, i directed u.s. nuclear planning. i did the war plans, i interacted with two presidents and multiple secretaries of defense. it is a complete fiction that a senior american official would say, oh, that's a low-yield weapon, i'm going to use that. the notion of crossing the nuclear threshold is the most serious decision any president or any secretary of defense would recommend and the notion that it's only halve a kiloton
or a kiloton instead of 10 kilotons does not enter into that. if any president were forceed into the use of a nuclear weapon, he would use the one suited to the task but it's a callumny to suggest that modernizing the force leads to the increased possibility of use. any secretary of defense, any secretary of defense, any secretary of state. >> certainly the decision to use any nuclear weapon would be strategic and in the past these capabilities have provided by some flexibility in terms of yield options. final question to elizabeth, one of our residential fellows here. >> thank you, i'm a fellow here at the wilson center and work on the history of the iaea. thank you for this very interesting panel. i have a question which relates to something that was strikingly
absent, i think, from the debate and this is the ctbt. is that because it is not a priority at the moment? is it because nobody believes that it will be ratified by the u.s. soon? what's your opinion on that? i think it's a question to the whole panel or to whoever wants to answer. thank you. >> there was a panel a few months ago that ernie moniz and secretary kerry engaged in that talked about ratifying the ctbt and the conclusion of that was that it would take a great deal of ground work in this country to get ctbt ratified and that ground work hasn't been taken. second of all, if the u.s. ratification of ctbt would bring the treaty into effect, that would be a strong argument, i suppose, for pressing it ahead. it won't. the count these haven't -- that will not join the ctbt are india, pakistan, israel, north
korea. so the ctbt is not going to come into effect. that's a basic fact. and third, the united states is obeying -- has had a nuclear testing moratorium since 19 199 under the bush 41 administration. so people ought to focus on the attempt of the ctbt and not the ratification process which won't bring about entry into force. >> i was working for frank as his special assistant when ratification debate began and there were fundamentally two questions that opponents of ratification raised. first that the ctbt was not effectively verifiable and secondly that you could not maintain the weapons without testing. i think we have made a lot of progress since then i think what we have seen on the verification side of the house that through the international monitoring
system we have dramatically improved our ability to verify nuclear explosions. further more, and i think lab directors have certified this every year since the late 1990s is that we have been able to maintain our webs without testing. however, if you look at the u.s. senate i believe 80% of the senators who are now in the senate weren't present during the ratification debate and, as frank noted, there has not been a great deal of discussion about the benefits of the ctbt. so instead of pushing for ratification at this time, what the administration is focused on is an education process, discussing the merits of the ctbt with the public but more
importantly the merits of the ctbt with members of the senate, many of whom are not cited and particularly knowledgeable about the specifics of the treaty. >> thanks, frank. bob, we'll give you the last word. are you more optimistic or pessimistic at this point than you were in a decade or more ago on the nuclear front? >> yes, yes, i am. [ laughter ] >> thank you for that appropriate non-answer. i'd like to thank all of those in attendance today, those viewing on c-span and other networks. please join me in thanking our panelists for their excellent presentation. [ applause ]
just how they work and how they're made. >> i love american history tv. the presidency, american artifacts, they're fantastic shows. >> i had no idea they did history. that's probably something i'd really enjoy. >> and with american history tv, it gives you that perspective. >> i'm a c-span fan. a panel of russian journalists and activists recently discussed the country's domestic politics. it included remarks on opposition to president vladimir putin, the state of russian media, the upcoming parliamentary elections and the role of the u.s. and non-governmental organizations in advancing political change. the hour and a half forum was hosted by the center on global interests in washington, d.c. >> hello. let's start. my name is nikolai, i'm with the
sent for global interest. i am welcoming you here. we have outstanding panel today and i hope -- it's kind of reminds me, you know, 1990s when we have just russians sitting here explaining to america what russia is about. so we kind of went back a quarter of a century and actually half of the people sitting here were in 1990s explaining to you guy what is russia is about. so we're still here. i guess we didn't do very good job then but we'll try again so we have another event i'm welcoming you on april 14. we'll have a discussion of
