tv Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Policy CSPAN January 11, 2018 12:02pm-1:32pm EST
not even half the battle. long-term sustainable ends of conflicts demand political agreements. >> we are going to leave this portion of the senate foreirela committee. if you'd like to see it, go to our website c-span.org. type i.c.e. in the search box. going to go live to the heritage foundation for a discussion on the possibility of israeli, palestinian peace, also expected to discuss u.s. policy relevant to the process and the broader middle east region. live here on c-span3. >> italy and the southern europe task force command. join me in welcoming luke covey. . >> thank you, john. welcome, everyone, here to the heritage foundation this afternoon to discuss a very important and timely matter
about the israeli/palestine crisis and the recent announcement about the move of the embassy to jerusalem. so the timing couldn't have worked out better in terms of this event and the president's announcement. it's my pleasure to introduce ron desantis, a native floridian who has bed in congress since 2013. prior to election, he served as a j.a.g. officer in the navy deploying to iraq income 2007 during the troop surge, as an adviser to the u.s. navy seal commander in support of the seal mission in iraq and served as a jag officer at the terrorist detention center at guantanamo bay. as a former u.s. military policeman who did operations in afghanistan, i know how important the j.a.g. officer is. he is a lieutenant commander in the u.s. navy. in congress, he has been a leader on issues pertaining to national security and also an
outspoken advocate for the state of israel. as the chairman of the national security subcommittee and a member of the foreign affairs committee, he is deeply engaged in developing policies to combat foreign threats supporting our allies in middle east. he has been a key player in the discussions is your rounding the relocation of the american embassy from tel aviv to jerusalem. he also has launched the israel victory caucus to educate congress on the shared challenges faced by our nations in support of peace in israel. so it is my pleasure to welcome the congressman and please join me in introducing him. thank you. [ applause ] >> thank you. >> thank you. it's great to be here. one of the things i think that you learn around here is that there are a lot of things that just get repeated and that people will kind of just say that's conventional wisdom that really is -- has no basis in
fact and proven to not be true over and over again. one of them comes to mind, the subject of this forum here today is that you will never have peace in the broader middle east until you solve the arab/israeli conflict between israel and the palestinian arabs. until you do that, you can't do anything else. i never bought into that from the time i got to congress. and i think that there are very few members of congress who really think that that view carries water anymore. and i think the trump administration is showing that that view is not the view that really represents the reality on the ground in the middle east. it's important to think about what this administration had inherited when they took over. you had a middle east that really was in chaos. the islamist regime in iran was ascendent, flush with a lot of money due to that iranian
nuclear deal. they were fomenting problems in yemen and syria, funding groups like hezbollah and were in defacto control of baghdad in iraq. you had the emergence and growth of the terrorist group isis that happened after american troops pulled out of iraq in 2012 and, of course, the deepening conflicts in syria, yemen and really israel isolated on the world stage in part by u.s. actions such as the obama administration's pursuing u.n. resolution 2334 at the end of the administration, which really the u.n., i don't know really what they do other than attack israel. in that year, they did 24 resolutions and 20 of them were against israel. but even by the u.n.'s very, very low standards, resolution 2334 was a disgrace. it basically said that even things like the western wall
were considered occupied arab territory and that would have been something that i think almost any administration previously would have vetoed certainly this zwrigs have vetoed. so the obama i think approach was first and foremost empower iran. they bleened in a rapprochement and the ben rhodes idea they're going to turn over a new leaf with rouhani and moderation. that's what they said publicly but even people like rhodes admit that was nonsense. they believed if you empower iran that that will be better for the united states in the united states. they also did things like fail to embrace leaders who may not necessarily be our cup of tea domestically in all areas like president el sisi of egypt but who are very strong in identifying the threat posed by militant islam and somebody like see see who is a devout muslim
nevertheless wanting to be pro western in his outlook and challenging radical clerics in egypt to reform some of the teachings that incite violence against other countries or other faiths. but yet they preferred groups like the muslim brotherhood in egypt to the president el sisi and seemed to blame israel for almost every problem in the region it seems. that was one approach. i don't think it was a successful approach. i was very much as opposed to most of what the obama administration was doing from the day i got into congress. i can tell you i wish i would stand here and tell you that i was wrong about some of this stuff. i think it would be better for the country. i think the results have been sub optimal to say the least. so the trump administration has come in and and ththey've pursu different approach to the arab-israeli conflict.
when the president did the press conference with prime minister netanyahu early in his presidency, he basically said look, we want to be for israel. we'll stand by israel and what's good for israel, we're good with. it's a much different posture than saying this whole problem of middle east conflict is because someone's building an apartment in parts of jerusalem or in other parts of -- so that was refreshing to hear. now they are trying to broker a peace. i don't know what's going to happen with that. i didn't think that was worth spending capital on. it's being done from an unabashedly pro-israel perspective. i think that's a good thing. if you look at trump's tweets i guess it was last week about the palestinian incitement in support of terrorism, i don't remember very many people really -- some of us in the congress have been willing to use the power of the purse so that we're penalizing bad behavior by the palestinian arabs instead of always
rewarding it. trump said we need to stop doing this. why aren't we insisting on better behavior. we're sending hundreds of millions of dollars to the palestinian authority. but yet, after all this time, they still incite violence and hatred against the state of israel. they actually pay families of terrorists who murder israeli jews. they will name streets and sports stadiums and other public places after terrorists who commit really, really heinous acts. so you think about is that something that is causing them 0 change their behavior if you keep sending the money. so i would think that we should condition account funding on better behavior. you reward good behavior and penalize bad behavior. but that was view was voer boaten in the prior administration. trump has come out and done that and made those statements. we'll see if there's more meat on the bones. i think that would be very, very fruitful to do because when you talk about the conflict between
the arabs and israelis, the number one issue is why there's a conflict because the palestinian arabs do not recognize israel's right to exist as a jewish state in perpetuity. that is the fundamental problem. the land and all this other stuff, they don't view the israel as having a right to exist. they want potentially a deal at some point only if it's a stepping stone to israel's ultimate destruction. so for us backing an ally like zra, we should not be pressuring them to do a dethat would lead us down that road. so i think that how the trump administration has gone with this and it was flushed out when the president made his jerusalem announcement is to look at the conflict and say and trump put it this in his tweet, look, we took jerusalem off the table. i don't think it's likely we'll get a deal but i think that makes it more likely that you get a deal because people won't
