tv U.S. Army Air Missile Defense Strategy Part 2 CSPAN May 17, 2019 4:15pm-5:32pm EDT
>> it went from hand to hand. people thought it was important enough to carry it on. there probably were others written by people who were enslaved. but this is the only known existing manuscript in arabic. written by a slave. >> watch american artifacts, sunday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. a new report is out intended to guide usair and missile defense strategy through 2028. a number of current and former defense department officials reviewed the report. during this discussion at the center for strategic and international studies.
>> okay, folks, we're going to transition to our second panel here. we have a great lineup of some very thoughtful people to kind of talk about the army strategy, put it in context. i want to turn things over to our moderator for this panel, lieutenant general dick for mica. general formica spent 36 years in the army, had a number of posts in the army. his final assignment, of course, was the commanding general of space and missile defense command. so i'm going to turn things over to him. before i do that, i also want to recognize senator john warner. i appreciate you here, sir. we have seen you here at our events before. thank you very much for coming out and for your service. so general franco, over to you. >> thanks, tom. and thanks to each much you for being here and those that are online. on behalf of the panel, i say good afternoon. for those of you that had an opportunity to hear it, i want to thank tom charactero and colonel chad scaggs again for that thoughtful discussion on army air and missile defense
2028. i think they provided a great understanding of where the army is headed and how it intends to get there out to 2028. they have identified the need to address the full range of threats to provide a tiered approach to missile defense. we talked about offense and defense integration and the integration of lethal and nonlethal capabilities. and the army's four lines of effort to get after that. with this panel here as a follow-on, we intend to broaden the discussion and to build on it. and to look at amd 2028 from different perspectives. and then we'll -- as dr. karaco did, take questions from the audience. so to that end, csis has assembled a really stellar panel. let me introduce. first, dr. peppy debioso,
director of the office of missile defense policy. it's a position he's held for over 18 years. he's been an adjunct professor, and has think tank experience and has been principally responsible for the drafting of the missile defense review. he'll be followed by dr. kathleen hicks, senior vice president and the henry kissinger chair here at csis. she's a former principle deputy under secretary of defense for policy and a deputy undersecretary defense for strategy, plans and forces. and she was a member of the national commission on the future of the army. mr. peter woody woodmanstein is division chief for integrated air and missile defense, united states european command. he's been in that position for ten years. he's a retired united states marine corps colonel with over 25 years of uniform service.
and then finally, colonel mike solis, division chief, joint integrated air and missile defense organization. he's a u.s. army air defense officer. colonel colon colonel solis served for over two decades and served as chief of staff at the 32nd army, air and missile defense command. so this panel brings unique and varying insights and perspectives to this discussion. and we're going to offer them the opportunity to make opening comments for five to seven minutes and then that will leave plenty of time for your questions. so let me first turn the floor over to pepi dibioso. >> thank you, dick. i didn't hear the earlier part of the discussion, so i'm going to proceed as though there isn't too much redid you know dance
here. i've been asked to give a few remarks that set the policy framework with regard to integrated air and missile defense. i'm going to continue to use the "i" part. i understand in the earlier discussion it was mostly the amd piece. but really the long-term objective is to sort of get to the integrated piece of air and missile defense. and talk a little bit about how the missile defense review sort of framed up this issue. the very name of the missile defense review gives you an indication that the department is thinking about missile threats in a larger and more comprehensive term. and consequently right, we're thinking about the defense solutions in a broader way. you probably heard in discussion earlier today that it's more than just ballistic missile threats. but i will keep making the point that we continue to deal with large numbers of ballistic missiles and countries continue
to acquire those capabilities in addition to other new missile threats. so the missile defense review identified integrated air and missile defense as a major strategic operational concept. one that is animated by shift in the security environment. in the words of the national defense strategy, one that's more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. that complexity and volatility consists primarily of two major elements. one, the rapid evolution and die fusion of advanced military technology. and secondly, the onset of the renewal. it's different from the great power competition of the cold war. we've actually got at least three powers that are part of this equation. at the same time, the challenge is -- the missile challenges associated with sort of rogue regimes and region mal -- potential regional opponents remains largely unflydiminished.
