tv Discussion Focuses on the National Security Council CSPAN January 6, 2017 8:38pm-9:45pm EST
than twice. and no person who has held the office of president or acted as president for more than two years of a term, to which some other person was elected president shall be elected to the office of the president more than once. >> for a complete american history tv schedule, go to c-span.org. ♪ >> the presidential inauguration of donald trump is friday, january 20th. c-span will have live coverage of all the day's events and ceremonies. watch live on c-span and c-span.org and listen live on the free c-span radio app. next, a discussion about the role of the national security
council and how it could change in the trump white house. this hour-long forum for wednesday was hosted by the council on foreign relations in washington, d.c. >> good morning. i see lots of familiar faces up this early. thank you. welcome to today's council on foreign relations meeting on reforming the national security council. i'd also like to welcome the members around the country and the world listening via live
stream. i'm karen deyoung and write about security for the "washington post." we're fortunate to have today as our speakers, three people who have personal and academic experience in the national security sphere and specifically how the national security council operates. ambassador robert blackwell join us via video in new york where he is a henry kissinger senior fellow for u.s. foreign policy. he's worked multiple times on nsc staffs, mostly as deputy for strategic planning under george w. bush. as you can see in his lengthy biography in the program, ambassador blackwell had a long and distinguished career as ada didn't ma diplomat and paperwork and every area of foreign policy. bombing in charge after more than four years as the obama
administration's ambassador to nato. before his government service he was a senior fellow at brookings institution where he specialized in american foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship. matt destler teaching frp ing policy at the university of maryland and held senior research positions at some of our most distinguished think ta tanks. he has authored a lot of books including ambassador dalder here today. in the shadow of our office is a combination of a decade of work they did together including the compilation of oral histories of officials who served on the nsc staff and related agencies as presidents from jfk and george w. bush. the book is an historical analysis of security advisors who served those presidents, what they did and how they did it and recommendations for how
he role should be undertaken, work invaluable from my position and probably many of yours. with that, let's get started. as you know, this session is on the record. we'll talk for a bid among ourselves and then we'll open the floor to questions. our title today is reforming the nsc. that assumes that it needs reform. i have to say the need to change the way it operates as a new administration takes over is not in of itself a new concept. under jimmy carter some thought the national security advisor was too powerful. under ronald reagan it was seen as too organized and too operati operational, too weak under george w. bush and too big and powerful under barack obama. i'd like to start with ambassador blackwell. you worked for a number of securely councils and preside presidents. what makes for a good national security an adviser and effective nsc?
>> good morning, everybody. good to be with you. many in washington would see the model for national security as adviser as brent sco co-- skros scowcroft. i worked for brent. he has to have a close relationship with the president and has to have a temperament congenial to the president. he doesn't necessarihy have to know the president when he takes his position as national security advisor. curio curiously, henry kissinger had one 5 minute meeting with richard nixon at a cocktail party before he was offered the job. but he certainly over time has to have that relationship. second, and of course we assume, he has to be very smart.
