tv Maritime Security CSPAN June 6, 2018 4:35am-6:06am EDT
and theologians over how far he can push the church to change, what the church can change without undercutting its own traditions or breaking face with the new testament, the gospel of cheeses joois. q-- jesus christ. q&a, sunday night on cspan. now we take you to the center for strategic and international studies in washington for a look othow mu- - at how marine task forces coordinate with military branches to train for maritime missions. this is abt an hour and a half. >> i would like to welcome you all to today's event, i am mark, a senior advisor here at csis. the event is part of an ongoing series, the mare time security dialogue which is cohosted by csis in the naval institute. the series speaks to current
thinking and issues, seen the naval services, navy marine corps, coast guard. our event today is our first of 2018 and we look forward to having you join us for a future event. we thank huntington angles industries for their generous support of the series and making it possible. i need to make a simple administrative announcement at the beginning and in the unlikely event of an emergency i will give instructions on what we will do. we will either pull fast or move out of the front door, or the rear. now to our panel. we are fortunate in having distinguished panel with a broad set of experiences and responsibilities. we have general robert wall, 6th wing aviator and commanding general of the marine corps command at quant co.
we have general brian bud row, infantry officer, and now deputy for plans, and operations at headquarters. we have lieutenant general robert headlin, helicopter pilot and deputy for plans, policies, and operations. now, notes are wrong. i apologize, i would have brought you back, up to washington. no. and dr. maurly of csif and the office now, senior analyst outside johns hopkins university in the physics lab. our program today will have a discussion here among the panel and open it for questions from the audience. let me start and as we were talking a little behind the scenes here before hand, we have a new national defense strategy, we have a new
national security strategy. this highlights high-end competition, talks about long- term competition, particularly with russia and china, although it notes threats from north korea, iran, and global terrorism. i wanted to ask, first, what are the challenges and opportunities that that brings to the levels? we can start, i guess, general wallish, start there, and move down. >> i think the challenge is as we looked at it after many years of fighting in iraq and afghanistan, the national defense strategy clearly focused on strategic competition against really russia and china major strategic competitives, that is from a military standpoint.
the nss also focused on it strategically, i think what it did for us, as part of the naval force, it regrounded us as part of the navy marine corps team on back toerallyy our title 10-- back to really our title 10 responsibility, ployed force across the , globe, readiness and how we do that. i think that the opportunity there is to get back to our navy roots, back to working with the navy and partnership. that has been very exciting across the operating forces, the general will talk about that. t certainly from a headquarters marine corps standpoint, i also cochair the naval board, the general on the board with me, there is a lot of things going on between the cno and comdaunt to drive towards bringing the two services together, as we were in the cold war, towards major strategic competition, i would
say that would be the main part that i wod athe excite-- the tentof that opportunity. the other opportunity, a challenge, is where we have we been with inivistment the last- - investment the last 16 years, a challenge when you look at the capability that we used to have, for example, we used to have anti-aircraft missile battalion, when i talk to war fare and young captain, they look at me like i have three eyes when i talk about the marine rps hamissile battalions, antiaircraft missile battalions, i look at p look at the force and go how do we meet and pace the threat that we have the over match that we need across the board? thanks for the opportunity. it is always good to be a sir in dc, not permanently assigned.
