tv Aftermath of World War II CSPAN December 18, 2016 9:45am-10:47am EST
where you start. you want to be a voice for your community. >> thank you for all of your advice and tips for studentcam. if you want more information on our documentary contest, go to our website studentcam.org. on american history tv, historian david kennedy discusses the aftermath of world war ii in a talk entitled "unconditional jublilation: the world the war made." argues thatnnedy postwar changes such as economic globalization and the formation of the united nations transformed america and the globe in a positive way. and where the products of u.s. strategy during the war. his hour-long illustrated lecture is part of a multi-day conference at the national world war ii museum in new orleans, titled 1946, year zero, triumph and tragedy. >> the latest installment of the general mason jr. distinguish lecture of world war ii.
his career, as you heard and heard the introduction yesterday, took him from the front lines with general patton and world war ii in the european theater all the way to the period afterhis world war ii, and also a great and successful businessman, working together with his wife margaret, they established a very generous foundation. which we are the beneficiaries of. not the only but one of the beneficiaries. the gift that he gave to us before he passed away was to endow a special lecture series at this museum and bringing the best and the brightest historians to share their insights with our live and online audiences. so, a sincere thanks to the mason family, including the mason's son, and to their
foundation. so, i'm very pleased to have the opportunity here to introduce our next presenter. one of the more distinguish historians in our country and indeed, in the world on the subject of world war ii in the 20th century. david kennedy received his undergraduate education at stanford university and graduate training at yale. is professor of history emeritus and founding director of the -- center of the american west at stanford university where he taught for more than four years. he's won countless accolades, more than we have time for today, but you have information on him on your program, so i encourage you to look at that as well. but he is much admired and loved by his students, by his peers. and administrators he has worked within higher education over the years. and writing has
focused on 20th century american history, numerous award-winning here, including "over the first world war and american society," a finalist for the pulitzer prize. he actually won the pulitzer prize for "freedom from fear, the american people and depression and war 1929-1945." he has been a visiting professor at oxford. florence in italy, american history taught at other universities in america and around the world. spoken on- he's several occasions at this museum. so we count him as part of the family. he was one of the first speakers and presenters on our george p. scholz form on world affairs in 2008. so, we are delighted to have him back. please join me in welcoming dr. david kennedy. [applause]
dr. kennedy: i see folks ready to come up. ok. you very much, dr. mohler, for that introduction. thanks, all of you, for your interest in this subject. we are talking about 1946 as a year of transition, transformation. i want to take a little bit of liberty with that calendar year and back us up a bit into the my startingas point. i should tell you at the outset there is a premise that underlines my remarks here today, and there is a proposition that i'm going to try to argue and persuade you of is the proper way to think about this passage in the planet's history. the premise is that world war ii was by many, many measures of transformative event in the history of this republic and in
the history of the international order and in this country's relationship to the international order. that is my premise. the proposition that i want to try to argue here this afternoon is that the transformative effect of world war ii did not just happen. that in many ways, it was the anticipated and, indeed, desired result of a particular war fighting strategy that is called a grand strategy, that the united states pursued in the world war ii era. so, how transformative was world war ii? i'm going to take as my text a remark by winston churchill in be5, august 15, 1945 to precise, but first to put you in the mood, let's just look at a theimages of that end of moment when it was unconditional jubilation . i like this image so much that i used it as a cover for my book
on the subject. but here are others, here are gi's in france celebrating the announcement the japanese were about to surrender. here is probably one of the most famous and jubilate it photographs from that period. and here's the man who started it all. so, i want to begin with a remark by winston churchill. on the floor of parliament, august 16, 1945, the day after the world have learned the japanese emperor had signaled the intention of japan to surrender. occasion, winston churchill said many things. it was a speech designed now the great conflict was over, it was a speech that aims to educate his countrymen and anyone else willing to listen what he thought the consequences, the historical downstream effects of this great conflict would be. it says a lot of things and a lot of it is delivered in the usual churchillian, baroque fashion, but there was one
sentence in that address that when i read the transcript of it, when i was doing research for "read him from fear," one sentence looks off the page, not least of all for a grammatical reason because in this sentence, churchill renders united states as a plural noun. something we have not done in american english since the civil war, the old saw is that before the civil war the united states were, after the civil war the united states was. but churchill in this passage render the united states as a plural noun. that was the first thing that it quickened my attention. a sibylfull sentence, declared of sentence. august 16, 1945, winston churchill says "at this moment, the united states stand at the summit of the world." august 16, 1945. winston churchill "at this moment the united states stand at the summit of the world." the applications of that is what
i went to do -- would like to develop with you this afternoon, and i would like to call your attention, if i can school your memories, your store: recollection back to 1940, the last full peacetime year for the united states in world war ii. and just ponder for a minute how improbable that statement made in 1945. the united states stand in this moment at the summit of the world at how improbable it would have been to say something like that in 1940. 1940 was the 11th year of the great depression. one hoover administration and two roosevelt administrations had failed to find a proper exit from that great economic crisis. 1940 unemployment was still 17%. 2008-2009,sis of unemployment briefly exceeded 10%. but it had been about 17%, on average, for the entire decade of the 1930's. it was still stuck there as of 1940.
