tv National Security Officials Testify on Threats CSPAN January 30, 2019 4:04pm-6:30pm EST
tennessee's commissioner of agriculture. south carolina also has two new members of the house. republican william timmons served two years in the state senate before joining congress. he owns two fitness companies and operates a law firm in the greenville area. and congressman joe cunningham is the first democrat since 1981 to represent the charleston-based first district. he started his professional life as an engineer working on maritime projects and later went to law school. the congressman's father is a member of the kentucky supreme court. new congress, new leaders. watch it all on c-span. yesterday on capitol hill, the nation's top intelligence officials testified at a senate intelligence committee hearing. among them, cia director, gina haspel, dan coates and fbi director christopher wray. they updated lawmakers on threats to the united states from around the world. this is about two-and-a-half hours. this hearing is just undeo
[ banging gavel ] i'd like to call this hearing to order. i would like to welcome our witnesses today. director of national intelligence, dan coates. general robert ashley, director of the federal bureau of investigation, chris wray. director of the national security agency, general paul nakasoni, and robert kardella. i thank all of you for being here this morning. i would like to welcome the two newest members who in typical senate fashion are not here yet. senator ben sass of nebraska and senator michael bennett of colorado. they're both great additions, and i look forward to working with them. and with you to fulfill the committee's critical oversight
mandates. before i go to my formal remarks, i want to extend my condolences of this committee to general ashley and his work force at the defense intelligence agency, as well as general nakasoni and his work force at nsa. on january 16th, a d.i.a. employee and cryptology technology technician were killed. this is a stark reminder of the workmen and women do on behalf of the country every day, often with no public acknowledgment. we thank you for your leadership of this community and more importantly for what your officers do and the sacrifices they make on behalf of our nation. this committee has met in open forum to discuss the security threats facing the united states since 1995. the nature, scale and scope of those threats have evolved greatly over the last 25 years.
hostile nation states, terrorist organizations, maligned cyber actors and even infectious disease and natural disasters at different times have been the focus of the intelligence communities' efforts. our intelligence officers have repeatedly proven themselves equal to the task of refocusing, reconfiguring and relearning the business of intelligence to keep pace with a threat landscape that's never static. when this nation was attacked on september the 11th counterterrorism rightly became our nation's security focus. the intelligence community responded by shifting resources and attention. we learned the ways of our new enemy and we learned how to defeat it. we're now living in yet another new age, a time characterized by cyber warfare, weaponized disinformation, all occurring within a context of a world producing more data than mankind has ever seen. tomorrow it's going to be deep fakes, artificial intelligence,
a 5g enabled internet of things with billions of internet connections on consumer devices. what i hope to get out of this morning is a sense of how well prepared the intelligence community is to take on this new generation of technologically advanced security threats. countering these threats requires making information available to those who can act and doing so with speed and agility. sometimes the key actors will be the federal government, other times it will be a city, many times it will be a social media company or a startup or a biotech firm. i see a world where greater collaboration between government and the private sector is necessary while still protecting sensitive sources and methods. we have to share what we can, trust who we can and collaborate because we must. the objective of our enemies has not changed. they want to see the united
states weakened if not destroyed. they want to see us abandon our friends and our allies. they want to see us lesson our global presence. they want to see us squabble and divide, but their tools are different. i don't need to remind anyone in the room when this country's democracy was attacked in 2016, it wasn't with a bomb or a missile or a plane, it was with social media accounts that any 13-year-old can establish for free. the enemies of this country aren't going to take us on a straight up fight because they know they would lose. they're going to keep finding new ways of attacking us, ways that exploit the openness of our society and slip through the seams of a national security architecture designed for the cold war. what this means is that we can't afford to get complacent. we can't find comfort in being good at doing the same things that we've been doing for 50 years. those who would seek to harm this nation are creative,
adaptive and resolute. 's they are creating a new battlefield and we have to -- we've been playing catch up. defeating them demands that we as members of your oversight committee make sure you have the resources and the authorities you into he had to win. director coates, i would appreciate your perspective on how to best strike the balance between satisfying existing intelligence requirements and preparing the ic to take on the technological challenge of the future. i'd like to recognize that this will be director cardillo's last appearance before the committee. robert, since 2014 you have served as the consummate ambassador for nga and this committee thanks you for your more than 35 years of honorable service to nga, the intelligence community and more importantly to the country. i will close here because we have a lot of ground to cover today, but i want to thank you again and more importantly your officers for the selfless sacrifices that help keep this
nation safe. yours is an exceptional mission in that so few will ever truly know how much you do in the service of so many. before turning to distinguished vice-chairman i'd like to highlight for my colleagues at the committee we will be convening again at 1:00 p.m. this afternoon promptly for the afternoon for classified continuation of this hearing. please reserve any questions that delve into classified matters until then and don't take it offensive if our witnesses find the need to delay their answers to questions that might be on the fringe for the closed session. with that i turn to the vice-chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me also welcome our witnesses. let me extend my condolences as well for your loss. let me also echo what the chairman has said, robert, about your service, your leadership at nga, your willingness to always push, push, push and your
recognition that in many ways we need to change our models and how we make sure we use better use of our commercial and other partners. today's open hearing comes at an important time for our nation and the world. as i look over the witnesses' statements for the record, i'm struck by the multiplicity of threats our nation continues to face. from new threats like cyber and online influence, to those that we're more familiar with, like terrorism, extremism, police officer operation of wmb and rogue actors like iran, north korea and regional instability. we have also seen -- see on a regular basis, daily basis with some of the news yesterday an increasingly adversarial stance of major powers like russia and china. at the forefront of our nation's defenses against these threats stand professional men and women of the intelligence community whom you represent.
it is, i believe, unconscionable that some of these men and women and in particular to the fbi, department of homeland security, state department and others were forced to work without pay for five weeks because of the government shutdown. this is no way to run a country. we count on the intelligence and law enforcement professionals to protect us. we cannot ask them to do so with no pay and facing threats of eviction or losing their health insurance. the method of running government via shutdown brinksmanship must come to an end. the myriad of threats we face must also be placed -- must also be faced in tandem with our allies and partners around the world. as former secretary of defense mattis wrote in his resignation letter, quote, while the u.s. remains the indispensable nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve the role effectively without
maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies. unquote. i think that is a lesson we all need to take to heart. of the multiple threats we face i would highlight two that i hope we can especially dive into. first, russia's use of social media to amplify divisions in our society and to influence our democratic process. this is an area that i know was highlighted in our worldwide threat hearing last year and the concern that we and the ic that russia would continue its malign activities to try to influence the 2018 elections. while we did see russia continue to try to divide americans on social media, and we saw cyber activities by unknown actors targeting our election infrastructure in 2018, the good news is, general nakasone, i commend you, i think we did a much better job.
the question is, though, how do we prepare ourselves for 2020? how do we make sure that we're organized? what is the ic's role in fighting this disinformation threat and how can we build upon public/private partnerships with online social media companies in a way that works for both sides? this is a problem as the chairman has mentioned with the question around deep fakes and other areas that technology is only going to make more difficult. the second issue i would hope that you would all address today is the threat from china, particularly in the field of technology. i think we all saw the justice department announcement yesterday about huawei. i have to say as a former entrepreneur and venture capitalist i long held the view that an economically advanced china would eventually become a responsible global citizen that would join the world trade organization and whose system would ultimately be liberalized by market-based economies.
unfortunately, what we have seen particularly in the last two or three years is the opposite. with the consolidation of power by the communist chinese party and with president xi emphasizing nationalistic tendencies and an aggressive posture towards those nations on china's periphery, and an economic policy that seeks by hook or by crook to catch up and to surpass the united states, economically, especially in the areas of technology like ai, machine learning, biotech, 5g and other related areas. especially concerning have been the efforts of big chinese tech companies which are beholden to the communist chinese party to acquire sensitive technology, replicate it and undermine the market share of u.s. firms with the help of the chinese state. i want to thank dni director coats and fbi director wray as well as dhs for working with the
committee to take seriously the threat from china's whole of society approach to technology acquisition and to jointly reach out to our business community with whom we must work in partnership to begin to address these issues. unfortunately we've still got a long way to go and while director coats particularly we've gone on some of these road shows together with the chairman i think we need much more of those going forward. i want to ensure that the ic is tracking the direction of china's tech giants and to make sure that we counter those efforts, particularly as so many of them are beholden to the chinese government. the truth is this is a challenge that will only continue to grow. i also in closing want to thank not only you, but all the men and women who stand behind your organizations, who work day in
and day out to keep our nation safe. i look forward to this public hearing. thank you, mr. chairman, i yield. >> i thank the vice-chairman. before i recognize director coats for his testimony, let me say to our witnesses a number of the members of this committee have competing committees meeting right now on very important things, so members are going to be in and out. please don't take that as a sign of any disinterest in your testimony or your answers, but there are a lot of things going on on the hill today that are priorities from a standpoint of legislative activity. director coats, it's my understanding you're going to give one opening statement for the entire group and then we will move to questions. >> yes. >> the floor is yours. >> mr. chairman and mr. vice-chairman, members of the committee, we are here today and i'm here today with these exceptional people who i have the privilege to work with, we are a team that works together in making sure that we can do everything we possibly can to bring the intelligence necessary to our policymakers, to this committee and others, relative to what decisions they might
have to make given this ever changing world that we're facing right now. during my tenure as dni now two years in i have told our workforce over and over that our mission was to seek the truth and speak the truth, and we work to enhance -- to agree with and enforce that mission on a daily basis. i want tour people to get up in the morning to work to think that this is what our job is, despite the swirl of politics that swirls around not only the capitol but the world, our mission is to keep our heads down, our focus on the mission that we have to achieve in order to keep american people safe and our policymakers aware of what's happening. so truly the efforts of people sitting here at this table and all of their employees and all of our components is not really public for the -- released for the public to know about, but we
continue to value our relationship with this committee in terms of how we share information, how we respond to your legitimate questions that you bring to us and tasked for us and we value very much the relationship that we have with this committee. my goal today is to responsibly convey to you and the american people in this unclassified hearing the true nature of the current environment, and in the interest of time i would also like to refer you to my statement for the record for a more complete threat picture. as i stated in my recent remarks during the release of the national intelligence strategy, we face significant changes in the domestic and global environment that have resulted in an increasingly complex and uncertain world. and we must be ready -- we must be ready to meet 21st century challenges and recognize the emerging threats. the composition of the current threats we face is a toxic mix
of strategic competitors, regional powers, weak or failed states, and nonstate actors using a variety of tools in overt and subtle ways to achieve their goals. the scale and scope of the various threats facing the united states and our immediate interests worldwide is likely to further intensify this year. it is increasingly a challenge to prioritize which threats are of greatest importance. i first would like to mention election security. this has been and will continue to be a top priority for the intelligence community. we assess that foreign actors will view the 2020 u.s. elections as an opportunity to advance their interests. we expect them to refine in re capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each other's experiences and efforts in previous elections. on the heels of our successful efforts to protect the integrity of the 2018 midterm elections we
are now focused on incorporating lessons learned in preparation for the 2020 elections. i would now like to turn to the variety of threats that currently exist and may materialize in the coming year. i'd like to begin with the remarks on what i would describe as the big four, china, russia, north korea and iran. all of which pose unique threats to the united states and our partners. china's actions reflect a long-term strategy to achieve global superiority, beijing's global ambition continuing to restrict freedom of its citizens while strictly enforcing obedience to chinese leadership with few checks on president xi's power. in efforts to diminish its influence and extend its own political and military reach. beijing will seek to tout a
chinese autocracy and implicit alternative to democratic values and institutions. these efforts will influence apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages over its competitors, including especially the united states. china's pursuit of intellectual property, sensitive research and development plans and the u.s. person data remains a significant threat to the united states government and the private sector. china's military capabilities and reach will continue to grow as it invests heavily in developing and fielding advanced weapons and beijing will use its military clout to expand its footprint and complement it's broadening political and economic influence as we have seen with its one belt, one road initiative. as part of this trend we anticipate china will attempt to further solidify and increase
its control within its immediate sphere of influence in the the south china sea and its global presence further abroad. whereas with china we must be concerned about the methodological and long-term efforts to capitalize on its past decade of a growing economy and to match or overtake our superior global capabilities. russia's approach relies on misdirection and object fuse misdirection and ob fuse accusation as it seeks to diminish our standing in the world. even as russia faces a weakenening economy, the kremlin steps up its campaign to divide western, political and security institutions and undermine the post world war ii international order. we expect russia will continue to wage its information war against democracies and to use social media to attempt to divide our societies. russia's attack against ukrainian naval vessels in november is just the latest
example of the kremlin's willingness to violate international norms, coerce neighbors and accomplish its goals. we also expect russia will use cyber techniques to influence ukraine's upcoming presidential election. the kremlin has aligned russia with repressive regimes in cuba, iran, north korea, syria and venezuela. and moscow's relationship with beijing is closer than it has been in many decades. the kremlin is also stepping up its engagement in the middle east, africa and southeast asia. using weapon sales, private security firms and energy deals to advance its global influence. regarding north korea, the regime has halted its provocative behavior related to it's wmd program. north korea has not conducted any nuclear capable missile or nuclear tests in more than a year. and it has dismantled some of its nuclear infrastructure.
