tv U.S.- South Korea Relations Part 4 CSPAN September 18, 2017 6:40pm-8:01pm EDT
constitution and you. and we're asking opportunities to choose a provision of the u.s. constitution and create a video illustrating why it is important. our competition is open to all middle school and high school students, grades six through 12. students can work alone or in a group of up to three and produce a five to search minute documentary on the provision selected. include some c-span programming and also exexplore opposing opinions. 100 thouds will be awarded in cash prices. the grand prize of $5,000 will go to the student or team with the best owe all entry. the deadline is january 18th, 2018. so mark your cal ders and help us spread the world to student filmmakers. visit our website. >> the u.n. security council voted last week 15-0 to impose new sanctions on north korea. up next, a panel on the north korean threat and the challenges it poses for the u.s. south
korean alliance. the center for stratic and international studies hosted this hour and 15 minute event. >> well, welcome back from your break. i'm michael green. i'm the senior vice president for asia and japan chair here at sic and a professor at georgetown and like victor cha, a veteran of the long forgotten bush administration. this panel is going to look at our alliance in the context of northeast asia. the previous panels touched on bilateral defense issues, on ways to deal with the rising threat from north korea. those issues will come back in this panel, but what i hope we can do for the next hour and 15 minutes is provide the larger geopolitical context within which we're now working. the north korean nuclear challenge cannot be divorced from the larger geopolitical
memory and vision for the future of northeast asia. and we are confounded, we are obstructed in our effort to find a diplomatic solution by the fact that there are different ideas in north east asia about what the region's past was and what the region's future should be. views as diverse as china president's she's speech in shanghai several years ago where he called for a northeast asia without blocks which most people interpreted as without alliances. a vision of sort of lower u.s. presence, diminishment or end of the alliances that held the u.s. and regional stability and proch perty together after the war towards something new, more defined by china. others talk about the danger of a split in northeast asia, a divide between the continental
and maritime powers. with china, russia on the continental side, perhaps the u.s., japan, india, australia on the other side and korea as a peninsula stuck in between. others articulate the vision for building on 70 years of progress and stability in the long run we obviously had the korean war and vietnam war where we had struggles. so another vision is one that continues spreading and forging deeper ties based on the rule of law and an open international order. the very different vision for the future of northeast asia, very different interpretations of what the past meant and it's precisely because of those differences that we find it very difficult for the major powers to align on the north korea nuclear problem. of course, new york uses these fissures and splits to try to maximize its own position, its leverage and its threat.
so we'll come back to the north korea nuclear issue in this panel, but i think we'll want to put it in the context of larger geopolitical trends, memories that shape the region. and we have a panel who will talk about how our alliance figures in all this. we'll begin in the order you see with professor kim john hun from hong done university. eats an expert on northeast asia and has had various roles advising the government. then we'll turn to laura rosenberger now at the german marshall fund who served with great distinction in the state department in the previous administrations. then professor kim jong could you from add joe university who has particular expertise on china. dan blumenthal from american enterprise institute, known to everyone here, doing a lot of work on chinese grand strategy and the future of northeast
asia. and then professor song young who has a broad asia background but particular expertise in japan. we'll hit the major powers, the trends in the region. and we'll talk about our alliance. because in these different competing vision about the future of northeast asia i started with, probably the variable that will control those futures the most will be the u.s. korea alliance. this alliance began in the wake of the korean war in the front line in the battle against communist expansion. it is now an alliance that will be perhaps more decisive than any other bilateral relationship in determining how the u.s. and japan, japan and china and the larger spread of northeast asian power plays itself out. and we have to get this right as allies. hopeful the we'll point to some of the ways we'll do that.
so i'm going to ask each of the panelists to give us a three to five minute top line, key take away set of points on their talking memos, which are in the conference panel. and then we'll come back and tray to get some debate and disagreement going and then open it up for your questions of the yes, sir. >> okay. this is hugh -- i wrote this like seven page, but i have to talk to you in three minutes. and the question is the big picture of northeast asia. actually, i rewrote in the morning when i heard it i have five minutes. okay. as you all know that the present situation security structure is much more complex and it is therefore a multidimensional -- totally different from the dichotomy structure of the cold war. but somehow the appearance remains the same. the norn tie hang lar kind of
alliance, even though it's not really an alliance. north korea, russia and china and southern tie angle still kind of have at least a skeleton. so in a way good part is it is easy to draw cooperation from all the allies. the bad part, it's harder to solve the problem because the problem is on the other side, north korea. so this complex, this complicated situation, we attempt to dichotomize the problem and then at the end of the day, maybe we are in the position that it didn't solve or failure. there are two main variables.
