tv Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction CSPAN March 23, 2018 10:30pm-11:30pm EDT
it made sure all citizens are provided an attorney. there is much to be done to eliminate socio-economic bias in our legal system, the case made remarkable advancements and change the way we interpret our right to counsel. >> watch landmark cases on the right to counsel on monday 9:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. ahead of a closed security meeting members of the house arms service committee on emerging threats and capabilities held an open hearing with defense apartment officials with weapons about discussions issues covered, north korea's nuclear program, serious continue use of chemical weapons against their own people and russia's recent involvement in a lethal nerve agent attack against the former's by living in the uk. this is just under one hour.
the subcommittee will come to order. welcome everyone to today's hearing on the department of defense policy and programs for countering weapons of mass destruction. for fiscal year 2019. almost one year ago we met to discuss this same topic admits news of serious repeated use of chemical agents and north korea's advancement in nuclear weapons as well as metric use of nerve agents for political assassination. in the year between reports of service of north korea's biological weapons program and the regular transfer of chemical weapons technology to syria. we have also seen russia's attempted use of military grade nerve agent in support of their ongoing political assassination
campaigns. deepest to say a lot has happened in just a year. the pursuit and potential use of weapons of mass destruction remains a high consequence threat to our national security. thankfully we have not seen any use domestically. but we must not take this for granted. as the past few years have shown, the use of wmd has unfortunately become more and more commonplace. low barriers and in some places no barriers to entry should force us to continually review and evaluate our program policies and activities designed to counter and mitigate. from an adversarial standpoint i am particularly concerned about advances being made in synthetic tech knowledge he. china and russia continue to get a technology that should give us all tremendous pause.
with respect to nonstate threats, some analyst say the potential for a single undetected terrorist group to develop and deploy first seen engineered pathogens has never been higher. as the subcommittee has discussed before synthetic biology and gene editing when combined with high-performance computing and access to large scale genetic data sets has the potential to redefine biological threats as we know them today. with all of this in mind we can understand the importance of today's hearing. we have before us four distinguished witnesses. assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security. assistant secretary of defense for nuclear chemical and biological defense programs. director of the defense threat reduction agency. deputy commander of u.s. special operations command. i would now like to take a moment to recognize the ranking member for opening remarks. >> thank you. thank you to our witnesses. to provide testimony on the department of defense strategy,
policy programs and preparedness for countering weapons of mass destruction in the fiscal year 2019 budget request. in 2014 the department released its strategy for wmd which announced three and states that no new actors possess the m.d. that there would be no wmd use and should wmd be used -- the strategy notes fiscal constraints require the dod make strategic choices and accept some risk. however increasingly old rogue actors and technological advances are challenging the strategies goals of maturing that the u.s. and its allies and partners are not attacked or coerced by adversaries possessing wmd. for example earlier this month we witnessed a peacetime chemical attack in the united
kingdom and an assassination attempt of one of russia's former military intelligence officers. this attack on one of our closest allies trotted by russian president vladimir putin demanded a strong response which is why i introduce bipartisan house resolution 786 last week in condemnation of this attack in support of our allies. in syria, consider the use of chemical weapons on civilian populations is advantageous to achieving tactical objectives. technological advancements especially in biotech may allow individuals with intent or by chance to produce biological agents in a scope and scale not yet encountered. since the strategy was released the department has taken some initial steps to strengthen cwmd efforts . in 2017 special operations command was
designated as the coordinating authority for cwmd. today we will hear from within a general and the deputy commander of so calm about how the command is leveraging best practices from its traditional missions and lessons learned. the witnesses include assistant secretary of defense. these individuals hold positions that put the roles and responsibilities with aligning cwmd policy . and strategy and programs. and delivering current and future personal protective equipment and other cwmd