so what we have seen over the past couple of years, opponents have been rapidly developing military capabilities for high-end conflict. this is particularly evident in the domain of offensive missiles capable of threatening the u.s., its forces abroad and its allies and security partners. let me give a couple of characteristics of this threat environment as we looked at it in the mdr. one, we're seeing the steady, quantitative expansion and improvements in ballistic missiles. they're not going away. they're getting larger and more challenging. we're seeing the development of new systems by big powers like russia and china. new advanced weapons, hypersonics and advanced cruise missiles described in the china military power report that the department released within the last couple of days. additionally, the traditional distinctions between missiles is collapsing. we're seeing hypersonics that can fly regional or
intercontinental ranges. nations launch from aircraft. you can take an mrbm or an irbm and give it icbm ranges. so those distinctions with regard to missiles you can kind of regional and strategic and homeland are starting to rapidly collapse. so that's one of the features as we have thought about this missile defense and air and missile defense problem. we're having to cope with. countries like iran and north korea continue to carry out their ballistic missile activity. and lastly, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are sort of a feature of contemporary warfare. we're seeing the russians use cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in syria. we've seen nonstate actors like the -- houthi rebels in yemen use ballistic missile and cruise missiles and weirdly in a an integrated, complex attack structure, right? threatening and firing missiles both at naval vessels and
american naval vessels over the last -- over the last couple of years. with regard to both regional adversaries along with china and russia and in addition to the technologies and these new missile capabilities, we're seeing big powers and the regional powers integrate current and emerging offensive capabilities with their military plans in ways -- in using employment concepts that are generating new vulnerabilities to u.s. homeland and forces abroad. we broadly characterize this challenge as one which seeks to deny the u.s. military access -- ability to access in key regions and operate within critical areas. the so-called anti access or denial challenge which i suspect was discussed a little bit earlier today. a strategic aim of a2ad is combat power at the initial stages of conflict and our decision making and material ability to respond to aggression or respond to partners and
reinforce our partners in conflict. the point of all of this, it's not exclusively missile-oriented but it is missile-centric. at least now and for the foreseeable future. there are other elements to it. defense, counter space and electronic. but predicated mostly on offensive missile capabilities. and it's directed really at the core of american defense strategy. namely, you know, the united states as an island power as relied for six to seven decades on its ability to project power at great distance, reinforce its deployed forces and our security institutions and architectures have been built around this principle, anti access or denial, aimed at the heart of american strategy, which is why it's kind of an important element to address. so the mdr identifies a2ad as a strategic operational challenge. it calls for a strategy to deter and defeat these threats by taking a more holistic approach
to dealing with these offensive capabilities. its missile defense or active defense. its passive defense. and its attack operations. for the purposes of this discussion, i'll focus a bit more on the active defense dimension. the mdr highlights a role for imd. now, in past big defense reviews, missile defense reviews and other types of reviews, certainly over the past 20 years or so, imd -- air and missile defense -- how do we think the problem set associated within ballistic and cruise missiles has not been a prominent feature of defense plans. hasn't been a focus of american strategy. but the mdr does call out a number of key roles for integrated air and missile defense. top level, right? contributes to deterrence of adversary missile attacks, threats, by undermining and complicating anti access or democrat strikes.
detect conventional forces, bases in associated infrastructure. required to respond promptly to aggression and ensure the ability to blunt adversary missile strikes in order to maintain our ability to project power into a theater and flow forces into a key region to halt or reverse military gains. that is to prevent the fait de compli. so going forward, four areas that the dod will focus on or acquire sustained attention in kind of adapting its posture to address a2ad. this applies to potentially to the u.s. joint force as well as to what we do in our military alliances. first imed capability. there is a sort of a set of capabilities we're going to need. i think in particular, on the cruise missile defense front. it's an area where there hasn't been -- as i said earlier, a lot of focus in the past couple of decades, because that isn't where sort of the main threat vectors were coming from.
essentially the services -- the army is sort of a good example. not to pick on them, i think they're doing a good job of getting back into the amd and cruise missile defense game. but as you know, the army is buying iron dome, two batteries of iron dome. attempting to buy two batteries of iron dome. air and cruise missile defenses from a foreign government. part of it sort of reflects the fact that if we're going to rapidly move in that direction, we're going to have to, you know -- we're looking at sort of other -- other sources. capacity in the air and missile defense arena. this is the question about the right balance between bmd and cmd. so these are issues the department is dealing with, looking at force structure sufficiency with regard to regional dmb and cruise missile defense, in light of adversaries who have large missile strike postures. integration. a third area. it came up earlier. ensuring that ballistic missile defenses and cruise missile
defenses at a technical level are sufficiently synchronized in order to be operationally effective against combined ballistic missile and cruise missile strikes. and the army is actually doing some good work putting -- bringing together the fed and the pac 3 system. and lastly, interoperability. and within kind of the air and missile defense kind of framework. i think it's really critical with allies and partners. i understand at least some of that was discussed as well. this is really the key to increasing the overall effectiveness of our collective combat capability. so it's going to require sort of systems that we and our allies have that are compatible, are going to have to do exercise and training to develop concepts of operation in key theaters to make sure we can pull together missile defenses to develop cruise missile strikes. and there's some good news out there, as well. some of you may know.
nato actually has an iamd policy on the books. you can go to nato's website and you see an area of missile defense and it says all the right things. it's a deterrence, it's attack ops, passive defense and missile defense. and what's essential for nato is we and our nato allies in this case continue now to bring sort of new capabilities to the framework that's in place. so let me stop there. i think the army's air and missile defense framework that they published is kind of a good path. i think the service is kind of thinking -- you know, the right way about this problem set. we think we've got a ways to go to sort of build out these -- build out the posture. >> thanks. and i think it certainly comes out to be that not only is the army approach heading in the right direction, but it's nested nicely with the missile defense review that you just talked to. i'll now turn the floor over to the doctor. >> sure, thanks very much, dick. it's a pleasure to be with everyone today. it's especially nice to be with
pepi. i think pepi and i first got to work together in '94 or '95. and what strikes me most right now is i don't think either of us had reading glasses. i'll put mine on. what i thought i would do is reflect first and foremost on what we said back in 2016 in the commission on the future of the army on missile defense issues, and where we have come to in the army's framework. so just to reposition you in that time frame, we were one of the first major external big studies, whether on the army or something else, that was occurring in the aftermath of the invasion of ukraine and the annexation of crime crimea and that really helped us, i think, in some ways turn with helping the army. i like to think. they claim they supported all our recommend legislations.