u.s.-russian relations and american policy toward russia with tom graham so you're welcome there, please. we don't know the place yet for the event but april 14 please mark your calendar. and we have one american here just to be polite, my deputy mike purcell who will introduce our distinguished speakers and i will moderate this event and you'll try to keep it as informal as possible and our speakers have 15 minutes to talk and then we'll have yes-and-and sessions so, guys, feel free to be informal as you wish. thank you. >> thanks, nikolai. i know you all have programs in front of you but i'm going to get in this just a little bit for the folks who couldn't be here today and may be watching by video. i'm the director of operations for center of global interests with nikolai. today's panel on russia's
domestic outlook, we're lucky to offer you an increasingly difficult to find access to an insider's perspective with an excellent panel. as russia prepares parliamentary elections in fall, the situation pr preremains in plux. texs with the west abroad remain at stake with the kremlin wants to at least appear legitimate. we're pleased to welcome you with three journalists and activists who will share perspective on the country's political situation, the state of the media, future of the opposition. so i'll begin with introductions. from your left, anton rejov. a fellow at the cannon institute, or partner in today's event. a co-sponsor. he's a russian human rights defender. since 2007 he's served as a lawyer for the committee against torture, a russian nonprofit organization that monitors instances of police brutality and provides assistance and rehabilitation to victims of torture. an expert in international law,
he represents tortured victims before the court of human rights. he's spent more than a year and a half in total performing field work in one of the most troubled regions of russia, the chechen republic. since 2013 he's been a visiting corrections facilities and police stations as a member of a special pod di created to monitor human rights. 2007 to 2013 he was a lecturer of a university. published more than two dozen works on virs legal topics. to anton's left is natella, a journalist, columnist in featured in newspapers from '91 to the president. hosted numerous radio and television programs in russia. she's the author, producer and anchor woman of a 36-episode documentary fs series entitled "parallel, people and events." a civil activist, poet songwriter whose passion about civil rights, she was awarded the laureate prize with the moscow helsinki group for contributions in the human rights fields in 2014.
she's host of moscow radio and a columnist in for two newspapers. she's also a fellow at the institute and is currently working on a project related to international support for soviet dissident movement in historical perspective and contemporary context. and to natella's left, stanislov kutcher is in town briefly. russian liberal journalist, television radio host, filmmaker, currently a columnist in for the online project snobs.ru as well as editor-in-chief of multimedia projects around the world. russia's oldest and largest circulation monthly magazine. he's the most of a monthly talk show, a round table, previously served as chief political commentator and editor-in-chief of the national geographic travelers russian edition. in 2002 he film produced and filmed a documentary "a russian
rake" which received a number of awards and was streamed at the human rights festival in kiev. this was not shown on russian tv. 2014 to 2004 he was he was anchor and host of "the 25th hour" which was suspended after stories criticizing the actions of special forces in beslan. from 2012 to 2014 he served as advisor to mikail prokhorov and started as a committee member of the civic platform party. currently he's with a bod/of public figures in the ngo media and arts communities that advise the president on protections of human rights and civil society in russia. last but not least, the founder of cgi in 2012, nikolai zlodgan. he moved to the states in '93. been associated with a variety of top institutions and has served as a go between between
the american policy and academic community focused on russia and well published in english and russian and most importantly serves as an interpreter of american culture, society and politics for a russian audience which is an important role. so i'll turn it over to nikolai and he can begin the conversation. >> thank you, mike. we'll start with my right. we'll start with stanislov and i think we'll have three of them speaking and then question-and-answer session. >> thank you, nikolai, thank you, ladies and gentlemen. i'm looking forward to the questions and answers because i like the informal and i can answer the questions you're
interested in. but if i have to make a certain statement i would like to say what i think about the future of russia and describe three scenarios for the future of russia for the next few years, i would like to start with a quote. 26 years ago in the pages of "foreign affairs" richard thornberg, then attorney general of the united states warned about what would happen if perestroika, or reforms in russia, failed. "the primary problem before the soviet people and their leaders is to prevent the new soviet union from becomes a revived version of the autocratic monarchy, to foster instead the political pluralism and limited government reflected in the rule of law and respect for national rights. what he foresaw happened precisely.