great to be up to be a part of the panel. you mentioned this is part of the emerging, reemerging, strategy that we have used it as forcing function for building readiness and as an example, it recently returned to being a war fighting organization at the math level, 4 formation for the last several years because of many things general wallish rr had talked-- wallish talked about, the aid was the largest war fighting organization, largest on the st the expeditionary force was not going to be assigned mission to fight at that level. this is really reenergized an effort to-- with it not to the
nss and nds that this is really telling us to build the capability, rebuild the capability on the east coast to have a war fighting organization. again, creates some challenges, but i think there is far more opportunities to reinvigorate that war fighting focus out of the complex. carolina mag taf is very much excited about the opportunity there to rediscover some of the things that we all, we three, in particular, grew up with in the marine corps, have been dormant for the last 17 or so years and we having to now plan again. we are having to look beyond the next appointment, we are having to think about how do we recoop some time for marines and families and equipment to
be better prepared for a larger fight should that come? so it-- we have today's challenges and then we have got the challenges that have put out by nds and nss and how do we build the bridge between the two? i think that will be an exciting thing we have to work with here. with that i will turn it over to general budroe. >> thanks. good morning, everybody. itsureo be here, thank you for the invitation. i think the nds, nss, and importantly for us, planning guidance that followed proceeded. gives us a focus that we haven't had for a while. we prioritize the threat, which, now allows the institution at large to focus on that threat. it means we have to look at what we are studying in our school houses and how we train officers for a high-end threat. what do we know about adversaries and what don't we know? the competitors, lets say.
this is more than just operational forces preparing, this is an institutional res high-end war finganall at thcomes with it. with a good strategy comes good resourceing and we are very pleased with the budget we have had in 2018 and what is for 2019. in order to restors strategy, to modern-- resource the strategy, to modernize, to maintain the competitive advantage that we do not want to lose against china or russia, this is not just the whole of government or military, it has to be a whole nation approach, how students stud aand they-- study and silient capacity, should we have high end war fare we can regenerate a force. recruitment, it does concern us that, perhaps less than 30% of the american population is eligible to come into the military. you know, we theneednation to understand that, to broaden those to serve to replace and regenerate capability should there be losses.
i think also gives the mag taf a thrust in the way we haven't had and it shows the brilliance of the procurement of the f35 and what it can do, cipati the fight that wa potentially come in the future, lets hope not, where competition is cort of conflict. if it does we have the right penetrating capability against sophisticated means to deny us or attempt to deny us. for the first time we have a threat base, threat-based strategy, not a capability- based strategy, and our intelligence is laser focused on that. durnt is laser focused. marine corps who trains staff is focused on that, and the training infrastructure has to support a high-end fight is an investment we have to make. if operating in a sophisticating spectrum, we train to allow f35s to do that.
if we get extended long rapg precision-- range precision firearms that go out, we need ranges that support us and ability to put a censor and shooter together to operate at those kinds of ranges. even something as simple as a rifle, with higher caliber weapon extended ranges, our ranges at camp pendleton in some cases have danger zones support training only to a certain degree, we have tolack at all of our ranges. with that strategy came the task force, secretaries committed on enhancing readiness and adding lethality into the force, we have benefited the money from ose under the lethality task force, we have sped up procurement in shoulder launch, rockets, enhanced night vision goggles and more to come as we work with the army. a galvanizing aspect, already
mentioned, are renugz of war fighter talk with the air force that went dormant for 10 years,o the challenge of pacific with the threat out there, again, it has been a galvanizing effort inside the naval board for future development and capability. what the army, it has been about procurement. ammunitions, long-range systems, ground systems, we get economies inside of our budget by working closer with the army. it has been a huge amount of opportunity built into, built into the defee strategy. the force can fight. today. we can win today. make no doubt in anybody's mind about that. maintaining this competitive advantage will allow us to insure it doesn'ange from now until the 2049, when ping will have a hundredth anniversary, so to speak, of what china has been after.
