tv U.S. Non- Proliferation Under Secretary Speaks on Nuclear Policy CSPAN March 12, 2019 5:31pm-6:48pm EDT
live on saturday, starting at 9:00 eastern. from historic ford's theater in washington, d.c., for the 22nd annual abraham lincoln symposium. this day-long gathering hosted by the lincoln institute and ford's theater society brings together lincoln scholars to highlight the 16th president's life, career, and presidency. speakers include richard carwakine on lincoln's sense of humor, david blight on lincoln's relationship with frederick douglass, and michael burlingame on lincoln as president-elect. watch american history tv this weekend on c-span3. the undersecretary of state for arms control spoke yesterday at the carnegie endowment for
international peace about the withdrawal from the nuclear forces treaty. this is an hour and 15 minutes. [ applause ] thanks very much, james. it's an honor to be here and a great honor for me to introduce this conference as the introductory keynote speaker, the honorable andrea thompson, the undersecretary for arms control and international security, a position she's held since last april. she's been on the job for a little under a year. she's been on the team a little longer than that. she was at the white house as deputy assistant to the president and has national security adviser to the vice president. these positions of heavy responsibility have capped andrea's long service to the public in the field of military
intelligence, where she served in a lot of difficult positions, not least of which was on the hill, as the senior adviser to the chairman of the house committee on homeland security and the senior military adviser to the chairman of the house foreign affairs committee. but andrea served even more difficult roles than these when she was in combat missions in afghanistan and iraq, leading military intelligence efforts for nearly 28 years. so, you know, whatever the tough reputation of this audience, she has been in more trying theaters and faced more formidable foes in her career. and i really look forward to engaging with her and with you at this nuclear policy
conference. so andrea, if we could bring you to the stage for you. oh, and the last thing i forgot to say, andrea is from south dakota, a part of the united states where niceness is a virtue. and her staff have confirmed to me that that is indeed the case. they like you as a boss. [ applause ] >> thanks, guys. >> so the format of this introductory presentation is a discussion format. and i'm going to pose some questions to andrea. and after a while, we'll get to the audience for the q&a for the last 30 minutes. if we could start in the nonproliferation field, with the mpt review conference coming up in a little more than a year, there's a lot of concern about how that's going to go, given the breakdown in some areas of nonproliferation.
but on the positive side, the p5 had what i understand was a productive meeting in beijing in late january, where they talked about not just the glossary of nuclear terms but how to promote nonproliferation, how to deal with elements in the arms control agenda. i wonder if, building on that, you could tell us a little bit about preparations for the review conference and what do you hope to see on the nonproliferation agenda. >> yeah, absolutely, thanks, mark. if i may take a couple of quick minutes out front, i want to allow quite a bit of time for the q&a, but i would be remiss if you didn't thank everyone here in the room for taking time on a gorgeous d.c. monday. you have options, and you're here. some familiar faces in the room, friends and allies from around the world and here in washington, d.c. so thanks for making the time. again, i hope this is a candid dialogue. the team will tell you, for those folks that have met me
before, i am an open door type of leadership. this is a great opportunity to get your insight and opinions ahead of some of the important topics we're working in the "t" family portfolio. i would also like to thank carnegie, 30th anniversary, an incredible accomplishment, and to continue this important endeavor. two other quick points, i was telling mark, i watched some of the points yesterday with the young professionals. and the addition of that to the agenda and to the carnegie program i think is incredibly important. one of my top couple of priorities, when i sat down with the team early on, after we assessed where we were in the "t" family, took the first 30 to 60 days to make some assessments on where we wanted to go. one of the incredibly important things i have a professional obligation to uphold as a leader in the "t" family is recruiting and retention for the next
generation of leaders. we have an incredible group of experts. we'll talk about that when we talk about dprk, when we talk about some of the very challenging problems we're facing today. we've got incredible individuals that have been on the state department team for years. we also have some new young folks coming in. and it's incredibly important to recruit folks in, encourage that, educate on what we do and what we don't do. the secretaries started off some domestic travel in the last couple of days for that. i'll be going back to the great state of south dakota later this week, again, to tell the story. but i would encourage all of you, if you're here in the room, that means you're passionate about arms control and international security. i would encourage you, if you're not a mentor to someone in the field, become a mentor to someone in this field. reach out. today is a great opportunity. we have other forms as well. and lead and develop. so 30 years forward, someone that's in this room will probably be -- a young person will be moderating the next
panel. that's an incredible important, i would like to start with that. the second note on gender balance, i give great kudos to the team for establishing that. again, to celebrate international women's day. last friday i was meeting with a group of international security leaders in london. so it's great to be able to sit on the panel and uphold with the 50%, although i must be bigger because it's 51%. so thank you for that initiative as well. to the question, to tee off the session, the importance of the mpt, we did have a successful p5 in beijing. we had had an initial engagement up in new york after the first committee that kind of set the stage for that. but the trip that ended january, the beginning of february, again, i tell folks to not to make too much, myself from a midwestern background, but i believe in candor.