that generation of russian reformers failed. again, we're witnesses of this right now. the current elites in moscow exist only because off and around a putin autocracy. they realize perfectly well what they did to their predecessors, to replace the yeltsin era elites and they rememberer perfectly well what the yeltsin era elites did to replace the soviet elites. there was persecution, exile, confiscation and for that reason there is a very powerful inertia for them to do whatever in their power not to change anything so they would not themselves be a subject to prosecution, persecution, exile and confiscation and that's why what
they're doing today is they're doing anything to forestall the day when something would change for them. but the thing is that the system they created, what they call the vertical of power is a system that actually does not work. it's that system that has led russia to where it is now. the huge economic crisis, the -- what we would call the bite of the bulldogs under the carpet, meaning the fight between the elite elites. and the putin elites are beginning to understand that if nothing is done this will eventually lead to their replacement. in a more or less violent way. they will be replaced in exactly the same way as they themselves had replaced the previous
elises. so one what are the scenarios for russia and what can be done to avoid the worst? the first scenario that i personally see -- and i'm not the only one here, let's call it stagnation under putin. when i say stagnation both economy and domestic political life and you know perfectly well that there was a so-called zastoy, which was the brezhnev stagnation period and that period is admired by russians, especially the older generations, the pensioners, retirees. because they remember stagnation as the period of stability if not prosperity. what they do not realize is that stagnation under brezhnev was still with pretty high oil prices and stagnation under putin is pretty much different
and import substitution has so far been less successful than medvedev's innovations. and the situation is definitely getting worse and worse and more and more people throughout the country realize that perfectly well. putin in the past 15 years has built an economic system or vertical integration add absurdum where any initiative outside the regime's complete control is an automatic threat and is treated as such. directly or indirectly members of the putin team control every part, every sector of the russian economy, including small and medium-sized enterprises
and, well, i'm not sure if you know, but there was destruction of moscow's street kiosks in february of this year and that situation just merely underlined the tendency, anything outside the elites' control is vulnerable. and the classic refrain of small and medium-sized businesses just, you don't need to help us, just don't bother us. now it pretty often sounds like a revolution their slogan, something pretty close to an extremist exhortation to revolution in today's russia. a ranking official in the putin administration once said "without putin, there is no russia." and it is the thesis of the
putin stagnation period any criticism of the regime no matter where it comes from, where western-oriented liberals or from business people or from doctors, teachers, truck drivers, from wherever will be either silenced from the budget or be treated as a provocation from the west and treated as such with all the consequences that would follow. and he precisely illustrated the fault of today's putin regime, the fault of the russian state ruled by personality rather than ruled by law. so what i foresee under putin's stagnation is elites will continue to fight among
themselves regularly and publicly declaring their love and loyalty to putin, swearing, i don't know, upon their willingness to fall on a grenade against the fight against external or internal enemies. russian fsb, federal agencies like interior affairs, they have been been playing this game already for years with many corporations to show for it. and as the budget shrinks, the pressure -- this fight will only increase and, yes, there will be campaigns from time to time, campaigns against corruption which will be initiated by
corrupt deputies or corrupter ifs and there will be some sacrifices, some bureaucrats will be, some cure krats who want to bite a big piece of the pie be probably be shown to the public but not really high-ranking not very influential public figures although as the stagnation continues and as the pie becomes smaller and smaller and smaller i'm sure that certain conflicts will become public and since putin is used to this role as arbitor who solves all arguments between the elites but sometimes when it becomes too public and when the scandal can reflect on putin's image, then probably some serious figures will need to be sacrificed. putin is one of -- one of
putin's most treasured traits is probably his lylety. he says that he never gives out his people. but what i think, of course he will continue to defend his people but at some point, like i said when these conflicts become public, a combination of scandal and shortage is likely to create a situation where a member of his team must be sacrificed for real and not just demoted with canned gloves as was the former defense minute, for example, yes putin has all the resources to remain in power until 2018 and through '18 at the very least. he will knock down protests with a combination of whithered carrots and a well-financed
