tv Japans Defense Strategy CSPAN September 28, 2017 11:09pm-12:46am EDT
of the 2017 book festival, starting at noon eastern. michael eric dyson discussing his book "tears we cannot stop." laura jacobs with her book "you're in the wrong bathroom." and andrea mitchell, "invisible no more." robin spencer with "the revolution has come." devon allen, author of "a beautiful getto." watch our coverage, saturday, starting at noon eastern on c-span 2's book tv. retired japanese officers talked about the future of japan's military and efforts to
strengthen the u.s.-japan alliance, cybersecurity. the discussion is an hour and a half. good morning. welcome. this is the annual event that japan program hosts to invite strategic thinkers in japan to whom we often don't get to listen to here in washington. and this year, i am extremely honored to have these three self-defense members. they have taught me so many things in the ten, 15 years that
i've nope th i've known them. so i'm very glad they've agreed to come to washington and talk to us this morning. you have the detailed bio in your seats. but i have quickly, to my might left, to your right, is general iwata. and next to him is admiral takei. and the far end of the podium, lieutenant general hironaka. they are here to explain the importance of the self-defense forces. and we will listen to what they have in mind about future, japan's defense posture. before i start i'm a director of japan program here. i'm yuk ey
i'm yukie tatsumi. this event could not have happened without a lot of the sponsors and supporters of the japan program. i would very much like to thank all of the japan program supporters at this occasion. you can see the list of supporters at the back of this brochure. hopefully this will grow over the years. a couple of administrative announcements before we start the program. first of all you all picked -- some of you picked up the simultaneous translation headset 6 headset. if you haven't done so and you need one, there are ones right outside of this room. channel 2 is english and channel 10 is japanese. the speakers are going to speak in japanese so you'll probably need -- most of you will probably need the head sets and get to channel number two.
if you haven't done so please do so at this time while i'm stretching my time making these announcements. you'll also notice that you see a note card and a pen or pencil in your seat to conduct the q and a session more efficiently. i usually do this only for this event. but as you listen to the speakers, a question that pops up in your head, please do write them down. stimson staff will go through to collect them from you. finally, the head sets, when you leave this room, please leave it in your seat. we're going to get charged for any lost equipment. it is very important. these are expensive. please help us.
and this is how we are going to do, the first half an hour, 45 minutes i will pose them a couple of questions and ask their responses and after i go through those couple of questions we are opening up the floor to your questions and their feed backs. so with that i will go ahead and start with the first question. so first question to each one of you. so since the prime minister abe came into the office, he promoted the peace and security legislation. under his watch japanese government had reinterpreted the constitutional interpretation of
whether japan can exercise the right of collective defense or not. so from outside, particularly here in washington, it looks to us like that there are great changes that are happening on the legal foundations and policy orientations. and in the way that how japan engages with the international community in the area of international security in particular. and how does that, how does that look to you? do you, do you feel that japan should reorient in a very different way from it has been doing so this the last seven years, the way that it engages with the world in the realm of security, security policy? he'll start from you general iwata, and then i think i'll go down the aisles. [ speaking in japanese ]
>> translator: before i answer this question, there are two things that i would like to say on behalf of myself and my colleague, colleagues. the first is that recently there have been two marine disasters near japan, the "john mccain" and "fitzgerald" had accidents near our country, and as a result, 17 sailors perished. and as a representative of the japan self-defense forces, i would like to express my condolences. their wonderful contribution has helped to maintain peace in our region and has also helped to bolster our national security. so i would like to, once again,
express my thanks to the united states for its work and also to express my condolences for these irreplaceable lives that were lost. that's the first thing i wanted to say. the second is ms. tatsumi has been supporting us for a number of years in self-defense forces and japan as a whole, so's wonderful that we have an opportunity to spend time with you today. the three of us are graduates of the national defense academy, and we have had long relationship with ms. tatsumi. also stimson center has been very, played a large contribution to allowing us to have direct talks in the exchanges of views and i'd like to once again express my thanks
to ms. tatsumi for everything she has done. and as far as the question we were just asked, my thought is that the leadership of prime minister abe has really helped to change our posture through legal measures and through his idea of a peaceful corrective contribution to peace. and we who have served in the self-defense forces feel that our constitution is something that of course we need to protect, but it is something something of a check on what we can do, but it is important for us to pursue corrective contribution to peace and the fact that we've had new, a new
