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tv   The Civil War Battle of Antietam Lincoln and Emancipation  CSPAN  September 23, 2018 10:00am-11:06am EDT

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our cities tour staff recently tried that traveled to louisiana to learn more about the history. learn more at c-span.org/cities tour. you are watching american history tv. all weekend, every weekend. > next scott hartwig former supervisory historian at gettysburg national military park talks about the lead up to 1862 battle of preliminary emancipation proclamation after the battle. symposium by the the emerging civil war blog. what an introduction for an introduction. first i will say that i do serve executive director for civil war trails and it is an honor because i have a chance to
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all of you. the program grows at the grassroots level and it is like you who may have an idea that you want it and marketed and you come to us so it is your stories we tell.o i would be remiss if i didn't say i came to history at a young are few scholars i can point to who helped me get there. the gentleman i have the honor of introducing is one. listen to a biography and i know who that is. have to necessarily have a biography but this one is is a noted of scott 34-year veteran gettysburg supervisory historian 20 years within the national park service award in excellence of 1993 and was n in undamental in the growth of history program in gettysburg on if it was the 11th site
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burke's list of 10. included distance and satellite education to key layer for the design all aspects of the new gettysburg museum and retired january of 2014. as we often know when you retire you stay busy. ed essays and books channel.story discovery, pennsylvania cable. c-span and to antietam creek the american campaign from september to september 16 and 800 page study of campaign up to the eve the battle of antietam published september of 2012 by john hopkins. working on the sequel which will cover the ballot of end tam and aftermath and of the campaign. join me in welcoming scott hartwig. if you have to drive
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around northern virginia in your job my hat goes off to you. you know what i'm talking about. and, burt worked for me. failed.ly [laughter] you, : no, i have to tell u when i came in here and heard the list of top 10 with this crowd i was like oh my to be -- you oing can't win in a top 10. be has ot win because their own argument. think burt did a great job so i have no problem with gettysburg being 11, nine, eight. all have our own opinions on
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these things. of this, we y part will talk about the antietam and a theorist once war is politics by other means. you might say extreme means. maryland campaign of 1862 or antietam campaign you could of the ick any campaign war but this one in particular politics, not h just on one side, on both sides. what i intend to do is talk t this campaign and about five topics associated with the campaignment for me to campaign ishe whole a seminar, not a talk. emancipation bout in the maryland campaign. invade maryland? the armies of the campaign.
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understanding the strengths and weaknesses can help you better campaign how this evolves the way it does and turns out the way it does. and special orders number 191. lost orders, mous robert e. lee's orders that are and mcclellan is given the orders. why did lee offer battle at sharpsbu sharpsburg. the war and slavery. the myths from the civil is that emancipation played of 1862 ntil september when lincoln issued the preliminary emancipation proclamation. that is not true. from the beginning of the war republican party and abraham lincoln were out for slavery. were -- they didn't want
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states of missouri, kentucky, maryland were slave states. they could not afford to let them go into the confederacy. careful how they proceeded but the attack on the ry again very early in war. remember the confiscation act? they are connected to the war. august of 1861 first slaves tion act says that come within union lines are free. emancipated. one of the biggest emancipators spring nion earl in the of -- army was george b. mcclellan. he didn't like this policy but it because civil government made the policy and he obeyed the policy. slaves who came win lines on the virginia peninsula were free. will up the ante more
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because as the war continues to and the border states are being very difficult to work wither him because he is trying give them a plan of compensated emancipation and interested. they want to hold on to slavery. south is fighting very hard. there are big battles. win are determined to their independence. o, they are going to up the ante on the attack. there is also complications for are ers in the field who running into slaves. d his a loyal master or disloyal master? i don't know what i'm supposed to do with the slaves that came within my lines. we will make it simple for you. secede andstate that the slaves come within your lines they are free. you do not return them to the owners. not only do you not return them, you willing court-martialed if
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t. is illegal to return slaves to their owners. confiscation bcond act. a second thing in the the scation act calls for president to issue a proclamation declaring all laves in the states in rebellion to be free. we think lincoln just came up idea, i will issue this emancipation proclamation an change the war. republican congress calls for him to do this. this is very common for congress to do this. here is a great back called freedom national that lays out -- discussion of disrurpgs in more ect of slavery detail because it gives you a better idea of the attack upon and him's role in this. lincoln is on board with this. second this