i believe in transparency. and i believe in getting things done. so i polled my counterparts, i said, we've met multiple times over many administrations, with different leaders. if we're -- and we've flown a long way, we're in beijing. if we're just going to sit around the table and continue to use our playbook and our talking points for hours and go back and forth, we should probably just go home now. instead we have an opportunity to be transparent, to share ideas, to recognize that there's going to be topics where we don't agree. sometimes it's a p2 and a p3 making up the p5. but there are going to be areas that we don't agree. but there are areas what that w agree, and how do we build upon that? talking about what do we do now to build to 2020, what do we need to be doing as a p5 to lead, to set the standard in that area? so we did have a very candid
discussion. i think we made some headway. again, he's goti've got a great senior advisers who have been through p5 engagements so their insight and feedback is incredibly important. they said, yeah, this one is different. as we look towards 2020, and i challenge the folks to recess, let's look back a little bit on where we've been, what have we done, what's worked and what hasn't worked. so recess where we were. then look forward and recommit. and the things that make the mpt what it is as we celebrate the anniversary next year, recommit. commit to the standards, commit to the developed mpt early on, make sure we're removing those obstacles, working together. there will be some obstacles, i'm clear-eyed about that. i know it will be, you know, a tough road ahead. but that's what we do, that's what diplomacy is, when you sit down across the table from one another and exchange ideas. we have some opportunities in
the near term. we've got the communities coming up in the next month. but this is an important piece. i would encourage the folks in the room that can help shape that as well, again, it's for the safety and security and to uphold the standards we established years ago to make that a successful prepcon and ipcon. >> thank you very much, andrea. at the beijing meeting there was discussion on arms control issues. if i could hone in on that a little bit, one of the areas of disagreement among members of the p5 obviously was the inf treaty. in this room i guess there's a lot of concern about the imminent demise of the inf, coupled with the president's expressed disinterest in extending new s.t.a.r.t. a lot of people draw the conclusion that strategic arms control is, if not dead, nearly so. it's part of your title, but are you going to have to change your
title if there's no strategic arms control? how do you respond to these concerns about the inf and new s.t.a.r.t. nonextension? >> thanks, mark, and i would actually push back on that assessment. those that know me, know my leadership, know that i'm standards-based. this is incredibly important. i remind folks that the underlying foundation of our arms control agreements when we sign it is the safety and security of the american people. that's the foundation of this agreement. and so when folks are like, oh, the demise of the inf treaty, i remind folks, across two administrations, we've had these discussions, for many, many, many years we've had these discussions on showing russia where they've violated the treaty, continuing to present that intelligence and information, working with partners and allies. so i remind folks, if you sign for a treaty but you're not willing to uphold the standards
of that treaty, what kind of leadership is that? what kind of arms control regime is that? and so i counter the narrative, and again, i am truth in lending, i have not spent most of my adult life in arms control. i have spent most of my adult life defending democracy and the constitution of the united states. i have spent most of my adult life in international security with partners and allies. and if you see that there's a violation of that standard, in this case the ssc8 being developed and fielded and multiple battalions and you don't hold the other treaty partner accountable, you've now set a new standard. you've now allowed the violation of that arms control treaty to become the norm. and so what does that set the precedent for future arms control treaties? so yes, i'm very passionate about what we're doing with arms control and very passionate on
upholding the standards of treaties. and again, with open dialogue. the president made the announcement in october, the secretary subsequently made the announcement in december, reached out. the russians had sent, again, offers to meet, and they did, flew to geneva in the middle of january, and sat across the table with the deputy foreign minister and his team. we brought a team represented from state department, nsc, dod and the joint staff, and had a candid dialogue. didn't make movement, because the russians still didn't admit to violating the treaty. but we talked. i met with the ambassador here in d.c. we also met, we're on a panel, many of you might have been at the munich security conference, i was on a panel with the deputy foreign minister when we discussed it again. so the demise of the inf treaty
isn't a trump administration. the russians violated this years ago. we're finally upholding the standards and holding them accountable. again, the safety and security of the american people. we haven't conducted the r&d. we haven't fielded missiles of the treaty-violating systems while russia has. so i will continue to always fight for the best interests of the safety and security of the american people. i would also counter the narrative that the president isn't interested in the s.t.a.r.t. we've had discussions, we're in the interagency process now. we've had the discussions on the extension, what it means, where we are. we continue to abide by the treaty. we met the central limits, as did our russian counterparts last year. we continue to meet at the experts level. we continue to have the dccs. and so it's really in the discussion. so i think the other point is, much like what we've done with the nuclear posture review, we
engaged early and often the partners and allies. this was a transparent process. so i just got back from london where i had an engagement with some partners and allies on next steps, and getting their feedback, and getting their input, and working together. it's an important part as we formulate our policy. again, the foundational element of that is what's in the best interests for the united states and with our partners and allies. so we'll continue to work through new s.t.a.r.t. we've had, again, two years to make the decision on the extension. but the foundational element is what's upholding the safety and security. but again, i'll welcome input. there are some folks in the room that we've met on this topic. i'm sure we'll get it in the q&a as well. >> thanks very much, that's promising, i think. changing the topic a bit, i recently participated in an iiss tabletop exercise in which artificial intelligence was
manipulated by malevolent actors to impede nuclear command and control. and i know you've been giving a lot of thought to new technologies and how the state department should get a handle on them. can you share some of your thinking on how to address new challenges in the field of nuclear threats in new technologies? >> absolutely, mark. and, you know, i started this morning talking about one of the top priorities with, you know, retaining the expertise and recruiting the next generation. the other priority that i established early on was on cybersecurity and emerging technologies. i think it's an incredible part of -- obviously it's here, whether it's in the defense field. but in the national security arena. i've had discussions, again, with experts within the government and with our private industry partners. and i think this is an area, i used some analogies, where we