as well kim jong un continues to demonstrate openness to the denuclearization of the korean peninsula. having said that we currently believe north korea will seek to retain wmd capabilities and unlikely to give up nuclear weapons and production capabilities, because its leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime survival. our assessment is bolstered by our observations of some activity that is inconsistent with full denuclearization. while we assess that sanctions on exports have been effective and largely maintained north korea seeks to mitigate the effects of the u.s. led pressure campaign through diplomatic engagement, counterpressure against the sanctions regime and direct sanctions evasion. now let me discuss iran. the iranian regime will continue pursuing regional ambitions and improved capabilities even while its economy weakens by the
day. domestically regime hard liners will be more emboldened to challenge rival centerists and we expect unrest in iran in recent months. tehran continues to sponsor terrorism as the recent european arrests of iranian operatives plotting attacks in europe demonstrate. we expect iran will continue supporting the houthi in yemen in iraq. they threaten u.s. forces and allies in region. iran maintains the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the middle east. while we don't believe iran is currently undertaking activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device. iranian officials have publicly threatened to push the boundaries of the restrictions if iran does not gain the tangible financial benefits it expected from the deal.
iran's efforts to consolidate influence in syria and arm hezbollah have prompted israeli airstrikes. these actions underscore our concerns for a long-term trajectory of iranian influence in the region and the risk of conflict escalation. and all four the states mentioned kbh, russia, north korea and iran are advancing cyber capabilities which are low cost and growing in potency and severity. this includes threatening both minds and machines in an expanding number of ways. such as stealing information, attempting to influence populations, or developing ways to disrupt critical infrastructure. as the world becomes increasingly interconnected we expect the actors and others to rely more and more on cyber capabilities when seeking to gain political, economic and military advantages over the united states and its allies and partners. now that i've covered the big four i'll quickly hit on some regional and transnational threats.
in the middle east, president bashar al assad has largely defeated the opposition and is now seeking to regain control over all of the syrian territory. remaining pockets of isis and opposition fighters will continue we agree -- we assess to stoke -- to stoke violence as we have seen in incidents happening in the idlib province of syria. the regime will focus on retaking territory, while seeking to avoid conflict with israel and turkey. and with respect to turkey, we assess it is in the midst of a transformation of its political and national identity that will make washington's relations with ankara increasingly difficult to manage during the next five years. turkey will see the pkk and related kurdish groups as the main threat to their sovereignty. president erdogan u.s. turkey recommendations will be important but not decisive for ankara.
in iraq, the underlying political and economic factors that facilitated the rise of isis persist. an iraqi shia militant to further entrench in the role of the state with the assistance of iran will increase the threat to u.s. personnel. in yemen, where 75% of the population is reliant on foreign assistance, neither side of the conflict seems committed to end the fighting. and the humanitarian impact of the conflict in 2019 will further compound already acute problems. in saudi arabia, public support for the royal family appears to remain high even in the wake of in the murder of journalist jam khashoggi and the kingdom's involvement in the yemen conflict. in south asia the region will be potentialed on turmoil
surrounding afghanistan's presidential election, ongoing negotiation was the taliban and taliban's regional attack we sess near the afghan government more taliban will be able to gain a strategic advantage in the war in the coming year even if coalition support remains at current levels. however, current efforts to achieve an agreement with the taliban and decisions on a possible withdrawal of u.s. troops could play a key role in shaping the direction of the country in the coming years. militant groups supported by pakistan will continue to take advantage of their safe haven in pakistan to plan and conduct attacks in neighboring countries and possibly beyond. we remain concerned about pakistan's continued development and control of nuclear weapons. in africa, several countries are facing significant challenges that threaten their stability, which could reverberate throughout the region. libya remains unstable in various groups -- and various groups continue to be supported by a variety of foreign actors and competing goals.
in the democratic republic of congo a new government will be challenged to deal with ongoing violence by multiple groups and the outbreak of ebola in the country. and instability is growing in sudan, where the population is angry at the country's direction and president bashir's leadership. in europe, political, economic and social trends will increase political uncertainty and complicate efforts to push back against some autocratic tendencies. meanwhile the possibility of ha no deal brexit where the uk exits without an agreement remains. this would cause economic disruptions that could substantially weaken the uk and europe. we anticipate that the evolving landscape in europe will lead to additional challenges to u.s. interests as russia and china intensify their efforts to build influence there at the expense of the united states. in the western hemisphere flagging economies, migrant -- migration flows, corruption,
narcotics trafficking and anti u.s. autocrats will challenge u.s. interests. venezuela at a cross roads as its economy faces craters. and political leaders vie for control, all of which are likely to further contribute to the unprecedented migration of venezuelans. we expect the attempts by cuba, russia and to some extent china to prop up the maduro regime security, or financing will lead to additional efforts to exploit the situation in exchange for access mostly to venezuelan oil. we assess mexico under leadership with pursue cooperation with the united states as it tries to reduce violence and address social and economic issues. but authorities still do not have the capability to fully address the production, flow and trafficking of the drug cartels. high crime rates and weak job markets will continue to spur u.s.-bound migrants from el salvador, guatemala and honduras. to close my remarks i would like
to address several challenges that span the globe. i mentioned the increased use of cyber capabilities by nefarious actors, but we must be mindful of the proliferation of other threats beginning with weapons of mass destruction. in addition to nuclear weapons we have hating heightened concerns about chemical and biological weapons. assessing that north korea, russia, syria and isis have all used chemical weapons over the past two years which threatens international norms and may portend future use. the threat from biological weapons has become more diverse as they can be employed in a variety of ways and development is made easier by dual use technologies. we expect foreign governments to expand use of space based recognizance, communications and navigation systems, and china and russia will continue training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new anti satellite weapons to hold u.s. and allied space services at risk. space has become the new global
frontier with competition from numerous nations. terrorism remains a persistent threat and in some ways positioned to increase in 2019. the conflicts in iraq and syria have generated a large pool of skilled and battle hardened fighters remaining dispersed throughout the region. while isis is nearing territorial defeat in iraq and syria, the group returned to its guerilla warfare roots, plotting attacks and direct supporters worldwide. ice sis intent on resurging and still commands thousands of fighters in iraq and syria. meanwhile al qaeda is showing signs of confidence as its readers leaders strengthen networks and encourage attacks against western trts. we saw this in kenya as there there is a hotel attacked frequented by tourists and westerners. lastly, the speed -- excuse me, talking too fast. lastly, and this is important. because both the chairman and
vice chairman have stated this, and it's something that i think is a challenge to the ic and to the american people. the speed and adaptation of new technology will continue to drive the world in which we live in ways we have yet to fully understand. advances in areas such as artificial intelligence, communication technologies, biotechnology and material sciences are changing our way of life. but our adversaries are also investing heavily into these technologies, and they are likely to create new and unforeseen challenges to our health, economy and security. mr. chairman and mr. vice chairman and members of the committee, this becomes a major challenge to the ic community. to stay ahead of the game. and to have the resources directed toward how we need to address these threats to the united states. we look forward to spending more time discussing this issue, as
both you have raised. with that, i'll leave it there. we look forward to answering your questions about these and other unmentioned threats. >> director coats, thank you for that very thorough testimony. every year, this hearing has geographically increased. and i think this year you have left no region of the world untouched with a concern that we might have. and this year, especially, the threat landscape continues to increase from a standpoint of the tools used. i'm sure much of that will be the subject of questions both this morning and this afternoon. i want to acknowledge that we have a distinguished group with us -- joining us this morning from austria, who come from their government. and i'm not going to ask them to stand or anything. not to distinguish them out of the group. but we're delighted to have them with us, being part of the united states senate today.
