tv University of Chicago - Nuclear Weapons CSPAN February 8, 2018 7:39am-9:04am EST
logic of suicide terrorism, bombing to win, air power and cornerings war, why economic sanction does not work, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism and many other articles average frequent contributor and an throes a vote of news and media outlets help taught at dartmouth college before come thing to the university of chicago and he taught air power strategy for the u.s. af school of advanced air power studies for three years, he received a ph.d from the university of chicago and graduate sim ma cum laude and phi beta kappa from the university of pittsburgh.
. next to robert pain is paul post, who is an assistant professor in the department of political science here at the university of chicago. a research affiliate of the peerson institute for the study of global conflicts he studied international relations with a focus on international security. the author of two books, the economics of war and organizing democracy. he is authored or co-authored academic papers in numerous journals and has been featured in various news outlets as well. he received his ph.d from the university of michigan am masters or of science from to the london school of economics and political science and a ba from miami university, and before coming to the university of chicago, he was an assistant professor in the department of political science at rutgers, and taught in the department of economics at the ohio state university. next to professor post is austin carson, an assistant professor of political science at the university of chicago, where he currently specializes in
security and intelligence, and their relationship to international relations theory. international security and global governance. at the core of his projects is an interest in understanding how government selective reveal and conceal what too and the juncture this creates between the front stage, quote, and the back stage, quote 0, international politics ump his book analyzes covert forms of military intervention and they're role in states pursuit of limit it ward. other work assesses the politics of open secreted, the impact of publicity on international rules, sensitive information and international organizations all of which will be in play here tonight waded watch ph.d in political science from the ohio state university and has research fellowship at the niehaus center for global gov indian at princeton, the studiesy george washington university a wood to wilson center in washington, dc. next to professor carston is paul, an associate prefer of political science and tackty
compare of the committee or international relations. he codirects the program on international security policy and program on political violence. his research focuses on political violence and international security, particularly as many of you in south asia himself book, networks of rebellion, explaining insurgents cohesion and collapse, won several awards and has publicked widefully academic and policy journals. finally next to professor is page pryce combe who is the numb clear proliferation fellow for the chicago project on security and threat here at the university. she recently received her phn political science from in the university of south carolina. her research and teaching interests lie at the intersections of international relations and compare of politics. she is broadly interested in our institutions affects the foreign policy of leader and mows specifically how they affect a leader's propensity for nuclear proliveation and explores the
issues under which leaders reverse in programs and i working on a book and most recently was named one of the seven freshest perspectives on nuclear policy in 2017 bit the bulletin for the atomic scientists. please welcome all of our panelists here tonight. grade to have you with us. [applause] we are going to start on the far end with professor pain. the floor is yours. >> thank you very much, staph, and thank you, dean woodward. is especially fitting to have our ir faculty, especially the young ir faculty, commenting on the effect of nuclear weapons here the university of chicago and i'm delighted be part of it. nuclear weapons inspire tremendous fear, not just among experts but widely in the public at large, and for good reason. when researching why japan surrendered, i had to wade through gory details of hiroshima and nag nagasaki two o
atomic bombs killed over 200,000 people in lest than one minute. today's nuclear weapons are even more destructive. no wonder the thought of nuclear attack evokes fear. paradoxically, however, nuclear weapons are also a powerful force for peace. the treasure before the momming of nuclear weapons, from 1850 to 1945, was the classic era of great power politics. with numerous major wars among the great powers of the day. these wars were hugely destructive. in world war, 120 mental pipe died. world war ii was worse, over 50 million people died. but since 1945, great power wars have come to a dead stop. the united states, china, germany, britain, france, the soviet union, now russia, have had their troubles and have even waged proxy wars but none of them have fought a shooting war
against each other, major one in over -- almost 75 years. now, what is the cause of this long great power peace? is it the democratic peace? the idea that democracies don't fight each other? no. china and russia are not mature democracies. are international politic friday n general, now so peaceful that major powers no longer have serious international crisises with each other? no. from berlin, taiwan and cuba during the world war, to ukraine today, major powers have experienced numerous crises that one might think would escalate at least to sustained conventional combat between their militaries but none have. in 75 years. now, although other factors matter, nuclear weapons have probably done more than any other to vastly lower the risk of great power war. the existence of nuclear weapons
does not stop crises but they serve as a powerful deterrent on the escalation of those crises. why? the very fear that makes us anxious about nuclear weapons also serves as a brake on the outbreak of major power war. this fear is to great that even a whiff of nuclear gun power provokes tremendous pressures to de-escalate a process cries. consider last summer president trump went through a sear of tweets and other moves that essentially played a game inform nuclear chicken with north korea. the game of chicken, you know this. it's famous from the movies when two high school teenagers drive cars head on toward each other, daring each other to swerve. that is what president trump did last summer, and that is why the fear of nuclear war has grown under the trump administration.