were in the '80s. i tell some of the young leaders, as i sit down, i say, this is an incredible era in arms control and international security, where you see the nexus of technology, where you see the capabilities in cyberspace, where you see the quickly-evolving technologies in artificial intelligence. whether it's hypersonics, as we've seen with some of our adversaries, whether it's quantum computing and the uses of quantum computing. it's in advanced manufacturing and 3d printing. these are all technologies that have applications to what we do in international security. but we need to have those discussions now. and, you know, i tell folks, i say, the rate of policy and the rate of technology, we've got to get better with our rate of policy, otherwise we're always going to be behind the evolution of these next steps. so i think it's an incredible part. again, very interested. i'm finding that as i travel the
globe, more and more of our partners are having the same discussions. how do we harness, harness that intellect, harness those ideas. because they're similar applications. the challenges of ai and nonproliferation in the united states is the same to our asian partners or european partners, partners across the globe. let's share those best practices without confining the technology and innovation that makes it great. i tell folks, the united states, we lead the world in innovation, and the energy and entrepreneurial spirit. you want to harness that. where we continue to have the applications, whether it's the digital economy and free flow of information, and using it for all the positive aspects, whether it's health care, again, there's just a myriad of applications. but ensure that those same technologies aren't used maliciously. how do you establish norms of responsible behavior? how do you have responsible nation states that say, yes, i have the cyber application, i won't hack your election, i'm
building ai for this health care application, i'm not going to use it to manipulate your nuclear control systems. so we're starting those discussions now. again, i think it's a fascinating part of the portfolio. and a fascinating part of where we this kind of generational mind. decisions we make now i think will shape arms-control for years to come. >> think you very much andrea. that sounds very promising. >> can i go back to the ins issue. i think everyone here would agree on the importance of commitment to norms and upholding those norms. i think everyone would also agree on the importance of protecting your responsibility to protect the american people. if the russian cruise missiles are a threat to u.s. national security interest, i imagine there would be a plan for how
to ensure that there is no further expansion and deployment of these 9m729 missiles in addition to upholding the norm. what we do actually with the issue of the deployment of these missiles. can you share any thinking on this? yes we've had that discussion with my russian counterpart in the early months of what does it mean to be treated compliant again, i told the deputy foreign minister, you know what the standards are. know what it means to get back to be compliant with the treaty. the truth of the matter is they don't acknowledge it's a violation so they continue to feel these. the decision made by the president and announced by the secretary on -- now that we have defended and announced, the department of defense can start those research and development actions that they haven't done it all because we were treated compliant. the dod is looking at that for
next steps. r&d, what does it mean. we've just now commenced that. >> okay. thanks very much. you are very game to let me jump around issues here. compliance is so important in all aspects of arms-control and nonproliferation. one of the issues involved, iran's compliance with the gcp way and its overall commitment under the mpp. a lot of questions have been raised with the document that is real revealed to the world and provided to the ia ea about iran's previous and possible ongoing development of nuclear weapon technology. russians have been raised have been whether these documents are being utilized with the speed and devotion that they should be, particularly by the iaea. given the family's role in
clients and cooperating with the iaea can you say anything about how you see the iaea moving forward. are they moving fast enough to assess and utilize these documents in holding iran to its commitments? >> i mean, iaea, no surprise to the folks in this room, and incredible and partner to this united states. upholding standards and taking next steps. i would say much like we all do, we evolve and modernize. the iaea, again is looking at that. what are their responsibilities and how they apply the actions to pursue that? have taken next steps. they are working diligently, not to give a shout out to the iaea but again when you're talking about opportunities, that is another opportunity to serve. it's incredibly important. to have access and be able to confirm or deny what's going on
across the world. in this case in iran. justin israel for the joint political engagement and you talked, not to delve too much into the jcpoa and their activities, but it was pretty incredible to me, you know you study it from here and there outreach and funding with their proxies, whether it's the hoodies, hamas or in this case i guess is real, and going up to the northern border and going down into the tunnels, 12 -- the city has approximately 12 years of digging through stone, you know, a kilometer long to infiltrate and attract -- attacked the people of -- to
have a plan and deal the comes from the whole range of that line activity. very moving to me to see the on the ground in israel a couple weeks ago. >> i wish i had that opportunity. i kind of miss being in government for those reasons but not other reasons. just keeping to the middle east, and we will get to audience questions pretty soon, saudi arabia is intent on developing nuclear power, they've been in negotiations with united states with key officials about the nuclear cooperation agreement. haven't heard very much recently about those negotiations, many of us in this room have been hopeful that the saudis would agree to the gold standard. two for enrichment and reprocessing. there doesn't seem to be much
interest on the part of the saudis in that. and they haven't even yet signed up to the modified small quantities vertical or have taken any other steps to demonstrate transparency in their nuclear intentions. given all that, is the gold standard still something to which we can aspire in the united states in reaching nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear want to be states? >> the short answer is yes. i tell folks, again i think people have a tendency to maybe misinterpret, so i'd like to clarify again here today. last year in february during my confirmation hearing, i was very clear to the senate foreign relations committee on my obligations if confirmed, as under secretary, to uphold the standard for the safety and security of the american people. working always toward the gold
standards in the 1-2-3 agreement. reform that subsequently after being confirmed, we had an arms- control hearing, i lost track of the date, we had an arms- control hearing after the confirmation and stated that again. that will always be my going in position. always. the gold standard. with that i would also add, as we've seen other countries fill the gap, i always want american company to be the first one in line in the system. we are working diligently with that to make sure -- we know it makes the best equipment in the world with the best standards. and if we are not there the chinese will be there among others. so yes i will always go with the gold standard and i would always stand up for what's best for the economic disparity of the american people. >> i'm very glad to have that on the record.
