tv Demographics the Future Political Landscape CSPAN April 17, 2018 10:52am-1:02pm EDT
science, love and common sense." watch 1968, america in turmoil, women's rights, live sunday at 8:30 a.m. eastern. on c-span's washington journal and on american history tv on c-span 3. now to a conversation on changing demographics in the u.s. and what it means for electoral politics. the bipartisan policy center, center for american progress, brookings institution and american enterprise institute are releasing a report on the topic, this is just over two hours. welcome to the bipartisan policy center, i'm john, your democracy project here. we are happy to see all of you and all of you viewing from afar here at a very important fourth anniversary of a project going on called the states of change. the states of change is a coalition of a number of think
tanks working on election demographic work and includes, we are happy to be part of this, but with the senate for american progress, the brookings institution, now the public research, public religion research institute as well as some other think tanks like others on our advisory board. this is a project that covers the political spectrum and has involved a lot of talents around town. i'm here to welcome you, to introduce you and set up the day. the first panel is going to be the release of a report we put out each year and it really is a look at election demographics, how demographic data interact with our political data and what scenarios might look like going forward. this is the fourth annual report we're putting out. especially unfortunately no
especially you'll note the report looks at the 2016 election, the first to incorporate that data and breaks things down this time with a white college and noncollege voters who were always in our early reports but lumped together and with the other groups we look at we have a pretty good look at what scenarios are going forward including that group. again, the people on the panel here don't need much introduction. i'm going to introduce first we're going to have three commentators at the end, but i'll mention them and won't give long introductions but we've got mark hugo lopez from the pew research center, matt morrison and amy walter. you will hear from them after the initial presentation and then i reserve here for our three key authors of the report that has been released today, rudy teixeira, bill friday of the brookings institute and now at the public religion research institute and they will make a
presentation, they'll take questions, there will be some interaction among the panelists and then time for you. just looking slightly further ahead, we've always in this project wanted to get reaction to this data from a different -- from several different perspectives and a second panel will follow this one where rudy and i will come and join with two people who have written papers for us and looked in depth at the report from a republican and democratic perspective, anna greenberg will be with us, we can introduce her later, and shawn trendy on the republican side. that's the day. we look forward to having you with us. i will turn it over to rob griffin for this panel. >> thanks, john. thanks, everybody, for being here. i know it's a rainy, monday morning. so just to kick this off, we are going to do a short presentation by bill rudy and myself where we will go over sort of some of the top line findings of the report. but just to sort of point with
two things out to to you to hold on to, because we will throw numbers and simulations. the demographics of the country are changing and some of these changes are going to come to define the electoral landscape of future american elections, how the parties are going to need to strategize and what sort of incentives they will have going forward. so those are sort of the two big things to take away today. and without much ado i will turn it over to bill frye who will walks us through some of those demographic changes. bill. >> okay. well i'll kick it off. i think most people understand that the election of donald trump and the elections of barack obama in 2008 and 2012 were heavily affected by the changing dem graphics in the united states. and what i'm talking about there, is the increased diversity of the electorate, the aging of the electorate, and the increased disparity between
educated and say college and non-college voters in the u.s. i think all of those groups their propensity to vote differently and their changing in the demography of the country had a big effect on some of the outcomes we saw in all of those elections and will probably have bigger impacts on the elections to come. and so this 2018 report that we've written, a fourth in a series, as john has said, again, takes a lot of attention to the underlying demographics of the u.s. that's a key part of our research here. the underlying demographics, how it's changing and affects election outcomes and politics in the future. now two years ago, before the 2016 election, we put out a similar report. that report projected the 2016 election and several different respects. we had several simulations and several different outcomes based on the 2012 guided by the 2012 votes. so we sort of used the 2012 votes, tweaked them in different ways to simulate different results for the 2016 election.
those of you who may recall, four of the outcomes would have elected a democratic president in 2016, two of those outcomes would have elected a republican president in 2016 and without patting ourselves on the back too much one of those republican outcomes if you looked at the electoral college, the shape of the states in the electoral college, not too much different than what actually happened in 2016, although a lot of people didn't believe that one. we put it out back then. this new report we're projecting 2020 election and all the presidential elections to 2036, projecting and not predicting, and what we do has many different scenarios with many assumptions about how voters will change. what's common among all these different projections is the underlying demographics of the electorate. there are two things different about this report from the last report. one is we're using 2016 as the base, rather than 2012, and secondly, we're adding to the demographic projections
education as well as race and age because we saw as a result of the 2016 election, the election of donald trump, non-white -- white, noncollege voters, made a big difference and they're in there as well as education in jen until our projections. so that's what we're going to be doing with our simulations going forward. my job right now is to take you through a little bit of the demographics, underlying demographics of these projections and that will be followed by a discussion of different scenarios. let's talk about race and ethnicity going forward. in 2016, the eligible voter population was 69% white, 31% minority. if we move up to 2036, which is the last of our projections, 41% of the eligible voters will be minorities, the percentage that are hispanic from 12% to 17%, african-americans, stay pretty flat from 12 to 13%, asian and other races from 3 to 7%. so we see that we're becoming
more diverse nationally but what's really important is what's going on in different states. now this chart shows two maps of the united states. it shows the racial diversity of different states in 2016, where the darker the green, the higher the percentage of the electorate are minorities and going up to 2036. now in 2016, there were three states, hawaii, california, and new mexico, that were minority white. four others were more than 40% of the states were minorities including texas, mississippi, georgia, and maryland if we move to 2036, by then many more states are at least 40% minority, that includes texas, which by then becomes minority white, that occurs in 2020 according to our projection, nevada will be minority white and other states will have 40% of their electorate minority, arizona, florida, virginia, louisiana, and also three urbanized northern states,
illinois, new jersey and new york. you can see that's happening and why, the dispersion inward new minorities in the united states. hispanics moving inward or upward from texas or florida, to the other states. if you look at nevada, for example, 2016, 60% of nevada's eligible voters were white, but if we move up to 2036, that 60% goes down to 45% because of the dis pergs, more hispanics and asians moving into nevada. in the southeast, georgia, a largely major minority group or african-americans, even more african-americans moved to georgia, one of the biggest detractors of the african-americans in the united states, but also more hispanics and asians moving to georgia. georgia has had a 60% white eligible voter population in 2016, goes down to nearly 50% white in 2036. that will be the case, not quite as big of a change in states like virginia, north carolina,
and other parts of the south. if you think about it this way, a lot of these southern states and even some of the mountain west states prior to barack obama's election in 2008, were largely republican states for many elections. some shifts but for many elections those states were republican states by virtue of the strong white voting preference. they're becoming much more minority over time and more in play for the democrats. the other side when you look at the whiter states, the other parts of the country, those states, too, are becoming a little bit more diverse over time. even in 2036, quite a slew of states will have at least 70% of their eligible voters that are white, these include the famous states of wisconsin, michigan, ohio, and pennsylvania, that stuck out in the 2016 election as moving republican because of their largely white votes. so we're seeing these shifts going over time not in the same way in different states but affecting parties in different ways. let's look at age. if you look at the age
structure, this chart shows the percentage of the eligible voter population in different age groups over time. the only age group that's increasing between 2016 and 2036 is the 65 and over population. these are, of course, baby boomers. a lot of them, myself included, in this room. as we move from that age, these folks are going to already turn 65 or going to turn 65. you might look at this chart and say what about the decline in the 18 to 29-year-olds. aren't millennials growing? that's true, but millennials will not forever be 18 to 29. in fact, the oldest millennial now is 37. soon more millennials will be over age 30 than under age 30. that's something to keep in mind when you think of the young voter population. still, you think of how this is across states aside from states like florida and arizona and south carolina that are big retirement magnets, most of the states that have older populations tend to be declining in population, because it's the
young people who leave or tend to be whiter states because the white population, older age structure than the minority age structure. we project that in 2036 the state of maine, one third of its eligible voters will be over age 65. similarly with the state of florida. of course the big shift and the new part of our projections this time, is incorporating the educational attainment of the eligible voter population. this chart shows between 2016 and 2036, the percentage of the electorate who are white, noncollege, white, who do not have a college degree, go from 46% to 37%. those are still pretty high numbers, as being a part of the electorate over time. what's even more important is looking at the geographic distribution of these noncollege whites and here's a map. of course the greener parts of the country are the ones with the highest percentage of noncollege whites. west virginia leads all in 2016. 75% of west virginians eligible
voters were noncollege whites. in texas only 34%. california it was only 28%. and in washington, d.c., only 6% of the eligible voters were noncollege whites. about the same percentage that donald trump got. you might want to look back there. what's more important is for 28 states, more than half of your eligible voters are noncollege whites that include again wisconsin, michigan, ohio, and pennsylvania. and even if you project this up to 2036, most of those 28 states will have at least 45% of their eligible voters as noncollege whites. that tells us something about how the electoral college might be different for different parties over time. so i'm going to stop here except to say, that these projections by education, by race, by age, we're doing for the whole country and for each of the 50 states. these are the background, this is the bed rock of these
simulations we're doing and what the simulations do is make different assumptions about the turnout of these groups and the voting behavior of these groups and now going to pass the baton to rob who will tell us all about that. >> thanks, bill. so, just to recap a little bit, the country is changing. it's been getting more racially diverse, and getting older and educated. what does this mean for politics and for the democratic party and republican party going forward and the types of strategies they might pursue. well one of the things that we decided to do was run a bunch of simulations. i want to key in on that word for a second. simulations. not predictions. we're not in the prediction game. a bad time to get night it in general, we're not going to do so after the 2016 election. how we like to talk about these they're base lines for thinking about the future. the future is always sort of inherently hard to understand, right. nobody can predict the martian
invasion of 2024, things like that. it's really hard to sort of not say really predict but use these simulations to sort of have the contours of the future in mind. how can we sort of think about what might come tomorrow. as bill kind of explained, all the simulations we're about to present they use the same set of demographic projections but we will kind of go in and turn the knobs a little bit and say what if this group turned out a little bit more, what if that group supported the democratic party a little more, what if two knobs move at once and some things dependent on one another, would mean gaining among the other. we'll start off with a simple one, one we call 2016 forward. so with the 2016 forward simulation does, it says what if people voted exactly as they did in 2016, they turned out to vote in exactly the same way, and they voted for the candidates in the exact same way they did in 2016. the onlying that i changes is
the demographics. to walk you through our sort of visual sort of legend here, at the top of each of these you will see what actually happened in 2016, and we've selected out for each of the scenarios a number of key states sort of interesting in that scenario. and you can see just sort of by the color coding here we have iowa, texas, and ohio, going sort of deep red, strongly republican wins, an then georgia, north carolina and the rest sort of being a moderate or lean republican win. on the right over here we also have what happened in the electoral college which went for donald trump and the popular vote which went for hillary clinton. so what happens if we just sort of change the demographics between 2016 and 2020, but hold everybody else's behavior constant. what we see is that wisconsin, pennsylvania, and michigan, all go blue. that these narrow wins by donald