interpretation of our constitution allows us to change our stance on what it is we can do, in other words, it's been changed in security legislation. further, as far as what we can do, we have been able as a result of some of the changes brought about by the abe administration to do more to support the united states. so these, we're able to do things that we were not able to do up until now because of the checks placed by the contribution. further, japan, with its article ix of its constitution was not allowed to use force. and some people misunderstand and think that we now will be using force, but that is not the case. the constitution has not changed. we will not use force outside of japan. there's no change in our stance. so it may look as though there hasn't been much change in our
constitution, in our room for operation. but some people may also think why is it that there's so much discussion in japan. and what i can tell you is that our public sentiments are still not completely mature, i think. we don't know exactly how it is that we should act, how it is that we should be on the international stage. and what it is that we should do to maintain peace. should we do something outside of japan to try to maintain global peace, and i think that the change in security legislation has, will allow us now to play a larger role than we could up until now. some of the media in japan wants to try to lead people in
thinking that there will be a change in our constitution, that there will be a dangerous path from here on. but that is not the case. we have not had, really, an adult conversation in japan yet about this. so i think that we've had a couple steps forward as a result of the abe administration. so i think that's one thing that i would like to have you understand. as far as i'm concerned, i am distinguished national fellow of the navy. and up until now, i have been in a position where i have had to keep from criticizing the united states, but now that i am academic, i do have more of a leeway to express myself fully. and as far as the question that ms. tatsumi asked about japan's
national security policies, whether this has changed or not, i think that the ldp and the, and its com eteito coalition partners have, it looks like they have changed their stance, but, if you look from a different angle, what you can see is that things have not changed drastically. it's just that during the democratic party of japan government, there was not much progress in terms of our legislation relating to national security. and basically, i think what has happened is that there has been a little bit of a change, such that we are able to apply our security legislation, policies in a different way. and with the three years over
the democratic party of japan's rule, there were a many in of different things that happened. i don't think that the dpj was able to respond effectively to a number of different things. one thing i can point to is the fact that the dpj government released the captain of a chinese fishing vessel that caused an accident near our land. the other thing is the east great japan earthquake and the nuclear incident at fukushima. i don't think the government responded effectively. and so the, this has, this basically set the stage for a change in government. how is it that japan will change its stance on security issues? one thing is if you look at the guideline, it's easy to understand the guideline itself was published in 19 -- 1978 for the first time, and it set out
the road map for the guidelines for cooperating with the united states under the aegis of our alliance. and in 1997, this was revised. and then it was, from 1993 to 1994, there was the first nuclear crisis in the korean peninsula. so there was a discussion about what it is we should do to support the united states in the case of a contingency or crisis around us. so the guideline was revised with that in mind. and then in 2005, there was another revision of the guideline and in 2015, rather, this was revised after the earthquake and sidal watidal wa fukushima, so there was not just a matter in the crisis in the environment around us but also what we can do to respond to domestic issues, and this led to
discussion of joint, more joint planning. and from here on out, how is it that japan should be involved in its national security, and what sort of policies should it pursue? and one thing i think that we need to do is to continue to apply our policies as we have in the past. one thing i can say is that in 2015, the revision of the guideline, i think that probably will have to revise as a result of what's happening in north korea in or rather it's possible in the future, japan, north korea might have missiles, might be able to have nuclear weapons. that sort of thinking did not exist when guidelines were revised. so there's a question about whether the most recent revision still is in line with the times or not. and so i think that this is something that we are going to
need to think about. and i think there are three points to consider in this regard. the first is the forward deployed forces of the united states, account united states and japan have interoperable planning or not, and with north korean missiles, we need to have a 24-hour operation that will allow us to respond to any crisis that might emanate from the korean peninsula, and we need to look at what we can do to cooperate more in a three-party-type situation with south korea. and so what it is that we can do together with not only the u.s.-japan but u.s., japan and