capabilities to our war fighters. since last hearing on this topic the department has reorganized the split of the undersecretary for acquisition technology and logistics into two entities and it serves as an opportunity and also into an area of risk for the cwmd effort . they must be continued coordination with all elements of the office of secretary of defense on this front including the undersecretary of defense in research and engineering. there must be continued focus and prioritization of cwmd by all of those with assigned roles and responsibilities. enclosing, there is much work to be done with policies and preparedness. in understanding how dod strategy and and states are consistent with the national
level strategy and whole of government effort. without a want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. i look forward to your testimony. >> just a reminder to our members today. immediately following this open hearing we will move next-door to a closed classified roundtable. thank you to our witnesses for being here. assistant secretary, we will start with you for opening remarks. >> thank you. i am pleased to be here today to testify with three of my esteemed colleagues about the department of defense is effort to counter weapons of mass destruction. the honorable guy roberts who is the secretary of defense for nuclear and biological defense programs, the deputy commander of u.s. special office koran -- command. the four of us, the joint staff, the combatant commands and other dod components work closely together to ensure the
department prioritizes its efforts and fully leverages dod's unique authorities, resources and capabilities to protect the nation. as assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security i am the secretaries primary advisor on cwmd strategy and policy. the united states faces a range of complex and multidimensional wmd challenges. chief among these are north korea's dangerous and provocative testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. the continued use of chemical weapons by the steering regime and isis. china's expansion of its strategic nuclear force. russia's return provocative statements regarding nuclear strike capabilities. and the likely responsibility for the attempted assassination of a former russians by in britain using a highly lethal nerve agent. technological advances lowering barriers to entry for a range of adversaries around the
world. we maintain unique capabilities to address these and other wmd threats and achieve the national defense strategy objective to dissuade, prevent and deter adversaries from acquiring, parental rating or using weapons of mass destruction. we enable more lethal and resilient force by degrading wmd threats, water rising key wmd capabilities and ensuring the department's policies and plans comprehensively account for wmd threats. dod strategic approach to encountering wmd missions focuses on three lines of effort. preventing acquisition, containing and reducing threat and when necessary responding to crises. dod seeks to prevent acquisition of wmd through the departments cooperative threat reduction program or ctr. by working in over 30 countries to build capacity to detect,
secure or eliminate wmd and pathogens of security concern. to prevent the transfer of wmd or dual use materials, the department works closely with interagency partners to build partner capacity to spread and understanding of international norms and obligations through the proliferation security initiative. to contain and reduce threats already developed the department maintains specialized plans and capabilities to isolate, identify, neutralize and dispose of wmd threats before they can reach our borders. dod also continues to support state department led efforts to work with international allies and partners to hold the assad regime accountable for using chemical weapons and will continue to ensure the president has all the options available to respond as necessary. the u.s. and our coalition partners continue to exploit
opportunities on the ground to better understand and disrupt isis cw networks. ultimately, should deterrence or efforts to contain and reduce threats fail and an adversary attacks us, the department of defense is taught military prime already is to respond and prevent future attacks. dod safeguards and ensures personnel can sustain effective operations in an contaminated environment against the dod war fighting capabilities. using the unique section 333 authority granted last year, dod improves partnerships and alliances by training and equipping donations to conduct cwmd operations . dod also has a live range of domestic cbr and response elements and continuously trains and exercises to employ these capabilities which can be used to support civil authorities to help save and sustain lives in the aftermath of a domestic
incident. the complexity of this mission area requires a whole of government approach and strong unity of effort. in alignment with the secretaries prioritization of defense reform, we cooperate closely with other u.s. departments and agencies and our allies and partners. we rigorously prioritize the application of our roles responsibilities and capabilities to focus on countering the most operationally significant wmd risks to achieve the most security impact for the nation. we are bringing together dod cwmd stakeholders to ensure common prioritization of threats and objects. as wmd -related challenges continue to emerge your continued support for the department and the effort described today are critical to understand, anticipate am mitigate these threats. >> we will have to take the rest for the record. assistant secretary. you are recognized for five minutes. >> thank you.