trump in 2020, would actually turn into narrow, less than 1 percentage point wins by the democratic party in wisconsin, pennsylvania, and michigan. this would result in electoral college win by the democratic candidate, whoever they are. now, what's interesting about 2016, though, is this was obviously a high -- sort of high watermark for third-party vote, about 6% of the vote went towards a third-party this year. what if that doesn't quite hold, right. what if you can think about third-party voters going home, go back to the parties they typically vote for, that would mean a lot of jill stein voters back to the democratic party, johnson voters to the republican party, about 100% of mcmullen voters back to the republican party in utah, what happens under that scenario? it's not something i have displayed here but i can walk you through it. we expect michigan and pennsylvania to go democratic, but wisconsin, not to go democratic. and this would result in a very
narrow, 1 point electoral college win by the republican party. and the reason that would happen is because of maine's second district. . as some of you might remember in 2016, maine, apportions its electoral votes by not only who wins the state but the congressional districts and maine's second went towards donald trump, one electoral college vote. because of that single vote we would anticipate in a situation where third-party voters went home, and everybody else sort of turned out to vote and everything else stayed the same, it would actually be a republican, very narrow republican win, in sort of 2020. so what happens as we go forward? this is 2020. i'll walk through the results and give you an end point the end of our timeline is 2036. we would see florida flip into the democratic column as a result of demographic change, 2028, north carolina go, and in 2032 it would be arizona and georgia. all of those states sort of going blue and the states once
sort of a deeper red going sort of a little bit lighter red republican. sort of democratic wins all the way out and it would be a democratic win of 350 by 2036. take our second scenario. in 2016, african-american turnout went down and african-american votes shifted slightly towards the republican party. what i mean by that is that donald trump did slightly better among african-american voters than did mitt romney. what if we see a return to those prior election behaviors. so an increased turnout among african-americans, and also sort of a shift back toward the democratic party. gen we've pulled out key states to look at. this is what happened in 2016. as we shift forward in time, we see pennsylvania, michigan, wisconsin, florida, north carolina, which barack obama did not win in 2012, but a return to 2012 rates, and support rates among african-americans would result in a flip of north
carolina and amazingly georgia would join the democratic column. georgia is as fascinating state, one of the few states where the african-american population is growing, it's growing quite quickly and as a result of that, the sort of dynamics within the state would mean that a return to these higher levels of activity among ancfrican-americs would flip this. this would be a huge win for democrats if this were to occur. they would win the electoral college by 339. as we go forward in time there's not too much that changes in the scenario except that arizona joins in 2028 so that out by 2036, or essentially looking at a 350 vote win in the electoral college for the democratic party. north carolina by that point even going dark blue, being sort of very heavily democratic win for them at that point. our third scenario, what happens hispanic, asian, and other racial groups go to the gop. so within sort of, you know, the sort of one of the major narratives we've seen in the last couple years that the
republican party, certain portions of it, have been trying to appeal to some of these new and growing populations in order to sort of -- they think that's a path forward for them electorally. we've selected out some of the states and here's what happened in 2016. what would happen if they improved their margins by 7.5%. so republicans would do 7.5% better, democrats would do 7.5% worse. republicans would expand their electoral college win based on what they won in 2016. they would also pick up new hampshire and nevada, secure the electoral college vote, while still losing the popular vote. this is an important dynamic that you will see through a lot of our simulations, is that even when republicans are winning the electoral college, they're still losing the popular vote if we baseline off of 2016. as we go toward in time, this starts to fall out sort of not as quickly as it appears here. this electoral strategy actually would hold for republican party between 2020 and 2028.
if they were able to increase their margins among these groups, they would hold on to the electoral college until 2028. over that time we would see georgia, north carolina, wisconsin, pennsylvania, michigan, nevada, eventually sort of go from blue as the demographic change is still occurring in the states. sort of overwhelming the increase in support they saw. so, these aren't all of our simulations. we did 37 in total, but i don't want to put everybody into a light coma. i'm going to hand off to my colleague rudy teixeira who will walk us through changes in the white college vote. >> great, thanks, rob. we got a few more simulations for you. hope everybody is staying awake in this extravaganza. and in these simulations, we're going to feature, you know, an attribute of our new simulations, it's very important, we looked at the education gap, the difference between white noncollege educated and white college educated voters because we're able to break up our projections
between those two groups and it turns out that's really important as you might expect. in 2016, according to our data, we thought that white, noncollege voters supported trump by 31 points. we found that white college educated voters supported clinton by 7 points. this is an immense education gap, larger than shown in the exit polls. we also found in our analysis white noncollege educated voters were 44% of voters which again is a lot more than the exit polls. this is an extremely important group. let's look at some of the things that happened when we start looking at this. this just shows you again the 2016 result with some states highlighted. what happens if white, noncollege educated voters get a 10-point margin swing toward the republican party. so 5 points less support for democrats, 5 points more for the republicans. as you can see they do very well, indeed. they add to their haul in 2016,
new hampshire, maine, minnesota, and nevada, for a 329 electoral vote victory. even larger than in 2016. in addition they take the popular vote narrowly by a point. however, that does not -- the popular vote thing does not last forever. in 2024 to 2036, the democrats come back and take the popular vote, but this is very interesting. in every election from 2020 to 2036, the republicans would take the electoral vote, despite losing the popular vote, in 2024 to 2036. eventually by the time we roll around to 2036, the democrats have taken back pennsylvania, they have taken back minnesota, taken back nevada, but that's not enough. the republicans still have 296 electoral votes and victory through 2036. that's really kind of extraordinary. this is a different scenario that's in a sense the mirror
image of the one we just discussed. white, college educated voters continue on trend and swing toward the democrats in a ten-point margin swing. so plus five democratic who are white college, minus five for republicans. what happens if we walk that into 2020. as you can see, the democrats do way better, they take back the rust belt free of wisconsin, pennsylvania and michigan, add north carolina, they add arizona, and they add florida for a very robust 334 vote electoral victory. and that just continues rolling until we get to 2036. they take the popular vote all the way through this and they take the electoral vote through this. by the time they get to 2036 they have fully 391 electoral votes because they add to the ones they took in 2020, they get georgia and eventually down the line, they actually take texas because of the influence of
democratic change coming through that electorate. this is a massive 391 vote electoral haul for the democrats by the time we get to 2036. now, as rob mentioned, it's not -- these two simulations ooifr shown, a lot of our simulations are turning one knob, but sometimes groups change in their voting behavior in reaction to changes in another group. for example, what if the republicans did a lot better among new minorities, hispanics, asians and those of other race, because they made a special outreach effort or sort of made a real appeal to these voters and it was successful. what about what if in reaction to that white, noncollege educated voters went in the other direction because hey, it's not their party anymore. what if white, noncollege voters reverted to their 2012 voting patterns, less favorable for the republicans. what we find as we move forward to 2020, is this actually would not be a good tradeoff for the republicans. they would actually not only
lose the popular vote as they did in 2016, but they would lose the electoral vote as well as the democrats would take back michigan, pennsylvania, wisconsin, they would also get iowa, and though they would lose nevada because of that new minority shift, the end result of that, about a 279 vote electoral victory for the the democrats. so that's not, you know, that good a tradeoff for the republicans. they wouldn't be happy with that. and then if you move forward to 2036, obviously the democrats continue winning across the board, and they add to the states they took back in 2020, they get nevada back, they take north carolina, they even add ohio. so republicans just kind of underscores the extent to which the republicans have benefitted from this white, noncollege shift, and how difficult it would be for them if, in fact, that white, noncollege shift went away. the final tradeoff we're going to look at here is, one thing we
saw in 2016, was that the education gap widened at both ends. the white college voters became more democratic, and white noncollege educated voters became more republican. what if that continues into the future? widening at both ends. and say there was a five-point margin shift toward the republicans, among white noncollege, five-point margin shift among white college for the dems. well, we find if you do that, the republicans actually on net benefit from that tradeoff and that really reflects the fact that white noncollege voters there is more than white college voters and efficiently concentrated for republican purposes. under that tradeoff the republicans actually like would slightly amplify their electoral vote victory even as they continue to lose the popular vote, they would add new hampshire to their column. by the time you get to 2036, this disappears pretty fast. the republicans under our
analysis would still take the electoral vote in a popular vote loss in 2024, but by the time you get to 2028 and onward they start losing on both ends and get to 2036, i think the democrats around 350 electoral votes as the democrats get back new hampshire, michigan, wisconsin, florida, arizona, north carolina, and georgia to make a pretty overwhelming victory for the democrats. so that just shows that if we turn both two knobs at the same time and things go in the opposite direction the net you gets depends on the distribution and size of the different groups that you're affecting by turning the knobs and again it underscores how important white, noncollege voters are to the republicans. so as rob mentioned we have 37 different simulations, we have hundreds more we could have run, but i think you probably got enough numbers to chew on for now and i think we'll move to a discussion.
>> you know, thanks. i just want to start off, i guess with a sort of general question for all our panelists and amy we can start with you and sort of move our way down. one of the things we did this report sort of intentionally avoided having a discussion about this is more likely than that in terms of a scenario. it's something where we just wanted to go after the scenarios that we thought spoke to interesting dynamics and just aspects of democratic change that were interesting. my prompt for you a little bit, sort of your general reaction to the report and was there a scenario that you found interesting and how likely do you think that scenario might be? >> i think that's a fantastic question. i'll start off with my first reaction to the report and which you all touched on, but is the tremendous disparity between the electoral college vote and the popular vote in that in 16 of these -- in six of the 16 scenarios, republicans win the
electoral college but in only one do they win the popular vote. the implications, of course, for that on the populous to see one party continue to win electoral college victory while losing the popular vote would have tremendous consequences i think just going forward. but on the simulations, i thought it was really fascinating, i looked at all of these and they all struck me as something that we've heard eater from a candidate, a party, or an ideological group, okay, about which scenario is best for them. in the democratic party the debate is do we basically write off all the white working class voters that are voting for trump, never going to get them back and maximize like barack obama did, nonwhite voters, especially african-american voters. if we do that, according to your simulation, we win. we don't need to win that group back. you can have the rnc autopsy. remember when they recommended
in 2013 we have to do better among nonwhite voters. it has a short shelf life but it can get through them 2020. then the trump more cow bell scenario, which is do even more with white working class, forget about everything the rnc autopsy said, anything that the sort of never trump said about reaching out to this traditional establishment republicans, that also can work. and then there's the joe biden scenario, right, get the white, working class voters back from 2020. everybody can actually point to a scenario where it works, and i think that is going to be fascinating as we watch 2020 get in the shape, everybody can come out and say well, if we do things my way, see, these guys tell me that there's a possibility of it working, versus this debate about which one is the best.