we know what path they are on in terms of their development and capability, we won't seek any ground in that regard. rest assured of that. i will stop there, turn it back over to you, thank you. >> great to be back at i have to put dismramer on saying my-- disclaimer on, saying whatever i might say, my purse personal view, not as apl. i think i will take a slightly contrary view. to me, one of the biggest challenges for the marine corps and strategy, or strategy, is how they institutionally come to grips with what i think is an interesting challenge. one, the emphasis on dynamic force employment or in more deliberate approach, reziness
and surge capacity suggests there will be less of a more persistent presence that we have worked so hard to try to sustain in recent years. and you couple that with the access challenges, and that, i think, makes the problem a little bit harder. it is, again, i think the most acute r the marine corps because of their forward presence that would, in theory, enable the access, they have been working to exploit that but how you do that is the navy is not as present, or on a sustained basis, as they might have been in the past, is something i think that is going to require some additional adjustments to the growing relationship, i think maybe suggest the marine corps needs to be taking more deliberate
actions to collaborate with other services, in particular, i think so-com, it implies if the marines are going to be inside the bubble from the get go, which i think at least some degree would be expected, how do they to leverage that to enable the access from the other services? i think while i am a big advocate of the strengthening relationship between the navy and marine corps, i think the marine corps needs to think about broadening that and new concepts that extend beyond that, cause i think that dynamic suggests it is changing a little bit, because it should change, the strategies, and i don't think the f35, while useful, solves that problem to
the degree it is required. it will be interesting to see how that guidance gets implemented, but i think it creates the biggest tension for e rp i look ard see how will awer. >> let me build on your question here and give the generals a moment to thing about their response, which is to pick up on this dynamic force employment that iin the nds, not a lot of description, but the outlines of that appear to be the idea of not being deployed as much, the capability towards surge requirements. and i want to ask the panel, how is that playing out? i realize this is still in very early stages, but we expect to
see deploying a different way as a result of this concept. >> thank you. i will start with that. importantly as nds tells us what to focus on in terms of the threat based capabilities that are out there, competitors, it also, in the defense planning guidance, tells us what not to focus on, the areas that we can accept risk as we focus on preparation for major combat operations, say, rather than countersolely ceo ght. the whole basis of our dynamic force employment is to remain operationally unpredictable, so we are probably not going to say a lot about that to maintain our operational, some degree, again, unpredictability. one might be able today to know exactly when an ex-carrier strike group will go, next will
sail, where it will go, those days are going to change and they will change by year and they will change by focus area. -- change by focus area. very much will be a cool that the discretion for the use of the secretary of defense and consultation with the chairman and joint chiefs on how those deployments, those dynamic force employment, deployments, will be scheduled and where they will go. it will be-- it will come from four deployed forces as well as search forces. we will t pements within a force that is already for deploy. that is what we are trying to get after, strategically predictable to allies and remain unpredictable to those who take interest other than being a partner. >> any other comments?
>> one thing is, to count arlittle what the general said, we have been a very busy force, the navy and marine corps team, but with the strategic guidance we have gotten now and strategic competition, focused, like you said, on dpg where the marine corps focused, more so in the pacific than we have in otalr, it allows cepting some-- setting some capability back where we have been heavily focused on the middle east. it gives us space to reset some of that force, to focus much more so, we talk ed earlier, on higher end equipping, training, towards the guidance nds is telling us to move towards. >> i think it is-- i agree that focus is very helpful and i think the question becomes there is also language in the
strategy about thinking about more dynamic facing and posture ways of approaching the challenge, how the corps executes that, it is easy to talk about and a lot harder to do, yokn bter than i do. what that ends up looking like and if you assume that is going to be most of what you start with, if the bubble goes up, if the balloon goes up, how then you maximize the flexibility and the combat power of that force around the theater to create conditions for others to come in, i think, is a real-- it is a significantly different way of thinking about things. i think the corps had tothink about for a while. and the degree at which you are able to leverage the navy to do
that, at least in the short term, is an open question in my mind. >> let me ask about picking up on another thing that marron had raised, thenvironment, there is a lot of talk about that, particularly with china and russia, their ability to build defensive bubbles around their homeland and i realized pno does not like a2ad because it sounds a little too restrictive, maybe, on our operations. but i wanted to ask about what that means for the training organization and doctrine of the may tap, operating in that environment opposed to permissive environments we have been living in. well, really, two decades and many of your remarks have touched on that. but lets start with general and