ranking member and distinguished members of the subcommittee, i appreciate the opportunity to testify on the departments effort to counter weapons of mass destruction. i am to highlight for you a few key aspects of the organization i am charged to lead. the enduring challenges our forces face and what the department is doing to address them. i am responsible for advising the secretary of defense on nuclear weapons, nuclear energy and chemical and biological defense matters. on behalf of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment our office also oversees the modernization of our nuclear forces and the development of the departments capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction threat. we are comprised of a workforce that includes weekly matters,
chemical and biological defense programs and threat reduction and arms control as well as threat reduction agency. we ensure the nuclear deterrent is safe and secure and effective and we take proactive steps to reduce and eliminate known wmd threats and we develop capabilities to protect forces against the bmd threats. state efforts to modernize develop or require wmd constitute a major threat to the security of the united states, deployed troops and allies. both state and nonstate actors have used chemical weapons against civilians such as in iraq and syria by isis and the assad regime. russia recently reported use of a military grade nerve agent in the uk constitutes the first offensive use of a nerve agent since world war ii and uk. -- in the uk.
we are just beginning to grasp the implications of the accelerating diffusion of these technologies and materials. perhaps most significantly china and russia are accelerating their nuclear forces among other things in a different to reduce the influence of the united states, gain veto authority over other nations economic diplomatic and security decisions and ultimately shaping word consistent with their model to gain advantage. our top objective is to dissuade prevent or deter state of the terrace -- our nuclear forces make essential contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and nonnuclear aggression as well as nonproliferation. are nuclear forces not only deter attacks by any scare -- by any scale -- thereby
supporting u.s. nonproliferation goals. to counter current and emerging threats like those enabled by synthetic biology and nontraditional agents the chemical and biological defense program is developing protective equipment and detection systems as well as developing new strategies to anticipate and respond to threats. especially in the area of medical countermeasures. consistent with the u.s. commitment, we are eliminating nuclear weapons in colorado and kentucky. this investment is
strengthening international norms against proliferation and use of chemical weapons. wmd threats pose a clear and present danger to our way of life. our adversaries pursue them because it will give them leverage. our job is to reduce any way they can gain. given that our prosperity and stability are at stake the importance of modernizing cannot be overstated nor is the value of protective equipment for our forces. your leadership and oversight on these issues as well as the authorities and resources you provide are vital to our collective success. thank you. for this opportunity to testify. >> good morning.
it's an honor to appear before you today to address the progress and direction. i am proud to represent the 2200 members of the agency who we count on every day. our nation is faced with the most complex global threat environment we have ever faced in our history. our mission to combat weapons of mass destruction and ensure a safe nuclear deterrent is at the nexus of our response to this threat as outlined in the national security strategy from national defense strategy. as an agency we must adapt to be more agile to meet our mission obligations within the context of this threat environment. on this day 10 months ago i was sworn in as the director of the agency and set four priorities. restore focus on combat support, strengthen and expand
our interagency and international partnerships and develop capabilities to address gaps in our nation's ability to prevent proliferation, deter its use. it was most important that i empower leadership and staff to me their obligations within the mission responsibilities. i met with secretary mattis and he emphasized the need for us to restore our focus on combat support. my first priority was to establish a strong relationship with u.s. special operations command and the coordinating authority role. i think this offers us two immediate opportunities. we can collectively accelerate the progress against this threat across dod with interagency partners and international communities. we are not bound by geographical distinctions so we can actually look across to address the gaps accordingly.
we have received operational needs for many combatant commanders. we have established operationally specific theaters of teams to accelerate progress to encounter russia, iran and north korea threats. we have extended our outreach to go after these adversarial networks. we have accomplished a lot but much remains to be done. i look forward to keeping you informed of our progress and i am happy to answer any questions you have. >> good morning thank you for the opportunity to address you today. it's an honor to be here.