>> probably a couple of folks are. >> i think if i could have the indulgence of the conference organizers if we could get to audience q&a a little earlier than had been planned, because i've run through most of the prepared questions i had. i think many of you would like to pose them. be in about five minutes if we could do that. maybe you have this app you can start posing your questions. before we do that, can we return to the beijing meeting? and this is a closed-door meeting see you can tell us everything that happened there i wonder if among the areas of agreement and engagement among the p-5 weather efforts to protect against nuclear terrorism were on the agenda there or whether they will be on the agenda in other meetings coming up. i mean, nuclear terrorism, written big in preventing north korea from selling its nuclear technology to benevolent nonstate actors. and nuclear terrorism ventured
efforts in the form of developing norms and standards and rules including for example the amended convention for the physical protection of nuclear material i think there's an upcoming review conference on that. and what the u.s. position will be in seeking to further strengthen the rules, protecting the nuclear materials and other ways that nuclear want to be terrorists make it their hands on the wrong materials. >> we did discuss it as far as the responsibilities as p-5 liters on speaking out bad actors, upholding our standards as the p-5 members to ensure that those technologies and systems are not proliferated. that they are not only used responsibly by those that have them but they don't get into the wrong hands. we did discuss that again,
responsibilities, the importance of being the p-5 and action not just words, that we didn't just come to talk and leave but we have a professional obligation if you're in the p-5 to uphold the standards. we also talked about how we could work together. again, transparency measures. and direct a little bit on our npr. we talked about it's important to share those important practices and it's important to be transparent about what you're doing. i use the united states, our npr as an example, again we worked with partners and we worked here internally to form that incredibly important document. but there's also next steps. so at first committee this past year, i said i will come up and bring my joint staff counterpart and we went up on the dais at the u.n. for about one hour briefed the npr into questions from the field. i think that's important. i did call out some of my p-5
colleagues who said that is transparency gentlemen. that's what it means to have a program and a policy to be able to explain what it is and what it is and. and to have a few holes poked in it. and lou -- we look forward to the other members of the p-5 doing the same. again, a positive element in beijing and we look forward to continuing that. >> and when you say gentlemen i presume that they were all gentlemen in the gender balance we are seeing here doesn't prevail in every other field of our activity. >> it wasn't the u.s. team. >> the question and answer from the audience session, i'd like to now begin and i'm already getting some good questions. there better than the questions i was thinking of. so be on your guard. i know that in beijing i presume there must've been some discussion on how to deal with
the bomb treaty. and doctor rebecca gibbons is asking, what is the status of the creating conditions for nuclear disarmament working group? >> great question. so, again, talking about feedback and you'll see a theme here, feedback and input. so we did some initial engagement with allies and members of the p-5 in the word conditions, there was a bit of a rub with the word conditions. what does this mean and what are you trying to do? and so we sat down and said okay we are in the environment, it's now cmd. we are getting positive feedback. again, we formulate this what it is and what it isn't, you think of this more as i don't to stay informal but i think there is an opportunity to have more candor and inclusiveness. so in early stages, again folks
that are involved with this, welcome your feedback. my assistant secretary be here on a panel tomorrow afternoon. one of the many great ideas that chris has had in his leadership and assistant secretary, i encourage you to keep asking we are excited about cend and it isn't as robust and inclusive as it needs to be. >> i got good questions here about asia, inf, and new start. you're ready to field all of them? on inf, doctor susan martin asks, setting aside for the moment the need to avoid normalizing violations, can you explain the military significance of the russian violations of the inf? >> normally i would leave the military assessments to the military i will address one
portion of that. you say the military significance, the fact that there are multiple battalions of this -- again an education process, i parents, my family using them as a benchmark when we have these discussions and my dad and we talk about the treaty and you know these systems are already fielded. he's like, what? no these are prototypes. no. these are systems that are researched, developed, manned, equipped and multiple battalions across the russian federation. they can range partners and allies today. so again we have a responsibility to ensure the safety and security. and they can arrange americans distance abroad. we have encumbered in our responsibilities to make sure we are protecting ourselves and our partners and allies. incredibly disconcerting not only from the treaty violation and what it means for arms control and from the military
standpoint. and i always caveat that with after wearing the uniform for 28 years, i tell folks, i know that the u.s. equipment, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, are the best in the world and i have the full faith and confidence in her u.s. military. >> right. thank you. darrell campbell notes that russia's ambassador to the united states, we think will be speaking later in this conference, says that if the united states and the russian federation allow strategic arms control treaties to collapse, the npt review conference next year is going to be a disaster. would you agree with that assessment? and then related would you agree with general hyden that the new start provides transparency and pretty ability -- predictability that's valuable for your security? >> all start with the new start and then go back to the ambassador statement and
darrell. i would agree with the assessment that new start, again, we have capabilities to meet. we have the capabilities to inspect. and that does give insight to what the russians are and are not doing. it does also allow an opportunity to exchange information and have dialogue. so i would agree with the commanders assessment and also had a great opportunity to get out off the air force base and sit down with the general and his incredible team. for those of you who don't know, again, what these young folks do day in and day out, it's absolutely incredible and he's a great leader. the short version is it does allow us to have insight to the program. on darrell's question and with the ambassador's statement about what was the quote? >> he said if we allow strategic arms control -- the treaties to collapse, it's
going to be a disaster and i wouldn't want to be there. would you want to be there? >> i want to be there. that is what leadership and responsibility is. shirking that and saying it's a disaster two years away is a telling indicator of russia's commitment to it. and committed to making it. i think many in this room are as well. the collapse of the inf treaty -- the catalyst was not the united states of america. catalyst was the russian federation. again, they don't acknowledge the steps taken, they don't acknowledge the violations have been incurred. so i don't give much credence for the assessment or the npt. he hasn't shown much success with his recent events. so i will continue to work hard for the npt and getting to work with allies making sure we are doing everything to make sure 2020 is a success. >> somehow i didn't think you