be under illusions somehow israel is a transient country. with the embassy decision the president made, i thought it was one of the best speeches that i can remember an american president making. it was something i was invested in admittedly from the beginning of the president's term because had you other presidents that said hey, we're going to move the embassy. they would say the right things in front of the different interest groups. it's not -- american jews support it but american christians really support it. it's not just a jewish thing. they'll talk to evangelicals and say we're going to do it. everyone says it. bush promised it, didn't do it. clinton promised it, didn't do it. obama i find it hard to believe he meant it when he promised it. i think he said something along those lines at one point and he obviously was never going to recognize it. trump made that promise. and i think the president is somebody who he does not want to be somebody who is not following through with his word. it matters to him, his campaign,
what he campaigned on and that he's going to deliver on those things. so i thought that history would not repeat itself. i just believe that he would make the change and that he would be willing to lead on the issues. so i organized a letter at the beginning of the year where we got over 100 congressman to say mr. president-elect, when you take office, pull the trigger. let's do this. it will shake up the middle east in a positive way and show your leadership. and so he got that. but dick understand why he didn't do it on day one. you don't have your government in place yet. lord knows there weren't too many people at the state department who supported recognizing jerusalem. i understand that. i then took a trip on the national subcommittee chairman for oversight and we do a lot of embassy issues. i went to israel in march and we identified all the sites, potential sites where you could establish an american embassy. and i am engaged in this now
about what sites they're choosing and i think that we may find out very, very soon some very positive news about one of the sites we profiled. we did that. we had a huge press conference in israel. basically, there was a lot of attention to this idea. is he going to sign the waiver for stalling the jerusalem embassy act for six months. other presidents had done it. it didn't even make news when they did it. now because of the promise and because people had expectations and i was trying to heighten expectations, it was a big question whether trump was going to sign that in may or whether he would recognize jerusalem. i thought on the trip over there which coincided with the 50th anniversary of the liberation of jerusalem and reunification, he could do it then. he decided not to do it then. we weren't deterred. a big hearing with great guests like ambassador bolton and others highlighting why it would
be good for america's national security interests 0 recognize jerusalem. there were a number of components. one of them is being borne out is that when in the arab world, if you're acting swiftly and with strength, that's something that makes a big impression on a lot of those leaders even if you're acting against their interests, if you're the strong horse, that's something they respect. when you show yourself to be backing down and be a weak horse even in a way and taking a position they agree with, that causes them to wonder whether you really can keep your word or not. i think for trump's personal prestige, it was important. i think it was good for the country. the waiver decision was coming. people were asking questions. it was going to be another media event. the president to his credit pretty much all his advisers except maybe the vice president were telling him no, just sign the waiver. we don't want to ruffle any feathers or anything. from going and being briefed by people on ground with the state department and some of our other agencies, i did not find a single person in the career
civil service who said that recognizing jerusalem would be anything other than a major disaster that would cause the middle east to erupt in flames. i didn't find one person who said we could do it, it wouldn't be that big a deal. they were all saying this would be something that would cause all these problems. so i think that was reflected in the president's senior leadership because that was the information they were being given. i think they expected that and the president to his credit said, no, no, we got to deal with this. what's the plan? let's do it. he actually ended up signing a waiver but he recognized jerusalem and said i'm ordering the state department to get this done i thought was a great acof statesmanship. i'm excited if the plans that are being discussed now end up being implemented, that we could have a temporary embassy open sometime this year. so instead of saying next year in jerusalem, at least for the embassy, we can say this year in
jerusalem which would be nice. so that posture of support towards israel i think has been very, very important. i think he had the freedom to do that because the administration took a different posture towards the islamic republic of iran. trump said it was one of the worst deals ever negotiated, said it was a disaster. same thing happened in some ways with the embassy. if i said recertify, recertify, so he did it and did it again thinking what are we going to do? finally he told them hey. that decision where he wasn't going to certify under domestic law i think showed this is a president that understands the threat posed by iran and posed by the iran nuclear deal. that is music to the ears of the gulf states, places like saudi arabia, the united arab emirates fear iran's influence and do they want our embassy moved to jerusalem? no. but are they going to cry a
river over that when they need to work with us and work with israel to combat iranian influence? of course, not. their interests were to align with the united states and with israel to combat the iranian threat. and there's a lot of discussion what to do with the nuclear deal. my view is it was a bad deal, you can't keep going on the way it is because i think it leads to iranian bomb. either they cheat and get the bomb because we don't have access to all their sites like the military sites or they abide by the deal and get the bomb the next decade. either way that's bad. you have to do something different. other targeted sanctions, other provisions. but have a different policy. i still believe that. i can tell you this, what's going on in iran right now the is potentially historic. and if i could pick just one thing to have happen, you know, in the world, i don't know that i could think of too.things that would be better for peace in our
time than having those protesters overthrow this regime which is effectively an illegitimate regime which suffocate the persian culture for decades and spends most of its money on promoting terrorists. the president has come out in support, much different than the previous administration because the obama administration effectively sided with the regime in 2009 because they wanted this deal. i think that we have to use whatever tools at our disposal can be effective. want to do it smartly and strategically. i don't think we can miss this opportunity to stand behind those protesters against one of the truly evil regimes in the world. and just imagine if that regime were to collapse. we don't have to worry about -- north korea is still going to be an issue, but the most likely purchaser of their nuclear some of their nuclear arsenal is iran. they're sitting on cash and want
it. that threat would go. hezbollah's money tarts to dry up. baghdad could maybe turn and be pro western instead of an iranian climate state. yemen will cool down. syria may be able to be dealt with in a positive way. israel would lose an existential threat to its existence. the dividends in that would just be absolutely phenomenal. so i hope the administration gets more engaged in this. you don't want to do things that will undercut the protester. i've said with this decision on the nuclear deal now, i'm against the nuclear deal entirely. but i would make that decision you know, with an eye towards how that affect the facts on the ground. can the regime use a decision you make to harm what's being done there. but this is an important, important moment and we all need to stand by them. i just think that where we are now, it is this outside in
approach. i think it's much more effective. there's a lot that needs to be done. i don't see how you could look at the world after one year of trump's administration in the middle east and say that we're worse off than we were when he took office. not evening mentioning the caliphate in isis crumbling. that's obviously a major major deal. it's been an exciting year i had i in terms of international affairs. i think the president has gotten his sea legs after making some of these tough decisions. i think we can do a lot more in the upcoming several years. so it's an honor to be here. we're going to take questions. i'm happy to take questions. >> thank you, congressman, for that great overview of the current situation in the middle east especially your depth of knowledge of not only the israeli issue but the other issues facing the region and how they're connected. we do have time for a couple questions. i ask that you please identify yourself, your name, your affiliation if there is any.