now, what has happened since? north korea, china, south korea, and even the united states, have taken steps to change the game. instead of bombing north korea, we're out in talking about north korean athletes at the winter olympics in seoul. in other words, as with numerous major power crises since 1945, a crisis among nuclear armed adversaries is generating tremendous pressure to dampen risks rather than escalate them. now, so, does this mean all this worry has been for nothing and that the peaceful effects of nuclear weapons are so strong we should all just go home? alas, no. the true danger related to nuclear weapons is strategic miscalculation, especially in a crisis. that is, that in the early stages of a crisis, individual political leaders will overplay their hand, bomb facility is
with conventional wins, oblivious to to possibility of accidental or inadvertent nuclear proliferation, these i why an informed public debate is important to call attention to alternative pathways to resolve tension. today no need is greater than with north korea. it is imperative to end the game of nuclear chicken. not just for a few months but in a lasting way. our goal should be to use the next month surrounding the winter olympics to stop playing the game of chicken and to de-escalate on both sides. the best way to do that is to say, okay, you say we're a threat. but we're going to de-escalate if you de-escalate. we should be heading toward a straightforward deal. we should de-escalate the military exercises that the united states and south korea have been conducting annually,
every year, for years, to practice conquering every inch of north korea. in exchange, for north korea de-escalating nuclear and missile tests. starting at the olympics, let's put this deal squarely on the table, and truly change the game of nuclear chicken into a game of mutual de-escalation and use the fear of nuclear weapons as a force for peace. thank you. >> thank you, professor pape. we religion now turn to paul post. >> great. thank you, steve. thank you, dean woodward, thank you all of you for being here tonight. this is obviously a very important topic, and i'm excited to be up here with such a great panel of my colleagues. so there's two constants in international politics since set 49. first one is the presence of nuclear weapons, and really that start before 1949. the second is the presence of
the north atlantic treater organization, or nato, and as it so happens these two things are intimately tied together. as nato's first secretary general famously remarked, to keep the purpose of nato is to keep the americans in to keep the russians out and to keep the germans down. well, when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in nato, that same three-part formula applies. that it's about keeping american nukes deployed, keeping russian nukes deterred, and keeping german nukes denied. with respect to keeping american nukes deployed, this has been at the center of nato since the beginning. it's indeed why nato is called -- refers to itself as a nuclear alliance. from the stationing of b29
bombers in england during the late 1940s and 1950s, each of which was equipped with the bomb, to the forward deployment of nuclear forces controlled -- american controlled nuclear forces in germany, turkey, and even today, belgium, netherlands, other nato allies. keeping american nuclear forces, american controlled nuclear forces, on the continent has been, again, foundational and fundamental to nato's operation. that leads directly to the second purpose. keeping russian nukes deterred. the idea is that by keeping american nukes deployed, in europe, it makes it that much less likely that russia would pant to tempt coercion, either by threatening a nuclear strike or even threatening with conventional strike. the reality is u.s. nukes are safely stowed away in a sigh he
in south dakota, russia might say they're not really going to use them. they still have them. so maybe we can co kess but -- coerce but if they're on the front line it creates a logic of use them or lose them, and the russians would be more likely to be deterred. finally when it comes to keeping german nukeses denied, that was condition for germany to even enter nato in the 1950s. had to not possess their own nuclear weapons. throughout the cold war, that remained the issue and became even more important with the end offering the cold war. in fact in many ways this is why nato did not become less important with the collapse of the berlin wall but became more important. in order for gem now reunify it had to make a commitment to not acquire nuclear weapons and that was a commit. signed on to by the other major powers in europe, the united states, england, france, and russia, and
the way to do that was to mike sure that a unified germany remained part of nato. that mission was then expand to this rev of eastern europe. this fear being if if these countries were left on their own they would extinct acquire nuclear weapons as a way of deferring a future threat, perhaps from resurgent russia. so by bringing them into nato it's offing the protection of any u.s. nuclear umbrella asen incentive to not acquire nuclear weapons and ties 0 toe to an idea that dr. price will be talking about inch short, nato is a nuclear alliance and in many ways nato exemplifies the role of nuclear weapons in the world over the past 60-70 years. nuclear weapons have been at the core of nato's mission. indeed, in the most recent nato strategic document, they stated that as long as there's nuclear weapons in the world, nato will
re mine a nuclear alliance. i would take that one step further. i would say as long as there's nuclear weapons in the world, there will be a nato. thank you very much. >> thank you, professor post. and we now move to austin carston. >> thank you to dean woodward, thank you, steve. excited to be here today and i'm struck by my colleagues rob and paul, should be handing nuclear weapons out at the entrance of the u.n. security council. a force for peace. i'm going to give a slight didisperspective. want to focus as muching on the threat that nuclear weapons pose as the promise they provide. and nuclear weapons is a technology that is inain't criminal innovation. here at the university of chicago with hey site revered is a symbolic of human ingenuity and creating a an incredible form of technology that helps both civilian peaceful purposes and military purposes but raises
critical ways and about what we do about the technology, how do we respond to the fact that the jeanie is in a sense out of the aboutle and do we have some buyer's remorse for developing a technology that is in the current state threatens the species. threaten this human races. my comments i'll focus on how the united states and the world has managed nuclear technology and i want to focus on the global architecture designed to control nuclear technology. the nuclear nonproliferation regime. it's fundmental core parten the ntc and the eye aie it the world was diedded two two nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon state and the grand bargain was that nuclear weapon states including the neutz granted a monopoly on nuclear weapons. they most destructive, powerful weapon every developed by he human race was allowed to be in