second, it's a big management job because getting before the president decisions he needs to make and then being sure the decisions he makes are implem t implemented is a big management job. some of the nsc advisors who haven't done all that well haven't because they concentr e concentrated on their substantive advice to the president at the expense of their management role. third, this may even be the most important, he has to have a temperament, a non dis-pu t taitious temperament, if i have to put it like that because he or she needs to instinctively needs to be fair-minded prese presenting options to the president. of course, the president, at least in my experience, will usually ask the nsc advisor, what do you think? that's after the nsc advisor at
best, this was certainly brent, would present to the president in a fair-minded way, the various options that various members of the cabinet supported. just to conclude, this is a very tough and challenging job. it's because of that, that i suppose two-thirds of the national security advisors, since the kennedy years, have actually failed in their job and have been replaced or quit. >> in addition to the personality of the national security advisor, obviously the structure is very important. one of the first things every administration has done in the last half century is to produce a document right at the beginning, talking about how national security policy making will be structured, how the process is going to work. i know you participated in that process for president obama. i wonder if you could talk a little bit how that works and
how important it is. >> in part, in order to do the job in the way that bob has described it, you need to have a process and an organization that facilitates that, particularly that last point, the ability to understand what other people and other agencies think and then how to present what they think in an objective and trust fulfilling manner to the president. over the course of the last 50 years, the way in which that process has been put together has changed, except that since brent scowcroft in 1989, actually coming out of a commission report that he chaired as a result of the iran contra affair, we've had a relatively similar kind of structure, a structure where you have a principals committee chaired by the national security advisor and whose members are all the members of the national
security council minus the president and sometimes the vice president. so you have the senior cabinet figures coming together on a regular basis, chaired by the president's national security advisor. you then have the deputies committee, number twos and sometimes number threes depe depending which department you're talking about trying to manage the process almost on a day-to-day basis and is the crisis management facilitator. third, you have, this is whewhere it changes from administration to administration you have the assistant secretary level int interagency working groups which get renamed under every president because that's the president's prerogative. currently, the interagency policy committees, ipcs sometimes get chaired by departments and sometimes get chaired by the nsc. there's always a big fight about that issue on whether a
department gets to chair it. over time, the reality is because the central mechanism is in the white house, it tends to be chaired by the nsc. even in the obama administration where initially there was, in what was it called psd 1, the first memorandum by the president laid out the int interagency process. there was some thought being given at the state department either chairing or co-chairing some of the regional ipcs, that's never happened, pretty much abandoned pretty early on for one simple reason, the assistant secretaries supposed to chair those meetings aren't actually confirmed six, seven months into an administration so somebody has to do the job and the person the nsc will be there on day one because they don't have to be there on day one.
in every administration the question is, do we have the same process or do we have a different process of interagency management? i would suggest that's one part that does not need reform. it can work. there's a question about how many meetings you do and how frequently they are and how you run them actually less a process or organizational one but more a process question. then, there is the larger issue we may want to get into later, what is the companies thetence covers versus the others out there whether international issues, homeland terror issues and intersecurity issues. that is an issue right now being debated within the trump transition team. >> bob and ivo have done an admirable job of developing the national security advisor and
has persisted the last 30 years now, 1986, 1987. but, of course, driving a lot of this and sometimes distorting it of the role of the president and relationship of the president to the national security adviser we have a book to to rem to look at that. what i will say there is enormously from president to president and it defeat the dreams reformers. at the beginning of the obama administration there was amount of verment in the national process improse reports with multity hundred page reports wherein big structure a lot of people want to return to the way presidentize hour ran the nsc
ran the administration. the the problem was general jones -- obama had interest in this. however, the president did not. the president and jones never hit it off in the hence, he represented gem jones, he represented and ad mired president but they never hit it over in terning of day-to-day management policy relationship. the people who worked for obama for the a long time, semi-jumped into the vacuum who is essentially did a lot of the national security adviser job until that was change. so you find episodes where the structure is one way. and the personal relationship doesn't work out and therefore they get, since the president is dominant, we are all
particularly rising that right now, with unusual president about take off, but the point i would make is for every president there are ied yoe sin kre sis, different style press conference and they shape how process operates. >> before we go to the specification of what's happening now, i want to talk about the size of the nsc staff, skoe scoff said it's 50 people and it's about right. it's doubled since then to the point you have over 400 people working in the nsc staff in the obama white house. many of those were not policy people. this administration has said it's work to make it smaeler