two months ago general thomas testified to the house armed services committee emerging threats and capability subcommittee. he discussed the u.s. special operations command responsibilities and on a role as dod coordinating authority for countering weapons of mass distraction. we have made tremendous strides in enhancing the counter wmd community of action. we heighten the operation between entities and developed a center dedicated to coordinating information flow and executing planning efforts thus furthering our initial goals. the role of coordinating authority broadens socom's authority to a more strategic view of overall planning of dod, counter wmd and other
commands. as directed other u.s. government agencies. we are proud to be part of that mission. in the time since transfer the counter wmd authority, we focused on developing a campaign plan in coordination with the geographic combatant commands that emphasizes active prevention of new wmd development. we have conducted a baseline assessment to determine geographic combatant command capacity and shortfalls to establish mitigation plans. we have built a fusion center which provides a nexus for active planning, intelligence integration and assessment of progress. continued work remains as we finalize and continue to revise an active campaign plan. this will be accomplished by expanding and refreshing efforts to assess and understand the evolving
operating environment and regularly measure our capabilities map to these assessments. the reality is that the counter wmd mission is highly dynamic and possibly evolving requiring effort and vigilance. socom looks forward to work with ost and the joint staff and dtra . the foundation of expertise they provide and the value they place on collaboration is integral to success. thank you for the opportunity to address the committee this morning. i look forward to questions. >> thank you for your opening statements. my first question will focus on innovation. as a referenced in my opening statement we have seen rapid advancements in synthetic biology, gene editing and biotechnology. how is the cwmd leveraging these advances in technology? i would like to start with the policy piece and then
recognized that. >> thank you for the question. advanced development of biotechnology, genetic engineering and other capabilities such as artificial intelligence, very much present double-edged swords when it comes to how we look at how threats and actors and want to be threat actors can leverage the knowledge and the ability of these capabilities to develop certain types of threats. particularly in the bio rome in terms of when you look at the degree of dual usability when you look at the skills and technologies as well as the advance information or artificial intelligence sequencing. we do have some very important programs in those areas. i know that my colleagues
particularly mr. oxford and mr. roberts can speak to some of the details. >> mr. oxford. >> >> thank you i think it's important to understand what mr> rapuano said we are working closely especially with the guidance we get from mr. weber's office. we have been part of a community looking at the pros and cons of that technology. at the same time there are nefarious ways to address that. there is a lot of generalized fear and uncertainty in terms of where the good and about our. we need to get the top 10
things. >> let me ask you given the importance of s and t efforts you think our budget is adequate for s and t? mr. -- >> the most important part of the budget is predictability for us and the one thing that i would ask is ensuring that we get our 2019 budget and therefore we can plan and operate based on a known set of resources which we will prioritize. obviously in the recent budget the department has more resources than we have had in quite some time and i am confident we will be able to focus on priorities as we laid out. >> shifting gears, mr. rapuano this is a question for you can you talk specifically about how this program can be used to address current and future
threats? >> absolutely. it has evolved considerably since his initial focus on former soviet union states and wmd capabilities that were legacy from the soviet union. as we look toward the future and this is something that mr. oxford can go to into great detail, we are looking at this what we call left of boom in terms of prevention of cwmd. the focus of the cpr efforts working with and developing new partnerships with nations to help inform and equip their efforts to counter wmd as well as the proliferation of technologies and know-how that could lead to wmd capabilities. >> i wanted to give mr. roberts an opportunity to answer my previous question on the policy side. >> i concur with mr. rapuano. i think the budget as we submitted that's a support the
president's budget and i think it is adequate. >> mr. oxford, did you want to comment on the left of boom as we modernize the program? >> on the smt side i think we are adequately resourced. the cr is hurt. on the ctr program one of the first things i wanted to do was get with commanders and find out what the best programs we could operate. >> thank you. the chemical weapons attack on sergei skirpal provides a try good -- is a tragic test case.
