tv U.S. Atomic War Plans from 1945-1950 CSPAN July 26, 2016 11:30am-12:34pm EDT
>> my name is -- [ inaudible ] my question is for ambassador roy. in the past two weeks, we have seen a lot of meetings between the u.s. and china. you know, susan rice is visiting beijing now. also, we see it's trying to lower the tension because of the south china sea. considering the g 20 summit will be held very soon and in which president obama and president putin will participate, how would you expect the trilateral relations to evolve after the g 20 summit because china will see the summit as bigger role in the international arena. secondly, do you expect the
u.s.-china high level exchange mechanism will continue if donald trump is elected? thank you. >> it's a good question. the first part. it's very easy to see that china and the united states have some very difficult issues we need to manage in the bilateral relationship. issues, if mismanaged, could push our relationship in a negative direction rather than a positive direction. and certainly the south china sea is one of them. because it involves territorial issues and territorial issues are always sensitive to sovereign states.
but at the same time our mechanisms for dialogue with china are the best we've ever had. we have frequent, not as frequent as but tputin and xi jg but putin and president obama had frequent meetings, and a special characteristic of it, which even putin, i don't think, has. they will spend hours together in discussion so you can get beneath the surface of issues and not simply run through your talking points. and this is reflected in what is going on now. i think this is in part of preparation for the g 20 meeting, the president's national security advisor has gone to china, not for the first time. she knows the people she's dealing with in china effectively. we've had our chief naval operations over in china. i can't believe they didn't discuss the south china sea and
have some exchanges on it. in other words, the channels for communication between china and the united states are wide open and we are utilizing them. i think this is the most effective way to deal with full range of issues in u.s./china relations. every time our presidents get together, they issue a joint statement talking about 50 plus areas of cooperation between the two countries. none of which gets the slightest bit of attention. because all of the focus is on big issues such as the south china sea or the deployment oin south korea. my sense is both countries are serious in wanting to manage the relationship in a way that will not let it drift toward a hostile relationship. that's the way it should be. as for the second part of your question, i defer to my
colleagues. it's the job of the chinese embassy to analyze the political process. not mine. [ laughter ] >> that was very cleverly said. >> trying to avoid getting in the presidential campaign and, you know, i think that these broader factors are very important. these are the choices that -- these are how the choices are going to be framed by these structure factors. and i think just one very quick point on the channels, i think this is where there's a major difference between the relationship of the united states and china and the united states and russia. we don't have those channels and the relationship with russia. partly because putin and russia tends to be a bit of a one-man show. it's deny difficult to purely a one-man show in china given the
sheer size of the politics and the population and the still very strong presence of the chinese communist party. i guess president xi is more of a big poplar figure than some of the predecessors have been. and he's been accused on some sides of creating a for americanized presidency. that's paled in comparison. so we have real difficulties in figuring out how to structure that relationship. that was in part of the reset was about in the early parts of the obama administration. different layers and structures set up to manage the relationship. it wasn't just about the two men on the top. because given the nature of the russian/u.s. relationship. it's unlikely that president obama and president putin are
going to have the same frequency of meetings. there's less to talk about in many respects and lots of difficult issues to talk about. and, you know, who wants to be sitting in an environment where all you're doing is haranguing each other. i don't think they particularly enjoy their counters. ambassador roy is says there's a little bit more to talk about and get in different layers between xi and obama. so this is one challenge that we're going to have moving forward. about how you build a broader basis of relationships. how you create new mechanisms and channels from the russia/u.s. relationship. i would suggest, and maybe somebody wants to comment. the china/russia roip doesn't have the deeper layers either. it's something of a top heavy relationship. it's probably why xi and putin have --
>> yes. >> western media. we know that last friday the dnc, the democratic national convention their internal e mails were leaked and made public. some people say it was probably supported by putin because it was published by the russian hackers. how do you think of this kind of possibility? thank you. >> we waited so long for your questio question. >> yes. i have been spending so much time with the dnc's e-mails i can't get to my own e-mails. i apologize for anyone that e-mailed me recently. i'm looking forward to my e-mails so wikileaks and others can respond to them for me. frankly, we don't know who has hacked the dnc files. the strong suspicion it's russia because along, frankly, with china, the russians have the
strongest capabilities of being able to detect this kind of operation. even if it does prove and the fbi and others are looking into this now and, of course, there's been a lot of inquiry into this. the first time around. it's not the first news of this hack. several months ago, in fact, and we've had one leak and information related to the trump campaign. it's not all news.