congress has moved in the legislation to mandate some argument of whether they have power to do that. they have done it in legislation but it d k not be more than 200 people. how important is that does size dictate function or does function dictate size. does it make a big difference? >> on the very top handful of issues problem not much. because those are handled by the president and the chief people,s deputy secretary so forth. what it matters on a lot of other issues. if you have a couple hundred policy people which obama had until end of the administration, most of them never see the president except maybe to shake his hand when they're hire or fired. most of them don't have any
relationship with the national security adviser but they have mandate to work in the policy area and they are aggressive people entrusted to making a difference so they control what's going global. as a result you have increase difficulty of people the agencies being able to take initiative and lead and connect effectively with the national security adviser but because there's only one national security adviser one president, one cabinet member it creates a bottleneck. they are good people. they are active, they care. they come to government because they want to make a difference. in that sense, a large number is the enemy of the good, the sko kroft idea, we wrote a piece in
2000 which we said we think 40 to 50 is about right. that did not include homeland security if you add that, it's get bigger. with under w bush and under barack obama. it's gotten bigger. ivo may want to speak to recent changes. >> first the idea that congress should legislate presidential shaf in the white house they may or may not be allowed to do it but it is not wise things to do it. president should be able to choose how he some day shape get advise from the people that she or sheet want to get advise from. it's not for congress to decide. number one. two, in terms of policy staff, as you written, the national security council under susan rice has for the first time
sense brent, said let's look at what's right size of this originals. has have taken a look at how many people they need and have cut staff dramatically particularly on the policy side. it's now under the soon to be mandate of two hundred policy professional staff. they have tried to figure out how to streamline the process by which decisions are made including the principals meeting which were over taking the day-to-day responsibilities of principles and deputy around the department. third point, just to echo max last point, the more busy you have on and the core thought that everybody should wake up with from the national security adviser to the lowest policy
person is is what i am concerned about something the president ought to be or is interested in. don't worry about it if the answer is no. you have a entire bureaucracy that exist to worry about what the president should worry about. staff should worry about the things that president is or should be underscore should be concerned about. when you have 50, 60, 75, maybe it a 100 people, you have enough to cover that broad range of issues the caveat with how big policy is. does it include domestic home hand security disaster response policy, the larger of the remit of the nsc that's larger the
staff would be. that's the key the president needs to make early on in the administration. >> bob you have seen this from inside from several administration. what's you're view about the size function dictating size what difference does it make from the inside? >> when you first say i agree which what has been said in every respect. i observe it doesn't seem to be a relationship between the size of the nsc staff and the quality of the policy that the president is following. it may be an inverse relationship. but, if we think of the lake great duke new stat president gets organization they want and so this president will get kind of organization he wants through his national security adviser
and whether that errors on the sighs of large or small doesn't matter all that much as long as it's reasonable. i don't think 400 is reasonable. because it has the affect as my colleagues have said of getting nsc staffers "on behalf of the president involved in policy that have no president would be interesting in. so i think about 100 is right. it could be a little more a little less, but certainly not as large as it has been in recent administrations. >> we don't know a lot about what president-elect trump wants from his national security staff what we do know is that he has already changed the structure swla at least we know that from a appointments that have been made not because there's been any structural document release but he has apparently revived
separate homeland security council, he hassle elevated economic council and he pointed heads of all of these in the white house all of whom report directly to him. all of them have staffs. so i wonder what you think about what that says about how smoothly the system is going to run, what his interests are, and how he intends to pursue them through the white house? >> on the issue of homeland security council, it exist in the obama administration, the council which is a group of people that meets at the principal level and pleat meet
with the president. we don't know yet whether the appointment, as a new homeland assi assistant to the president it's same tight as lisa monaco has today. >> doesn't see report -- no, she reports directly to the president. they abolish homeland security staff and merged it. are we going to have a separate staff dealing with homeland terror and cybersecurity staff under cio in the white house today. that we don't know. but we don't know how that's going to happen. the larger point is exactly you're point that on the big issues dealing with international affairs r ranging from home land security through national security through economic affairs and trade we have going to have four individuals who are all in the
white house directly reporting to the president. the question is who is going to coordinate the coordinators. these are four people coordinating various parts of the government then they have to coordinate within themselves because strangely enough, foreign economic policy and trade policy are not that different and many national security involve both trade et cetera, the coronation of the coronation within the recipe for more staff because who is going to coordinate the coordinator and recipe for potential conflict. everything we know about donald trump management he seems to like that. he wants to have different people coming forward with different points of view. he creating a white house organization that will do that in spades. we have not talked about the domestic staff and the chief of staff side.