>> mark, sort of the same prompt, reactions to the scenarios and which do you think is the likeliest to occur. >> first, i want to say the report is interesting to read and i've enjoyed reading these reports over the years. there's a lot of insights in this and a lot of great simulations to consider about what happens if this occurs or that occurs. the one thought that did occur, the same thought that occurred to you, a lot of scenarios where one party wins the electoral college but the other wins the popular vote. i can't imagine what would happen if we had several elections in a row where this happened where the democrats were on the losing side, the republicans on the winning side. look at the conversation that happened in california after 2016, for example. in terms of scenarios, one scenario nobody talked about in your presentations was one about what happens when you get the latino vote and the asian american votes and voter turnout rates up to what you got for everybody else. in other words you close the gap. great idea. would love to see it happen.
i think if it did happen you would see some pretty big differences, but there's been a lot of effort to get out, for example, the latino vote over the years and the story and the track record has been one of declining at least flat voter participation. we tend to be in th in the scen where half don't turn out to vote. latinos are distributed in a way that's not adven takes you for campaigns to pay attention to them and it's also young and part of the reasons why we see that. i'm not sure how likely that scenario is. the accidenter in yo i would have like to see you run what happens if the latino vote and asian-american vote see slight increases in voter turnout but not this matching what we see for whites and black across all education groups. that seems at the moment really, really unlikely. the other thing that i thought was really interesting about the report, is looking at some of these states you hear a lot of people talk about when will texas turn blue and georgia turn blue. it's interesting to see the
different scenarios and when that happens. now my final comment is, when you take a look at latinos and asian-americans there's two things you need to worry about. one the slow down in immigration in both groups, it's happening in a significant way for hispanics, starting to happen for asian-americans and i wonder what that means for the future in terms of growth. the second part hispanic population is diverse. it's not the same. your scenario about an additional 7.5 points to a republican candidate among hispanics, not out of the range of possibilities, it's where george bush was in 2004, so it's possible, but i do think that there is some changes within the hispanic population that might lead to a different set of voter turnout rates and voter support for different candidates, depending on those candidates, and depending on the group, whether we're talking about puerto rican in new york cubans or mexicans. you will have different
scenarios. i'm asking you to do a lot. i realize that's not an easy thing. >> let me write it down on my schedule for the next year. >> you could have a whole set of reports about that. one sort of thought to keep. >> thank you. matt? >> well, first of all, thank you so much for the report. i always find the work that you guys put together informing in terms of how we approach the landscape. i'll say a couple things that jump out at me. one having spent a lot of my youth in georgia i'm really excited about prospects here, both near term and long term. i do think that it's interesting that one of the immediate questions before us is, what happens this year, not just what happens in 2020 and beyond, and so for that, you know, timing is everything. if we think about what is at stake this year, full slate of governors races, obviously control of the house, et cetera, this has implications for what the shape of congress is for the next decade, for example. so the opportunities for shifts for dramatic shifts in power,
are pretty near term. i think the second thing that really jumps out at me, this is partly a function of the work that we do, is there is really no meaningful path for republican party to exist in this country without overperforming in the noncollege white vote share. and that's, you know, national, it's localized, et cetera. as a strategic proposition i'm going to do what amy mentioned, ideological group, i have a perspective f you deprive conservatives of the core constituency, partly what barack obama did to an extent, in 2012 and 2008, then that fundamentally shifts what the map can be. i think to the point in terms of increasing voter participation for my diverse parts of the electorate, i agree wholeheartedly. i've been one of the actors trying to affect voter participation and turnout and you see that behavior is a hard thing to move.
it takes, you know, a lot of testing and adjusting and learning cycle over cycle. it's not that it's undoable. ohio went from 4.8 to 5.8 million votes between 2000 and 2004. i think hillary clinton got 600,000 more votes in texas than barack obama did. so you can have these massive shifts in participation, but it's hard to predict and it's even harder to call. so those are some of the things that really jump out at me. i think in terms of next steps playbook kind of where does the interest lie, we're working on your to-do list. i would like to understand this question at a finer geographic level. if you look at -- there's an overlap between where college -- excuse me, educational attainment exists amongst white voters and urbanity f you look in smaller communities those are the older populations referenced earlier, but it tends to be a
lower educated population and quite frankly less communication in those spaces as a political matter, so those are some of the trends that are jumping out at me. >> let me cue up a point that you had there, matt, and talk about the 2018 election and i'm sorry if none of you want to talk about the 2018 election, i apologize for this boring digress, but from here out we could have a conversation, doesn't necessarily point at anybody, but since the inauguration we've seen a lot of special elections where democrats have been over performing, so they've been doing a little bit better than hillary clinton did in 2016 and a little bit -- and republicans have been doing a little bit worse than trump did in 2016. what do you all see as driving that? is it, again, thinking about our knobs here, is this changing in turnout where we're seeing democrats and republicans turn out at different rates and what demographic group is that or is this people changing their minds? >> i would say at the outset it does look much more about
turnout than it does about persuasion about people actually changing their minds, although i think pennsylvania '18, special election there a few weeks ago, did show that in order for a democrat to win there, while it was helpful that he got democratic turnout, he also did need to win over some republican voters. he needed to get some minds changed. it's true that perception of donald trump in a lot of these districts is different than the perception of him back in 2016. so he took 58% of the vote in that special -- i'm sorry not special, in that district in 2016, it's according to polling right before that election was about 49%, and the republican candidate got 49%. so the perceptions of the president are also having a direct impact on the perceptions of the republican party. i think taking some of the numbers that you put on the screen in terms of the under or
over performance by certain groups and you just sort of pumped those up, especially women, younger voters, and nonwhite voters, who -- and the women numbers right now to me are the most dramatic, whether you're looking at the most recent polls that came out this weekend of just the perception of the president, job approval of the president, that women now are off the charts in terms of the disapproval rating of the president, we'res also seeing that the intensity of disapproval of the president is that much stronger than approval of the president, so i think a lot of this right now is intensity more than it is changing the actual d demographics. we'll know more about the changes of the demographics once we get to 2020 than 2018. >> yeah, sure. >> i'll jump in. so i'll start with pennsylvania in '18 a race where we were
actively campaigning, we had a chance to see up close what's going on with the different segments of the electorate. i think just as a broad oversimplification, white college voters have decided where they are on trump, and so to the extent that was a significant portion of his coalition, you know, if you earn $80,000, have a four-year degree and white that generally means you're a republican. that portion of the electorate actually has started to shift considerably. we saw it in virginia, we see it in place after place, we saw it in georgia 6, and so the question is, how much of the vote does that make up in any given election? so -- an pennsylvania '18, that obviously was an important part of what was a 20-point gap or so. and we saw -- we tracked approval in that particular race for trump and what we were seeing is that as you said, trump approval is absolutely predicative of where you fall. but the second part of this was, how do you get to the conor lamb type of victory and you had to
reach into a more working class portion of the electorate because that's who the voters are. washington, west moreland, green county, outside of allegheny county, somewhat rural populations, that's now 60% of that population. excuse me of that vote. lamb actually shifted in every one of those counties in terms of his vote share. he improved his vote share. so that's unique, though, because when you look at virginia, if you look at alabama senate, which, you know, it's probably not a replicable set of circumstances, but if you look at these different races what you're seeing is that there haven't been a lot of other places where you see that type of shift from the noncollege whites since the last election. so i think one of the things that we're going to have to pay close attention to this cycle or this year, i should say, is to what extent are college educated whites represented in the upcoming electorate versus
noncollege educated whites versus people of color. and the one thing i do want to point out, and i should have said this earlier, i do think that we should acknowledge that barack obama was kind of a unique historical figure and so the probability of getting african-american turnout and vote share back to the same levels as when barack obama was on the ballot, it does require some real imagination. we'll see what happens in georgia. there's a primary coming up soon on the gubernatorial contest and so should one of the candidates prevail, stacy abrams from the democratic side, we actually have an opportunity to see can you replicate that particular phenomena and therefore change the electorate. that's what i'm interested in. >> let me key up one of the points you brought up, amy, young women. recently there was a pew report put out and one of the biggest findings i thought was a huge shift among millennial women in the last four years. today 70% of millennial women identify as democrats or lean
towards the democratic party and a lot of that again has happened in the last four years. what's driving that right now and what do you think maybe are some of the long-term consequences of that? >> i really agree wholeheartedly about the shift of college educated voters on trump who i think were always a little bit weary in 2016, a sense of, i don't know about this guy, i don't like his behavior, but man, hillary clinton, right, like i can't have four more years of that, and he's a businessman and an outsider and he's going to change politics and sure, there are still a lot of college educated white republicans who feel that way, right. i still don't like his behavior but i like what he's doing policy wise. i think for women, what you saw
was the -- right after the election, was a sense of engagement that hadn't been ig night or -- ignited or intensity that hadn't been ignited by hillary clinton, but the idea of having a woman as president was exciting for many of these women, but what they got with the election of donald trump was even more intense in terms of the reaction to that. that's what sort of is remarkable about this coalition that right now is engaged, certainly much more engaged than the trump coalition, is, you know, what we're seeing in the american politics now is what it takes to engage the coalition. it's not that there's a transformative figure everybody loves and supportive of as much as they turn out and are engaged because of how much they hate the other person and that can drive you through a midterm election, most certainly, may even drive you through an election -- presidential election, but it's not enough to sustain you as a party.