there's been a lot of investigative reporting to find the different groups behind this this very strong suspicion they're directly related to russian intelligence different parts of russian intelligence but there's no definitive. the question is really if it is russian intelligence, why would they want to do this? it gets back to the comment i made before about russia and putin and, you know, the world view is we have expressed here being in competition with the united states back to the question about the perception of col revolutions. i have a strong feeling that the united states tries to influence periods of domestic weakness might be interested in the business of regime change. if you are in the business of intelligence in russia or elsewhere, well, we are in the business of basically counter intelligence. if you believe the united states has been doing this kind of thing and you want to pair them
back with some kind of activity. we've already had the release of phone conversations between the u.s. government officials during the ukraine crisis there was a telephone conversation between a official and the u.s. ambassador to ukraine that was put on youtube and a very sensitive moment in that crisis. that was a great deal of travesty it was the russians. had the russian's mo all over it. in many respects, we shouldn't be surprised because from the russian perspective, again president putin is unshamed of the fact he was a kgbt operative he takes great pride in russian intelligence. you might remember the story broke the russian agents. the infamous alan chapman who became something of a media darling back in russia amid the glamorous young woman who was
revealed to be a russian spy. putin met with them all publicly. there was no shame in the fact there was a great deal of disappointment, i would imagine there had been uncovered. it was no shame in this at all. putin makes no secret of the fact at any point he relishes russia's prowess in spying. they have not admitted to this. a lot of tactical surprise. it's not to say we have definitive proof but we should not be surprised this kind of activity goes on. again, the russians take pride in the possibilities of the intelligence. >> great. >> yes. young lady --
>> hi, my name is maggie. i'm a graduate student in international affairs. my question is about we hear a lot about the u.s./russia relationship regarding syria and iraq and everything going on there, but china is very absent from that do main. so i'm curious as to how you think some sort of attack in china would change that. especially given that the chinese tend to think more long-term than united states and probably russia, as well. thanks. >> one of you maybe -- >> there's a lot of attention to the russian factor in the syria isis/isil problem in the middle
east. china is very concerned about domestic terrorism. they are particularly concerned about terrorism that links to the uighurs where there are some external organizations that claim to be trying to stimulate resistance or separatist forces in the area. clearly if there were linkage emerged between isis and uighur terrorism the chinese would treat this as a top priority issue. there is cooperation and intelligence exchange among countries that are concerned about this type of terrorism, and i think china is part of that process. but i don't expect that china will become interventionists on
those issues because of its concern over this type of terrorism. they would probably step up cooperation with countries that were in a position to uncover intelligence that will be useful to china in dealing with any potential internal threats that were connected to that. but china tends to be critical of intervention in other countries and issues and while china is giving a lot of attention to try to strengthen its ties in the middle east, it's not yet in a position of wanting to actually commit chinese forces to intervening in those areas. >> okay. we pick up a few questions. and a special question -- raise your hand, yes. thank you very much. i'm with the national -- research. my question about the initiative and the integration with the your asia economic union which you mentioned earlier. it seems it's progressing
slowly, as mentioned. can you talk about some areas of success that has been in this area whether that's in russia or in other countries in central asia? >> second. yea yeah. >> greg tillman arms control association. one aspect of the triangle between china and the u.s. and russia is each of these countries can annihilate the other two countries with nuclear weapons. my question, really, is given china's slow but steady increase in its nuclear capabilities which seem to be oriented almost exclusively at defending itself against the u.s. how does beijing think about the russian nuclear threat? is it below the surface or is it about as alarming as the u.s. worry about the british and french nuclear threat?