work our way down. >> i will start with-- is general budroe, said strategy is the most clear strategy i think in my career, since 1989, since reagan administration, clear strategy, the department is clearly turned in that direction, clear strategy is telling us to move in that direction. concept strive where we go, strive, training, clipping, or manning how we organize. with the clear guidance nds, things like toll operation and environment, signed by the cno, getting very close to be signed by the comdaunt d cno. another, the main battle we are working on with the army, is anotr concept. the concepts will drive very
much where we exercise to, war gaming, from inside my world, that is strive everything we do, unifying the service with the army, the multito main battle sight, but certainly the environment and base operations are driving everything we are doing in the department all the way down to the operating forces. i would start with the concept and piece is a major driver and i would say our marine corps operating system, that we really signed in the fall of 2016 put us on the march down the path looking at higher end conflict. >> none of this happens overnight. where we have been for the last several years, where we aspire to down the road, being directed to down the road, certainly secretary mattis
would like the air force to get there more quickly, we are incremental-- incremental changes to hand oua perfectly formed concept before we begin to play with it. for instance, we are exploring ways to where we can at least table top and in terrain that is different from what you might immediately identify as an eabo-type of environment. how do we do that in other places around the glob? how would at--lobe how would that look if we had to do it? how might we contest those areas differently than purely force-on-force type of confrontation? we are trying to find slices of these concepts that we can put to work immediately and begin
to learn from them now, rather than waiting for everything to be perfected. we know that is going take some te. same thing with the force presentation. we have a of folks on the road, around e worling us dothe nation's bidding, i would like to have more of that at home preparing them for higher end confrontation. we are working on alof that, but it doesn't-- can't flip a switch, say come home, retool for a high-end fight and next year we will be good to go. that won't happen. it take as change in mind set, a change in culture, almost-to get refocused on the thingsthality are going to matter, should we have to fight as an inside force. i will come back to the inside force in a minute.
i think what is recognizing in nds is different than in the past, we may have to fight to get to the fight. the idea that we have sea control and air superiority from the get go is an assumption we are not making anymore. so, when we look at t st thabo, or littoral operations for the environment, from a joint perspective we are working close with the air force on the concept and naby, distributed-- navy, distributed maritime. when you merge it with the joint concepts we all recognize it, you can be seen, is to be targeted, is to be killed. so, in a place like the pacific, it is distribution of the force, it is about decoys and deception, it is about low observable properties of modernization of our equipment.
it is all of those things. it is about all domain access and assureing ourself across all the domains; space, cyber, surface, unrsea, land, cabe a land base to support sea control and asymmetry, it doesn't have to be naval against naval. we look at procurement of a naval strike missile igh mobility artellry rocket cyst-- artillery rocket system, we can do with support of a naval campaign we haven't done in the past. u add unmanned capability, unmanned censor, unmanned shooter, network force, networked system, now we are talking about a very sophisticated high-end fight where we need to mane tain dominance-- maintain dominance, first of all in the space, and electromagnetic spectrum. that wun everything we need to do for command and
ntrol, ship talking to a land- based system, for a man censor, talking being able to relay through unmanned censor back to er and and contro- command and control apparatus at the time. to include artificial , caintellbilities wit the base of decision making, has to move as quickly as the opportunities reveal themselves. there will be a lot of machine working, investment, artificial intelligence. we know the chinese made a lot of investments in the area and that is great capabilities. those are the things that will enable the force to fight, a high-end fight. >> inside force,u may e two different emerging, all within the same marine corps, there is the constantly forward deploy aspect, it will be inside the adversaries area, if
they decide to light up their system one day. we have to be the contact and blunt layer, someone has to do the job. going to deny the adversary capability. we will disrupt their plan, we will buy time and space for decision makers in washington that can make a decision to be able to surge the force. you will see a mag caf operating inside the contact and blunt layer, you will see the third layer, the surge force coming in, and the fourth layer is homeland defense, more geared towards nor-ed, nor-com. you will see it operating inside, has to be survivable and lethal, disruptive in denyinforce, and the rest coming in from places like camp
pendlen, or camp lushun, assembling at the right place to serve as part of the surge layer, war-winning force that the army will in. i want to rn to the navy navyplan for 355- ship battle fleet that would build the m-fibs, i think up to 38. even 38 -- even38 isn't enough to put on the demand put on by forces. it will take some time to get there. i wanted to ask first about the navy building program and the pleat developing-- fleet developing and how that meets the demands of the meg calf, in the challenges. but the second part is asking about the use of auxiliary and nonamphibious ships, particularly as they are done in the pacific.