please keep your question pithy so we have time for as many questions as possible. gentleman in the front, then i'll go to the gentleman behind the gentleman in the front. you first sir, right there. >> thank you for come. heritage foundation. just a question regarding north korea. can you comment on that? what's your take? it's really serious now. >> sure. obviously. i give the president credit for engaging in the issue. the prior administration just neglected and hoped it would go away. it's not going to go away. i think the fundamental issue is that kim jong-un realizes his nuclear arsenal is his ticket to survival. the pressure that's been applied although i think it's been good and helpful, i don't think has been sufficient to convince him that his current course is actually more dangerous for his survival with pursuing the weapons. if you had military political, economic pressure such that he
feared that his regime would buckle or that he would lose his grip on power, then maybe he would be willing to come to the table. we're not at that point yet. and i think it's a dangerous situation. the talks with fine they just had. i think that's probably going to be beneficial just for the olympics and maybe getting through that. we're not even sniffing any negotiations on the nuclear program right now. so that's his calculation. if we change the calculation, then you can make headway. >> the gentleman here at the microphone. >> hi, my name is ditry. to me it was disgraceful and sad that you said something as an official that is not true. the united nations did not adopt 24 resolutions in 201620 related to israel. it adopted 76 and one related to israel. >> i don't think that's right. >> you can double-check your facts. >> my question is. >> stuff's been widely reported. i don't think it's much up for
dispute. check your fact. how do you see the negotiations happening between palestine and israel? do you see it with the u.s. as a third party, as a broker between israel and palestine. >> do you see it going to more multilateral form? thank you very much. >> i don't think -- we shouldn't be necessarily a broker because i think our interests align with the state of israel. we have more affinity with israel with both our interests and our values. it doesn't mean you can't try to work constructively. i don't think we should take the posture of brow beating israel to be offering all these concessions when the palestinian arabs still will not recognize israel's right to exist as a jewish state so that to me would be a precondition for negotiations. >> the gentleman there then the lady. >>. >> my first question. >> could you please state your name, please. >> i'm just a participant.
>> okay. >> my question is that the way you were talking, can you hear? can you please speak into -- >> are you representative of u.s. congress or presenting israel, interests of israel? what i see the damage that israel has been done to all of this -- >> the question is i think do you represent the u.s. congress or the caness the. >> created against the u.s. in the war is because. >> time. we're running short. just one question. >> no, no, you've had your say. that's enough. >> thank you. >> so he mentioned my background. so i'm a military veteran. obviously swear an oath to the
constitution. of course, i represent my constituents and america's interests. i happen to think it's in america's interests to have a good relationship with countries that share our interests from a security perspective and that share our values. and israel does both of those. there's other countries in region which share our interests. may not necessarily share our values. if you listen to what i said, i said there's times you should be working with people like see see and saudi arabia to fight iranian influence. if we share neither interest nor values like with iran, it's very difficult to have any type of relationship with those countries. so it's all from the perspective of the united states. i think your question was somewhat ridiculous. >> we have time for one final one. the lady first. thank you. >> first of all, he want to thank you immensely, immensely. thank you. i want to thank president trump who i once doubted. there are millions of us who are
thrilled at what he's doing and what you're doing. two questions is, one. >> one question. >> okay. how is the state department taking this and what do you do about a state department that has clearly been on the wrongside of history for a very, very long time? >> it's a good question. you have thor. the bureaucracy, then you have administration policy in the political appointees and the permanent bureaucracy. they offer resistance from time to time. this is one where you probably had close to as unanimous as possible an opposition to what the president decided to do. i'm not saying every single one but i would say at least 90% of the people who have worked in that region would probably have said that. and so and then you hear reports about well, you know, we may have a temporary embassy in four to six years. no, that's not going to be acceptable.
i think it remains to be seen what i've heard is i'm cautiously optimistic you will see some action to implement the policy. and if there's not, there's people like me in the congress who can conduct the oversight and make sure that the policy is being followed. the state department works for the american people. not the o'er way around. so when we have an election, we have policies implemented, it's the job of the department to implement those policies. and it doesn't matter your personal view. in kabul, election night, 2016, the state department at the embassy had a trump pinata they were ready to break open. that's their views. that's fine. but you got to follow the policies that are being handed down. if you're doing that, then it will be good. but i think that they have at least had to have some introspection about the lack of fallout they predicted over this issue. the fact of the matter is, all
the predictions i was told not one of them has come true from people who have been studying the region for a long time who work in the region, have been in the u.s. government for a long time. that's just whether it's group think, i don't know, but that's just the -- it's not just the state department. it was other agencies, as well. so we are where we are with that. >> great. well, i'm afraid that's it in terms of time. i would like to thank the congressman on behalf of the heritage foundation for taking time to join us today. please join me in thanking the congressman. [ applause ] >> thanks, guys. >> okay. we'll proceed with the rest of our panel at this point. let me just introduce the panel. it's the trump administration like many administrations before it has committed itself to fostering peace treaty between israel and the palestinians.