the hands of a small number of countries. the second category of countries, nonnuclear weapons states in return for for swearing they were given askis stance in using that technology for civilian burns, raidation, medical applications, including clear power, as well as a promise from those states that had nuclear weapons they would disarm evenly. it's truly to me remains an incredible bargain. on one hand the most destructive technology was allowed to be in hands of some states and not others and the eye moves others, the m critics of the regime, india being a very important one, a kind of nuclear apartheid. you can have it but others can't. ' in which the vast majorout of world said we won't evolve this technology. the second core piece of the nonprorevelation regimees the international day tommic agency. an international organization and its it designed to puts the bargain into action. it helps nonknock clear weapon
states access nuclear tech following nothing civilian purposes purpose. it keeps the nuclear weapons state monopoly in effect. through the safeguard system it monitors the use of nuclear technology nonnuclear weapon states to make sure they're not secretly diverting it for military purposes amount lot of my reef search focus odd whan make this effective and ineffective. let in talk about that. at key challenge in designing a role in system to control nucleic technology and keep the military application in the hands of only a few countries is identifying these cases of covert or hidden military diversion. it's kind of a cat and mouse game, as you might hajj and turns 0 the iaea is not the best cat, has not been given a very particularly powerful resources and legal camabilities to find the facilities. my research along with the co-author at columbia focus on what we think is an untapped source of insight which is
intelligence from governments. for their own security purposes countries like the united states spend billions of dollars over decades tracking all kinds of threats but in large part nuclear proliferation trends. some of most sensitive source and methods has of the to do with detecting undeclared nuclear facilities and procurement networks and provides vastly more insaying than the iaea, hamstrung by resources and legal access problems could ever hope to achieve. so our research looked at the conditions under governments are willing to share the intelligence. given that they face reel dilemma, the might want to say, hey, look, north korea has a nuclear site in which they're doing things they're not telling anyone about to potentially develop nuclear weapons. on the other hand, making this information public means it harder to gather that intelligence down the road. what we found is the iaea in the last 15 years has developed routines for serving up those
tips from national intelligence, including from the united states, and acting on those tips, going and looking at the site and egg what exactly is going on, while not advertising exactly who they got it from and how. so it is a kind of solution to this dilemma are how to share this kind of information wow giving away the store in terms of intelligence collection. there's relatively regular news stories about the u.s. deciding to share or not share information with the iaea about, say, iranian alleged noncompliance with the joint comprehend plan of action, the deal that it signed with the u.s. and other countries under the obama administration. the bad news that we found in our research is that this information, because it is so insightful and interesting, is a source of power. if the united states doesn't want to facilitate the iaea scrutinizing a country's program it doesn't provide that information. so what you 2010 is a kind of selectivity, which the glass is half full.
well, know he more than we would have without the iaea but the glass is half empty in the sense those countries with the resources and intelligence to provide, get to choose win to provide it and who to provide it about. so i think one officer the birth lesson is want to bring to table in our discussion today is in contrast to the physical signs where the emphasis on the 75th 75th anniversary is on the innovation, the discovery and application of this new technology of fission and fusion in the nuclear domain, i think the special sciences brings it own perspective on how technology as social and political implications. it's not pure science. that we what do and believe and agree and what we create institutions like the iaea, they shape the distribution of that technology, they create social and political categories that's help us understand make sense and manage that technology. and the political science perspective in particular i think is helpful because it injects a consideration of power. when you have information like intelligence, and that helps you identify the spread of that teching in the, who has thattings in, what can they do with and when.
hopefully that it will help shed light on how we manage this technology that continues to vex is today. >> thank you for those insights. we now turn to paul. >> great, thank you, everybody. thanks to steve, thanks to dean woodward and paul post for putting this testimony i'm going to come at from a slightly different spiff. i study south asia so i want to get a handle on these questions of the military political management of nuclear weapons. the consequences on nuclearization by looking a south asia, especially since 1998 which is when dueling toast nuclear tests were perform by india and pakistan. south ache, gnaw and pakistan exist in an environment of deep conventional military competition and since really the 1980s, also nuclear competition. and so looking at the introduction are nuclear weapons into this environment i think provides some interesting insights about the cross-effects of nuclear technology and
nuclear weapons. rather than kind of three tiers nor nuclear weapons or zero tier is want to talk about the tradeoffs, the mixed results that occur once you get the introductions of a kind of particular form of mute amoute actually assured destruction. during the cold war scholars of nuclear weapons introduced the idea of a stability-instability paradox and this characterized south asia since 1998. stability for all the reasons professor pape talk about. i if there is a nuclear war in scouting asia new most scenario there we've enormous loss of lift. destruction of the countries. is indupeses extraordinary caution about the prospect of nuclear escalation or use. there's feeling, hopefully, assume nothing miscalculation, beyond which conflict is very unlikely to good policymakers are well aware of the challenge that any kind of nuclear use or
escalation would present. so that guess news. the bad news is that at the same time this stability of the strategic level has allowed for sustained instability, below the kind highest level of interstate competition, we have seen in the last 20 years, there's a continuation of a pattern of proxy wars, terrorist attacks and low, level skirmishes and conflict that introduce the persistent element of instability. the threatened to lead to enat vert ten escalation has to unsettle the stability. there are many scholarly arguments. it's reason to suggest that pakistaniy where support has continued despite india's acquisition of nuclear weapons. 1/2 is deep lie restrained in options for responding, the mumbai attack or attack on the indian par him in december 2001.