one is divergence over north korean policy. but interesting point is the thaad issue is kind of litmus test paper between u.s. and rok. because the trump administration, some suspicions, some doubt mostly from u.s. towards moon. second, divergence over north korea. supporters, main supporters of moon government want divergent approach toward north korea. this is test paper, litmus paper that moon is not going to betray his voters. so he's kind of in between, sandwiched by these two. so how too solve this problem can decide u.s. rok relationships. early beginning stage i think
first test is more satisfactory. that means u.s. is satisfied with moon's approach, but not the second. and i think i spent half of it, i'm going to raise four questions. they're provocative, but i want to race these questions. first, we have been talking about coworking, u.s. rok consultations, but to me and to liberals, why only on pressures? emphasized con certificate tagsz only on pressures? was not -- for example, even in this grave situations, i'm sure u.s. tried to have some contact toward the north like contact in new york, but i don't think this is preconcerted with south
korean government. second question is, i know the situation is so bad, but even seems more to say to talk about now, but we need so many for choice. nobody is talking about engagement issues. not many menus already. number three. third question. domestic politics because leadership here, u.s. leadership including president or senators or even some experts, their voice is much louder in korea. sometimes inconsiderate. i know america is a democratic country, but there have been more careful and considerate. it's much more exaggerate and louder in korea.
and considering the petition with supporters, finally china and korea relationship. we talked about the pictures. china and korea and good relationships are really important. >> somehow always they had their cooperation is going on among u.s., japan, and korea, not korea and china and u.s. which is i consider really important to solve the problem. >> great. thank you. we will come back to some of those things. >> great. thank you. >> i want to start and i think mike did a nice job of laying out the visions for the future of northeast asia. i top the go into this by
talking about the importance of u.s. leadership in seeing that that direction continues in the interest of not only the united states, but the alliance and of many of the important values and rules that we have worked together so hard to cultivate over the past few decades. let me start by talking about korea that sits in a very challenging location geographically. korea has been doing a lot of work and it's security relationship with the united states. i worry that if u.s. commitments to korea became in doubt, that would play into -- it would strengthen china's hands and lead to greater economic dependency between korea and
china and make seoul resist the pressures they have seen from china on things like that and other questions about the security alliance. a lot of progress has been made in korea and trilateral relations are important in dealing with the korea crisis and managing the rise of china and it's essential to security interests in the region. absent u.s. leadership, i don't think we would see the progress we have seen and i don't think it would continue in the direction that i believe is in our collective interest. we know the perils of china filling a vacuum in the region if u.s. leadership were to be in question. we have seen china asserting its own economic vision for an economic framework for the
vision with the tpp vision. there are other ramifications. they allow it to set different rules for the region. they flex russia's region and the flights around the peninsula. what we heard from the chinese about that and other systems in the region. i think it's important to bear in mind. we will certainly seek to if the u.s. were to pull back in any way on the commitment to our allies and security.
i say all of this not to be pessimistic. i'm extraordinarily optimistic about the region, but it's important that here in the united states we continue to put ourselves on a course in the region to make sure it develops in a direction that it gathered in this room and we all want to see it continue. someone who carry that mantle of leadership when it comes to the international rules and norms and values. >> and i had grown up and while reading it and i have the great honor to make the presentation
and china is profoundly changing with the policy of great power. they have the new strategy and a new concept of policies. she xi ginning ping with his career policy and orientation that was in favor of south korea. he ecmphasized the normal state to state relationship with north korea. they have the force to north korea's nuclear mission as well as to her provocation. china has adopted an increasingly active stance on the peninsula that you see the proposal on the power of negotiation in 2016 and more so the suspensions in 2017. president xi was in collaboration with north korea
on the july force. the united states and south korea. and the new policy to the korean peninsula may bring about the corporation with south korea and most korean case and the corporation really matters for the stability in northeast asia. the most challenging question is how to reserve this issue to control china's corporation. since the new government came in south korea and china's opposition has been more test flights. the bilateral relationship between seoul and beijing is not likely to improve soon unless they are thabl to find the
solution. xi has an interest of when he met them in germany on july 6th of this year. in this case acquiring china's corporation issued & before south korea, i was saying the fundamentals of the u.s. alliance. i suggest while deploying on the south korea to protect the u.s. army and facilities from the text of south korea. if it's not utilized against china and south korea supporting the policies not taking china as an adversary. based on the months between south korea and the united states.