this goal has become the holy grail of the american presidency. as president trump has called it the ultimate deal. yet, there's been remarkably little progress on peace negotiations since the oslo peace negotiations broke down in the 1990s. is peace possible? and if so, what should be the role of the united states in creating the conditions for such a peace? we're fortunate to have with us today two of the most distinguished conservative experts on the middle east. i'll introduce them in turn. our first speaker is elliott abrams. he's a senior fellow for middle eastern studies at the council on relations here in washington, d.c. he's carved out a long and distinguished career in the public service serving as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security of adviser in the administration of president george w. bush where he supervised u.s. middle east
policy and the democracy human rights and international organization directorates of the national security council. he was assistant secretary of state in the reagan administration and received the secretary of state's distinguished service award from secretary of state george schultz. in 2012, the washington snunt for near east policy gave him its scholar statesman award. he was educated at harvard, the london school of economics and harvard law school. and before joining the bush administration, he was the president of a think tank here in washington, the ethics and public policy center. he also way was a member of the u.s. commission on international religious freedom rising to become chairman of the commission in 2001 and later serving a second term as a member of that important body. from 2009 to 2016, he was a member of the u.s. holocaust memorial council which directs the activities of the u.s. holocaust memorial museum and
he's a member of the board of of the national endowment for democracy. he teaches u.s. foreign policy at georgetown university's edmund a. wall school of foreign service and is the author of five books including most recently "realism and democracy, american foreign policy after the arab spring," and he spoke about this at heritage last fall. so it gives me great pleasure to welcome elliott back here again. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> i'll speak here. i'll stay here. it's a pleasure to be here. and back at heritage and to be with daniel who is a friend of a few years standing, we went to college together. so i think you asked the right question. is peace possible? i say that because frequently, the way the question is asked is
how do we get to the two-state solution. and that is not the right question. right question is, how do we get to peace. the two-state question is derivative. if it helps peace, that's a good thing. if not, it needs to be rethought. the u.s. as you were saying has been engaged in the peace process for decades. we invented the terp, the peace process or middle east peace process. and it's probably -- there's a lot of writing about this. it's probably partly the american legalization of foreign policy. so many lawyers like me involved in foreign policy, like congressman desantis, lawyers like process. so you have the peace process. and keeping the process alive has actually become over the years more important than whether the process actually achieves anything. we've had this process.
we've had carter in camp david. oslo, of course, and the kind of current process since 1991. we've had bill clinton at camp david in 2000. we've had annapolis in 2008. 2007. and the negotiations that followed. so the process has been going on for decades. but it hasn't produced peace. and i would have to say in my view, it is unlikely to do so because in a way the goal hasn't been peace. we fixed upon a goal early on even if it wasn't announced after absolutely independent sovereign palestinian state. and so that's what we've been pushing for rather than saying, what's up? what's happening? what are the conditions in the west bank, in gaza, in the
entire region. it's also the case that it's very difficult to get to this achievement if the palestinians keep saying no. and actually, they've been saying no for about 80 years. starting from the preworld war ii discussions when palestine, palestine mandate was in the hands of the british, ehud barak's proposals at camp david in 2000 to which arafat said no, ehud olmert's more liberal proposals in 2008 just before he left the prime ministership where president abbas said no. i think the window for palestinian statehood was opened widest from roughly 2000 to 2008. but i think it is closing.
why is it closing? for one thing, the palestinian refuse to admit the reality that they have actually and daniel has written a great deal about this, they have been defeated, but with the support of many in the arab world and in the muslim world in particular, some in europe, they've refused to acknowledge this. of course, if you refuse to acknowledge reality of their defeat militarily by israel, then you're going to have attitudes and approaches in the negotiations that are unreal. so that's one reason. the refusal to acknowledge reality. a second that outside support in doing so particularly from the arab world. a third reason is just terrible leadership. i mean, sometimes you get lucky. and you have hovl and you have wa len za and mandela and sometimes you don't get lucky
and you have yasser arafat. the level of leadership has not been what anyone would have hoped for. would a palestinian state be viable? that's a question we should ask if our policy is going to be to support palestinian statehood. think of thought experiment. let's assume su create a palestinian state and counter factually, there's no security problem. there is no security problem. there is no terrorism. it has been removed from the face of the earth. the palestinian entity that you have just created has no port. it has no airport. it has no currency. it has no natural resources. it has no productive economy. so i would think that the logic would be that that entity is
going to be tied to, you might even say fall upon, one of its neighbors either israel or jordan. for survival. and the logic of it, i think, is the logic that existed decades ago which is makes a lot more sense for it to be related somehow to or in a form of con federal relationship with an arab muslim, suny state rather than the jewish state. the logic it seems to me is that the major city you turn to is amman, not tel aviv. the airport you turn to is queen aliia, not men guria. people say it's unrealistic today. i don't think it's so easy to say it's unrealistic ten years from now or 20 years from now. the jordanian population itself
is changing. there are about a quarter of a million, it's a population of about 4 million. a quarter million iraqis who did not go back to iraq and are not going to. i think that's realistic. there are over a million syrian, suny refugees. are they going to go home or is that going to be another big change in the population of jordan? the middle east is changing in many, many ways. so it seems to me that the notion that the only possible outcome is a truly sovereign independent palestinian state needs to be thought about again. it shouldn't be so shocking actually. that would be a change in the american viewpoint. there have been other changes in the american viewpoint. i worked as jim mentioned for george schultz in the reagan administration. the policy of the united states
was to oppose the creation of a palestinian moon state. clear stated policy. and then we changed. so the notion that we could say, well, we changed because the world changed and the world keeps on change. so we want to have another look. we could change again. in the short run, i'll close with this. it seems to me short run meaning next five or ten years. i wouldn't predict much of a change. we all know that the, you know the line. the israeli occupation is unsustainable. 50 years is a long time for something unsustainable to be sustained. it strikes me if we were to come back and do this in five years, things will not have changed all that much. things can get better. certainly the palestinian economy can get better. governance in particularly the
west bank can get better. the attitude of the united states and more broadly donors can improve and help improve palestinian politics. we see this in the tailor force act which is a statement to the palestinian polity that the world is tired of and will no logger permit paying money to people who have committed terrible crimes of terrorism for those crimes. you see moves on the hill now on anra which suggests that the united states congress is getting tired of a situation that perpetuates palestinian, the palestinian "refugee crisis" rather than doing what we generally do through unhcr which is to try to solve a refugee problem. and finally the more general test book problem which needs to
be addressed because over time, one does want to create a much greater chance that israelis and palestinians, whatever their political relationship, can live together peacefully. during the bush administration, there was that famous phrase which actually was meant for domestic purposes, the soft bigotry of low expectations. palestinians have suffered i think from the soft and sometimes not so soft bigotry of low expectations. we should have higher expectations and we will get i think, and they will. and that's the important part. they will get a much better outcome. thanks. >> well, thank you, elliott. our next speak ser dr. daniel pipes. he is the president of the middle east forum which he founded in 1994 to appropriate american interests in the nevering debates over middle east policy.