on some of the big irissues of what we think of as competition. and nowhere was this more true than on missile defense issues. so i want to hit four things we talked about in the commission report explicitly on missile defense for the army and then where we are now in terms of the framework and the discussion more broadly in the defense department. the first item we really hit hard was the deficiencies and underinvestment, which we take for granted now. but at the time that was something that was being heard from the war fighter in the field. most especially in europe, of course. but not a place where the army was looking eager to invest significant new funds or structure. the second was the deficiencies and structure around patriot. and also in fad that there was a demand signal very high for both. and that we were not able to meet those. i'll tell you what we said in the commission -- what we ended
up deciding in the commission report was that the investment requirements for that, we basically couldn't solve for that. and i think that's sort of reflective of where the army is today. there is sort of a conceivable level of cost that can buy our way out of the missile defense challenge set at the level of requirement that's being felt in the field. relatedly, therefore, was the very high up tempo that patriot in particular was feeling at the time. and the reality that we didn't have a good solution inside the army for that, except to just keep plugging along and try to manage through the tempo challenges. and then finally, we made a special point of pointing out that the gmd mission set was exclusively held by the guard, and that we had concerns about given the centrality of that mission set to the national security enterprise at large, in terms of our approach with our triad. and with our -- excuse me, with our missile defense, our
national missile defense, that there ought to be a more thoughtful, thorough way of integrating gmd for a professional course for officers and for enlisted. and we had concerns that keeping entirely in the guard would limit that. so where did we get to as of now, including what -- how it's wrapped up, i think in this framework. i think you've seen a lot of prior in these areas. in shoread, of course, you have the goal set out by general milley for the four battalions by the end of 2023. i think that went much slower than we had hoped it would go in the army. you know. but looking back, you know, at least we're making some forward progress. i think the demand signal from the theater is very, very strong on that. and we are as of now from the army commission perspective, one of just a number of major studies out there that have highlighted this challenge. i'll also mention, i was on the
national commission for the national defense strategy. we make the same point there on shoread challenges and in particular with regard to europe. on patriot, you know, the framework does a nice job of pointing out the fms side of it. there are other countries that ought to be purchasing these missile defense capabilities as part of the solution set for our own challenges of structure and tempo. but you do still have these tempo challenges. and the framework acknowledges that. again, i'm not really clear. maybe it came up in the prior panel, how the army is intending to deal with that. and that's largely, i think, a result of the bigger challenge that it's very cost-imposing on us, the way we are currently thinking about missile defense. and we have this generational challenge of how to shift the cost in position and the shot, if you will, of the return shot, advantages to the u.s. and then on the gmd issue, it's not touched in the framework. i don't know if it was touched previously.
i actually just did a search using advanced technology of the 21st century for the word "guard" in the framework. it does not appear. so i am left to believe we are right back where we started in terms of that continuing to be treated as an issue that the guard can manage in and of itself without any acknowledgment, think of what challenges that puts to recruiting and retaining the force over time, training it, having it capable of executing that mission. so going forward, where does that leave us? again, i'm hopeful based on the framework that there is at least an acknowledgment of many of the challenges out there that there is a seriousness nested within the missile defense review to take on and take seriously the challenges of missile defense for the army. i continue to be worried as i am in every part of dod, frankly. it's not unique to this. that we are very incremental in our approach and that we are facing challenges that really are going to require us to be transformational. that's a lot more r & d,
disruption of current concepts of how we operate. and i think there's an acknowledgment of that, but i'm not seeing a huge amount of forward momentum here. it's not disproportionately here. it's probably more than anything reflective of the over all position we find ourselves in with regard specifically to russia and china. i think the emphasis on joint responsibility was important to have, obviously, in the report. i think that's something the army is going to have to -- and the testifidefense department i to have to hold the army accountable for delivering on behalf of the joint force and, of course, in combined environments where it's appropriate to make sure that those enabling capabilities are there. and then the last thing i'll say is the durability of this commitment. i think that's something -- any time you're working essentially against the major cultural influence of a service where in this case for the army missile defense is not usually the first and foremost priority mission that they like to focus on or invest in, it's challenging to make sure that you have a durable solution set.
that the investments focused on today will carry forward in the future, and that you can count on the next fit up building on rather than retrograding from the fit you're in. so i think that's where i'm going to be looking coming out of the framework. >> thanks. and now to bring a bit of an operational flavor, coming in from the united states european command, woody woodwin. >> thank you very much, tom, for inviting me. as most of you know, general walters just took over as commander u-com on 2 may from general skap rotty. then went up and took over as supreme allied commander europe. so general walters has two hats. pretty sure they talk routinely amongst themselves. so when tom asked me to speak, we were on the cusp of that change of command, and we
weren't certain whether it's vision and mission and priorities would be published. i'm here to tell you that i got it yesterday. and so i can give it to you hot off the press. and then i went to see how -- what the amd-2028 nests with a combatant commander's view with his joint view of war fighting. but i'll give you -- i have a disclaimer. actually, i'll give two disclaimers. one is that i don't have a nato billit. i'm in a u.s. billit. but you'll see as i talk everything we do supports nato. and nato ops. and secondly, i sit in an ops chair. i work for the j-3. and if you're a hammer, everything looks like a nail, right? so with me, everything looks like an ops problem. so i'll address everything as an ops problem today. so first, general walter's vision is that we're a combat-ready, war-fighting theater, united with our allies
and partners prepared to execute the full range of combined and joint military operations across all domains. he talks of speed and decisive battlefield effects. general walters sees his mission as he must execute a full range of multidomain operations in coordination with allies and partners to support nato. so you see a theme. allies and partners throughout. and to deter russia in order to defend the homeland forward. a lot of people forget that we at u-com are in europe to defend the homeland forward. so but should deterrence fail, u-com is prepared to fight alongside allies and partners to prevail in any conflict. so his top three priorities bold down to what's relative for us. first, he says constantly improve the for-fighti war-figh readiness of our joint force. second, strengthen the solidarity and unity of our
alli allies and partners. thirdly, foster a highly motivated team of patriots to promote lethality, agility and resiliency. so in a nutshell, what i just outlined broadly for this audience is general walter's vision. and it's really his priorities and his mission. and it's no surprise that he emphasizes joint coalition allies and partners and defending the homeland forward. so how does the strategy that we heard chad talk about about an hour ago, how does it fit, how does it map? i think it maps nicely, and i'll comment on how it maps nicely and then challenges they bring up and then additional challenges in the joint fight. so amd-2020 he wieloise 1 and 2 support the priority to improve war-fighting readiness and deter russia in assisting in the defense of israel.