i want to notice members that you will be recognized by seniority for five minutes. we intend to do one round, and i would say sorry to senator sass and senator bennett. had they been on time, they would have heard the great comments i made on their addition to the committee. [ laughter ] >> they still would have been last. [ laughter ] >> with that, the chair would recognize himself for five minutes. and general nakasone, this is probably directed at you. this committee requested independent third party researchers to produce two reports that detail the leveraging by russia to conduct disinformation and influence campaign in the 2016 election. without speaking to sources and methods under your current authorities, would the ic be able to conduct the same analysis and produce comparable finished intelligence? >> mr. chairman, thank you very much for the question.
and thank you for your recognition of chief petty officer kent. in terms of the work that was done by the two organizations that the senate's-led committee on intelligence had asked, they looked at an internal study with a number of social media groups which is something, as you know, is outside our authorities. but was very, very effective for us. as we prepared for the 2018 midterm, we took a very, very close look at the information that was provided there. we understand our adversary very well, and we understood where their vulnerabilities also lie. >> good. this to director wray and to yourself, general nakasone. is it the ic's assessment that this country's adversaries continue to use u.s. social media platforms as a vehicle for weaponizing disinformation and spreading foreign influence in the united states? director wray? >> that's certainly the fbi's assessment. not only the russians continue to do it in 2018, but we've seen
indication that they're continuing to adapt their model and that other countries are taking a very interested eye in that approach. >> general nakasone? >> it is certainly the nsa's assessment as well, mr. chairman. >> the production and storage and usage of data is a national security issue. in 2013, ibm estimated we were producing 2.5 billion gigabytes of data every day. and that data growth has not been linear. ibm similarly reported that 90% of the world's data had been created in the last two years. that data is now being aggregated, curated and trafficked to enable and enhance data-hungry artificial intelligence algorithms. how much of a concern should we have about protecting data from foreign adversaries? i'll probably turn to director
wray and general nakasone on this again. >> i think it's a great concern. certainly we see strong interest from a computer intrusion dimension, both from nation states but also from criminal hackers and increasingly the two in a blended threat way. so we see nation states enlisting the help of criminal hackers, which just is a form of outsourcing that makes it even more of a menace. so it's something that we're extremely focused on and should be a high priority. >> general? >> mr. chairman, i concur with the importance of data. it's the coin of the realm today. if you think the power of data, not only for information that it can provide us, but also, as you indicated, the weaponization of it. we see our adversaries very interested in being able to procure data. and obviously, as director wray mentioned, this is something we're very, very focused on as well as the national security
agency. >> i'll throw out who would like to answer, what are you most concerned today? >> well, certainly, china has the capacity and the resources to be able to do a lot. but that has not deterred other major nations like russia and others to be aggressive in doing this. you have identified this as a significant threat. we are awash in data. we have to understand how our adversaries use that data against our interests and how we can prevent that from happening. as well as use it for our own purposes relative to know what is going on around the world and what influence efforts are being thrown at the united states. so that is why we are -- hold as a high priority, as you mentioned in your opening statement in terms of how we resource our community -- intelligence community with the kind of tools and weapons needed to address this issue.
>> director? >> i was just going to add that as the challenges of encryption become bigger and bigger on the sigint side, we're more and more dependent on human sources and the more big data can be exploited by our adversaries, the harder it is to recruit and retain human sources. i suspect director haspel may have a view on that, as well. >> director haspel? >> i think director wray captured that exactly. and i would just add, from the cia perspective, that a big focus for us is finding out how our adversaries are using big data against us and sharing that with our partners. >> i'm going to exercise the chair for just a second for one last question. and this is your opportunity to recruit. your agencies do cutting-edge research on every technology you could imagine. from classic spy craft like the
disguising to communications technology that would blow james bond and q branch away, what pitch would you make to those in school now? or perhaps those working in tech? and looking to serve a greater purpose that they should comply their engineering degrees, coding skills and creativity and work in the ic? director wray? >> i would say there is nothing more rewarding than protecting the american people. and we've seen, with some of our smartest, high-tech folks -- i can think of one office in particular, where two of our brightest stars with great talent briefly left for what they thought would be greener pa pastures in the private sector and i was pleased to see them come back eight months later when they realized the grass was browner. >> if i could, mr. chairman. i would probably ask you for -- to release the tape of what you just said. in terms of how innovative and
how creative and the opportunities that the folks in the ic get a chance to engage in far strip anything you see in a hollywood movie. and the other thing i would add to that is, imagine when you get up every morning that your task, your responsibility, is to defend the hopes and dreams of 320 million americans. and that's something that we relish the opportunity to do every single day. and people would want to join that team. >> mr. chairman, our mission sells itself when we talk to our people. i would offer as we talk to young people that the national security agency, i saw big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning, cloud computing in places like baghdad and cab you'll in support of our forces, long before we ever called it that. that's the selling point that we emphasize to our people. because if it's cutting-edge, we will be doing it at the national security agency. >> robert? >> mr. chairman, we're proud of our ability to recruit some of the talent you just described. we don't do it often on fiscal
terms. we do it on psychic terms. and so serving something greater than one's self for a cause to protect the nation and our interests is one that both attracts and retains the lifeblood of our agency, which is our people. >> director haspel, you want to take a shot at selling something that not many people know about? >> well, like my colleague, cia officers come to langley for the mission and they stay because of the mission. and it's really about being something -- part of something that's bigger than yourself. and in terms of advanced technologies, it's a chance to be on the cutting edge and make a difference. >> let me just conclude by saying the disciplines that come out of higher education and community colleges today, all of those disciplines are applicable to the agencies that sit before us today. and there should be no student that doesn't look at this as a way to apply what they have learned or the degree they have.
that didn't used to be the case. it was all specialized, but now it applies to everything. director coats? >> mr. chairman, as somewhat of an older generation here who has to turn to his grandson to get the tv on the right channel, i'm continually amazed as i get around the country talking to colleges and graduates and people that are in the s.t.e.m. positions and studying of their incredible talent. they bring those kinds of talents and skills to our agencies, as you have heard. and it is extremely rewarding to see the young people who know they can have a better financial deal or settled lifestyle, easier and so forth and so on. they want to serve this country. and they see this as meaningful. and it exceeds what financial gains they could get on the
outside. plus, they are able to do some really cool stuff in all of these agencies, which we can't talk about here. but it is attractive to it. but their commitment to the country and commitment to the mission, as has been here is pretty, is awfully rewarding when you go out and see what these young people have and what they're willing to do for the country. >> i think all of you. >> well thank you, mr. chairman. and i agree that the people who work with all of you are extraordinarily special americans. and the mission is critically important. i would personally add one other item. that if they work for the united states government they actually ought to be paid on time. and i question -- i've seen the number of federal employees who have gone five weeks plus without pay. i'm not sure many folks in the private sector would show up
five weeks plus without pay on an ongoing basis. and while i'm appreciative of the fact that particularly the fbi that your agents will be reimbursed, i do worry, the fbi has a number of contractors. under our current setting they will come out of this five-week plus, 35-day shutdown with nothing to show. and if we cannot guarantee that the people that work for the united states government are going to be not used as hostages for either side of the political debate then i think our ability to recruit and retain will go down dramatically. i don't know, director wray, if you want to make a comment on that. but it's something i saw fbi agents, homeland security agents, air traffic controllers working double shifts and then going and driving an uber. i'm not sure i want somebody showing up maintaining the safety of our airways with four
hours of sleep. but i'd be happy to hear comment there. >> mr. vice chairman, needless to say, we are still assessing the overall operational impact of the shutdown, but what's quite clear is that it was incredibly negative and painful for the 37,000 men and women of the fbi and their families. but i will also say that i could not be more proud of their professionalism and their dedication to not let balls drop but to keep charging ahead across all the various program areas during that time. certainly when you talk about contractors we are very dependent just like every government agency on contractors for a whole range of services. and we want to make sure that aspect of our operations doesn't get disrupted. >> and my hope would be that folks on both sides of the aisle would look at how we might make sure -- particularly some of those well priced contractors,
oftentimes the folks who clean the bathrooms or serve the food, don't have to come out of this 35-day shutdown with absolutely no compensation at all. let me start my first question director wray and director coats. and this is the chairman -- the chairman alluded to it. we talked about it. the emerging challenge around social media, particularly the fact, whether russians or other foreign entities that try to masquerade as americans. they build large following, create fake accounts. i think this problem is going to get exponentially harder as we move into deep state technology. a lot of policy implications. how do we the sort through that work with our social media company partners to put americans on alert about the volume of foreign-based activity, bots, and others who are masquerading as americans going forward, so they're not
able to further manipulate not just election process but actually to build social positions? >> mr. vice chairman, this is a particularly vexing and challenging problem. i think it's going to require a holistic response, certainly at the fbi through the foreign influence task force and all of our field offices, we're trying to work much more close ly not just with our intelligence community partners, especially general nakasone and the nsa, but also as you say with the private sector. i will say one of the bright spots between 2016 and 2018 is how much more cooperatively we're working with the social media companies because there's an awful lot that really has to be done by them in this space. there were a number of success story, only some of which we could ever really share, where the social media companies based on tips that we provided, were
able to take action much more effectively, much more quickly, to block and prevent some of the information warfare that the russians were engaged in. i think we're going to need to see more and more of that. now that we have some momentum, we're looking forward to growing that partnership. >> i think you agree some companies have done well, some have not done as well. i think we're going to need to continue to explore this and just basic notional ideas of where i think we don't get into first amendment challenges where americans ought to have the right to know whether they're being communicated with by a machine or bot versus an actual human being, and some of the research done by the of the folks we looked at in a way may be a little more positive that says the vast volume of traffic on the far left and the far right in terms of political discourse in social media is actually not americans. but foreign-based bots.
