tv North Korean Nuclear Program CSPAN June 13, 2018 6:26pm-7:59pm EDT
of growing your own food, so as to conserve larger quantities for the war effort. this is actually byel wright, frank lloyd wright's ster, a prominent illustrator he. again, another individual who rises to the surface during world war i. you see here also food conser conservation. ke me everything out of corn today, but back then, we didn't. so this was kind of new. one thing that's worth noting n world war ii, the government stepped in to ration food. duri worldar i hoover believed that if you just encouraged people to act correctly, thewod ratifo themse. you didn't need to impose it on them, they would pledge that. >> that's sunday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span3. >> the carnegie endowment for international peace in washington, d.c. hosted a
discussion about singapore summit between president trump and north korean leader kim jong-un. the panelists gave their assessment of the summit and what it means for u.s. policy in the region. is an hour and a half. >> good morning, everyone. thanks for coming out. my name is toby dalton. i'm the co-director of the nuclear policy program at the carnegie endowment. it's my pleasure to welcomeou here this morning. and thanks to all of you who might otherwise be washington capitals fans who would otherwise like to be down on constitution avenue celebrating with the team, but we're very appreciative that you've decided instead to come spend your morning with us, talking about what has happened in singapore overnight, and what it all means going forward. i think it's fair to say that if
you look at what has transpired over the last year and hs, the delopments around ine korean peninsula are really surprising, to say the least. so nine months ago, we had north korea testing a hydrogen bomb and president trump famously calling kim jong-un "little rocket man." six months ago, we had north korea testing this very large icbm that by all assessments can target the united states. and then four months ago, you had this amazing reversal and the pyeongchang olympics and north korea participating in the olympics and marching wh the south korean team. six weeks ago you had the tekorean summit and the production of a very hopeful statement, the panmunjom dlirtio declaration. so in this very short period of time, we've witnessedajor shifts in the outlook there. and i think it's fair to say
that had any of us been able to predict this, we should have quit our day jobs and started betting on horses. [ laughter ] it's unbelievable how quickly things have shifted. so i'd also say that we started thinking about having this event already in mah, even before we knew there was going to be a summit on this day. and mostly it wasec w had this report to launch that was g at the sort of longer term development of deterrents on the korean peninsula. so it turns out june 12th is a great day to talk about deterrents on the korean peninsula and a lotf other things too. so we'll do that today. what we'll do is have a conversation with these experts from the region. we are noting that we almost have the six parties, with the exception of the russians and the north koreans here. so we'll have a good diversity of views and perspectives. and we can dissect what we think has happened and what may not
have happened, and what might fward and talk a little bit about how the different perceptions and perspectives in the region are going to matter as we try to sustain this diplomacy that has begun in singapore overnight. so let me first introducehe panel, starting to my left with laura rosenberger, the senior fellow and director of the alliance for securing democracy at the german marshall fund. next to her, sue gin park, a public policy fellow in residence at the wilson center here in washington. next to her is norshige mashita, professor and director of the security and international studies program at the national graduate institute for policy studies in tokyo. and last but certainly not least, my colleague tom jao who works at the carnegie center for global policy in beijing. so first,apned? laura, what happened? >> i had the great joy of being on a red eye for part of the
events of last night. so i was reconstructing what happened very rapidly this morning, having sort of taken off as trump and kim were signing an unknown document. and the great mystery that went around that. but my main take-aways, in terms of what happened is, one, i will confess that i was somebody who went into -- went into these events with trepidation about worst case scenarios, wor case scenarios of some kind of major blowup at the table, somebody walks out. you have somebody offending somebody and you have a major breakdown. so that didn't happen. the other scenario was that you have the illusion of some major grand bargain, where kind of everything in the sun, you know, rainbows, unicorns and puppies, is all g away, in exchange for, you know, probably absolutely very little.
and that didn't really happen either. but, you know, what we kinda did end up with was a kind of very basic, vague set of commitments. some of those commitments are much less than had been realized in previous agreements. in particular, on denuclearization. we didn't see the word "verification" in there. for many of us, that's a great concern. the word "irreversible" wasn't there. that's alsonce for many. but we have a lot of vaguary. in the meantime, i think we've given up so much leverage. the summittself was a huge win for kim jong-un, as we saw with the printing on the front page, just all these photographs of kim jong-un, world leader, kim jong-un, global rock star, walking around singapore. and maximum pressure is over. and i know that president trump
was talking about continuing maximum pressure in his press conference, but maximum pressure has been over basically since the agreement to proceed with the summit. th chigovernment's really let up onhe pressure there, but we saw chinese officials there calling for the security council to begin the process of formally lifting sanctions. so we've lost an enormous amount of our leverage. and the last thing that happened is, i think a head-scratcht least for me and i think for probably several of us, is this question of the exercises, which didn't appear in the documents. the was, of course reference in the document to some kind of security guarantee or assurance being given. unclear to me if the exercises were part that. it's unclear what trump meant by ending all the exercises. it's pretty clear at this point that that wasn't coordinated with our okay, with se two alliance relationships being
critical for continued deterrence. and it's also not clear if trump knows what he committed to. and if that's the same thing that kim thinks he committed to. and that potential difference ralng away with different interpretations, different understandings. you know, anybody who remembers the leap-day deal, and the problems of walking away with different interpretations of an agent, a then wha that can quickly turn into, will understand why potential vaguary around that is a problem. so that's a wrap-up of where i see, you know, what happened. >> so president moon said the other night that he was very anticipating -- very much anticipating the summit and couldn't sleep. so did you sleep last night? [ laughter ] did you sleep we, or were you also worried about the outcome? >> i think i was with president moon on anticipating what would be the outcome of this historic summit. and i honestly didn't get too