what do democrats do with all of these new folks that are engaged to keep them engaged? what kind of candidate in 2020 will be able to take that coalition of women, of non-white voters, college educated white voters, of younger voters and say here's the path forward for our party, rather than just you're going to come out and, you know, throw sticks at the white house. >> so we've talked a couple times here about sort of white, noncollege voters, what we've seen since 2018 is a decline in this group. it's been pretty dramatic over the course of the last ten years now. how -- and this is just a question for the panel sort of how much of that is permanent and how much is, you know, the democratic party can still win back some of the noncollege white voters who have temporarily left the party. >> i might add to that, make
that quest an even more in your face or whatever, i mean if you look at the data, i mean it's pretty clear that the knob the republicans really want to turn is the white, noncollege, so they don't have to keep it where it is, they want to turn up the volume. how feasible is that? i mean is there any ceiling to republican support from white, noncollege voters or do they eventually have to do something different? >> right. you do look at that and you think this is where democrats and quite frankly a lot of us got in trouble in 2016s because we looked at president obama or democratic performance say in western pennsylvania and we said, well, democrats can't get worse than this. if these folks elected an african-american dude named barack hussein obama, certainly they can vote for a white woman. or not. they could actually do worse. i just remember in 2016, same in minnesota, people saying, i thought we hit the low mark with obama like we -- democrats can't
do any worse than this. this is our absolute floor and then with hillary clinton it went that much lower. so i guess you're right, you could turn -- could you get to 75% noncollege -- i mean his -- i can't remember which poll it was this weekend, had trump's approval rating among noncollege whites in the 70s and if you said he got 30 -- 31% margin somewhere in the high 60s, right. maybe. i don't know. what do you guys -- >> sure. i mean, it could always get worse for democrats. >> there's that. >> it's fascinating, the -- you know, so -- one of the values of this report is that it's painting on a canvas that is influenced by other folks painting this canvas. what's happening in the economy, with incarceration levels, opioid issues and when you start to look at that kind of
composite set of indicators the trend lines for noncollege whites suggest that, in fact, it actually could get considerably worse. you have increasing incarceration levels. obviously we've all heard about and we often know firsthand what the opioid addiction means. you're having, you know -- it was -- i regret i can't recall the authors, hess, i think was one from princeton, did an analysis of -- or katz from princeton, did an analysis of the creation of jobs in the last decade, 95% of all new job creation was in the informal seb tore, so uber drivers, that type of thing, that trend line is the type of thing that i think actually drives wedges, elevates differences, between different constituencies. i think it could actually get a lot worse. there is good news for
democrats, there actually is a real credible path and a lot of evidence to support that showing up and engaging directly does change how folks are processing and it changes it in a measurable and a consistent way and so if there's actually an explanation of if i'm in southwest virginia, that medicaid expansion means something to our particular community, then that gives you a different variable to process when you're thinking about where you sort yourself in the political context. i don't think it's a surprise that we're actually seeing virginia possibly reverse course and expand medicaid for 400,000 people, partly because you have had so many republican defections from folks who previously said no, i'm not voting for this, and so it can get worse, but it also can get a lot better. >> that's a question too which is how much of this is driven by policy and how much is driven by culture, right. you know, this has been a culture fight for so long about you're on one team or the other, based not really on the specific
policies that these parties are presenting, but how do you identify with the messenger and i think a lot then depends on who the messenger is going to be, right, for the democratic party and the republican party going forward, having an ability to, you know, actually make significant changes among these demographic groups. >> mark, you know, i want to wrap up just with one question, it's something -- it's sort of anybody who works in the political democracy space we get critique of our work we make too many assumptions about the future of the hispanic identity, people will continue to identify as hispanic going forward, walk us through maybe some of the demographic changes occurring in this community and sort of why we actually might be wrong to assume that they're going to continue -- >> great question. also the general question of, is there really a population or i should say a community called latinos. i've tried to use the word population instead to describe this group because community
implies they all have the same point of view and it's not necessarily clear that that's what's happening. two big trends under way that are changing the way in which latinos see themselves in the united states, see their identity and perhaps where we might be in 40 years, for example. first is, declining immigration. ten years of declining immigration now, the share of the population that is foreign born is under 35% overall among adult, it's under half now, these are big changes that really reflect where the population is going. g t dn u.s. born people, more than by immigration. latin america, just doesn'te the people to fill the same flow, fill the same flows that we had just back in the 1980s and 1990s. the second big point is, intermarriage. when you take a look at interlatino marriage rates, newlyweds, married at 25%. how does that compare to whites
and blacks, around 10, 15%, asians about 27%, but this intermarriage rate has been constant since the 1980s. as we move forward we will continue to see more intermarriage. we did a report recently in pew research that looked at what happens to people who -- who have hispanic ancestry but perhaps no longer call themselves hispanic, no longer self-identify as such. we asked why don't you consider yourself hispanic anymore. these people would say that the number one reason i didn't know my ancestors, i didn't speak spanish, i grew up american. i think we're going to see the hispanic. population continue to grow, it's going to continue to grow at a pretty good clip, and it's also going to be important for u.s. population growth, however i do think you're going to see the numbers slow down and the notion of the hispanic identity might well be different 20 years from now than it is today. >> that's great. so we're going to turn it over to the audience now. there should be people walking around with microphones. i'll try to call you out. just a couple of bits of order
here. please try to wait for the microphone so we can all hear you, please let us know your name, and please make sure that your question is a question. you've all been to these before. gentleman right here in the front row. >> hi, don wolfeburger with the bpc. i'm wondering if these changing demographic trends would point to one thing being more dominant than the other in terms of policy issues, whether it be economic or cultural and so on? does this point to a changing, you know, important issue that would arise, let's say, in the 2020 elections? >> well, you know, the economy is always important, especially if it's not very good. i think that always will dominate, especially, you know, minorities and, you know, they may turn and help turn them out
even further in the future. the economy looks like it's okay now and will probably be good in 2020, although we don't really know. something could happen. but certainly, you know, the idea of culture we saw how important culture was in 2008 and 2012. the turnout not just of african-americans, but other minority groups as well. that is not going to go away, and i think, you know, as much as we want to talk to the interests of working-class whites and rural whites and, you know, things group of people who seems to persist in all of our simulations, sort of there, we know they were going to be there and they keep popping up in 2024 and 2036 and so forth, it's also important to look ahead and -- at the minority population which are going to be a bigger portion of, you know, the not only the 18 to 29, but the 30 to 34, and so forth, as we go up. despite what's happening with the hispanic population and i agree with mark that there's a little bit of a moving away from that hispanic identity, that's
not going to happen very quickly. i would say for 2020 cultural issues are going to be important. >> it's a little hard to separate cultural from policy issues or economic issues. you know, one thing that occurs to me is, you know, maybe the tag phrase will be something like "it's the geography stupid." because if you look at where the move to trump was concentrated and you look at the kinds of communities these people live in, you know, which are very distinctive, they have sort of a cluster of economic problems related to place, related to economic decline, related to lack of mobility, you know, there's a whole set of problems there that maybe need -- could be addressed by policy if that becomes underscored as something that's politically necessary and really the same thing you could say about communities of color in a lot of parts in the united states. they have things that are very place specific to their economic problems, so maybe one thing we'll see moving into 2020 is more of an attempt to -- it's not one size fits all.
there are distinctive problems in disticktive places and parties have to speak to them in distinctive ways. >> the woman in the third row there. there. >> yes. thank you very much. i'm a wisconsin native, so i would like to point out first of all that senator johnson won by something like 3% of the vote as opposed to the 24,000 that trump won by. so perhaps in your demographics in your studies, you might have looked at johnson's vote versus trump's vote going forward. but my larger question on all your demographics is that my takeaway, regardless of simulation for the state of wisconsin -- i'm a native -- is that massive suppression on a multilevel works. so you need to keep down the african-american vote in
milwaukee with strong voter identification law. you need to punch out wikileaks' sort of anti-clinton democratic party stuff online, and you need to work the elderly on the social issues with the koch brothers. and if you have those three levels or more of suppression in the state of wisconsin, it will stay republican. >> well, i mean, just to underscore what you're saying, according to our analysis, there was a 19-point drop in plaqblac turnout in wisconsin in 2016, which is massive. so whatever the reasons for it were, i mean, it's pretty amazing and hard not to think some of the laws that were passed and some of the difficulties presented for voting had something to do with it. you know, it wasn't as effective or didn't seem to have as much effect in some other states. clearly it's part of the
environment there that parties will have to deal with. one hopes they'll decide in favor of a fair fight rather than putting thumbs on the scale, but we'll see. >> i did want to just jump in on an earlier point. you know, we took a look at african-american vote in ohio, and we went out and did a field survey and just asked different cohorts. so you know, voted in '12 and '16, didn't vote in either, voted in '12 only but not '16. we wanted to understand, what was animating people's participation levels. so you know, black voter turnout dropped by 10% here in ohio from 2012 to 2016. why do you think that is? so we were being intentionally provocative to see what type of response we could get. and across each of those segments, regardless of what level of participation they had, the consistent answer was half of folks saying, i don't think it even matters.