how the policies develop with respect to respond to crisis strategic run of effort and the support partners dictate the departments response. to assist the allies and how is the department working to reduce incentives to russian aggression. >> i will take a shot at that. we are as a whole of government working very closely with the uk as well as other partners and allies developing the response to this event. as you may be tracking the advanced forensics as currently being conducted by the uk, that said it appears highly likely with the information at hand that the russians are
responsible for the use of an advanced chemical agent against this individual. we need to develop an approach that imposes high cost on these types of behavior in order to deter future types of behavior either from the russians or others. >> if i could add to that, i was privileged to be at the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons last week in which several of the nations had this issue come up. it was uniform condemnation of russia for what happened. broke the eu and nato as organizations made statements to that effect. as far as the support that the u.s. provided, we made it clear we were willing to help them in any way that we could as far as trying to track down and
chemically analyze what was happening. but there was a lot of support overseas for the efforts. >> at least the president was more vocal on this front as well. is a mention in my opening statement the department of defense provides opportunity and potential risk in coordinating programs across the department. historically cwmd has been treated as a specialized issue with somewhat summary of the policies. mr. rapuano can you please describe how there will be coordination to establish policies and procedures for developing programs to support current cwmd goals and enforce preparedness? >> i will take a shot at the policy piece. as i noted in my opening
remarks, i am the lead for the development of strategy and policy on cwmd for the secretary . there are many other critical functions within the department including atl that are necessary and critical to support the driver efforts. the secretary has made clear that we have got to achieve a higher unity of effort in terms of how the threat is involved in increased and the myriad capabilities and functions within the department. we have engaged from the get- go, since i came into my position, working with mr. roberts as well as mr. oxford as well as socom as the coordinating authority on how we are prioritizing and how we are focusing and how we are synthesizing our efforts to ensure that we are getting at the most significant threats in the most effective manner
possible. >> i can certainly echo what mr. rapuano said . combating wmd development in my view requires that the offices coordinate closely. i am happy to report that i think our cooperation and coordination is outstanding. my office serves as the principal point of contact in the office of undersecretary for acquisition sustainment for the counter wmd issues and we develop again in coordination with the officer mr. rapuano , policies and we make recommendations among other things the u.s. nuclear weapons, medical and nonmedical defense, safety and security, chemical and biological agents, safety and save destruction of current chemical weapons up all
-- stockpile. i think that relationship will grow stronger over time as we continue to look to other agencies within dod that have a role to play in this area. >> thank you for your testimony. >> thank you. lieutenant general, my question is for you. in your testimony talked about the need for exquisite access and you began to sort of discuss the extent to which we are trying to get information in what are challenging areas. some of the most difficult in which we operate. could you in an open setting talk about why you think what we are doing now is going to be more effective in that regard? in particular in areas connected to nonproliferation.
ice understand there are other responsibilities and offices for that. but as you look at the north korea threat, i am not talking about whether or not we have to take military action but looking at nonproliferation issues, how you feel we are in a better position today to be able to ensure that we know what is happening with those nuclear materials and others. >> thank you for the question. i think probably fundamental to that is in our efforts with counter wmd we are tied closely to the national defense strategy . the clear articulation in terms of prioritization and how our national defense strategy is constructed has been a great utility. in terms of assets, mostly as you refer to the capabilities associated to have information we need in order to conduct the missions not only in a planning
context but a tactical context. i would say i believe there is been a significant change with the emphasis in those hard problem sets and in the competitor range that allow us to open up that planning beyond just a counter mission that we typically focused on with our previous mission sets. and open us to look at the harder ones. it requires a whole of government approach. and allow us to continue with our interagency coordination to achieve that. >> you also talked about in the precrisis scenario the extent to which other agencies have responsibilities. could you define what would constitute a crisis and how we would determine that you are hearing the responsibility in terms of these issues and how
the responsibility has shifted from other agencies? >> i guess i would define that as precrisis being short of conflict. active and open. which is where the department of defense and i would for this toward the policy folks. it is where dod would look to take on primacy rather than a supporting effort. right now are counter wmd effort is held best to orchestrate the department of defense activities in that precrisis phrase to look at the problem set and work with it from a deterrence perspective. the shift being when it crosses the line into open and active conflict. >> i will have additional questions in the closed setting.
