tv House Armed Services Hearing on U.S. Military Activities in Indo- Pacific CSPAN March 28, 2019 1:57am-4:15am EDT
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michigan. live coverage tomorrow at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. c-span.org and on the free c- span radio app. >> the house armed services committee held a hearing to examine u.s. military operations in asia and the pacific with several senior military officials. they reviewed the status of the u.s. south korea joint military exercises, china's influence in the region and threats posed by north korea. this is two hours and 15 minutes. >> before we get started, one housekeeping item, in terms of how we do the questioning. as you know, when the gavel drops and you are here, you are on the list. if you are not here for the gavel, you would go to the back of the list. the confusing thing is, if you leave which a number of people are going to do -- at that
point, you are on the list. so whenever you come back, you get in line. that creates an inconvenient situation. we are thinking somebody is next and literally two minutes before it is their turn, if you come back and you are in line, you get to bump that person. if you are thinking you are next and somebody else gets called on, it is because somebody else came back and those couple of minutes. that is in the committee rules. so if you are here for the drop of the gavel and you are in line -- when you come back, you can jump anybody else that was there. i am personally not in love with that rule but then again i approved it. we will think about that for the future. that is the way it works. i say that also because once again, we have a hearing after this. we will try to stop at noon. i will try to get people in who are here. but if somebody comes creeping back in at 11:57, that kumble hates things.
we will try to stop at noon. we will try to do the classified hearing after. but it will be between noon and 12:15. i'm sure witnesses are fascinated by that. >> mr. chairman, on behalf of the members of the committee, have to go to mark up and vote and we appreciate you covering for us. >> he will be missed. we appreciate you giving us a heads up. we have the hearing this morning with the u.s. pacific command and u.s. forces korea. our witnesses are the honorable randall shriver, assistant secretary of defense with that apartment of defense, admiral philip davidson, commander of the u.s. and a pacific command and general robert abrams, commander united nations command combined forces u.s. forces korea. welcome i'm a gentleman. we appreciate you being here. we appreciate your service and we look forward to your testimony. obviously the pacific region is a critical region.
both president obama and president trump have emphasized our need to place a greater emphasis on the region. and we look forward to hearing about all of the issues around there obviously with china. working with countries around them to make sure they are playing by the rules and respecting their neighbors. i think the number one most important thing is that it is crucial to maintain a strong u.s. presence in the region. i think our presence brings stability and makes it more likely to be a peaceful and prosperous place in the indo- pacific. i think crucial is building alliances. our presence alone does not work unless we have friends and allies in the region that want us there and see us there as an asset to their interest. i believe we can do that and i believe we have done a good job of it. i want to particularly emphasize -- as you know, it is the first year -- that the indo-pacific change was made in
the authorizing bill last year to reflect the rising importance of india. to our a role in the region. the improvement of our relationship with the nation of india as one of the most positive developments in foreign relations for the last several years. i hope we can build on that and improve upon that. the most pressing questions we will have today is, how do we deal with china on a wide range of issues? militarily, what do we need to do to make sure we have the equipment we need to adequately deter them from doing things we don't want them to do. and as i said, how are we doing in terms of working with other key players in the region to form alliances to contain that threat? and of course we have north korea. without question, the situation has improved in the last couple of years. i have had numerous people say that the tension on the korean peninsula is lower then it has been probably since the end of the korean war -- sorry, since the cease-fire that happened in the korean war because it has not actually ended at this point.
i am curious as to your thoughts on how we build upon that and how we continue to increase stability and hopefully get to the point where we have a do you nuclear raised korean peninsula. with that, i will turn it over to ranking member mr. thornberry for his opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me add my welcome to our witnesses. we appreciate you all being here today. i think in a lot of ways, some of the most important statements were on the first page of the written testimony that admiral davidson submitted where he talks about what we have accomplished over the last 70 years. liberating hundreds of millions of people, lifting billions of people out of poverty. what has helped accomplish that orwood has provided the foundation for that progress is commitment of free nations to work together, which i believe is your engagement, mr. chairman. as well as the credibility of
the combat power of indo- pacific and a robust and modern nuclear deterrent. on the next page, i will read one sentence. u.s. power underpins the post- world war ii international system that helps strengthen the essential foundations of a rural based international order for economic growth and prosperity in the region for everyone. i think that is absolutely true in the pacific. i think it is absolutely true in the rest of the world too. what i worry about is that we take some of those things for granted. and we could let them deteriorate with consequences that would result in a darker, more dangerous world. sometimes, i think we just need to remember the basics and part of the basics are strong u.s. military presence and engagement. that is the key, not only in this region but maybe as importantly as anywhere in this
region, given what we see coming with china and the other challenges. so we will go down into a lot of details about what that means for the 2020 bill, et cetera. i just think it is important to remember that combat power, that nuclear deterrence and that engagement having been very successful for 70 years and we should not take those things for granted. >> good morning and thank you mr. chairman and thank you ranking member thornberry and distinguished members of the committee. i am pleased to be here this morning to talk about our defense work in the indo- pacific and honored to be sitting with my great colleagues davidson and abrams. we believe it will be made possible with a robust military presence and combat credibility. we believe this vision and our aspirations can be achieved
because they are founded on important principles that are widely shared and have benefited all the countries of the region and beyond. these principles include respect for sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution, free fair and reciprocal trade and inherence -- adherence to international norms and rules. although china has benefited as much as any country or perhaps more from this order does china under the current leadership seeks to undermine this rule space order and six a more favorable environment for its authoritarian governance model. china of course is not alone. we see other challenges. russia, as an authoritarian actor undermining the rule- based order. we see korea and the continuing dangerous behavior. we seek backsliding toward a liberated -- liberal governance such as cambodia which challenges norms related to human rights, religious norms and dignity. we see the evolving threats by nonstate actors including terrorism and criminal enterprise. and we see the persistent
threat from nontraditional transnational threats such as those emerging from national disaster and changes to the claimant. china's ambitions though are a pressing concern as they seek a different order. and the security domain china -- eroding our advantages and threatening our interest. there is perhaps no better example of this than the chinese actions in the south china sea. despite the pledge made in the rose garden of the white house by the chinese president in 2015, china has militarized the south china sea with the deployment of coastal defense crews missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles and they have threatened our interest as a result. we have a specific response of course in the south china sea. admiral davidson and his forces operate where allowed. we encourage other countries to do the same alongside of us or
unilaterally. nonetheless, we are concerned with china's drive for a different security architecture in the region. and this matters because, if the ccp's authoritarian approach becomes ascendance, we could expect several trends that would be unfavorable to us. we could see a weakening of sovereignty and a potential loss of access to global commons. we could see an erosion to our system of alliance and partnerships. we could see an undermining of axion and member states. we could see a diminishment of respect for individual and human rights. and potentially the normalization of the brutal oppression underweight and places such as tibet. our policy response at the department of defense is a true and limitation of the national defense strategy which outlines how we will effectively compete with china. the strategy has three major lines of effort. the first is to build a more lethal and resilient joint force and of course this must take into account as a pacing
mechanism, china's and russia's ambitions, pace of modernization and their capabilities. a second line of effort is strengthening alliances and partnerships. this is really a core advantage that the united states has. it not only enables our presence but it gives us partners that are more capable themselves of defending their own interest in contributing to upholding regional security. an example of this is the work we are doing with the help of congress through the indo- pacific maritime security initiative. a third line of effort is reforming the department for greater performance and affordability. and accordingly, this focuses on efforts to promote innovation, protect key technologies and to harness and protect the national security innovation base to maintain our advantages. i should note the national defense strategy talks about competition, not conflict with china. competition does not preclude cooperating with china where the interests align. and as we compete with china, we will continue to seek
military relationships with china that aim at reducing risk and continues to push china towards compliance with international norms and standards. we at the department of defense support our interagency approach to china including efforts to counter china's global influence. and we are very supportive of our state department and efforts such as the build act which was another tremendous example of our work with congress to give us better tools in this competitive environments. so to close, we work at the department of defense along with our colleagues in uniform to implement the national defense strategy framework to ensure we are on the trajectory to compete, deter and win and our priority in the indo- pacific. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, admiral davidson. >> good morning chairman smith, ranking member thornberry and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for providing director schreiber, abrams and myself the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the indo-pacific region. i am also joined by major tony sparrow and i am glad he is here with us today. let me say thank you for the significant support we have received from congress over the last two years. the temporary relief from the budget control act and the fiscal year 2019 budget. helping to restore the military readiness and the lethality necessary to safeguard vital u.s. national interest in the indo-pacific. there is indeed more work to do. the defense department's proposed fiscal year 2020 budget will help the department address the challenges described in the national defense strategy and ensure our military remains the most lethal force in the world. and this funding is critical to sustaining the readiness recovery while also increasing joint force lethality as we returned to great power competition with both china and russia. it bears repeating from what chairman thornberry read from my written statement earlier. for more than 70 years, the
indo-pacific has been largely peaceful. this was made possible by the willingness and commitment of free nations to work together for a free and open indo- pacific. the credibility of the combat power of the pacific command working with allies and partners and of course the credibility of our nuclear deterrent flows well. our nation's vision for a free and open indo-pacific demonstrates our continued commitment to a safe, secure and prosperous region that benefits all nations large and small. and it continues to place a strong alliance and partnership as the foundation of our approach to the region. the vision of a free and open indo-pacific includes a whole government approach with economic, governance and security dimensions and it resonates with allies and partners across the region. indeed, we are seeing a general convergence around its importance as japan, australia, france, new zealand and india have all put forth similar concepts or visions and indonesia is leading on the effort within xeon to elaborate
one as well. as a primary military component of the united states efforts to ensure a free and open indo- pacific, u.s. works with the rest of the u.s. government and constellation of like-minded allies and partners to advance the shared vision. there our key challenges that i believe threatened that vision and our u.s. national interests. first, until the nuclear situation is resolved on the peninsula, north korea will remain our most immediate threat. the recent summit in vietnam clearly identified the u.s. negotiating positions. now the gap on a number of issues and make clear that the united states expects final fully verified denuclearization. the outcome of the summit also reinforces the need for general abrams and i to maintain the readiness of our joint and combined forces on and off the peninsula. china however represents the greatest long-term strategic
threat to the united states. and indeed, the region. through fear and coercion, beijing is working to expand its form of communist socialist ideology in order to bend, break and replace the existing rules facing international order and prevent a free and open indo-pacific. in its place, beijing seeks to create a new international order led by china with chinese characteristics. and an outcome that displaces the stability and peace of the indo-pacific that has endured for over 70 years. china is using a variety of methods including pernicious lending schemes and promising loans or grants to extend our diplomatic and political reach by gaining leverage against the borrowers sovereignty. this is happening in the pacific islands with the south initiative as well as closer to home here in the united states where in just over a year, 17 latin american countries have signed on to one belt, one