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confiscation act. he wants to issue an emancipation proclamation. he is going to go down to harrison's landing -- i know, that is is out there not from harrison's landing. that is from antietam. i know. but it is lincoln and mcclellan and there wasn't any pictures harrison's landing. so he goes to harrison's landing early july, mcclellan has been in the seven days battles. he is going to sit down and meet with mcclellan. when he is there mcclellan will hand him a letter called letter.ison's bar mcclellan gets bashed for there letter like he is way out of line. he is out of line at all. he is demander of one of largest in the union and has a right to express it the united states e what i think of policy of what he says is a declaration of especially upon lavery will rapidly
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disintegrate our present armies. clear shot tty across the bow. i marry what is going -- i hear going on in congress debut being the second condition con act. don't do something radical. he is conservative but the other looking at anything he the as radical might make other side fight harder. he still has the concept that a lot of southerners who are unionists at heart and we if we don't goer too radical. the president has decided that going to fight the war with one hand behind his back any longer. politely to mcclellan and reads the letter and on july five days after the second confiscation act is passed he cabinet and h his reads them an emancipation proclamation. him, boss, not a good
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time. peninsula.the the war is not going well. of e could look like an act desperation and it might backfire. victory.a we need a military victory for want to occur. so, they hope that that victory going to occur in northern virginia under the command of commanding the -- general john pope and lincoln essentially gives him the army potomac. he never relieved mcclellan of command but they detach the send it to pope. ope, we know, gets defeat ed soundly at the second battle of anassas and the union army retreats into the for theifications of washington in tremendous disorder. disorganized and discouraged and furious at pope. is done.
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you cannot have pope any more. o, lincoln comes to a very painful decision. he calls a cabinet meeting september 2 and tells cabinet he's placing george mcclellen in command of all the orces within the fortifications. very specific about that. he is not the commander of the we will put in the field. commander of those in the fourthifications. -- fortifications. said there was a more disturbed feeling than i ever witnessed. one was edwin stanton to the hrelef of war.e secretary he was trembling with rage. -- despised mcclellan so much. somebody said he would favor the capture of washington to the return of mcclellan to command. i ther he said that or not don't know but he hated him. so they are not happy with lincoln's decision.
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we thought we were going to get rid of mcclellan. ut things are going to get worse because it appears that confederate army may move into maryland and order is sent saying llan september 3 there is every possibility that will cross the potomac and make a raid into maryland or pennsylvania. moveable army must be organized to meet him in the field. command that o moveable ea ablable army? haven't picked him yet. visit ambrose burnside and offer him and believes ill say he george mcclellen is the best plan to command there army. him in the ll stab back later but you don't think mcclellan knew that burnside had done that. him is over a barrel. he doesn't have any choice. september 7 he's going to
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visit mcclellan at his house which was also his headquarters washington. he tells him, general, you take the nd of the army in field, verbal command. if you read mcclellan after the says took command without the authority that no one will the currently it put hum back in -- the courage to put him back it. there is not a chance that he that. he had never been relieved of command, ever. they just took his army. verbal you d was a are back in command of the field army. mind s no question in my that lincoln did that. demacommand despite the fact they have a history and one-sided. lincoln can work with almost anybody. can hardly work with anybody. he has problems his entire life always.periors
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you can see some things he said about the president. 16.s an idiot august nothing more than a well meaning 1861. october of i went to tea to the white house here i found the original gorilla november 1861. he does this to others. is weaker than the most old woman you were ever by.yed he is funny. secretary of state steward was a officious incompetent little puppy. things to ng these his wife in private, but believe me you know when somebody feels way about you that you can pick it up. people that picked that up about but lincoln looks past this and places mcclellan as the best that he's got to command the army to take field against robert evident lee who invaded
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maryland. the mission is protect washington and do not let them and protect al baltimore. determine if there is a of the ate army south potomac. there are rumors that there is a ig confederate force still in northern virginia. you have to determine that as well. confederates he out of maryland. lincoln has a fourth thing that to do.s mcclellan give him a victory so he can emancipation proclamation. this is one of the great ironies campaign.yland we need the general who doesn't the emancipation proclamation to win victory to deliver it. that is what lincoln needs from mcclellan. it lee.ve why does -- move it lee. don't say lee invade maryland. which is red dot
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centreville menear manassas and where all the union troops are gathered within fortifications. lee has some options available to him. initiative. he's got three essentially options that i see. he can invest washington, d.c., besiege the city. going to be able to besiege the city because he entirely but he can besiege part of it. that maintains the pressure on and federal army. when you have a army outside gate that is pressure. negative is his men can't eat. supplies in northern virginia. that option isn't going to work. second option, withdraw to warrent reestablish your supply line, re-equip your army poorly supplied.
