tv Discussion Focuses on U.S.- Japan Military Collaboration CSPAN December 29, 2016 7:26pm-8:01pm EST
and radio networks. princeton university eddie clout author of democracy and -- and associate editor of "the washington post," david maranis, barack obama, the story. watch live from noon to 3:00 p.m. eastern on sunday on book tv on cspan 2. >> the hudson institute hosted an event with military experts to discuss the u.s. japan relationship in the emerging role science and technology can play in national security. and defense strategy cooperation. this is about a half hour. >> my opening raush, i mentioned the third off set strategy and mentioned also my own firm conviction that that third off
set strategy will provide one of the important building blocks and connective tissue for future u.s. japan defense technological cooperation. let eat find out more about that third strategy to insiders, as it were, who understand in many cases who helped to farm late that strategy and its many facets and implications. it's my -- to introduce our next panel, andrew, distinguished strategic fellow, which he founded in 1995. he assumed the position in march of 2016 after serving for 21 years as president of this premier washington think tank. his service was proceeded by his
21-year career in the u.s. army. on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. currently serveses as chief of the panel and advisory counsel, executives for national security. our other panelists is dr. williams shader. at the hudson institute and -- which is a washington based frad and finance advisory. now, he was formally secretary of state, science and technology in the 1980s, served as associate director for international affairs at the
office of management and budget. and he served as adviser to u.s. government in several capacities. almost endless. as his understanding both of military and scientific affairs is i think unparalleled in this town. f and in the think tank world. also served as chairman of the president's general advisory committee. as we get into this discussion and thinking about these questions, is how did this third strategy come to be formlated and how do we see it shaking up as something that will end up being more than just simply another empty sloegen or catch
phrase that circulating the pentagon for a number of years as what happened with for example, transformation and really becomes a solid mean way for thinking about how we will fight in sixth generation. >> sure we've had a number of views on this, but i think the third off set has the concept, whether we change that name or some other reflects the whey in which the u.s. adapts to the technology it needs for national defense through the threat's post. the u.s. has had a strong predisposition to using technology to solve problems, whether it was in a civil society or with the defense. we've always preferred using technology as a way of
mitigating these kind of shortfalls and the of course the modern history of this concept is rooted in the cold war, where the immediate aftermath of world war ii, left the former soviet union with a huge manpower presence in central and eastern europe and that offered them a powerful advantage in conducting conventional military operations because these forces could be concentrated by the introduction of a short range theatre neek lehr systems in the '50s and '60s, we were able to force the first echelon forces to diminish their effectiveness as a powerful conventional force, but
this capability quickly lost its credibility when you were trying to shoot 30 rounds of nuclear artillery per day for 30 days. and that evolved into the need to deal with the ultimate problem which was the russian second and third generation capabilities. in the convergence of the technologies that made it possible to in effect, defeat without firing a shot and the soviet forces in central and eastern europe. technologies of the precision navigation and guidance with persist surveillance.
enabled the u.s. and nato forces to completely expose the second and third echelon soviet forces to destruction and that contributed to the ability of president reagan and bush to line up to cold war without the kind of warfare we had constituted, but now, we're in a new environment, post cold war, where the defense science board has gotten several studies op this problem, where technology of modern warfare is now more or less universally fable. almost any country can get hold of this technology and as matt suggests, while china is perhaps the most powerful exponent of the use of the technology for military purposes, other countries are doing the same thing perhaps on a different
scale. including iran and north korea. and russia is adapting its own operations to the opportunities created by access to these technologies. the need is to find a constructive way in which we can defeat these technologies along the lines of remarks mentioned, so the third off set reflects an effort to to do so. let me give you my fwis on the issue. the third off set strategy is dr. schneider says, a nice term, but at the core is strategy. we all know the basic definition
of strategy, how you employ the ends you seek. but if you dig deeper, you see strategy is also about at its core, really, identifying, developing, exploiting advantages. against your adversary. while at the same time, recognizing those advantages that you have that are becoming what was called the nearly day of the cold war, wasting assets. those advantages that are fading away. and your adversary is trying to make wasting assets and make new advantages of their own and there's this constant of its own. that became a wasting asset when
the russians tested their nuclear weapon in august of 1949. we were confront wd a choice, do we build up our conventional forces in the lisbon conference in nato in 1952, there was a commitment to build up a force of 90 divisions, which sounds fantastic these days when you look back at it. president eisenhower said this is going to be a long-term competition. trz we don't know when this is going to end. the source for us will be the industrial base and the economic base of the countries of the free world.