>> thank you. the gentleman in the back. yeah. that's fine. both of you. both of you. yes. >> david sydney with csis. my question for all the panel li ists. you laid out the relationship triangular relationship china seems to have the advantage. do you have any recommendations what the united states can do to swing that advantage toward the u.s. thank you. >> and last one. yes. >> my name is -- [ inaudible ] university of california san diego. my question for ambassador. what do you think of the phenomena that the american presidential -- [ inaudible question ]
>> yes. >> sure. the integration of the two frameworks are progressing very slowly. most we have heard is about a discussion that the two governments and two top leaders had about integration. my suspicion is that some of the projects that the chinese are contemplating with both russia and situation countries are going to, c be categorized and integration category between the two frameworks. that should not be too difficult a task to complete. also, a short comment on counter terrorism and there's a question about china's involvement in central asia, south asia, and middle east. i think the attacks that have happened in china so far by
the -- by uighur population have already motivated chinese government to take a more serious attitude toward a cooperation on counter terrorism. and enhance its role in these regions. all though there is a problem in that process because i wouldn't name which country it is, but in the process of such cooperation it is also discovered that if china has motivation and interest in cooperating with the governments because of counter terrorism, then what is the incentive for that government to eliminate that problem so they can no longer solicit the chinese population in this regard? so we hear the chinese talk about this privately. that some governments are cooperating with china but they're not cooperating with china. >> do you have a comment on the nuclear issue? >> the nuclear issue is a strategic stability dialogue is ongoing between not only china and the united states but china
and other nuclear powers. also, the chinese policy community perception. russia is targeted at china. that's not a commonly shared perception. >> okay. ambassador, a special question. i think your friend kissinger talked about china may have leverage in the triangular -- >> i'll briefly comment on this. i agree with this on the nuclear missile issue. there are two ways to diffuse threats. one is to have a power position, which enables do you deal with the threat, and one is to simply create a political relationship in which the threat is not a relevant factor. i think that in the case of russian relations at the moment,
china is simply not concerned about the potential of a attack an china and china has a nuclear deterrent in case that judgment is proved wrong. this is not leaders up at night worrying about it. the question was, how to deal with the triangular relationship and get the united states back into a favored position. it's simple answer. it is a question of whether or not the united states can manage our relations with china and with russia in such a fashion that the national interest is served by having the united states back in a situation where we have better relations with those two capitals than they have with each other. at the moment that's not an easy task but we ought to be thinking in those terms because, again the manipulative concept of managing foreign policy has the same detriments that you would have in a social situation if a
friend was considered only interested in manipulating your friendship so that they could gain some particular advantage. you do not advance your diplomacy by giving the impression that your sole purpose in having a relationship with an important foreign country is so you can use that country against some other country. i know a lot of people think in those ways. i read a lot of articles talking about how we should be pl manipulating china against russia and russia against china, et cetera. it's bad diplomacy. leaders are skilled and diplomats are skilled at figuring out that you're trying to manipulate them as opposed to accomplish something positive. u.s. elections. why do we criticize china during elections, and then behave differently after the elections. there is a simple answer. candidates are interested in
getting elected. and therefore, they tend to not think about the consequences of what they're saying. their calculations are, will it assist me to get the votes necessary to come into office. the u.s./china relationship is based on national interests. that's why presidents of democratic and republican persuasions alike, after the election campaign is over, have tended to come back to a common understanding that a bad relationship with china is not in the u.s. national interest and that we benefit from having a more constructive relationship with china. that dynamic i think we'll discover in the terms of the current election campaign in the united states. if the candidates choose to criticize china, they will discover, if they are elected, the u.s. national interest requires a relationship with china that cannot simply be
based on criticism of them for the way they are and the way they behave. so i would expect that dynamic to continue to play. >> we only have five minutes left. >> leah from voice of america. we know that russia and china have both expressed their oppositions to the deployment of the thet system. china had said repeatedly that such a deployment would undermine china's national interests and also destabilize the region. wondering if you think there's some validity to such an argument, whether the united states and south korea should take china's position a little bit more seriously. because i would imagine that there could be a chain reaction if china does think that way and i think they might, you know --
they do not say in their opposition that they might do something about it. >> let me answer that. quickly. life is filled with contradictions. chairman mao in his wisdom wrote a learned article on the correct management of contradictions. the north korean nuclear and missile development programs have created a potential contradiction which is that it's placed under threat two important allies in northeast asia -- south korea and japan. at the same time, the most effective countermeasures against a missile threat has the potential to degrade the nuclear deterrent of both china and russia. so how do you deal with that problem. the answer is, if you don't deploy the that, you wi achltha
essentially be increasing the risk of your allies because of the concern of the -- deterrent of countries that you want to get along with. i think the way the united states has handled that issue, in close consultation with south korea which has clearly demonstrated it wants a decent relationship with china is to make the deployment because the threat from north korea is greater than the potential degradation of the deterrent that china and russia have against the united states. that is clearly not the outcome that either beijing or moscow would have preferred. but they are very aware of the fact that this was not simply a unilateral action or a bilateral action by the united states and its ally, south korea, aimed at china and russia.