stick and people will buy that. the confrontation with the west will continue and the worst thing about this stagnation scenario is that it will eventually lead, like i said before, to the replacement of the elites in a more or less violent way. and one of the violent ways it can happen is if a third force comes to power. what third force, as i'm talking about -- am i talking about? there was this committee of january 25 which was created on january 25 of this year headed by no other than igor gurkin, the hero of don bas adventure. and he and some other guys, including edward limom, the famous russian writer and
politicians from previous administrations in that committee and who said that they criticized hard both the putin administration and they said what putin is doing to his people, they're committing suicide in front of everybody, but on the other hand they also criticized western-oriented liberals because they believe that they sold themselves to the state department and they promised -- they are not afraid of parallels with the 1917 bolsheviks. they said, yes, we are the third force and we'll come to power in exactly the same way bolsheviks came to power because as you may know in 1916, not too many people in russia had even heard of the bolsheviks then in a year they took power and turned the world upside down for the next century. so these guys, this third force claim they will rid vush russia
of corruption. think unite russians that have been separated by borders and as you can guess, this can hard by be done without the use of military force so this is probably the worst scenario which is pretty bad for both existing elites and the liberal opposition. so i guess i'm running out of my time right now so i'm be happy to answer your question as to what i believe needs to be done to avoid the worst scenarios when my turn comes to answer your questions. thank thanks. >> a week ago i visited a museum and there i found very interesting quote from daniel patrick moynihan who said that if the newspapers of a country are filled with good news, the
jails of the country will be filled with good people. i think that if we talk about the situation with media in russia, media is also the part of society. so i cannot till any that is not in common of things that have been said so we have three part, tv, radio, and newspapers. of course we have internet that is around all of these parts. we have so-called state champs. some of the jokes that all of them are first channels because if we try to tell you some details of the content of our state channels, i can remember a raped girl, a boy and they lent
shadows of the skin of them, grandfathers of liberals. it's -- here are the things that people say from that this craze. so they got another page of the story of media after russians invade crimea because i asked mr. daniel, alexander daniel who is the son, what was the reaction of society when soouf yet troops invaded czechoslovakia and he answered "you cannot imagine." that period propaganda was more less than the russian propaganda. so i'm not a user of state channel. i don't want to answer which channel i watch now so nobody in my family watches modern russian tv. but you see a situation with internet is so that every
interesting article, every interesting film, you can find on the internet and social nets or somewhere else. state channels often use some products from internet and so it's some kind of circle. by the way, the very big difference from the period of the soviet media is that every event is shown on the internet so you can understand everything as it goes. in street actions in russia, people look like this. they go and they make picture and everyone can understand everything what's going and so if we'll ask ourselves why are people -- why people don't take care of that -- of what is going in russia, they don't want to take care. and so media they are
entertainment. media, sometimes they make some kind of awful things to present their audience that everything is going our troops in ukraine, they say that we're right. and here in washington people in the hospital they have no hands no feet. they are victims. and when we speak about conflict between ukraine and russia, it's not a conflict. it's a war. we have radio stations stan is a representative of a well known radio. it seems to me when our editor
in chief is asked why putin leaves you to broadcast, he answers that there are several reasons. first reason, they, themselves from kremlin, they should get some use from a news source. so he thinks that it is a good source. the second reason is that we need some sure case. if some person from the west comes to moscow and he asks where the freedom of broadcasting of the world, they can answer. and the third reason, it seems a very important reason that radio has no meaning as a source of propaganda. when there are elections in russia, you can see the people