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condition me of the value less sent -- convalescent wounded and sick men and the army will be bigger. safe move. negative. surrender the initiative to the enemy. if you know robert e. lee he likes to do that. option.aryland, third leaves northern virginia open. battlefield of second manassas, still trying to collect the equipment off the field. give a break to the area of orthern virginia and give the conscription officers to get in and conscript soldiers that were by the yankees. maintain the pressure on the federals. you go into maryland, they have to react. you first the enemy to take the before they are ready. that is why you don't want to go to warrenton.
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you when they want to. you force the issue, they come to ou when you want them before they are reorganized, about of the 300,000 volunteers been absorbed into the army and trained. get them out in the open, into and fight them. you retain the initiative. shots. calling the there is the potential to invade ennsylvania and influence the fall congressional elections. .hat is a biggy, really big for lee, he has once expressed to jefferson davis the confederate president whether he seeks are heavy victories. what he means is victories that damage to the federals but the confederates and that er as much will undermine the morale of the northern people and the way they that is they will vote out the republicans and vote in the democrats who are likely to negotiate a peace settlement with the confederacy. potential for he
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european intervention if you are successful. -- dent think there's going doesn't think there will be but some do. it is always the possibility. the negative, how are you going it supply the army and physical condition of army. is a negative in any of them. it is a no brainer for lee. we are going to go into maryland. that is where we want to go. lee will write to jefferson his army isber 4 as crossing into maryland i'm more persuaded of the benefits that will result of the maryland and o will start unless you signify disapprobation. should the results justify i propose to enter pennsylvania deem it should unadvise believe r -- unadvisable. there is pro forma stuff. davis absolutely approves this
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movement. he is already moving. he is just showing deference. is smart because davis didn't like people who didn't deference. he is showing him deference. you are the president. following strategic ideas that we discussed that if this opportunity arose. why he knows davis is not going to say no, i don't want you to go into maryland. a good idea. he knows davis will approve. he just wants davis to feel like is his idea and he is the approving official. check lists on how -- choices on how to go, east of or the way at gettysburg, west of the blue the shenandoah valley. he goes east of the blue ridge stone extend wanted him -- stonewall jackson wanted west. go the reason to go east of the to frederick, up
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maryland, was sound. by moving, it frederick he is washington, d.c. and baltimore. he poses an immediate threat it bring aces and he will the union army out of the defenses of washington faster -- it the goes it gettysburgampaign -- campaign route. he wants to fight the army and where i ecause that is will get the political consequences of that victory. lee makes his decision. why does he invade maryland? move politically for the confederates. as s a risk militarily but lee will tell james seddon the war derate secretary of before the kidsburg campaign about ddon was concerned vicksburg and wanted to move the rmy out there lee reminded him all decisions in war entail risk. to calculate the
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risk. lee's calculated the risk and option for the confederate si is to march into confederacy is to march into maryland. the two arms that will confront different. the army of northern virginia begins the campaign much any ger than almost confederate writer will ever acknowledge to you. 70,000 to bly about 5,000 men, extremely poorly supplied particularly the troops second maneen in the machine campaign. they have -- second manassas campaign. food.ave no regular their uniform and clothing are falling apart because they have supplies because they are beyond supply line. are those that are supplied throws that come up from richmond and reenforce lee. rough shape and lee knows that. dorsey pender writes following
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machine -- men in his brigade during the harper's ferry operation. such a group i have never seen honor or decency and right or respect for property i would strike many with my sabre. the officers are nearly as bad. my regiments when they thought they were going into a scoped x of 10 officers out and didn't come up until they thought all danger over. my brigade went off that day. is in roughrmy that shape. but right below that dr. laws was a u.s. sanitary commission doctor in frederick nd talked it a lot of confederates when they occupied frederick. in aid they all believe themselves as well as their generals and are terribly in earnest. he thought they were pretty toughment one thing the -- army is arl