historians looking back and using later diagnostic the level to gauge of property and the united states have estimated that in 1940, 40% of all white households were below the poverty line and 95% of all african american households. so this was a country that was decade of this deeply blighted by the greatest economic crisis of modern times. and anyone who it said that just five years over the horizon of the future this country, and indeed much of the world, would stand on the cusp of a generation long, two generation long economic expansion, so great and so pervasive that by the end of the 20th century, people would be using a newly coined term to describe this phenomenon of incredible economic growth. rd anybody had said such
a thing in 1940 when of been considered to be certifiable and probably removed from the scene. at the international arena in 1940, and this country's relationship to it, the contrast with what is coming just a few years over the horizon of the future is if anything even more dramatic. but this was a country in 1940 that had refused to join the league of nations. even though it was the brainchild of the american president woodrow wilson. at the conclusion of the prior world war in 1919 and 1920. just after the war, the peace negotiations, the united states was contiguous -- conspicuous by failing to sign a legal nations. this is what this country that twice within the preceding decades had -- past high tariffs. the territory smoot-hawley tariff in 1930, effectively closing off the united states from all foreign vendors who try american markets. this was a country that had for
the first time in its history in 1924 in post numerical limits on how many immigrants could enter the country in any given year, roughly 130,000. it was a country that had insisted on the repatriation of treasury loans made to the british, french and italian governments during world war ii . a position that badly disrupted international capital flows in the inter-war period. and a country that had passed no fewer than five so-called therality statute durin g 1930's designed to keep the united states out of the conflict that would become known as world war ii. so, anyone who had predicted, again from the standpoint of 1940, that this country would champion a new international organization to succeed the league of nations, call the united nations. and it would be located not over there in geneva, switzerland, but in fact, on the soil of our principal city in new york, and
that we would be its chief funder and patron for many years into the future, and at the same country that had insisted on repatriating all those allied i wouldom world war step forward as the sponsor of something called the marshall plan and invest billions of dollars to the reconstruction of postwar europe, that this would country would -- which had sealed itself from international markets in the tariffs would institute something called the fundnational monetary which would work to stabilize international exchange rates and underwrite stability in international commerce, that this country would also be the chief funder and founder of another institution called international bank for reconstruction and development or the world bank, which would also make capital available for post war reconstruction. itsthat he would enter into first peacetime military alliance, in the later 1940's, the nato, and so on and so on.