there might not be as many crazies out there as is seems, editorial comment, but i still think we have a long way to go. >> mr. chairman, if i could add one more thing to support director wray's remarks. having served on the committee and gone through the frustrations of the interaction and information sharing with private social media companies, we have seen a significant progress with that. many of us have sat down, eyeball to eyeball, with its leaders. our tech teams are working with their tech teams. i can't say that's worked with every social media company, but it's significantly better because there's information we can provide them that is in their benefit, and of course, we always stress the fact that we're -- we need to work together to protect our people from the influence activities from abroad and threats to the american people. so i'm encouraged, having made some trips to several of these companies, encouraged with the
openness and willingness to see what we can do while protecting privacy rights, but also insuring security. >> thank you very much. first of all, let me say that i'm always astounded in this committee and in the foreign relations committee with the volume of issues that we have to deal with. i think your opening statement, director coats, indicated how difficult this is to process all of this and to deal with all this. and your statement for the record that all of you joined in, again, lays this out for us. it tells us the kind of volume we have to deal with. we're certainly only going to scratch the surface today, but i want to focus on something that doesn't get as much focus as i think it should. we have seen these days every time we pick up media or turn on the tv, they're talking about russia and russia's ham-handed efforts to affect things in the
world. certainly, it's a concern, but in my judgment, and i think many others', the real concern is china. we're approaching the end of the first fifth of the 21st century. if we learned anything, it's the last few decades have convinced us that china in the 21st century, as we proceed through it, is going to be a major competitor of ours in every way that there is. obviously, economically, militarily, culturally and every other way. and look, this is going to happen. we're living in the 21st century. the communications and transportation are so different than what they were. and we as the united states are going to wind up having to compete like we never have before. with a gorilla that's starting to get to be about the same size we are. as a result of that, we're going to have to learn to deal with that. the thing i really want to focus on is how we're going to deal
with that. we're americans. we have always competed. we can compete. we innovate. we create, we manufacture. we do the great things we do that have really led the world. but we can only do it if we're operating under a rule of law. and that is something that is greatly missing at the present time, as china tries to compete with us. the poster child for me is a local company we have in idaho, micron technology, most of you have heard of them. they're the second largest manufacturer of memory in the world. and they have had a recent case where chinese nationals stole intellectual property. and then took it back to china. they are now suing micron in china through a state-owned entity and a state-owned court in front of a state-owned judge. and this is the kind of thing that we just can't have. i had a spirited discussion with
the chinese ambassador about this, as he attempted to defend the undefendable. and his suggestion was that, well, things aren't as advanced in china as they are here. well, i get that. they have come a long, long, long ways in a few decades. but if we're going to do this and keep the world order in rightside up, china is going to have to develop their rule of law and live by it much better than what they have recently. we just saw again the indictments against the huawei official, and in the defense of the department of justice, the department of treasury, and others, they have indicted these chinese people that have affected micron. the question i have for you is, after listening to the chinese ambassador, i'm not wholly convinced that their efforts are going to be as robust as they need to be to get china right
side up when it comes to the rule of law. when i'm talking about the rule of law, i don't mean just covert theft. i mean what i call overt theft, where they require businesses we all know to divulge their information before they can do business in china. and then having the kind of restrictions they have on them in china. and all of this causes us real difficulties as we attempt to compete. director coats, i wonder if you could address that or assign it to somebody there at your panel. i'm looking for what are we seeing in the future, number one, and number two, how can we try to get our arms around this to do something about it? >> well, i'll start, but i would like to turn to director wray, relative to what was just released yesterday, which pointed, i think, in the direction of what you were talking about. but frankly, while we were sleeping in the last decade and a half, china had remarkable rise. in capabilities that are
stunning. a lot of that was achieved, a significant amount of that was achieved, by stealing information from our companies, by inserting chinese in certain of our labs or bringing back technological stolen properties, which china engaged. you can talk to any number of everything from automobile manufacturers to sophisticated software as well as rnd for military and i think general ashley can speak to that on the military side. i think we could go down the panel and discuss for a significant amount of time the kind of actions china has taken to become a competitor and also to gain superiority in what they're doing and how they're spreading it around the world through their belton road initiative and a number of other initiatives, it's a serious issue that has to be dealt on. you're right on target in terms of saying that rule of law and international norms and the
fairness in the trade and engagements is not the chinese model. in countering it, we have to expose it. it was exposed yesterday in a significant way relative to telecommunicatio telecommunications, and director wray can talk about that. we have alerted our allies. they are now second guessing and questioning their initial responses to china. oh, it's a great market. we need to get over there. don't worry about anything else except selling our product. they're now finding that their product has been duplicated by the chinese and sold for half the price because they didn't have to spend as much money on research and development. so it is -- we are working with the chairman, the vice chairman, and with the committee actually to try to be as transparent as possible with our company heads. we have been traveling around the united states, meeting with ceos and others.
we're dialing up a program. i think i'll stop right there and the rest of this ought to go into a secure setting in terms of how we're dealing with this, but i would love to turn to director wray, relative to what they're doing. >> senator, i completely share your observations. and i would just say that one of the things that the american people, i think, are now sort of waking up to understand is that the chinese government, the lines between the chinese government and the chinese communist party are blurred if not totally erased. the lines between the chinese government and chinese state-owned enterprises, the same. the line between the chinese government and ostensibly private companies for all the reasons you described. and especially the line between lawful behavior and fair competition and lying and hacking and cheating and stealing. and one of the things i have been most encouraged about in an
otherwise bleak landscape is the degree to which, as director coats was alluding to, american companies are waking up. american universities are waking up. our foreign partners are waking up. and it's one of the few issues that i find when i engage in the interagency and up on the hill, covering from one end of the spectrum to the other, there seems to be actually more consensus than i have ever seen before in my career. and i think that's a positive, and we need to build on that. >> do either of the generals -- general ashley. >> sir, you laid out the problems set very well and what's been highlighted isn't just a u.s. issue. this is a global issue. when you think about the internet of things, when you think about the nature of global business, and how corporations are integrated. and if it touches a company in australia who may have a relationship with a company in the u.s., then we become
connected. from the military standpoint, when you look at major acquisition from a defense intelligence agency, one of the things we put against this is supply chain versus management threat analysis center. when dod looks for major acquisition, we do the due diligence and research against those companies, but that challenge is getting more and more complicated because they either buy it, steal it, or they can build it, but the nature of the business, you have things like white labeling where you don't necessarily have to disclose the relationship, where you can sell a semi-conductor, a chip, a piece of software, and ostensibly it's from your company when in fact it may have been manufactured by a chinese company. that's the due diligence we have to apply to the supply chain across all acquisitions and we have to bring all our partners in and eliminate the challenge and make sure they're doing the same due diligence, whether it's through cfius or other protocols. >> thank you, chairman. director coats, in this hearing
last year, you testified you would recommend minimal access to classified documents to anyone without a permanent security clearance. you made that statement with regard to reports of multiple holders of interim security clearances in the white house, and now we are seeing published reports that dozens of times, the white house has overruled the career fbi experts responsible for adjudicated security clearances, granting top-secret clearances to white house officials. would you still recommend minimal access to classified documents to those white house officials since fbi experts recommended that they not be given those top-secret clearances? >> i do support the providing all the information necessary for not only the white house but for all of our branches relative to providing security clearance. they have the authority to do that. we issue guidelines in terms of
what -- >> i understand they have the authority. i want to know, do you think that the white house should take seriously the recommendations of those fbi experts. >> to my knowledge, they do take seriously. it is their decision based on a whole number of factors. we have seen every administration issue clearances based on how they assess what is provided. our job is to provide them the best information we have relative to security clearance processes so that they have the full picture in front of them when they make that decision. >> speaking of the full picture, last year, we passed the secret act. as the director of national intelligence, do you think it's problematic that the administration has not complied with the portion of that law requiring the white house to report on its process for conducting security clearance
investigations? >> i'm not aware that that has happened. i would be happy to look into that. >> i would appreciate that. director wray, as i mentioned, we're seeing public published reports that numerous times the white house has simply overruled career fbi experts responsible for adjudicating those clearances. in your view, were there valid reasons given for why the fbi's expert advice was overruled so many times? >> senator, i think there may be some confusion about the way the process actually works. the fbi is in the context of providing background investigations for people other than its own employees is what's called an isp, or the investigative service provider. we essentially do it at the request of whoever the requesting entity is. in this instance, it would be the white house. and i think where the confusion is is what we do is we assemble the information, provide the factual information. we do not actually make
recommendations one way or the other about the clearances. the decision about what to do based on those facts is entrusted by long-standing process to the requesting entity. so we provide the information, but then they make the call. >> thank you, director. >> director coats, i want to come back to you for a moment. your office issued a statement recently announcing that you had submitted the intelligence community's report assessing threats to the 2018 midterm elections. to the president and to appropriate executive agencies. our committee has not seen this report, and despite committee request following the election that the odni brief the committee on any identified threat, it took odni two months for us to get a simple oral briefing. and no written assessment has yet to be provided. can you explain to me why we haven't been kept more fully and currently informed about those russian activities in the 2018 election? >> before i respond, let me
acknowledge to the members that the vice chairman and i have both been briefed on the report. and it's my understanding that the report at some point will be available. >> yeah, the process that we're going through with two 45-day periods, one for the ic to assess whether there was anything that resulted in a change of the vote or tampering with machines. what the influence efforts were and so forth. so we collected all of that, and then the second 45 days, which we then provided to the chairman and vice chairman, and the second 45 days now is with dhs looking and doj looking at whether there's information enough there to take -- to determine what kind of response they might take. we're waiting for that final information to come in. so that will be coming. >> so the rest of us can look forward to reading that report? >> i think we will be informing the chairman and vice chairman, yes, of their decisions. >> that's not what i asked.