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most of them are combat veterans. experienced combat veterans and strand and lee has and lee has a very small good command team. because tial wings confederate congress doesn't yet the form so rps to they are commanded by james long stonewall jackson. he has there really good command team. progresses, mpaign quartermasters like william elder manifest immense s and grow to proportion. if we can only get enough for machien it eat i don't believe army can be beaten. but he can't get enough to eat havoc.t will play when they get to leesburg they shakedown like sherman
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sea.efore the march to the they will shed about 5,000 soldiers that are physically or don't have shoes. they are excused. they will march this will to winchester, virginia. hat leaves a balance of 5eu6z,000 to 69,000. 3,107 in the e there and you have a of about 63,000 men. they will fight the battle of 37,000 andth between 40,000 men. you can do the math. lose 25,000 to 27,000 stragglers in the maryland campaign. these are sick guys guys who to eat. et something hey are at the end of their
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tether. hey leave a stream of stragglers. that is 40% lost due to straggling. is a massive problem. if you think it is all made up after e's correspondence the maryland campaign is over. he didn't think it was made up. crisis.a is a my of the potomac hodgepodge of three different armies. even w that every army though they belong to the same army, do things a little differently. work for the national park service and spwefrpb station did things resource y than management and law enforcement and so on. it is the same with where we did differently than antietam or fredericksburg. way. are the same you have the first corps and pope's armyboth from of virginia. one ave the second corps,
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division of fourth and fifth and sixth from peninsula army of the was on the peninsula. ambrose corps is burnsi burnside's corps and they have -- an expedition narrow core.tionary about 84,000 on september 7 and to 87,000 by isn't 17 the day they fight the battle teeth. r one -- antietam. one significant thing about 18,000 of is about -- 18%y, about 1% it 18% of the infantry are raw recruits. recruits i will give you an example. 13th of new re the jersey was himself an experienced soldier and had been new jersey ridgement on the peninsula. he is having a conversation with crowsdale of the
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128th pennsylvania 12 days battle of antietam and he asked him how to form a battle. not knowing himself and giving as an excuse that he had no time commissioned to buy a copy of tactics. he is going to be killed in antietam. when he is killed, his unit is form into a line of battle and it is chaotic. how to do it. none of the officers or men know how because they have never trained. they have never even fired their weapons most of them. hat is what a lot of these regiments are like. so it inhibits the ability of certain things -- rmy to do certain things and mcclellan. people said why didn't he march a day. you can't do that with people who never marched. to season them
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gradually. they will throw them in the battle at antietam and the for them. is painful but for the veteran corps of the rmy, these machine who have been demoralized by the defeat on the peninsula and now second mood of the men is reflected by a general in the army corps had writes to his daughter i can't tell you of the future. the north has no ho hope, no safety that i can see. to win this. the confederates feel the same up this epic campaign. a lellan's command team is little bigger than lee's and more complicated. he's divided the army into two the right which is ambrose burnside under center , edwin sumner will command the center wing which is
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second corps. he continues it command it. the old army corps gentleman will take command of that two days before the battle of antietam. joseph mansfield. the two best with the ninth corps and hooker of corps.st the last two guys you see are when the arrest campaign begins. william ohn border and b. franklin. charges were levied against them they are pe and relieved of command but mcclellan asks the war epartment, this is a crisis, these men are experienced, they are some of my best guys. i need them. release both of them. everybody is under a bit of a cloud. doesn't trust the government or war department. there.sn't like anybody they don't trust him. he's got two of his experienced
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fifth and nders, ixth and they are possibly marshall.rt he has some good commanders but streamlined and simple as lee and he doesn't have commanders of the of jackson and lo longstreet. 191 the most s famous lost orders of the civil war, what are they? when lee invaded maryland and marched up to frederick where the right, he n got there and expected -- there where it n garrison says miles, three dots, miles, and you see white and martinsburg. garrisons, two union big one at harper's ferry a little over 10,000 men and one martinsburg. they are sitting a i stride the communications lee will need to use going into pennsylvania when