road. the prc military activities expanded last year with the placement of crews missiles and radar jammers. undisputed militarized features in the south china sea in april 2018. and today, they continue testing the development of advanced capabilities like fifth generation aircraft, hypersonic, aircraft carriers and counterspace technologies. i am also concerned about the growing malign influence of russia throughout the region. moscow regularly plays the role of spoiler, seeking to undermine u.s. interest and impose additional cost on the united states and our allies whenever and wherever possible. terrorism and other nonstate actors also put a stretch on the vision of a free and open indo-pacific as they seek to impose their views and radicalize people across the region as evidenced in 2017 when isis captured the southern philippine city of more than
200,000 people. lastly, the indo-pacific remains the most disaster prone region in the world. it contains 75% of the earth's volcanoes. 90% of earthquakes around the globe occur in the pacific basin. and many countries across the region lack sufficient capability and capacity to manage natural and man-made disasters. to address all of the challenges i mentioned, u.s. is focused on regaining our competitive military advantage to ensure a free and open indo- pacific over the short and long term we must field and sustain a joint force that is postured to win fighting and if necessary, ready to fight and win. the u.s. ability to prevail in armed conflict is the foundation of the combat credible deterrence in our ability to compete. by fielding and maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, we reduce the likelihood that any adversary will resort to military aggression, to challenge or undermine the
rules-based international order. to meet this command, my top five budget needs are focused on the following. increasing critical munitions, advancing the high end warfare capabilities like long-range precision fires, enhancing and improving the persistent integrated air and missile defenses, evolving the counter unmanned aerial systems capabilities and by continuing to develop the exquisite set of tools uniquely provided by the strategic capabilities office and our service research labs. these at deliberate actions will help ensure a free and open indo-pacific and deny those who seek to undermine it in both peace and a level of conflict and war. i must add that our five indo- pacific treaty allies in japan, korea, australia, the philippines and thailand have all been steadfast in their support for a free and open indo-pacific. let me close by saying that our ability to ensure a free and
open indo-pacific is only possible with your support. i would again like to thank this committee for your continued support for the men and women of the u.s. indo- pacific. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, admiral. general abrams. >> good morning chairman smith, ranking member thornberry and distinguished members of the committee. i have had the privilege to serve in this position as the commander of the united nations command and u.s. forces for just over 120 days. in that short time, i have assessed that the rock u.s. military alliance is stronger than ever. our combined forces or strategic deterrent, pastor to respond to potential crisis or provocation. and if called upon, ready to defend the republic of korea and our allies in the region. today, and korea, we have tremendous opportunities before us as well as some great challenges. ongoing diplomatic engagement between south korea, north korea and the united states has led to a significant reduction
in tension compared to the recent passed marked by missile launches and nuclear tests. diplomacy is creating the opportunity for north korea to choose the path of denuclearization to build a better future for its people. and while diplomacy is not without its challenges, it remains the mechanism underpinning that transformation we have witnessed over the last 14 months, as we have moved from provocation to more. the first steps to creating a better future for all koreans has begun. we have witnessed multiple summits, enter korean dialogue and support to sanctions. the steps agreed to last april and specify later in the conference of military agreement, combined with the active emetic efforts have all contributed to a marked reduction in tension on the peninsula and created mechanisms for the development and cooperation and confidence
building, essential ingredients to the incremental process of making history on the peninsula. still, i remain clear eyed about the fact that despite a reduction in tensions along the demilitarized zone and the cessation of strategic provocations, coupled with public statements of intent to do nuclear eyes, little to no verifiable changes occurred in the north korean military capabilities. for instance, we are watching the ongoing korean people's army training cycle including a slate of full-spectrum exercises which is progressing along at historic norms, meaning that we have observed no significant change in the size, scope or timing of the ongoing exercises compared to the same time period over the last four years. further, north korea's conventional and asymmetric military capabilities along with their continued development of advanced systems, all remain unchecked.
these capabilities continue to hold the united states, south korea and the regional allies at risk. as such, i believe it is unnecessary to maintain a postured and readied for us to deter any possible aggressive actions. building our force in korea requires sustainment to meet were fighter needs. today that foundation is sound. it serves as the bedrock from which we deter aggression and ensure stability. not only on the korean peninsula but in northeast asia. our posture allows our diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength as they work to achieve peace and final full verified denuclearization of the dprk. i want to thank you for the support we have received over the last two years after we have -- as we have improved the posture and readiness of our forces on the peninsula from additional stocks to additional ballistic missile
defense capabilities and much more. i cannot underscore enough the importance of the on-time appropriation in 2019 as it has enabled us, for the first time in many years, to make smarter investments, improve our planning and provide protect ability to our commanders in the field so that they can sustain the hardened readiness that is essential for being a fight tonight force. with the support of congress and the recently submitted budget, continuing the work of improving and sustaining the defense posture. the readiness required to be a credible deterrent is perishable. we must continue to exercise the core competencies necessary to the planning and execution of joint and combined operations under the strain of crisis. however, we must also strike a balance between the train and a requirement to create space for diplomacy to flourish. as such, we have innovated our approach to training exercises
by tuning four dials that modify exercise design and conduct. size, scope, volume and timing. adjustments to these dials enable us to remain in harmony with diplomatic and political requirements without sacrificing were fighting requirements and were fighting readiness to unacceptable levels. the combined forces, republic of korea and the united states recently completed a significant step in our evolution by conducting the first of our combined command post exercises 19-1. earlier this month, we exercised tactical, operational and strategic competencies to be prepared, should the call come to respond to crisis, defend the republic of korea and prevail against any threat. this training is built upon the relationships, lessons learned and staff interactions, derived
from many, combined training and exercise events conducted by our components and the republic of korea counterparts throughout the year. the rock u.s. alliance remains ironclad. it has been tested multiple times over the last 65 years and only becomes stronger. the military partnership continues to deepen and broaden with the long-standing relationships that exist. on behalf of the service members, contractors and their families on the peninsula, we thank all of you for your unwavering support. i am extremely proud to be the commander and work hand-in-hand with the republic of korea to protect our great nations. mr. chairman, i look forward to answering questions. thank you. >> thank you very much. as you mentioned -- our presence in the region is very important and that presence takes on many forms. certainly in japan and korea, we have troops stationed there. there has been talk about cost- sharing and how much the countries we have our true
presence in pay. and we get an enormous benefit from that presence. for the record, are you satisfied right now that our partners in the region are paying their fair share of what the cost should be for our troops? you want to start with that? >> i am. and i think the deals that have been struck to date have been mutually beneficial with our allies and our -- ourselves. we are entering new negotiations shortly with both countries and i expect the same outcome. that we will get something mutually beneficial. >> there has been talk about this cost plus 50 idea. it is just a rumor and nobody has confirmed it. just for the record, i would assume you would think that, not a good idea or not a good approach to negotiations. >> i have seen discussion mostly in the media. it is not anything we have been directed to seek or any formal guidance. i think our presence is known. we think there should be a
burden sharing. we will leave that to the negotiation when the time comes. >> would you directly comment on the idea that cost is a good idea or a bad idea? >> i think we will try to seek a good deal for the united states obviously. i think it won't be based on that formula that i am aware. >> members of the committee, bipartisan, have expressed concern that that approach would drive a wedge between us and our allies which we don't need to do. we mentioned the importance of the alliances -- i think it was articulated best on the international treaties -- basically countries with democracies working together to promote the greater freedom in the region, as the greatest prosperity. one of the most important steps we can take to shore up the various international treaties and organizations in the indo- pacific region. and which countries are most important to expand upon those relationships. what can we do to enhance that level of cooperation and that
rules-based democratic approach to the region? >> thank you. i think that we are not only strengthening traditional alliances and making investments with our traditional ally partners but we are expanding the network. india was mentioned i think in the opening comments is a great example of a partnership that we are investing a lot in. we have had the first two plus two. we have have made great strides in the defense relationship. throughout maritime asia -- vietnam for example, is the country concerned about their own sovereignty. concerned about freedom of the season. the south china sea, we have expanded our defense relationship with the support of congress there. i think there are a number of emerging partners. the philippines, traditional ally. we are strengthening their relationship. i see a lot of opportunity. and with my colleagues here, we are investing across the board
when we can. we see a strong demand signal. there is concern about the erosion of these fundamental principles. >> if i can just build on the assistant secretary's point our values really compete well across the region. particularly when all that china has to offer is money. our ability to expand those values, protect them absolutely but expand them to others, i think will be critically important as we seek new partners and the free and open indo-pacific concept. it is going to require some work. it is at the heart of my engagement, i know. i know when secretary shriver travels through the region, he is doing that as well. >> so it is your sense that the authoritarian approach to china is really rubbing a lot of countries the wrong way and pushing them more towards us? >> i think everybody recognizes that a country with a close and authoritarian internal order would be a
threat to a free and open international one, yes. >> are there countries in the region that you see as flipping more toward china's influence? and we need to work harder to pull back? >> two of the countries mentioned by the secretary shriver in his opening statement -- are places in which the government approach that extends those values will be important. and we are going to have to find the areas in which we can indeed compete with china there. it will be difficult. >> thank you. mr. thornberry. >> admiral, i want to go back to engagement for a second. at the initiative of this committee in previous years, we have created the indo-pacific stability initiative. and the idea was you see that the european defense initiative was pretty successful. both and funding, needed improvements and also sending a
message that we are here and we are coming with dollars. not just the chinese. but we are coming and we are committed to -- in that case, nato alliance. i understand there are differences in the pacific. but i'm concerned that i don't believe the administration has requested a specific dedicated funding for this initiative. even though it is authorized in law now. can you comment about the benefit, if any, that you see to having this sort of indo- pacific stability initiative to help make it -- to help training, to help facilitate military cooperation in various ways. again, somewhat on the idea that we have pursued successfully in europe.? >> yes, sir. i think the model has been very successful for resources supporting. and sending capabilities to europe, in a place in which
there have been given ability and capacity withdrawal in the few years before that. while there has been no money either appropriated or asked for with that, the fact of the matter is that i put down a pretty assertive issue nomination last year for some capabilities and capacity needed -- and i think in the budget, you are seeing a down payment on that this year. thank you. >> i will just comment. one of the requirements in i believe last year's bill was that we need a plan from osd with how you would fund various elements of this initiative. we have not gotten that yet. so we have to work on that because we intend to pursue it. i just want to ask general abrams briefly -- you talked about north korean military activities that are unchecked. what can you say in this format specifically about the
production of missiles and nuclear weapons? >> has there been a change? we know they have not tested. but in the production of nuclear weapons and material and missiles, has there been a change? >> the activity we have observed is inconsistent with denuclearization. and we will be happy to go into as much detail as you want this afternoon during the closed session. >> i just did not know how far you could go in the open session. but i think that gives us the direction. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you to the witnesses this morning. admiral davidson, on page 14 of your written testimony, you talked about some of the challenges for increasing joint force lethality, the under sea warfare provision.