much sleep. but i think today there are many things to touch on, but as a starter, because we did not really expect this summit to resolve the nuclear issue on north korea once and for all, just through one summit, it kind of met our expectations that we expected a kind of a basic framework or set to be agreed upon, and that was what we s today. so it's a good start. it's a fine start to bin with. and -- but i do have to say, there are many areas that we need to get more details on for concrete actions towards denuclearizati and also what's very critical and to have a specific timeline of how things should go and what can be expected, in addition to the verification, which is very crucial. so there are many areas that will need to be worked on, and i
think, i'd like to hope that it will -- it will be picked up expeditiously, as included in the statement and follow up negotiations. and from what president trump has said, it does seem like secretary pompeo will take on that job without any pause. so hopefully the real work will begin after the summit by these working level officials and diplomats and experts, to fill in the gappes, yes. but one thing that did take me by surprise was during the press conference, that president trump said war games will be halted. and i think we need clarification on that term of "war games," what he means by "war games." so i don't want to say
definitively what that would mean because, depending on what that really means, would have different ramifications. i'm thinking maybe he meant halting of deployment of u.s. nuclear tactical weapons for military exercises, not joint military exercises all together. because halting mitary exercises all together is not something that president trump alone can decide on. it's an alliance issue between the rok and the u.s. although that could be discussed down the road, when we see concrete steps being taken toward denuclearization, because we can't all get what we want. we need to give some in order to make tangible progress. so i think that is something
that can be discussed along the road. but not at this point. especially if indeed he means halting of jointar drills gether. >> yeah, i think the first statement about we're going to halt the war games, tashat very definitive. but then subsequently in the press conference there was a little bit more detail, where he said that in particular, the flights of u.s. aircraft from guam, that's a long way it fly, it's very expensive to fly aircraft six hours from guam to fly over the korean peninsula and then all the way back. so maybe there's some elements of the exercises that he's picked up on and has agreed to stop. but as you said, it's pretty vague at this point and we need more detas.and i gather tt thee government and usfk were a little bit surprised by this announcement. so hopefully those details will come yet. mishi, what's your top-line reaction? >> i would say it was a step forward and an important step
forward, but at the same time, where are we? i think, you know, two people, mr. trump, and mr. kim, made an agreement from which we can go anywhere. and at least i have already four different scenarios in my mind. one is okay scenario in which north korea will take the necessary steps for denuclearization. i don't think north korea will denuclearize quickly and comprehensively inim but they can take steps gradually, and the u.s. and north korea can decide to improve their relations. and so that's an okay scenario. it seems that north korea, kim jong-un, young, ambitious leader, is actually interested in rehabilitating his country's economy. so he might actually go into that path. the second scenario i have is a
bad scenario in which we go back to crisis situation. the u.s., you know, trump expect a lot from north korea, but north korea cannot deliver, you know, cannot abandon all nuclear weapons in time, and that he will become frustrated and if he starts taking kind of tags from domestic critics, for example, during the presidential campaign did, he might decide to take military action against north korea in order to divert attention from domestic difficulties to foreignrisis and consolidate his position. and the third, you know, similarly bad scenario that i have is what i call a bad piece scenario in which trump seems to
be doing, can say, well, there's a peace on the korean peninsul so there's no longer need for the u.s. to remain committed. so we kind of leave south korea. and if it happens, you ow, that would really rmin sty and security on the korean peninsula, and that might create, you know, actually war situation like before. and finally, fourth scenario is a tricky scenario. i would call i a gorbachev scenario. if you remember in 1987, on this day, june 12th, ronald reagan, then u.s. president reagan, asked gorbachev to tear down the wall, berlin wall. and gorbachev actually did tear down the berlin wall. but together with the wall, he tore down the soviet union, his country, right? and kim jong-un might do the
same thing. he's interested in rehabilitating and undertaking pretty serious reform in his country. but his country is , you know, a diflt coury to reform. and he might end up destabilizing the country, which might end in the collapse potentially, and in the clapse of north korea, which can create peace, create war, create a civil war, i don't know. so we can go anywhere. so we have to wait and see. >> president xi jinping has had two summits recently with kim jong-un. not in singapore, obviously. but how do you compare what you saw out of the xi jinping/kim jong-un summits and the trump/kim summit? i think all of the summits were symbolic. i believe president xi never expected north korea to
completely surrender its nuclear weapons soon. it's clear that north korea has a two-faced strategy. phase one, try to auire nuclear deterrent as soon as possible. that was achieved at the end of last year. and now north korea is in phase two. the primary objective is to retain its nuclear deterrent capability. and on that basis, to develop a normal relationship withhe outside world. i think north korea is achieving that goal right now. but standing from where kim jong-un is, i think after securing his regime's survival, after addressing the security concerns on north korea, now he's looking at long-term strategy for the country, in the future. so i think from where he stands,
he has long-term strategic goals of creating a good environment in which north korea can pivot to economic development, and one precondition for creating that good environment is to have a long-term, positive relationship with washington. so i disagree with many cosammenta, kim jong-un is simply looking that one summit, this one photo opportunity with president trump. i think he's looking much beyond the summit. he wants a long-term relationship with washington, without giving up its core nuclear weapon capability. that's very difficult to pull off, but he looks like he's making progress. the agree, the maximum pressure campaign is basically has maxed out. and that's why, we are having this reach out today. the u.s., before president trump went into the summit, has already lost its coercive
leverage with north korea. north korea after acquiring a basic nuclear deterrent ability has no urgent need to resume tests. and north korea is capable of offering south restraint, refraining from additional military provocations, building an image of a responsible player wanting to engage with the outside world, wanting to focus domestic and economic development, wanting to reach out to everyone. and under these conditions, there's no way the u.s. can threaten a disarming military strike against north korea, or to have another u.n. security council resolution to impose extra sanctions on north korea. so given the u.s. has already -- had already lost the coercive leverage even before the summit, i think this result is very much