i hope the united states also needs to provide technical assistance in the similar days. they alleviate chinese apprehension that most policy might be pursuing. in fact, and the policy and no regime change from the army. almost identical with chinese north korean policies. in spite of the united states china increasing pressure and warnings on september 3rd of this year, they have this hydrogen bomb. tim obviously revealed he would not pay any respect to chinese
interest as well as the united states. as a consequence, northeast asia is falling into grave security dilemma situations. nobody knows the outcomes. what is urgent is to establish a strategy or corporation among south korea and the united states and china. they need to understand each other and increase mutual trust. the u.s. civilian and expert based dialogue. then the three need to agree on the intend of nuclear weapons. the message to deal with these issues and crisis mechanism. they fly over the horizon and we need to move. the fresh ideas and
determination. thank you. >> great topics for us to come back to. >> yes. thank you very much. >> i can only imagine how it's nerve racking and distressing in korea. for us in the united states here too, but living with this threat with this kind of person in charge just must be awful. my heart really goes out and i think we will find a solution overtime. geopolitically i think the context number one is that -- since the end of the cold war the president said the greatest threat that the post cold war world faces is terrorists or world regimes. we found out is that it can happen and it did happen. that's a huge failure of the post cold war strategy.
if you are a dictator hell bent on getting it, you will get one. that has enormous geopolitical consequences and consequences for the mideast and geopolitical consequences here. i can come back to this later, but the idea that we are treating it as a state rather than as a mafia or terrorist organization to boggles the mind. it's not a state in a real sense of the term. it should be treated as was treated for sometime as a mafia organization trying to get nuclear weapons. that has all kinds of organizations for policy. the second is as china and really the end of the period of reform. it ended probably 10 years ago and the reform period.
they put a big explaination and changes the consensus for our eyes. at the same time that china actually has the most ambitious foreign policy plans that it put forth in the last 20 years. less resources form an opening upside and expansive territory that goes from the person parts and eastern parts of afghanistan to claims near south korea. that in itself is the geopolitical context. when it comes to korea, the first unit has got to be that it's an empire with this expa e expansive territory.
that's the way they had to pay tribute in the imperial era. they were repeated south korea got e nomous pressure and not to take care of its own security interest. if that's how it views asia as part of the zino sphere and that impinges upon the strategy inside the maritime east asia including korea and has been and always will be the cockpit of history. for china, that's where it began through korea and japan. i'm not trying to justify and everyone knows needs to happen.
the u.s. dropped the ball on value and leadership over the last 10 or so years because we have not been employing or policy that speaks to koreans on both sides of the peninsula or moves towards what has been stated. i'll stop and we can -- this is a huge issue. at the very least you are prepared for that. from the point of view from the department of defense, korea and japan will get everything they want. they will have straight capabilities and the alliances will be tighter than they have
the history problem continually drags down the bilateral relationship. the previous and this is something you have to translate that words translate into action. in other words, it's the approach that you want to cooperate on political security and economic matters. with japan while separately discussing the history issues.
the countries play and the choices before. the contest now, political economic incentives for japan has relatively -- decreased as is china plays a big power and economic benefits and incentives for cooperation in japan has been declined as the japanese economy. that's the intriguing need for bilateral cooperation for a multilateral contest.
they are not in the bilateral contest, but the trilateral contest. that's very important. that's the lingering problem derived from history between korea and japan. how you get over this. the issue of pe rrennial proble. trilateralism is good for and crucial for north korea and handling the issues. if that is erected to china and containing china, this is what
regime, but you have a liberal regime that has been established and has been severely disrupted by the new american american government who ordered and also indicating repeal of korea. the countries really need to develop cooperative action. for the region and sustaining the liberal trade regime here in the region. we need to reactivate or multilateral free trade negotiations and also tpp minus alpha whatever you call it.
coming up. and we have to make a decision after that. it's going to be very interesting to see whether moon will continue to keep this pragmatic approach or he catered to the pop lift in demands for renegotiation or the harder approach. >> thank you. thank you all for concise and precise web of relations and the geopolitics. a number of issues came up that i call tactical or operational or means rather than ends. several speakers said that's the most important thing.