there's again a ceiling on what you can do without creating unacceptable risk. this led to ongoing proxy war. that creates a kind of grim and very bloody stability. punctuated by the sporadic and intense crises after provocative attacks. this is potentially quite stable over time. from pakistani -- in 1965 and 1971; in response, though to this worry about being stuck in a stalemate, india started to modernize the military and pursue options what to allow for military strikes that hopefully mott cross red lines leading to nuclear -- trying to come up
with info innovative ways to get around the number -- it's continue to go relative to poise, india is a enormous country, growing economy, investing in defense, pakistan is much smaller, peerer and has to run harder just to keep up. so, what do we see now as challenges to the stability and instability dynamic i argued chargize the subcontinent. india is trying to delve new options for limited strikes. it's been trying out these along the line of control and kashmir. modi government pursued surgical strikes against the poise pakistani army positions the line of control that divides india and pakistan has seen a massive extra layings and skirmishes and raids back inning for. supposed lay cease fire in place since 2003 but india is trying put pressure on nix a way that won't trigger the red lines and
risk of unsantaable escalation. pakistan decide it is much like nato during the world war. basically much larger army, pakistan has forward deployed battlefield nuclear weapons, telling the indians if i engage in a limit conventional strike there's a chance that something could debt out of hand on the palefield that could trigger nuclear escalation so pushing nukes forward and leaving a risk of something going unacceptably wrong that witness still indian poile policymakers well see the grim ugly stability but in which both actors are trying manage and manipulate. india trying to escape and pakistan trying to fortify the fat tuesday quo through nuclear postures. this is the good news and bad news this good news, film, ugly, dangerous but real stability. the beside knaus being that strategic actors who want to get around the stability are
searching for innovative ways and then facing countermeasures. there's other things we can talk about here. , "being seen a proliferation risk, fear of lose nukes and losing crowell of weapons in the heat of chaos and crisis and the emerging india-china competition. i leave it here for now and look forward to questions. >> thank you. we close out this portion of our conversation with remarks from page price collins. >> wonderful. good evening, everyone. i am very honored to be here as part of an amazing group. i want to round out our discussion by talking about my research on inducements and how inducements affect the nuclear reversal process, and what that means for the current international security environment. my research finds a positive indukements generally more effective than negative inducements by getting leaders to revaries nuclear weapons programs rolling back nuclear
activities and to the do nuclearize once they have already achieved status as a nuclear weapons state. and for tonight i'm going to limit any discussion to north korea. but i'm happy to talk about anything inducement more generally during q & a. so i'm sure that for many of you the situation in north korea and the tweet storm between president trumps trump and kim jong-un is top of mind and certainly is for me. though potentially not for reasons that seem obvious. so for me, it's not the fear that little rocket man is going to irrationally lob a nuclear weapon at the united states or south korea that keeps me up at night. rather, for me, the fear comes from united states policy towards north korea. to put it simply, if the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result, ensaintes an anti-description of just sanctions policy toward
north korea. professor pape has said it best. economic sanctions are generally ineffective when its comes to counter-proliferation and this is particularly true in the case of north korea. for reasons both institutionsal and leader send tropic kim jong-un. so institutionally, economic sanctions are ineffect never north korea because kim jong-un is not beholden to his population nation same way the leader of a democracy would be or the way at the time president putin is bold hold ton oligarchness russia. economic sanctions are arguably also inciting kim jong-un to more daring nuclear tests and shows of strength. so his worst fear is of american interference in north korea. a big part of his domestic propaganda just like his father and his grandfather before him, has been that nuclear weapons
are an essential tool to guard against american imperialism. so, every time that president trump tweets about increasing economic sanctions or even threatening to use force, he is not only restarting the cycle of interaction between the two countries but he is actually escalating the tension between them. tweet-by-tweet. so if economic sanctions and threats of force are ineffective and potentially even counterproductive, then what options does the united states have in regards to north korea? and my research would suggest that a better option would be positive inducement to offer north korea concessions, and this can take a few different forms. it could be lifting a previous economic sanctions. it could be offering much needed aid, working with pyongyang to build a sustainable energy program or could even just be
changing the rhetoric about north korea and the international system. a e away from the vial dictatorship that president trump most recently referred to the regime as. but something to keep in mind with inducement is that it's an incremental process and that denuclearization is most likely not going to be immediately achievable. so coming to the negotiation table with preconditions of denuclearization might not bell the best option, but rather, what could happen is the united states could offer north korea concessions in exchange for the halt offering future nuclear tests and then if both sides comply and hopefully develop a mod rick culp of trust, maybe at the winter olympics, then perhaps others round of induce. quds be offered. but what is clear is that we need a dissolution and for a different solution, we need to take different action.