so u-com has a capacity. i think we talked about that, as well, as army -- as a capability problem that the army can help close. this goes toward improving u-com's ability to be ready to deploy, fight and win in a joint multidomain, high-intensity conflict by defending deployed forces in critical assets within u-com aor. the army views -- their army's views i think allowing for best sense or best shooter aligns nicely with thoughts on increasing the speed and quality of our decision making through enhanced c2 and combined situational awareness. it remains to be seen how and if ibcs can be truly integrated and interoperable across the coalition and joint domains. the concept best shooter, best sensor, i believe, is spot on. fieldi fielding thaad patriot. chad went into detail.
i won't redo what he said. but certainly we see it as important to fill in critical gaps. integrated air missile defense. must create windows of opportunity, allowing for the synchronization of offense and defense. i think you've heard the panel, kind of a theme for that. chad brought up that, as well, as a theme. now, moving into eloise 2 and 3. the capacity for multidomain ops and three, providing train-ready forces. again, nests nicely in commander's position of his highly motivated team of patriots that he talks about. amd's 2020 future structure, patriot thaad. fit into the vision of multidomain and highly motivated teams. loe 4, maintaining presence. couldn't agree more with the army's focus on building allied and partner capacity and
supports our commander's priority to accelerate the adaptation, modernization and engagements as well as aligning collective efforts at accelerating interoperability. deterrence. i don't think deploying a piece of equipment here or there across the world is true d deterrence. it's part of it, but really it's in our commitment to support nato, to support our allies. so a piece of equipment is just a piece of that. it's our commitment to our allies that is key. so exercises and training exists led by our components within u-come. support u-com's priorities to build allied and partner capacities. our own tenth aamdc and our army component in europe are instrumental in a lot of these exercises that help our allies and work toward that
integration. so, you know, some of the challenges that are in the document, challenges about foreign disclosure policy, technical integration among u.s. and allies. incorporating allied and partner interoperability requirements and sufficiency that shared commitment that we strive for within nato. so some of my own views on challenges we face in theater in no particular order is passive defense. i think the -- the strategy document touches on it, goes into it nicely on passive defense and what it is. but how is it being incorporated in all we do? are we ready? i think sometimes we pay lip service to passive defense. and passive defense starts with a mind-set. and got to ask yourself, are we ready to go there. interoperability. we talked at length about that. i think chad did a very nice job in how he outlined the three steps for us. the complexity of the threats.
we have a cruise missile problem in europe. okay? it's a 360-degree threat, as we talked about. but we have to look more broadly other than just army systems. it's important, but there's air force systems, there's navy systems out there. how are we bringing them into the fight. how are we looking at not only point defense, but area defense. how are we looking at fifth gen fighters. how are we looking at navy command and control platforms, air force, the aoc. the operations center. how are they -- how is ibcs plugging into that system. and lastly, the command and control challenges. what are -- is speed. how much speed do we need? what's the right level of automation? and truly are we integrated? so those are the questions that we ask ourselves in europe whenever new systems come online when we're looking at legacy systems, replacing those legacy systems. how can we better command and control this fight. and i look at everything, again, operationally, not so much at the tactical level, but at the operational level.
and i'll close there. >> good. thanks, woody. and last but not least, colonel solis from ja joint staff. >> thank you, sir. and thanks again to the folks at csis for having us here today and tom for, again, spearheading a conversation on this topic, asking the army to stick a me mirror in front of their face and asking key stakeholders to take a lens from their own view and see how the strategy faces up on that measure. as we led up to this panel, general formica actually recommended that the lens we look at is the iamd-2020 and he said you could probably stand up and on behalf of the joint staff take credit for the army leading a strategy. i think i'm going to defer to 2029 and measure the successes of the strategy at that point. so on that note, the imd vision 2020 and the army a & d strategy 2028 nest well with each other.
both emphasize the need for a full spectrum of deterrents, active and passive defense and offensive and defensive integration. a common theme we've heard from not only chad's outline earlier today and the fellow panel members today. as a strategic document versus what the imd-2020 and aspirational document, the army is grounded in its current efforts. and talks about fielding the current systems and the pipeline to defend the maneuver forces and critical assets. and getting those elements of that strategy right. the manning, the training, the forward presence in there. again, pulling on the theme about the difference between an aspirational document and a strategic document, i think on a first read, you may look at the imd vision 2020 and say that there may be a disconnect between the army strategy, because the vision statement says we can't afford an active defense solution that meets the enemy missile for missile.