expected. i will say one last point, which is, i think in some sense, president trump stumbles into some correct decisio and thisis, thk, a mainstream chinese view. from our perspective, the key problem is not really north korea's nuclear weapons. north korea's nuclear weapons is the symptom of a disease. the disease itself is north korea's paranoia. it's north korea's deep bias towards western countries, its deep distrust towards the outside world. and the fundamental way to address that root cause is to engage with north korea, is to bring north korea back into the international community to promote communication with -- between north korea and outside world. and to address that north korea paranoia, the best way is to start a good relationship
between north korea and united states. fundamentally transform the relationship. i think in that regard and the first point in this joint statement is, both countries are committedo a new relationship. i think that's important in the long run, eventually, that would helpate mig north korea's paranoia. gradually address north korea's sense of insecurity, and therefore make north korea less dependent on nuclear weapons in the fute. in that sense, i think president trump makes some good decision, even though himself might not be aware of that. >> so this raises an interesting question, and we've seen this reflected a little bit in the reporting here about how china has engaged this issue. and the narrative is, you know, china is increasingly concerned about being left on the sidelines during this u.s./north
koreara -- rapprochement. is that too strong a statement? >> i think right after the news of the u.s./north korea summit was announced, there were serious concern in beijing worrying about china being sidelined and losing control over future direction. i think that -- i mean, even -- we can -- we even heard wide concern from chinese experts from different background that in some extreme cases there was maybe a chance that when u.s. and north korea were talking, they might make some deal in which they collude together against china. because china knows for a long time that north korea doesn't
really like china. if conditions are right, north korea would be more than happy to establish close relationship with washington. north korea wants to play this role as strategic balancer in this region, between the two big powers. and many conservative chinese experts also always believe the u.s. doesn't really worry about north korea's nuclear threat. the u.s. knows very well north korea's nuclear weapons are simply for safeguarding regime survival. north korea would never use nuclear weapons without being seriously provoked and invaded. and therefore u.s. has been simply using north korean nuclear threat as an excuse to strength alliance network. and given this deep chinese distrust towards both north korea and the united states, there was extreme concern that when these two guys are talking together, there's a risk both countries might decide to put aside their nuclear dispute and
try to forge a very close relationship. i think that concern was slightly mitigated after kim jong-un came to china twice and and had very good meetings with the president they went to singapore and north korea published the picture with kim un working outside of the airplane with the big chinese flag in the background. that shows a special relationship between north korea and china that exists and north korea still relies very much on chinese in the future. the thing that actually addrsechinese concerns. another big factor is this rising u.s./china strategic rivalry. that is major strategic
development in this region. againsis background both chinand the united states see each other as important long- term rivals. as a result if nuclear capable north korea is going to be a reality in the foreseeable future i believe the thinking in beijing may become that we want to make sure that a nuclear capable north korea has a closer relationship with china than with the united states. i do see a competition there taken place. >> that is not typically how we think of things here but do you see some sort of major geopolitical alignment. the president is already saying he has wiing to pull troops out of south korea and that may really change the picture there. >> i did a lot of work on the talks in 2009 and 2005 and we
had a variety of different working groups on that. one of those groups that has been forgotten was focused on building a northeast asia peace and security mechanism. we had a really fun acronym that we used for it. the russians really loved having that plform. that was a vision not just as tong described it but how we could potentially realign things in the region and provide some sort of broader system of multilateral institutions and roles etc. i am pretty skeptical of that at this point in time. it never really got very far then and that was a very different time geopolitically on many different fronts. more than 10 years on we are even further from that kind of
position but a couple of things i would like to pick up on along these lines i completely agree that kim jong un is playing the long game. and what worries me is i do not see president trump play in the long game. i see kim jong un really in the driver seat of this round of diplomacy really choosing his moments on the world stage. you know as tong said feeling that he has the deterrent in his pocket and with the confidence that he can set out and go forth. there have been many rounds of conversations of meetings since kim jong un came to power. he had been very worried about becoming overly dependent on
china for quite some time. the interest is there in plain some kind of balancing role. do i see it as having broader application? i do not. what i do see is a very carefully planned process. that is by the north koreans here. as i mentioned earlier, one of my concerns is some of these examples is the alliance coordination that can be exploded desk are exploiby kim. i think all signs point to kim heading back to beijing to have a chat with the chinese president again about what happened in singapore. i think that really ensuring that we, here in washington have a good handle of what kim is driving in a much more
coordinated way than at are pursuing. >> do you think president moon is playing a short or long game? i know he does not play golf so we will leave those references out. there's a big political shift in seal as well. he has been interested in this process but at this point it could take off in ways that could be quite uncomfortable for south korea. >> i think president moon , as you asked, has been woing on peace. that was beginning way before he assumed the presidency. i think he is playing the long game of ushering in peace on the korean peninsula. i think for now, however,
president moon has become very aware of the significance of having a good alignment and needs to stay in sync with the u.s. policies for any progress to be made in terms of inter- korean relations. the analogy is quite often used as two wheels of a barrel. without progress on one the other cannot . it is a matter of sequencing, i think. the foremost goal istomove toward denuclearization even if that may take long and even if we may not be able to achieve 100% denuclearization.