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go down the valley you can't get past these two with communications. has it clear them. he thought they would just retreat when he got to frederick, he expected they will do the smart thing and pull them out. general leck the union and chief orders those garrisons to stay in place. lee, characteristically, doesn't a problem. he sees it as an opportunity. let's get them. the n get them before yankee army comes out of washington, d.c. he draws up a very elaborate extremely complex plan we you consider these men are ll dealing with written communications, there are no radios or telephones or tell graphs. -- tell graphs. under take one force stonewall jackson and march to boonsboro, williamsport, across river, march into northern virginia and either destroy the garrison at or drive it on to
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harper's ferry. general olumn under afayette will capture maryland heights key terrain dominating harper's ferry on the maryland shore. third column one infantry nder general john walker will cross near point of rocks and go through northern virginia and heights on the south side of harper's ferry on commanding side harper's ferry. capturing those key positions the jackson sealing off west they should be able to destroy or capture the union harper's ferry want once that garrison is captured hraomarch its will hagersto hagerstown. in the original plan nobody was going to hagerstown initially. began it execute the rder on september 10, lee
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however had learned through some pies or someone that there was union militia approaching hagerstown from pennsylvania and hat the people in hagerstown were taking their food supplies. bad.eds that food he modifies the plan on the longstreet's es demand up to leesburg and leaves a division at boonsburg. map and ook at the realize lee is taking a gamble. eaarmy is divided by mountains, rivers and widely dispersed. leesburg, bansboro, harper's ferry, north of the potomac, south. from the shrpb dough, then -- shenandoah and jessica west of harper's ferry. that is the plan that he draws up. the confederates begin to execute there the union army is
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on hing across maryland and september 12 the leading elements river and occupy frederick. september 13 the army of potomac begins to close on frederick and the town and some of the troops river south of the town the 27th indiana. they march into the field and ridgement stacks arms and n.c.o.'s look down and see an envelope. pick it up. paper igars in it and wrapped around it. i have it tell you there is pretty awards. the army of northern virginia issue armies rom headquarters in envelopes rapid around cigars, or orders around the cigars. strange. be that as it may, they find a spaniecial er with orders 191 the areas from to d.h.l.rs everybody points fingers as to who lost this.
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there entire affair reeffects well on the way of did business at army northern virginia headquarters. they should have known that that order order, there should have been a d.l.l. will received it and signed for it. here is no record it ever happened. just kind of ride on. orders. they are going to hurry them object up the chain of command and eventually they will be in hands of george mcclellan. when does mcclellan get them? of debate about this right now. a lellan is going to write very excited telegram that he president that is 12 m.or timed 12 meridian, 12 noon. this is what we have always
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accepted. mcclellan didn't do anything the rest of the day. he's been roundly criticized for this. a few years back maurice going through the lincoln papers and he found the telegram that lincoln had received received, not what was sent from army and lined the 12 m written 12 midnight. over there.w james thanks to james because he a the e while back sent me books of the u.s. signal corps and messages they sent back and during the campaign. there is a message sent to mcclellan on september 13, they don't put the time but says the president is at the war department office and anxious for news from you. the line is open to
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point of rocks. all the lines have been cut so you are not telegraphing from washington.o mcclell mcclellan's message is going rocks to sugarloaf washington, d.c. and the emergency is probably -- probably sent at midnight. there is why i think it is. unless away find the smoking gun we can never say searcertainly. 3:00 p.m. inl send the afternoon a message it his come into have just possession of -- he doesn't say possession of the orders of the confederates. marchtes out the order of of confederates in special orders 191. he says i want you to determine confederates follow this order of march. if he had found the orders and
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noon he's not re going to sit three hours before to pleasanton. he won't do that. at idn't get the orders noon. he probably got them in the early afternoon and shortly he is e gets the orders going to have someone on his it f write there message plentiton and probably going to pink is chief detective areton try to -- pinkerton find in frederick who might be in the know did they follow there order of march because with determine it is genuine. you have to determine that movement.u order by 6:00 p.m. he is convinced before he hears back from on that they followed the order of march and starts to orders to his army. after the orders are issued to the army for the operation on at 11:00 p.m. he writes henry halle