>> mr. oxford, the question about the turnaround time that dtra has when you get the request and you prototype and develop and produce. by using a separate process outside of acquisition or not? is there anything you need to change or we need to consider changing within the process you use to increase -- shorten the turnaround time? >> thank you for the question. it depends on the complexity of the problem we have been asked to resolve. we can talk about this more in the closed session. we have been known to turn it back in 12 days. that is to provide limited numbers of capabilities. in many cases we are looking at a two or three year time period.
we have a lot of requirements from the undersecretary to make sure we're looking at every contracting vehicle possible as opposed to the contracting vehicle people have used traditionally to look at these various levels of complexity of the problem and what the appropriate contracting vehicle is to get after the problem. the cycle will be predicated on the complexity and the vehicle we can use -- as an agency we became traditionalist in our contracting and we are opening the lens through this innovation board and bringing in new contracting officers to get the problems in a more holistic way and with more innovation. you bring in new contracting officers from other agencies in dod. we will hire new people. the undersecretary has told us to make sure all of our contracting officers are trained in other transactional authorities. it's something she wants. we have people that are using
ota at this point in time but it will be a bigger part of our future >> i know you said you could cover other things in the closed session. >> yes. >> mr. roberts, i think this is for you. it's about the proliferation security initiative. with that before you or mr. rapuano? is psi still helping to prevent wmd perforation? to improve upon changes. >> absolutely. really the driving purpose of psi is to shape the environment in terms of partners, allies,
international community with regards to the importance as well as the how to's associated with enforcing un security council sanctions with regards to proliferation. it's active in terms of the education process and that consensusbuilding process in supporting the maximum rusher campaign against north korea. >> our partners in psi, have they been willing to utilize -- are you hearing any reluctance from partners to utilize their own laws or rules? >> the actual coordination of activities really falls into other categories beyond psi. psi is more about the engagement, education, consensusbuilding. in terms of specific actions, those are handled in a variety of different ways that we can speak to during the closed session.
>> this may be for mr. oxford. there appears to be some overlap in our capabilities between the dob -- dam -- dod -- >> there is always interagency strife. we follow suit as a performer through mr. roberts office. they handle the prioritization of what we are tasked to do. >> if i could comment on that. we have in fact established medical countermeasures platform within what we established as the advanced development and manufacturing center in florida. this is a facility that is
contract operated and owned but we provided the equipment that provides us different circumstances rapidly develop vaccines for the war fighter. and also over agents that would not be normally profitable for big pharma. this is a new innovative thing that is up and running. it provides us a capability that is not in the civilian community. >> i will move to the second round of questions and break for the closed session. i want to direct this first to socom and then dtra. given the threat of biological and chemical agents what is there ability to operate in a contaminated environment? to have a good equipment or readiness concern? i want to ask that question broadly and specifically with the north korea threat.