to me, some of the amphibious demands when there aren't enough amphibious ships go around. >> first thing i would sayoon the-- say on the increase in money that we have got, the funding that we came in 2019, with 7% increase, is certainly the navy as you are well aware, did four structure assessment, determined 35 ships was the right plan. now how quickly we can get to that requirement is really the challenge and how long that funding will be consistent. if you looked at the 30-year ship building plan in there, capacity at our ship yard, where we can increase capacity, where we can build more ships we get more money to accelerate at a faster rate. that is one of the things out there, if congress can help accelerate th, that would certainly, we would be supportive of that. we are on a path that we are
mongorward, r largdeck with our laj class ship with america, triple e coming online now. we have aul segot - also got our lpd and lxr coming l on spaceto get us to the 38-ship requirement that we are looking for. the last few years prior to the influx in modernization money, we have been focused on readiness and just as the general said, marines have been operating very hard, so is the navy ship. focusing on readiness, getting the readiness of the ships has been the first focus, now is that capacity, the number of ships we need and closely behind that is part of the equation, is capability on the ships. when we talk about distributed maritime operation and if it floats, it fights, paof that-- part of that from a power projection standpoint but a sea control standpoint. when you talk about dynamic
force employment, part of it is getting to the-- how do we use auxiliary ships in diff ys? i wi you one example is exciting, out there in 5th fleet with task force 51, we have a marine general that is in charge of that task force. they took the esb, the staging base, that chopped into theater and gave it over to had the arg mu. used with epf, which was the joint high speed vessel or fast transport, with those two together, put that into the equation, with the other naval ships that we have got out there in 5th fleet. that was the first time i have seen an operational commander bring those new auxiliary ships in, whether esp or efn, and use them in different ways for operational mission in the 5th
fleet aor, i think is a dynamic we are watching very closely and how that could operate on the pacific and the mediterranean. >> i think i will carry that auxiliary idea further. we should be very reful how we characterize these ships and how we rely on them or how we operationalize them. we will spend a lot of time from norfolk looking at the platforms because just because it has flight deck doesn't necessarily mean it iscapa of doing the things an amphibious ship can do. the options that it gives you, the opportunities that are available when you have more options are always a good thing.
characterize the ships as more than they are, or less than they are, for that matter. any time that you can spend time with our navy brhe and sisters and learn more about the platforms and capabilities is always good. i would kind of complete my remarks in this piece about relationships, that is the strongest part of, think, this current time that we are in is that the relationship with our navy brothers and sisters and norfolk, have not been better in a long, long time. we are looking forward to continuing that. they really do have an operational mindset and they want to enable the naval force. so given the things that general wallish talked about with funding, a plan, and some options. we, again, look at great opportunity going forward.