would agree with him. >> had a question for one of the organizers and i feel obliged. toby dalton. over the last three weeks it was a major crisis in south asia and just adding to his question, knowing there are major crises in south asia and talk about war, talk about nuclear war is on our minds. what role did the united states play in trying to prevent the crisis from escalating? >> many steps taken. and again, when you talk about a crisis and the engagement in casimir, to prevent a crises you have to work beforehand. strong relationships and engagements to set that dialogue and motion, to set, to build those relationships, i tell folks again, another important part of what we do with the state department, the first time you're picking up a phone is a counterpart shouldn't be when they are
shooting at one another. build those relationships early and often and continue to build on those relationships so on the time of there is a moment of crisis you can pick up the phone or have your representative at the embassy go in person to make sure cooler heads will prevail. was a secretary engaged slowly. we engaged absolutely. to ensure the both india and pakistan do not want a nuclear war and have cooler heads prevail. but again, you look at next steps. it's not 81 and done. bullets were exchanged. mortar fire was exchanged. shooting aircraft was exchanged. we need to continue to work those relationships to make sure that not only those nuclear programs but these relationships have other parties that reach out and have these conversations. and i would imagine he will
continue to build on those relationships. >> okay thanks. one of our foreign participants asked the questions about this armament. so going back a little bit. from california, scott sagan, okay not really foreign -- [laughter] scott asks, he notes, because the senate ratified the npt, the article 6 commitment to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament is the law of the land. and this commitment he says was glaringly absent in the 2018 nuclear posture review. he challenges you. convince us as you tried to convince the review conference that the united states is making good faith efforts towards nuclear disarmament today. well, you look at the steps >>that we've taken. you look, i would challenge you to reread the npr. but remain committed to it. and again, there are to engage
and i look forward to sitting down and engaging with our team. engaging with my counterparts over at dod on what the npr is and what the npr isn't. >> that is fair enough. i've avoided questions about north korea but since a lot of people are posing questions i think i ought to put them to you. these are from foreigners, or at least people with foreign sounding names. , welsh, he asked, will there be a third nuclear summit, what are the prospects for this and another asks many experts, twitter albeit, it's time for discussing arms control with the dp rk rather than nuclear is asian.
that may be a question for stephen. are we entering a new era about thinking north korea or does denuclearization remain a priority. is there a third summit? again, secretary and president made clear, they remain open to the dialog. they haven't obviously put a date on the calendar, but our teams continue to work towards that. again, just a shout out to steve, but incredible expertise and maybe selfish, tooting the horn here, between the bureaus and the families supporting steve and the secretary and the president. the leaders in the isn and i tell the secretary this at every opportunity. i know when he sits across the table from chairman kim that he has the best technical advice, bar none. folks in the ranks, they've been to pyong yang multiple times and been in discussions multiple times. those men and women are in our
ranks today, working every day. i'm very passionate about this, the kind of the unsung heroes, if you will. behind the work that's been done. my mom got to do-- an anecdote again. my mom says, are you going to the summit? i said, mom, if i do my job right, i don't have to. the secretary has everything he needs to make those decisions and give the best advice to the president. so is there a next summit? well, i think there will be because i know the secretary, i know the president and i know steve beigun and i know this team at isn and abc. and continue to push it. >>i hope your mom has a chance to watch this. she had be proud. and an iran question, let's see who posed this question. yes, steven young notes undersecretary, u.s. allies in europe disagree with the united states over the iran agreement.
while according to press reports, united states is seeking to aggressively punish u.s. allies and businesses that are working within the agreement. allies in europe and elsewhere, were also surprised and shocked, really, by the u.s. early announcement of the withdrawal from the inf. though they came around. okay, so this is more than iran. this is about u.s. relations with europe, sorry. and now there is the quote, cost plus 50 debate for allies on cost sharing. so he says, tell us what you're hearing from u.s. allies in these key issues. so violate diplomatic confidentiality and what are you hearing from the allies. >>totally my style. totally my style. i would encourage allies in the room to express their own opinions. what i will tell you is got back from london on saturday, meeting with partners and
allies and got back from brussels, i've been to to geneva and munich. we're engaged often with our partners not to mention hosting them here at the state department. again, it's about relationships. it's about being able to share that candid information, pick up the phone when you need to, to clarify when you need to, and i've had that with my counterparts, and i tell them, and i'll say to this room as well. i'd rather have one of-- you know, my european counterparts or any counterpart for that matter, with the question, or see something in the press or hear something that a guy told a guy told is guy to say, hey, andrea, is this what you meant? is this what the u.s. is doing? they'll pick up the phone, no, this is what we're doing, yeah, this portion is right. that's an important part of diplomacy, and again, another telling indicator is the great work done by the secretary- general and his team at nato. i reflect back when we talk
about the demise of the inf and you look at the strong statement in december from nato and i would argue maybe even stronger statement after the announcement in february. you know, 29 countries came forward and said, we get it. russia violated this treaty. this is not what we're about. and we support the decision. we will continue to support those relationships. >> there was a related question i probably should've posed concurrently. it involves discussions with allies. from joshua pollick, the russian inf missiles primarily strenuous allies. he notes that our allies are surprised when national security advisor announced intention to withdraw from the
inf. how are we approaching consultation with allies on matters affecting their core security concerns? >>i would argue if anyone was surprised at the inf treaty was at work as it was intended, we probably need a better assessment because again, year after year after year. this wasn't something the russians did and october that triggered a decision. it was somethingthat was done across two administrations. the people engaged with this, for arms control, but in government and in think tanks candidly new russia was violating the treaty. this isn't new news. the news is the president made the decision and said wait a minute, this is in the best interest of the american people, of our adversaries, that we are not able to conduct r&d, and with allies. so again, we will continue to get their input as a talk next steps in somebody's arms control treaties.