although we will still have to have that as a seated goal that we will puue. i think what president moon and this whole administration is doing is to put that on track so that they can albeit slowly moved toward the end ate in order for that to happen is to have the u.s. in alliance. also to have north korea come to the table. it is crucial to have e sanctions work. up until now it was rking quite well but now that there are thesnew issues of alliance especially with the military exercises as president
moon calls himself a facilitator there is more work on his shoulders to make sure that this does not go off track and they remain focused to making tangible steps toward denuclearization. in tandem making progress on terms of inter-korean relations and the family reunions and reducing tension on the border. i think we will for sure have a very bumpy road ahead. they had a su that was called off and on again. we compare ourselves to see that kind of drama in front of us but i think president moon will remain very focused and veryetermined the result the
issues that come in front of them. >> personally i have been a little bit critical of this idea of south korea as a mediator. a u.s. ty shld not be mediating. it sounds discordant but i think that now that there is the potential for things to go wrong i would think that they would focus more on the alliance to ep that ontrack. the prime minister has also spent a lot of time focused on the trump administration and he has invested a lot of personal n it. how do you think of a look at what has happened in singapore? will he encourage the trump administtion ttake harder line on north korea or not?
and what might be the domestic political consequences for him if it looks like he is not winning on trade and trump is ignoring north korea and so forth. >> let me talk about trump's remarks onnuclear exercises. when he talk about the possibility of stopping the exercises with south korea his message was not targeted only at north korea but also at south korea. he has been saying that south korea was a free rider d the signed a free trade agreement to the united states in a fitting more south korea than e ited states so we will have to renegotiate a deal. i think that trump by talking about the possibility of
stopping the u.s. exercises with south korea is telling the south koreans wemight stop helping you any more on defense and if you don't want that you have to pay more for the stationing of the forces in south korea and renegotiate the fda so that become more favorable to the unitedstates. i think that was the message to north korea and south korea. that said in terms of japanese response, i think the japanese ticket especially and are generally concerned about the outcome because japan has already spent -- always been hoping that mr. trump will maintain the position in north korea.
he has used his position so much in this meeting. i do not know whether he talked about that issue in the meeting with kim jong un and in what way we do not know but given the overall tone of the outcome i don't think trump made a strong point about the security concerns that japan ha included the issues of a midrange ballistic missile targeted at japan and the northern missiles and the range of 1000 kilometers. i think we are kind of feeling a little bit left behind. i know we have to find a way to get more engaged in the process somehow. >> on the domestic policy will there be consequences for the
prime minister if he has not seen as enabling to translate his relationship to into policy gains. >> i think that his critics will uthis portunity to criticize the prime minister. >> i think the domestic politics of this issue here are also quite interesting. you have expectations that have been raised to unachievable little -- levels. that was the mantra for a long time until last week when it became clear that that was not actually going to be happen. but then you have democrats saying that's what the administration said and we will hold them to that standard and then over the weekend maybe you were wi-fi free at that point but senator graham said if we don't achieve this thanexct democrats to come on board with my preferred approach to explore limited
military options. what is your sense of how this issue will break your along political lines? >> i think -- one of the things that i think has made the domestic politics little bit trickye as well is that i think trump has himself contind to move the ball and to do what he frequently says as part of his negotiating style is to really sort of ratchet up as high as he possibly can and then you reach a deal somewhere in the middle. in this case it's not just his negoing partner it's just also about us. as you noted about a year ago many folks in washington, myself included were warning about the significant threat of military conflicts. we had very hot rhetoric and we had a comparison of the size of
nuclear buttons happening and fire and fury. we had signs that the administration -- leaks coming out about significt planng for conflicts and the nomination for ambassador of south korea was withdrawn because he had privately expressed concerns about conflict scenarios. there was the impression that war was possibly inevitable. i think there was such a collective sigh of relief and so many quarters that suddenly we were out facing conflict and then we re on a diplomatic track. what we saw yesterday in my mind is not necessarily anything that resembles my understanding of real diplomacy in the negotiating process. it's not like ything i saw what i was working in the bush or obama administration in negotiating process. ul
i think the expectation piece is something that has -- the terms have been set by the president one way or the othe he is cin ing to be selling this as a success to his base and the reality is, of course, that many people are coinuing to breathe a sigh of relief. i think that the biggest comments i kept hearing overnight was the church hill". the reality is there is a lot of space between jar jar and world war. what i see right now does not indicate to me that we have a amework for and meeting -- meaningful negotiating process. one of my former bosses and government used to say diplomacy is a team sport. right now we have a e- show on the si and th
is not sustainable. that is not diplomacy or negotiation. for me when it comes to the politics of this we have to really focus on what is realistic and how do we set the s? whate cabuild -- really going to be and had we focus and drive that. >> when we talk about the militapt actually i am a little bit more concerned about the military confrontation now than before for two reasons. one is last year when we are talking about the possibility of military strikes i was not o because when we use force we do not know whether ration.ncerned that if we use force against north korea
kim jong un michael crazy and launch all-out war and retaliation against south korea or possiblyagainst the united . we could not take that option. now in a summit meetingwith president trump he has proved to be rational. he has a rational actor. is for north lyink that even korea if it is limited necessary use of force against high-vue targets mike nuclear and missile development he might not go crazy. that is the utility ofthe military option has actually improved in my opinion. is it good news or bad news i don't know. other thing is by the end of
the last year mr. trump was saying one thing and kim jong un was saying another. they were engaged in the battle of words but they were not really engaged. now they are engaged. when they are engaged when you see who is really winning and who is losing and if you are on losi si you have do something about it. you have to ke tangible action to change the situation. it is a strange sin and they are talking and this is good ne and generally speaking i am relieved but on this point we have to be careful that military option is still not off the table. >> now, tong, the chinese