will the rest of the committee have access to that report, mr. chairman? chairman burr? >> well, let me say to the members, we're in uncharted ground, but i make the same commitment i always do, anything the vice chairman and myself are exposed to, we'll make every request to open the aperture so all members can see it. i think it's vitally important, especially on this one. we're not to a point where we have been denied or we're not to a point that negotiations need to start. so it's my hope that once the final 45-day window is up, that is a report that will be made available, probably to members only. >> that would be my hope as well. >> senator rubio. >> thank you. director wray, we keep talking about china, and this takes off on what senator risch has already asked. using the academic community, commercial espionage, vetting
themselves potentially entering the supply chain, obviously, traditional counterintelligence work they do and the like, is it not fair to say that china today poses, just looking at the scale and scope of the threat, that china today poses the most significant counterintelligence threat this nation has faced, perhaps in its history, but certainly in the last quarter century? >> well, i hesitate to speak categorically about the entire course of history. >> let's do 25 years. >> i would certainly agree with you, senator, as i look at the landscape today and over the course of my career, i still think of myself as a little bit young, that the chinese counterintelligence threat is more deep, more diverse, more vexing, more challenging, more comprehensive, and more concerning than any counterintelligence threat i can think of. >> in that realm, would it not make sense, and perhaps this is for you, director coats, that we
would have a more coordinated approach to educate and prepare all of the departments and agencies of government as well as businesses, universities, i mean, just the scale and comprehensive nature of the threat, would it not make sense to have some high-level coordination or a coordinated approach to be able to prepare all of these different entities in our economy and society to deal with this threat? >> we are working carefully with the committee. particularly senator warner and senator burr both have engaged with us in terms of putting a program together to do just that. i would turn to general ashley for his comments on it also. >> so the fact that we're having this discussion and that you have -- last year, we talked about the confucius institutes. that word gets out. since 2014, 13 universities have closed down the confucius institutes. u.s.-wide, i think the number is about 100, but again, my previous comment in terms of this is a global issue, while we closed down about 13 in the u.s., there's been about a 23%
increase globally in asia, europe, and other places, and there's probably about 320-plus institutes globally. the education is getting out from the u.s. standpoint and it's training the right way slowly, but again, it's a global problem, and we're as weak as relationships with some of those partners subject to influence. >> this is where i made the obigatory pitch. we have created a bill to help coordinate the response to this threat across the board, and so i know everybody on the committee is interested athis topic. i want to switch gears for a moment, and maybe ask you, director coats, as well. we look at the situation in venezuela, which usually i raise in this committee and people know it's important and now it's really topical. we had 3 million migrants flow primarily into colombia, peru, and ecuador. it's projected to be 5 million if current trends continue by the end of this year, rivaling,
that would be a rival number to what we have seen in syria situation, and most certainly has had a destabilizing effect on colombia and other neighboring country to the point where very few nations could talk in one million migrants in one shot, not to mention that quickly. imagine 2 million and the impact it's having on their government budgets, their health care systems and the like. we know from department of justice filings and sanctions from treasury that their government doesn't just tolerate drug trafficking. they give it the protection of government and many high-level officials are active participants in narco trafficking. we know they have a relationship, long-standing relationship with iran and with hes bola. we know they have openly and repeatedly, at least maduro has, invited the russians and putin to establish either a rotational or permanent presence somewhere in venezuela, thereby, creating a russian military presence in the western hemisphere. in fact, they flew about three weeks ago or a month ago two
russian nuclear capable bombers into the caribbean sea. seeing all of these factors, what's happening in venezuela, we care a lot about democracy, we care a lot about freedom, about human right, but when you add all these things together, the migratory impact on regional partners and how that spills over into the united states, their relationship with iran and hezbollah, the drug trafficking because all that cocaine is destined to come into our streets. the invitation to the russians to potentially have a military base, whether it's rotational or permanent, in our hemisphere. is it not in the national interests of the united states of america that the maduro regime fall and be replaced by a democratic and more responsible government? >> well, i think everything you said has been very open to the american public relative to the situation that exists in venezuela. our job as the intelligence
community is to provide all of the relevant information you just talked about in terms of what the impact of what's happening in venezuela and then throughout the region and the threat that it evolves from that. the decision is to how do address that. obviously, it's a decision by the executive branch and by the president, ultimately, with the support of the national security council. so we do obviously face a dire situation that has enormous consequences. i think nobody is more aware of that than you. you have been the person we turn to for almost ready to invite you into the intelligence community given the information you can provide for us, given your interest. i was remiss in not naming you as someone relative to china as taking a forward effort on the part of the committee and joining us in a number of ways to talk to ceos and others around the country relative to the chinese threat.
with venezuela, it's a very tenuous situation right now, as you know. we have taken steps in terms of recognition of the opposition as the legitimate president of venezuela. yesterday, the treasury department announced there are sanctions against venezuela oil company. their major company that we do business with here also, so steps are being taken. and we have a lot of support from a lot of our allies. so as i said, it's a very fluid situation that i think hopefully will be successfully resolved with the support of the venezuelan people, and when we do assess, i'll turn to general ashley here, the influence of the military on that decision, i think, venezuelan military on that decision probably is key to what direction we might go in. >> i would say everything you
laid out is correct. we expect another 2 million r refugees to add to the 3 million in the region. the relationship they have with russia, china, and iran is a long-standing one, pre-existing. the reference you made to the tu-160 blackjacks that flew those strategic bombers, third it rashz iteration of that, and we have seen it again. as far as presence on the ground, we can talk more detail in a closed session about where we see russia and china going with that greater instability, but in the open press, what you have seen thus far really is nothing more than just vocal support that's coming out of moscow and coming out of china as well. but there is a relationship there, from the military standpoint in the way of training, lots of venezuelan officers go to russia for training, and there's a recip c reciprocal relationship for equipping them as well. >> thank you, mr. chair. in light of senator rubio's comments, i would just like a note of caution, he listed
refugee flows, human rights abuses and corruption. there are lots of countries in the world that meet that description, and our right or responsibility to generate regime change in a situation like that, i think, is a slippery slope. and i have a -- i have some real caution about what our vital interests are. and whether it's our right or responsibility to take action to try to change the government of another sovereign country. that same description would have led us into a much more active involvement in syria, for example, five or six years ago, and other parts of the country. i just wanted to note that. senator burr, i loved your opening state. it was very thoughtful and you came up with a wonderful formulation for i think a mission of this committee and also the intelligence committee of creative, adaptive, and resolute. i must say it reminded me immediately of my old high school football coach who put it somewhat less eloquently. he wanted us to be agile,
mobile, and hostile. i think that might be a less elegant way to put it, but the same principle. on huawei, it seems to me they have to decide, they're either going to be a worldwide telecommunications company or an agent of the chinese government. they can't be both. and right now, they're trying to be both. and i think the world's customers, which the chinese are certainly sensitive to, are the best enforcers of that principle. director haspel, one quick -- i think a yes or no question. and i think i almost said senator coats, director coats referred to this in his opening statement. is iran currently abiding by therms of the jcpoa in terms of their nuclear activities? >> senator king, i think the most recent information is the iranians are considering taking steps that would lessen their
adherence as they seek to pressure the europeans to come through with the investment and trade benefits that iran hoped to gain from the deal. >> but since our departure from the deal, they have abided by the terms. you're saying they're considering, but at the current moment -- >> yes, they're making some preparations that would increase their ability to take a step back if they make that decision. so at the moment, technically, they're in compliance, but we see them debating amongst themselves as they fail to realize the economic benefits they hope for from the deal. >> thank you. director haspel and general ashley, mr. khalizadad said based on the current talks with the taliban, they would prevent afghanistan from ever becoming a platform for international terrorist groups.
of course, that was the basis of our original intervention. do we believe them? are they capable of that? did they learn something from having given a safe haven to osama bin laden? do we believe there's a mindset change that that could be an enforceable or at least a reasonable expectation? director haspel? >> yes, senator. and you're referring to very recent and fresh news that has come out of ambassador khalil azaud's very intensive efforts over many months now, but particularly over the last eight days in doha, where he has been engaged in talks with the taliban to seek to achieve a framework under which we could -- >> can we believe that the taliban will do this? >> well, because we have inflicted severe damage in al qaeda in the theater, i think however all of us would agree it's very important that we maintain pressure on the
terrorist groups that are there. and so if there were an eventual peace agreement, a very robust monitoring regime would be critical and we would still need to retain the capability to act in our national interests if we needed to. >> thank you. another note. director coats, you mentioned i wouldn't say almost in passing, but it was just a sentence of your introduction, which i think is a very important point and maybe the big news of right now, what's going on. increased cooperation between russia and china. for a generation, that hasn't been the case. that could turn out to be a very big deal on the horizon in terms of the united states. if those two countries begin to work together systematically, that could be a big problem for us. one more quick question. director wray, you're doing a lot of monitoring and working with -- working on the intervention in our election process.
one thing we're worried about is deep fake, which we have used but not defined. that's when they use technology to create essentially a false reality. an apparent speech by a candidate where different words are coming out of their mouth than what they actually said. here's my question. if in the next two years and particularly in the year preceding the next election, your agency determines that this is happening and that it's sponsored by a foreign entity, will you inform the candidates that are the victims of this? the committees? my concern is it's one thing for the intelligence community to know this is happening, but if they don't inform the people who are being victimized, who are being attacked in this way, i think that really blunts the effectiveness of the availability of the intelligence. >> senator, we have a fairly established protocol that we work through to try to determine whether or not we have
information that is reliable enough and immediate enough and actionable enough to be able to notify a victim. the department of justice has a set of guidelines that goes through that. they have recently been expanded to provide us more flexibility in the foreign influence or malign influence arena, which this would be a permutation of, and we would expect to follow that process. >> i hope you'll review that process, because telling the world of a malign influence a month after the election doesn't do anybody any good. i hope that could be reviewed and thought about in terms of letting people know as soon as possible when there's a credible evidence of a foreign deep fake or other kind of cyberattack on a campaign. >> just to be clear, i wasn't referring to the post-election process. >> i understand. >> the protocol i'm talking about is, that's where the actionable piece of it comes into, into play. obviously, the ability to be
able to contact, just like we do in the cyber arena. >> i want to be sure our policies keep pace with the magnitude and accelerated nature of the threat. >> we clearly need to be, to your point about agility, we clearly need to be able to adapt as the technology adapts and as director coats said in his opening, we would expect our foreign adversaries in the malign influence base to keep adapting as well, which is a source of concern. >> we want you to be agile and mobile, maybe not hostile. thank you. >> mr. general ashley has a comment he would like -- >> if i could go back to your comment on huawei. they needed to make a decision about the direction they want to take with regards to how do they support chinese government or as an independent business. the challenge in which you laid out in front of the dialogue is that decision does not lie with huawei. it lies with the xi jinping and the way they're starting to centralizing greater the management of those businesses. therein lies the challenge where
you see a an execution of capitalism that really has this auth authoritarian capitalism in the way the government provides oversight and puts strict rules in place that makes it very problematic for all of these businesses to operate without providing that information back to beijing. >> i think the market has to tell them that's not acceptable. thank you. >> agreed. >> senator collins. >> director haspel, director coats described this morning a russia that is aggressive across all fronts. did the cia have any concerns about the treasury's actions to ease sanctions on companies associated with the close putin ally oleg deripaska, in terms of
his ability to retain some informal control. this isn't a typical american company that we're dealing with. >> senator collins, i don't think i'm expert enough to comment on treasury's decision, but what i will say is that we work very hard to make sure that every agency and all of our senior agency leaders understand putin's methodologies and what he will do to try and achieve what he perceives as russia's place in the world and as a great power status. moscow continues to grapple with the effect of western sanctions. there have been very severe sanctions placed on them. i'm also, i think, as an intelligence community, both director wray and i were very pleased with the decision to expel 61 russian intelligence officers. it has a tremendous impact on
their ability to hurt us in our own homeland. so our job is to make sure that everybody understands putin's efforts to influence globally and to enhance russia's power status in the world, and we will continue to support treasury as they look to impose sanctions. i think treasury has been very, very aggressive on the sanctions front. >> did the cia raise any concerns about the treasury plans? >> no, i don't believe we raised any concerns, but we provided all of the supporting intelligence about the oligarch in question versus the aluminum company you're referring to. >> let me switch to a different issue, and that is syria. let's assume that after we depart from syria, the assad regime takes control of northwest syria and eastern
syria, which i think is a reasonable scenario. should this happen, what kind of threat would the united states and its allies expect from the thousands of extremists who are still currently fighting in those areas of syria? such as isis? >> senator collins, to start with the last part of your question, everyone at this table is working very hard to make sure that we can finish the defeat isis campaign and also that we understand the foreign fighter picture in eastern syria and that we don't allow the foreign fighters that have been captured to return to the battlefield. it is, of course, accurate that isis has suffered significant leadership losses and near total loss of territorial control. but of course, they're still dangerous, which is your point, and the largest sunni terrorist group, and they still command thousands of fighters in iraq
and syria. so i think the stance in the administration and supported by the ic is that we're going to work very hard to finish that mission, and that's another example of where we must maintain a very robust monitoring regime and retain the ability to project into syria should we need to. >> director coats, you look like you wanted to add to that. >> well, just to make the point that while we have defeated the caliphate with a couple villages left, it would be -- we should not underestimate the ability of terrorist groups, particularly isis and affiliated groups with al qaeda, and other terrorist groups that they are operating not simply on what takes place on the battlefield that gives
them strength or weakness, but they're operating on the basis of a theocracy, a theology, an ideology that we will continue to see for perhaps years ahead in various places of the world. so we see those that were engaged in syria moving to other ungoverned spaces. we see the tentacles of isis and al qaeda tactics in different places in the world, north africa, philippines. we have seen that take place. isis claiming credit for that. so isis will continue to be a threat to the united states. we're going to have to continue as director haspel said, to keep our eyes on that, and our interests in the realization that this terrorism threat is going to continue for some time. >> thank you.