and if -- i made this mistake on my first read at a army strategy when i saw all the emphasis on capacity and all the emphasis on building up our forces. but then when i sit there and remind myself where our current forces are, it just was recognized by the commission for the future of the army that we had allowed a huge gap. and i think chad's comment earlier about bringing observer control back to the national training center, i was the last 03 level oc at the national training center that did force on force operations and i left in 2003. so an enormous gap has formed over that time. so we can see where the army is rightfully putting their resources to building towards those -- or closing those gaps. chad outlined a couple of risks to the strategy, and he talked about the fiscal risks. and i think everybody within the dod or within the government always wakes up every morning wondering and worrying about
their funding streams and making sure those stay secure when they wake up the next day. and, of course, the technological challenges as we face some true splitting the ty concepts that we need to get to in directed energy. backup but i think there is one hidden risk in there and really only evident once i dig deep in there. and that's one that chad punted earlier to me as representative about joint staff about interprablt and use this as a confessional on there. in order to achieve all those things that he talked about in integration -- and we have to do the -- talk about the interdependens and then he talked about the interprablt to get to integration. one ting thing that is lying and the term i used before as obviousen in the department of defense. but recognized as obviousen is the ownership of the operational architect yur. in context it leads to you
developing the systems architecture and subsequently the technical architecture that allows you to get to those and to use a highly technical term, the beeps and squeaks that get to the integration that we critically need. but, again, the department has recognized as part of some of the efforts most the mdr we are looking hard at why that was fallout carried on at the end of the chairman's time of controlled activity, where the the right place and what's the proper way to resource that effort. we won't make up for the two years plus that that has not been an effort led by a designated organization in the d.o.d. but i'm sure that with the right priority and right authorities we'll apply enough vigor to that to make up some of that ground. and sir with that i'll close my comments here. >> good, thanks. before i open it up to you for questions -- though i promised we would do that after the
panel, listening to the panel members at the policy level and down through operational, i heard a couple of recurring themes one on capability and capacity. and one of my observations has long been that there is a tension as you go down there between balancing investment in new capability and increased capacity of what you currently have. so before i open it up to them i'm going to throw this to the panel. what are your thoughts on that tension of capability and capacity? what needs to be done, not only army but across d.o.d. and are we doing those things to address that tension? and i'll throw it ep to the panel. >> i'll start. >> you can start. >> no, okay, thank you i'll defer to the lady. >> yeah, this is i think a major challenge the department is facing, right. you have -- i often talk about as the iron triangle of painful tradeoffs process the level of
national ambition is roughly where it's been and where it appears in the nds which is significant, in other words a significant level of desired military capability at the end of the day you're ultimately in a fixed top line or even not fixed but, you know, not -- not endless top line you have to trade off readiness, structure and modernization. it's not quite that simple. but it's kind of that simple. there are things that can get you out of that triangle, that geomerritty. position, alliances. there are ways to kind of ease that. but fundamentally that's what the department has been grappling with and grappling with it for decades. and it's -- there is no in my opinion obvious answer. i think for some experts there is an obvious answer. for those people it tends to be just modernization. but i think the reality at the wrr rowe war fighter level is
just more challenging than that. i do think fundamentally as i said in my own remarks with regard to this issue set and more broadly we have a challenge in continuing to approach this issue too incrementally. and that pushes us into an almost immediate need to resolve the challenge whereas thoughtful investment over time and the right research, you know, if we had known we would need advanced, you know, short range air defense systems and invested in that for years when the tralg presented itself in 2016 we would have had more than a pick up game but that's a road of counterfwakt the ball we don't live in you have to make some investments -- you have to give up some structures in those so capacities -- how people often call it i prefer to call it structure. in order to gain the modernization advantage.
because i think capability is a combination of all three things i talked about. it's not separate from structure. and it's not sfrat from readiness. but you have to invest in the modernization. you have to find the money. and i actually think we can make in a less hard tradeoff because -- well, outside of the department, the department is largely constrained politically from making the really hard trade yofs. it's also internally constrained culturely as i mentioned. this takes tough leadership, central leadership, civilian leadership for the department to get there. inside the department of defense, white house and inside capitol hill. and we're not see nag right now. >> thanks. >> sir, i think we know what capacity buys in terms of the results of our capabilities there. the -- our next best dollars are best placed in capability development and looking for innovative solutions both on thes sensing side of the house so we can make our offensive fires more effective as well as
on the active defense non-kinetic solution that is help prevent launches in that arena. but if we had put our dollars on the table i think capability development in those areas would be our choice. >> great. anybody else. >> just a brief observation. i mean, the tension between capability and capacity you describe, i'm actually -- it's an ongoing reality. it never goes away i would argue. it plays an important role in the department because it forces, right, the different approaches in d.o.d. i mean the capability/capacity -- i don't want to say pits different organizations. but the combatant commanders, war fighters think of the fight tonight. they are interested in capacity, capacity, capacity, as they should be. others may be on the civilian side or r & d side are thinking about how to you -- that's -- we understand that but you also have to lay in the foundation for future threats, right, that
are developing. in part it's strategy driven, right. i mean at least as a policy guy i always like to think that policy and strategy the reality in the building is it's a bit messier. but certainly one has to look at the -- there's been a static period of 20 years post cold war in which the capability, capacity challenge as it related to major conflict and high intensity conflict, right. wasn't a challenge within the department, right. . the international security circumstances have changed, right. i mean, as i mentioned earlier rapid military advancements, diffusion of those capabilities and new major geopolitical challenges is going to force the department- and i'd agree with cath here is forcing the department leadership to engage on how it prioritizing competing resources. because it's not ray infinity set of resources to fund capacity and capability. and maybe to mike's point, in an
era of rapid geopolitical change pan rapid military technological change, i think the scale maybe should tip more in the innovative capability direction, all right. because we are having to think differently about the problem set we deal with today. because it's different than the problem set 10 years,s 5 years, 15 years ago. >> good, thanks. anybody -- what do you want -- >> just shortly say, operationally, at the combatant command, capacity, you never have enough. we're always arguing with the joint staff on give us more, give us more. pacom is asking the same thing. but we could do like cat said, alliances we use the term with nato burden sharing. i've always disliked that word, bus collective defense shouldn't be a burden. it should be a shared commitment, right. so it should -- what is the shared commitment? what's the right balance for u.s., nato?