so there's this kind of culture versus policy question. i think that there's a pretty big swath of folks who have no connection at any level to the system. so you do need a singular figure like a barack obama or someone to elevate interest when you have to go beyond where's my self-interest in participating in this process. so i think we have to kind of take a deeper look at what the economic interests are, not just -- economic interests are not peculiar to white, working-class people. people of color have economic interest as well. so let's look at the full set of actors who are involved as well. >> this gentleman right here. >> thank you. my name is mark. my question has to do with the white, noncollege educated. it was treated at least in the presentation as a single group, but if you peel off women, is
there much of a difference? and par as concerned about sexual assault, adultery, the whole raft of issues where republicans start losing with college educated women. >> well, okay. white noncollege women, if you look at the data, we weren't able to include that in our simulation, gender, because it would cut our cell sizes too small. if you look at other data from 2016, it does suggest that there was a huge difference between noncollege white women and noncollege white men in terms of voting behavior. however, we do see in terms of data that's come out since the election the noncollege white women are definitely moving away from trump at a faster rate than noncollege white men. so that's a potential
significance. one thing our data does show, did show from 2016 is that if we looked at millennials, we look at young, noncollege whites, and again, we didn't have it broken down between women and men, but they're quite different. they're much less hostile to democrats. they have much more positive results for the democrats in 2016. so it would appear the younger generation of noncollege whites might be much more accessible to democrats than some of their older counterparts. you know, yes, it's not just one big glob of voters. there's very important differences among them by generation and by gender. i think those -- there's some potential there for democrats. >> this is where 2018 is going to be really important to see if those splits -- i think you're exactly right -- in terms of who is moving to or away from trump is not going to actually become
clear in the midterm elections where you're going to see not just white college women in the suburbs moving away from republicans voting for democrats, but you're going to see is the drive going to be driven by women who are noncollege. i am fascinated to see what the turnout level will be. usually women turn out, you know, by one or two points more than men, but i will be curious actually to see if we're going to have an even more significant turnout differential given the intensity that we're seeing among women. >> let's try to -- right here in the front row. >> hi. stacy burgess with veterans vision. my good woman over there touched on my question and stole a little bit of my thunder. i was wondering what role will
these voter laws play as far as your demographics are concerned because laws are changed every year, and every state has different laws. you say african-american turnout was low. however, a lot of them were purged from the voting roll. they showed up at the polls but with were turned away. how will state laws affect your demographics in the future? as far as access to voting. >> so ohio's one of our flagship states, so we have a lot of analysis about it. we looked at the change in population from '12 to '16 and the change in number of registrations by race. what you see is a far disproportionate level of purging in terms of removing folks from the polls based on race. that's not shocking. i know there are several folks who have actually been litigating this matter. i'm not sure where it stands
before the court. i think it's going before the high court. what we're seeing is that even inside of that context, there's still a depression of voter participation. so you have both the purge but then the folks who are left on the rolls are still not participating at the same levels as what we had before. now, some of this is a direct effect of some of these nefarious laws that have been passed to suppress voter turnout. i think we should take a broader view of what actually suppressing voter turnout. i think gerrymandering is an enormous factor in suppressing turnout because if you don't have to compete for a particular geography, for a particular race, then who's engaging, who's mobilizing folks to turn out. lastly, i think alabama isn't known for its most progressive voting framework, and there you saw a heightened level of black voter participation. i think that the objective is clear for these laws. the actual effects tend to be a bit more nuanced. the meaningful effects are
coming from a broader set of suppression efforts, namely gerrymandering. >> i want to concur with matt's point about the message mattering and people feeling like they have something at stake. we heard this over and over again in focus groups, especially with millennial african-americans who saw the biggest drop between 2012 and the 2016 election. over and over again is what does it matter, right. they didn't see anything they liked in either candidate. they didn't think that engaging in the process was going to do anything to make their life better. so they didn't show up to vote. that was as much about it as it was about what's -- so i think if you're thinking ahead of what's the most important thing we need to do to engage more people of color in the process, the first thing you have to start is why does it matter for you to vote, not to focus on what are the things that are preventing you from voting, the structures preventing you. when i looked -- you know, you look at a state like california, for example, that has done more than almost any other state to
get the process -- it's like a little laboratory. what can we do to get people more involved? how can we do gerrymandering in a fair way? automatic registration, top two primary process that encourages people to come and vote, doesn't matter what party you're in. you can come and vote in the primary. and yet, you know, we saw this in 2014, the last time i went and dug into all this, where they had the lowest turnout in like modern history. okay. because -- and when you talk to voters, why didn't you turn out in 2014? it didn't matter. it wasn't going to make a difference. i think that should be a bigger concern for democracy. what voters are saying is i go and i vote, nothing changes, the system's still dysfunctional, my neighborhood isn't any better. or they say my neighborhood is better, so i'm going to vote in my city council and school board, because that affects me. but these people in sacramento or washington, they're not getting anything done. until they get -- you got to come and get me.
don't expect me to come to you. until politicians get that, and i think trump got that with a certain community of voters and they turned out at a rate that nobody really had expected because he spoke exactly to them. you're right, nobody has come and asked you. nobody did say what would it matter if you showed up or didn't show up. i'm going to ask you and tell you what i'm going to do. so i think, you know, that -- for any candidate running for president, if your first question isn't how do i get you to think that i'm going to help make your life better rather than how am i going to change the laws so you turn out, then i think you're kind of missing something. >> unfortunately, to keep us on schedule, that was going to have to be the last question. if you could join me in thanking our panelists. [ applause ] i'd like to invite the second panel up.
>> so welcome back. we are moving right on to the second panel. i'm here with my co-ring leader, who you've seen earlier. we are going to be joined in this segment by a couple people who really are known to all of you and who have worked with us in the past and are working with us today. they have written papers for us, but let me say also they're part of an advisory board that we have, which is really an incredibly advisory board.
they've been helpful to us along the way in the four years, giving advice. but there are other members of the advisory board in the audience. so we have a great group of demographers and election analysts who really keep us honest and give us advice over the years. but anna and sean have written papers for us this year from the respective of the democratic and republican parties. what should they take aware from these scenarios. these papers are available for you to read. one, we have a printed copy for those of you in the room. these are the two papers. the report underlying this project, which was just presented, is also available as part of this package. and those both can be found online, certainly at the bipartisan policy center,
americanprogress.org, at brookings.edu. and i believe prri.org. we hope you'll take a look at both the two papers we discussed on this panel but also the underlying report we heard of in the first panel. again, without waiting too long to jump n i want to give one award to sean trendy. sean was supposed to be a guest last year, a panelist, not a paper writer. he was coming in to really give his commentary and had the worst of planes, trains, and automobiles you might imagine with several flights canceled and could not make it last year. this year was prepared to come the night before, everything was fine, of course planes were canceled again. rainstorms prevented his drive all the way here, which he drove through the night. but he is here with us. so we are grateful. [ applause ] so what we're going to do is have a conversation with you. again, we're not going to ask
them to recount their papers. you should all read them. but the highlights. you want to start? >> let's start with you, anna. maybe just telescope your basic argument for us but also maybe relate it to what sean wrote. i mean, where do you agree with sean, where do you not agree with sean, sort of where you come out in that sense. what's the anna view and how might it differ at least a little bit from the sean view. >> well, i was lucky enough to be able to write the paper from the democratic perspective. as you saw from the previous presentation, it's a much more rosy scenario than it is on the republican side. so i think it might have been a lot more fun to write my paper than sean writing his paper. you know, i think one of the things it raised for me, particularly as someone who is a democratic strategist and advising campaigns and party institutions, is it really hits home the challenge for what the progressive narrative is for democrats. in the scenarios that are laid out in some others that i
generated myself, you can easily win in the future solely on the votes of minority voters, white college educated, especially women, and not ever talk to the white working class. in other words, there are scenarios where you can replicate hillary clinton's performance with white working class voters, which is historically bad, and just keep that constant and just look at demographic changes and shifts in the margins. and win easily without ever talking to white working class voters. tactically, that's a fine strategy. philosophically, not such a fine strategy. it mirrors that all the debates we're seeing now about what the national message is because it's identity politics versus populism. that can be framed in very negative and i think destructive ways for the democratic party. while i think that the most realistic scenario is one democrats win pretty easily in
2020, and that's one thing i'll walk through in my paper, i also really begs the question what is the progressive narrative that deals with populism and white working class voters. most democrats agree it's not acceptable to say we don't care about white working class voters. so the scenario i developed in 2020 that i think is sort of pretty plausible and leads to a fairly easy win, and i won't go through everything they talked about in terms of the 2016 election, but holding the 2016 election constant and then looking at the demographic changes, a democrat can win in 2020. now, it's very tenuous, especially if you allocate third-party vote where actually it's probably a one electoral vote win for republicans. if you keep the third-party vote dynamics the same, democrats can win in 2020 purely on the strength of the growth of minority voters and particularly new minority voters and college educated voters. but it's very close. so you have states like pennsylvania and others where it's a 0.5 margin for a democrat. that's where campaigns actually
do matter. campaign matters a lot in close races. the quality of the candidate, the quality of the campaign, what kind of spending is happening from the inside and outside. if we look at what has happened since 2016, that scenario is unrealistic. you can look at virginia in particular, as a good example, but also pennsylvania 18. in both cases, the dynamics are slightly different. what we saw was both better turnout from democratic-leading groups, so the suburban part of virginia, what's closer to pittsburgh, but also a margin shift. so as an example, hillary clinton won about 51% of college educated women in 2016. that's a really significant shift in margin. so with whhen you look at that c and the fact that turnout actually -- people have really focused on african-american turnout in 2016 and the big drop and the margin drop, but actually turnout went up among hispanic and other minority voters in 2016.
the margin, the democratic margin actually went up with aapi and other minority voters. those groups are actually trending both higher on turnout and more democratic, even as the african-american margin and turnout dropped. so the scenario that i developed was let's say that african-american turnout in margin is in between 2012 and 2016. i think matt pointed out that, you know, obama was an historic figure that generated enthusiasm that is not easily rep lickable by other candidates. let's say it's halfway between '12 and '16 in terms of margin. i had a slightly smaller increase in turnout in margin among hispanic and other minorities simply because they're already trending in that direction. it wasn't such a massive shift like you saw among african-americans. the trend is going that way. then i increased the margin among white college voters. there's no doubt in my mind it's mostly college educated women that are going to drive a margin shift. i didn't touch turnout.
not only did college educated turnout, it just didn't go up as white noncollege. they have much higher turnout levels than white noncollege. i didn't want to artificially inflate the percentage of white college voters. in that scenario, democrats win the popular vote by nine points. so they easily win the electoral college. they win all those blue wall states and north carolina. so that strikes me as if you think about what's been happening since trump was elected and you look at all the special elections and the virginia elections, that scenario seems entirely realistic to me. that's actually without anybody doing anything because so much of what's happening on the ground, and i can tell you this as someone who works on campaigns, is actually organic. it's not because democrats are specifically doing anything to generate this level of participation and enthusiasm. people are just desperate to do something. as i say, i think the implication for democrats is you can win without worrying about white noncollege voters. i think that's problematic from a moral perspective. sean wrote a really interesting paper that i sort of mostly agree with in the sense that you
can't -- you negotiation real events happen. 9/11 happened. world war irngsi happened. things shift and realign. we can project out from these numbers, but nothing is sort of set in stone and nothing is inevitable. certainly there are lots of see na for th -- scenarios that could change the dynamics in the short and long term. >> sean, i think the leadoff of your paper is going to be memorable to everyone in that you look at as if you were an analyst for the states of change project in 1925 and look at some trends. republicans have been doing very well. trends that would never change, that democrats would always win the south, that african-americans would always vote republican, that works class voters were trending republican, and of course those things all change dramatically within a few short years, and it remains so to where we are
today. could you just look at some of the factors you are looking at. what might we think might not hold as we go forward, but also what's one of the see nacenario see in the states of change report that seems most likely. >> yeah, and it's not just 1925. there's any number of -- if i told you in 1949 that republicans were about to win, you know, seven of ten elections, six of them with landslides, you would have me committed. after having been blown out in five straight elections. if i told you in 2009 that the republicans were going to nominate someone who led his campaign off saying that hispanic immigrants were a bunch of rapists except for the few he assumed were good people and that he would win, i'm an emerging democratic majority skeptic, and i would have said
no way, that's not going to happen. these things have a way of not playing out once you get a few cycles down the road. i don't disagree with the way these data have been presented. i think it's important to distinguish between kind of the week emerging democratic majority thesis and some of the stronger versions you see in some of the popular press that just make it seem like this is a done deal. i think some of the issues worth raising with the hispanic vote, some of this was covered in the last panel, but what happens is the hispanic vote increasingly shifts to a native born population as you get more intermarriage, more conversions to protestantism, which does happen a few generations in. does the hispanic vote stay
salient in the way it is today, or does it turn out like being italian-american sort of is for me? for my grandparents, that was it. that was their identity. for my mothering that's sort of her identity. for me, that's the side of the family i'm closest to. but i don't particularly identify. my kids have no clue that they're an eighth italian. and we forget that in like 1985, part of why justice scalia gets appointed is because the italian vote is incredibly important to what was then the swing state of new york. these things can shift in very short order. we've talked a lot about the african-american vote and what i think is a difficulty, all things being equal. i think with president trump, all things are not equal. but all things being equal, getting that to turn to a 2008, 2012 level of turnout. it's not just the historic nature of barack obama's candidacy 2 candidacy in that he was the first african-american president. i think that quite frankly sells
him short for what a talented politician he was. he was able to do that while keeping the white working class largely on board, a tremendous feat that i don't think you would have seen from a lot of the other african-american politicians we've seen along the way. that was always the concern with jesse jackson. i think he has a very different presidential run than barack obama. and then there's the question with the white working class, which is what happens if those trend lines continue. i mean, there are a lot of white working class voters out there. somewhere along the order of 40% of the electorate. now, the problem for republicans is that sooner or later, you start to run into college students who do not yet have college degrees, who are not particularly susceptible to trump's message. you start to run into baristas in that portion of the whites without college degree demographics. so there is a ceiling for republicans there. we just don't know where it is.