>> it seems that with a 355- ship navy that we have a hard time breaking about 10% threshold for amphibs, relative to the size of the fleet. moving toward a 600-ship navy, we have 62 amphibs, 355 we are moving toward with 38 amphibs. i am confident we will get there. then a matter of what is on them? we need to build amphibs differently than in the past. we can't always count that there will bea number of destroyers and cr to escort or tuck in. thosr ships in and of themselves need to have, what kind of defensive system, and offensive systems, vertical launch systems, that we may need to place on them in the future that we don't have today, i think is important to make sure they have resilient command and control systems on board, that they have all of that required to be part of th larger network force.
so, c2 to fires, defensive systems, something we will look at. the auxiliaries are necessary but not preferred. an amphib gives more capaby rythan a out of necessity, based on a number of amphibs we have today and demands of training for higher flight, we used the auxiliaries, best suited for a low-end oper atn high-end war fighting. they are great platforms for staging a force to counter violent extremists, wonderful for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or execute a neo and bring evacuees back on board fome period ofe, but they are not lpd or lha. we recognize that but will take every vaj we have to the training opportunities allowed, which could be command and control, hell-born operations, and in some wayslooking connectors that operate with the ships.
the other part we haven't really talked about beyond auxiliaries and l class is what do marines do differently beyond? what capabilities cod be put aboard lcs that we haven't explored. small craft on destroyers and cruisers, there is capability we can put on those, not always high end, but just enough to give the adversary something different to think about. we are going to get create wfb everything that floats-- with everything that floats to explore and innovate with the navy any way we can. >> i agree completely. i think it is certainly all the work i have done, since the combination of command and control, capability in one platform, that you can get bits and pieces of in other platforms but that unique combination has a unique role
to play. i think the navy's commitment to the mare time operations goes exactly where general bud row was talking about, how you optimize across the fleet, thsibilities and flexibility th you those roles as, in theory, the network gets built out and fleet gets built out, implies a lot of change for both forces and thinking about how they can really get the most leverage out of the full capability that they offer. i would say that another major component is increase in naval capacity around the world, right? other navies are, many of our frnds, are growing the navy substantially in response to the same allenges that we see. : iwas able to do work a couple of years ago with the australians as they are
building amphibs, not-- so there are lotsf opportunities for other platforms as well that, i think, can bring real synergies with our marine corps. i know looking hard at that stuff as well. >> let me ask one last question, which is about modernization and acquisition, when many think innovation, they think new systems, panelists indicated that is too narrow a way to think, but it is an important component. new weapons, new systems coming into the fleet ani was wondering if you might want to comment about what will be in the may tef of the future. >> i will start with priorities we have as 2020. if you look at the marine corps
operating concept, the focus is information warfare side. so when it comes to funding, that has been our priority, that is where we see our advantage of operating in l domains, the marine corps is a maneuver force, we to maneuver in all demesnes-- domas, we see lots of advantages that we see in that area, good bit of our funding increase has gone into system intelligence, electronic war fare, control capability, how do we operate? degraded area. our big organization change we did in that area was standing up, is the general talk on the methinformation group. it is not only to put equipping in there, in modernization, but we change the organization significantly to move in that operating concept. our long-range precision fire is trying to increase the range of everything we have.
when concerned to artillery, systems looking at everything from a mid term and long-term perspective. the near-term, lacking, we are looking at capability or long range missile capability. going out and procuring something right now that is availablt w at we can integrate into the command and control system. a lot of cases like we have got with our gator radar and our command and control system, we have 5th generation censors out there right now, that is the good news. we start integrating into the joint force, we have t syems li that. we don't have the shooters that we need from air defense standpoint, or anti-ship long range capability. those are are things we will focus on in there. air defense our third priority. c2 in degraded environment is where we are putting investment and health. formation of the future we see