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henry halleck chief of staff and probably around that time is when he will receive this mergency from point of rocks telling him that the president is at the war department anxious midnight he will write the message that will go to the president. is completely logical. the timing of a 12 noon emergency is not logical. that is why i i believe it went out at midnight. mcclellan plans an offensive. just sit there. he orders the ninth corps to catoctin mountains front ddletown valley in of south mountain. on september 14 the main part of going to -- his army is going to march toward turner's gaped a fox's gap and take on what he thinks is the force at nfederate street and lee, long
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he smallest force will be reinforc einforced and break through crampton's and relieve leonardo and relieve harper's ferry. that was a big order for corps it nd the sixth execute that. be that as it may, on september does army of the potomac move and they do fight a battle, series of battles called the battles of south mountain. ox's gap, turner gap and crampton gap and they crush the onfederates and break through into pleasant valley and they arm.on the confederate's they hold their position at fox brings longstreet's men own and they lose half of them straggling and reenforce on south mountain and holds but
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key terror ridden. during the night -- terrain were during the night lee makes a retreat.to we will get to that in the moment but the last thing on special orders 191. has been suggested that it didn't really help mcclellan. plan.ready will a he didn't have a plan. t helped mcclellan immeasurably. i don't ascribe to the idea that special orders 191 didn't help mcclellan. it confused him. didn't confuse him. it answered a lot of questions. he was condition introduced that there were condition federals hagerstown and harper's ferry. he didn't know where the man strength was or what they were do.ng to he knew harper's ferry was threatened but he was not sure of has send the weight african-americ army. it.cleared he knew what he needed to do and he did it. was a big coup and he did
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act upon it. so, lee is going to order a .etreat from south mountain that leads us to the question of battle at offer shrar sharpsburgburg. those things in the army of the at foxes gap and turn three white are lee, longstreet and d.l. hill. been whipped and lee during the night of september 14 rders them to fall back across he potomac river at shcheppers town. that campaign is over. mcclause getgeneral your troops across the potomac river any way you can. might have to abandon equipment. we have it get out of here the we are in a tough spot.
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he tells stonewall jackson breaks off the operation march shepherdstown. the campaign is over. as they file often the mountain he reconsiders. a good no, that is not move. we have to do something to help mcclause. halt at keetysville and draw the union army away from toward us.ners gap that will give mcclause a chance away.t maybe there's a possibility mcclause can get around maryland march up to sharpsburgburg and join us there nd we can retreat to shepherdstown. he will send orders it mcclause that.e if he can do as the troops march lee changes his mind again. i think he is probably studying maps and questioning people who says the farand he
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better temporary defensive position is behind the antietam sharpsburgburg. d.l. ers long street and hill to form them. combiampaign is over and there is a temporary stand to extract mccause. he has the orders he sent to jackson it break off the siege. in the execution of this movement on the morning of 15, as lee is close to creek, hever antietam gets a dispatch from stonewall jacks lee on, and jackson tells by the blessing of god harper's to surrender. they surrendered that morning. 1 union p.o.w.'s. one of the biggest victories in confederates. they lose about 300 and capture artillery, ammunition,
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equipment. it was a well executed longer thanust took lee thought it was going to. arper's ferry will surrender, ok. lee starts it reconsider -- starts to reconsider. there's a chance that i can reunite my army and we can in maryland, here at sharpsburg bu .arpsburg you can look at the map. that is risky. is. where mcclause he has it march down cross the and get it harper's ferry and up to shepherdstown and sharpsburg. all have to march there. look how close almost all the army is and he only has 15,000 at sharpsburg. so, he makes a decision. i'm going to try to fit a battle mye and see if i can reunite army. people have opinions about that.
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.p. alexander his chief ordnance officer and one of the best critical people of the analyzed y who confederate campaigns in the war this t, he writes of decision a defeat would involve he utter destruction of his earl becau army. p. wroets one of he boldest and most lose dust decision -- lohazardous. bewildering that he should have thought of doing it. i think it will be pronounced by critics to be the blunder military general lee ever made. so, why did he do it? i think it is a good analysis by douglas. not fought in positions select the upon sound military principles.