experts prop -- calculate likelihood of military on as high are not likely last fall? >> i am not sure there was a consensus. we were generally concerned about a military conflicts breaking out and i think that that played an important role in china putting real pressure on north korea. >> and now what do you think? >> the option is still on the table practically speaking. basically we did not if there is still no results in the technical negotiations in the near-term future i can see if the u.s. at that time wants to start a war with north re
i cannot even imagine china or russia mobilizing their military forces in adtion to vetionfrom south korea as well. >> also i just want to add that although you do have a point that there is still a chance of military engagement that is not off the table and i think president trump will want to maintain that on the table although he has refrained from resorting to it during his press conference when he was pushed to make remarks so i think that all the does not off the table completely i think that in a way might be helpful in moving the progress forward not in a way that is ideal but realistically speaking i think it is not all that bad. given that we don't reso to it because north korea does feel
intimidated that president trump is somebody that could actually go that path. now that -- although things could always go wrong i think it is important to note that president trump and chairman kim jong un have built rapport and have begun a relationship although that does not guarantee anything i think it is meaningful. once you begin that relationship and from what president trump has already alquite happy with the start and confident that he can move alg, at least from the appearan on the media even if it was staged i think it was a cordial start and they can communicate along the way. it will be a long and protcted p, lothan mabel -- we may want to but we
will definitely have to work on it without giving up tenaciously. i think given the vested interest with both parties president trump and kim jong un although we will have to tested out along the way to see if he is genuine about making tangible progress i think we need to give it the benefit of the doubt because it is a start. and given all of these changes on north korea's front although we cannot be sure or confident that is yet to say they are changes. for instance like you said it is surprising to see north korea revealing the reality as it is that it is traditionally speaking the north korean leader would have been very
ashamed to show his people that they had to borrow a chinese airplane and coming out of a plane with the chinese flag on it although it is the closest ally as hementioned north korea has a very strong distrust of countries including its closest ally china. i think those things are not li things that we should just push aside. i think that that is some clue as to what this new leader in north korea may be headed toward . he is pling along game. he wants to retain his position in regime, albeit as a dictator but he wants to improve the economy so for him
to retain his position on the people he needs to nstrate to the ople that he is capable of not only developing clr weapons but also improving their livelihood in ways that they can feel. in order to do that he does need to engage with the outside world, especially with the u.s. for security because they are paranoid and whether they are groued or not that is the reality. so to relieve the paranoia they need assurances from the u.s. and to get that i think north korea will be willing to make some concessions and in order for us to push back further along towards denuclearization we need to give concessions and reciprocate with the concessions >> the holding out of military options as a fallback position particularly of maximum
pressure has dissipated how concerned are you? >> i have always believed in national security especially when dealing th an adversary tan option off the table. that is a bottom-line preme which is where i am always going to be. i think i am a little bit le sanguine about the potential consequences of a military option. i believ that kim is rational but i think that your scenario puts a little bit more weight on command-and-control that i may be comfortable with and then i think we necessarily have the confidence in. i would not want to test it it must we were really up against the wall with no other option facing an mintattack. so that being said one of the
scenarios that does worry me is similar to one of the scenarios that was being painted earlier. we do have this process being set up for implementation and presumably a similar group of experts working with them have been working through the meetings in advance to try to work out some of these details given the gulf that we have already seen trump was asked in the press conference about the lack of verification in the agreement and he shuffled the papers around and said it is here. it is all good it is complete. we minutes. i cannot remember exactly what the phraseology was but you get the point. it is clearly not there probably for a reason and you
can see where the negotiations particularly with john bolton as part of them could come up again with some pretty severe resistance there. when you have already had a meeting at the summit level you have frontloaded the sort of peak option here. you do not have a lot of runway after. if the talks break down and you can't come to an agreement on the basic principles of verifiable denuclearization let alone everything else than i do worry that the conflict will come back as one of the only options that remain especially given the pressure. i really don't see how the pressure campaign can return especially because i also think in that scenario kim jong un can probably da pretty good job of painting the u.s. as the one that was the spoiler of the
deal and that would make it very hard to get china, russia, and ybe even steal -- still back on board. i do not want to be one of thpointing to the old agreement folks but i have for historical purposes i want to remind people that of course we have committed in the past normalization of relations with north korea as a goal. we have committed to negative security assurance with north korea i can't remember the exact phraseology but we agreed not to invade or attack north korea th chemical or nuclear weapons i believe is the freezing. i am getting affirmation from others that would be in the know . these are things that we have seen before. that does not mean it is bad to
re-up for them now. we are in a good place to do that. i think this makes the point of the implementation be and what matters. >> this is a good segue for the last issue i wanted to touch on before we open it up to questions from the audience where as you think of a plan and obviously don't want conflict what you're left on his the in between space. we have written this report that you can pick up copies outside that think a little b head about what the deterrent picture might look like. i wanted to get your sense because a lot of the thinking in this report is based on the experience of the united states decided with south korea to deploy the missile defense system in south korea and the china retaliated for that. you can see the future in front of you read the u.s. and south korea may do additional things
to ward against north korean provocation that could elicit the spillover effects were china feels the need to retaliate. say a little bit about what drove the chinese considerations and then looking forward what are you most concerned about if additional deterrence steps might be taken. >> so in this report we expected a list of some of north korea's nuclear weapons would stay for the foreseeable future. given that the u.s. and south korea might continue to play military capabilities to deter north korea provocations at all levels. those deployments would have original reactions from japan and china.