the intellectual high-end capability by tying that with technology is where our advantage is. that allows them to operate in sometimes autonomous and more inpendent maerhathey ever operated before. it could be a reconnaissance unit aren't protected but it has capability to maneuver on its own-- its own. things like the vehicle we are putting money into in this to develop what the next consignificance vehicle will be. finally, our ability to conduct protected mobility to mauv. and how do we get things like active protection systems? just like the aircraft have today on our 5th generation systems, we need those type of capability to enhance maneuver and protection of the mobility systems. i would say those are the capabilities that we are really
goingarve in the de-- going after in the defense budget. this near in 2019 we got a 7% increase in funding and we increased modernization accounts by 32%. thmoney es show where our investments are going and a lot of it is all going towards the information, warfare, long range precision fire, enhancing ability to maneuver and c2k capabilities. >> little more about the mig, and the proximity of the camp to quant foe is helpful, we get to play with the to it often and the things discovered out there. ld alligator, we get after experimentation, i invite experimentation into all our exercises to make sure we have a chance to put some of these ideas to work. for the mig, for those newt so steeped in marine corps
organizational structure, the methhad previously-- meth had previouslyuart headqs group that provide enablers and capabilities to them once they are able to train and work together. once on range they have everything they need. the transition with the meth st of those enabling ll retains capabilities but adds information component that is pretty important. what we begin to sort out now through a couple of exercises and y-toay learning is you can't take a lethal capability and non-lethal capability and expect them to play well with each other just by being in close proximity. the planning that goes into information environment that is lethal and protective of those we want to hato bebuilt for thum ground up,
baked in, sewn into the fabric, not added as icing that end of the day. we have-- we are looking forward to oppounities coming up in the fall to continue to build on this work. for just one small example, signature management, we are doing a signature management war game as the fall approaches at isreally worked at-- we used to be pretty good at signature management. one of the threats that we were up againsin the cold war were real. we have been-- i won't say lazy, but we have had not to worry about that as much as recent years. signature management has got to be a big deal. relearning or coming up with new techniques tomanage our signature on the battlefield, at sea, in the air, et cetera, is an important part of wh the expertise and the mig will be able to help us with going
forward. >> the last parts on this one, any technology has got to be sustainable. we have exquisite equipment that we need to make sure that the parts are there, the spaers are there-- spares are there, we can maintain it, is about the people at the end of the day. it is always about the people who put that technology into action and what are the training programs, how long are the training programs? we know how long it takes to develop a cyberwarrior, we have clearance requirements, back logs, getting people cleared to get them into the jobs, into the training. but the capabilities is coming, there are a couple of things we are looking at that the general had within his subset of priorities. one of those would be an armed uas that is operating from a ship there are all kinds of armed
uass today but few that operate from a ship. we are pursuing that way. focused effort in the rest of 2018 and into 2019 will be logistics modernization. if we have this concept of expeditionary advances bases across wide areas, how do we sustai whve in logistics disprubution and what do we need-- distribution, and what do we mead? manned? unmanned? moving which ways? what volume? tremendous asset coming to the fleet will be ch53 kilo, an incredible machine that can lift 91,000 pounds gross weight, can lift loads upwards probab excess of 36,000 pounds, can hit three separate independent zones because it has three independent sling loads th can supply and sustain over 12,000 pounds each. ammunition, fuel, whatever we need. so, that is just one piece of
several things that we are looking at and already in development to help us get through the logistic challenges of reflying and sustaining-- resuppg and sustaining, relocating the forces at the various advanced bases. may be up for 24 hours, break down and move 72 hours, break down and move. the operational unpredictability is how we are building it and we need a log system that can support the concept. to wrap up the last question, i will ask marron who worked at osu level in tanks. what should the marine corps be thinking more about? >> i think-- i leagree with the general themes that the general talked about this morning. in my mind the focus on information warfare and the spectrum warfare is, i think,
overdue and well warranted and so i think that is the critical enabling capability that has to be considered. so, dot think there r they are not-- don't think they are not thinking about the right things. the-- i think the marine corps faces fundamental challenges in, while you are able to leverage the other serves more significant-- services more significant, that hems you in a certain extent. you don't have a lot of money to go pursue new capabilities. capabilities that the larger services do. i also think you are inherently dependent on the others so that you can come up with great concepts, i think one of the challenges the marine corps had is they had a lot of good concepts and not as much impact