who will be our politics on any channel, but if you will listen, there are also people from opposition and they do not have enough audience to get their voices for voting. it will be not true if i say that there is no freedom of media in russia. there is no freedom of media in russia. there is freedom of media. sometimes these medias have very narrow audience. because there are some internet media, daily journal, others, that are now forbidden in russia. and there is one small detail. in 1975, for instance, if somebody accused the person of spreading some blackmailing information, he would prove it
in the court. and now they can close -- they can restrict the ability to find this. media without this sentence. so when you are in russia, in britain, in europe, you can find this very website here and no problems. if you will try to open them from russia, you will use the mirror -- it's not a simple procedure. what about radio additionally. maybe some of you remember several months ago it was a conflict between editor and chief. the reason of the conflict was the twitter of one of our journalists. they tried to force him to fire off his gentleman and he said
that it is his prerogative to do it and he refused to do it. then he said he would try to fire the vindictive, himself. it was also a very interesting page when the people from some other structure try to make independent journalists to do something. you can say there is no independent journalists in russia. maybe you are right because it was -- it seems to me it was soviet writer, songwriter who said, tell me who tries to influence you and i will answer who pays you. so i think that the whole situation with russia is rather
set. because there are some restrictions of getting information. my colleagues, my friends, i don't understand how they work really because they have their own list of victims. i know that they are journalists, they do a lot of things to -- to do their real job, but it's rather difficult in russia. i know also many journalists who i invited to kremlin, not exactly to kremlin, but sometimes some people try to meet them to offer them some things. not long ago it was a very funny story published in the social net about the young journalist who got a call from federal special service and he said, i want to meet you, but i don't want to meet you, he said.
we can offer you some exclusive information, you will be proud of us. she said that she doesn't like it and then she was frightened. she was scared. she thought the next day they will come to her and do a rummage. she began to clean her house. she found very interesting things. she was scared a lot again. then she decided that she wouldn't be afraid of them no more. so i know some people who i invited who are the figures of persuading, and i know that it's difficult them. i know also the situation is connected, it was a couple of years ago when he took one of journalists in the forest and he said, i will kill you and i will, myself, investigate your assassination.
after it, it was a ridiculous story for journalists from moscow, me among them. we went to the building and we wanted to make some protections with posters to bring journalists to the forest. we had no time to do our work because all of us, we were arrested. there was me, there was others. ladies and gentlemen, it was not the order of alphabet. it was some wish of those people. everyone said we had some lists of those people who will go to protest. "a" this day, "b" next day, so on. we were sitting in this for a couple of hours.
we felt as a real heros that myriad period and we, of course, understood nothing bad with happen with us but sometimes journalists especially from internet media, if they're arrested, sometimes they have broken devices. sometimes they are beaten. so it seems to me that it is no way out because every rational person has ability to get any information from the media, from internet, from twitter and so on, but nobody does anything. because i think that the number of protesters is very small. after the case, many people had to immigrate. and these people, active people. i know, i have a member of my
own family who worked on the elections several times who participated in the street actions. he was arrested for six or seven times. and after it, we understood that next time he would be in prison. so when he emigrated from are russia, he wrote me a mail that in israel there are hundreds and thousands of those people. some tried to go to europe countries. at the top level it looks like philosophers shop. intellectuals are leaving russia. every month in paris, computen's advisers and they have come consultations. they want to ask some questions.
my questions, why is he there, why is he not in russia? so it seems to me the whole directions in which goes the whole society and media, among them is not not perspective directions. it's not good, to me. thank you. >> thank you. anton, it's your turn. >> ladies and gentlemen, thank you. nikolai, thank you for this possibility just to address to you people such crucial topics on human rights. sorry, i'm a lawyer, so maybe some my words will not be, you know, understood by the audience, but sorry. yeah. so i'm not going to talk too much because as stanislav said, i prefer