he's one of the world's foremost analysts on the middle east and muslim history and he's been far ahead of the curve in diagnosing policy problems, particularly in identifying the threat of radical islam. long before 9/11. the washington post called him perhaps the most prominent u.s. scholar on radical islam. the "boston globe" concluded if pipes' admonitions had been heeded there might never have been a 9/11. those are strong words. he's a graduate of harvard university, seems to be something very common here with both a b.a. and ph.d. in history and he's been recognized as the one of harvard as a 100 most influential living graduates. he's taught at harvard, princeton, chicago, the u.s. naval war college, and pepperdine university. he's worked at the state and defense departments, held two presidential appointed positions. testified before congress and worked for five presidential
campaigns. daniel's a prize winning columnist formerly for "the new york times" syndicate and now writing independently. he's also written 12 books and his writings translated into 35 languages. his website danielpipes.org is among the most accessed sources of specialized information on the middle east and muslim history. he has a stellar record of anticipating middle east crises, for example, in 1993, within days of the signing of the oslo peace accord he wrote arafat has merely adopted a flexible approach to fit circumstances saying whatever needed to be said to survive. the plo has not had a change of heart me,ly a change of policy enabling it to stay in business until israel falters and when it can deal a death blow. in 1995, he wrote about radical islam, unnoticed by most
westerners, war has been unilaterally declared on europe and the united states. al qaeda invited him by name in a september, 2006 video to repent and enter into the light of islam. he declined. saying, and he said i'm faithful to my own religion to my own country and to my civilization. i thank you for being such a faithful exemplar of all those. ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to turn the floor over to daniel pipes. [ applause ] >> thank you so much, jim. and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. what he didn't mentioncy worked here for a summer in 1984. and what elliott didn't mention is that last time we did an event together was 1971. so in reply to the question
before us, president trump's ultimate deal is israel, palestinian peace possible, my answer is yes. but i would like to propose a completely different approach. i do not think that the existing approach which goes back 30 years of peace processing about which you've heard quite a bit now is going to work. it can be improved perhaps. which i think the ruch administration is doing. it's improved version. but it ultimately will crumble because it depends on palestinian acceptance of israel which has not come about and is not coming about. and therefore, that is the topic that needs to be addressed. that cannot be addressed in diplomacy. that needs to be addressed in a very different way. so i'd like to take a step back before proposing an approach. i'll start by giving three dates. actually six dates. first three and then another three. the first three are 1865, 1945, and 1975.
the end of the civil war, world war ii and the vietnam war. all of those were conclusively ended war. it ended. there was nothing more. the south never rose again, the germans didn't rise again and we didn't try and go back to vietnam. three other dates, 1917, 1953, and 1967. the end of, i'm sorry, 1918. the end of the first world war, the end of the korean war, and the end of the six-day war. those were inconclusive. any day, the korean war could restart, any day there could be hostilities between arabs and israel. the difference between these two sets of dates is the sense of defeat. in the former, there was a sense of defeat. it was over and the latter there wasn't. simply to lose a round of war is not to have a sense of defeat. giving up on one's war goals means being defeated.
that's what we americans experienced in 1975. victory i would define as imposing one's will on the enemy. the enemy gives up. you've prevailed. when you take this and apply it to the palestinian israeli conflict, what one sees is for 45 years, from 194 to 1973, the israelis were speaking victory. after that, since 1993, since the signing of the oslo accords on white house lawn, they have not been seeking victory. they have been trying various different fancy approaches, apiecement, you know, lateral withdrawal, putting outs brush fires but they haven't been seeking victory. peace process has been adopted, has been dominant in those years. the emphasis on diplomacy on assuming that what arafat said on the white house lawn in
september of 1993 was valid, that the palestinians now accepted israel. war was over. but it wasn't. and it isn't. it continues. so what is needed is an approach that confronts this irreducible problem of palestinian platoon rejectionism. palestinian rejectism goes back a century. it means saying no to designonism to jews to israel, no, no, no political contacts, no economic relations, no personal releases, no. it's fractured. it's no longer has strong as it was a century ago but it's still there. palestinian rejectionism is the core of the problem and needs to be what needs to be confronted. as elliott pointed out, there's this is delusion due to bad leadership, due to international support i would sad islamic doctrine, israeli security services mentality, there is this delusion that exists among
the palestinians that they can defeat israel and cause the jewish state of israel to disappear. that is what we as a great power looking at this conflict need to deal with. what i'm suggesting is that thet a policy which encourages the israelis to win, to win, as in 1865, 1945, 1975, to end the conflict by winning, by causing the palestinians to understand that the gig is up and they lost. it's over, done with. when they're really upset, they write a very strongly worded letter to the editor saying we're unhappy. okay. but enough with the u.n. resolutions, however many there are, and there are very many against israel. enough with building up militaries. enough with the campus. enough. over. it's done.
i'm hoping some president, this one or a future one, will say to his staff, diplomacy isn't working, we've been at this for decades, it's not going anywhere, is there some other alternative? >> yes, there will be another alternative, what we call israel victory. as you heard, the senator is co-chairman of the house israel victory caucus. there are now 32 members. there are 26 members of the knesset israel victory caucus we began a year ago under the auspices of greg roman, who's sitting here, the director of the middle east forum, and e.j. kibble, sitting parallel on the other side, the head of our israel victory effort in washington. we're building a political base for it and the intellectual base by having talks like this, having studies, commissioning studies, bringing this up as an alternative to the existing paradigm. let me emphasize it is an approach. it is not a number of policies. we're not saying two-state or
not two-state. i have my own opinions, but that's not the point. the point is israel needs to convince the palestinians that it's over. the conflict has been resolved by the fact that israel is a flourishing, powerful state. the palestinians have an oppr s oppressive and week polity that isn't working. it's a long-term effort. the goal is not to change policy in the next few months but it is, with time, to put something else on the table that fits the historical pattern. you don't end wars through negotiating. i mean, think of vietnam. it didn't end through negotiations. it ended by the north vietnamese army coming in and taking over. that's how wars end. wars end when one side gives up, and we have close relations with
israel as representative desantis said. we share interests and a moral base with it. it should be the side we want to win, we should help it win. the ironic thing is once the palestinians give up, then they can go on to build something good. when they give up this foul g l eliminating the sush state, they can build their own economy and culture. so in the long run they'll gain more than the israelis. yes, the israelis will not be murdered on their way to the pizzeria and face this barrage of hostilities, but they lave good life, the israelis do. the palestinians don't. they live under oppression, backwardness. they will be able to build, once they give up, this rejectionism, once they move on to something that's more constructive. so i hope you will join us in
advocating for this approach with your members of congress, intellectually. i think it offers a new paradigm that pulls us out of the mire of this endless processing that goes nowhere that, in fact, is even counterproductive, i would argue to you, that palestinian/israeli relations are worse today than they were 25 years ago when the oslo accords were signed. we need something new. i offer this to you as new thinking and as a way for the ultimate deal to be achieved. thanks. >> thank you. i will open up to the floor after i ask one question. the thing that troubles me is in a lot of the analyses of peace prospects, there's an assaultings orassaul ans
summings or presumption that they don't consider the hammerlock hamas has on what kind of negotiations are going to going to produce. i would say even if you could assume that tomorrow the palestinian authority and israel negotiated a perfect peace deal that satisfied all their various prerequisites, whatever those may be, that the next day hamas could explode it with another round of rocket terrorism. and to me it seems like peace really is impossible until the palestinians themselves come under a more unified government. i wonder what either one of yor you or both of you think about this triangular -- and now we have the islamic state moving in to challenge hamas and gaza.