>> we do have the ability to operate in those environments. we continue and are enhancing training throughout dod in the sense of being able to operate in those environments given the emerging and more prevalent threats than what we have had in the past. we have always have a capability. even in the iraq and syria mission sets where chemicals have been used we have been able to respond to those adequately with the proper protection, proper forces and able to work from it. some of the specifics with north korea i prefer to wait until the closed session. >> more details in the closed session if we get. i will say that after 17 years of the counterterrorism fight we are finding things we did with big forces are under stress. as we look at north korean or
other engagements against those threats, we need to rebalance the force and i think the secretary mattis would say back to preparedness and modernization would be his top priorities. >> mr. roberts, your office overseas the chemical the militarization program. can you update on how this work is progressing? understand there has been some contract issues. >> our biggest -- first of all we have two facilities. our biggest challenges right now, the bluegrass facility is not up and running and will not be until next year. pueblo facility, we have had some problems with the throughput of the neutralization and treatment process. as a result we have not actually been dismantling and
destroying the munitions since last august. we are hoping that the facility will be up and running by july. as it stands now, given all the other things that we are doing, working closely with the contractor we believe we will meet the december 31 the december 31, 2023 deadline. >> my last question is for mr. oxford. which has to do with rapid development and fielding. what has dtra learn from the rapid capability delivery? >> i think the biggest issue is to understand the operational requirements. we created a strategic imperative within the agency. illuminating the entire network and identify through intel analysis how you get to the solution space and allows us to
rapidly turn questions to take the ability to tailor the response and identify commercial capabilities as opposed to developing them within the department which has been the traditional approach. and having adequate test and evaluation process tailored to the complexity of the problem. >> thank you to the witnesses. mr. oxford, how is dtra coordinating s&p and r&d with research and engineering community? >> a couple of things. i have a working agreement with steve walker.
he spent the day with us. we are a transition partner. regarding the national labs, i hosted 10 national labs and talked about a path forward where we will meet with labs and identify capabilities and figure out working with the leadership how to gain access to those laboratories in a way that meets the solution space. my head of research and development is a member of the executive committee under mr. griffin. he meets with his seniors on a quarterly basis. even though mr. griffin has been in office a short while we have direct connectivity into his chain. >> i believe a whole of government effort is required to support cwmd strategy and policy . can you please
describe your work with other agencies to achieve your strategic cwmd objectives ? how is under resourcing and marginalizing of other agencies such as the department of state affected the cwmd effort ? >> to your point congressman, it truly is a whole of government effort. when you look at particularly in the acquisition, capability, development on the part of adversaries or potential adversaries, many of those introductions, many interventions and efforts to get at the pathways we call in terms of the routes for individuals who are not state actors or develop the capability are getting at the diplomatic piece, arms control, compliance piece, economic sanctions. we have the treasury,
department of commerce, dhs in terms of export control issues. we meet on a constant basis. weekly in terms of at the white house and the pcc at other interagency constructs that we can speak in more detail in closed session. it truly is a well integrated effort in terms of all the different players. >> i don't want to hear the good news. i want to hear how the under resourcing and marginalizing such as the department of state has affected this cwmd ? >> i cannot speak to other agencies. i will note that it is ongoing and strong. >> i can address that. we had it -- a meeting that we can talk about it in the closed session. the challenge is illuminating
the network so we can get the interagency involved in getting after the threats within their authorities as far as becoming a problem. we are reemphasizing the need for the interagency to be involved in what the burden is on many other interagency partners is lack of information that dod often has but we have not always shared. getting better information sharing further and neighbors -- >> thank you. lieutenant general noted, how are each of you working to
bring clarity to cwmd roles and responsibilities as well as policies and programs so that the efforts are across the dod? >> the first thing we are focused on doing is prioritization. all wmd is not equal. and all wmd is not equally interdict the bowl in the sense that will look at the different pathways and means of acquisition of different actors, we need to be and are prioritizing who the actors that represent the biggest risk and threat. therefore what pathways and activities we will focus on. and identify the agencies with the information authorities and capabilities necessary to work with others to most effectively get at that acquisition and deny it.
>> we continue to work with the services and the joint requirements office to align. we arrive i will be called a joint priority list which identifies as capabilities. we are in close collaboration with the end-users. i think the process as our overarching allows us to effectively identify the priorities that need to be addressed. in order of priority. >> i have two quick things. one is developing a functional campaign plan which socom has done. which harmonizes and coordinates the activity does. and the creation of the fusion
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