i think you very clearly stated what is happening in that domain with -- as he put it, with 160 of the submarines in the indo-pacific region belonging to china, russia and north korea. you go on to describe that that is happening at the same time as the fleet size is shrinking. just to finish that thought, there was a testimony yesterday -- walking through the fleet size right now which is 51. the retirement to the los angeles class, will be at 42 by 2026. given the fact that again, you don't get all of that sub force. you get about 60% of it with the allocation to the indo- pacific region versus other command areas they are. that trajectory which harris, your predecessor described repeatedly in his visits to our committee over the years, is a
big concern. obviously it is not getting any better, i assume, based on your written testimony. i wonder if you can talk about that a little bit. >> the 100 feet domain, despite the capacity shortfalls, number of submarines, is an area in which we hold the asymmetric advantage over virtually all the adversaries. it is a critical advantage that we need to extend. the capacity limitations, as we go down over the course of the next several years is indeed a threat to the day-to-day operations that i think we need to have in the theater for present needs and a risk to plans to a certain extent. i would be happy to talk about more details in later sessions. >> the admiral testified in the open session that only about 50% of the stated requirements for subs can be met, given the fleet size today as opposed to -- but again
that was open testimony. is that pretty much the state of play? >> the day-to-day requirement is met by slightly over 50% of what i asked for, yes. >> this committee actually tried to change that last year in terms of at least getting some uptick in terms of the build rate. and the administration opposed that and was therefore blocked. the new budget embraces that. and again, it would help the cause in terms of your choices you have to make out there. if again we move forward with a three sub build rate for this year's budget year which actually will not be executed until 2023. i just wondered if you could comment on that? >> it is doing our best to reverse the trend in the 2026 timeframe is a critical need in the indo-pacific, yes. >> thank you. i would like to change the subject for a minute to talk about -- recently, the coast
guard actually was part of the deployment in the straits of taiwan. the coast guard national security -- for tough participated in that. i wondered if you could talk about that part of the sea service in terms of helping the u.s. presence in international waters. >> yes, sir. it is on deployment in the western pacific and has been for several weeks now and will be for a few months to come as well. it is a very important partner with the u.s. navy on really all things in the region. in fact, the mission they were doing not long before the taiwan strait transit was helping us to enforce united nations sanctions against north korea and the illegal transfer of oils and ship to ship transfers in the east china sea. the coast guard has key relationships across the region, particularly for a lot of nations that don't have
militaries but perhaps have defense forces -- and some instances where there are just law enforcement forces. it really helps with key challenges that some of the stations have. whether it is illegal or unregulated fishing, narcotics, human trafficking, maritime domain awareness. they are an important contributor across the region. i have a good relationship with linda fagan, the coast guard specific area commander. >> i just want to thank you for putting the spotlight on that. during the shutdown, there was this view that does this was not part of the fabric. and obviously, what they are doing out there really rebuts that narrative. >> thank you very much. time is expired. mr. turner. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i will ask you a question concerning the chinese nuclear forces. and like the two part question,
i'm aware of the classified session but i am looking for a full nonclassified answer in the session. as you know, when you give us information, it helps us formulate policies not just by ways we know but ways we can and unclassified areas, share the information with others. i will follow on to the theme that we are using the nato alliance is a question that comes to us in this area. the united states has backed away from the inf treaty with russia which is largely viewed more as a european issue then another issue. however, we know that it also affects our relationship with china. as we look to the chinese modernization of forces, the inf is a relevant concern there. we look at your testimony on page 6 to china undertaking hypersonic glide vehicles and electromagnetic rail guns.
i think this is the most important sentence. you said beijing is also modernizing and adding new capabilities across forces. so here we have an adversary adding new capabilities. this is not just a statement issue. trying to modernize what we have in our inventory that might be requiring updating. this is actually a new capability they are doing. you then go on to say that they have nuclear power ballistic missile submarines that will be armed with jl3 ballistic missiles, erode mobile conventional intermediate range ballistic missile, and accountability -- intercontinental ballistic missile. my question relates to -- the united states is now leaving the inf and it poses both an opportunity as we look to our own capabilities but also an opportunity diplomatically. would you please give us some characterization of the threat that china poses and the
intermediate range missile threat. what operational importance non- inf compliance to the knighted states would represent in this changing environment and what would be the benefit of a possible russia china u.s. steel on the inf treaty and that we know that -- there were significant assets. it is not as if we can just say, we can't reach this because people have these assets and these treaties that resulted in lessening conflict by destroying weapon systems. can you give us a picture of that? >> thank you for the question, congressman. a long question. china -- let me put it this way.
at the operational level, about 93% of china's total inventory, if they were a party to the inf, would be in violation of that treaty. these missiles number in the hundreds. and we can talk more specifically about that later today. and present a serious challenge to not just united states but all of our allies, partners and freedom of action in the region. at the operational level, our long-range fighters are constrained to just air and sea assets right now. with a wider set of capabilities with the united states, you really present a problem to the chinese or the russians and you improve our freedom of action by presenting a like delimits of them. i think that is critically important. i need to add that secretary shriver should talk policy here a little bit. >> with respect to any kind of future arrangement, of course it is not under active
consideration because we are not quite out of the treaty yet. but given the significance of china's capability following in this range, certainly it would make sense -- if we were to go down that pathway of another agreement, to think about china being included. i cannot see it being meaningful without china. >> thank you mr. chair. >> thank you. >> mr. chairman, general abrams, last year, we had an effort to make sure we have a floor on the troops in the u.s. forces -- what you think is the appropriate number of u.s. troops to have on a peninsula to maintain deterrence against kim jong-un? >> congressman, our current troop levels that we have with both assigned and rotational forces is appropriate. and it
meets the requirements to provide an adequate and credible deterrent to the dprk. >> admiral. >> i fully agree with that. >> great. and i think you answered this next question, whether you can confirm -- if it is designed to provide the best deterrence versus north korea. >> yes. i -- i think the current force posture does do that. of course it takes other forces off the peninsula as well. as general abrams mentioned in his opening comments, the committee and the department have done a lot in the last few years to make sure that capability is sound. >> thank you, admiral. with that in mind, let's go through some projects the pentagon has given us that could be rated to from the president's border wall. tell me if you think this is more or less important than a border wall. $25 million for a facility at tango, korea.
you want me to go through the four? >> i would appreciate the list, congressman. >> $53 million for uav hangar in korea. $35.1 million for storage facilities and guam. 23.8 megamillion for a corrosion control hunger japan. are these more or less important than a border wall? >> congressman -- i can only speak to the two projects in korea. they are certainly important to u.s. forces korea. but it is inappropriate for me to make genders some sort of judgment as to -- we have to take into account all of national security. i am responsible for providing a credible, properly postured force on the korean peninsula and we would have to defer that to the acting secretary of defense. >> i understand. i don't want to put you in a tough spot.