i focused on how china might like a responsetosuch future u.s. and rean operation and deent. i tried to identify those capabilities that could generate the strongest chin concern and reaction. it is all in the report so please feel free to read it. one lesson that is concerning is china came out of the status. china basically made the decision to move down. at dispute was not resolved but simply shelved.
the lesson learned by many chinese experts from this episode was that in the next dispute over another major deployment by the united states in this region that china perceived that threatening its interest china probably should not start with soft economic sanctions. they probably should start with very tough military countermeasures. that are threatening to the u.s. and south korea. they will force the u.s. and south korea to come to china for negotiations. the lesson that china is drying from this is actually reinforcing china's belief in power. if there is going to be another dispute of another deployment
we are likely to see stronger and more overwhelming response from china and that is very concerning. objection only speaking china does have disagreements about those deployments. it shows how pre-existing things are between china and the united states are seriously biased. china is understanding about the technical capabilitiesof the system. that further contributed to even greater critical discourse. i think you future disagreements arrive there needs to be time to look at
this underlying technical disagreements probably not. we look at and predict where are the areas were disagreements might arise. there is a general disagreement . that is the only way i think to prevent and maybe even the conflict. no there will be some nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. the yes desk u.s. will continue
to train north korea but from the chinese perspective this is already managed and resolved. north korea is not going to further its. it will keep a minimal nuclear posture first of -- survival. now they are focusing on economic development. understandings between china and south korea with north korea is even more divergent. they agree what is the adequate military capabilities to deter north korea. there is an even greater challenge and they will have secondary indications. >> that is right.
the interest and political investment that you are going to see and augmenting the missile systems will make it more difficult. the perception of how serious a threat is north korea to the united states to south korea and japan. the differences and that perception is a really serious challenge to finding ways to get to this point of a stable peace regime around the peninsula that is talked about. in other words that is not the ending of an era but the beginning of an era when they will generate security challenges in this region. at this point i want to bring in the audience for
discussion. we have two microphones in the audience so when i point to you please come identify yourself and keep your question relatively brief. i saw that gentleman back there first so it will come to you and we will take two at a time. >> jonathan cattleman american university. we are talking about steps and things you know that seem to be the core of it that they will remove sanctions if they do this. you cannotavpetype of process so what is this process with korea going to look like. they don't want to get rid of their nuclear weapons but they want to get rid of sanctions. if the step method is not acceptable what is the process? >> i am going to go to a
variation of the previous question. since trump walked away from the jc poa he thought that it wasn't adequate enough and to some degree i agree with them. i did nothink it was appropriate to walk away from it . the verification is the key to any negotiated agreement. what they would say in a press conference about how this is better than the jc poa or will he simply did what he has wanted to do and lie about it.
>> we have two questions. a process question and a u.s. credibility question is what i any you want to take those up for us. >> i would start by saying i can't speak for the administration to to ith a little bit ident about folly so i will not engage in that either. what i will tell you is number one, of course iran's nuclear program was not anywhere to the point of where north korea's is today so that sort of in my mind makes it clear how much harder the challenge will be
essentially to account for the actual weapons program. and the point at which they have reached. number two, b th any agenkore has to include a very robust verification regime. the verification regime and the jc poa was the most robust we have seen in a nuclear agreement of its kind. it is the kind of thing that would have been and sh be, if you include the weapons components what we should aspire to for north korea. i also recall very clear -- clearly that the main precipitating factor that brought the end of the last major round of negotiations with the north koreans in the 2009 timeframe is inability to
reach agreement on the verification regime. >> i can tell you what was on the table that point comes nowhere close to what was in the jc poa. so how we sort of foreclosed that gap -- i don't know. i do nosee any other -- if i were advising and i certainly believe there are very good experts that are trying to advise the trump administration that this is the only way to do this. another regime is critical. they actually provide a model in many ways. if that fell short i do not quite know. understand the difference and what the programs are. the last piece i would adon
this because i also think it gets into the complication of the verification piece is we have not talked about the proliferation risk. tom talked a lot about the chinese view on the north korean potential use of weapons and believing thatthat is not likely and it is really about regime survival and that is likely true but we also know that north korea has shown a willingness in the past and i think that that is something that has got to be kept in mind when thinking both about deterrence and also about verification because that is not in my mind an insignificant risk. >> if i could just add a little bit on what the possible ways if it is not step-by-step. i agree with laura that in essence it has to be some kind of a step-by-step but this kind of any towa e frayser concept may be something that can be phrased the release of
the u.s. citizens prior to summit voluntarily there are some things this should be done voluntarily and advance. those things we can work on having north korea in hopes of getting reciprocal rewards and showing a big carrot ahead i think that would enable the trump administration. they are doing this voluntarily.