he has lot of people reporting directly to him that will make decision. >> the president's create organization to signal priority. where every president since nixon have had white house staff that have dealt with issues outside of nsc. willy announce he was going to create and did create national economic council nec with is parallel to the nsc because had it bob are you bin was a strong affective leader of that. it became an kons kwenal entity. so then you have these three then you have obama you saw
adviser, as ivo pointed out the staff, there's a dilemma here as a defender of the separate staff ideally you would like to have everything under national security adviser they have not responded adequately to the economic addenda. because of that, it is tend to be negligented it it moved to other people because politics and congress and industry, and that pushed that way so you had a -- i think the biggest redundancy is the combination of the national trade council those after ramp there. trump does it because he want to revolutionize trade policy. because ivo suggest is going to
be either one of these adviser establish clear privacy and the other defers or alternatively there's chaos. >> bob, you mention that it was important for the national security adviser not to be dispennation was the word you have used. assume for the moment that that the national security adviser has primacy among the interest that we're talking about interpretation of national court. general flynn, very distinguished officer throughout his military career, former head of the defense intelligence agencies where he ran into problem with the pentagon and the white house, some concerns have been raised he does have a reputation for being disputationous and someone focus
three his career has notice been on a wide range of national security issues, how do you think his characterics fit idea as you described it earlier? >> i don't want to speak to that because i never met the man so i don't know washington reputations or formed in different ways so i don't want to get -- i do want to though to reinforce something that's been said about national security adviser and economic issues just -- i may be not priet about this i was sitting here thinking has there ever been serious economist who has been security adviser but ross cow would call. they tend to be national security types, general, admiral, or people like condi
rice who spent her career on east west and soviet issues so forth. that downgrades the economic dimension. now matt bun di's deputy was francis who was distinguished economist from harvard but there's not economist who is not deputy either. having a separate structure given the preoccupation of this preside president-elect's with economic slish having that structure makes sense. on the broad issue of temerment we have to see what i am confident having watched myself dozen national security adviser successful and unsuccessful
close-up, disperation in trouble because sooner or later the cabinet members beginning with the secretary of state will be in having one-on-one meeting with the president saying we have a problem here. in most cases if the president has to choose between secretary of state and national security adviser they choose the secretary of state. so weal where'e'll see. this is experiment that's about to occur we'll see how it turns out. >> who are used to running their own shows, so it -- you can see the possibility of conflict on that level. i want to -- >> just two points on what bob just -- one, the only person with economic background other
than walt ross stou is sandy who did trade law. but he was one of those very broad people. i would agree fundamentally with the negligent of big economic trades issues by the national trade security issue. the way this has been resolved the key person doing economic affairs nec is do have reports to nsc, mike fer man was stronger powerful person in that position, he was under obama and he was deputy in the nec and merged that. one other point on temptment how to think about it, as bob said, the key characteristics you want is someone who is create a trust
within his cabinet counter parts particularly within the secretary defense minute to minute basis to the president. the national security adviser sees president every hour on the hour at the begengs of the day and at the end of the day. they need to know that their views are going to be presented fairly and openly and they need to trust that. the moment this breaks down is the moment the system break down. i done know if it's two third within 50 years but it happen way too often. it was brent's skill to be able to be very very close to the president, closer than any other national security adviser.