how are we working that shared commitment to give us the right capability, capacity, for defense in europe? and again how long do we defend before we make the decision to go off -- can't play catch forever there has to be a balance between offense and defense. >> i hope that offense/defense integration will get that -- that thread will be pulled through your questions but if not i'll come back. the second thing i wanted to highlight, i heard through your discussions annual colonel skaggs talked to it, the whole reason of 2020 -- imd 2028 was in gap that we have in capability in the army. and i think it's important to remember -- i've heard senior leaders say there was a strategy gap. and we let amd shore add trkly atrophy. i would argue there wasn't a strategy gap.
there was a distinct strategy. the same five threats, terrorism, china, russia, north korea, iran where a identified. the priority and what we attributed to that threat was different. and as an army looks at -- cath talked about balancing modernization, force structure and readiness. as the army looks at or any service what kind of capability do you need and what capacity you are going to build starts with the strategy. what do you want the army to do? what capabilities do you need it to have? and then to build a force and then you answer the question, can you organize pan, equip, train and fund and station it? and i believe that process took place over the last 20 years. appear the army responded to the strategy, the capability that was expected of it for the fight that it was in. and now with a new priority, a new assertion of threat for near peer competitors, you have a different set of capabilities that's required. and i think that's where we find
ourselves. with that i'd like to open the froor over in the back. the young lady. there you go. >> jessica bland from the british embassy. firstly i want to thank everyone today for compensates on the importance of allies and partners with regards to missile defense. and particularly the statement around how having forward deployed forces is a pregts for the u.s. homeland. my question comes in two parts. faresly do you believe -- nato focused question, no surprise -- do you think nato is responding appropriately within the iamd forum or even partner countries within europe with regards to the inf violating missile that russia has deployed? and secondly how do you balance any change in that posture with the need to reassure we are not affecting their strategic capability through the nato bmd construct which is focused on
iran? >> anybody. >> i'll take the second part because like i said earlier i don't do policy. that's the hard things it for peppi. but also we -- i think sometimes we let the russian rhetoric get to us because knows systems are all defensive systems and all -- we have said it over and over again. they're aligned -- they're not aligned toward russia and don't have the capability for russia. so we have said it over and over again. but we allow that rhetoric to get to us. yet nato bmd, i think it's one of the wins for the alliance. it shows again not burden sharing but shared commitment amongst the alliance members. and i don't think whatsoever it is poking russia one bit. i'll leave the first question to someone else. >> you know, on the -- how is nato responding to, right, sort of the iamd challenge, i think both for the united states and
the nato european allies, right, we sort of left iamd kind of in the distant past. right? it was an artifact of a cold war. and we've sent 20 plus years not focused on those kinds of capabilities and concepts. so we're in the a way i'd say kind of the united states and nato are in the same place, right. i mean, as i said, we identified the integrated air and missile defense as an important strategic operational concept to help us deal with new anti-access area denial challenges posed by the big powers. so we have reintroduced the concept, right, the department -- the d.o.d. has spent a good bit of time in the past six to 12 to nine months. consulting with allies. in capitals to really rebuild the consensus on the role of integrated air and missile defense. that's taken a while.
there were lots of consultations to hem them ubds look this is what potential big power adversaries are doing. integrating the cruise missile and ballistic missile strikes in ways. it's not a technical problem. they're trying to prevent, right, the alliance upholding its deterrence and defense functions. and so you know the short answer is i think the allies are starting to respond. but it's -- there is work in the policy levels in nato. and you have nato military committees. i will tell you that both the pull mill committees and committees in are looking at integrated missile defense and developing positions and sort of strategies and in trying to figure out the way ahead with the united states intimately involved that regard. as it relates to russian inf i mean what the russians do with the land based long range cruise missile is emactually emblematic
of the larger threat that's been in place for a while with russian cruise missile capabilities. it reinforces the importance of the alliance, right, rethinking defense of its own critical assets. >> grate. thanks. anybody else? >> brian. right up here in front. >> brian done lock lockheed marten. i like the dialogue up here i especially like the discussion of achieving balance between left of law firm, deep strike operations and the defensive operations. so from a d.o.d. standpoint it appears now that the department at least has taken the position that the focus of resources and priority is going to be to the left of launch. there is a tremendous amount of investment and resources that are being applied to hypersonic strike. very, very inversely on the hypersonic defense side.