>> thanks very much and thanks for bearing with me as i jump around here. i finally figured out there's a way i can group questions. let me group 3 questions. it's all about the gold standard in the saudis. for example ambassador asked, or notes that there are countries who do not bother to pursue the gold standard. i to every other country besides united states. his question is how can we persuade them to? actually depend japan does. otherwise japan and the u.s. will suffer. how to persuade other countries to try to apply the same standards. the second related question from michael gordon is, is the gold standard the going in position with the saudi or is it a firm requirement for a nuclear deal? and would it be time-limited?
michael gordon is with wall street journal. have you say will be quoted. and then matthew asks a more broader question but still in the same theme. saying that with 30 countries planning, considering or actively constructing nuclear power programs, challenges and opportunities do you see for the united states to mitigate the risk of proliferation and maintaining a position of leadership >>is great. great questions. and again across inter-agency we do this every day. wake up every morning and engaging with partners and allies and thinking through what are the best practices, whether it's the gold standard, and i won't discuss the direct details with our engagements with another country. that's a breach of trust across
the board come since we're in dialogue. i will tell you would talk about the importance of the standards and prevent the proliferation of these technologies while also giving the opportunity for american companies. so whether it's m.o.u., whether it's a 1-2-3 agreement. working across the globe, we are engaged across the globe every day showing standards and training opportunities and best practices. there may be one or two folks from our bureau working through the programs. we look at the footprint of where we are helping shape best practices and control mechanisms to make sure things don't go across borders or transit from country to country. the great work being done with the team, and again, educate, inform, reinforce and callout,
quite honestly when there is a breach to make sure it doesn't happen again. >> thanks very much. we haven't talked about china and i was looking to see if there were any questions about china. a simple but important one, is the united states pushing for any nuclear arms control with china? will kind and what are the prospects. i can tell you that i have had some discussion with my chinese counterpart and we have made no new headway. but again, working with them closely in the p-5 many have asked that china be open to engagement, they talk about the inf and next steps in can you will collateralize that? based on the discussion with chinese counterparts there's no interest in that from the chinese side i would let them answer. >> no interest. okay. >> they would have to do a large part of their arsenal which i don't foresee
happening. >> i would have to agree. although we could have talks about stability i suppose. >> we could. >> okay. there a lot of questions about russia so let me go through a couple of these. professor william potter notes that the united states and russia have long been partners on nonproliferation. recently a very good book about this that i think bill had something to do with. he was a co-author. aspects of this partnership remain today? >>the partnership, go to some more of your statements, having come into you have dialogue and continue to have access and exchange of information i think is incredibly important. i tell folks the deputy foreign minister has been a professional counterpart. with a candid discussion with one another. we've had exchange of ideas. we have been, have been toe to
toe a couple of times now. i respect him as a career professional and he has respect for me and our team. we continue to have that dialogue. we have partnership with the embassy. again, who continue to have that open door. we will disagree on most things, but that we are working together to ensure that they have the information. whether it is to start, whether it's arms control or regional topics. working together through the p- 5. need to continue to have those relationships. >> okay. right. i have some questions i think would be in the category of hostile fire. but you been under hostile fire before to you won't mind. sorry joe, i shouldn't of prefaced this but [laughter] in his gentle way, he notes
that ronald reagan worked for six years to get the soviets back into compliance with the abm treaty. he never walked away from the treaty. he upheld the norms and getting them to finally admit their violation and tear down there violating radar. i'm not going to try to quote his accent, but why are you abandoning reagan's tenacious approach? >> i would caution, again, two administrations, two teams have done this for six years in dialogue, in having that engagement. this isn't six weeks, this isn't six months. two administrations and multiple years. i won't bore you -- i may. i get a kick out of this analogy. but maybe a bit yogi berra. i call it a partnership or a marriage. we signed a treaty. takes two to that agreement.
in your marriage if over the course of six years you knew that your partner was being unfaithful and you had the intelligence and information and what have you, and you continue to engage in you continue to meet and try to reconcile, at some point after six years you go you know what, i don't think this marriage is going to work. russia has been cheating at the inf treaty for years and years and years. and we have tried. we have sat at the table. the obama administration and the trump administration at the table. senior officials showing the information and intelligence. providing them transparency measures. providing them input on what they are doing. and after years that has not worked. and in the same timeframe they continue to develop systems while we have not. i know as an american, i always want the best for the safety and security of the american people. always. re-read my oath of office.
when i see an adversary or partner violating the treaty it has a direct impact on american citizens abroad and at home, i'm just not going to stand for. i'm going to stand up for what's right. >> okay. >> a little passionate there. >> i feel it. this is a similar question and your answer will be similar. but i'm going to pose it from stephen schwartz. how does withdrawing from the inf treaty old russia in your words accountable? someone commits a crime society holds them accountable by prosecuting them. sometimes literally making them pay for their crime. the trump administration decision to walk away from the inf treaty rather than working diplomatically to bring russia back into compliance effectively towards russia for its violations by allowing it to retain its currently prohibited missiles at this point as many as it desires in the future
with no legal percussions in the detriment of our security. how is that holding russia accountable? >> i would go back to the answer to the previous question and a couple of questions before on calling out the violation and then recognizing after multiple years and engagement that they are not going to change the behavior to allow the systems and processes to take place of the united states to engage in the r&d efforts. at least start to make the steps on a level playing field in that sense. keep the answer short because i think we've addressed the. >> i think so. thanks. going back to the third question we talked about about emerging technologies and what your bureau is doing. heather williams asked, do you see opportunities to discuss emerging technology potentially to include emerging local arms control in the context of p-5 meetings? is this an area for multilateral operation? >> it may be. i think it's too early to make that assessment on where we want to go with the p-5. i can
tell you we have had discussions with both the 1.5 track to get academics and other leaders to say what does that look like. i am very interested, and again i will put that marker down, i'm very interested, this is a field where quite candidly the private sector will lead in some of the expertise. i welcome your insight. i talk about building the digital diplomat. we are doing at the state department to ensure every post has, he or she that has that person, that has the technical expertise, the knows how to integrate these technologies into our diplomatic endeavors. incredibly important part, we have started to feel that across the globe again. i was just in london meeting with my uk counterparts. they have done the same by introducing training to make sure folks out at the post have that.