it would also be the chief sponsor something called the general agreement on tariffs and trade, which would decades later morph into the world trade organization which would be an institution dedicated to liberalizing the international flow of commerce and capital. any person who had predicted those things from the standpoint of 1940 two repeat would've been identified as crazy and certifiable and no one would have paid attention, but we know, because we get to see things illuminated by the fabled stern lantern of history, that that exactly what happened. so, the question for us is what defines the difference between 1940 and 1945 -- the short answer is world war ii. in that three or, four or five year period, 1941-1945, things happened that actually transformed this country's relationship to the world and its own, the character and shape
of its own domestic society. so, how did this happen? my undergraduate students at stanford, when i can get them to speak honestly, candidly about what they think about the study of history, have been known to say, well, you know, professor kennedy, the trouble with the study of history is one damn thing after another. [laughter] dr. kennedy: the way history is taught in some venues, i'm sure that is true. that is why so many students are turned off by it. if you take on things away from this discussion, i hope it will be the notion that the result that we got, the contrast between 1940 and 1945, the churchillianhat statement that the united states stands at the summit of the world in 1945 did not just happen. it was the result of some very shrewdly taken and very fortunately followed premises of grand strategy that the roosevelt administration developed very early on and was
lucky enough -- there is some luck -- to be able to stick to write to the war's in 1945. let's go back to that moment when the united states enters the war and let me share with you a few remarks by some of the principal players. you have already seen, well, let's go back a little bit here. adolf hitler. when hitler heard of the news on the attack on pearl harbor we have an ear witness to what he said what he thought were the implications of the japanese attack. he said "now it is impossible for us to lose the war. we now have an ally, japan, who has never been vanquished in 3000 years." hitler's first reaction was
exhilaration about this. what we are allowed to think was the same moment in time, churchill heard the same news, he did not have any advance knowledge. he heard over the newswire. we don't have an ear witness, but we have his written account. readers to make the understand what was his frame of mind. he said, he wrote "the united states was in the war up to the neck, and into the death. so we had won after all. england would live. i slept the sleep of the saved." what is interesting to me is the
comparison between adolf hitler's reaction and winston churchill's. leaders locked in mortal kombat for the fate of europe and the world. the same news at the same moment 100 80 degreeave different appraisals of what will be the strategic implications of american belligerency. is early reminder that as december 1941 it was not clear to much of the world exactly how, when, and by what means the united states would put its weight onto the scales. how big a force woudl it field? what would be the composition of that force? were questionse not deeply understood in 1941. let me share two other remarks most of the first one was from the timeframe of december, 1941. i will read you a sentence or two from a memorandum that the
german foreign minister, shown ine, wrote for his fuhrer 1941 that he tried to make some sense of what might be the implications now that america was a formal belligerent. this follows the german declaration of war on the united states. it is a lengthy, detailed, thoughtful memorandum. it is quite shrewdly analytic. here are the important two sentences for our purposes. he wrote the following, "we have one year to cut russia off from her military supplies for the if we don't succeed in the munitions potential of the united states joined up with the manpower potential of the russians, the war will enter a phase in which we should only be able to win it with difficulty.: that was a more
accurate appraisal of the implications of american belligerency than hitler himself had made spontaneously a few days earlier. remark i wantast to share, i will break the time and share a sentence or two from another document written in 1940 by this man, the commander in chief of the japanese imperial fleet. 1940, theptember, u.s. and japanese relationship is going bad and yamamoto prepared a memorandum for his prime minister. he said the following, "if i am told to fight, regardless of the wildquences, i shall run
for the first six months or a year. but, i have no confidence for the second or 30th. i hope you will endeavor to avoid a japanese-american war." that is the man tasked with the job of starting the war. the mastermind of the pearl harbor attack any less wealthy did midway attack. the striking thing to me is that riventropp both kennew somethigng that hitler dd not know, the first rule of warfare is know your enemy. what yamamoto and riventropp the united states had industrial and financial resources at such a depth and on such a scale that if they were fully mobilized in a certain p
eriod fo time that the fate of was sealed.ers this was a great contribution the americans could make to the war effort. franklin roosevelt, as it happened, said something very similar to visit the famous address would be said "we shall be the great arsenal of democracy." he did not say the sword, or the shield, but the great arsenal. this is where we begin to get at thecentral core assets united states could bring to bear in this great conflict. ry briefly withto some of the characteristics of a parable. about three cities. if we understand what happened in these three cities over the course of the war, we have a good understanding of the contours of this american grand strategy. an three cities all share
attribute. they all sit on some great famous river. that is a little bit incidental. again, i picked these three for pedagogical reasons because they make my case. that i will a group tell a tale of three cities in we understand its essence understand american grand strategy. i asked them to guess what the three cities would be. washington, oak ridge, tennessee, and los alamos, new mexico. [laughter] to be honest on another occasion i could organize the same argument around those three cities. that is a different proposition today for the three cities i'm talking about our rouen, france, on the sienne river, and the
is washington, d.c. on the potomac. the third changed its name a couple of times over the course of the 20th century. today we know it by the name of boulder grad -- voldograd. when this happened it was known as stalingrad. this takes place in a specific point of time between 1942 in february of 1943. things happened that we can use contours ofd the american grand strategy for subchapter one, rouen, france, let me-- pardon me, 16th,-- august 15th or 1942 photo this is not a date
inscribed on our historical memory. issa how it is not so deeply described in mind. like some of the others. but it is a very important date to understand grand strategy on the part of this country and world war ii. why? lets: august 15. i may be off by a day or two. 7 squadron of one dozen b-1 bombers took a from their base in the south of england, accompanied by will swarm of spitfire fighters despite the fact that the b-17 were supposed to be self defending. they crossed the english channel and drop their bomb load on rouen, a railroad there. same place where the british had burned joan of arc at the stake. wjhhy is this important? not the fact that they dropped
on the primary target or turn to base without damage to aircraft or loss of crew. that is unusual in the history of air raids, but that is not why i cited it. it is important because we see the implementation of a very deeply consequential strategic decision made about a decade earlier. in the early 1930's, when american military planner studied a book by an italian war theorist, in a book written in the early 1920's called "to command the air." a bitd there was technology to revolutionize warfare. that technology was the airplane. advocated something we know
today as strategic bombing. in other words, he argued that air power should be used not to support the combat arm on the ground, the leapt over that and said the revolutionary implications of air technology for warfare was to build weapons delivery platforms that could overfly the traditional batter filled and deliver their blow against the enemies homeland. he was unapologetic about ranking these as equivalent. the first was to compromise and destroy the enemy's infrastructure, energy producing facilities and manufacturing facilities, that he would be unable to sustain the force in the field will subsequently, he argued that it would so terrorize the enemy civilian population that they would lose their will to fight and pressure the government to settle things in a hurry. so, that is the doctrine.