it was a measure aimed at north korea because of the inability of the international community, including those particular parties, to be able to deter and halt and roll back the very, very dangerous nuclear and missile developments in north korea. so this is an issue which is very troublesome, but it is manageable because it represents a contradiction. and i think all of the paerprti understand that it is not necessarily a unilateral action directed against them primarily. >> we are coming to the end of this program. i found i learned a great deal from -- particularly from my colleagues who real ly share yor insights and analysis. and particularly, i i wanted to go back to your point about the good diplomacy and the bad
diplomacy. and also we look at china's perspective is ever changing in attitudes toward united states, toward russia. i think this reminds us that we should be wise, we should be foresighted, and also we should avoid that some countries think they do not have any choice but to have a confrontational policy or form kind of alliance against the u.s. interest. now also that, particularly i want to thank my colleague that when last time you e-mailed back, you said you had like a 500 e-mails having to look at. again, thank all of you to come and share with insights. this is really caused some interesting debate. i assume that democratic parties have their convention. no one will watch us.
i will end up with that. thank you. i want audience to join me for thanks. later today you'll be able to watch this program again on our website, c-span.org. now live we'll join a discussion on the future of u.s. relations with turkey, following a failed military coup there. >> -- an expression and a vehicle for his unbounded ambition and his transformative vision of turkish society. cannot tolerate another charismatic, influential, politically central center of power, whether out of
pennsylvania, or out of istanbul. that is why we are seeing the government take the dramatic actions that it has taken since the coup. whether gulenists were involved, it is clear the government is making an opportunity out of the failed coup to finally, as they have said, pull out the roots of the gulenist movement. a lot of people are going to be caught up in this and it is going to be an extraordinarily difficult and violent moment in turkish politics as a result. >> the gulenists are also -- i don't know how to say this diplomatically. the gulenists when they were allies with the akp also contributed to crushing out opposition voices. they were very much involved in
trying to remove a lot of the military from government elements and taking over the police force. and so while i don't buy into these rumors about who's responsible, are the gulenists part of the coup? maybe they are. i think that there needs to be evidence. but i also have to say, i don't think that they are a completely innocent organization. i think that it is an organization that bears a lot of culpability for a lot of the chaos that is going on in turkey. >> one of the problems that the gulen movement is the lack of transparency. and that raises a whole host of questions about what it is their ultimate goals are. i think it is pretty clear that the gulenists have over time place their activists and followers within the bureaucracy and sought to direct state resources to their favored and preferred activities and operations. but every turkish political
party and movement has done that over a period of time. i think the gulenists have been -- again, the lack of transparency with them has raised a whole host of very important questions about what their role is and what their ultimate goals are. >> if i can just jump in here and take the moderator's prerogative. it sounds like conspiracy to an american audience. it's this idea that this man living in sailorsburg, pennsylvania instructs his followers to infiltrate turkish institutions with the longer term goal of remaking the states in the way that he sees fit for his own political objectives. now i wanted to pick up on something there. because i both mentioned that there was at the outset of akp rule a harmonization between the shorter-term ambitions of the akp to protect itself from the very attempted coup that took place on friday and saturday. and a longer term ambitions of the gulenists which is to be
legitimatized and recognized within all aspects of the turkish bureaucracy, including the military. i'm interested to flush out your thoughts a little bit more on did the akp's efforts to coup-proof the system contribute to the attempted coup that took place last saturday. and then the concentric circles going around in this roundup of people who are allegedly part of the gulen movement is what longer term implications are there for the turkish state, bureaucracy and the military as well. >> i'll answer the first part of your question very quickly. i think i alluded to it in my opening remarks. that is as a result of the sledgehammer cases, which were these cases that began in 2007 and 2010, which were these
spectacular cases against military officers accused of plotting against the state, creating an environment where you did -- or risks fissures and splits within the turkish armed forces. i think that those splits and fissures came out very clearly in friday and saturday. i would not have predicted what happened on friday and saturday, but i was aware, and i think we all should have been aware of the fact that the way in which -- with the help of the gulenists trying to subordinate the military did contribute to an environment where something like friday and saturday could happen. now, i think your question is what are the purges of the ghoulghoul
let me talk about the thinks we are most concerned about here in washington, d.c. which is can the turkish military, can turkish police, can turkish intelligence control the borders with syria? can they conduct operations with the united states. can they work with the united states at -- and its allies at incirlik airbase. i think we have to raise questions about whether that is possible. not because the turks may not want to but because they clearly don't have the capacity. if you are cashiering thousands of officers, if you are dismissing tens of thousands of country focused on itself, a military that's in chaos, decimated by purges, one has to wonder whether turkey can be an effective partner to the united states, whether they can actually run this government.