how can there be peace given all of these cascading radical movements? >> analysis in the past century, 80% of palestinians have been rejectionists, and 20% have accepted israel. the goal must be to expand the 20% to 40%, 60%. so it's not nothing. don't start at zero. start at 20%. and this 20% has been very important over the century. and so the goal, my goal is to encourage an increasing number of palestinians to recognize that the conflict is over. i'm less focused on leaders. i'm less focused on polities such as the hamas one and the p.a. i think you want a change of heart. you want to get people to recognize that it's no longer worth their while to engage in, say, suicide attacks because it's futile. as long as you think that you were part of a movement that's
going to lead to the elimination of the jewish state, well, worth doing it. but if you see it as futile, you're not going to do it. so i'm looking much more at the populace than at the leadership. >> i'll just say about the leadership, i think what you're saying points to a real problem, which is somebody mass to do that negotiation, whether it's tomorrow or ten years from tomorrow, and the palestinian leadership today has a declining legitimacy. this is partly because they won't hold elections because of hamas. that is president abbas was elected in 2005. the parliament was elected in 2006. and those were the last elections. and fatah party will not hold elections presumably because it's not confident that it will win those elections. but that creates a situation where you have a palestinian leadership of which whose democratic legitimacy has been
severely undermined and which is looking over its shoulder at hamas, knowing that let us suppose it signed a compromise, we know exactly what hamas would say. yasser arafat wouldn't sign, you signed, you're a traitor. that's not obviously going to be a very practical proposition for anybody in the palestinian leadership today. so that makes the possibility that this leadership will sign such a deal much lower. i would add to that that the palestinian people have not been prepared for the compromises that any, any agreement would require so that you get arafat backing away in 2000 and you get abbas backing away in 2008. i think because they genuinely wonder whether -- i don't know if those numbers are right today, but they worry that in fact the majority of palestinians would reject those compromises, which would of
course be rejected by hamas and islamic jihad and other groups. >> okay. let's go at this point to the floor. wee l ask this -- we'll ask thi gentleman here and then this one. >> i'm mori amatay. is there any palestinian in any leadership position who has basically said, okay, we've lost, now what happens to us? and if one does, what is israel's reply? >> yes, there are. bas amid comes to mind. there are plenty of others. but they are part of the 20% that has no power. [ inaudible question ] i'm encouraging the u.s. government to encourage the israeli government to take those
steps within legal, political, and moral bounds, which will encourage the palestinians to change their behavior. let me give you one example. two days ago an israeli rabbi, father of six, was murdered in cold blood. obviously, the israeli government is going to try and find the murderer. but one of the israeli leaders, nafta l naftali bennett, suggested that's not enough, that because this rab pie livbi lived in an outpost, now you murdered someone, here's what we do in response. that's the kind of thing we'd be pointing to. we'd be sending a signal rather rapidly that murdering fathers of six is not really a helpful step for the palestinians. in fact, it was counterproductive. >> mariah bass. i work at the heritage foundation. thank you so much. although we're dealing with the question of whether peace is
achievable, what should the u.s.' next step be? i wonder if there's a way, maybe this sounds cynical, if there's a way for the u.s. to somewhat force both parties to finally sit and take these peace talks and process seriously versus nitpicking on small details whether of importance or not on borders and so forth, would be for the u.s. to take a stronger move in either reducing or cutting the aid that it sends financially to the palestinian authority, which is supposed to be going to helping fund infrastructure, fund schooling and education, and yet has proven time and time again to actually help the palestinian authority pay off terrorists and so forth. so that a good next step that would actually force both parties to come and seriously take the peace talks, well, seriously? >> i sort of agree with you or the implications about 50%. that is i think it is not sensible for us to force the
parties to come to the table if they don't want to goesnegotiat because it won't succeed. one price is it's always bad for the president of the united states to fail at anything. anything. it's bad for him. it's bad for the country. and if you have endless negotiations that don't go anywhere, it creates a kind of cynicism on the part of israelis and palestinians about the whole question of peace. so i would not say, well, if you don't go to the table right now, we will cut this part of aid, that part of aid, but i would look at the aid program and the way that congress is doing it. i mentioned taylor force and question of honor again. i think we should start rethinking not with the goal of saying, you know, our purpose here is to cut the aid really low but rather to say is the way we are giving aid actually helping the possibilities of long-term peace or not? >> and i'm against the
negotiations, so i complete, 100% disagree with you. that's easy. >> okay. yes, this man in the back here. yes, sir. >> my name is david edmond on the board of the middle east forum. i wonder if the speakers could forecast what they expect palestinian leadership and palestinian governance to look like one year from now and let's say ten years from now. >> it violates the famous line of yogi berra -- never make predictions, especially about the future. one year from now it doesn't -- i mean, because of president abbas' age, palestinians are thinking about succession issues. so that's a question one would have to assume he would not ten years from now be the palestinian president and the head of the p.a., plo, and the
fatah party. one year from now, you know, the assumption would be it will look pretty much the same. i think palestinians are trying to figure out now how changed is washington. there is a story in "the jerusalem post" today saying that palestinian -- that the plo, which is officially the part that negotiates with israel, in charge of foreign affairs, the plo is thinking of saying we're not going to work with the americans anymore, the americans -- there has to be an international effort at negotiation, and we're going -- the israelis and the americans have killed oslo, so -- it's reasonable for them to say those kinds of things. the truth is no other country could substitute for the united states in trying to convene negotiations, whether it's a good idea or bad idea. the french can't do it. the british can't do it.