and just like i think a republican strategist in 1970 would feel perfectly comfortable that 30% was about their floor with african-americans because that's how it had been in presidential elections for 24 years and then saw it fall down to 10%, you know, i'm not convinced that we haven't seen the worst of it for democrats among whites without college degrees. >> i want to follow up with anna. you have a lot of good things to pick from. the demographics or the current performance of the democratic and republican parties, all looking good for democrats. you laid out a number of scenarios, all of them do very little and you still win. looking out past the current climate, looking 10, 12 years in the future, what's the -- where do you think the party is really going to be moving and maximizing some of these changes? what's the one you would pick out and say, i think the democratic party is going to be doing much better here and taking advantage of these trends
here. and the second question, i know you've spoken about this before, if you saw some weaknesses around the edges of some of the democratic coalition, whether it's maybe african-american men or other parts of the coalition, maybe people think, where would you say the democrats have a little more weakness than people might recognize today? >> interesting. well, i do think -- and this is more speculative and not based on the data -- that a potential weakness is -- and from my perspective, it's not necessarily a moral weakness but a potential political weakness is the femme inization of the democratic party. on the one hand, you're seeing -- first of all, the gender gap bigger than ever, particularly driven by white, college educated women and younger women. there's obviously some overlap there but not complete overlap. certainly minority women, especially african-american women. so you see just tremendous -- i mean, white college educated women are almost becoming a democratic base group. they're much more likely to vote
than other people. and then you have historic number of women running. i have no doubt that we're going to see a pretty significant shift in the gender makeup of the house, okay. and even if nancy pelosi is not the leader, you're going to have to see significant women in leadership. there's just no way you can sustain what is mostly male leadership in the house when you have this kind of energy among women. so that, from my perspective, is a great thing. however, it is clear at least from the focus group research that i did in 2016 is that there are plenty of democratic leaning men who are pretty sexist who did not want to vote for hillary clinton. i heard people who are democrats saying, men saying awful things about her. and sort of saying, well, i'm going to hold my nose because she's married to bill clinton, and at least she's been in the white house before, not even mentions that she was a senator and the secretary of state. just that she was the first lady. and you know, what i think is a lot of the motive -- i did some post-election research among millennials and only 50% of
millennial hispanic men voted for clinton. they didn't vote for trump. they voted for a third party. i think one potential electoral weakness would be a backlash, some of which we're seeing already when you think about #metoo and the women's march, a backlash against democrats from male voters. women are majority of the electorate. majority of the democratic party. but i think you could see something like that happening. >> sean, let me ask you about something you mentioned that near and dear to my heart, which is the emerging democratic majority thesis. i do feel, speaking as someone who's pretty close to the genesis of that thesis, that it's been widely misunderstood and oversimplified to the point of, you know, just being sort of a trope without being a real analysis. maybe you could expand a little bit on the difference between the weak and the strong versions of the emerging democratic majority thesis. again, speaking as someone close to the emerging democratic party
hq, i do feel like you're on to something. >> yeah, d -- >> and for those in the audience who don't know what he's referring to, i'm sure you do, there's a great st. patrick's day -- no, we're past that. flag day or fourth of july precedent written a few years ago as well as later work. that's an important book we're referring to. >> yeah, my book, if i may plug "the lost majority" was originally conceived as a response to the emerging democratic majority. then i made the mistake of sitting down and actually reading the book. i was like, this book is nothing like what i see in the new republic or the new yorker or pick your favorite progressive publication. it's a very nuanced work that emphasizes heavily the importance of careful governance, of you know, tending to the various portions of the
coalition at the time. it relies heavily on the white working class vote, which things have changed if the last 15 years. i agree it's less important to the coalition than it was at the time. but the book is a very careful book about spelling out that this is not inevitably thwhat wl happen. at the same time, it was dead right about the trends in virginia and colorado and nevada. at a time that no one really took that seriously. it got a lot of things very much right. i think it's important when talking about these demographics as destiny arguments or whatever, because the emerging democratic majority book originally wasn't a demographics of destiny argument. really quickly on what anna was saying. i just want to follow up. i've always taken the view that political coalitions are like water balloons. you step down on one side, and
another side pops up. i think that is a real problem for the democrats going forward. you can try to tend to the various portions of the coalition, but inevitably, you have a message that dominates. i think we kind of saw that in 2009 and 2010. we're trying to keep this coalition at the time of wealthy white liberals, upper middle class suburbanites, white working class voters, minority groups together, really caused some tensions and fractures. i agree you can win elections in a particular way, but keeping that group together when they have some competing interests, without the threat of donald trump front and center, i think is difficult. >> a question to both of you, because i think you both have expertise in the midwest. you're a midwesterner, sean.
anna, you've done a lot of work for the union movement. so this is the key region, at least has been the key region the last election, a key region for the white working class vote that's up for grabs. maybe sean, could you think a little bit about republican performance in the midwest generally. we've seen a lot of governors win in the past 10, 12 years. seen a lot of state legislatures go the republican way. that certainly has relied some on the white working class folk. the scott walker wins are a little different than the trump win. what's your thinking about the white vote broadly in the midwest and what we with should be thinking about that. anna, that too, but also labor and the importance of labor and the union movement, both its diversification but also the white vote within the labor movement. what's the future? >> i think one of the things that we've danced around talking about the popular vote is the electoral college in the senate, which is how two-thirds of the government is decided. with the nonwhite vote, you get
a large concentration in states that just aren't electorally competitive. the white working class tends to be spread across the upper midwest, which is becoming the swing region. i think the real alarm bell for the republicans there is the water they're taking on among whites with college degrees. you know, if you want to know what really made wisconsin a republican state in 2016, yeah, the swings in outsta state are t of it. kathy cramer has a good book about that, documents the attitudes before trump's election. it's that bright red ring around milwaukee that's been the republican base. if that turns purple, i mean, republicans are up a creek. the county i live in, ohio, outside columbus, delaware county, has voted republican in every election since 1916, but it moved, you know -- it was still a trump county, but it
moved five or six points towards donald trump. it was a historically weak showing for republicans. so there are real alarm bells going on. in addition to some of the movement towards republicans, we've seen that counterbalanced in 2016, but down the road may not. >> i don't think you can separate what happened to hillary clinton in those states from the assault on the labor movement in those states. i think there's some pretty important research that shows that the elimination of collective bargaining in wisconsin has had a direct impact of the percentage of people voting democratic. it ranges from what happens when people are in unions and the effect of peers and that being diminished over time. but also the resources that unions have brought to communicating with union members and bringing out union members to vote primarily democratic. you also saw the same kind of assault. wisconsin was probably the most
extreme example. certainly in ohio you have also had some real attacks on unions and the right to organize and bargain collectively. i cannot remember the name of the report, but there was a recent analysis that really specified what the impact of these sorts of policies has had on the strength of unions and their ability to get out votes for democrats. i do think one other -- and that's not a problem that's going to go away. even if democrats take over state governments and that's going to be tough in some places, reinstitutes those kinds of laws and reinstituting the culture around unionizing is not something that happens overnight. certainly possible to do, and i know the labor movement is committed to doing that. on the other hand, in addition to what sean said about suburban voters, i think there are consequences to austerity. if you look at the difference between minnesota and wisconsin and how it did -- granted, minnesota had resources that wisconsin doesn't have around medical field and academia. but if you look at the kind of
recovery that happened in minnesota post recession versus wisconsin, it had a little to do with the fact mark dayton didn't make cuts, he borrowed. there were massive cuts in wisconsin. if you look at the most extreme example, of course, is kansas where you're now seeing an actual not just democrats getting stronger in the state but even moderate republicans voting to increase taxes. the austerity reaction to the recession has really hollowed out schools and infrastructure in states like ohio and like wisconsin and like pennsylvania. some of that's been restored in pennsylvania, but it takes a long time to rebuild from that kind of austerity reaction. i think kansas is kind of a cautionary tale for republicans, but i think you could see some of that backlash in those states as well. >> let's sort of stipulate that sort of a weak versioning of the emerging democratic majority holds and also stipulate that the political environment has moved in the way it has since 2016, giving the democrats better chances.
given that from the standpoint of, you know, the respective parties, what's the worst thing that the parties respectively could do to deal with this situation? what's the catastrophic mistake they could make in dealing with this? >> that's a good question. >> can i talk about republicans? that's easier. >> you can talk about republicans and he can talk about democrats. >> we already talked about the water balloon. someone mentioned this on the earlier panel. i think it's in my paper. winning over time with the electoral college and not the popular vote has, i think -- is profoundly problematic. there's two things. one, it can be problematic for republicans and just undermining their legitimacy as a party. you keep winning and governing as if you've won broadly when you have not won broadly. it just strikes me as over time
it makes the party weaker. the bigger danger for democracy is it's demobilizing. amy talked about this. if you think your vote doesn't matter, why go out and vote. we heard in post-election focus gre groups and even now you hear among millennials, hillary clinton won the election and donald trump is the president anyway. so our democracy doesn't work. so what's the point of coming out to vote. so i think that is a danger for the country and small d democracy, not just the republican party. >> i think the biggest mistake for both parties is what we saw in 2005 and 2009 and to some extent in 2017, which is taking a single election result as a mandate to do big things because as we've seen, that's not necessarily how most voters vote. most voters will look at their pocketbook or, you know, maybe look at the historic nature of a candidacy. there's a great quote about the electorate. say yes or no.