but you would agree that those are very much necessary to force protection and deterrence on the peninsula, correct? >> without making a judgment on the wall. >> i am just pausing just for a second. not necessarily for force protection but principally, for commanding patrol and sustainability, yes. >> thank you, general. >> mr. shriver, we often hear about the need for intelligence and surveillance and the need for airlift and sea left to pull forces into the region quickly. general shyness he told us in the armed services committee last month that there is no military threat at the southern border. in light of that, why would the department use money allocated for china or north korea to pay for a while that does not help us with a real threat? >> i think as secretary
shanahan said yesterday, we have made arguments based on what we think our defense priorities are and we now have the lawful order from the president to execute. and we are looking on how to best do that. >> thank you, mr. chair. i think what i am trying to -- and i don't want to put you in a difficult spot. the one thing i am trying to highlight is that we do have real threats. the ground with the militarization of those
outposts. our goal is to make sure that doesn't become a operationalize a softenty claim. we've taken steps along with his predecessor. we pointed to their activities in the south china sea as a reason for that. we've encouraged other countries to join in present operations, join patrols. our responses in the future may not be on point. the activities could be met with consequence elsewhere which i think was a case with rim pac. we're intent on making sure no one country can change international law. >> thank you, following on that line of questions, xi ping's statements at any time i don't think can be taken at face value. you mentioned his comments in the rose garden in '15.
i can't believe he didn't already know, as you said, militarize those islands. china has a longer term horizon than us. each step of the way they seem to allow some period of time for a new norm to establish itself. the new norm are these features as admiral davis refers to that have been militarized. what do we think? what can you share with us in this arena what you think the chinese steps might be next in terms of trying to gain control? i think there was a dust up between them and malaysia on one of their features recently. can we see ahead what the chinese might do next that we would need to try to counter and not let that become the new norm? >> sir, in that operational space one of the things we're starting to see is a higher
degree of integration with forces that are not entail on those features. so we're seeing fighter patrols, bomber patrols. the integration of airc intelligence equipment and aircraft operating from those bases at a higher degree of interoperability between some of the base functions and the afloat forces that they have in the area as well. >> so counters to that would be us continuing to operate in the international waters? >> certainly. mr. shriver mentioned earlier the importance of allies and partners operating with us in the region. that stepped up last fall. and i think was a critical factor in the international response there. and some of the behaviors that we saw out of china in the battle space and the diplo space in the fall. i think that's a critical
approach going forward. >> so without telling us what they are necessarily, are our crews, sailors, airmen, are they aware of what their self-protection steps should be should something come up suddenly? >> yes, sir, absolutely. i know admiral aquilino met with his officers both in the west pacific and on the west coast of the united states. and i've talked directly with general brown of pacific air forces as well to make sure that everybody understands the authorities that they have and to be sure to ask for the authorities they need going forward. >> general abrams, i suspect i know the answer to this, but you mentioned in your testimony that tensions on the peninsula have relaxed or seem reduced dramatically. north korea's continued to exercise. is there any sense among our korean allies, south korean allies, that they are, you know,
less likely to defend themselves? are they becoming too relaxed or at risk of being unprepared should the north koreans do something. >> congressman, absolutely not. iraq military continues to train intensely at echelon. very capable, very highly trained, committed, dedicated professional force. they have not taken their foot off the gas. >> thank you. >> recognized for five minutes. >> thank you gentlemen for being in this morning. thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow up on that question as far as we go with the training. you know, in the military drilling exercises, train, train, train. kind of like our piano teachers told us, practice makes perfect. that's what we're striving for. so if we're canceling or downgrading some of these
exercise that is we've traditionally done to prepare, you know, our forces there on the korean peninsula, how are we making that up? how are we continuing the train something how do we continue to make sure our prime operation to make sure that we're ready? >> congressman, thanks for the opportunity. >> first let me clear up some misinformation. i assume command on the 8th of november. just since november, as of last week, we've conducted 82 combined iraq-u.s. military field training exercises as appropriate echelons. so training has continued. combined training has continued. everyone's well air ware that last last we -- or last august we postponed one of our two annual exercises. the secretary of defense, secretary mattis challenged me to be creative and innovative,
develop an exercise regime that meets our war fighting readiness requirements while simultaneously creating space for diplomacy to work. work hand in glove with the rock chairman in december. crafted this new cons adjusting four dial-size scope volume and timing of these exercises. we briefed them up our chains of command, had them approved, and then recently executed it. we met all our training objects, trained all our mission essential tasks, validated our command control communications and isr plans, and validated the alliance decision making process. very rigorous, tough, demanding command post exercise. it's driven by a simulation. and i'm happy to go into more detail in the classified session as to what made it so rigorous
and so forth, but we are a trained and capable force ready to meet our treaty obligations. >> are we continuing joint training operations with our naval forces in the region too and? and the marines and air force as well? >> absolutely we are. and the biggest difference is we just don't talk about it publicly. >> mm-hmm. all right. and then just to kind of follow up on that, the president says he's canceling these exercises, we're saving $100 million. that money's already been appropriated for your training and operations. what are we doing with that $100 million we're saving when he's canceling these operations. >> congressman, i can't speak. i know what has been executed, what's been planned for, programmed for for u.s. forces korea. and we are executin appropriated budget as we had planned and programmed. >> mr. shriver, do you have any
idea what we're doing with the $100 million that we're saving by canceling these operations. >> we are at the request of congress looking at the cost differential between previous exercises in our program now. i'm not aware that we have a plan for specifically what to do if there is a significant cost dif ren sxshl how we would use that money. i owe back the remainder of my time. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and general abrams, i have questions for you but thank all three of you for your service to our country in your various capacities. this committee has worked hard to preserve, excuse me, to approve a joint emergent operational need to provide enhanced missile defense capability to our forces on the korean peninsula. over the past year, what progress has been made on the specific geon efforts to enhance missile defense? >> congressman, thanks very much
for that. and we are grateful for support from the congress of the united states on that joint operational needs statement. principally three capabilities. all three remain in development. they're all on time right now. they've -- the first and most important capability is slightly ahead of schedule. and we hope to have it fielded here in the next 12 to 16 months. >> excellent. thank you. and then what is the status of the revised missile guidelines with our south korean allies, and what is their planned path forward on missile development. and how do we factor that into joint operational planning? >> congressman, i think if i have your question right, that is one of the capabilities that's part of our condition-based plan. in an unclassified setting their progress continues on track.
they've got a plan. it's been resourced in their budget. and i'm happy to provide some additional information this afternoon in a closed session if you desire. >> i'll look forward to that, thank you. with admiral davidson i have a question. in the issue of readiness, if we have a conflict with a pier competitor, do we have enough ammunition stocks on hand and prepositions to fight and win a war? and along with that, how much supply do we have, and what are our risks if we don't have enough on hand prepositioned? >> so i'd like to take the most of that question down to the close during if we could. i will say that in stocks in the theater of critical munition supplies is a challenge and an ongoing challenge, and one of my consistent requests of the
department as they pursue their budgets, as well as the ability to resupply out there that remains a need as well. and i'm happy to get into more details. >> thank you. i appreciate the answer. and i look forward to that as well. and general abrams, back to you. we've heard concerning rumors about the level of investment the south koreans have made in their own provision of armaments. calling into question the viability of our operational plans because they don't have enough precision guide munitions. where do they stand with pgms and small arms acquisitions to support our joint requirements. >> congressman, i prefer talk about that in a classified session. those numbers are classified. >> okay. excellent. i'll look forward to that one as well. okay, i'll try another one that maybe we can address here openly. and this is a more broad and question, and i'm sure we can take it here in public.
trilateral cooperation between the south koreans and japan is essential to our common security. so what is your assessment of the level of trilateral cooperation, especially between these two very important security partners. >> sir, i think, you know, the most key evidence right now is at the enforcement coordination cell that the u.s. sponsors in japan. we have both japanese and korean partners sitting side by side, helping to enforce the u.n. sanctions regime against north korea. and the illicit transfer of oil and ship to ship transfers in the east china sea and korea bay. that's an important bell weather to keep in mind that we're working in a very collaborative, cooperative, and totally transparent manner. at sea, in the air, and in the
coordination of those forces in a single headquarters. >> thank you, i'm very encouraged by that. i appreciate your answers. and mr. chairman,i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary shriver, thanks. good to see you again. have a follow-up on mr. snaro's questions with regards to training on the peninsula. do we have demonstrable or tangible action from the dprk in response to readiness exercises on the peninsula? >> on our core area of interest and concern the issue of denuclearization, we have not see any progress to speak of. >> so would it be fair for me to conclude that we gave up something for nothing as a result? if i said that about, if that was my thought, would you say that was a reasonable conclusion? >> i certainly understand the
concern. i think what we've tried to do is create an environment for a diplomatic process to unfold. in hanoi we were disappointed that the north koreans weren't ready to talk about how to fulfill mr. kim's pledge. >> so the next question is what should we expect from this diplomacy ? >> we expect them to fulfill chairman kim's pledge made in singapore, to pursue complete denuclearization. we'd like them to start by sharing a common shared definition of what that means. then we can build a road map alongside them on how to achieve that. ultimately it is the full, final verifiable denuclearization that includes all categories of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and their deliverly systems.