this nuclear edge we have as long as we can to allow the europeans and some allies to rebuild their economy, their technological bases. that strategy worked in the sense that it succeeded in rebuilding these economies, these technical basis. until about the 1970s, when not only the russians as dr. sni schneider said, have a manpower advantage conventional forces advantage in europe, but also caught up to us in terms of nuclear cape bability. and those of us who were around remember this malaise and what are we going to do, hand wringing. there were a number of people in the pentagon that looked for another off set, another source. basically a tonl. they found it in information technology.
the rest of the advancededs were shift tog a hybrid based economy. that doesn't seem something able to do. i was buying sony television sets. i wasn't buying any made in soviet russia and neither were you. william perry and marshall saw the potential here. as a new source of advantage. a new source of competitive advantage. and as dr. schneider said, you can apply this advantage in a lot of ways. we used it in terms of sdi to lay the groundwork for the origin aal battle networks. we used it in submarine quieting. we used it in precision guided
weapo weapons. in developing stealth technology. there were a lot of ways we could leverage this advantage and this paved the way for what some called the revolution in military affairs in the 1990s. the advent of the battle networks combined with precision weaponry. as the first two areas of major advantage, both the admiral. china's development of these capabilities with chinese characteristics. at least being off set by chinese. where do we go next? i would argue that i think echoing dr. schneider here, i don't think the answer is found
in the 1950s or 1970s. i think the answer is found in the 1920s and 1930s. froms muif you look at these shifts through a great extent, technology is the key component. the commercial sector was driving a lot of what was going on. a the automotive industry, the aviation industry, radio. and the military take this is and adapts it. it becomes radar for example and the question is, what dif wrennuated the militaries that got it right in that period, for those that got it wrong. after a all, tonl is widely available. widely b available today.
where is artificial intelligence advancing. where is big data. robotics. nan o technology. the bio sciences. it's not occurring in los alamos. it's occurring out in the commercial sector. now, we can refine it and adapt it, but just as in the 1920s and '30s, the keys, i would say there were three keys in terms of who wins and loses. the first one was identifying, what are you trying to do. what is your purpose. so, the purposes of germany was to win a quick war against germany and france. different problems with different countries. different objectives. and what dif wrennuated, number one, trying to identify what you're trying to do. i would say today, what we're trying to do in terms of u.s.
japan alliance is defend the first island chain. if you don't know what your going to do, the it's hard to leverage technology in a a way that makes it most effective. so, for example, the german military leverages aviation, mechanization and radio. the american and japanese navies take some of that same technology and build their task carrier. long range radio, radar, aviation and so on, because they have a different objective and they have operating in a different domain. so number one is what are you trying to do. second is figuring out the concept. again, you see a great example that the americans use, the
french army and german army. both have tanks, radio, aircraft, but the german figured out how to put them together in the best way possible. the third is time. who can do it faster. who figures out the new way of war first. because whoever figuring it out first has a decisive advantage. which is why the british navy doesn't perform well in the pacific, where as the japanese perform at a very high level. it's a time based composition. as our soviet rivals would say, a concern reality here. this is what weather seen and
experienced in the past and so, for me, whether the name changes or not the challenge for us is going to be made. whether or not we succeed will depend on these three factors. thank you. >> these are important remark, especially the part about strategy and the vdimension tha imposes on figuring out the best way to use our access to these technologies. one of the other dimensions that's important at subsidiary level is a recognition that advanced technologies such as we have been discussing and technologies that are now being introduced is the particularly profound with new concepts of operation.