so from a crystal ball standpoint, at what point what is the inflexion point that we see that at at some point the hypersonic defense begins to be better resourced than what it is today? so at this point the department still is looking at its options for the defense of hypersonics. so i think time linewise maybe a year or so once those tough investment decisions are made. and when we're talking about hypersonics they are tough investment decisions. it's a very challenging threat set that will require new technologies and new -- new movements into different parts of the domains that we haven't been in before. and rightfully so fink we are taking a very deliberate approach to it. and i think the threat at this time and pacing of it allows us
to take that deliberate approach. and i think it's wise for us to go that way. >> anybody else? >> i think it is safe to say that hypersonics as a capability is something that we would be prudent to look at both from a defensive capability and how do we defend against it? and i think it's important that we do that. and then how might we employ that offensive capability. the only other thing i -- one thing on the term left of launch -- did i know it's a term of art. we use it fairly frequently. i hate for the term left of law firm for anyone to imply that we were going to attack them before they were able to attack us. and i think attack ops or offense, defense integrations as you know, brian much more nuanced than just rest of launch. we'll nef be able to do it all with an attack op prior to launch. it's going to be across the continuum of operations.
and it may be retaliatory. but it's not necessarily always gb to be -- it may be left of that guy's launch. but it's also taking out other systems that the full range of systems from logistics to command and control that's a part of offense defense integration beyond just a narrow left of launch. sydney. >> hi how did i know. >> sydney freed rk berg. breaking defense. i'm very struck by dr. we were doing this incrementally and hearing nato is having meetings is not the most reaassuring thing on the front and we need something radical. what is that? i'm --. the percentage yans saying we are going to fire so many arrows the sky will turn black and the spartan sergeant applies we are fighting in the shade. the volume of this threat ebrahim from china but also
russia is so great, a and the concept is so bad. is there a way to turn it around by putting laysers on everything? or some ew cyber approach? or some preemptive or you know, left of launch to borrow the term approach or do we need to learn to fight in the shade and everybody dig in and hide and pray they are alive after -- when the russians run out? >> well i'll say at a broad level. i'll defer down the row here for sure. you know, my flippant answer is it's probably a little bit of all those things minus the lassers on everything. i picture roroonla with laser w unice. >> first of all it's operational concepts. flat out there you can see the
army doing good work in europe and in the pacific as part of a joint force, trying to think through the challenge sets as they present themselves now. request o a question for the entire joint force and for the department -- which i cannot answer here today, is are we doing this at the scale and speed and seriousness and ability to bridge to adaptation of what we find -- are we doing that experimentation as we should be? i am suspicious we are not. i welcome being told that we are being proven i don't think about that. but i think it starts there. and then that leads to you the technology piece, whether -- what begins and what follows i think is always unique and not always one way or the other. by are but by and large i think the concepts have to be worked out with the technology before we know what exactly we want to invest in. and also i suspect it's about a range of bets. and those bets are probably as much in the r & d realm or even
more in the r & d realm than they are in the immediate for the reasons i just said procurement realm. i do think the allies piece becomes very important because of where we are talking about. i think the posture, dispersal et cetera whether you think in the operational concept realm or just in terms of global posture, you know, we just have to be very thoughtful about that at the same time we're kind of thinking through the reality of the shot doctrine problems that we're facing. so i do think some steady investment in the incremental side is important. it still matters. it signals for sure to adversaries and to allies and partners and it has real capability. but it mass diminishing returns as the technology advances so the question is how do we make sure we pace that and get in front of that? i'm not convinced that we're there. >> woody. >> i'll take -- fight in the shade, you know. i think, you know, we -- i
satisfy we -- europeans, u.s., nato have to be ready to fight in a complex environment. and we are. okay. the second thing is we got to be ready to defend what matters. and thirdly, again, it goes back to the commitment. and when you talk about the nato capabilities writ large, we in this room tend to think about what we just heard in the last few hours but what the u.s. navy brings process u.s. air force, marines and open up to allies and partners to europe. it's incredible capability we have in europe. and we don't get to see that enough sitting here in the u.s. and looking at u.s. capabilities. but when you go out and you see these exercises and you see the nato forces, how capable they are in fighting during exercises side by side with us, it's really nice to see. and they -- when we talk about homeland defense we always think about our homeland.
but guess what when we are in europe it's their homeland. they are committed to defending their homeland as we are our homeland. >> i think, look, there is no -- there is no silver bullets in this sort of problem set, right. i mean it's -- you know, as cat said it's kind of all of the above. it's not just the things we focused on here sort of active defense and passive defense piece and the attack operations. it's the other important role that general purpose forces play in particular theater when you combine them with the other capabilities you end one a much broader tool set intended to first and foremost did he tern right provocative actions at the lowest level possible. and if that fails rubio right to ensure you have the right set of offensive defense hive and passive defensive capabilities to accomplish the mission wherever it may be, in the europe orred indopacom area.