korea. the other thing i should talk about is that there is a limit to what forward deployed forces of the united states can do. and therefore japan, which is an ally country of japan and south korea, they should work together so together move forward. how we maintain the presence in western pacific. i think cooperation is really needed in that regard. as i mentioned, around the korean peninsula long term, defense posture needs to be reinforced. from that perspective, the, it is of course, japan must reenforce. and so assure the aegis assure. i think is very important to be deployed. and thirdly, in order to reduce u.s. burden, japanese engagement in the region, we need to revise
our postures again. and the burden which is currently borne by the united states in order to reduce that, we should take more initiative in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. there is a good possibility of the i think we should discuss this with u.s. forces in order to have a better coordination between japan and united states. and i think that would be the new way for japan to engage in this region. >> translator: thank you very much for this opportunity. in washington d.c. i was a research fellow in think tank in d.c. and for the two years, i was involved in the project to think about u.s. foreign policy, and from different think tanks of the washington, d.c., i was
invited to attend the symposium, and i mostly turned down, and i returned to japan. and then i got invitation from tatsumi sa tatsumi-san, and of course i could not turn down that request. and ms. tatsumi, before answering her questions, i would like to talk about how the alliance between the two countries should work. in 1954, the sdf was established. the ground self-defense force in 1950, one year before the korean war, it was started as a reserve of the police force. and the two years before the maritime started. but the self-defense forces, the 73 years ago, in 1954, the self-defense forces, 63 years ago?
no, that was started formally. and after that, there is a good development of the sdfs. but if i may summarized briefly, during the cold war era, in 1989, there was collapse of berlin wall, the cold war collapsed. however, even after that, the sdfs, together with the u.s. forward deployment forces in order to keep their presence, including logistical activities have been making great efforts, particularly the maritime and air self-defense forces, and the ground self-defense forces in order to put emphasis on the northern area, including hokkaido presence increased. and both surveillance and air activities have increased. and we have been fighting
together. that's what i would like to stress. for terror and other measures, the american bases in japan, we have been presenting thootectins together. there has been some sign of changes. and the sdf have come to the point where we really need to adjust our roles. and in 2015, the legislation was formulated. and of during the peacetime. i think we all incorporated into what we can do during the peacetime in that legislation. an emergency or contingency in order for the sdf to play the role of more appropriately, there are more things to be done. so we have come to the point where we really think about those points more seriously.
>> i think that's a great segue into the second question i have for all of you. we talked about the, how japan had responded and adjusted to the changes in international security environment and which resulted in the internal changes that you all laid out. so, in that context, just as, just as general hironaka pointed out. if the self-defense forces is at the phase, indeed, to really, we think, about how to posture selv to respond to such changes, what kind of a defense posture should the self-defense force look for? looking over next ten, 15, 20 years? i guess i will start again from you general iwata and go down perhaps.
of. >> translator: thank you very much. the ever changing security environment that ms. tatsumi mentioned, in order to share the concept together, as of four years ago, as the government, there was a cabinet decision that was the national defense program guideline, that is a program for the next ten years. and i'd like to touch upon that. and, when we think about the changing security environment, north korea, china and russia, those are very important factors to take into consideration. seven or eight years ago the, we thought that north korea was the crisis there. and china is the crisis in near future. and russia was the crisis in distant future. that was our interpretation seven or eight years ago. but over the last four to five
years, i think there has been some change in the, our perception. and the north korea, this is exactly the immediate, imminent threat. and china, i think the threat for the near future and the russia, unless you watch closely, it will be very dangerous. i think those are the changes of perception about the crisis. and four years ago, under those circumstances, in order to respond to the change of the crisis, they integrated defense posture. so, in other words, at the southwestern islands, which was a vacuum that is the, from the south of kyushu to taiwan. and the china called it the first island chain from okinawa to the southwestern islands. and the taiwan and philippines. and that is the first island change. and 1,400 kilometer distance.