>> do we have a timeline under consideration when we will restart full exercises? when will we stop waiting for north korea? >> congressman, we are looking to the president and the secretary of state and their judgement on how the diplomacy will go. and they'll give us the signal of how to make adjustments in the future if they so determine. >> thanks for that. is that the pentagon's role in this? is to wait? for a signal? are you, in fact, just waiting for, as opposed to injecting any information into this -- in this discussion in the administration? >> well, i think as general abrams indicated, the objective is to give both, give our diplomats space and maintain readiness through adjustments made. if there are risks associated with a prolonged posture like this, we would make those known.
and we've made known our interests in all the things we think we need to do to maintain readiness. i think general abrams is doing a tremendous job on that regard. >> thanks. not follow-up, another set of questions for you on the budget-related. we talked about this a couple weeks ago on the strategic support forces that china has created in the reorganization of their own -- of the pla. and i'm wondering thousand budget proposed to congress reflects perhaps a response or an attempt to get ahead to the reorganization of the pla specific to the ssf development. >> i think i would primarily point to increased investments in cyber in that regard. both in terms of resiliency and
protection of our own infrastructure as well as expanding the competitive space. we can talk about that more in the closed session. but given the mission of the special security force, i think that's the area i would point to. >> yeah. so i think from my first set of questions you probably understand and understand, general as well, i wanted to ask the policy guy because it was more of a policy question about my concern that we seem to be giving up something big for not anything. for nothing from dprk. it's something i think that's worth exploring for this committee as well. continue to press on this question and expect that to happen. so thank you very much. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us. general davis, i'm going to start with you. the general spoke about the challenges he faces in the
european command. he was two destroyers short. i wanted to ask you three yes or no questions. and then i want to get you to elaborate. would you say that there is a sufficient attack submarine presence in the indo-pacific. >> they are not meeting my requirement, no.. >> a sufficient carrier strike group in the pacific? >> that's also below what i've requested. >> would you say you have a sufficient amphibious group in the pacific? >> that's slightly below what i requested. >> the map you gave us is very telling. there's lots of blue on here. your oar has a significant amount of area that require as naval presence. i know the navy is going through a force structure assessment, looking at what the future navy should be, the types of ships. have they consulted with you to look at your needs, to assess
the risk that is are going to be there in the future. and have they talked to you in the respect of being able to help you reduce your risk to an acceptable level as you manage this oar in the indo-pacific? >> the navy staff is completely away of contingency planning and where we're going in the new global campaign plan construct. it's informing this force for structure assessment right now. >> thank you. secretary shriver, yesterday secretary shanahan spoke before this committee, and he was discussing the administration's budget. and we were talking about those things that were in it, but also those things that were not in it. one of the things that's concerning is the reduction overall of the number of air aircraft carriers, down to nine. and i'm curious if you would discuss with us and give tus thought behind the analysis with
the shipbuilding projection that going down to nine carriers between now and 2027 which is what retiring cbn 75 early would bring, do you think that in relation to what admiral davidson told us, do you think that puts us at an acceptable presence of risk with navy presence around the world? >> well, those decisions, those tradeoffs go beyond my purvey. >> acceptable or not acceptable risk. >> yeah, i think -- i have to defer to the leadership that has to make the global considerations on tradeoff. i am concerned about any shortcomings identified by the war fighters such as admiral davidson. >> admiral davidson, in your best professional military judgement, would you say that reducing the number of carriers with taking out cbn 75 in the inventory, do you think that that leaves you and your availability with having carrier 2.0 presence. do you think that leaves you
with an acceptable level of risk? >> as i think about the future and the capability of the aircraft carrier, i don't see as i constantly revisit our campaign plaining and our present needs, i don't see the requirement going down. >> okay. very good. do you see too in the region as you work with your allies there, we are talking about coalescing resources, jointly operating, doing joint operations. do you believe that with potentially having fewer carriers available, do you believe that that send a signal to them as to our commitment in the indo-pacific region as far as our naval presence? >> sir, i would say our allies and partners across the region watch everything we do across all of the joint force. the level of participation we provide in exercises, what our current operations are doing,
and they take signals from that absolutely. >> thank you mr. chairman. with that i yield back. >> thank you mr. chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here. admiral davidson, econ military efforts should be coordinated for an effective and coherent strategy. when a power goes rogue it impacts our overall strategy. what value do economic sanctions provide to our military strategy on the korean peninsula? and two, can you speak to the north korea illicit sources of funding and what efforts indo-p accome is using to reduce those sources. >> most importantly, we're supporting the state department's pressure campaign. the regime's ability to sustain its funding or gain funding from outside really undermines our
diplomatic effort because if it fails to bring them to the table. we worked with our law enforcement partners as well as posts across the region on everything that north korea might be doing across the economic and diplomatic spaces as you indicate. we should note that what they're doing comes in the form outright counterfeiting. comes in the form of cyber theft really across the globe and not just in the region. and we're certainly in coordination with law enforcement. and the rest of the government on those issues. but they're actually in the lead there. >> how effective are sanctions right now? >> well, speaking really just to the illicit transfer of oil, their imports of refined oil at sea are about a third less than
before the sanctions regime began. it's very difficult to figure out what impact that those -- that that sanctions enforcement regime is having because it's so opaque inside north korea as to what do they keep in reserve? how do they distribute around the peninsula? and how it affects kju's decision making overall. >> an area we do not focus enough on are the threats associated with weapons proliferations, specifically in regard to north korea. reports show that north korea has exported conventional arms and ballistic missiles for decades. and has proliferated these arms to countries like syria, which poses serious threat to our international security. admiral davidson, as best as you can in this unclassified setting, can you provide us with better situation awareness on
this issue? are there concerns that north korea is proliferating nuclear materials? and how can we do bet tore address this concern? >> it's well known, i think, across the united states and our allies that north korea has long been a proliferating of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities globe. that's, i think, part and parcel and, in fact, you know, i should really say the basis of why we're going after denuclearizing the peninsula, because they are not a reliable country on the goeb. and it's -- it causes instability in areas that we don't want to see. i think to get to more details on this, sir, i'd like to rather take that into a classified setting, if i could. >> thank you. mr. chair, i yield back my time. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen. i wanted to follow up on the line of questioning we've had about our relationship with the
allies and our importance of that in the indo-pacific region. and specifically admiral davidson, you talked about how in the fall of last year we started focussing on that, stepped it up, and i applaud that. i think that's great. i wanted to mention that march 13th, the b-52 bombers conducted routine training in the south china sea for the second time this month. and i think that's very very important for the navigations we have in the region. it appears many of our allies in the pacific are reluctant to conduct the same time of navigation activities. so i was wondering your thoughts on that and can we expect to see our allies and partners support this effort in the future? >> if i could, ma'am, the bomber patrols we use really around the whole of the region are to maintain our readiness and to understand how others respond in
the region. we don't actually use them for freedom of navigation operations. >> okay. >> those are training missions and how they're employed. to the point about maritime forces doing freedom of navigation operations, though, we've encouraged all nations really to step up their operations in the south china sea. and if they're not capable of taking a policy decision to actually do the very assertive freedom navigation operations we do, we do them more assertively across the globe and always have in the united states to enforce these international rights. if other countries aren't willing to do that, we're perfectly happy to see them operate in international sea space that is the south china sea. it demonstrates that it's an international concern to maintain that open, free, and excuse me, open sea and air space. and but certainly, and we welcome people to do it unilaterally as well as with us
and in our multilateral forms. anything to add? >> i would agree with that and would add given the expansive nature of china's a claim, everything inside the nine dash line, present operations are valuable in and of themselves even if it's not a direct challenge of a feature claimed by china or any other party. presence is extremely important. >> great. as far as the partnerships go, we have several compacts set to expire. like compact of free association states which impacts our relationship with them. you know, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. can you expand on the importance of these agreements and whether we should continue to fund them? or should we let them exsnier. >> we look forward to working with congress in the hopes of continuing to fund them based on the needs. over time it's our hope that the requirements will be less given
the state of their economic development. but for the foreseeable future, we think there will be need and the compact relationship is mutually beneficial. we do make certain pledges with respect to their defense, but we also gained access. we gained support and international fora. >> if i could just add, mad dam, those are the connective tissue between the united states and the western pacific. we fought and bled in those lands during world war ii. and the relationship that we've sustained in this compact i think it's important to maintain that going well into the future. >> i wanted to mention, japan is a little bit -- had an opportunity to travel there last year as well as south korea. and you know, there's been a period of heightened tension between south korea and japan. i know it goes back a long ways. so i was wondering, can you kind of give an update on that
relationship and the efforts that the department is doing to undertake to try to bridge this devide? >> i commented a little bit earlier, congresswoman, about the enforcement coordination cell which we're using to enforce u.n. sanctions against north korea. and japanese and korean officers are sitting side by side in that headquarters with united states officers. and in fact, other officers enlisted from allies and partners from across the region and, indeed, across the globe. i think that's a very positive sign because it's providing the transparency and the collaboration and cooperation of what the sea and air forces are doing in that sanctions regime to each party. i can tell you i've talked extensively with both the chief of defense from korea and a chief of defense in japan about the -- at least the military incidents that had occurred earlier this year.
and things seemed to be calmer right now. >> thank you very much. mr. garimandy? >> mr. chairman, i like the way you enforce the rules. thank you very much for the courtesy of calling on me. >> that's my purpose here. so i appreciate that. >> my apologies to my colleagues for jumping in front of them. mr. shriver, we have had a discussion about the influence of china throughout the pacific, particularly pacific islands. what is the best way for the united states to be present? to expand or at least maintain our position? i noted the admiral gist talked about the history back in world war ii and beyond. so if you could elaborate on, that not just with the pacific islands, but beyond in the entire region. let's leave india aside for just a moment, but others. thank you.