the russians can't do it. it's not sensible. so i think you'll hear a lot more of that rhetoric, and, you know, the palestinian ambassador from washington was recalled, but i gather he's been sent back or is being sent back. so there will be a lot more friction, but i would suspect a year from now things would look very much the same. >> i find it amusing and very happy that the palestinians have decided to boycott the united states. made my way. as for what things look like in the future, should the existing dime be continu paradigm be continued with the peace processing, which i call war processing, looked the same. may not be abbas, but it would be in that same tradition of rejectionism. harder rejectionism or softer rejectionism but rejectionism and we'll still have the same conditions we have today. only if there's a complete shift
will there be a prospect of something better. but at this point, that's only something we hope for. there are no signs of it. >> this woman right here and then the man behind her. >> i'm donnie jackson with the national black public council, almost a member of the heritage foundation as well. can you hear me? oh, good. i want to thank the entire panel for taking time out of your busy schedule to be here today. we appreciate it very much. i also want to ask a question to dr. pipes. you mentioned that israel would never be accepted due to the palestinian rejectionism. and of course it's hard and soft. you just mentioned that. you said go back 100 years, bringing us around the 1900s. now we're in 2017. and my question to you is, with
the bloom or the boom of social media, how does that affect the palestinian rejectionism? is it more harder or more softer? >> what's the impact of social media? i would say it has led to it becoming harder. people tend to talk to their own. you are in discussion with people who share your views and whatever it might be. and therefore you tend to get more excited and stronger in your feelings. so i think, as you can see in this country, left and right have become harder, more hostile to each other. i think you'll find the same elsewhere. let me point out, though, that we're talking about palestinians. we're not talking about arabs. we're not talking about muslims. one of the striking things that happened that representative desantis noted isjerusalem, and what's most especially striking is the arab states, of which
there are 22, the arab states were quiet. i mean, they made modest condemnation and the saudis called it irresponsible, but they didn't want to deal with it, and there was an extraordinary "new york times" piece a week ago which had the tapes of an egyptian policeman calling up talk show hosts and saying, leave jerusalem alone. remarkable. a policeman calling up a talk show host, saying stay off this subject. it's not an egyptian national interest for you to talk about this. we only have that one concrete incidence, but clearly across the board this is what we're talking about. this is not arab israeli. this is palestinian israeli. it's very different. while there are so more arabs than israelis aen s and so many tanks and everything, they have very little economy. this looms large over them. winning a war is rather simple. not talking about winning over
morocco or malaysia. talking about winning over the palestinians alone. also striking in contrast to the arab states being quiescent is that the hotbeds of hostility were in iran and turkey and in europe. >> this man right here. >> i'm frank alshore with the senate for a free cuba. my question is how did the policy of president obama toward iran impact on the israeli/palestinian situation, and how is the current policy of president trump impacting on the same? >> i think the main impact of the obama/iran policy was, oddly enough, to produce a kind of rapprochement between israel and many of the sunni states,
because they have a common enemy, not obama, iran. that common fear of iran, of its support for terrorism, of its support for war, has led to what appear to be improved relations. i'm not even talking -- i mean, one assumes there are lots of secret meetings, but you can see in the tone of comments. dan just mentioned the reaction to jerusalem. it's striking to me now when there is a terrorist attack in israel, the official saudi reaction on it is always we condemn this attack, we condemn all terrorism, this is unforgivable, period. that didn't happen ten years ago. so i think it's -- that is an oddly beneficial impact. i don't think there was much of
a long-term impact on the israeli/palestinian situation. and if you think of it, there were eight years of no negotiations despite considerable efforts by the president and especially by secretary of state kerry in the obama second term. tremendous amount of time put in on this, but nothing happened. so i would say i think it just kept the process going weekly for another eight years but had no significant impact on it. >> as a historian, i savor the ironies of history, and one of them is that the huge amount of money that we pay to the iranian government created a rise in expectations that led to the outbreak of revolts in the last few weeks. looks like they've been suppressed, but it was a factor that in the long term i think harms the iranian regime more than helps them.
another irony is that u.s. lsh isra -- u.s./israel relations, i tend to like it when u.s./israel relations are not so good, because when they're really good, as, for example, during the bush years -- elliott, don't listen to this -- the bush, george w. bush years, the bush administration would make demands of israel such as to be technical, leaving the corridor, which were dumb demands that the israelis because of the flourishing regulations just felt they had to do. but when there were tensions, as there were during the obama years, the obama administration makes these demands and the israelis happily ignore them. i like not tense, but poor relations. >> that's a two-hour question and answer. but i would take exception on the detail of philadelphi where
i would argue that ariel sharon as a general came to the conclusion that if he was going to get out of gaza, defending what is actually a line, was simply militarily nuts. so i don't think it was actually something he did because of american pressure. i think it's something he did for military reasons, but you raise it, so -- >> okay. >> this man right here. >> thank you very much for coming. i'm max lonegan. i'm a junior at mt. st. josef in maryland. yesterday president trump had a press conference with the norwegian president and he got a question regarding a comment a general made. he said that war is coming and specifically, you know, with his strategic -- where he is in norway, you would think it's with russia. but where do you see russia especially making strategic
movements in the middle east in the next few years? >> you want to start? >> well, i think putin to a surprising degree has been able to reinsert russia as a great power in the middle east, and i think part of that was the obama administration's policy in syria, its failure to push back, and behind that i think also was its focus on striking a nuclear deal with iran and everything else came second. so i think russia is back, and i don't think it's back to the extent that it was say before '73. i don't think it has much of a role to play in peace negotiations, but as a security force i think it's back definitely in syria and it has a growing alliance with iran.
>> i see two major vulnerabil y vulnerabilities. one is the fact that moscow has aligned with tehran and has created hostility in so many other places. and secondly, russia is a declining power. it's demographically and economically going down. so, you know, good luck. make high hey whi make hay while the sun is out. china is going to be the problem of the future, much, much more serious. >> okay. this man right here. >> yes. maybe dr. pipes addressed this in passing with neftali bennett's recommendation, but talking about the population, how do you expand that 20%? and in the foreseeable future --
i'm sorry. my name is louis morano. i forgot to identify myself. in the foreseeable future, especially in terms of considering abu mazen's advanced age, would you anticipate any palestinian leader, nonrejectionist, being able to survive physically, as well as politically? >> my focus is for reasons you're implying not on leaders but on the populace, reducing that 80% rejectionist element to something less than 50% so that eventually a nonrejectionist leader could survive. but no. it's a long-term project. it will take time. lit ta it will take one palestinian after another coming to the conclusion that hoping to eliminate israel is a forlorn dream. it's just not going to happen.