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welkton, innapoleon and lee wer when theyith them and disregarded them they had strong reasons for doing so. lee is clearly disregarding them. he doesn't tell us why. to try to surmise it. reason why he stays and offers battle. -- he is an opportunist. confederacy lie in maryland. taking the course and falling into virginia yes, i will preserve my army and sacrifice the initiative. like to do that. you lose the strategic gets it, and enemy the fighting at sharpsburg will carry great risks. is risks in every operation. it has great possibilities. what if mcclellan attacks and he defeats the attack and mcclellan
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where will he fall back it? the likeliest place he will fall he can defend easily is south mountain. open does that, lee has an corridor to hagerstown and on into pennsylvania and the north of permanent political nd consequences continue. training is why he will fight at sharpsburg. he sees the best opportunity for taking ederate cause by this risk. he knows that his army is in bad he knows on't know if how bad it is. everybody always candy coats boss. for the his subordinates may have been doing that. risk.es take a tremendous on the next day september 17, mcclellan will attack him and the battle of antietam. battle.dously bloody both lose heavily but i can tell army of northern
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virginia is mauled in there terribly mauled. the eaarmy of payment. more than than he anticipated. he remains on the battlefield the mber 18, explores possibility of making a flank being attack against mcclellan something about the resiliency of lee. not alizes that is possibility once a recondition recon sapbs determines that. then he will retreat and across the potomac river. they will cross the potomac river on september 20 and with a the fifth arm corps. lee will counterattack of rously and the battle shepherdstown will occur a union maryland campaign 20.es to an end september
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two days later, remember politics? it rears its head. later lincoln issues the emancipation proclamation. s burt mentioned antietam the battle may be a drawn battle but trategically it was a union victory clearly. lee did not achieve his goals did.his plans and mcclellan he got them out of the state of maryland. losses. ted leaf -- leaf losses. losses. lincoln issues the emancipation proclamation. when i have read about the emancipation proclamation people write about the army of potomac and reaction to it is as if the writers seek out who thought it was a terrible idea and it was going to be the end of the world and all of those. but anybody who thought it was a ood idea i won't better
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mentioning those people. one of people who thought it was was the commander of the army george mcclellen. he writes in a private letter to of his in new nd york, i'm anxious it know how like you regard the emancipate islation ing slaves and one stroke of the en changing our free institutions into a dispotism. went off onequently things like this privately and publicly being a tppbacknowled government was s subservient to them and he does that. army we have to obey the orders. it is a proclamation. we will follow it. he doesn't lead a revolution. in the cornerught
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fields of the six wisconsin and 1863 he was invited to go to his hometown of arietta, ohio and he was asked to address the people in the was about how the war going, what they thought about the war. said about the emancipation proclamation. slavery is the chief source of and the in the south basis of their aristocracy. nd my observation is that a when to slavery hurts more than volleys. we like it because it hurts the like the prbg makes because it lets -- proclamation because it lets the the real issue is. you don't hear that side but here -- remember, lincoln did win the election. he was a republican. he majority of men in the earl are republicans as -- army are republicans and won again in
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1864. but even among the democrats not desert in mass. disintegrate.t rancis donaldson reflects the mood of a lot of them. i'm a democrating first, last all the time but as long as the rebels are in arms i will sustain the government's efforts to put down the rebellion with my life if necessary. what donaldson reminds us is accepted, soldiers they may not have liked the emancipation proclamation, men ike him, but they accepted it because it was a measure they felt might bring the war closer end and they would just accept it and continue it fight. -- continue to fight so the maryland campaign of 1862, this major plays role in the considers of the campaign and the -- in the
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and army the campaign reflects the differing views in the north that will play out war as the rest of the the country grapples with this issue of emancipation. you very much for inviting me down here. [applause] >> we are all busy like oh my gosh. so good. we have time for a couple of questions. let's see where you go here. on the all your work
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maryland campaign what do you think when all is said and done lee's assessment of mcclellan as his opponent? assessment -- drew: mcclellan as his opponent. i think he understood electric mcclellan although i think surprised him at south mountain. mcclellan was more aggressive accustomed to. mcclellan will always been a very cautious person in operations. he was kind of a set piece commander although i do still believed that that way would behave when he makes his decision it stand at sharpsburg. for one e realizes thing mcclellan gets severely criticized why doesn't he on 15 march from south ountain and tack robert -- attack robert e. lee's army. you can look at a map and say it
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easy to do. but we you get into the weeds as soldier would have to it was impossible. mcclellan couldn't have attacked september 15. would be hasty with part the army. they had that roads to move the earl so there was a gigantic traffic jam of frican-american as it tried to -- african-american and he had cross where they can antietam creek and no attack was take place until the 16th. that is where i think lee takes measure of mcclellan and he is confident that he will not be the 16th and if he is it will be so late he can position. he feels with mcclellan even surprised at en south mountain this is a commander i basically know with and how he to do will operate and he is going to be pretty cautious and careful the rules. thing by
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he what do something outside rules. hat is what i think lee felt about mcclellan. understanding of the lee expected 191, jackson's men to have enveloped er's ferry by arp the 13th of september which is mcclellan got the copy of order. that had not think happened. was there telegraphic communication it harper's ferry? scott: no, there were not and we don't know of any communications that occurred with lee. we know that lee wrote lafayette cclause and told him and mondayish mondayish -- admonished him that heard from him. it is possible he heard from and he was ally apprising him of where he was in the course of operation.