i think it's an interesting part in the evolution of diplomacy. we will be rolling out hopefully in the near term a new bureau at the state department with cyber security and emerging technologies. the secretary, we've assessed that that that is a requirement. seen it from the hill. you have seen legislation from the house just passing in the foreign affairs committee. we have a bit of difference on where it takes place. the secretary made a decision it will fall under because it is a national security challenge. we will continue to maintain her academic endeavors to make sure we have digital economy and everything that makes that run. but how do we integrate that? what we do for ai? i am very concerned. i will not. whether i'm engaged with think tanks, i was just at a sister post, a roundtable where i welcome to that as well. people are thinking about it
but we need to harness that and get it into place so it's not three or four years from now we are still talking about how ai can affect arms-control. >> thank you in behalf on my institute thank you for joining that discussion in london. i got good feedback about that. got a couple questions about north korea. i will group them together here. mr. timothy meyer asked any interest in encouraging north korea to join the ct bt as part of talks and efforts to limit improvements to their existing arsenal? and then an ambassador asks, on north korea, how to make sure in the end they are not rewarded for breaking out of the npt? >> i can share a couple of things. i want to leave some nuggets for him, i will tell you the incredible importance, when you say the final will be verified, that in every engagement. we shape the discussions and
give the technical information to the secretary, advice to the president that has to be verifiable. the bighand wave isn't going to cut it. we have seen this playbook before, and many in this room and previous administrations where they know what the regime is doing. they have seen it time after time which is grandfather, father and now him. making sure that doesn't happen again. the other piece i would like to emphasize that is incredibly important, again a great work done with partners and allies is upholding the un security council sanctions. incredibly important that we hold that standard. and appreciate all the support from across the globe from asia and europe and everything in between, finding those ship to ship transfers, the work being done to fund the regime. so appreciate that they have
held fast, the international community has held fast in upholding the sanctions and the work that's being done at the u.n. and the secretary and president were very clear that we will continue to hold the kim regime responsible for those actions that he said he would do when they met the first summit. we are not letting the foot off the gas. we will continue with the pressure campaign. we will continue to uphold sanctions and continue to work with the team abroad to make sure those stay in place. >> thanks very much. and thank you for your willingness to take every and all questions. >> is there an option? [laughter] >> you signed up for. it's great. several questions about china, including a couple, you've already addressed part of his question when he asked, is the united states seeking a new or modified inf treaty to include china. he also asks how much of the u.s. decision to withdraw from the inf is because of china's
immediate range missiles? and then he also asks a question about missile defense and notes that the 2019 missile defense review report commits more missile defense deployment in east asia. what measures does the united states plan to take to mitigate chinese concerns about u.s. missile defense impact on china's nuclear deterrence and efforts by the united states to maintain u.s.-china strategic stability? >> so i can start with the inf decision. it was clearly about russian violation of the treaty. again, work with them across the board. when we suspended with the treaty it was clearly related to russia. when you talk about the engagement with china and let the chinese representatives
speak on their own behalf, and again i can tell you in my engagement in the p-5, the bilateral engagement and then subsequent panels with senior leaders, there is not much of an appetite for any arms- control treaties from the chinese side. >> thank you. rose posed the question directly related to what you just said about chinese lack of interest in pursuing this. what about the ct bt? she asks, could gratification by parallel help foster trust between the two countries? >> you know, it's an interesting question. again i don't see that, the environment being where it is today in the global security situation where it is today that that would be something that would be doable. but again, there's opportunity to engage with chinese counterparts and i look forward to the next p-5. >> okay good. sticking to east asia, doctor
joshua white says that the trump administration has been publicly skeptical of multilateral solutions to nonproliferation challenges. but do you see any specific opportunity to advance our nonproliferation or strategic stability objectives for so- called mini lateral or trilateral's or quadrilaterals from where you sit how do you think about this new architecture, particularly in the indo pacific? >> the beauty of this job is you get to engage in many different levels. bilateral discussions. again, just came back from a quad. occasionally we have a trilateral and then you have engagement, whether it's with nato, with aussie on and others, there is opportunities where we can attract 1.5, other discussions. i would say the solution really depends on the problem. there opportunities to engage
in multiple levels. also tell the team at the state department, it's march madness. bear with me, that i should play an away game by and large. i hold a lot of meetings here at headquarters, i think it's a responsibility to meet on their ground as well. it's an important part of what we do. and getting folks together in those opportunities, again whether it's government to government, whether it's with key think tanks across the region. a bit of a challenge out there for the folks from abroad. >> i welcome the opportunity to meet with my counterpart and meet with academics and meet with young people and to meet with the think tanks to continue with that messaging. >> that last point, it's probably the answer to the latest question that come in. you might have to rephrase it.