so i'm excited to talk to you about what that might be and hear your thoughts on it. i with that i'll thank you. >> thank you so much. so so much to pick up on here. i'm torn to ask followups just on the north korean situation because site present but i think what night instead is to pull the lens back and start with this macro question and then work down as we come to you with more specific questions about our present moment. that is, i think professor pape you made quite clear that you made a strong argument for the way in which the existence of nuclear weapons has actually created a balance of power and a dynamic that has led to a safer 75 years in large measure. for the rest of you, this question before is, is this a safe are more dangerous world because of nuclear weapons? what would the rest of you say in regards to that? anybody can jump in. want this to at the free flow,
safer, better off or more dangerous place? >> i think professor carson thinks that -- prefer pape is wrong. >> you think we are like, hey, nukes for everyone. nukes are stable. >> hand them out at the door. >> that's the -- >> get yours on the way out. >> a free cowboy hat. i think there is an argument -- so i'll start. there is aning arement to be made as professor pape did that there has been stability brought about by the prince of nuclear weapons but not the good type of stability. in some ways this kind of goes to a question that is perplexed a lot of scholars who study conflict, which is what is the mean offering peace? is peace simply in the absence of conflict? right? and but that could be for a lot of reasons. that could be cause the two sides are u.s. and canada. get along great, maybe we tease
other but we have good amicable relations, or it could be in the case of the u.s. and soviet union or the great power conflict, that both sides oar deterring each other and actually are fearful of each other, and so that -- in that sense at that time would be the type of safer world that we would describe. wouldn't necessarily be a happy world. it would not be necessarily a world that we would find desirable, but it would be one that you would see as was laid out, less great power conflict if not the complete absence of it due to the presence of them. >> paul, you use the experience of india and pakistan to talk about a way in which the world is far lest enable dynamic of two nuclear powers. as we enter an era dealing with in multilateral world and with proliferation of nonstate actors, what insight does the india-pakistan example provide for global affairs more broadly,
if any? >> i think just to be clear in a sense south asia would become more dangerous. in a different sense not the largescale conventional war the level of interstate conflict we saw for instance, sit 1971. thousand offices soldiers killed, hundreds of thousand loves refugees, millions out of the 1971 war. but the down side risk is much larger. it depended on what your probability estimate is that we're all going to die in a nuclear holocaust. i'm serious. if you believe that you can build strong command and and control structured that avow nuclear accidents and keep the material out of the wrong kind actors and institutionally robust enough to survive unpredictable individual leaders, and if you also believe that you can build fairly robust communications between nuclear powers to limit miscalculations and inadvertent escalation, that neverring having world war ii
again seemed appealing. i you're pat would is known as proliferation yes piss -- pessimist. you worry about inned a vert ten miscalculation and we're in a much more dangerous world so a theoretical empirical question how to balance different risks s and they're -- they're both battle of the calculation of how you come down on this. basically how well can you manage these nuclear weapons. people have very different answers. >> bob, you made a nod to this the level of individual actors and the unpredictability of how individual leaders respond in the face of threats and the face of limited information or misinformation as the case may be. provide carson was talking about the global structures that have inhibited this. what role do personalities of individual leader played. >> i think it's really do have what what paul called the pessimists. because i think it's good for us
to be vigilant and i think it's the fear that i talked about, which is really behind that. that's what keeps us alert to looking for those ways. the individual is a good example of that. last summer, when president trump started to tweet ask to do things which looked impulsesive and scary, this wasn't just impulsive and scary. this led to discussions of maybe we need to constitutional -- well, either constitutionally or not, take away with power to use the nuclear weapons, right? and i was on lots of different situations where i'm being asked, well, just what are the limits of the secretary of defense here? and so forth. that occurring because of the fear that we're talking about and just how quickly that occurred. so, that wasn't -- didn't take three years, didn't take nuclear weapon dropping. that took a tweet. and it's because the fear of
nuclear weapons is just so powerful. hawaii, hawaii went kind of -- and it's because of that -- >> the false alarm. >> the false alarm that occurred. people weren't waiting around to find out if that was a false alarm. it's because they took seriously the power of nuclear weapons. now, it's unhappy that it's grim stability. it's not a perfect stability. we may be able -- i actually kind of like democracy, so i hope over time democracy can make it even a better, stable peace over time. but i don't think democracy is spreading all around the world in a way by tomorrow oregon ten years from tomorrow. so i like the idea that as we're trying to make for a better, more stable world, nuclear weapons i think are generally helpful. but it is the case that i just would say two cheers for nuclear weapons. >> professor, you wanted to story.