in this region. and there, the ground self-defense forces of 2,500, the force were deployed in the area coming into taiwan, there were no force. so there was a vacuum of the forces. in this region and the first that vacuum historically, when you consider china over the 50 or 100 years, china has been building up their strengths, and we can see the south china sea. so without creating the vacuum of the force, we have to really build up our force structure. so is that the concept from four to five years. the vacuum area of the southwestern islands, we decided to build up and strengthen our, the power. and there are three things. the first is the, we have a
standing force near thhere in t region. and second strateage is when th is any emergency or contingency here, new force will be injected, and the force will be injected in order to eliminate the vacuum in this southwestern area, in order to strengthen the deterrence. so those are the two ways to increase deterrence. and in third stage, still, some island is taken by the opponent, we have to take it so the new force for that purpose is created. so those are three phases in order to fill the gap of the vam -- vacuum of the southwestern ooi islands in order to build up the defense. that started three years a we
are in the fourth year. so we are still in the midway, but there is help for u.s. forces. this program has been under way steadily. >> translator: in japan our attempt to maintain the status quo, there are revisionists in our neighborhoods who are trying to change the status quo, but in order to keep the status quo, what is it that we need to do? . the maritime self-defense forces is thinking about what japan needs to do to be able to maintain it. and as far as mayritime self-defense is concerned, what i'd like to say is that we want to have two kinds of deterrents. one is deterrence by punishment, one is deterrence by denial. and these two kinds of
deterrents would allow us to maintain the status quo. another thing is that india and the pacific ocean, in order to maintain the status quo here, we need to have sufficient forces. the third is to have a strong u.s.-japan alliance and wian the self-defense forces, the maritime self-defense forces must do their part in order to maintain a strong alliance with the united states. as far as deterrence is concerned, people often think about nuclear weapons. but there are two kinds of nuclear weapons. one is tactical and one is strategic. we are dependent on the united states for nuclear deterrence. and what japan can do is maintain deterrence with conventional weapons. in order to do that, japan needs to strengthen its forces and
also japan has, needs to be able to maintain and strengthen its deterrence by denial. and as i said earlier about north korea and the change of situation there, what is it that we can do to respond to that? what we need to do is to strengthen our cooperation with the united states in our region. one other thing is the reactive versus proactive deterrence. up until now, the self-defense forces, especially the maritime self-defense forces had reactive deterrence. and what reactive deterrence means is that if something happened we would be able to respond. we have the ability to respond, and so that would include the
our vessels and our planes. one thing is antisubmarine warfare. in order to respond to something with a submarine. we would look at that threat. we would sink the ship that was posing a threat. that's sort of reactive. but proactive defense has to do more with gray zone operations. for instance, always having sufficient information. also to have a situation awareness under the sea and on top of the sea, and if there were a crisis, we would be able to use that in order to gain the advantage if hostilities were to break out. and so this sort of proactive deterrence is something that i think we need to enhance for the self-defense forces in the
future. >> maritime perspective. so i'm hoping to hear your perspective, general hironaka. >> translator: okay, then i will talk about the air self-defense forces. the u.s. air force was set up in 1947. and we have only had an air force since 1954. and the imperial army did have an air force component. it was set up in 1910. that was the first time in which we had an air force in japan. and in 1945, we lost or the end of world war ii, and that was the end of our air force. so we really only had this new air force for a relatively short period of time.