we discussed application of unmanned underwater vehicles and the possibility of the seabed becoming more transparent. a requirement for much different concepts of operation than we have here become accustomed. for this, we need a very creative defense establishment, including especially the office and core that are able to adapt quickly to these kinds of operations. and i think that is something that's sometimes given too little attention with the preoccupation in the technology as he said, is many different ways in which the technologies can be applied and it's only tlut shaping of concept of
operation related to spothing a constructive strategy, that the technology really makes a difference and i think this is something that we will need to take advantage of because the nature of the technologies that are on offer u are moving much more rapidly than the experience we've had, even in the 20s and 30s, the technology was moving rapidly. the technologies for these events, military capabilities, are advancing at exponential rates and sometimes, it's hard to get your head straight. if you think of taking a step of one meter each and do that for 32 time, you've gone 32 meters, but if technology is advancing 32 increments, you're up to a
billion, so almost any technology that has the property that it can be various has the property that can be software and vulnerable. not hardware, they're al gor it ms and the evolution of military equipment is going to move much more rapidly than we have previously been discussed. that will create different capabilities and the need for changes in concepts of operation to enable a country, or in this case, we're discussing today, ab alliance.
you need a kind of industrial organization that allows companies to go in and out of various markets. need to be more flexible, simply because the technology changed imposes demands to respond cannot often be done with the same organization, so, there's a lot of things that need to be thought through. a collaborative scientific and industri. >> i was just add to that, using history as an example. everyone knew that aviation was a new and important thing. how new and how important. it was a great struggle in our navy.
early on, what planes could do was to help the battle line get into position. by scouting when the enemy fleet was. the planes were very useful and going out the distance. you want to just shoot down their plane, but at some point, both the american and japanese navies realized that you can use these planes for raids on airfields. of course we'll remember that. in fact, our own navy was very much involved developing those capabilities but there was a transition point and the navies said look, these all helped our fleet. but at some point, if aircraft fly a very long distance and
carry a very heavy payload, they could sink these ships and it's not a matter of positioning our battle line. the whole thing changes. and of course, that led to the end of the battleship and the rise of the carrier and submarine. if you look at things today and all within the context of what are we trying to do as admiral coda outlined for us. i've had senior naval officers say to me, is the follow-on to the virginia class attack submarine a much improved version of what we have, or is it something very different? is the next attack submarine more like what we think of an aircraft carrier today, a rather large ship but one that doesn't do the attacking itself. one that launches the way it launches unmanned underwater vehicles. well, just as when did the transition occur with aircraft in the '20s and '30s. when is the transition in terms
of unmanned underwater vehicles occur now? may have something to do with propulsion systems or ability to refuel to allow them to travel great dennis distances. nanotechnologies. the fusing of unmanned underwater systems technology with smart mines. if you think about mines becoming smarter, smarter, smarter mobile smart mines they start to look a lot like unmanned underwater vehicles. there's so many different tokenolotok technologies moving forward that it really requires very serious, sustained intellectual effort built around not only the technology but how can you leverage, and what are you trying to do? what's the ultimate political purpose for this military capability that we are trying to build? >> we're going to want to move smartly on to our panel at 10:30, but we do have some time
for questions, including mine, which i'm going to pose first as moderator. i claim that privilege. as both of you know, there is a feeling in dod that the third offset strategy sits in uneasy relation with the way in which dod thinks about its existing conventional forces. our new president, our president-elect has made it his motto, peace through strength, and he has clearly been thinking about this along the lines of building and increasing both spending and also production levels in terms of conventional weaponry. ships, for example, the 350 ship maybe and so on. if you were advising president trump, president-elect trump, on how to think about third offset strategy in relationship to existing conventional forces, what would you say to him? put this to both of you.