as they might have if they had been one of the bigger services. within the constraints that you face, i think the focus is in the right area, i would also say the mag caf, arguably is going to change, some number of decades. you can debate how many decades you want to put into-- that you want x to be, but it is a lot, i think. so, the fundamental question about is that, is that being explored fully enough? and, again, i think given the dependence on the other services, i am t sure a broader investigation would get you anywhere differently, necessarily. do you think there is a general consensus about the problems and challenges, and the real question will be, can you
collectively come up with joint answers and programs? i guess the proofs will be in the pudding. >> thank you. we will open it to i ask you wait for the microphone to come down to you and i would alsoask that there be a question mark at the end of your question. admiral, as the cohost, you get the first question. >> naval institute, pete, thanks for the opportunity. do we run a risk if we go to this dynamic force employment, the general said have a mag caf forward, doing every day things and maybe more higher end group back home that has been able to train to a higher level, do we run the risk that we are going to have to compete for assets
to move those marines and be more dependent on six ses, or land bases forward under that concept? and does that blur the brand? >> thanks for the question, admiral. i would say no. i don't think we are going to have to wait on lyft, because the dynamic force employment of marines will be tied to the navy. the global force management decisions how forces get allocated around the globe is being looked at as we speak between chairman and secretary, what that looks like now and in the future. in terms of the drivers will be the readiness of those forces, back in the u.s., those that are forward deployed, we know already are most ready. so, the key is combat credibility. are they combat credible?
we have all kinds of marines that are forward deployed, but a small unit in south america, doing operation at platoon lebl is not combat credible. they are there for a specific reason or purpose. we might have two in the pestern pacific, might have the 31st and a west coast that, together, combine with command and control, headquarters could go over the top very quickly, aggregate and now you have a significant combat credible force to dopart of the dynamic force employment i mentioned. it is about readiness, readiness of the forces that may go forward and about combat credibility in the formation. >> sydney. >> hi, gentleman. sydney freedburg from breaking defense. a quick question, comes to
mind, a difference between the surge force and blunt contact force, the blunt contact force willabto operate when the balloon goes up, as it were. you might be, in the emgency ben the sumarine anthe patrolling marine force, on the block, as it were, and perhaps a three-way fabrication with those guys on the hatter missions offering auxiliary ships who might not have the same level of hardware or masks, to what degree are you creating different flavors ofmag taf? we already have special forces. what degree can you retain the interchangeability you have right now? >> so, not to try and make this too simple, because it is not,
the marine corps is a one force, if something breaks around the world, forces you described are the ones who are going to go. so, for instance, in the korean theater, there are forces that have trained specifically for that mission. there are forces that camp that have comes to full colict have not trained specifically for that missi now they have obviously done very well to ain to the corps essential tasks within their mission, but they may not be as steeped in the knowledge of the peninsula as the ones who will work there every day and stream them. same goes for that force that is almost every conflict that can thing of in recent history the marine corps has been
associated with. did windows on the way to o back from the conflict. whether desert storm,seemed like liberia was always a stopping point on the way to or the way back from the conflict that was more serious. i agree that the perfect solution would be those three forces that you described know each other, train together, had the opportunity to do things together. that is optimum. we don't always have luxury. again, things like well-known operating concept that has been tried out and exercised with the cross force, is valuable. then if you are-- if cr are to put-- you have to put the forces together to do it, at leigh you have a common ground towork from, with-- to work from, with the knowledge that
being able to do that with the exact forces who might be called to do it is going to be very, vey tough. may need embellishment, if you will, from the other panel members. >> the only thing i would like to at is it is a matter of training focus and it gets to the deployed force onssigned mission, it might be focused on ct support. it might be to do personnel recovery, quick reaction force, primary missions. but it is going oobe combat cred-- to be combat credible. might be marine expeditionary, which in and of itself, may not be enough oo do what is necessary. it gets to the training folkus and the training folk-- focus and the training focus of those back at home verses those four deployed should be on jo combat operations fighting at the meth level or med level or higher, that is a different