it's been 35 years since our air force was set up. so, in order for us to have an organization that can fight effectively, we need to keep in mind the fact that there's not much history to our air force. and the united states air force really was also set up after world war ii. and so what is it that, what kind of role should our forces play in the air? basically, it is to support operations on the ground and on the sea. there are many different discussions about this in various ideas. perhaps the air forces should be more independent. they should have their own planning, their own operations. some people have that sort of view on things. and this was tried during the
persian gulf war. and so we need to get this historical perspective in mind in whee think about what it is that the air forces should do. i think that one thing is that the air force needs to have extremely advanced technology at its hands. and the air self-defense forces, what is it that we need to do? and, as far as the two ideas about protecting the southwest asian southwest islands and enhancing our deterrence, i think that air self-defense forces fit into here, having especially a deterrent effect. the idea of having strategic nuclear weapons in japan is not something we're considering now, but our air self-defense forces is charged with protecting the country with conventional weapons. and so how is it that we can
enhance deterrence with conventional weapons? this is something we really need to consider. and so this is, i think, the thing that is really at the center of what it is that we need to think about. >> they're writing their questions done. so if the stimson person can start can collecting the cards. have them, if you have the card already filled up, wave to these would t two people and they will come get your card and give it to me. thank you. up to here, we talked about how japan should engage in the world and what type of defense posture is appropriate for the self-defense force to adequately provide a national defense. but when you think about these goals, what are the challenges that you see? either internally or externally? and then i think for the last question, i think i might flip the order, and if that's okay, i
would like to start from general hironaka and come down to general iwata. >> translator: as i said earlier, since the beginning of the self-defense forces, we've had quite an abrupt difference from the imperial army. we've had a very close cooperation with the united states also. we have had our thinking, our tactics, our technology and our logistical support in all of these areas, our self-defense forces function as a defense force of a democratic country, and we've learned a lot from the united states in that regard. the united states really helped us to build up our forces and i think that we need to think from here on out what it is that we
can do to have joint planning with the united states. to have better planning with our wonderful friends in the unit. i think it's the most important thing that we need to think about. >> translator: let me talk a little bit more in abstract terms. unfortunately, this will be a little bit abstract. i think one thing we need to do is to make sure that we are aware of the situation, have a good take on the situation. we, there are, have been huge changes in the international security arena. and what is it that japan needs to do to respond to this? we really need to have a clear view of what's happening, and we need to try to have a better clear view of what's happening. as i said earlier, the
guidelines that are currently in place may not be sufficient to deal with today's reality, so these might need to be revised. we need to know, we need to have a clear take on what's happening and use that for our, the course in which we're going to proceed. there is another static way that we have come to understand the shortfall and also war game, which is dynamic. so those are the ways that we have to make more efforts, and i think general iwata will talk about this more. so in a statistic, in a static way, japan has not been very eager up to this point. so we have to reenforce the static method of net assessment and also in both public and private, we should share the crisis, the consciousness and
awareness, and as a nation, we have a national council. and so that could fare the nation properly. so now we are able to turn to the same future and we are able to move ahead together. and the private sector should also involve in order to have a break through in a crisis situation in the security environment in order to address all different kind of crisis. how to resolve the private and the public that work together in the next to japan we do have a country which can handle this very well. one country in government is able to control the resources, time and energy freely, including the private sector. so just like the south china sea
reclamation in 1970, the reclamation by china start. but when the timing arose e t, actually created the artificial island in a very speedy manner. so resource could be used under government discretion very freely by our neighbor. so in order for japan to respond, i think the public and private should work together to make inroads moving to the same direction. and the sense the change is so rapid now, japan-u.s. alliance needs to be maintained in a very robust manner. and rather than overdepending on unit, wh united states, what japan can do, if you think about maritime self-defense force, the we learn from the u.s. navy. we introduce new equipment.
and also learn from new tactics from u.s. navy. and but now time has changed. the maritime self-defense force together with navy, we have to develop a new equipment, new tactics. and we have to think together how to fight the war. and i think that's what u.s. navy wants us to do, if that is a different, i would like you to tell us. but so in the asia-pacific region, the relative u.s. influence, not absolute, but relative of the influence has been in decline, at least in our perception has been in decline. so now maritime self-defense force together with navy, we should make joint efforts to keep the u.s. presence in this region. in other words, we should make up for some of the shortfall for u.s. forces. and that is the purpose of the alliance, and i think we should work together for that purpose.