>> i think the third offset technologies that we have been discussing, like unmanned vehicles, artificial intelligence and so forth, can actually extend the life of existing systems. fourth generation aircraft like f-15s and f-16s, if accompanied by swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, that are able to operate autonomous ly cn extend the life of these platforms so the evolution of military capabilities and the application of military power and support of a particular strategy can survive with a mix of existing systems evolved using this, for one of a better term, third offset technology as we introduce new capabilities that are built around entirely
new concepts of operations using technologies that are becoming available that can be applied for military applications. >> i would, i guess, by elevator speech, would be that we have built a military that is very advanced but is used to operating in an environment that is passing from the scene. what the military calls a permissive environment. nobody really goes after our muscle. nobody really goes after our nervous system. we get to have that as sort of out of bounds. well, the chinese are putting it in play, so that would be my first point. my second point, of the three revisionist powers, china in any way you want to calculate it, is the most dangerous. and we've talked about
rebalancing to the western pacific but that is really a hollow phrase. what are we trying to do? and we're trying to do -- i assume it's defend our position, maintain the balance of power. deter the chinese from aggression or coercion. how are we going to do it? can we defend the first island chain which i would say at the core is japan, taiwan and the philippines. do we intend to do it with forward defense, with reinforcements as the admiral says? with expeditionary forces? do we intend to fight the way we did in world war ii which is mobilization. we lose the first island chain but take it back at some point? i don't think our allies would be too happy to hear that. some talk about an offshore strategy which essentially is blockade. but that risks giving up the
first island chain to get it back. depending how you answer this and what military postures you want to pursue, you get different answers about the kind of military that you need to have. and we haven't done the hard up front thinking about this that we need to do. we've been sort of going on what's the pentagon calls program momentum. if it's in there, we should be building it. but i think if we took a good, hard look along the lines i've described we could end up getting significantly different answers. >> now for questions. one down here in the front. give us your name and also affiliation, that would be great. >> phyllis, peace foundation usa. just last week, i was sitting at the u.s. counsel on competitiveness and talking about the changes in technology and what implications that had for the workforce keeping up with it for u.s.
competitiveness. what thoughts, whether it be the industrial workforce having to make these things or the military workforce in terms of being able to implement and stay abreast of that change? >> the military establishment has a pretty good track record of training people at all levels. officer enlisted and civilian to keep up with changes in technology. the civil sector has done less well and i know a lot of ferment about apprenticeship programs and other kinds of training. we probably need to do something different than we've done in the past in order to keep up with it because the changes is much more rapid. but i believe also the ability to train people is much improved if we take advantage of it. >> i'm not sure how to answer
your question properly. dr. schneider knows more about this than i do. i would say from a strategy point of view, one thing that we have ignored that our chinese friends have not, the mid-'90s it was general wong min at their military college made a stateme statement, the americans cannot fight a long war, and we will win a long war. even though their doctrine and what they'd prefer to do is to win a short, sharp victory. on the other hand, we spent a lot of time and effort during the cold war making sure the soviets knew we could fight and prevail in a long war. we've given up on that. and a big part of what we've ignored, i think, in that, are things like strategic material stockpiles, whether our industrial base can surge production. you can't surge production of a
forward class carrier so, okay, but you can surge production of other things potentially like precision-guided munitions. so how we thought about what kind of posture we need to be in in order to convince the chinese that, you know, no matter how they are thinking about it, aggression and coercion are not in their interest. >> thank you very much. our panelists. thank you for giving us ideas not only about where this third off set strategy comes from but where it's going. appreciate it very much. thank you. [ applause ] ♪ ♪ the presidential inauguration of donald trump is
friday, january 20th. c-span will have live coverage of all the day's events and ceremonies. watch live on c-span and c-span.org and listen live on the free c-span radio app. coming up, programs from the national world war ii museum conference in new orleans. first, a look at the post-war fate of nazi and japanese war criminals. then on how world war ii changed the united states and the world. later, the life and postwar career of cartoonist bill maudlin. a look at the fate of nazi and japanese war criminals. to punish or to partner was part of a conference hosted