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lee's timetable, i have to believe that jackson and cclause and others when they looked at his timetable were lake, seriously? were like seriously? ok you are the best. in place byl troops you are the boss. move over 50ays to miles and take care of the union garrison in spartanburg. i think it was a really tall order for lee to be expected to carry that out. what they could not know when they were planning the operation was, with the garrisons try to run for it? if they tried to run for it, it would be easier to destroy them out in the open. they could not know. i am sure lee felt any plan like this would have to have wiggle room. it is just that mcclellan's surprising move on september 14 took away any wiggle room lee had. >> time for one last question.
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two but they are quick. one, following up on lee's measure of mcclellan. how much do you think his view of mcclellan impacted his decision to save the campaign as opposed to retreat? i did not hear anything on the shrinking of the army of virginia with soldiers not being willing to save the fort. >> will answer the second part first and first part second. there's almost no evidence the soldiers were opposed to going in. there was one north carolina regiment in walker's division that after the war said there were some men who said we did not sign up for doing this, we signed up to defend the confederacy so we do not want to go in there. therefind some evidence
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were rumors that soldiers threw their shoes away when long streak issued the order that any men without shoes were exempt from going into maryland. there were rumors they threw their shoes away. you don't eat food and you are marching all the time and bullets are blown people's heads off. i could see somebody throwing their shoes away. they had kind of had it. i found most confederate soldiers were enthusiastic. they were delighted to carry the war into the north. marylandhem thought because it was a slave state would be welcoming. i will paraphrase one soldier. when they left frederick, he called frederick a damn yankee hole.
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the second part of your question was with lee and mcclellan? >> [indiscernible] >> i think that was part of it. i think with other commanders lee faced, look at hooker. he was a very aggressive officer. he executed this brilliant campaign plan at the beginning of chancellorsville, and lee still takes this tremendous risk against him. lee is a risk taker and opportunist. i think he may have tried this with other commanders as well. any goodnitely believe commander takes their measure of the other side. willing to did of napoleon. napoleon did of wellington. they all knew their strengths and weaknesses. they all tried to seek to exploit them. i think lee is no different.
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he knows mcclellan pretty well. >> when extraordinary privilege it has been for us -- what an extraordinary privilege it has been for us. thank you so much. [applause] >> you are watching american history tv, only on cspan3. what does it mean to be american? that is this year's studentcam competition. and we are asking middle school and high school students to answer it by producing a documentary about a constitutional right, national characteristic, or historic event and how it defines the american experience. we are awarding $100,000 in total cash prizes including a grand prize of $5,000. the deadline is january 20, 2019. for more information, go to our
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website, studentcam.org. how our leaders chosen in the u.s. house of representatives? next on "american history tv," catholic university politics professor matthew green discusses determining factors in the u.s. house leadership elections from the 1960's to the present. professor green is co-author of the forthcoming book, "choosing the leader, leadership elections in the u.s. house of representatives." the u.s. capital historical society hosted this event. it is just under an hour. >> ok, folks. we are going to get started. at themselvesn se as they wish. thank you for joining us. what do i need to say about this? it is beautiful. we appreciate the library of congress for letting us use this space today. next week, wll

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