to what extent can scientists be effective tracks to diplomats nuclear uncontrolled matters? nrdc, i don't know what you didn't mention i nss in his question. he should've in the past decade. >> they are important partners. track 2 dialogue we've had multiple opportunities. we have opportunities for internships and fellowships at the state department that summer advertised and some quite candidly we need to better put the information out there. whether it's consultations, fellowships, whether it's coming out and meeting organizations, paid advertising, whether it's at carnegie with a wide range within the tc area. and quite candidly across the west. if there opportunities to bring
folks together, i get incredible feedback and insight, whether it is 10 or 20 senior fellows. i took a trip up to harvard and mit. again to sit down and see the work being done with artificial intelligence and others. many of these are phd candidates. in my doing it pitch? absolutely to try to get them into the fold and say this is how you can contribute and give back to your country, serving at the state department, whether it's doe or it's a great opportunity and i rely heavily on that. >> very good. i like that answer. we are drying 40 clothes. you've been answering the questions with such clarity and not trying to draw the clock. so we may end a few minutes early. looking ahead to the next two years, or the next six years or however long you're in the job. a couple people of posed questions about this immediate
future. i will group 2 of these questions together. madeleine creedon asks, if the new start treaty is in the u.s. best long-term strategic interest, why not go for a clean extension and continue it further separate discussions on other matters including nonstrategic nuclear weapons? and kind of related to that, alex asks, after withdrawal from the jcpoa and the inf and serious interagency discussions about whether or not to extend to start, how do you define success in arms-control over the next two or six years? >> great question. so with new start, we are currently in the agency process on next steps. we have engaged across the nsc and agencies on what's worked and what's not working. what are the next steps and
what are the options. again, i've had some discussions with allies on their input and ideas. i don't want to say it's early on because we are moving this forward in the interagency process. there might be some options available for that, next steps. until then we will continue to abide by the treaty. an important piece to remember, we do have, with obligations by the treaty, and we will continue to do that. we will continue when the team asks, and continue to support that as well. it's an important treaty and we will continue to work hard to move that forward. >> okay great. going to call a cease-fire in another minute. maybe this will be the last question. and it's a futuristic question. lindsay asked, can you let us know the future of arms-control and space? >> i've told folks 28 years is an -- as an intel officer predicting the future is incredibly hard. i try not to do it in groups of 400.
but what i can tell you, the future of arms-control, and we talk about space, we talked about norms of responsible behavior. groups of like-minded initiative and effort being done. again whether it's an cyber, in space, for a i. those discussions are happening now. we are engaged at the assistant secretary level, my level, what to those look like? again, we don't want to hinder the innovation. don't want to prevent private industry where different companies from doing the amazing things they can do. but, that there is an acknowledged behavior and how we work together with allies on what that is. what i'd also like to add is, and i mentioned it before, again, this is an area where quite candidly within the state department we don't have a ton of depth when it comes to the artificial intelligence experts. we have some. but we don't have the depth that is required.
so it's really important to have that outreach. with think tanks. with industry. with leaders in the field. so again, it drives the staff mad, but i tell folks, my door is open. this is a great forum, but if their ideas the people have, the technical experts will have a paper they have written, i'm on the airplane quite a bit, i have some time to read and it's usually on aircraft. so if you have ideas, be part of the solution, not part of the problem. i tell folks, most of the questions were actually questions. which is not always the case. many times we get statements. >> we weeded those out. >> thanks to the folks that asked the questions but am very, again, passionate about this. i may sit in the chair behind the desk at t but t is bigger
than me. the responsibility a half is bigger than me. this is a national security issue. this is about american prosperity and american security. i welcome your input. i welcome your feedback. again, we are going to agree to disagree at home as well but we will be better and problem solvers if we contribute to this effort together. thank you for that opportunity. >> thank you so much you have kicked off this conference on a good note. you have made it easy for me as a moderator by answering all the questions, answering them with precision, clarity, and positivity. i really appreciate the way you have committed yourself to upholding norms, not least of which that norm is niceness. >> you lose your citizenship in south dakota if you are not nice. >> please join me in thanking undersecretary andrea thompson. >> thank you. thank you very much. applause --[applause]
>> at this point please join us in the atrium for a morning break. >> here's a look at our primetime schedule on the c- span networks. starting at 9 pm eastern, on c- span. testimony from wells fargo ceo on his buddies business practices. at 9 pm eastern on c-span two announced budget committee hears from acting my house budget director on president trump's 2020 budget request. at 8 pm on c-span3 officials from t-mobile and sprint will put their proposed merger and how it could impact the wireless industry.
>> c-span's washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up wednesday morning, the washington examiner's kimberly leonard will join us to talk about president trump's $4,700,000,000,000.20 20 budget request and its potential impact on healthcare policy. including medicaid and medicare. and then answering it them credit congressman, a member of the budget and ways and means committee discusses the budget and former vice president joe biden talks about the 2020 presidential run. also republican south carolina, and will be on talking about 2020 to request. t-shirt to watch c-span washington journal live at 7 am eastern . joined the discussion. president trump's 2020 budget request was released monday. tomorrow, wednesday, acting white house budget director
will go over the details with the senate budget committee. you can see that live at 2:30 pm eastern time on c-span3. on thursday the senate picks up the resolution to terminate president trump's national emergency declaration over border security. four republican senators have said they will vote in favor of it. susan collins of maine, thom tillis of north carolina, lisa of alaska and rand paul of kentucky. if all four vote with all democrats to block the declaration, it will be enough to send the measure to the president's desk but president trump says he will veto it. a final vote in the senate is expected this week. follow the senate live on c- span2. >> sunday night, georgetown university professor examines russia's foreign policy and international goal. in her book prudence world. russia against the west and with the rest. she is interviewed by
congresswoman who serves on the house foreign affairs committee. >> are you a little more optimistic that if we find common ground like you mentioned on arms-control we can be a good partner with russia? >> popularity has fallen by about 40 points since he was reelected last year as president. and public opinion data in russia show the majority of russians now don't want civility, they want change. we want a better economic situation. and many of those people understand that having this antagonistic relationship to the west is not a way to if they want to have greater economic growth. >> watch afterwards sunday night at 9 pm eastern on c- span2. next, a hearing examines you wish nationals currently being held in iran. with testimony from three relatives of the hostages. they spoke on the impact their