then trying to interpret that is a fraud example. i think regardless of what happens, you know, in 2019 and 2021, i think the overplaying the hand is kind of like an ongoing joke online. but i think it's real. being careful about that. and it's tough. your base is excited because they think they won because it's the end of history. so you have to walk -- toe that line between keeping your base happy and the reality that your base is almost never a majority of the electorate. >> and it's also hard for structural reasons, which is we have weak parties and strong partisanship. the way we govern is not conducive to a more moderate, middle of the road come propipr way of governing. with the rise of nonparty spending that goes up every single year, i don't see an end to that any time soon. even if you want to as a party, to govern in a way that's more compromising, more moderate,
it's almost impossible to do. >> so first, anna made the point about the electoral college. we've seen scenarios. since ai've been plugging other people's books, i figured i'd plug mine. if we have this scenario, it doesn't sound good for the country, but it might be good for the book. my question is there's a lot to pick from. generally the demographic story is good for democrats. you can pick the rise in the latino vote. you can pick the decline in the white working class vote. but let's focus on millennials, our younger voters. this is a little bit of a political science question, which i know both of you have expertise in. if you look at millennial voters, they are very strongly democratic these days. of course, that's partly because they're more diverse but even the white vote and millennial vote is strongly democratic. one would assume unless the 10 and 12-year-olds of today are very different, that sort of
marches through the electorate and looks very good for democrats. there's some people who believe that your voting behavior is really formed at an early age. there's certainly literature on this. that you kind of stick with the party you had when you become of age to vote. it doesn't change very much. but there's a little bit of evidence that maybe you change as you acquire a family or grow or buy a house. so what's your thought on that? is the move of young voters through the electorate, are we likely to see this be a democratic group going forward, forward, forward, or are there some concerns you have about that might not be the case? >> you know, when i started writing on this a decade ago, my line was that's, you know, a decade or two down the line for republicans to really start having to worry about this. so now the answer is, yeah, it's up front and center problem for republicans. because their voters are old. in a decade, many of them won't
be around. there will be more and more of these younger, lib reral voters. i think it's important to keep in mind mcgovern carried the 18 to 24-year-old demographic while losing in a landslide. today those are boomers voting overwhelmingly to the right of the country as a whole. i'm not saying that's something republicans should bank on. when we're trying to plan how things can go, events really do impact things. the other thing is that the partyin parties will change. you know, the debate over marriage equality is over. there's still battles around the edges that matter, but the core debate, it's not going anywhere. so sooner or later, the republican party will change. if the country as a whole is 75% in favor of marriage equality, then you're going to have probably a majority in the republican party in favor of it. i don't think that happens in 2020, but by 2030, i think yeah, that's going to be how things
go. so it's just hard to speculate that far in advance. >> i mean, i would say i'm a little less optimistic. obama won white millennials in '08 but lost them in '12. won millennial vote overall but lost white millennials in 2012. and what i saw with millennial voters is a real detachment from the democratic party. so while attitudally, they're split on issues of gender and race and are in fact upset about the divisiveness and attacks by the trump administration on people of color. it's very unique. you don't see that with older white voters. it's interesting to see white millennial voters be focused on attacks on minority groups. if you look at african-americans, older african-americans who still have a very profound attachment to the party because of history, you just don't see that with
younger african-americans. so younger african-american men in particular were not terribly supportive of hillary clinton. they did not vote for trump, but they didn't vote or voted heavily third party. i mentioned hispanic men as well. so while i think that in terms of ideology, certainly millennials are liberal and i'm sure the folks who have come of age during trump are even more liberal, but i don't know they're terribly attached to the democratic party or think the party has anything relevant to say to them. part of that is because part of what the democratic party has run on year after year has been issues that affect senior citizens, especially in midterms. if you're not talking about social security and medicare, you're not talking to 60% of the electorate in a midterm. so i don't think democrats have quite figured out to what say to millennials. i don't think that democrats, you know, often what they default to is talking about college affordability and student loans, which is important, but we know majority of people aren't going to go to
college. so what do you say to millennial noncollege voters. i don't think democrats have particularly figured that out. >> what about the issue of immigration relative to the party? if you look at the data from 2016, it's pretty clear that while trump has this profile of being, you know, having a certain amount of racial bias, the issue that was really most prominent was anti-immigration. it was less anti-black than it was anti-immigration. those attitudes were the most predictive. it still seems to be a huge part of the repertoire. when he goes out and does these rallies frequently, it's like an incredible contentious issue within the republican party. do we see that changing any time soon as a result of some of the dynamics we've talked about in our scenarios, or does this continue to be just, you know, the party's just completely at loggerheads about this and thereby having a significant in effect their strategies and outcomes? >> i think the challenge for democrats on immigration is that it's a much more important issue for republicans. so if you ask people what their
most important issue is, economy, immigration are like one and two for republicans. immigration falls down to four, five, or six for democrats. so you have this imbalance around the kind of communication and activity around immigration, daca, et cetera on the republican and not just mainstream republicans, but if you think about social media and misinformation propaganda, immigration is a huge piece of the tropes that the right and the far right and russian bots and bulgarian trolls sort of push around in social media. the challenge for democrats is how do you talk about immigration when your side doesn't care about it as much as republicans do. i think for the party itself, daca and others, comprehensive immigration reform will continue to be a big part of what the party talks about. for voters, it's less important. in some ways, it benefits republicans more than democrats. politically, that is. i do think, and i go back to the millennials here, the divisiveness and attacks on
hispanics in particular as it regards to immigration is really -- i mean, millennials don't like it. maybe it's not that they're out there wanting to march for comprehensive immigration reform, but they are -- they do want to march against, you know, discrimination and hate and prejudice and attacking people, and they really, really, really don't like it. so it may be that's where the counter is for democrats. it's less about specific policies and what does this mean for who we are as a country and what we represent morally. >> yeah, i talked a little bit about the kind of passing of the fight over gay rights and the religious orientation we had over politics in the 1980s and '90s. then i look at europe and say to my progressive friends, if you didn't like the religious right, wait until you meet the secular right. to you know, it gets to stuff that i think even if you're someone who is not particularly
progressive but more racially progressive, it gets to an attitude that's hard to appreciate at a gut level. because this has a lot of gut resonance for people that the republican party elites kind of overlook to their peril. it's part of what took them down in the 2016 primary. and i think if i had to point to an area of potential democratic overreach, that would be towards the top of my list. i don't know how widespread the ban i.c.e. attitude is, but a lot of my younger progressive friends, that's a mantra for them. i think that would be crazy, at least for the next decade, to really go with full stop immigration enforcement. i doubt the democratic party leadership would go along with that, but there's a lot of energy in that direction that, again, it's hard for me to game out because it's something that just doesn't register with me in a visceral way the way it registers with other people. but it's real.
look around the world. it's not just us. >> kind of like the shutdown over daca. potential shutdown over daca, where there's this big conflict in the democratic party about they didn't go far enough. they should have shut down the government for two weeks just to get daca. or the republicans would have caved. that was really contentious. you kind of see that as a potential flash point going forward. >> yeah. >> so let me ask one question to let you know we're going to be turning it to the audience, so get your questions ready. to follow up, immigration is a place republicans have been moving to be more skeptical of. the democratic party in the other direction. one of the key dividing points on the white working class. the other issue that donald trump was very different on was trade, and of course that's become more to the forefront today. what do you think about the issue of trade within the coalitions? here perhaps in the midwest there's a greater divide between
the different types of republicans and maybe on the democratic side some shifting as well. is the issue of trade something that's going to have potential shake-up as much as the issue of immigration? do they go together? what's your sense of that? >> i mean, i think trade and immigration are in a lot of ways different sides of the same coin. i think you're seeing a shift in the republican coalition, but i'm a lot more interested to see how it plays out for the democrats because i think, you know, trying to reinvigorate labor or appeal to the labor base causes some real tensions on the trade issue. so i defer there. >> look, i think with trade, and it's not just what's happened most recently but even polling i did with tpp, people don't know a lot about trade. they don't really know how it works. they don't know what our trade policies are for the most part. what's interesting to watch over the last three years is how it's
become just partisan. so i just asked some questions about the chinese tariffs on a poll i did last week, and 75% of democrats think it's bad and 75% of republicans think it's good. independents are split. it's just a purely -- in fact, i was working on the presentation. i was like, there's nothing interesting to say about this because it's just a partisan response. you saw the same thing with tpp. so i don't know what to make of that except to say that from the perspective of voters, i don't think they really care that much. i think they just see it through the lens of whoever is in power and whatever policy they're promoting at that time. low information when it comes to these kinds of complex economic policies. >> great. so we're going to turn to the audience. i ask three things. one, you're away from the microphone, two, that you identify yourself, and three, that you ask a question. >> thanks.
a question for each of our paper writers. to anna, sean made two structural points up front. you know, one having to do with the possibility that the latinos and the italians of the 21st century and the other posing the question of whether the ceiling on republican support from white working class voters has been reached yet. i'd be interested in your response to that. for sean, first of all, i have to congratulate you on working in the first eric vogel reference on a poll i've ever heard. congratulations. in the previous panel, amy walter raised a very interesting question on the white working class vote. to what extent are we talking about actual policies and the consequences of those policies.
so suppose we get to 2020 and working class wages haven't risen smartly and most of the coal mines haven't reopened and steel is not doing so great in spite of the tariffs, and life for working class people is not per spentively better. does that matter? >> well, on the latino question, i think we can already see if you look at the differences among latinos that for our native born, english speaking latinos, they're more conservative than foreign born and spanish speak latinos. so there's no reason -- if the republicans had taken the republican report seriously in 2012, was it, about doing outreach and not said they're all rapists from mexico, i think there would have been a real shot at making some gains with latino voters. i think the problem, at least in the next, say, 10, 15 years, is what's happened around
immigration, which i think will continue because it's such a source of strength for republicans, is it makes it much harder for that dynamic to change. and by the way, it's not even so much about the niceties of immigration policy because there are plenty of latinos who don't like illegal immigration. they say, i came here legally, i did it the right way. it's about discrimination. because if you look at what's happening on the secular right, the demonization, just how gross the conversation is -- and i think by the way, that's also important to asian-american voters who have shifted heavily democratic in the last ten years. most recently in '12 and '16. so i think that kind of demagoguery around race is just really problematic for this notion of inevitable assimilation into being just like everybody else. if they had followed the 2012 report, i think we'd see different dynamics, but they went 180 in the other direction on that. i don't know if republicans have reached their ceiling.