>> senator bennet. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your welcoming me to the committee. i apologize for being late. but i also want to say what a privilege it is to hear your testimony this morning. and to know that you and the agents and officers who work with you are at their posts, keeping this democracy safe. and it is a reminder to me what's at stake when our partisan politics can't even keep our government open. and you guys are still doing your work, and it's an inspiration to me, and i hope to the people, whoever is watching this at home. in that spirit, actually, director coats, i wanted to start with something you ended with, which was an observation about concerns that the ic has about political uncertainty in europe and the ability for european democracies to push back on what you described as
autocratic tendencies. could you say a little more about that? >> clearly, europe has seen russian aggression in hybrid ways. significant cyber incidents, trying to influence not only their view of our alliance but their own view of their own alliance within europe. seeking to sow divisions between countries. and between europe and the united states. it's interesting that some time ago at a meeting with nato intelligence officials, the question was raised by the director, did any of the 29 countries of europe not see russian influence in their countries and particularly in the political processes of those countries? not one person raised their hand and said i have not seen that.
all 29 have seen some type of influence from the russians. so it's a persistent threat and a pervasive threat that the eu needs to address, and we address with them through our nato coordination. but i think the warning is there. i think the nations are aware of the threat. we see some issues that threaten some of the alliance, the coalition. turkey is a member of nato. and yet we're having some issues with turkey. they're in a very geostrategic point in the world, and we have been happy to have them with nato, so we would like to keep them there. i don't know if i'm directly answering your question. >> what about within the domestic politics of those
countries? the autocratic impulses. whether aligned with russia or not aligned with russia. >> i think there's a lot of wariness about aligning with russia, whether you're authoritarian leadership or not. we have seen some countries leaning in that direction. raising issues as to the strength of the alliance. a lot of that is related to the economy, to trade matters. to a number of issues beyond just the military. >> in the minute i have left, director, if it's okay, i want to switch to potential dual-use capabilities that china may obtain through its one road -- one belt and road initiative. there were reports that china may press pakistan for military access. as pakistan falls more and more to china's debt, i'm concerned about data access china may
control through digital infrastructure projects in countries around the world. what is the ic's assessment of potential dual use aspects of china's belt and road initiative and what threats to they pose to u.s. interests? and where, i would say? >> well, you can look at the globe. it's called one belt, one road. it's global. and you can look at the map and see a lot of strategic places where china has a real interest in perhaps a dual effort to not only provide infrastructure support, loan support, to airports, roads, a lot of infrastructure. loans to help with their economy. but also interest in placing strategic military positions. we have seen that take place off the horn of africa. we have seen china looking at -- if you look at the spots where they're engaging, you see some geopolitical and military
aspects, and with that, so it is dual. i would like to turn to general ashley to give you a better detail of what that looks like. >> so we can talk in a classified session about the nature of the relationship with pakistan. we can eliminate what you're seeking there. in terms of dual use technologies, there's a multiple of things out there. it's not necessarily germane to the belt and road initiative. think about quantum from a communications standpoint, from a computing standpoint, from a sensing standpoint, what the advanced sensors can do. if you look at genetics, engineering. it gets into how do you cure diseases and there's a flip side and nefarious aspect to that. there's a plus and negative side. there's agricultural aspects.
so there's a number of theings n terms of advanced technologies that have dual use capabilities that will musure over the course of the next decade. >> senator. >> thank you, chairman. thanks to all of you. i want to join everybody in thanking you for what you do and the important service that you provide in securing our freedom and the freedom of lots of other people. general ashley, i know we lost a st. louisan in syria as part of your defense intelligence operation, and certainly we reach out to their family and the families of all who serve who put themselves at that level of risk. director cardillo, actually, i saw a "60 minutes" over the weekend that talked about small satellite data, about all of the commercial imagery available.
as you come for what is your last likely appearance in this job before this committee, if there's a legacy that you're leaving, it's bringing commercial data community in in a way that we're taking advantage of what's out there that we don't have to produce ourselves, but as we do that, what concerns do you have about cyber activity that might in some way impact that data or the data that we get in other places? how would you describe your concerns about cyber as it relates to commercial data that you have made great steps in using, and the other geospatial we produce ourselves that may be disrupted before it gets analyzed with information that's not really there? >> thanks, senator, for the question. i don't think there is a more important issue on my desk or i would offer the desk of my colleagues here. and that is at the heart of our
profession is integrity and credibility, reliability. that's how we get invited to meetings. that's how we get invited back to meetings, to provide a sense of confidence to those we serve to help them make decisions. what you just described is both an opportunity, that's the connection with new partners, nontraditional sources. small and large companies and universities, et cetera. every one of those connections is also a threat or a risk because if i'm now plugged in to this new source, to understanding coherence, i'm also plugging in to every aspect of vulnerability that they have. so we work on this very, very hard. i obviously count on the experts at nsa and fbi on the digital domain and the hygiene necessary. i will also say because it was brought up before this issue of deep fake.
as that technology advances, and it will, i do worry about as a community that needs to seek the truth and then speak the truth, in a world in which we can't agree on what's true, our job becomes much more difficult. and so going back to your question, we have to do a better job at protecting what we do so when we do show up, you have the confidence. ia know where it came from. you know how we handled it. you know who did or didn't affect and manipulate it. again, it's an issue in tcenter of my desk and all of our concerns. >> in your plans, one more question for you, director. in your plans for geospatial western, the development of the new facility replacing the 75-year-old facility in st. louis, which is fully redundant with what happens in springfield, virginia, the difference you're looking at
there, i think 40% of the space in that plan is unclassified. how does -- how does ic work in an unclassified environment? and how would you calculate success in your future view of how that works, and why would it work that way in finding new ground and unclassified space in a classified facility? >> short answer is very carefully. i'll expand. so some four years ago when i stepped into this privileged position, i challenged our team to think differently about our value proposition in a world that is much more open now, in which there's many more sources of information. some good and some not so good. and so i coined a phrase that we need to succeed in the open. i modified that a few months later with some help of my teammates. i said what we really need to do is succeed with the open. to your point about our new campus in st. louis, which we couldn't be more excited about.