>> well, i think our engagement is very important with respect to the pacific islands. both admiral davidson and i have led interagency delegations there within the last six months. it's providing an alternative that's whole of government. some of these countries don't have militaries, they have law enforcement entities. so we bring our coast guard in. we bring other agencies in to really create approaches that meet their needs which are very significant, illegal fishing, criminal activity, et set ra. we have to fashion approaches that provide an alternative to what china or any other country might provide. i'd add we have like minded partners looking at oceana, new zealand has its reset. we're looking to be better. with respect to broader approaches, i think it's the same. there is blowback from how china
is approaching some of these relationship but we've got to be there as well with alternatives. and i think a demand signal is there. and we're doing our best to meet that demand signal with quality engagement and meaningful engage. that meets their interests and needs. >> admiral davidson, would you like to add anything to that? >> one more specific thing. we've undertaken an initiative to look at our defense attaches. i completely agree with mr. shriver's comments. >> i'd like to drill down, not in the next two minutes, on what specific things we should be doing. and why don't we take another minute or so and then maybe i have a follow-up question. but get down to specifics. what is it? military attaches? fine, what about the rest of the government the wholer
government? mr. shriver? or admiral jump in. >> as i mentioned, whole of government, bringing in our coast guard where there aren't militaries. agreements with some of the countries that assist them in monitoring their sovereign territorial waters for the purposes of preventing illegal fishing, other illegal activity. we have national guard state partnership programs this place. we just expanded that to includefy ji through the state of nevada. so there are a number of tools that go beyond the engagement, the presence of attaches. our foreign military financing with state department has been stepped up in the region. fiji would be an example of that where we're helping with peacekeeping forces. >> well, i was kind of chumming for you to mention the peace corps but there's a whole host of things i just draw my
colleagues' attention to the whole of government and the fact that in the president's budget most of the whole of the government is reduced. our presence beyond the military is lacking. i'll let it go at that. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> admiral, i want to thank you for mentioning communist china and their use of one built, one road in the western hemisphere and our backyard. i think it's interesting vietnam asked, or allowed us, asked or allowed, whichever way we want to put it, us to park the carl vincent right there. and i think that's, if you wanted proof that you can't trust communist china, even their neighbors don't trust communist china. and their movement into the western hemisphere corns me. we're not here to talk about that today. but i don't think we as a unit,
the united states, have paid enough attention to our backyard. i'm afraid we're going to wake up one day and have a chinese base in the western hemisphere. that's something i don't think we can afford to allow. with that said, secretary shriver, as communist china continues to grow physically and virtually around the world, what impacts is this having on the united states' ability to strengthen our partner ships in the indo-pacific regions? are we at risk of losing our partnerships because of communist china and their use of one belt, one road to buy their way into favor? >> quite frankly, i think we're more often than not the preferred partner. i think a lot of chinese engagement has resulted in a backlash because their intent is not benign. they come in with the goal of entrapping countries in many instances. when we go in, we want genuine
partnership. we want to help countries address their needs. all we really want is countries to be sovereign and have the ability to protect that sovereignty and independence and freedom from maneuver. we're the preferred partner, but we've got to show up and be a reliable part noer them. >> i agree with you. in things like trade relations, quite honestly, in many cases s have as much if not more to do with it than military strength. when the tpp was discussed it became a political football that got kicked around by both sides quite honestly. and we need to have the trade relationships in asia. and we need trade relationships with countries other than china and asia. general abrams, you've stated that you have a persistent need for isr. i know of no comangder who thinks that they have enough
isr. the geographic challenges of the korean peninsula, the size of it. so in your first 120 days as commander, your support with isr to detect attack as early as possible, are you receiving enough support there? and if not, what do you need from congress as we push forward with the national defense authorization act to do that? >> congressman, we are adequately resourced with isr during armistice conditions as it relates to the current reduction in tensions on the peninsula. so i want to be clear i'm not ringing the 5-alarm fire bell right now on isr. but as we look to the future, conditions might change, if they change negatively then it, our stance and our posture, is not adequate to provide us an
unblinking eye to give us early warning and indicators. and i give you a cup m of examples during the closed session of exact capability that we would need. but suffice to say, we're short to be able to do that if things start to turn bad. >> i will tell you the air force base, i'm glad that we're starting to do the depot maintenance work at robins air force base. hopefully we get more of those planes in the air. i want to just leave you with a couple things. i engs mentioned this to the secretary of the air force this morning. hurricane michael hit the southeastern united states just under six months ago. we have approximately three legislative days left that are not fly in fly out days before we leave for easter break and we have yet to have a disaster bill passed. if that is not passed before we
leave for easter, then it will delay things for weeks, potentially even another month. i hope that the people at the dod will help us get that done prior to to leaving. you are about six months from sequester. >> gentleman's time has expired. if he wants to wrap up that thought, he's more than welcome to. >> i would just caution you that the calendar's ticking and we need some type of agreement on a cap seal, mr. chairman, i think everyone would agree with me on that, sooner rather than later. >> i would echo that thought. i mean, as you mentioned in the outset, having fy19 october 1, you knew you were good to go. to get that again for fy20 would
enormously important. it's greatest burden in congress and the white house. budget caps set back in 2011 in a situation where, i mean, mr. turner and i had a robust disagreement what that situation was. but we did agree today that it was all part of the controversy trying to figure out what to do about the budget. the debt ceiling and how do we get that under control? to jeopardize the entire discretionary budget over an amount of money that isn't going have impact on our long-term debt and deficit is the height of our responsibility to my mind. we need to work together for dod and the entire discretionary budget. >> thank you. miss hoalihan? >> thank you, and thank you for coming and testifying. i'm going to continue asking the question that representative larson and narrows were talking about. i serve on the foraffairs
committee and i had the chance to ask the same questions of mr. victor shaw that had to do with the exercises conducted overseas that have been suspended in some cases. i'm trying to triangulate the answer. you said you were asked to be creative about redesigning the der sizes. he mentioned he was concerned that if those reimagined exercises continued in the capacity that they were, which was in some cases not actually in the places they ought to be, that by the springtime he would be anxious that we should be returning to actually exercising in the place that is we plan to have those scenarios actually unfold. and do you have that same kind of concern where as if we continue to sort of exercise off site for lack of a better descriptor, which is how he was alluding to it, that we are in some ways less ready than we would have been otherwise? >> congresswoman, i did read
those comments and i've got the utmost respect for mr. shaw, but he's not fully read in on how we conducted these exercises. i prefer to, i'm happen foy give the members tall details you want on things that we have done with the exercise designed. but i want to assure you and all the members this exercise was probably more rigorous, challenging, and stressed our systems more appropriately than we have in many years past. i prefer to go into how we were able to do that in a closed session. but the department is committed. i know the secretary of defense is committed to us being able to sustain that readiness and continuing to train and exercise as we need to to keep it as a fight tonight capability. >> thank you. i look forward to that conversation in the next
session. my next question is for mr. shriver, and admiral, it has to do with the bases currently in jabudi. if you can look at the map of the area we're talking about today, and think about if there are any vulnerable countries you can think of. or maybe -- will maybe succumb to the lure of china and their money and resources. can you identify what countries those are that you would be maybe worried could be coopted into being a jabudi type situation? >> before naming specific countries, i think it's important to note that china's opportunistic. wherever they see conditions, and generally they are weaker, in some cases authorit states. vulnerable economies, et cetera, where predatory economic haves a traction. i think we what we have seen is attempts in places like sri lan ca and the maldives that were
somewhat tworted by the elections. in malaysia we now have mr. h mahatir in his second turn as leader. much of that is a result of china overplaying their hands. in the pacific islands we see vulnerable states china is approaching. there's been press coverage on some, like vanuatu. we've visited to say sure them there are alternatives and shine a light on what happened in these other countries. >> thank you. i have one last question with my one last minute which has to do with that. i think people do say china is more successful in developing economic security and security relationships with countries because it doesn't have the same kind of regulatory restrictions and requirements that we do in terms of human rights and
vetting and anti-corruption requirements and those kind of things. you mentioned our values compete well in this area. do you believe that countries choose china over us because of these requirements that we have? or do you think that we are able to continue to have our values and also be competitive in the environment that we're in right now? >> i think as admiral davidson alluded to earlier, our values are key to our ability to compete. and there is an attraction to it. i think the countries that are most susceptible oftentimes have weak authoritarian governments willing to engage in activities that are corrupt. what we offer, even if it's not the nthe vast sums china comes to the table with, is clean transparent approach that is have a long-term benefit to the people not just the leadership. >> i appreciate that and agree with that. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
admiral davidson, intelligence suggests china has made strong progress in the developme hypersonic weapons that poses challenges to america's current missile defense systems. do you a judgement of whether china is apt to use these in a regional or strategic scenario? >> sir, they don't have capability that they would use, i think, in combat immediately. but their initial capability, i think is in the horizon of just the next few years, yes. >> with respect then to china's expected capabilities, are you planning for them to have conventional tip foreheads? nuclear tip fore heads? or both? >> i think nation needs to be prepared for any outcome there. both. >> and what are our current hypersonic defense capabilities? >> as you indicated in the preface to your question, sir,
our ability of our air and integrated missions is short of the capability. they have a you know, flight profile projectry that makes it hard for current tracking systems to maintain track on those things. excite makes it hard for our current interception systems to make the turn and do the intercepts. so continued advancement here by the department. and i think you'll be pleased with the down payment in the fy20 budget. it's going to require an airborne or space layer. as well as continued advancement in our ability to intercept these weapons, defeat them. i think you're going to see that the beginnings of that in the budget. >> how long do you anticipate it will be before our defense capabilities are such that we can rely on them? >> sir, i'll have to take that for the record.
you know, money is a resource here. that is a factor. but so is time. and i think dr. griffin and as the services pursue this capability, i think they can give you a more refined answer than i could. i need to do coordination with them to get back to you. >> that flows into my next question. how much more money do you believe we need in the next fiscal year defense budget in order to adequately accelerate defense capabilities to hypersonic weapons? >> sir, if i could take that question down below, you know, i can begin to address that. but i'm going to have to take that for the record as well. >> thank you. we moved from defense now to offense. assistant secretary shriver, the missile defense review opens the aperture for hypersonic glide defense. what investments are necessary to get the department of defense developing such a capability for the indo-p ac com area of
responsibility, and then follow up on that with in your judgement, how long will it be before america has an effective offensive hypersonic capability? >> i can only answer the very general level. >> i understand. >> the part of the department that deal with both the offense and the defense equation. but i do think you will see this reflected in the 2020 budget. the increase in resources both on the defense and offense side. i do think time is of the essence given where china and competitors may be on this. and of course, it's not limited to hypersonics, but as was pointed out, all the enabling sensors and other capabilities that china's pursuing as well because there's a variety of ways to deal with this capability. and it may not only be shooting down a missile. it may be disabling other aspects of their infrastructure. but to get into more detail we need to be in another setting.