1930's the war planning department of the united states decided that in the event of a future conflict this country would place the biggest bet on a strategic air arm, that would be the element that would receive priority. slowly ating in 1935, first but eventually with phenomenal speed, they began to build a strategic air force. that araid was the first time that an all-american force dropped its bombs on nazi-occupied europe. this is fromve that raid, but here is a photo of those aircraft. knowis something i didn't then but only no later. i wish i knew it then. it is one of these delicious historical factoids that tells a
big story. i want to call your attention to the man in the upper left of that photograph. i don't know if he is recognizable because he is an headgear on. here is his card. there he is again. i can tell by the murmur that many of you know who he was. now deceased, he was the man who firstd and dropped the atomic bomb on hiroshima just three years to the day from this raid. so, the deliciousness of this is that in this one man's military career and world war ii the arc of his career he begins the air war in europe in august of 1942 and ends the war in the pacific, the same man. spread of those
1942-1945, and that d-day was two years later than this raid. foughtted states principally from the air until the last final endgame of the war in europe. the air war was the principal means which we carry the fight to our german adversary. it is the means by which we concluded the war against japan. the reminder of the centrality of the air arm in american grand strategy. chapter two, much less dramatic, i am sorry to say but is consequential, takes place in washington, d.c. on october 7, 1942 just a few weeks after that rouen raid.
it is in the office of the man at the center of this photograph, donald nelson. probably not a name that reverberates in memory doing that paul tibbetts's name does. but he was the ceo of sears-roe buck, and was drafted to head something called the war production board. oversee theto transition from a peacetime to a military economy in the shifting of resources of the civilian sector to the military sector. he hired an economist by the laterf simon kuznets who forthe nobel prize economics and he was on the economic staff of donald nelson's war production board. along, hent
argued the scale of mobilization was possible without -- in possible without straining the civilian economy leading to the point where the american public would suffer enough from deprivation might lose their taste for war and revert to isolationist attitudes. kuznets, this is known inside the administration as the feasibility dispute. was it feasible to pursue a very lengthy document drawn up in the work plan division in 1941 called the victory program. that stipulated everything down to the number of chainsaws that would be needed to cut the barracks to house the troops that would be in overseas. he argued it wasn't feasible on the scale that nelson had been trying to pursue. in donalding happened
nelson's office in october of 1942. in which the kuznets argument prevailed. the pace of a mobilization had to be slow down in targets had to be scaled back. two significant consequences flowed from this meeting. first, the date for d-day, the cross channel invasion of northwestern europe, had original document had been set 1st, 1943. -- june it was now delayed by a year 6, 1944.e this was a deliberate decision to slow down the pace of the planned invasion which raised all kinds of strategic question with joseph stalin, among others. the second decision that was made in october of 1942 was to
scale back the target of 215 division and had been intended to be drafted and equipped and trained and deployed and sent it to combat was reduced to 90 division. wereivisions of manpower originally intended to go into the armed services were now to be held back on the production lines and to field a much smaller force of only 90 division. the military this is a hard decision to swallow. it became common at the time to call this part of that decision the 90 division gamble. why was it a gamble? this takes us to chapter three, stalingrad, and 1943. anyy view, as much as
single battle can be said to be the turning point of world war ii, that is a big "if," but if you want to argue that was the i would say that stalingrad is the turning point. it is the point in which the germans suffered their first strategic level defeat on the ground in their invasion of the soviet union. this point the germans go on the defensive and push them back all the way out through theo-russia and back into streets of berlin by 1945. anybody with a minimal familiarity with the battle of stalingrad knows just how awfully battle that was. rare color for a graph of that moment. and here is d-day, coming again more than a year later in june
of 1944. here you have the basic elements of american grand strategy, the principal bet on the strategic air arm as a way to deliver a blow against the enemies homeland. joint anglo-american bomber command did that for years until there was an actual land invasion of northwestern europe. ground invasion by a year until 1944 original date a 1943, and to fight with much smaller force of 90 division's rather than 215, and stalingrad is the pivot of all thehis because it ratified viability of all those earlier premises. up until stalingrad there had been a deep anxiety among churchill and roosevelt's part