maybe it is just a different packaging. >> i would just adhere that i think there is an optimistic reading of what has happened which is they have committed to a regime of not provoking each other whether it is through military exercises, one of the other little detailcas that out in the press conference was that north korea had agreed to destroy isontest whether already destroyed or it is not quite clear yet but you can see the potential for some sort of framework around which you could then do more deeper negotiations and technical negotiations on what they would declare and how you would verify it and what they would dispense on and so forth. you can see an argument there that it is different than the way it is done before.
the joint statement in 2005 from this party and all of these different working groups that are essentially desegregated. you have the peace process going forward and denuclearization on its own track. if president trump is going to claim ccesr this it is probablyon denuclearization. it will be coming to some sort of treaty on the korean peninsula. weather that has positive or negative effects is an open question. i have heard it both ways. i think that you could make the argument that it is not all at once but it feels a little bit different. >> there are different elements. one is a nuclear weapon and to his nuclear material. we have to address the issue of testing production of nuclear weapons and the stock house -- stockpiles of nuclear weapons. there is a challenge already because we do not know the
estimates. we don't know how many they have to dismantle. in terms of material and we can kind of keep them safely in north korea or we would kind of move out of north rea. we would have to talk about the facilities and we use the term dismantlement which meant partial dismantlement of the facilities. in 2007 it meant destruction of the cooling tower. so there we have to find out
different elements and kind of phrases elements in the right order. it is very challenging in terms of this is going to be a very technical process and there is a limit to what we have. there are a lot of challenges going ahead. >> this is where the rhetoric has left the road. these gentlemen over here and one over here. we will do this one first. people are saying that the u.s. is a driving force with u.s. president negotiations. it is not a driven force because the u.s. has been on the forefront for many years.
it is in the interest of the united states and prevent the unification of north korea which can be an economic powerhouse they have not worked out their own plan and what we see now is just addressing and what is presenting to trump is something that has already been trump is going to go along with it because they got out of the lentic city desk atlantic city and they will be getting out of
the korean peninsula. that is plan b for expelling the u.s. >> as we talked about it is so complicated desk i was talking the so-called nuclear experts. i do not know if they are physicists but they are really knowledgeable people. they were saying it will probably take 10 years to denude -- denuclearize.
there are steps to follow and so forth. my question is can you come in on that. >> last question over here. >> stephanie cook with nuclear intelligence weekly. i wonder given the -- that kim apparently views this situation somewhat akin to the india program at the program is akin to the india program and he is a fully fledged men desk a member of the nuclear weapons club that actually getting any kind oflearization or declaratn would not have to happen under some kind of existing multilateral scheme involving other states er than a separate standalone deal with them and if that was the case what are the options. >> who would like to take up -- i am not a nuclear physic
but knowthat we have one on the panel. tong, if you want to talk about the decades involved in verifying the denuclearization it will be welcome. >> if all things work well it would take at least 15 years to achieve denuclearization. looking at the physics side of the equati -- and i think we also need to -- they are indicating that if there is no security threat to north korea i think he is sincere with what he has been in. from the hostile into the friendly one just like the u.s.
vietnam relationship transformed from a hostile into a friendly one. that took more than 40 years. that process was also accelerated by third actor factor china which emerged as a concern to both china and the united states. it really did come to north korea to protect how long the u.s. north korea transformed. >> i think optimistic. and that is why. -- why kim jong un did not give a timetable. >> this is interesting and the time is a function of confidence as well.
what level of confidence do you want to say that you have achieved? in a country like north korea that is incredibly opaque and is iculintelligence target it is impossible to have 100% confidence on almost every aspect of thprogram. we can't get close to it in some but in others we will be very far apart so you have to assess the political risk that is associated with lower levels of confidence in what we think we know about the program. that also relateto how long is it going to take to develop a u.s. north korea friend relationship. >> when we talk about this time. that it takes for this dismantlement we have to take a look at the technical aspect and political aspect out ofit. at the end of the day we need to create the situation where north korea can live with nuclear weapons.