>> translator: from my side, as i siaid, we need to understand the current status. so when four years ago when we created the national defense program guideline, although the victor, the direction is the same, but the pace of change has been accelerated. if you think about north korea, the other day, the second time that their missile flew over hokkaido, so missile and the nuclear threat is real one. so for over the last three years, the threat has increased. so we do need to challenge this and make efforts for that purpose. and china's aggressive, the stance in south china sea. and from east china sea, for the first time, the passing the
strait of miyako moved to the pacific ocean in a very rapid pace, the fleet has become more aggressive. so aid to a.d., this strategy, they have already demonstrated by using their own activities enable in the air farcorce. the other change is u.s., there is a change of u.s., the strategy. and so vis-a-vis aid to a.d. in order to come to that, the
first of the first island chain. we will treat the u.s. forces to the east of guam. and the first island chain defense is left up to the alliance, allied countries. in using long-distance strike try to contain china. we heard that that strategy has been currently studied. if that strategy becomes reality, as mr. takei mentioned, so how we should strongly defend the first island chain. so i think over the last four years, that's what we really study from now. so with all those changes, the japan had come to the point of revising the national defense program guideline since four years ago the situation has changed. and in order to adapt ourself to the new change, new revised national defense guideline should be put in place, and
vis-a-vis the minister onodera, i think government will be thinking about this. but my personal view is that the bmd, should be further imposed so aegis and those alone cannot withstand the many attacks from north korea. and therefore, in order to further strengthen japanese capability, the aegis assure needs to be deployed. and government already announced that that would be deployed very soon. and that should be done quickly. and towards china, the defense of the southwestern islands, the three, the services of japan have done that, but we should reenforce that. and with the third set of
strategy, if there is a retreat of the u.s. forces to guam. >> the defense of the first islands should step up efforts, defend this. and as mr. takei mentioned, we should never forget the standpoint of further enforcing japan-u.s. alliance. and there is the bilateral planning. in other words, on a very equal basis. we should consider a japan-u.s. forces together. and four years ago, the guideline was the established. and i didn't think that the total alignment of japan-u.s. forces was not done under that guideline. and so the, well, after two years, we had a guideline u.s.-japan cooperation.
but i think they should have been done together because mission capability should be carried out in joint consultation meetings. and then in order to introduce the bmd, not only in the conception, but strike the, against the enemy base, the u.s. has been the sword and japan has been the shield. that is mission role capability, the sword and the shield between japan and united states, but we need to think about this once again. so the part of the strike capability on the enemy bases can be owned by japan. and so in other words, i think we need to have a more good alliance of the strategy between japan and united states. i think that importance will further increase between japan and united states. and mr. takei said the net assessment or mission assessment
so i think we need to further study the mission assessment. and america has created the vision and the assessment office has implemented this and make it more concrete. and has formulated policies whenever the contingencies occur. and there is no net assessment of sasb. so now we need of to create those, because we are counsel tir pa -- counterpart with united states. we should have a better realignment between japan and united states in order to consider the full structure. >> thank you. there is actually a member from csb in the audience. they should be grateful for the
prop he just gave them. from here i'm going to open up the floor for questions and answers. general iwata kind of stole my first question. especially given yesterday's missile launch by north korea, there were a lot of questions on north korea. particularly focussing on the potential for japan to have a counterattack capabilities. and do you support it, there were very direct questions about shouldn't japan have a tomahawk? we've already heard general iwata's thought on it. so let me start by continuing on that line and ask general takei and admiral here nironaka if yoe additional thought on whether japan should be considering counterattack capability. or in case of a jmsdf, something
of a little more drastic like tomahawk. general, you're spared from this. because of' alreayou've already. it's up to the three of you. [ speaking in japanese ] >> translator: having the ability to attack enemy bases, counterattack capability. when you think about ballistic missile defense, i think there are three important things. the first is to enhance our ability to strike down a missile. and that has to do with the aegis piece. and also deterrence. to be able to strike enemy missile bases. another thing is that we have