and i'd probably have to have the support of colleagues who have more of a technical background. >> to use a football analogy, sometimes the best defense is a good offense. do you have anything you wish to add about our development of offensive capabilities? offensive hypersonic capabilities? >> only that i know it's been identified as a priority. and it's being resourced at greater levels in our budget. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you all for being here and for your service. admiral davidson, north korea has a list of u.n. security resolutioned sanctions. you spoke about sanctions enforcement. can you speak to how russia and china are living up to their responsibilities to do the same? >> well, i think of the diplomatic space both russia and china continue to try to undermine the sanctions effort by proposing relief to sanctions
at the u.n. but that's certainly not helpful in what i think should be the world's objective to get to a denuclearized north korea. i also believe that russia kind of con found our initiatives across the region by direct diplomatic engagements with other countries to garner the votes that they need to prevent these sanctions. i can tell you that china in the maritime space using terrestrial sensors, airborne sensors, they're watching how we do the sanctions enforcement regime. they're offering zero assistance. i can't say that they preventing our ships and aircraft from doing their mission, but they're certainly not mon torg their own territorial seas very well, and they're not adding to the picture at all. and they continue, i'm sorry, they continue to undermine the
effort at the u.n. as well. >> thank you. so i guess along those same lines, you spoke earlier about how russia play as spoiler role in the region. can you talk a little bit more about the specifics around that and what that entails? >> there's a -- one of the things that they tell other nations in the region is that our sea and our desire to maintain an open sea and air space in the south china sea, for example, should not be our objective. yet, they use that same sea and air space themselves and actually use the open seas and airways to, you know, fly threatening bomber profiles to our allies and, in fact, on the united states as well. i think that's a high form of hypocrisy. they're doing engagements in the region where they're seeking to either gain access in a commercial fashion or a science fashion that could lend itself to military capabilities. that's been upsetting. the good news there is that some of these other countries have at
least called us and notified us of that. and they've made it -- they've partnered with china in a large exercise last fall that was in russia. they just are unhelpful in the whole of the diplomatic informational, military, and economic space. >> general abrams or shriver do you have anything to add on that front? >> congresswoman, i will tell you that there is -- we continue to see positive effects on the sanctions admiral davidson briefed it earlier. but to reiterate what the admiral said, the chinese can and should do much much more to meet their obligations in accordance with the u.n. security council resolutions. >> so what do you think this all kind of boils down to? what do you think the general effect is having and what do we need to do about it?
from your end. >> china has attempting to undermine the rule space international order to their own benefit or to the benefit of people or entities or regimes, frankly, that they seek to partner with. it's not helpful. >> and same for russia? okay. so along those lines, then, we've had -- the president has made the decision to cancel u.s. parps in key resolve and full eagle. what message do you think ending those with the rok, because of his relationship with kim jong-un, what message do you think that send to our allies and partners in asia and to russia and china themselves? >> if i could, just to be precise, and this is not semantics. key resolve and full eagle were
not canceled. we have concluded that exercise regime that was in effect for about 35 years that was probably necessary, designed, optimized based on the situation on the peninsula vis-a-vis bellicose and impressive and provocative behavior from the dprk. with guidance from shanahan and jong from the republic of kree yashgs we've concluded that. and they've given us the green light to develop a new set of exercise regimes to maintain and meet our readiness requirements. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i believe it was chairman smith who said during his opening statement that on the korean peninsula, we are at a high water mark since the korean war.
i wanted to give general abrams and general davidson an opportunity to reflect on how those conditions have manifested. what is the evidence we see and what do we expect as it relates to the resolve of conflict on the peninsula? >> go back two years, 2017, during the height of missile tests, nuclear weapons tests by the dprk. i was not the commander then, but i was certainly watching very closely as the u.s. army's force provider to have forces ready should crisis be required. i would characterize our posture and our stance as we were in a low crouch. we were increasing our stockages, increasing our forced posture. we made the decision to deploy an integrated air missile defense system called thad.
people were at the low ready. now compare and contrast, juxtapose that on to 2019. and there is a palpable air of calm on the peninsula. we're able to sustain and we continue to train and maintain our readiness, but simultaneously along the demilitarized zone, on the west sea, the east sea, along the northern limit line. inside joint security area that for the first time since 1976, the joint security area is now 100% demilitarized. all of that are evidence, i would say, about how i can say confidently that things have -- the tension is reduced significantly. >> admiral davidson, did you have anything to add to that? >> no, sir. i will add that the readiness of our forces are key in our mind. we want to make sure the tactical forces and operational
level forces all that training and readiness is sound. so as general abrams indicated earlier, we're keeping aearlier keeping a close eye on any changes in the capability said, conventional forces north korea, whether nuclear, the potential for a nuclear test, and missile testing, we will be ready to respond should those indicators say that they are on a different trajectory than what general abrams described. >> it seems to me that this new era of calm has been ushered in by an unprecedented level of engagement, the chairman and north korea, have you drawn any conclusions about the actions that have been taken by the ministration, and the extent to which they have contributed to the new sense of calm that they
have articulated? bigger the unprecedented step of meeting leader to leader has made the environment what it is, ultimately is -- >> what it is is safer? bigger tensions are down, i would describe it as safer in terms of avoidance of an immediate conflict. we do need north korea to take advantage of the requirement and fulfill his pledge to denuclearize. are we ahead or behind china in hypersonic technology? >> i'm not sure i'm qualified to give you a precise answer, a sense of urgency, that we need to invest in the defensive and offensive side to make sure it is maintained. >> what are the consequences if we are demonstrably behind china in hypersonic's going forward, how do you think that
impacts the balance of power globally?>> increased risk and greater vulnerability for our ability to impact our security interests and more in the indo pacific. >> i yield back my time. thank you chairman, general abrams, thank you for coming to my office yesterday, i appreciate the discussion, i want to start by saying that when you're commander, our commander-in-chief, handed you a deck that meant you couldn't continue your prime exercises in this sphere, i learned yesterday that you innovated remarkably, and have improved upon the old exercises, making them more full-spectrum, adapting to the current situation, you deserve credit for that, i know it's not easy to do in the u.s. military, and i appreciate that very much. you stated in your
testimony that north korea will remain the most immediate challenge until we get the fully verifiable denuclearization as committed to by kim jong-un, in the summer of 2018. we gave up the exercises, what did we gain from the summit? >> i think we gained an opportunity to engage in a way that could be productive if north korea is prepared to take the difficult steps in the direction of denuclearization. >> did that not exist before? >> it created an unprecedented opportunity, but they have not taken the steps to fulfill his pledge, we are disappointed that they have not come to the table in a serious manner. >> are you surprised? >> having worked on this in some form or another for almost 30 years, i've seen a lot of different approaches, none of which have been successful, this is the best opportunity that north korea will ever have,
whether or not they make the strategic choice, that is difficult to say. >> why would they give up their nuclear weapons? bigger a better future for the country, quite frankly, i don't think the weapons are making them more secure, only one or two years ago we were at a period of high tension, i don't think it is making them more safe and secure. >> you said tensions are down, my colleague said there is a new level of calm, has tensions there been higher than at the beginning of the ministration, when north korea's hotheaded leader was exchanging tweets with ours? >> we have had periods of heightened tension, 1994, secretary perry said that was the closest he came to war. >> while he was cemetery, but has it ever been as dangerous a couple years ago? >> -- i guess my point is that if you're just solving your own
problem, the tensions that you created yourself, as a result, we are where we were before in terms of negotiations, north korea hasn't given up anything, we know from public intelligence reports, they are continuing their nuclear weapons development, they are farther along than they were at any time, literally today, father long than any time in american history, and all we gained after giving up our exercises, is a quote unquote opportunity that nobody is surprised that the chairman has not taken, where do you think this goes next, and what diplomatic leverage do we have at this point? >> the choice for north korea is very clear, and it is a stark one, they can continue to live in isolation -- >> i understand their choice, what leverage do we have? >> the maintenance of sanctions, continues to put pressure north korea. >> you think sanctions are helpful? bigger i do. >> why do you think the present canceled the sanctions?
bigger as i understand it, none of the sanctions have been removed or changed since the tweet, as the white house that >> so you would disagree with the idea of removing sanctions, that would be unhelpful? >> i think it is helpful to maintain pressure, the decisions on future sanctions are beyond my purview. >> but doing it by tweet would be helpful. shifting focus to india, you previously mentioned how important our relationship is with india, how did the recent purchasing of the as/400, and the russian nuclear submarines impact our relationship going forward? >> the decision to procure us for hundreds has not -- 4 -- s- 400s, i think it would be unfortunate if they chose to pursue that, we have the
legislation hanging over all of that, it is not designed to be an impediment in the strategic partnership, it is designed to impose costs on russia, india is a emerging partner for us. >> we are going to do a declassified hearing at 12:15 pm, we will go upstairs for the classified at 12:15 pm. -- we will go to a classified hearing. you said they only have a quarter of the reconnaissance and abilities required to address the range of threats in the a you are, -- aor. fy 20, a portion of the funding requests appears in the upl, and looking at the command requirements, the current and
future security environment, would you include assets as a critical isr shortfall, especially in light of that activity? >> given the ongoing expansion of chinese submarine operations in the pacific, and the indo pacific, and new capability that the russians will be introducing into the theater in the next couple of years, cruise missiles, it is going up in value and need. >> make it for that. shifting gears, secretary shanahan, i asked yesterday, i'm going to ask you the same questions. even if every congress and president agree on a goal of a 355 ship fleet for decades to come, we will not reach the desired goal, i said 40 years yesterday, without a firm commitment, the secretary pushed back and said 18 years.