dismissing 20,000 teachers. how can it be a blanket border that academics cannot travel? they have dismissed 1,500 rectors of universities. this is going to have a profound impact on turkish society in important ways that i think will be felt for quite some time. this is a purge on the order of the purge after the 1980 coo dada coup d'etat in which the military stays in power for days. we could think of turkey as a manifestly unstable country right now. we they have a war with the pkk. they have experienced at least 11 terrorist attacks, six of which can be traced to the islamic state. that's separating out all of the pkk violence. they have a military that's essentially in chaos and a purge under way which is undermining
the capacity and effectively of the turkish state. that's to my mind an unstable country. >> i don't really have -- i don't really much have to add to that but i think to underline the point that steven made, i think this comes down to a question of governance an purging all of those people not from -- from public service, there were a number of people dismissed from the foreign ministry today, and the teachers, i think there is a question of where are you going to find the qualified people, individuals, to fulfill those positions. but there is an economic cost here, too. and i don't know what the numbers are but i can imagine that this coup has cost turkey billions of dollars. just in terms of military, the dismissals and the aftermath that you're going to have. i think it is a question of again, there's a grab for power here but i think what turkey really needs is governance right now. then just going to the point of
the gulenists or the akp and these various factions. i think what turkey ask also suffering from is this legacy of democracy by majority. it is majority and not about the individual freedoms and rights. until we can get to a place where people can feel like they can have whatever belief and expression they want and not feel like they have to belong to one group or another, i feel -- i'm not -- you can maybe call me pollyannaish, i'm not as down as turkey because i take a look at the economic in the start-up world so i spend a lot of time with entrepreneurs who are creating in investments. a $526 million fund was created. i know in week another silicon valley based fund will announce another fund that will go into investing in turkey. i think looking at it from that perspective, think turkey has
evolved since the 1980s. but i also think until it can actually get to a place where institutions and the rule of law is respected, you're still going to see trouble ahead. >> in the days since, where these actions had been taken against suspected gulenists and the suspected bureaucracy, the focus in the west has been on the purges. but when you talk to turks, i find very few are weeping over what's coming towards the gulenists ways because many people feel like they are getting what they deserve. i like to joke they have a higher unfavorability rating than donald trump. you have perhaps some discomfort from many of the opposition parties but you largely have u.n.fy since the failed coup about what the akp is carrying out. so what are your thoughts on that, about the sort of
political space afforded to the government to carry these things out? >> i had the same thing in fact, a spirited e-mail exchange with one of my friends from college who is turk who lives in istanbul who said essentially well, the gulenists, i don't really care. and not to besmirch the fine reputation of one of my buddies from college, i think this speaks exactly to what amir is talking about, this sort of ill l ill-liberal view of politics and democracy in turkey. it is true turkey has elections. it is true president erdogan won 52% of the vote in his presidential election in 2013. but by no means can we think of turkey as a democracy. i don't think we can say for certain that turkish society itself has kind of embraced the norms and principles of liberal
democracy. those kinds of things that these people have had it coming to them. it is the same kind of attitude when the agape and gulenists were cooperating to work against the journalists. there also a isn't of a rule of law and the equal application of law. it is getting after whomever is the villain of the moment. that to me suggests that this is a society that is going to have a very hard time coming together after this trauma. where does this purge begin and where does it end? we've seen this kind of thing in other settings as well. let me point out also that the narrative that i've heard from any number of turkish friends over the course of the last week is that this is justified because we're saving democracy.
it's hard to make the argument that turkey is a democracy. as i said, there's been elections, there's been a vast array of coalition governments. there have been free regularly scheduled elections since the 1940s. but let's talk about just this government at this moment. this government is a function of a rerun election from november of last fall. because president erdogan did not like the outcome of the june elections in which the made it impossible for the coalition government to run out the clock so the then-prime minister, who by the way was pushed by power from president erdogan, a power that president erdogan does not have, and they would have rerun elections in november.