by the way, the infrastructure is closer to 100 years old, but this is much more than an infrastructure project. i think of this as a new campus. it's almost 100 acres. we can reimagine our profession on that campus. part of it needs to be re-engagement with the open community in a way that's protected and we know who and what we're plugging into. we couldn't be more excited about the ability to take the opportunity we have in st. louis now to redefine that value proposition in a more open world, in a more connected world, in a world in which we're taking on sources that we know and sources that we need to double and triple check. and so the 40% you referenced is just an estimate that we have now. but we just want to build into the infrastructure knowing that we're going to have to work not just in but with the open. and so that's why we have laid out that marker at the beginning. >> general nakasone, how does this fit into what you do, the whole idea of gon, of individual
personal geography, all of the things we didn't useded to have access to that we have access to now. not only using it but using it with confidence? >> senator, i think your initial question with regards to the data security is a very important one in the terms of how do we insure the integrity and assurance of the data. director cardillo and the men and women have to be able to leverage every day in support of a number of different requirements, whether or not it's policymakers, it's forward forces deployed. our job is to assist in that and make sure that data is well protected and we can rest assured that when we leverage it, it's the right time at the right place and the right data we need to be able to utilize. >> thank you. thank you, chairman. >> senator harris. >> if i could just add something here. robert cardillo is finishing up 30-plus year career working with the intelligence community. one of our crown jewels, and we
hate to see him moving on to maybe greener pastures and easier times, but he's just been a terrific partner with this team. and i just wanted to recognize his contributions, he's been exceptional, and he won the best dressed on the panel award this morning. >> he does that every team. i just want you to know that. senator harris. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i join with my colleagues in thanking each of you and the men and women of your agencies for honoring the oath that they have taken and often with great sacrifice. thank them, please, from all of us. this question is for directors haspel, coats, and ashley. it's about north korea. what would you say is the current state of the threat from north korea? and perhaps we can start with director haspel. >> briefly, of course, the regime is committed to developing a long-range nuclear armed missile that would pose a direct threat to the united
states. it is positive that we have managed to engage them in a dialogue. they have taken some voluntary measures to close the site, dismantle a site, but ultimately, the objective is to lessen that threat by getting them to declare their program and then ultimately dismantle the program. i think others can probably add to that. >> director coats. >> well, i affirm what director haspel has just said. we continue to go into this situation eyes wide open. we want to employ the best assets we can to understand what the koreans are thinking. north koreans are thinking and what they're doing. we have capabilities which we can talk about in a secure session in terms of how we gather that information and how we assess that. to get to our policymakers and to give to the negotiating
partners relative to where we're going with north korea. we hold to the stated premise that that denuclearization is the goal which has to be achieved. i will, at that point, just say that we want to assure the american people and assure everybody listen here that we are fully engaged in providing the essential intelligence needed relative to the negotiations going on. >> in this setting, can you say, since you have been in the position you have been then, that there is a threat in terms of their ability to strike the united states has diminished in any way? >> until this particular point, the assessments hold as i mentioned in my opening
statement. earlier this past year, we have not seen any evidence. they have not seen nuclear missile testing or launching. that is the position we are in right now. we keep open eyes and open ears to exactly what is going on. >> the technology they demonstrated -- shows the capability to have the icbm function still exists. there is still substantial military capacity that kim jong- un wields 70% of his forces are along the tmz. so the capability and the threats that existed a year ago are still there. >> thank you. director haspel, north korea has obviously a huge horrible record of human rights and deeply isolated from the international community. and this is a result of many policies, intentional probably
mostly. do you believe north korea values the legitimacy that comes with the direct diplomatic engagement with the united states? >> yes. i think our analysts would assess that they value the dialogue with the united states and we do see indications that comes on is trying to navigate a path toward some kind of better future for the north korean people. >> are you aware of any intelligence suggesting that his behaviors and the human rights record has improved in any substantial way over the last couple of years? >> it is obviously something we monitor to the degree possible. i do think a vision for north korea that further brings them into the community of nations
would have a positive effect on our ability to influence them on important things like human rights. >> but over the last couple of years, have you seen any change in their behaviors? >> i don't think i can point to any specific changes over the last couple of years. >> thank you. director coats, changing the subject, as i talked to you about social media, can you tell us, do we have a written strategy for how we will handle the influence operations at target? >> we are fully engaged in that issue. we have regular communication among the various sectors of the intelligence community. and much of that is shared both verbally and in written form. >> so there is a written strategy? >> not a written single strategy but we are always looking at how we can best address this. it is a fluid situation. we had earlier discussions relative to the engagement with
private sector social media companies. >> my time is running out. can you tell us, do you have any intention of having a written strategy that will be agreed to and understood by all members of the ic as it relates to the collective responsibility and individual responsibilities for addressing foreign influence on social media in the united states? >> as i said, it is a fluid situation. we are making significant progress on that. in terms of one specific written strategy, something will have to be looked at in a continuum of change. so i'm not exactly sure why a written strategy would give us anything more than a single strategy. that would have to be modified daily. but you can be assured that it
is a top priority as we have talked about before. it is something that we are working on and we have seen very significant progress. when you go back and read the transcript of what we talked about before, you will understand. >> i actually have the transcript from february 13th, 2018 when you and i had this discussion at the last worldwide threats hearing or the previous one. i ask you then, would you provide us and would there be a written strategy for how the ic is dealing with these threats. so can you tell us, has there been any advancement on that point since february of 2018? >> i will be happy to get back with you on that. >> you were referring to 2017 ? >> 2018. >> thank you. >> senator cotton. >> thank you for your appearance and your continued serviceth nation and all the men and women in your organization serving the
country. we have talked a lot about the threats posed. let's make this concrete for americans watching at home. you can raise your hand if you respond yes to my questions. how many of you would use a telecom product made by while way and the te? >> i think we should talk about these kinds of things in a closed session. these are not all yes-and-no answers. i think there is information here that we could do better with a closed session then an open session. >> like a professional who has at one time been on the debate stage and not raise their hand questions. i will simply say for the written record that i saw no hands go up and i will defer to the closed session -- if i asked a fair question which means, how many of you who are not heads of an intelligence agency like your neighbors or
church members -- there would be six no votes of confidence. director coats, in september, the house intelligence committee voted -- by partisan and not controversial, to you -- to send several dozen transcripts and the investigation into russia's interference in our 2016 election so they could release those ending your classification review. where does that review stand? >> that is another issue i would like to discuss in a closed session. >> thank you. >> director haspel, you spoke some about isis today and the threat of isis if they were to reform. one ongoing threat from isis is that the syrian democratic forces have a number of detainees from isis. do you know how many detainees the sdf currently holds? can
you turn your microphone on please? >> senator, we do know the number. in this forum, i will say that they have hundreds of foreign fighters. the ic is working hard to make sure we know who those are and return people to their country of origin and to make sure that, even as we continue to make gains against isis on the battlefield, that these foreign fighters are not able to return to the fight. and i can be more specific this afternoon in terms of the exact number. >> can you speak broadly about the types of detainees? are we talking about foot soldiers or major external operation planners or bomb makers? that sort of thing. >> all of the above, senator. >> that would be very bad for our nation if those detainees were released. >> i think it would be really bad. and ic has taken great pains to categorize and make sure we know who these individuals are. and we have course are working closely with foreign allies to
do just that. >> thank you. director haspel, i would like to stay with you and turn our attention to russia. i know you have a lot of experience with that nation. president vladimir putin has publicly stated that they are working on nuclear weapon systems like a nuclear power cruise muscle, hypersonic leg muscles and underwater torpedoes. he announced last month that the russian successful test of a hypersonic vehicle which is called an intercontinental strategic system -- is that the case that some of these systems are being designed to explicitly invade the constraints of the new started treaty? >> senator, i believe, and i can go into more detail this afternoon. and i'm sure general ashley would like to add. i believe some of these systems have in fact been in development long before a new start treaty. >> general ashley, do you have anything to add? >> i will come back to that one. when you look at the technology stuff -- and i think zte is a
great example. but the complexity is, do you know what is in your phone? do you know who provided the chips or the software? we are tracking everything that you just addressed in terms of putin. i am not sure if any of that violates the new structure. right now i know the russians are in compliance. and for the systems it can deliver, there are about 700. they can have 15 warheads and 800, in the latter category in terms of other systems. i am not aware that this violates. i will take that one for a little research as well. i will be able to get that to you in the closed session this afternoon. >> director haspel, one final follow-up question even of the system don't violate the new start treaty, i believe both this and the past administration have said that
russia is violating the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, the open skies treaty, the chemical weapons convention, the biological weapons convention and is no longer adhering to the presidential nuclear initiatives. is there any treaty that russia has with the united states for which they are currently adhering? >> the russians obviously would have a different interpretation. but i do believe that you are correct in terms of the state department assessment and compliance with those treaties. >> thank you. >> senator wyden. >> thank you very much. i want to apologize to all of our distinguished panel. the hearing, the finance committee. i will start with the matter of saudi arabia and the late jamal khashoggi. i am concerned that the dni statement for the record barely mentions the threat posed by saudi arabia to the rule of law around the world. director haspel, the senate
unanimously passed a resolution stating its belief that the crown prince was responsible for the murder of u.s. resident and journalist jamal khashoggi. is that correct? >> senator, we can go into a little more detail this afternoon. as you know, during the fall month, we spent a significant amount of time briefing and providing written products on our assessment to what happened to mr. jamal khashoggi. as you know and as the saudi regime -- itself has acknowledged, individuals travel to istanbul and he was murdered at the consulate and it was a premeditated murder on two, october. the trial in saudi arabia, i believe have -- has begun. >> respectfully, director, the senate unanimously passed a
resolution that the crown prince was responsible. was the senate wrong? >> senator, it is my job to provide the intelligence to support the senate's deliberations and i think we have done that very adequately in this case and we will continue to do that. and we continue by the way to track this issue and to follow it very closely. >> a question for you, director wray and other panel members. in my home state, there are alarming indications that the saudi government has helped saudi nationals accused of serious crime leave the country. and this strikes us as an assault on the rule of law right here in the united states. my question for the director -- director wray, will you look at this and come back with any suggestions about what the
fbi can do? and just so you know, what has troubled me so much is what looks like evidence that the saudi government help to these individuals who have been charged with really serious crimes -- my home state and manslaughter -- helping them with illicit passports and possibly the prospect of private airplanes to get out of the country. will you look at this and come back with any suggestions about what the bureau can do here? >> senator, i appreciate the question. i will say that i have had occasion to visit the portland field office, not only to meet with all of our employees there but all of our state and local partners across the state and i would be happy to take a close look at anything you want to send our way on this. >> can you get back to me within 10 days?