for example. south korea for example it took about almost 3 decades from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s for south korea to become a relatively poor country to an affluent country. it will take probably more than that. the question is can we y we have to wait 30 years. i think realistically we have to set the stage so in the first stage we have to say we have 10 years and in the meantime with
the conditions. with the framework from the u.s. and north korea in 1994 how to target. of 10 years. it wjust too short. >> can i get you to take on the secret plan to expee united states from east asia question. >> i do not know if there is one but i can say that i can pick up from what has been discussed that it is so true that denuclearization is not just about the physical aspe and physics aspe but ve much the political aspect. i think it is important to take that into account and in that regard to resolve this problem i think we need to rember that political aspect and addressing that is partly having the peace treaty to misplace the current armistice. technically we are still at war. and that is what makes north ar
korea so insecure. i think we need to find a way to address this issue as president trump actually mentioned about ensuring the end of the war as kind of a transition toward the peace treaty ultimately. i think that those are me the ings that we need to work on and to move toward in tandem with the physical denuclearization of the political aspectand also another thing that i wanted bring up is that although we will have to see if the thinking remains with his current leader kim jong un, because previously during the inter-korean summit's his father addressed that should the security issues be resolved north korea would not be
against having the u.s. troops on the korean peninsula for a number of reasons. for one they want to have more stabilizing factors against south korea should south korea provoke north korea that they would have the u.s. on their side. the bigger picture is the stabilizing force in the region with northeast asia meaning that they are very conscious of china's presence. i think this is very suspect and it is something that should things go well in the long run that it is something that is possible i do not think from south korea's perspective that there is any plan to drive the u.s. out of the peninsula. in fact, should we have a peace treaty and have a more stable situation with the change of
the role and status and the majority of the people possibly even with north korea would like to have a u.s. presence. >> i will briefly add as i mentioned earlier i believe that kim jong un is driving the process. i think he is choreographing this dance. he sees the role of different players in here and he is deciding on what termsto engage with them. whether there is a broader plan that has been cooked up among them i have not conceived of that before and i am a little bit hesitant to believe that that -- that it is is a sophisticated enough operation. what i think is pretty clear is that the kind of alluded to that beijing certainly has an interest in scaling back of
u.s. exercises including strategic bomber flights. that is the point of course but also u.s. troops on the peninsula so i think there is absolutely a regional dynamic to many of those questions. kim jong un is surely aware of how to play to those strengths. on the india analogy question many of us who sat across from them are very familiar. going back to tom's point earlier about why we are at this point with north korea has reached the point of ha a credible deterrence. i think that many of us were not surprised to see him make that pivot to a negotiating posture at this point in time. the one thing that surprises
can basically occur by saying we are in nuclear stateand we will engage only if you recognize us as a nuclear weapon state and it will be the purposes disarmament and not denuclearization. i think that would open up the kinds of questions that you are asking about. what is interesting is that kim has pu denuclearization in the biggest possible terms rather than actually committing to it firmly. is that because he had the sense to realize that trying to bargain hundred and saying recognize us as a nuclear weapon state and engage in arms- control would have been a bridge too far and decided to just hold the denuclearization carried out i think that is
what we have seen here. >> to add briefly to that legitimacy project that he is on at this point is to build ceof north korea and a state that will have nuclear weapons. they will only get into these talks if it is multilateral. we will see. there is one last question all the way at the back and then we will wrap it up so if you will just wait for the microphone to come to you. >> dale mcneil with longview global. one question to my former colleague and friend laura that involves congress which we have not discussed this morning. there was some talk about making sure that congress is deal that will make its way to congress. if i am kim jong un i'm looking at what happened to the iran deal and i'm trying to figure out how to find something that will live -- if you are playing
the long game lived beyond what could be just two more years of a president. i would love to get your thoughts and comments on how you engage congress. if possible in this political climate is there any continuity that we will see beyond the trump administration. >> you will be surprised to know that i come to some of these questions with a strong executive branch bias, as a general broad principle notie enhance that is a broad principle. and we feel like we are in a different world on some of these issues and maybe day deserve a little bit depending
umstces in which we i was saying a couple things. one of them is that there are a number of different scenarios in which congress would be involved. congress has taken a very strong and forward leading stand on these sanctions. there was a significant role that congress will place and that you just list sanctions. it is essentially what happened with the jc poa. you can see a scenario in which congress has passed including just last summer and one of the only pieces of legislation s co and the most bipartisan one has included north korea sanctions. there is definitely some space for talking about that.
that is number one. another place where you can see congressional role is the mi conict. and has come up a couple of times with this military option with the white house and the executive branch need for militaor there was some talk by this administration. and then they could somehow shoehorn this because they can say i'm not a lawyer but some lawyers i lo inde i at that. that is really fraught because when you were on the front end and you end up with an iraq scenario. how does that come into play -- to me it sideration. ultimately depends on what is really on the table as an agreement.
there are some agreements that should be robust ento be treated as a treaty. particularly if it deals with some kind of significant en they will have some kind of actual treaty that is formally binding which would of course include congressional role. thise branch bias comes into play. i would to see the threshold at which that particular agreement would take the form of a treaty no >> we will wrap up very quickly here. there i suggest that you each give me a second forecast. you have already seen where we have come in the last six months. six months from now. so january 1 2019 are we still negotiating are we in some deterrent space are are we back to fire and fury?
>> i think the u.s. and north korea will be still negotiating having -- technical issues starting with the program and stopping further test and maybe even stopping and producing the materials. i think that we might consider -- and prove very slightly and gradually. i do not think we will go back to the fire and fury. >> let me give likely guest to the scenario. i would give 35% to the first okay scenario. 25% to the second crisis scenario 35% to the last sc and 5% to gorbachev scenario. >> okay. >> i will keep it short. i know that it is very widely
used and kind of jaded now but i'd like to remain cautiously optimistic. it is just the first step of a long road and it is kind of encouraging that presid trhaowleed the fact that it will not be resolved overnight and it will be a process. with that in mind and with a budding rapport and confidence building hopefully things will go in the right direction. >> that is really optimistic. >> i thin we will play rope a dope. if the north ans are pulling out a playbook. i firmly believe that kim jong un is different than his father and grandfather but the north koreans have always been very good at basically creating entropic -- entrapment scenarios and using them as leverage onto themselves. i think we will probably be in that kind of scenario and
whether it leads to something or not remains an open question. >> sotill boxing six months from now. >> thanks again to all of you for coming and your attention this morning. please go so for the washington capitals. cspan washington journal live everyday with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up thursday morning, michigan public were -- combating the opioid epidemic
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