these are all mechanisms. and i top the see if there is a divergence. and some of the big questions about what we want. what koreans want from the u.s.-china relationship. i want to ask the americans, what do we want from korea's relationship with china. these are the unspoken sources of doubt and none of us are in the government now and probably don't have to worry about that happening any time soon. i think we can try to put them out candidly.
rules and storms that we believe will continue the peace, prosperity and security of the region. i don't believe -- i know that is extraordinarily s operational and there are a lot of terms of the vision that i believe is in our of our interest. >> anybody want to add or subtract or disagree? you didn't mention the u.s.-korea alliance. >> should he? >> yes, that should have been implied. by continuing to be carrying forth the rules, norms, values. to me that is absolutely tied up directly with the u.s.-korea alliance. the security region there are conversations that could be had about the particulars of the security aspects of the alliance would look like. i see no future for the region. and the rules, norms and
unification under the democratic rule. >> you pay lip service and we say korea, let's not deal with the humanitarian issues. let's deter and coerce them. let's have them make a big concentration camp in the country. i have one thing for that. for now, as china and forget how we view china. china views us, but in terms of trying to get to the maritime
power, long time alliance with unified korea because it should be to hold the line. >> integrated with asia open by rule of law. as the ultimate end state we are aiming for. >> of course. this is such a word like a sacred word. if you talk about the unification, you have the benefits. the former president park with
the jackpot. i want to quote this west germany's foreign minster. once he said in the interview, he is called like a kissinger in west germany. he said i never worried about reunionification officially. it can be considered as a experience that they give the upper hand. unification is far away and not too extreme. in between peace management versus balance.
>> is it accommodating things like that or is this the way it's going to be. trying to get the liability to feel so much pain with the relationship of north korea. not talking about end states. if you were there, you would get the focus on end states. but the deal with china at the end of the day would have to be -- you know where this is
headed. this is punishing you terribly. we have to get much tougher on the kinds of sanctions and money we go after in china. that's doable. this militarization. japan would strike capabilities and korea is going to happen. you know, china is saying now, if there is enough the deal is the deal. we will help get rid of him and give him a nice villa or whatever with dennis rodman as his companion. whatever it takes to -- then comes the trade off. if we do that, which i think we should do, it will be more difficult to get an ally. you may get a unified democratic korea with no wmd. it might be a tougher negotiation.
including our own aversion to taking on chinese state owned enterprises that are not directly in north korea, but whose sister organizations also supported by the party are. the ccp would have to feel like this is the biggest risk of my ability before they face. >> i don't disagree with the direction and the tactics that they had.
i think that's certainly what we need to be pursuing. i have always been of the strong view that this is not -- u.s. and chinese interests when it comes to north korea are never going to align and it's not a problem that they can outsource to china and that will continue to be the case and be active. i'm not convinced that we can shift them far enough. i think we talk a lot about the concerns about the peninsula and not wanting to have troops north of parallel and all that. i think one of the things we forget is the chinese are a communist party and state and they are a communist party leadership. there is something that is actually regime-threatening to the ccp about supporting a regime change in the north. i think that's something that is existential and i don't know that that can ever be something
they can be reassured on. i think much greater pain on the chinese is necessary in part because it will at some point have i hope a strategic effect in china. part of the reason we have never been able to turn the screws tight enough is we have never been able to go after them. they were saying i just add one final point. not that i have any views on this, but it's important when we talk about these things, and i know dan was not implying we would do this without our colleagues at the table, but the idea has been floated by some in the past of a u.s.-china direct dialogue to sort this out that would bring in seoul. it's important that the idea of nothing about us without us is incorporated into any conversation around this. seoul has to be a part of this. >> let me hear from my
colleagues and we will wrap up. >> i agree with her. they welcome structured. we can all see this is the structures. between the u.s. and china. we are actually witnessing so hard for the u.s. and china can cooperate to solve the problem. i talked about this today. a lot of test cases. that can be the test case, i think. at this moment i don't think this one man's decision cannot see this. the strong leadership and the nationalism and putin and everybody.
politics affects international politics more than the other. vice-versa. it's not easy to do that. i think we need the trade offs. what kind of trade offs they can exchange. that's the consent of koreans. >> you are concerned the u.s. will give away too much. >> of course. always. and what it's about. the negotiation and the end of a deal. >> just to push on that, would it be better if dan blumenthal's
idea was put in a box and they don't have a dialogue. >> of course, they have too, but the problem is how to communicate between the united states and south korea well. >> the lowest point. >> that's very important. whenever we have a dialogue between south korea and china, we have to have a communication with the united states. >> it's a mixed mat.