he writes mem roir with the president. that's going to be key to success. >> when ivo and i were doing our project, we organized roundtable, what the big point he said, he said when you become national security visor you have to spend first year, year and a half establishing trust. you have it to get the -- you have to get so the cabinet people believe in you. otherwise they are going to go around you and you'll have a big conflict like kissing ger l with roger and vans or different administration, it's notice go to work. what ivo and i used our book from david abshire a long time veteran was a expert on that
said trust is the coin of the realm. you have -- organization good policy. and george h. bush administration was wonderful administration. was not such a para gone and problems arose from that. >> i want to ask the members to join with the questions to remind you first of all, community is "on the record" and i'll call on you and wait on the microphone if you can state your name and your affiliation i done have to ask you to limit yourself to one question to get as many as possible. yes, back there. >> cam carry at the brookings
institution on the government study formally at the commerce department. i want to pick up on the theme of how you integrate economic issues into the security council process. i did a paper at brookings last fall which addressing that question, drawing particularly on the experience of the disclosure and the response to that which was initially treated as a national security issues but had enormous reverberations beyond that. one of the things to look at is the composition of the national security council of the obama administration psd one say if economic international economic slirks are on the agenda then
the adviser for international economic affairs, secretary of treasury, other advisers are at the table. but the proposal you change that default so ordinarily those people are at the table unless the issues are not on the table. the presumption is things have some impact on those issues. and i think the notion that economic councils are a solution is certainly important but you still need to integrate those issues. so i wonder if you would comment more on how you make sure that economic agencies, advisers have visibility into what's going on but may have impact on issues that may the not be seen by it's
people that make up the nsc. >> who wants to take that. >> one thing that the clinton administration did when it established nec was to have a staffer of people who had worked for both nec and nsc in charge of the economic issues at staff level you had sbel grags. then in the george w. bush they el elevated that to the deputy assistian so this helps to sbel grate at staff level. it doesn't fully solve the problem but it's a useful step, and as ivo pointed out, mike pro man played the role strongly in the first obama administration. >> can i chime in.
that is important issue raised. especially in an era ge yoe around the world china, others are using economics for geopolitical purposes. most secretaries of the treasury are not enthusiastic about involving their agency in the process. therefore don't come to those meetings unless their colleagues become interested in treasury issues. my experience was it was heard to get the secretary of the treasury over to the white house for issues for the reason i said. >> just to am fly what bob said,
it is the question whether she show up. and at certain moment the invitation -- there's a lot of meetings they don't think their expertise is important so it gets downgraded to who shows up and ultimately nobody shows up. >> the deputy. oftentimes there were to many meetings at the white house the level went down overtime. >> i have a question about the nsc staff coronation function. the staff's primary function is staffing the president and pushing the president's priority but they have to coordinate the government. you made the point if the president doesn't care about d, staff shouldn't worry about it. the president doesn't need to care about a coordinated government. and there's a tendency perhaps
in the republican administration in particular i started when the moved nsc staff in 2001, let's hire strong staff secretary you cannot do that. we have a government that is has got to coordinate with each other. cia has got to coordinate with staf and defense. we saw what happened in the bush administration has got to coordinate with other. they have to be justice have to coordinate with government. the brob is there can be too much coronation if every single thing done by every department is sent to the nsc hatch it's what drives people crazy. what the is appropriate level of coronation across government that the nsc staff should do which goes on kbe low the
president's eye level? >> so that's an excellent question it's key driver why staff gets larger in the white house because the opposition is the only place that ask and does coordinate. i think it's time to ask the question whether that's in fact true. like others in this building, i was an ambassador and i coordinated by definition because as chief you have every one from every different agency. part of your coordinating function and it used to be the case it's not coronation something new we didn't have do in the 1960s, but it used to be the case that a assistant secretary from powerful people in the state department or justice department, did much of that coronation at that level. i think we want to go back it seems to me to a system where
political appointees who are senate confirmed so they stand at a higher level have pour power to do the job. the idea that it can only happen in the white house lead you to 2, 3, 400 staff folks. you want to have many as it's happening. the only person who can coordinate interagency process is somebody sitting in the white house is wrong. there's no reason why the assistant secretary from europe can't coordinate russia policy with folks including the white house but go to the state department and strange idea from the white house to the state department it's equally far from the coming as from the white house to the state department. just think about that.