>> well, number one, fear itself is not a guarantee of stability or safety. you can respond to fear in different ways. when i think about the question of safer more dangerous world i think about the things hay that allowed fare to the harnesses for peaceful ends and the'sful or safer or more dangerous qualities of nuclear weapons, none of that's is a product of technology. it's product of what do with tech nothing. when i think about the safer world that professor pape is sort of characterizing today, i think about two things that contributed to that strategic stability. one of them is this idea that deterrence, mute tour actually assured destruction between two countries has to be learned, figuredded out emthe miscalculation happens when you don't know or understand the milner noor the other side is using. iy interpret it as an attempt to take out a nuclear facility and since you don't have any communication lines with them you you take it to the next level. so what professor said i agree with, which is that the south
asian context injure scores the -- underscores the degree to which stable deterrence is the product of years, derek caveds, of development0. a stable deterrence post steur win the u.s. and soviet union during the cold bar and is in the process of being developed and replicated for india and pakistan tisch other thing that has gone fans hand with the strategic stability that nuclear weapons can provide is the global nonprorevelation regime. keeps the number of crisises in which they're invoked to a reasonable number. keep this number of dyadses that have to develop this deterrence and at a manageable level and it's unfair about the system. it's a precondition or facilitating condition for that sort of safer world outcome. >> but as da kickol founder now, you referenced at the beginning of your mark this jogs of the
genie out of the battle. isn't it inevitable we'll get expensive proliferation. the technology exist it. what's your sense of that? we have nine nuclear powers now. right? >> exactly. >> so is it just a matter of time before there's a tenth and 11th and another rogue actor and the technology falls into the hand offered another state. >> you can see it both ways but i don't thinks it's just matter of time. >> or 11 countries, right. >> there are nine currently, nine states that currently -- >> we were successful in reversing 11. >> so we have known the technology for how to build a nuclear weapon for a very long period of time. a ph.d physicist can actually did this as ph.d project to get everything that he could publicly on how to build a nuclear weapon, and was able to find all of the technology needed. it was just a matter of knowing
the technology exists will get you proliferation, shows you there's a problem there he we're known that since then 1970s. but i think the things is a really be point. we have kind of touched on this idea that nuclear weapons creates a world between the haves and the have nots, and i do think that part hely leads to a more dangerous world. so i can try to play devil's advocate here a little bit. i do want to give a nod to bulletin who for the first time since 1953 put the hands of the doomsday clock to two minutes and this is not something they did on a whim. it's certainly something they thought through very carefully. and so the reasons they believe that the world is more dangerous than it was last year and than it was 70 years ago, is a lot to
do with how president trump is responding to north korea, how he is responding to the jury cpoa with iran, and interactions between the united states and russia, and then the nuclear posture of the eu. part of this is also the public and that we have less belief in institutions and i think this is a huge part of why people are fearing -- feeling more fearful. >> that's a perfect segue to your comment and your work. trump himself as a candidate and early in this president si questions the validity of nato to a large degree. right? so where are we with this, erosion our institutions. >> i think this is -- i was saying the other day i studied the one constant dish mentioned about how nato and nucleares are
the two constants of international politic but one constant of american politics since 1949 is complain about nuclear weapons. every president, every secretary of state, every secretary of defense, has main about nato, they're not spending enough. but part of that is why haven't we pulled out of nato, then sniff wore always complaining about it, even someone like trump, what's the point. they recognize that nato is more than just actually defense expenditureses that is a was talking about, it's the -- once you bring nuclear weapons into that context, you realize it's much different. you realize nato is so much more valuable but valuable in ways that aren't necessarily happy ways. part of this touches on what professor -- doctor cone was just saying which is that nato institutionalizes haves and have notes. the whole purpose of it is to say you're not going to have weapons, that's okay because we're going to have the
weaponed. >> we have your back. >> we have your back, trust us. that's why the article 5 is so important to be able to say that, yes, we'll defend you. but it institutionaleyes the haves and have nots. and it does so because the, i have your back, is not the threat of a small state acquiring weapon. it's the threat of the two major powers the threat posed by and still perceived throat posed by russian and this goes back to the point that tornado cohen was raising about how there's been very few states that have actually acquired nuclear bend the ones who have them, they're the ones who pose the bigger threat and indeed that's the reason that the atomic bulletin has moved the club. it isn't because of the threat of proliferation. it's the threat posed by those who already have the weapon and nato is just one of the institutionsal arrangements that's been made to manage that. the other one being the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. >> just to pick up on that from your perspective, us aston
carson, you talked earlier about -- we talked earlier as group about misinformation and you've done a lot of work looking at secrecy and transparency and we can recognize the risk of not having access to information. you advocated for much greater trains sane see when it comes to -- transparency when it comes to sharing technology. what is the tradeoff there and why such a significant piece of this that is missing from the dynamic currently? >> well, i actually have -- i'm of two minds of the issue and have done some research on way in which the more information can be worth sometimes, which we found some history yale episodes where countries were worried if the countries in middle east in the late 60s and 7's new quite our sophisticated the israeli
nuclear arsenal would there would be a rush for the exits to get their own weapons so that was a strategic choice by the united states at that time initiate and then maintain along with israel a kind of strategic ambiguities about what israel's nuclear capabilities. there's a downside. in the work that i've been doing on the iaea, the real traitoff that we have found is that on the one hand governments are unwilling because of issues, concerned about sovereignty and control over their physical space and the information that you can deriver from that. there's an unwillingness to give some other actor the authority to go verify whether or not you are prolive rating or not or if we ever got the world where we did do consecutive tomorrowment to verify whether or not a country that had nuclear weapons had gotten rid of them. they won't let somebody else do it and then sharing information that they might have about other governments deceiving or using secrecy to eevade detects.