that the soviet union would collapse. it would go down in a military theat giving the might of germans. or the russians would've suffered so badly that it some point there was a will throw in the towel and negotiate a separate peace on our front and in 1918 withe like a sign the famous treaty in which they surrendered or gave up to the germans at that point took themselves out of the war. pact just before the operative world war ii before that there was a history of them do business with german adversary's. it was not impossible that they could withdraw from the war of the cost. be too high. stalingrad lays those worries theest, and makes it clear russians will stay in the war and have an effective fighting
force on the ground and can deliver defeat to the germans. provedmonths later, they conclusively they could sustain a long-term offensive. the sovietsact that would stay in the war and could carry on an offense of warfare ratifies the viability of these earlier decisions to fight with a smaller force principally from the air and delay the d-day invasion. now, joseph stalin had his own i'mof summarizing the story trying to tell you. he told roosevelt and churchill this to their face when he met them for the first time together in 1943. he said, without any apology, "it seems you americans have decided to fight with american money, and american machines, and with russian men." and cynicalrard
way to put it but it terms of the greater historical context, it was an accurate way to describe. if you asked the question "who won world war ii?" that is a subtle question if by ean which country did the greatest price for the eventual victory the answer is clearly the soviet union. without any qualification of us if we mean who emerged in the most advantageous position the rest of the -- reasonably the rest of the world of the answers clearly the united states. i would submit there is a correlation between those two different answers that the united states as it happened avoided some of the very worst most punishing aspects of the war that were inflicted on people all over the world. that is why it was the -- at that summit in 1945. let me say a few more things
about this production of miracles, so-called. to remindso images us of the quantity and quality of stuff military stuff that the united states was capable of producing in world war ii. the particular for rep i like so well i used for the cover of the split edition of my book. are similar images and reminders of just how great the so-called production miracle was. it is hard to read, but it is how rapidly american shipyards were capable of producing warships. let me touch briefly on one last matter and use this bases department store as in -- macy's department store as an example.
with every other country that fought the war, every other major belligerent, more or less for the duration, the civilian sector shrank as resources were depleted or shifted to the military sector. the two countries from which we're the best the data are the partners the grand alliance, the soviet union and united kingdom. in both of those countries over the course of the war the civilian economic sector shrank by about a factor of one third, one third less food, fuel, and shelter. in the united states, and in the united states alone, the civilian sector grew, evem around 15%. there is no country that fought the war where anything comparable was true. 1944,appened at macy's in
this photograph is from 42, it's illustrative of this. in 19, towards the end of the calendar year the marketing geniuses decided they were going to have a big discount sale. they started discussing what should be the date? the one they settled on was december 7, 1944. oray, if walmart or costco somebody decided to have a 9/11 seller think -- sale i thinkw e creepy.d find that but this was within weeks of the battle of the bulge, at the height of u.s. engagement. they have the sale at the end of the dya,ay, and what they found that macy's had taken in more
sales than in any single day in all of its prior history. there is simply no other country that fought world war ii where anything like that could possibly be even imagined. that a consumer retailer would have its best sale ever in the midst of this great conflict. alright, and it is during the war we see the ignition of these engines of economic growth that repel the united states intellectually extraordinary economic expansion and widely shared economic growth for the next 25 years or so well into the 1960's and 70's. alright, let me conclude with a brief reference to something else that is hard to take on board but it is an important metric nonetheless, that is the number of deaths in the war. we think world war ii's the history orn modern
all history where civilian deaths were greater than military deaths. not least because of those theing campaigns, and disruptions of civil societies in combatant societies. here you get the picture of how various countries fared. the blue are military death and the brown are civilian deaths. thanks to what happened in poland and the soviet union we get this worldwide effect were civilian deaths are greater than military deaths. if you look at the united states, you see a little bit of military deaths, not a trivial number, but in the scale of other countries contributed it starts to look a little different. if you look at civilian deaths in a war that worldwide took more civilians than military