so you can do coronation in a different way. >> what you have to do if if you do if that way is informal group effort include defense person, intelligence person, may include economic person depending on the issue who are conjennal with one another. they will work together and realize -- administration have not been able to establish effective and formal coronation at the cabinet level tend to be more effective than establishing it at the assistant secretary level. >> you have to give somebody n convening authority. you mentioned about, ipc, the obama administration in their directive had a pa graph saying ipc will not be interagency headed by a department they will
be in the white house headed by a person in the staff. the control from the white house was in their heads from the start. >> in part because it tries to answer john's question of coronation, the only person who doesn't have a stake in this is in the white house and they are every this the only person to convene and control. i'm not sure that's true. >> if they don't if there's no coronation, then you hit -- then you throw it back into the hency written process. it doesn't get coordinated in many cases. it dose in country often. >> job if when you immediate need to. >> i'm andrea chris kronian at
the university. where are strategies made, or is the concept inak kro nisic. >> bob you want to take that one. >> when i look at the white house, last time in george w. bush administration i was deputy adviser for strategic planning and so i started out as condi had asked to try to do that and the secretary of sate colin powell said forget it. there's going to be any strategic planning generated out of the white house it will come from the agencies and presented to the white house and it can amalgamate envoy to iraq because our policy in iraq is such a
mess and i spent an extra year in baghdad. i'm pretty skeptical of strategic planning being generated by small nsc staff separate from the national security adviser himself. the best example of strategic planning is henry kissinger that was basely out of the nix on's and kissinger's head. we'll see whether this national security adviser has that capacity. but i don't think it's generated upward toll any significant extent by the nsc staff.
>> when the henry kissinger was made national security adviser, he invited bob to do long-term planning, he treated cos good with the up most respect, and os good was more or less he was irrelevant. there was no -- i think the reason is a process it's hard to overcome. issues come -- the national security adviser gets his or hear leverage from the day-to-day issues managing them for the president. these are urgent if you have a president involved, that issues drive. nixon administration was
impressive agencies being able to move -- it came from nixon and kissing jers -- notify from staff. not from institution procedures. >> to bob's earlier comment, policy from different agencies present it to the present if you can give example of when that process worked well. what was policy you feel was executed both from the beginning toward the end. >> this good book on this by the way, on how we got to date, so after it truly disaster, tony lead process where he asked different agencies to come up with their best idea how to
resolve it, it was state department effort and defense effort mem yor it was nsc effort and those different efforts were put together in a series of meetings and series of discussion with the department over a number of days that lead to a strategy for trying to get the issues resolved one way or the another and the one way or the either through negotiation or through with drawing the un troops and lifting the arms embargo and striking air power. using the military means in order to get the process going. that lead to date and then lead to the implementation of the post period. it ended the war that was in
1996, 1995. it's now 2006. while situation in boss ya is not different from what it was in 1995, one things is different, nobody is killing each other. and that's sense it was remarkable successful process run out of failure. which is usually what things happen. the surgery iraq surgery is other good example. how do we get new ideas together. that's when the national security adviser whether they play the rolls right become if you twant to do strategist or planner in order to resolve particular issue in case of boz ya it had to be resolved before 1996 election in the case of iraq that it wasn't working
eating up everything going on in a domestic policy. >> steve played a crucial role-playing that. >> absolutely. >> in 1989. through september of 1990, when germany was unified under in nato that was one not that was born out of failure it was born out of utterly unanticipated event which was gosh chof and loseening of europe and the consequences and the president and brent, in the sfring of 1989 seeing the events created the policy of going as fast as one
could toward unification and involving gosh chauf in that process. it was tri lateral endefer of bush, cole and gorbokhauh, if you go back to say what i think at least in the case i'm familiar with, which is the one i just mentioned it was because of the trust and baker and chen knee and present and the president worked their way through tactical disagreements without a bump. and that's what it takes to
implement the kind of policy and examples we have been using and we'll see if the trump administration is capable of that. >> one other things, that trust went down levels of the administration. you have bob working with the kim and others and that team equally trustworthy and worked as well. it's bring interagency process and trust downs through level of the government that is critical. >> that's one of the problem with the george w. bush in the first term where you had entity went down with people defending period of time sides. >> the obama administration has it exists that level goes down
quite far. there's always competition, there's different views, but people work together at various different level when that happens things can move. >> we have five more minutes. let try to get into two or three more questions. in the back. >> hiem campbell from google could you comment on dynamic on cyber entity within nsc or cyber experts within the europe directorate. >> who wants to take that. >> this as a larger issue. the competent in government is not in the white house it isn't. you can't have all the of the expert in the white house if you do you'll take all of the department that's where the
expertise lie. it's true for everything. so the people that you want in the white house are the people who know where the expertise is. ask can bring it to bear in the decision-making process. if it you bring it into the white house then it become u.s. government, why bother. it's constant tension, belief only way to coordinate is to have expertise. that lends to growing staff. it's availability to think where in government is expertise how to bring it to bear in the decision-making process and let them implement it. the question that brent put it every morning when i wake up i look in the mirror say how can i have one less person.