>> let me ask a question. where do you get the 80/20? i haven't seen that. >> i have it from a lot of statistics. i have a web log entry on this going back to the 1920s, various surveys that have shown this. i'd be happy to send it to you. i think if you looked up 20% palestinians, my website, you'll see about ten different surveys and historical researches that point to this general number. >> there was what i would call a positive effort under salam fayad as prime minister, that is, an effort to build -- i'm not quoting but as he put it more or less, we need to build palestine despite the occupation. forget the occupation. that's israel's business.
our business is to build institution by institution, create a dwogovernment, create economy. it is a sort of zionist concept, that is the zionist movement had no way of knowing would there be a jewish state in 1918 after the war or in the '30s or in 1945 or in 1960. all they knew is build, build, build, you have to be ready if and when the day comes, which is i think essentially what fayyad was saying. now, his party only won two student-athletes in t seats in the palestinian legislature and he was ultimately forced out, forced out by the fatah party, of which he was never a member. there is impressionistic evidence -- i will have to look at the data -- impressionistic evidence i have heard from a number of palestinians that younger palestinians are more
concerned with building a future than they are with some of the old formulae, like our future can only come when israel is destroyed or even perhaps like our future can only come when there is an independent sovereign palestinian state. they're more concerned with how do i get an education, how do i get a job, how do i raise my children? which is precisely what in a sense we would want. we would want people to be thinking less about politics and less about israel and more about their own society. but i think -- i mean, that's the right question. i'd say one thing is for sure. that percentage, if it is 20%, cannot expand if a lot of money is being given to the people whose life's work it is to make sure it can't expand. for example, by paying you a large amount of money if you try to kill israelis.
that should be obvious. and it can't expand if we continue the model in which what we're telling you is no, no, no, despite the fact that you were born in let us say jordan or lebanon ten years ago, you're still a palestinian refugee with the thought of, quote, going back, closed quote. so we are, by directing money in, american money, american taxpayers' money, to chose institutio institutions, practices, expenditures, hurting very much the expanning of 20% to 80%. >> the title of the blog is how many arabs and muslims accept israel. i began it in 2003 and have been following it 15 years now. >> i think we have time for one more question. this man in the back here. >> thank you very much. my name is yaya with the unit
nighted state of africa. i was outside briefly and somebody here asked me whether i thought of what you're doing. i said most of what they're saying not of interest to me, i know about that, et cetera, et cetera. i said elliott abrams made a statement which would be the futu future, not matching with israel but they will have to match with jordan, because smaller states like we know in africa -- very soon the palestinians will understand that. >> okay. >> okay. maybe at this point, if i could just ask the two of you just so t -- to sum up your comments. if you had to advise president trump how to proceed on this issue, what would you say just, you know, the top two or three
things? >> well, the president clearly from everything we can see now is still focused on trying to get a comprehensive agreement, what's called a final status agreement, something that eluded every president since clinton. i think that's very unlikely. and i think it would be more useful to focus on more pragmatic ways of improving the lives of palestinians, the palestinian politics, and the medium and long-run chances that israelis and palestinians and jordanians and egyptians, because gaza is out there, too, will be able at some point to live together in peace or to live apart in peace, which may be more realistic. >> the middle east is aflame.
there are civil wars in libya and yemen and syria and arguably if lebanon and iraq and afghanistan, in turkey, there is a near civil war, sinai has something close to a civil war, anarchy, problems all over. it is remarkable that we're still talking about a problem that is 70 or 100 years old when there's so much going on, when -- i mean, think of the syrian refugees. half of the syrian population, 22 million, has been displaced internally or become refugees outside the country. huge numbers. far beyond the numbers of palestinians, which have 600,000 back in 1949. and this is not '49. this is 2018. so given this fact, given the iranian rampage of aggression, given the fact that turkey has become close to a rogue state,
given the dramatic developments taking place in saudi arabia where i think mohamed ben salman is undertaking a transformation, wishes to undertake a transformation as deep as the ottoturk period in turkey, given all that's going on, i would say let's outsource the palestinian issue to the israelis, let them take care of it, and let's focus on the much bigger, more dramatic, and more dangerous developments taking place in the region. >> and with that, i'd like to invite the audience to join me in thanking our speakers for a very illuminating presentation. thank you.
looking at the u.s. capitol where the house and the senate will be wrapping up the sessions for the week today. they'll be both on break for the mlk holiday at the end of the legislative day today. the house debated and went on to approve six-year extension to certain security elements of fisa, set to run out on january 19th. the vote was 266-164. you can see how your congressman voted on fisa on our congressional chronicle webpage. go to c-span.org/congress to get there. over in the senate today, lawmakers continuing work on judicial nominations. a couple of votes on nominees. later the senate will take up the fisa legislation passed in the house today. you can see the house live on
c-span, see the senate on c-span2. while the house debated the foreign intelligence bill earlier today, president trump offered these comments via tweet. "house votes on controversial fisa act today. this is the act that may have been used, with the help of the discredited and phony dossier, to so badly surveil and abuse the trump campaign by the previous administration and others?" and then just under two hours later, the president tweeted, "with that being said, i personally directed the fix to the unmasking process since taking office and today's vote is about foreign surveillance of foreign bad guys on foreign land. we need it! get smart." you can watch the senate vote on the fisa bill when they take it up on our companion network c-spa c-span2. coming up later today, a discussion with former secretary of energy ernest munoz. he'll address the current situation with north korea.
live coverage from the center for strategic and international studies starts at 4:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, c-span.org, or listen live with the free c-span radio app. and later the american constitution society looks at the judicial nominations process and the trump administration. see live coverage of that beginning at 6:15 p.m. eastern, also on c-span. watch c-span's "profile" series on white house administration officials. this week will feature energy secretary rick perry. >> today, as we market u.s.-produced liquefied natural gas, lng, as we sell our technology on carbon capture, being able to use coal in a responsible way to other countries, the department of energy, those national labs, those 17 national labs, are probably some of the best
investment that the american taxpayer made over the course of the years because of the basic research that was done there and then the commercialization of that research to change people's lives. >> rick perry friday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span, c-span.org, and with the free c-span radio app. and now senate foreign relations committee ranking member ben carden and congressman will hurd, a member of the intelligence committee, talk about the immediate need to address russian interference in elections around the globe and what actions can be taken to prevent future efforts. the german marshall fund in washington, d.c., hosted this event yesterday. it's about 90 minutes.