personnel it is to the vanishing point. in fact, in the 48 states that had a star on the flag, i am cutting out of this discussion alaska and hawaii, the results would be different but not materially different. in the 48 cut the u.s., civilian deaths due to enemy action were theople and all died on shoulder of gearhart mountain in the cascade range near the tiny hamlet of bly, oregon, in south-central oregon. the monument that stands to this day to these people. it was a woman named elsie mitchell and five children with her on a sunday school outing,
this is her husband, archie mitchell had driven them up to this picnic site. he let them out of the car and park to the vehicle. you hear an explosion he ran to it and found his wife and his five children as he described it lieke the out a bicycle wheel all dead. also, archie mitchell had a rough life. wife on did he lose his this occasion but a few years later he remarried and went to be at as a missionary. a approximate -- vietnam as missionary, disappeared, and was never heard from again. sympathize with him. what is important about this? what they found, what killed was a japanese firebombed. it launched almost 10,000 of they consisted of a
30 foot diameter rice paper was inflated and was hung a goblet with a three pound incendiary bomb in some of these also put in anti-personnel weapons. launched these things into the jet stream with no internal means of propulsion they crossed the pacific ocean on the jet stream and the concept was they would fall to earth or be lowered by a bit of an internal navigation device and would go off and ignite forest fires all over the american west. on such a scale that the united states be forced to redeploy resources to fight in these forest fires and not prosecuting the war against japan quite so vigorously. this is -- this was japan's a campaign of strategic bombing against the united states but it was pathetic and killed exactly six people.
the weapon themselves had no means of internal propulsion and it was not very effective. all right, let's return to the end of the war moment. this is the image familiar to in pearl harbor for the last anniversary very moving occasion for me. i want to go back to our topic thehe postwar and implications by taking us back to what this photograph represent. in the foreground is the monument to the uss arizona, in the background, looming over the arizona is the battleship missouri, on the deck of which the final surrender documents were signed in 1945. let me tell you a story, it has theo with, if you look on left side of the photo a, causey
aircraft-- kamikaze that was attacking in the battle of open aloe. the plane, they will show you the place where the plane struck the hull. it looks the equivalent of a fender bender. the plane got that close, struck the missouri, then went into the sea. the pilot was recovered. this is the pilot. missouri,s on the they got ready to do whatever it were going to do to his body in the captain of the ship came over the loudspeaker system and an foughtp that, this m for his country and was just as patriotic and his beliefs about his country as you are for yours and we give me full military
funeral." that is what happened. i think that incident they make a point of showing is that if you visit the boat today. it is quite a bracing and terrific story that i hope tells us something about our national character in the way we engage in these kinds of conflicts in the way we treat our adversaries. i want to go back to the surrender deck on september of 1945. i want to call your attention to -- look at the contrast in garb between the american officers in their fatigues and the japanese delegation which are in their fanciest uniforms. on the right side of the photograph in civilian clothes hat, offp half -- top to the right, is this man here. partly educated in the united states at emerson college.
then he went back to his home country and became a diplomat. he was a senior diplomat there that delegation at the surrender ceremony. he later wrote a book called uri."ney to the misso that momentabout when he was on the deck and try to swallow his humiliation and anguish as he helped sign the surrender documents. he tells us he heard douglas macarthur city following, "from a bettermn occasion world shall emerge, one founded on faith and understanding." ite then says i wondered if would've impossible for us had we been victorious to embrace the vanquished with a similar examination -- magnamity. i will get wonky here and give
you some date. the -- data. there are people that tried to quantify help powerful the united states was. they do it but to link of the composite index. there are many ways to do this. this is probably the standard methodology for measuring national power. index, the sum population6 of the of iron and steel production, military and personnel. the unitedere is states relative to the other players. it is times more powerful than the next most powerful country which was the soviet union. longer 2007, we are no at the top of that index, china is, largely because of population.