that's the right question. >> the question you raise is a basic dilemma of government. it depends on the nature of the issue if you predominantly -- if each issue with china is trade issues you give that issue to the economic people if they are more security then you give it to the china people. so it's not automatic or easy. i think cyber with be an example which in principal is a functional, it doesn't mean you have to pull everything up into white house which can create a mess. >> good morning. do you have a view of the role of the u.s. mission how that out to be coordinated position
essentially created another poll of u.s. foreign policy making as functional matter i would be greatful for your views. >> i think the un ambassador should report to the secretary of sate like every other ambassador and that's where it belongs it should be an instrument of american policy. so i would move it into the direction of resbintegrating it back into it. you would have loved to have been cabinet member, i done d think either of us would have been as effective as opposed to people part of the state defense apparatus so the idea that the
un ambassador has a separate standing i know my great friends and colleagues woody agree but i edo grief sbel grating itting back into the place where it belong which is the state department is -- here here. >> if you look at the history and starting with james kill patrick, i think they wanted to have her and her feelviews in t cabinet, that it allows president to have another woman in the cabinet. i think that's -- something that's. >> i'm for women for secretary of state. that's way to solve it.
>> yes. >> as we're talking about downsizing the nsc i have a question about whether you believe human rights belong whether it belong in the nsc. one of the ways we have participated in that's there's consultation, robly lots and lots of consultation on many issues, can you talk about what happened to the ability to integrate civil society into policy making process and where you believe human rights belong if at all with nsc? >> it tends abuse taken by national government there's strong press state department has affective organization dealing with human rights how do you make that a cross the blind
wean the function and concern of the human rights and country relationship which has multiple interests i done don't know there's a clear answer if if the president is concerned about human rights and l to give it priority and to advertise the priority that would make difference. but creating specialize office does not make a difference. >> this came up in jimmy carter administration where president carter was preoccupied with human rights during the campaign setup a special office in the white house on that subject but discovered that he had essentially two different policy toward everyone country one of the secretary of sate one of the human rights person on his own staff after a while the human rights apparent left position was downgrade but you u that
brings to the final point about coronation which is fm you're not careful you're going any administration faces the danger of having several policy at at the same time being articulate to our governments and that gets back to the crucial function of the nsc adviser to try to be sure on behalf of the president that the president's policy has the president has decided is implement and there's only one. i was in the reagan administration and especially in the early years on any given monday there were four or five policy on any particular issues being pursued by various agencies of the u.s. government. and we were until colin powell took over as national security
battle to repeal and replace the nation's health care law. reporter simon mottly talk about his article look at program offering college eastern saturday morning. join the discussion. c-span video student document is underway and people are under work sharing share experiences with us through twitter.
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diego. we'll here the story of bicycles left along the boarder, in the book the coyote's bike and rise of boarder line empire. >> a long that i went do after that had a pile of bicycles from the state park to the gol mez place right down here there's a county park and other ranges and the people of the valley were collected these bicycles that were abandoned by migrants. then on c-span 3 we'll hear how u.s. historian. >> she was a grand new ship of a large and new design and so the navy put had you through she
made numerous deployments. in 1954 it was decide she need today transfer to the pacific in 1955 she made an epic voyage because she was too large to pass through the pan na canal cay cross the indian ocean and entering the pacific from the west. sunday afternoon on 2:00 p.m. on c-span 3. working with the affiliate and visiting cities across the country. >> flex a discussion about military cooperation between us and japan and shared interest. the hudson institute hosted the panel, technology andan