it seems hard to imagine democrats doing much worse than hillary clinton did. and already in places where i'm working with big pockets of white working class voters for people running for governor and other things, we're already seeing improvement with white working class. some of that may be driven by white working class women, but we're already seeing some improvement. it's at the margins, but hillary clinton lost at the margins. i can't imagine republicans doing even better. and i'm not seeing that now, but i don't really know. >> i take the view that on a macro level, elections are largely driven by the parties in power. i fully buy into retrospective voting. but i think at the micro level, message does matter. i think democrats were able to do well in pennsylvania 18 because they had conor lamb. he was running a very focused
message that i don't know nationally, you know, the democratic presidential nominee is going to run on. that said, you know, if we're in a recession or there's still a mini recession among some of these industrial areas, i can't imagine trump will be duplicating his 2016 performance. that said, in 2009 -- in 2015, i couldn't have imagined trump would win. so there's a lot of failure of imagination. >> if i may just add one thing here about latinos. mark lopez isn't here anymore, i think, but he said something very interesting to me. the report frequently gets cited. you might have cited it, sean, in your paper, about the decline of hispanic identification among hispanics and sort of the implication of that is that if latinos become less likely to really identify with that ethnicity, that they will become more politically conservative. he said his data didn't seem to see a lot of difference as
factors sort of among these people who have lost their latino identification, their attitudes and political behavior looked very similar to the people who still had their latino identification. i think that's something interesting. mark said they're going to publish something on it eventually. i hope he does because that's an interesting wrinkle. >> i'm curious what you all think about the move of college white voters, how much that's a reaction to trump, if that's going to continue, if trump's no longer the head of the party, and how much of it is really about what the democrats are doing. >> those are two different questions. the trend of college educated, especially people with post-grad education becoming more liberal predates trump. and trump just accelerated it
because he's the an thtithesis what a college educated voter is. also the trend of white college educated women moving more democratic predates trump. so i think those dynamics were already in place. >> if you look at the white without college degree vote and you control for national vote share, you get a line towards republicans. you don't see lines like this in election results. yet, that's what we get. so trump in that respect really is a continuation of trend. whites without college degrees, it's a trend, but there's less of one. i think suburbanites were the republicans' base in the '50s, '60s, '70s, and '80s and bill clinton started to break them away. i think they're the swing vote right now. they're not guaranteed to be a swing vote ten years down the road, but they're kind of the name of the game for the parties, trying to keep them in
the coalition. >> i think the republicans have a challenge because to the extent that republicans are seen as anti-science, right, and anti-women's rights and women's rights in the workplace in particular. i just i just think it's very difficult to make gains, not necessarily with the entire block of college educated voters, but certain important segments of it. and as long as that's important to the republican base, i just don't see how you make gains with college-educated voters. >> you have college, from my perspective, whites without college degrees are kind of in the crosshairs, like the cultural issues that the republicans run do not resonate all all under that. i think some of the -- if you take a bernie sanders progressive approach, you know, that's going to be tough. and trying to balance those two impulses for both parties is a major challenge. >> well, the good news is that the bernie sanders candidates in the primaries have not been winning, so. >> one thing i'd add about white college grads is it was
apostulated in some quarters, including among my old comrade, john judas, that an emerging split was taking place between white postgrads and white college grads with only a four-year degree, and that was part of an emerging republican advantage. there's an emerging republican advantage, but it's among the white non college voters. if you look at the white population, the trends are similar to postgrads, just from a lower baseline. so, it appears like four-year degree and up is all moving in the same direction, this emerging split that some people postulated just isn't taking place. >> far back here, to the right. >> there has not been much discussion about the impact of foreign policy in the various electorates, but at various times, the democratic party as well as the republican party have been motivated primarily by foreign policy issues. and you know, democrats have --
there's been a dominant wing of the democratic party that has been anti-interventionist, and i suppose you could say there's not much that rand paul and bernie sanders agree on, except get out of europe, get out of asia, focus on domestic spending, domestic programs. so, i wonder if anyone would be willing to talk about the role of foreign policy interventionism, noninterventionism, isolationism, whatever, globalism, whatever terms you want to use. but it's certainly there, but we don't hear much about it. thank you. >> i think americans like winning wars, and so, when a war is being won, they'll rally to the party in power. and they don't like losing wars. so when a war is going poorly, they'll react to that party. and otherwise, they just don't care much about foreign policy. that's sort of my take on the postwar foreign policy dynamic.
they just don't know much about it to begin with, aside from this war is going well or it's going poorly. >> completely agree. >> let's go far in the back here, left, and move around the room. >> thanks. my name's tom. my question comes from something that you raised -- sorry. my question comes from something that anna raised and was raised by the first panel as well, in terms of this disconnect in 2016 between the electoral college and the popular vote, and then, perhaps, that continuing for the next couple elections. it's clearly bad for democracy, but i wonder if it's more problematic for the democratic party or the democratic-leaning vote in terms of there not being
an incentive to vote because their vote is not worth as much as it should be, whereas for the republican-leaning vote, their vote is actually counted more than it should, and so, it might not be a discouragement to voting. >> well, yeah, i think i mentioned that, that i think that is the danger for democrats, which is that it's demobilizing, that people don't think their vote matters because they're seeing democrats win the popular and losing the electoral college, and i hear that now in focus groups as we think about how to try to win in 2018. >> i'm just going to add, i think the scenarios that we've come up with are generally right and pointing the right direction. they all show, if a republican wins the electoral college and a popular vote win in the other direction. you know, in 2000, the speculation was, perhaps it would go the other way flp was more betting on the side that
perhaps al gore would win the electoral college or win the popular vote. and i think one other bit of wisdom i used to spout was it was hard to have a split of the electoral college, which was 1% of the popular vote, and a split in the other direction and we've disproven that. and some of the scenarios go further and further apart. >> four points, and there's still -- >> right. so, i don't doubt -- the way the demographics are going, i think it's pointing towards states. but i think there is some uncertainty. so, if one saw surprising trends we're not paying attention for -- i mean, part of the issue was the state of california, the margin for democrats expanded by such a large amount. in some places where the vote didn't really matter, the score was run up. and so, perhaps we're not seeing some of these things, but i guess i do think the data is showing that direction, some of the things we used to think, not so true. >> okay. let's go back here.
>> one thing i was a little surprised hadn't been brought up was the wall, which is the most visceral, sort of, i think, anti-immigrant image that i think did propel trump to a lot of victories, to a lot of places where people did not think that that was possible. so, as either it doesn't get built, which i think is likely to happen with this congressional makeup, or if it does start to, you know, actually get built and you have states like arizona and texas, where it is really not popular, what would be sort of the effects of that? >> i'm curious how shawn would answer, because i'm starting to see, like different, you know, hard core right people upset that trump is not living up to his promises, but i have no idea if that's just elites and crazy people like alex jones, or if it's actually -- who he attacked
on syria this weekend, i think. so, i don't know. i don't know if it's a real thing or just elites. >> i think democrats have very much dojd a bullet with the trump administration. i think if he had led with something like infrastructure instead of the muslim ban/travel ban, you would have a very different dynamic. and i think it was brain-dead idi idiocy to take the wall for daca deal, because i would have said there's no way he would be getting a wall and if he had actually gotten there, i would have been like, holy, his supporters were absolutely right about him. his supporters would have overlooked the daca thing and been like, we get our wall. and the democratic base who sees the wall as a symbolic thing i think would have gone berserk. >> okay, we have time for one last question. we'll go right here. >> hi. thanks for the second question. stacy burgess with veterans vision. i just want to make a point that there are black people that actually live in the suburbs who
are concerned about education and affordable education and accessibility to education, higher education. i'm one of them. i've get a kid in college. but for my other brothers and sisters in rural and inner cities, their american dream has become a nightmare. and what donald trump has been able to do is to reach out to those people in rural areas and give them hope. what are the democrats going to do to give those black voters hope? i know daca had a dream. blacks had a dream, too. it became a nightmare for some in the inner cities. so, what are you going to do to give them hope? because they are lacking hope from leadership. >> can i follow? you have a scenario, one you thought was the most likely or pretty favorable that maybe black turnout doesn't return to the barack obama, but goes kind of halfway in between. what would make it go that way, what kinds of things in that direction? >> i think in part that's a reaction to trump, but that's not an answer, right? just being against trump is not an answer to your question about
what are democrats going to do. and i think, first of all, there has to be a real economic plan and vision that includes people of color in all of the circumstances that they're in. but i also think criminal justice reform is obviously, if you think about the new jim crow and what criminal justice system has done to the african-american community and continues to do, that strikes me as a place where, you're already starting to see some places like in philadelphia, you're starting to see the conversation shift and democrats, white democrats, getting more comfortable with that as a priority. and so, i think in addition to, obviously, an economy that works for everybody, that strikes me as the place with the most possibility to actually make change, both in policy terms, but also in people's lives. >> yeah, and i do think that's an area where you start to see some of the tensions in the democratic coalition that you laid out play out. ryan enos had one of the most fascinating political science papers ever written, as far as i'm concerned, where he was
actually able to track -- and i'm thinking in particular of the obama administration initiative at the end to try to create low-income housing in suburbs and integrate suburbs more. ryan eno swas was able to trackn they tore down the greens where residents went and where they ended up, the white areas became more republican f. there was a reaction. we aren't past race by any means in this country, and i think some of those fissures are still salient and become salient when you start getting into the nuts and bolts of governing. >> well, i have a lot of people to thank. first of all, i'd like to thank anna and sean, who have done a tremendous job, both on the panel, but with their papers, which you should read. this is the fourth annual states of change report. we plan on being in business another year and for the foreseeable future, so we hope you'll come back for the fifth annual.
the four thinktanks involved, the bipartisan policy center, ruy teixeira, center for american progress, brookings city and prri. we thank you and hope we'll see you again next year. we'll be back here on capitol hill this afternoon on c-span3 with a house armed services subcommittee hearing looking at the president's 2019 budget request for the pentagon's missile defense programs. three generals will speak, the head of the strategic command, the northern command and the missile defense agency. that's at 3:30 p.m. eastern, live on c-span3. this weekend, live coverage on book tv of the 22nd annual "l.a. times" festival of books. starting saturday at 1:00 p.m. eastern with journalist jorge ramos and his book "stranger: the challenge of a latino immigrant in the trump era."
political reporter sarah kendzior with "the view from flyover country." on sunday, live coverage continues at 1:30 p.m. eastern with journalist david corn and "russian roulette: the inside story of putin's war on america and the election of donald trump," co-authored by michael isikoff. black lives matter co-founder patrisse khan-cullors with "when they call you a terrorist," and political commentator roger simon "i know best: how narcissism is destroying our republic, if it hasn't already." watch the second annual l.a. times festival of books live on c-span2's book tv. british prime minister theresa may addressed the house of commons yesterday about air strikes in syria conducted by her country, the u.s., and france. this is about an hour.