i will give the secretary 18 years on the low-end, some experts say 40 years on the high-end, in light of that, what you expect the balance of forces between the u.s. and china to be the time we achieve a 355 ship fleet, and when do you believe it is realistic to achieve this goal? >> to your first question, congressman, i think we are going to lose our quantitative edge in about the 2025 timeframe, that is going to be a challenge for our equities in the region, absolutely, i can't comment on how much faster or slower it needs to happen, there are some shipbuilding limits, the capacity in the united states to produce ships, but i think the for structure assessment will take that into account, and we will come later in the year with that. mr. schreiber, in your
testimony, you said there is an active north korean effort to undermine sanctions, and so political division and their execution, north korea has turned to the use of illicit ship to ship transfers off of china's coast, to evade refined petroleum in textiles and coal. they were imposed and periodically strengthens with their development activity, going back to march 2016, with that, what is the logic of the trumpet ministration considering lessening sanctions on north korea, rewarding them if they don't comply with the original sanctions to begin with? >> i'm not aware that sanctions have been removed or changed, it is very important to keep pressure on, and a sensible statement, we wouldn't be where we are today, the pressure about -- on north korea. and according to my statement about china, we will not be
successful unless china does more to enforce sanctions themselves, including their territorial waters.. >> you have talked in the past about naming and shaming those entities that a bit north korea, have we made any successful efforts at all to minimize sanctions evasion? >> there have been a number of flag states that we have engaged in, as well as other countries, to sideline vessels that have been participating in the illicit transfer of oil to north korea, as well as some of the ownership companies and the shippers involved, and i think the key is to disrupt that providing network as we go forward. there has been engagement at the diplomatic level, the naming and shaming of individuals, we have seen robust action from other countries. >> you have seen progress, or we hope to see progress?
>> we have seen progress, it will continue. >> with that, i yield back. i've heard a lot of questions, and the ones i was going to ask, i will take this a slightly different direction if you would, touching upon this little bit, talking about persian gulf ports, and china's presence in that part of the world, a little bit outside your area, but the national security strategy, and national defense strategy does talk about reorienting ourselves, including china, military to military engagement, i was curious i've been reading some reports about china having military to military cooperation, national
government, the relationship in pakistan, one road, there are ports in iran if figures largely that region -- and it figures largely in the region, just thought and what kind of a footprint do you hope to see, and how important is it to your area of responsibility that the u.s. has a strong relationship with the afghan government? off >> we are in afghanistan, first and foremost to protect americans, if the ambassador is
successful, it is expected that it would be a terrorist threat that would remain, sufficient for the terrorist threat, in a post reconciled environment, we would expect the afghans themselves to deal with a terrorist threat, we surely don't want that on their territory, the government in kabul, conditions based, that will be reflected in the negotiations. if i could add quickly, i mentioned earlier, i think our u.s. values compete extraordinary welcome -- well, if you look at china's incarceration of more than what is estimated to be 1,000,000 1/2 people -- 1.5 million people
, afghanistan would view heavy chinese involvement in the country and chinese interests as a chilling factor. thank you mr. chairman, i want to thank you both, particularly your families, it is a team effort to serve, thank you for your years of service. i want to talk about india for a moment, i agree, if it is the ranking member is, perhaps the chairman, really one of the seminal alliances moving forward, what more can we do in our engagement, what more should we be doing, and what more would you like to do, and how can the body help? >> the signing of it, and the 2
+2 meeting that they had last september, in india i think is a breakthrough. down at the operational level, working on a effort to operationalize it, it is a i.t. agreement essentially in which, underpinning that, we can do information sharing and other things. there is an opportunity for us to share technical flyaway kids, and a operational system that would advance it on a military to military level very well. i continue to make the point that the interoperability and compatibility going forward, will be advantaged with the purchase of u.s. systems. that allows us to get to training, doctrine, tactical level coordination, that is really powerful, and so while
they very much want to protect their nonaligned policy, the tactical and technical capability, we get out of like systems will really events in the military space. >> thank you, on top of that, switching to space, how does china's growing capability, the capabilities that they are essentially putting all over the globe, in terms of tracking, one road, the debt diplomacy, how is that affecting you operationally? leaving it to anyone on the panel. >> the development of the battle space, that would have an effect on the freedom of action on the entire joint force, really around the globe. switching to china or excuse me, japan, i understand
this is a internal japanese issue, a contentious political issue in terms of article 9, a hard look at, sharing, growing chinese capabilities, we are looking at losing the quantitative edge in terms of the flea, as the admiral mentioned, by 2025, look at me -- what can we do to talk to the japanese about taking additional steps, the heart step internally, and making those changes, to make it a more effective partner? >> it's a subtle decision of japan, the world has changed. >> the steps they took gave us better flexibility and latitude, and we are taking advantage of that, the new national defense program guidelines, when compared with our national
defense strategy, revealed to us that there is nothing but open space to build the alliance out, i am not aware the distinction between reinterpreting versus changing the constitution is an impediment right now, but if it became one, we would raise it with our japanese friends. how does the latin american angle, in terms of the 17 nations that you mentioned, participate in signing agreements, one belt, one road? how is that affecting the force posture, is it significant, what do we do going forward? >> all the countries are in the area of responsibility, i talked to admiral fuller last night, to make sure that i understood, and he wanted to understand my concerns as well, i think you are not seeing profound military action in the south calm, that you're now,
china ran a hospital ship with medical capability.>> in my time remaining, i want to note, they put a satellite tracking system in argentina on land lease, a road, a trend we are seeing. >> we are seeing other requests across the indo pacific, the result of which is the potential for more bases, and places for china to operate out of base airplanes, big ships, that kind of thing. >> the gentleman's time has expired. we will reconvene after this. >> especially good to see you again, i spent four years in the western pacific, i am familiar with the area, what is striking is the large distances that have to be covered, i want to focus on the challenges with logistics with the large distances in the pacific, and our current navy, based on the
ability to deliver fuel, parts, supplies in a uncontested environment, i appreciate you see this is a vulnerability in the comments you provided in preparation for the hearing. while china continues to develop weapons like the df 26, the guam killer, giving you an idea of the range and what they could intend to use that for, threatening the ability to deliver logistics from the fixed basis we have relied on for more than 50 years, we really haven't changed the tactics or procedures with regards to logistics, and practiced those recently, such as console ops, for about a decade, do you see logistics as a achilles' heel? baker the advancements with the logistics so to speak is going forward, we have done some ops in the last five years, we just concluded the pacific blitz exercise, merging essentially
what was a tactical exercise, and logistics, both marine corps exercises, to exercise that capability, clearly, recapitalization of the system is critically important, as is aging out, and propulsion plans that are expiring in capability, and the ability to maintain them. >> i had the opportunity to hear from admiral busby, as well as u.s. trends calm, and we focused on the age of the sealift fleet, and on any given day, 50% of the fleet was available, what kind of impact would that have, because when we were briefed, that was basically what was unavailable at a snapshot in time, and what impact would that have on the most limiting plan, the ability to carry it out within the theater?
>> a risk to the troops, and the people in the region, if there is any delay in our ability to deliver the logistics. >> going back to the console ops, and the ability within the region, currently in the msp programs, there are no takers whatsoever, do you see that as a need in order to execute the plan? >> the military sealift command is exploiting commercial opportunities to do these things as well. >> lastly, many of them are heavily reliant on shore infrastructure, in areas around the theater, are you taking any actions to heart in that short infrastructure or provide additional defenses forward to maintain the logistics necessary to carry out our 2 principal plans? >> defensive capabilities in guam, i would like to see improved, we are using a mobile system, on the ground, as well as ship support, i think in the
future, we need a more robust and fixed site, the mobile sites can be employed to support the logistics and other basic needs around the region. >> i will wrap up by asking you the same question, coming before us, on a different note, what have you perceived within the theater, what percent? >> 70%. >> as i'm the last to go today, thank you for the time to brief us and helping us with the decision-making process throughout the budget process. >> thank you gentlemen, i appreciate your testimony answering questions, we are adjourned, and we will reconvene in 2212 as soon as we can get up there.
policies that impact you. thursday morning, republican congressman buddy carter of georgia discusses the future of the affordable care act and climate change, and sheila jackson lee, democratic congressman from texas, the efforts to reauthorize the violence against women's act, c- span's washington journal, seven -- 7:00 eastern. during the discussion. more live coverage and the morning, a confirmation hearing, with david bernhardt, acting secretary of the interior department since january, following the resignation of ryan zinke, before the energy and resources committee, at 10 pm eastern. president trump holds a rally in grand rapids, live coverage on c-span, c-span.org, and the free c-span radio app.
this weekend on american history tv, world war ii navajo code talkers, and a look back at the 1979 three mile island nuclear power exit -- accident. oral histories, world war ii navajo code talkers, using their language to secretly communicate operational plans. >> it took us, the navajo code talkers, compelled to use their language, and they devised it and schemed in such a way that it played the role of a very unique one, of confusing the enemy. >> live sunday morning at 8:30 am eastern, american history tv, and c-span's washington journal, the 40th anniversary of the three mile island
nuclear power accident near harrisburg, pennsylvania, the most serious one of the united states. joining us, historian and author samuel walker, acting director of the nuclear safety project for the union of concerned scientists, edward lyman, and concerned mothers of women in pennsylvania. 4 pm on real america, the 1979 cbs report, fallout from three mile island. >> there is an evacuation, stay indoors with the windows closed. >> for almost a week last month, the people of middletown pennsylvania lived in fear of a enemy they couldn't feel, hear or see. >> watch it this weekend on c- span three. healthcare advisors and insurance commissioners discuss approaches to eliminate surprise out of network