>> you live between push and in some ways even better those. that's not in the same philosophical, but it's a mixed bag and certainly on the strategic question. i don't know that they even raised it. >> high level, yes, but the lower level is not there yet. >> we are showing them the way with the panel. >> you get the last word at this point. >> that's in the region. i think it is useful for the
stakeholders in the region to be able to establish an economic network, for example. we had tpp or ourselves. it is important that china create japan and the middle powers will be able to the united states will be able to come in and in terms of regi regional, we have to look at security issues that expect to have more harmonious regional networks.
>> the reason i'm pushing on this with the panel is because and i personally think one of the most important variables with the debate and within beijing will be in the long-term strength and if the u.s. and rok appeared to be diverging, we are going to enable chinese decision makers to avoid decisions or empower those within beijing who think time is on their side. in the long run, they will have an influence over north and south korea to control them in bay ways that favor chinese power at the expense of the united states. and so we can have disagreements, but i think it's important and vital for the u.s. and korea to have this dialogue
as we have and to make it clear that while we may have tactical differences, there is no end on the peninsula. the problem with making thad or dialogue or specific things too much of debate. i personally don't believe that. and by the way with japan. you will agree that often people viewing the peninsula often in tokyo think the u.s.-korean alliance is much more wobbly in the long run and there is much less solidarity in our vision as
is the case. it's important that we have these dialogues. let me turn to the audience and come back to the panel and take questions from you. we have microphones, lisa. and matthew and company. raise your hand and i will call on you. no speeches, please. right up here in front. microphone is coming. >> hi, i write for the korea center for investigative journalism. i have a question for the korean panelists. i spent a few months in south korea over the last few years and i have never heard koreans talk about forced unification under south korea. i hear koreans talk about wanting to visit their families and wanting to have unification in some way. not forced unification under
u.s. pressure with u.s. troops throughout korea. and american troops. it's a good question. we are talking about the end state here. we are trying to talk about the end state and the tactics and media policies. let's ask if the panelists want to answer how they are politically. the opinion polls show there is no census on this at all.
everyone talks about president trump and the koreans talk about fire and damage and the picture is that president trump talks about bringing fire and damage to north korea and everybody speaks about the ability of north korea to rain rockets down on seoul and have a tremendous casualty rate. the second issue that is not talking about, but thought about is the idea that this may be china. the question, how did that feel. is there a possibility of the fire and damage and is there possibility of a quiet career and u.s. agreement to perhaps
knock the agreement or knockout the nuclear facility before it creates something. >> i guess you mean a preemptive strike. >> whether that's a concern and whether it is a policy. >> is there a possibility of a preemptive military strike. is there a possibility of china taking care of the problem for us? >> it's an interesting point you raise. this is not a static issue by any stretch. unification or changes one way or another are going to happen, i think either because of the intense pressure by a global embargo that cracks the kim regime if we do all these things that everyone else adjusts.
china is going to go in and take care of this. i think none of us have a doubt about that. and china, part of the reason that china invested so heavily in north korea. carving out a sphere of influence and the panel decided they are right or not. they have the national interest while we get our act together and if kim starts to crack, they may do things unilaterally and we have to be prepared for unification and collapse no
kind of options. and china these days increased the preparation to control or manage the north koreans. close to the chinese border. they are doing exercise. they won't take that kind of actions. with that consensus or agreements and they will be taking that initiative. this is my kind of question. >> well, let's answer the question briefly. basically i agree with dan. it's unlikely. your question is, is the u.s.
capable of pretemptive strike. do we know where everything is, the answer is absolutely not. a preemptive strike would be less than effective in terms of eliminating the programs and the threat. that said, i believe that if hillary clinton were president or jeb bush or marco rubio, they would also be sending a very, very tough message and deploying strategic options. clearly even though kim jung un may have capabilities, it hoz not changed the fundamental
commitment to defend the korean interests and we are fully prepared as the chief of staff said to go to war. it doesn't chance that at all. a lot of the saber rattling as you see as a little bit of a world wrestling feel when it comes out of twitter is i think probably the kind of prudent messaging that you have done at this point. we will go ahead. you cannot put his words aside. i can confirm that all of those options that you laid out would have in fact been part of or in the planning and transition documents for the clinton administration.