very domestic release that information because as our work focus its on, may cans it harder to collection this information from other targets down the road. so, there are things that have been institutional solutions experimented with, where the iaea can receive a private briefing from the french her to german order the u.s., that involves some intelligence and then acts on the information. they don't tell wherever what the know but the investigate. that's one we way found they're trying to keep with this tension but a tensions that it unavoidable so always going to be operating want it sort of imperfect, uncertainty type climate, you're thinking about proliferation or nonproliferation or if this idea of disarming or abolition which is difficult aspect of that problem. >> tell us more about were we haven't had us as much talk of disarmament or abolition in
recent years and the post cold war environment. why not and what are the proctsets as you see it? >> i think -- hmm. well, some blaze has been quite a bit a discussion, the nuclear ban treaty that's been negotiated, and politically those initiatives are going to go anywhere until the states that have nuclear arsenals get behind and president obama received a premature nobel peace prize for his commitment to disargumentment and that got us a real far on that front. so, i thing the underlying reason is -- ate least my underlying skepticism of the process sal in spirit in my heart i want to be an abolitionist and see disarmament some day, but in practice i think you really have to wrestle with this issue of how do you deal with the bomb in the basement? or even if there isn't a bomb in the basement, how to deal with a
team of engineers and research scientists that can over the course of six months or a year in a dedicated crash program redevelop that technology, even if you somehow politically got over the hurdle of getting tier commit it to. so if people want to talk about it more i'd be happy to engage gut that's the thing that -- the sticking point for me, to verify disarm it is a difficult nut to crack and you of the confronted it. >> i really worry about going too low, and i know that going too high is bad. so i first want to say that one reason i think we don't have a whole lot of proliferation is because deer not in an era of a nuclear arms race over the last 30 years. the year of prorevelation where we went from one to eight the numbers was an era of actual arms racing and so is tea arms race occurred, since the end of the cold were we have been going
the other way. to try to really go super low, that's when you can start to design these super slick strategies that paul was talking about, about how to actually knock out the other side's nuclear weapons. so if the other side has really only got ten and this is the india-pakistan situation. if they really have teeny teeny-tiny numbers that's the most dangerous, belter to have 200 than 10 because once you're down to ten you'll gate bunch of smart folks like at the university of chicago to say, how can i take out that guy's ten, and they're going to fool themselves into thinking they can. >> i think they'll be wrong but they'veing think they can do it. >> i think this is absolutely right. if you're going to have nuclear weapon outside want survivable arsenals. arsenals you believe cannot be taken out in a splendid first
strike because if glory a world where you think you have to use them or lose them, that's a very dangerous world and you start to give up preemptive use. one thing people worry about with orange county, that kim jong-un thinks we're coming for him and it's a window where i might become rational to think about nuclear use. so some sense in the pakistan context, the nuclear armed race that occurred there in some ways has been good because it's not rally hard to emergency a brilliant strategy that wig knock everything out. there are people who have made the argue; that the u.s. if itself got really lucky could go after chinese nuclear facilities. so once you start think about real counterforce targeting, going after -- believing you can engage in a first strike to take out nuclear weapons and remove them. that's when you're incredibly dangerous world. completely agree with everything bob said. if you have them you want medium size arsenals.
>> we have had a lot of conversation about deescalation since the cold war and throughout the later phases of it. not as much publication conversation in the most recent years in terms of foreign policy debate on a public. he let me come to you, page, you were talking about poisetive inducements and then questions from you. one of the rejoinedders you can anticipate when we talk about positive inducements would be isn't that just rewarding bad behavior? so what is your response to that argument? >> absolutely. i wanted to take a quick second to tie this back in to what bob was saying earlier. the professor pape said that proliferation ended with the cold war. that is true but there has been a lot of attempts after the cold war and this is why i think positive induce.s are effective because there have been at least 10 to 12 other statements that it attempted to build nuclear weapons programs after the cold war.
collapse so that those weapons to bursts through north korea that is a dangerous situation to be extremely concerned about these policies that we should be tough on those actors. that we may actually break north korea that we cannot occupy that fast enough. >> so for instance with israel to keep the nuclear program secret and under wraps for quite a long time, as far as i know there is no country with a comprehensive nuclear weapon
defense system like in the 80s. what are the chances of program like that is possessed by the nuclear powers and under wraps? and if so what are the effects of that. >> it is a possibility we may discover a way to shut down a nuclear weapon. united states in particular has put his foot down to do just that it isn't impossible but the problem we face the other side to get a nuclear weapon we would try to shoot down has an enormous advantage there are so many ways if
north korea really wanted to i don't want to scare you but they don't need a missile. there are shipping containers we don't look at we don't need to respond this month or even the shear to the provocation but they could retaliate two or three down one -- two years down the road but but this misleads the public so it should be very difficult to do. >> the other thing that i would add to that is keep in mind with nuclear weapons what is terrible is it just takes one. but it just takes one missed
trike -- strike maybe 95% correct. that will work 95% but that problem is 5% you just need one. just one getting through could be devastating. >> i'm happy to bring the microphone to the front. >> the same question with the opposite angle with a missile defense system. and raise the possibility so what do you think of that mutual destruction? >> it is conceivable that could be a case those are highly confident you could worry about a moral hazard so
therefore i connect however i want. everybody knows this is the extremely imperfect tool but they are still very present there is no defense for this and that you have catastrophic events. >> as a quick sidebar so to be staging 1985 december meeting between reagan and gorbachev to say fascinating a fictional account. with that dramatic interpretation.