it is hard to conclude given what's happened and what's happened previously that the akp is -- >> picking up on the point of november, the re-election -- >> the redo? >> the redo election in november. i think that what we saw leading up to that was an atmosphere of fear that was created. and i think, unfortunately, the purges are also creating this atmosphere of fear which really turkey does not need. i think this is already a society that had a low level of trust among individuals. you already have -- again, i keep repeating it, weak rule of law and weak institutions. but this atmosphere of fear, i mean i have talked to lots of people in turkey and they're all afraid to -- they're all afraid
to express their opinions. i know that people came out in the name of democracy on july 15th, but the protesters who were beaten back in 2013, a lot of them will not come back at all. you have journalists being jailed and silenced. and i actually think you have the firing of all of these teachers and academics. i think you're going to start to see a roll back -- i wouldn't be surprised if there was a clamp down on a lot of ngos, particularly western international ngos in turkey. i think there is a real atmosphere of fear where people are afraid to express themselves. when you live in an environment like that you cannot have progress. this is what actually scares me in turkey. >> that's a rather bleak note from you both about the current state of the country. i'd actually like to flip to something that a lot of people are discussing, honestly from right at the outset when this thing looked like it was going to fail. the status of president erdogan.
there is a lot of talk that his position has been strengthened because of this, because of sort of all of the resulting moves. but there's also a counternarrative to that that, no, this is a country that just underwent significant trauma and it was failed coup attempt. so while he may have some more room to politically maneuver, he is presiding over a system that underwent a failed coup attempt that had pretty wide buy-in support from a lot of factions in the military. interested to hear both of your thoughts on these conflicting narratives. what is the status of turkey's president, the most important politician following the failed coup? >> i think erdogan is both weak and strong. i certainly think the way that people came out on july 15th and stood up against the military coup, the way that he called out. and again, erdogan is a
popularly elected individual. 50% of turks do support erdogan and erdogan's policies. so he is profoundly successful and so i think he has brought a lot of power. certainly the purges and replacing them with individuals who are supposedly loyal to him, i don't know how you actually gauge that. but will certainly strengthen him. but i think what has happened has weakened turkey and that's what makes erdogan weak. you're a strong man of a weak country. i don't know what that really means. i think there is a tragedy here. and i think the tragedy is that erdogan, in 2002 and 2003 when he became prime minister talked a different talk. he talked about inclusion. he talked about minority rights. he talked about representing turks regardless of who they were. he was the first turkish leader to actually sit down with the kurds. he got turkey closer to european
asse asse ascesion more than ever. i think he negated all the gains he had come in and started out in office with. >> i have just absolutely tremendous admiration for president erdogan. i think his political skills are unrivaled. i have had the opportunity to be up and close to him a number of times over the course of my care career. i have to say, he is an extraordinarily charismatic person in his political skills, even in non-turkish speaking audiences come through. he is -- think about it. he's better than bill clinton. he makes bill clinton look like a jumble of nerves and not
charismatic. his ability to kind of hone in and understand what turks feel and believe and hope and want is rather extraordinary and the kind of personal story that he has been able to advance really helps politically. all that being said, i agree, he is strong, and he is strong for those reasons that i pointed out. and he has won a presidential election with more than 50% of the vote. but he is also quite weak. let's keep in mind that the akp has never surpassed 50% of the vote. and erdogan who governs half the country that supports him and intimidates the rest and uses coercive measures against the rest. you see protests. what's happened over the course of the last three or four years
past failed coup, in erdogan felt as confident that his vision for turkish society was as broadly shared, was common sense, was embedded in the minds of turks as something that's natural, he wouldn't necessarily have to use the kinds of measures that he's used. he wouldn't have to be intimidating his opponents. it would not matter because he would have -- he would have the country. but i remember around the time i was in turkey, calling out 400,000 people to re-affirm how much they love tayyip erdogan struck me as an inherently weak thing. yes, 400,000 people came out. and my turkish friends who were not supporters of erdogan saying, well, they used istanbul buses to get people there was meaningless. there were 400,000 people. but the fact that they actually had to do that suggested to me that all was not well and that there was a sense of
vulnerabili vulnerability, that there was a need to re-affirm how important then-prime minister erdogan is and how important the justice and development part is. i have to say, that rally was outstanding. i purchased a tayyip erdogan t-shirt and carpet during it which have come into great use the last week. >> something you just said. i think there is vulnerability within the akp. i think that's right. everybody was focused on istanbul when this was happening naturally because that's where a lot of the heart of the protests were in ankara. but i flew to kind of like the akp -- that's the mothership, this conservative town knin the middle of anatolia and i wanted to see what was happening there. there where akp dominates. they have this beautiful building downtown. i actually came across a number