it has to be credible and has to be clear. what has worried me about what we have seen. it has been mixed and not clear. nobody knew what fire and fury meant and locked and loaded meant. nobody really knows what many of these things mean. i'm not even sure the president himself knows what he means by that. that's incredibly dangerous. i worry about not actually either north korea to mean the action. what i worry about is miscalculations and two scenarios worry me the most is and because of a lack of clarity that something is said that is misinterpreted potentially in pyongyang. something is said that leads him to believe that a u.s. strike is
imminent. kim jung un acts out of what he believes to be preemption. scenario number two is one of the pacts is why it's considered to be so dangerous. and not going to use it, but it's much more and north korea with conventional action. some other kind of activity. i think we have seen the risk of that go up incredibly as this capability developed. in time when messaging is unclear and there is a high risk of miscalculation, this is why the alliance coordination is of utmost importance right now. what we can't have is for a scenario like that take place where the u.s. and korea don't
have a clear expectation of what the response is going to be and who will be back. >> and the credibility question where i thought we might be going, we have decimated our military for the last we have designate mated our military to the point where it will take a long time for the bill to get back up. for those who argue for a containment deterrent strategy, we're well behind the curve on missile defense decimated in the last eight years. well behind the curve on everything from tactical aircraft to long range strategic bombers. actually that's one of the legacy's, i think, that hurts us the most over the last eight years. i don't see any improvement along the way.
south koreans are asking for all kinds of assets to be put in place. they'll probably get them there, but at a huge risk to other parts of the world. i think that's not discussed enough. i think the president and congress has chance to fix this. >> koramerican people are surprd korean people are so calm in the crisis. this crisis not different from old.
>> i think most korean issue now we are entering a new phase in which united states takes this as a national security issue. it's not only the national security problem. that security problems but also it's about economic problem of north korea and human rights problems and many other things together. we have to solve not just north korean nuclear problems but north korean problems per se. then the surgical strike where
this military action is a partial solution but not the ultimate solution. kind of giving you interest between south korea, south korean people and american strategies. >> laura's worried -- eng we're in agreement the posture was ini inevitable. the tweets and the policy are a problem. you're worried that kim jong you think -- kim jong-un may believe it. i'm worried he won't.
there are, i remember well. there were some pretty big disagreements between the two president. for president bush's part he never voiced them in public. i think president trump will have to and his team will have to and maybe this most recent phone call is the beginning of that exhibit a lot more discipline in terms of how we talk about our ally. as we were talking about to the extent the other big players, china, you mentioned russia and japan, the other big players are on the peninsula thinks the appliance are applian align are not flux.
>> i don't think the declaratory policy has been a -- i think that there's inconsistencies in timing with the rest of it. we have no idea. that's very scary. we had some sense. even then it was near misses. >> i'm not saying that at all. >> i understand that. what we need to do and done effectively is scare china.
i've never seen china this scared on this issue before in my life. what we need to do to get to the strategic end state, in my view, that we all agreed here on unification is to have china very, very scared and on its heels about what we're going to do and what we're capable of doing. >> motivated china. fear of a u.s. attack does that. another thing that does that is a recognition contrary to some expectations u.s. alliances are getting stronger, not weaker. there's a tension between those two. if the belligerent rhetorical line is not credible or if it creates tensions with seoul, then we may win in the short term being scary about
preemptive strike but lose in the longer term. that's a very subtle balancing act. why these two presidents have got to get in lock step and our two governments have got to be on one page on this going forward. we can do this further. this is really interesting. we've had some big disagreements but some really strong agreements on the future we have for the korean peninsula. it's been really good panel. i appreciate it. we get a 15-minute break? >> we have a 15-minute coffee break. everybody reconvene at 2:45. thank you for our panelist.
we have to be sure that we get the best value for the health care dollars we currently spend and that we do the best job we can to reform the system so that health care is delivered more efficiently at higher quality to all americans. the simple fact is that americans are spending nearly now $1 trillion a year on health
care. we are not getting our money's worth. >> whether it happened 30 years ago or 30 minutes ago. find it in c-span's video library at cspan.org. c-span where history unfolds daily. >> tonight on c-span 3, a look at additional sanctions against north korea for its access to foreign financing. last week the u.n. security county approved sanctions against north that imposed a ban