>> a? j.p. morgan chase last year, toward the end of the year with the sole survivor clause in the event of a nuclear attack a board member could take action without legal liability. >> i understand that is language from the 50s any thoughts or comments? >> since the trump administration has come into office. but also talking about nuclear weapons so why can't we use those? and what that has done has triggered in the public those
that don't know much the details of nuclear weapons, they know they were bad. so what you are seeing are the pressures come in that they are becoming afraid having the effect. that is what you are seeing. is fear. >> so what do you think of the dangers with time passing since the cold war with governmental ignorance of nuclear weapons that is the point that was just made that people who don't really know about nuclear weapons are not
only coming-of-age but with the president coming into office. so that was part of the rationale for moving forward and what did you think of that? that degradation of knowledge? >> great question. >> first i would say it is great that this is a huge part of it that they are more interested in the kardashians to have that intelligent discussion and so what that means in this current era is wonderful. i do think it is a huge problem the public perception and trust is declining since
president trump came to office. and then to set the hands of the clock back. >> donald trump is not a spring chicken he was around during the cold war. doing duck and cover and in new york city. he doesn't even have that excuse. after mac there is an interesting questions maybe we don't know as much as we used to. i wouldn't exaggerate how much people understood but the more interesting question is has the van continuity or expertise to maintain that is confident and effective i have
not seen degradation of that but some if you think of those institutions keeping those nuclear weapons from what you pay attention to so with bureaucracy and professionalism is criticized. >> a friend of mine did a very fascinating study 500 people with senate confirmation with the defense department or the state department to ask them a very simple set of questions. what was the most important things you learned at university? 80% they all said little things but they said nuclear
deterrenc deterrence. and 80% said that was the number one thing i got out of college because that is what we are talking about. there are general worries about degradation but the fact of the matter is it is kept in universities because of the future leaders to make that a great point. >> i'm not sure we want to go back to the early 50s with duck and cover under your desk and he will be okay. so just keep that in perspective but that is of the
so can we talk why they could get it? but the second part is here is the motivating factor mold that motivate him? >> so with a quick point that is a very good question north korea's economy last year estimated at $20 billion the chicago economy was $600 billion. south korea last year was $2 trillion. just to put that into perspective so why was it able to do that? they're one of the most vulnerable states on the planet. and for decades year after year united states and south korea have many, many times
with that technological advantage and we are about to do this again in march. where we will conquer every inch north korea. and we have two more acres to go. but if we can get them to put their resources there we have to stop conquering countries it's not a good idea. [laughter] >> let me just ask one question. so if you were to advise the u.s. government on the top two priorities to keep in mind for our own nuclear security what
would it be? >> the number one thing is the health of the north korean economy. i really worry about the health. we have a deal i don't know if we can get it so the real answer i would give to your question is no. i want to support them from becoming a failed state. so not to abandon the nuclear deal already in place. >> first and foremost so to help them understand the value of nato it is essential not a relic of the cold war but to give up those nuclear weapons
some of those came into nato. it is not a relic of the cold war it is about trading incentives there is a need to rethink>> i want to go back and emphasize what dr. cone said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again expecting different results, right? and i think that we've seen that whether it's invasion, as the ultimate form of negative inducement, to sanctions that this is not an effective policy for preventing proliferation. and to more generalize from your north korea point is this idea of really using -- offering g d
goodies as a way of preventing proliferation, i think that that's the main poll. >> i austin carson. >> number one i would recommend that we redouble our support for the international atomic energy agency and find creative ways to alou th allow that actor to do the heavy lifting and find out what's going on with a country is developing nuclear technology and make sure it stays in a relatively number of finite hands. number two, this is going to sound a little bit weird, but when i think about the trump administration and the scenarios about a war with north korea, i would recommend to each individual person in the bureaucracy to remember that there are noble forms of bureaucratic disobedience. president trump orders any kind of limited strike, let alone a nuclear strike against north korea, a bunch of human beings have to everyone meant that order and they need to be ready to push back using any professional means necessary to
advise against that and not imp implement it if they think it's a disastrous decision. that's what gives me a little bit of peace of mind that there are ways for that. >> i'll stand on all of this and add add two different ones. we haven't talked about the rise of china but the big challenge over the next 50 years is going to be the western pacific and the rise of china. we need to think hard about ways of building robust deterrence in the west pacific, supporting allies, building credible turn post tures that reduce as much as possible inadvertent escalation. you worry what happens when you get a taiwan contingencies. how do we limit those as much as possible. the second is my wheel house is thinking about the problem of basically pakistani nuclear weapons. i don't think is as big a problem as some people have said but it's not a trivial one
especially when you get battlefield nuclear weapons, everything starts to get crazy in the war plans never survive first contact. you worry about radical actors taking advantage in crisis situations to grab a new deployed nuclear weapon and cut iran off with it. that's the one scenario i worry about nonstate actors and nuclear actors. we'll leave the last minute of this conversation to go live now as the british house of commons is holding a hearing here in washington, d.c. focused on so-called fake news. scheduled to last until about 3:00 eastern. >> and we're all thrilled to be here and absolutely delighted with the support and welcome we've received from george washington university and grateful for their efforts in helping us put on this -- these hearings here. this is the first time the select committee has taken live evidence in this way outside of the united kingdom, so i'm grateful for