of akp supporters who actually expressed their disdain for erdogan. and complaining that erdogan had sold out the country and that he sold it to people in the middle east and that turks don't own anything anymore and that -- this one woman said something reminiscent of the ronald reagan, am i better off now than i was four years ago. she said i am not better off. and i am worried about my future. but when i asked her would she continue to support erdogan and akp, she said i don't have a choice because the opposition doesn't represent my views. so i actually do think that there is a vulnerability within the akp. i don't think that a lot of these people are big erdogan supporters. but i also think because the opposition is so weak, and i think one of the reasons calling out these supporters, again, it is the natural clutch, the legacy of let's go back to nationalism, let's wave around the star and crescent flag and
create this image where we have to go out and rally behind the flag. >> you obviously paint a picture of a complicated society. i always joke, at least a very wise turkey analyst who showed me around when i was even younger living in istanbul at the time, in order to really understand turkey you have to leave istanbul and spend a lot of time out in small villages where -- to understand what gets people out to vote. we've been focusing really narrowly on sort of the coup attempt and erdogan. i want to broaden it out because we touched on it before we turned to the audience for a question and answer to wrap it up here. there is a lot of natural tendencies, both in the united states and europe, to say, yeah, there was a coup attempt, but how does it affect us. so i want to start actually first with not politics here in d.c. but politics in brussels where before this, there was obviously something -- there was a lot going on with the eu refugee deal. how do you look at sort of the post-coup attempt with the
purges, with all the cynicism that's going on in the different european capitals about the future of eu turkish ascension, is there one and what about the eu refugee deal? >> i think that the eu/turkey ascensi ascension, i think that's a very big dream. not only because of what happened on july 15th but in recent years erdogan has become much more authoritarian. i think there is this aspect where turkey's gotten to the point it doesn't really need the eu. you see the problems the eu is having on its own. turkey's economy has strengthened. it is so interesting to me, i remember going to turkey as a young child and everybody saying how can we come to america. and now a lot of my friends here going to turkey to start businesses and to be in turkey because that's really kind of where the promise and the
opportunity is. the confidence that turks have gained over the last 20 years, the start-ups that they've started, the businesses that they've opened, they have -- i think the whole mentality has changed within turkey where i think turks believe that they can actually succeed. and they actually don't need -- they don't need to be a part of the european union. i think that in recent days i think this question of resurrecting the death penalty and looking very inward i think is very disturbing. we just saw last summer the way that the eu reacted with the migration issue and brexit. they had these posters of like the turks are going to descend upon london. i think that there is a lot of internal concern within europe, but i also think turkey's in a different place and i think
that's just going to be a dance that they'll do but i don't think there is going to be any serious movement forward. >> there isn't any eu ascension. it seems clear whatever the europeans want to do with regard to the post-coup crackdown if they want to make a statement or take any kind of actions with regard to turkey, it is subject to to the implicit turkish threat to send large numbers of refugees in the direct of europe. it strikes me that the turks have a struggle especially the way politics are being played out in the european capitals. i expect that europe will be outraged because of what's happening in turkey but will remain relatively moot because they fear that erdogan will just let the floodgates of syrian and other refugees come across the
border, something that europe is manifestly unprepared to do. and the violence in european cities and capitals recently have made it even more a neur neuralgic issue. >> my last question before we turn it over to the audience. this is linking it back to here in d.c. where the number one issue i think is how we perceive turkey as the hub or forward-basing for the counterisil as we call it around here campaign. it picks up on what you just said. there's been a lot of uptick in attacks recently, particularly in europe. and then there's concerns that the fallout will limit or degrade, to use the word, the american capability to continue to carry out strikes against the islamic states in syria and iraq, particularly because the air force base where the air strikes are coming out, there was components of the coup plotters that came from that base. obviously that's extremely