he was the comparison from 1945, that was hard to read. from 1991, i neglected to put that slide in. states hade united more absolute power in 1945 than it did in 1991 when the french describes it as a hyper-power. what did the united states do with the power and 1945? i will leave this up here. it is matchless power at that moment when it stood at the summit at the world. newreated all these
institutions. the world bank, nato, the marshall plan, the international atomic energy agency, nafta, which comes later still. elsa put in the transpacific partnership and me trans-atlantic trade and investment partnership all of which are now in jeopardy. in my view as well the european union. i think the united states shepherded the whole european union project along from the moment it insisted as a term of participation in the marshall plan aid that the proposal had to come in from europe as a whole and not from individual countries that forced the europeans at that crucial moment to work with one another to come up with a joint common economic plan. world's they had the largestply,
navy and air force, more than 50% of the worlds merchant marine fleet come more than half of the world's gold stocks, more than half the world to monetary reserves, it was the world's leading oil producer and oil exporter. in short that the only intact large-scale industrial economy in the world. what it did with that power was to create these kinds of institutions. to begin to erect the global security architecture that has been in place for the last 70 years. i submit to you that international order by which he talked about last evening is something that has served us and with certainly some controversial exceptions that by and large i think its role as been beneficial for us and for the world at large. it should not be too readily trashed as we make our way into the next phase of the world's history.
i begin with was the churchill let me end with him as welland in 1945 united states stands at the summit of the world. sentenceshe next two that followed that. rejoice tahat it should be so. let ehher use her vast power not just for herself but for the wellbeing of all lands." i think world war ii did open an new era. there has been now ar between major -- no war between major countries in that time which is a major a compliment in this country for -- in history.
i want to conclude by repeating myself that we shouldn't too hastily undertake a wholesale dismantling of that architecture. that has prevailed for most of our lifetimes, thank you. [applause] >> thank you, dr. kennedy, we one quickully get question and one quick answer so we can get another quick question. >> just a comment one of your first slides showed paul tibbetts and the b-17 a wanted to let you know that the apple doesn't fall too far from the tree. third is not the the commanding officer of the b-2 bomber force stationed at whiteman air force base in missouri. [applause] thank you, one of
the reasons for me to come to occasions like this is to learn something and adjusted to thank you very much. -- and i just did the so thank you very much. >> all the way to your right, dr. kennedy. >> hello? >> icu and -- i see you and hear you. air power ofer the major reasons for victory in world war ii. but after the war a survey was conducted that concluded airpower had played a minimal role in the victory. how do you reconcile these? twokennedy: there are different surveys one in europe and japan. the european bombing survey could not come to any conclusive
answer about the role of air power in the final victory. advocates during the war argued consistently and repeatedly that if an even bigger bet were made, that alone could win the war. that was not the way things played out. bombing survey was quite inconclusive in europe. japan is a different story because it was the two atomic bombs that brought the war to the conclusion well short of the need of a ground invasion of the japanese home islands. the advocates of air power in the postwar period were quite, shall i say? the conclusionn from the pacific war for their best argument to create a separate air force. of thet that it was part united states army.
it was largely be japanese example that underwrote the desire to create a separate air arm as a separate command. assessments in the two theaters are a little different. >> thank you very much, dr. kennedy. >> does this work? here?ller, is done warould say the air succeeded in europe as well with the arrival of the mustang and the bombers being used in a different way than they were envisioned strategically. there were being used as bait to the bep the luftwaffe so 50 once concluded the skies for d-day which they did in the five months before then. planesy have a couple of flying over the beaches on
d-day. that had a tremendous impact on the advances of the soviet red army because of the diminishing capacity of the german liftoff ftwaffe.i they were also running out of oil. was strategically significant not exactly as we envisioned it. >> thank you all. [applause] >> you are watching "american every weekend on c-span3. follow us on twitter at @cspanhistory to keep up with
the latest history news. all weekend, american history tv is featuring scottsdale, arizona. city of scottsdale is surrounded by the sonoran desert and covers approximately 100,000 square miles. learn more about scottsdale all weekend here on american history tv. fred prozzillo: taliesin west is an example of how to live in the desert southwest. it was a building that frank lloyd wright used as a laboratory. wright was working to create a new kind of architecture for america. he was born in 1867 and died in 1959. he lived through an era of development and change. when he was born, america was very young.