we are trying to up the ante here to really get these people back. my sense is, like a lot of other things, people have a full plate. i have requested travel records. we will be in touch with your office. but i would like a response within 10 days to show that this is the priority that is warranted. >> senator, of course we have a lot of priorities. i would be happy to look at the information we have and work with your office. >> we have a lot of priorities. but the notion that saudi arabia can basically say it is above the law and that is what looks like to the people of my home state. and it is just unacceptable. so i will be back at this. and you and i have talked about matters before. and both of us have strong views. that will certainly be the case here. let me ask one other question
for you, director haspel and director coats, to change the subject to russia and particularly the trump putin meetings. donald trump met privately with vladimir putin and no one in the u.s. government has the full story about what was discussed. director haspel and director coats, would this put you in a disadvantaged position, in terms of understanding russia's efforts to advance its agenda against the united states? the question for you two. then i am out of time. >> thank you for the response. >> senator, clearly this is a sensitive issue and it is an issue we should talk about this afternoon. i look forward to discussing that in a closed session. >> chairman, my time is up. to me, from an intelligence
perspective, it is just until 101 that it would help our country to know what vladimir putin discussed with donald trump. thank you. >> when i reflect on the number of people that lost their lives as a result of man- made causes of world war ii. by some estimates, as many as 39 million people -- when we introduce the atomic bomb and nagasaki and hiroshima and we think about how much more efficient we have gotten when it comes to killing one another potentially and i wanted to ask you about weapons of mass destruction. if the theory behind destruction and deterrence is that none of the so-called rational actors -- russia, china for example, would use a
nuclear weapons because they realize what the consequences would be, we know we have less than rational actors that either have acquired nuclear weapons, thinking about north korea and certainly pakistan and india, staring at each other. both of whom have nuclear weapons. i worry that we are not spending as much time as we need to be, focusing on what is the most lethal threat to our nation and the world. let me ask you specifically about russia. we now russia continues to be a breach of the terms of the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty. most recently, our nato allies have concluded that russia, in the process of developing a ground launched crews missile
that is a direct threat to atlantic security, i personally think it is important for us to adequately fund nuclear modernization programs including the development of a low yield warhead and enhance the capabilities of the critical missile defense systems. i would also point out that china is not bound by the standards imposed by the inf treaty, further putting you in a compromising position. director coats, does the intelligence community assess the complete withdrawal of the u.s. from the inf treaty? posing a significant national security risk to the united states? >> that risk is there, whether we are seeing russia within the bounds of the restraints on that or whether we dealt. because we now russia has violated the terms of that treaty and has that capability. >> so they are still going to
have that capability. that is correct. >> director haspel, perhaps this would be a question for you. if the u.s. withdrawals from the inf treaty, i would welcome anybody's comment but if the u.s. withdrawals from the inf treaty, does the ic assess that russia will replace inf range missiles in cuba? or will they attempt to exert pressure in some other way? >> senator, what i can say and perhaps we can go into more detail this afternoon is we do see that russia is very concerned about our's decision to withdraw. we do see also consideration of ways they can push back due to their own concerns about our forward posture in eastern europe. i think i will leave it there
for now and we can elaborate this afternoon. i will ask of general ashley would like to add something. >> i would say that we could get more details this afternoon. and actions are not consistent with the ground cruise muscle which you spoke about. it has been in utilization and is available. their actions and what they would do i think would be symmetric to anything we did to move additional capabilities forward. and then those particular symmetric actions we can talk about in a closed session. >> would anybody on the panel quick -- care to talk about my statement in regard to production of a low yield warhead? i don't know who would be the appropriate person. >> the comment that we should be developing? >> as it. i will have to leave that to the policymakers.
what you alluded to is our ability to kill. and some of the weapons we have developed. and in the utilization and strategy we have heard in the past from the russians of non- strategic nuclear weapons and whether or not a rational act would use those kind of weapons in the field. we know the russians have a first use policy. and if they think the kremlin would be at risk would be what would drive that first use. so that is an escalatory control measure that they would put into place. i will leave it to the policy folks to determine the utilization of one of those weapons. we talk about the use of nuclear weapons specifically. one of the things -- the threshold is really high on their use, which is why we have hybrid war and if you look at the conflicts, it kind of flatlined after world war ii and things have taken place that has kind of been the outgrowth. the other thing that has come
to bear on keeping conflict at bay has been the development of nuclear weapons. >> thank you. >> last but not least, senator benjamin sasse. >> thank you for being here. thank you to the officers and their families. you lead and representing a community of folks that often have family disruptions and on behalf of this committee and the american people, thank you. general, when you are confirmed before the armed services committee, i asked you a question about whether or not russia or china had ever suffered a sufficient response to the cyber aggressions, to warrant behavior change on their behalf. and you said, no, they had not. at this point, in a classified setting, or nonclassified setting, how would you answer that question today? >> senator, i think the way i would answer the question is, first of all, what has changed since you and i talked last year?
is the fact that from our were collectively across the inner agency and the government, we have been able to show effect from this against, primarily in this case, the russians as we look at the midterm elections. whether or not that spawns long- term behavior change, i think is still to be determined. this afternoon, we can talk more about some of the things we have seen. >> thank you for your work on that and your success. i know director coats, you are going to give us a briefing on that this afternoon as well. i know a number of people on the committee have been anxious to get a more wholesome report of some of the successes from ic from early november. i would like to publicly say that whatever portion of that we can declassify for the american people to know the successes of the u.s. government and in your community, i would urge the declassification where possible. >> director wray, you have many priorities at the bureau. can you talk about threats we face with the long-term tech
war, tech race against china? and domestically, when you think about bureau priorities and looking at different chinese actions inside the united states, how do you rank those priorities? >> first, i would say that -- as i said earlier, i think china at large is the most significant counterintelligence threat we face. we have economic espionage investigations, for example. that is just one piece of it. in virtually every one of our 56 field offices. and the number of those has probably doubled over the last 3-4 years. and almost all of them -- not all of them, but almost all of them lead back to china. >> is there anywhere near sufficient resources for all of those investigations? and we asked previously director james coming about to howdy threats. we asked if it was sufficiently resourced. we were told that as long as
the u.s. was partnering with allies in syria to kill jihadists, they thought they were sufficient investor resources in the bureau. for counterintelligence and corporate espionage purposes, are you sufficiently resourced? >> i would say this. if the congress were to entrust us with more resources, i can assure you we would put them to vary good use. >> we have talked about -- our intelligence committee is a product of history. 17 intelligence agencies is not how it would be designed from scratch. but that does not mean every organization is often simplifying. you create more complexity when you are trying to get rid of some of the duplicate of functions we have across different agencies. when you think about the catastrophic potential to public trust and to market that could come from attacks, are we director coats and director haspel, are we organized in a way that we could possibly respond fast enough from a
catastrophic deep faith attack? >> we certainly recognize the threat of emerging technologies and the speed at which the threat increases. we clearly need to be more agile. we need to partner with our private sector. we need to resource our activities relative to dealing with these known technologies and unknown technologies which we know are going to appear anytime soon because it is just a quickly evolving flood of technological change that poses a major threat to the united states. and something the intelligence community needs, to be restructured to address. we are in the process of transformation right now, which incorporates six major pillars
that we have to put resources and activity against, and fast. cyber trusted agile workforce, artificial intelligence, private sector partnerships, data management, acquisition agility. all six of these are major issues which we have to transform. we cannot rely on where we are now. we are the best in the world. we have to stay the best in the world. we have real competitors. technology is giving then the opportunity to shorten that gap very significantly. and so we have a dedicated commitment to this transformation. it is called ic 2025. where do we have to be 2025? let alone 19 and 20. we are using that throughout the 17 agencies in terms of how we have to adapt to that. that is a major change that the ic has to go through. we are fully intent on making
it happen. >> director haspel, are you confident that we can respond fast enough? >> i think director coats captured it very well. i would say that while the ic is large and unwilling in some respects, i don't think in my 34 year career, i have seen better coordination or synchronization or collaboration among the agencies to try to stay abreast of the technological challenges. >> i hear that and i have been reading until daily now for 18 months. and the pace of upgraded game on the part of the community is a real testament to all of your leadership. i still think the asymmetric exposure we have or the barrier to entry is so low now. a lot of entities, short of nationstate actors, will be able to produce this material and a stable life not just trust but markets rapidly. and i think we need to be thinking about not just ic 2025
but also ic 2021, 2019 and 2020. >> if i can get back to -- the chairman when you said, are you concerned about our protection of data. how do you get data really good? training algorithms. it goes back to the ability to include the training of the algorithms to the degree where you cannot tell the difference. our challenge is, how do you build the algorithm to identify the anomaly? because every one has a flaw. at least now they do. >> thank you, general. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to commend director coats on the ongoing efforts to make sure we get through the backlog on security clearance reform. the chairman and i have worked on this very hard. we appreciate the progress that
has been made. my hope is -- i think we are at about 500,000. i think we can do much better. my hope would be that general -- any federal employee that might have had some level of a credit dinging due to the shutdown would not be penalized through that security clearance process for actions they had to remediate. >> we will continue to operate carefully with you also. you have played a major role in all of this. we have made progress. it is not fast enough. there were some paths we could have accomplished if the process was opened. hopefully, we won't have to go through that again.
>> i would like to think the chairman for his comments. i promised all of you ample time for nutrition and between sessions. i think we have accomplished that. i want to thank you for your testimony today in the open session intelligence community. we have always prided ourselves on making the impossible happen. you go where others cannot. you find what cannot be found. you discover, uncover and create. this committee has been privileged to see, behind closed doors, some of the truly fantastic innovations that are the products of your drive to accomplish impossible missions. sometimes these come from the minds of in-house geniuses. sometimes they are the fruits of successful collaboration with contractors. these public-private partnerships have always been at the core of american success
stories. however, as with any good competition, our and adversaries have watched carefully and they seem to be catching up. director coats, you noted in your statement for the record that, for 2019 and beyond, the innovations that drive military and economic competitiveness will increasingly originate outside the united states. and the overall u.s. lead in science and technology shrinks. the gap between military technologies evaporates. foreign actors increase efforts to acquire top talent company data and intellectual property via licit or illicit means. we must think about how too. greater innovation at home, mitigate potential risks and maintain a competitive edge. there is no easy path if we can see the innovation race.
not only our global competitiveness but our national security will be at risk. we need to make sure we are monitoring and acting on threat information as quickly as possible and getting the information to the people who need it the most. the federal government should educate the private sector on threats and enable a regulatory and financial environment that enables innovation. in turn, the private sector needs to listen better and be constructive. the simple truth is that we need each other. and only through collaboration, can we regain our lead. the architecture of government must change. and our partnerships must grow. in closing, please convey this committee's gratitude to the men and women of the intelligence committee for the work they do on a daily basis. the american people should know that their hard work, dedication and innovation are crucial to protecting this
country and the democratic principles for which we stand. although the threats we now face are dynamic, different and numerous, the intelligence community will continue delivering on their mandate to reduce uncertainty in an increasingly uncertain world. with that, this portion of the hearing is adjourned. and we will gather again at 1:00. [chatter]
coming up thursday morning, bipartisan policy center economic policy director shayna campos will be on to talk about the financial effect of the 35 day government shut down. american enterprise fellow jason lyle and the dema associate director mark ewell's men discussed free college proposals and other plans to make higher education more affordable. be sure to watch cspan washington journal live at 7:00 eastern thursday morning. join the discussion.
author of many books including, a people's history of sports in the united states, game over, how politics has turned the sports world upside down and the most recent, jim brown, last man standing. >> i love sports. that is why i think we need to fight for sports. we need to reclaim them. we need to take sports back. if we are going to do so, we need to know our history. that is our greatest ammunition in this fight. we need to know our history of the athletes, the sportswriters and the fans that have stood up to the machine. if for no other reason than knowing this history, i think allows us to look at the world and see that struggle can affect every aspect of life in the system. even sports. >> during the live through are conversation with dave zion. live sunday at noon eastern on book tv's in-depth