embarrassing for the coalition but also a reflection, i believe, of the fracturing of the turkish military to the point where officers that are being sent to overlook a key airbase where there are american nuclear weapons stored as well rebelled against the state. so i wonder if you could pick up on that threat. what will this do for the counterisil coalition, how should the united states view turkey as a partner? you spoke about it a little bit. wondering if you can expand a little bit on how this will affect both badr security and the broader mission more broadly. sgli think there is really two issues whether it comes to the united states. the issue that's essentially eaten american foreign policy and the prism flu whithrough wh view everything, i go back to the capacities of the turks right now. can they continue to control the border. what is the capacity of the military. what is the status of incirlik. the turks surrounded the base, cut off the power in order to go
after the commander of the -- turkish commander of the base to -- who was implicated in the coup attempt. but also it struck many as an implicit reminder to the united states that our operations out of incirlik are actually subject to turkish government approval. you realize that up until last july, the turks restricted american operations there to intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. only after a very long year of very difficult negotiations did the turks allow the united states and coalition forces to use the base as it is currently being used. so it raises a question in the minds of americans, american commanders, others, how long they could use -- how long they'll be able to use that asset and how effective the turks will be partners and a variety of other things. then there is the kind of broader issue of u.s./turkey
relations, which is extraordinarily eye-opening when you think about how the pro government press has fingered the united states as being directly involved in the coup. directly involved in the coup. individuals in the united states, and not just government officials -- people like us -- implicated in the coup attempt, which is dangerous, which has put people under threat. but the suggestion that the newspaper suggested that the united states tried to kill erdogan, that the united states is in this cahoots with someone is not lost on people outside of government or inside of government and speaks to the kind of quality of the relationship which has always been a difficult one, but it is likely to be even more difficult going forward. the days of the phone calls between president obama and
then-prime minister erdogan are long gone. but i think that this underlines the difficulties in the relationship that the government and its affiliated propagandists want to drive home the idea that the united states was directly involved and that they derived political benefit from it speaks to the quality, i should say, can diplomatically of the u.s./turkey relationship. >> i mean i can add something positive. in terms of u.s./turkey relations, or turkey/eu relations, i think going back to the economy. the eu is turkey's largest trading partner. turkey's not going to risk that because its economy depends on that. turkey depends on its economic relationship with the united states, too. and so it is not just political
but i know that in determineste start-ups, three universities in turkey are opening up innovation centers here in the united states, two in silicon valley, one in new york city. in thursday i was in boston talking about u.s./turkey innovation and the relations there, and the turkish science and entrepreneurship and technology office has announced a lot of funding between these two -- between silicon -- particularly silicon valley and turkey. i think that they do care about that. i think there is an element of the turkish government where they want to see that progress develop. >> thank you very much for this concludes my q&a with our two panelists. i'd like to turn it over to the audience with the caveat, i know a lot of people want to say a lot of things probably about what happened and probably want to respond to some of the things said up here. but questions aend in question
marks and are actually brief in how they are stated. so as the moderator, i may cut off soliloquies. so with that, please, let's turn it over to the audience. i didn't mean to stifle questions. i won't be that mean. anybody? >> hi. thank you very much for everything that you had to say actually. it was very enlightening. my question is, there's conversations going on about a pathway to citizenship for syrian refugees in turkey. could you touch a little bit on that and how it might be
affected with the current situation post-coup, and the implications for maybe what that would mean for erdogan and the party in general? >> the suggestion was raised in the week before the coup, and it was greeted unhappily by large numbers of turks. i can't imagine at this moment going forward on that issue, by any stretch. so i think at least for the moment, while the turks are cleaning house and restructuring the government and purging people, i think those kinds of issues -- and other issues related to syria and other things, important foreign policy and things -- cooperative things that turkey's working on with the united states are unlikely to happen any time soon. >> i can pick up on that because it is something i'm interested in. i think it is something more
broad. i agree with steven in that i think the mechanisms of state through the bureaucracy i think are in for some tough times because things will completely start to slow down. not only do you have what's going on, people who are suspected of being implicated in this, losing their jobs or at least being asked to resign or put on forced suspension, for those that remain, there's also a chilling effect in place about how do you operate within a system that's under a lot of pressure and where everybody is sort of under suspicion for were you or were you not in favor of what took place last week. so when you build on the sort of syrian refugee issue, at the time, public opinion polls put it i think at over 85% of turks who said absolutely not to this. but we all believed sort of the power of erdogan to rally his supporters could push it over the goal line. at least in the wayswa