fair point gnat offensive missile threat really is database -- dsh continuing to grow and present incredible challenge, right, to overall defense posture pifrpg the other piece gets back to this sort of the way we shall thinking about advanced technologies. again, the department of defense during the post cold war with, era wasn't investing in those areas because there wasn't sort of a strategy or threat driver compelling us is to think differently about new capabilities or innovative concepts of operation. right now the calculus has changed now and you can see in some areas even in sort of the narrow area of missile defense, the exploration of new and advanced capabilities to help provide more sort of cost effective future solutions. we're really in that process, early, but looking at those capabilities and a whole host of different dplans, right, most of which are sort of kind of unable
to be addressed in some public ways. >> i'd say yes to all that. and add two thoughts. first, when the army was looking at this problem it didn't look at it just from the standpoint of air and missile defense. and if you look across its six more thanization priorities from long-range precision fires to the network, to amd they looked holistically and what kind of capabilities we need to fight in a new environment and to bring that, as cat said, what are the concepts, multidomain ops to provide that conceptual primework in which you apply those capabilities. and then not to oversimplify this, but one of the reasons that i continued to talk about offense, defense integration, more than just attack ops, is my
experience over the time of my career when i we were in the middle of a cold war we were always going to face a soviet artillery threat that had much more capacity than our capability to do what i would call the counterbattery fire. he shoots. we pick it up. we shoot back. so we looked at counterfire much more broadly. and it started first with rapid offensive maneuver. because if you were pushing him back he wasn't shooting and if you could get him out of range you could mitigate the threat. two, you take out his eyes. and we applies passive defense as part of that, reducing the capability of his eyes. three, proactive deep strikes, go find his capabilities, not just the launcher but the full range of capabilities and take them out. we talked about that a little bit earlier. and finally, it was the counterbattery. the equivalent here would be the
active defense. yes there is always need for more capacity than we have. but there are other ways to get at it it's not just active defense. we don't have to just fight in the shade. we want to move the sun. next question. here. >> okay i'm a reporter from radio free ameya last year was the korea projectile including a short range ballistic missile i want to know the response to the law firm when it comes to missile defense. and second question is considering this north korea missile test how do you see the tons missile defense capability? because now the united states deployed patriot missile defense battery and start in south korea. how do you see the assessment in capability to deter the north korea missile threat. >> anyone to take that?
chad answered that question in the earlier -- and, again, the same kmint that we'll deploy a full range of capabilities and we'll constantly look at what's the threat, what kind of capabilities do we need and to be able to deploy capabilities to address the threat. i think we have taken that first question. and the second question then we want to talk about thaad capability in europe south korea. sorry. >> what was that. >> the capability our assessment of thaad's capability in south korea. >> well, so the deployment the thaad to r.o.k. is be clear is strengthening the protection of u.s. and korean forces as it relates to sort of longer range regional ballistic nifls from north korea. but i don't have anything to offer beyond that, right. it's intended to provide along with the patriot systems more effective leader defense.
so that's what thaad brings, right. it reaches out further, providing wider area of protection. pan in conjunction with the patriot now it will provide a more effective defense. and will provide greater sort of area -- area coverage against potential north korean missile launches into south korea. >> and it's an important capability. and that's a good location to have that capability. you had a question here, sir. >> and then did you? coming to you next. mellow my name is du young kim from voice of america korean service. regarding -- i want to ask about the allied commitment for the what you mentioned about the commitment to defend the ally. after it's related with the missile last week, after north korea fired the short-range ballistic missile there was a comment by mr. mike pompeo it's
not something to fuss about since it's not a long-range or middle range ballistic missile. and what the ally side perceive is oh since it's not a threat to the united states directly it's not -- it's nothing to fuss about. and so, like, some misunderstanding can happen with this thinking like is u.s. government just focusing mainly on homeland security for mid-or longer ballistic missile than shorter ballistic missile? and i just wanted to ask. >> as the non-u.s. government employee i'll be happy to answer that. >> i've got an answer too. >> yeah, those sorts of statements are extremely problematic. our commitment to extended deterrence, the commitment we have more generally, our treaty commitment to in this capes the republic of korea and japan, that that missile test clearly aimed to threaten and divide us from warranted a response that
signalled more than anything unity and strength of alliance. and that is not the message that was sent. so we have to make sure we do better on public messaging and private messaging all work to confirm that our best position with regard to north korea is if we are positioned together that means of course that the rock roc and japan have to have a strong recommendation but we as the united states have firm in statements of commitment and our expressions of commitment that would mean things like exercises that are currently suspended things of that sort. so, yeah, i think it's a troubling path in particular because it's clear that that is the north korean tactic of choice, which is to demonstrate a division between the united states and its allies. and that is clearly resonating when the u.s. reinforces that, whether by accident, misstatement or worse.
>> providing a slightly different kind of look at this. i mean the u.s. has ha substantial commitment of military capabilities in south korea today, 28,000 troops. hasn't changed. it's made substantial commitments to missile defense in south korea with patriots and thaad. and bmd aegis capable ships in the region. you can go to the state department for clarification on what secretary of state said. but in terms of the u.s. commitment of missile defense capabilities to south korea, that remained unchanged but over the past couple of years with the additional deployment of thaad that commitment of missile defense capabilities in south korea has increased. so i think that is a tangible element of sort of u.s. commitment to ensure is continuing to uphold security obligations on the peninsula. >> great, thanks.
sir. >> sure. the byron the cowen capital alpha partners. i want to throe this as a particular question the transformation the approach when you think about the threat broadly over the next five to ten years, is it fairly linear? are there major break points we work about? we mentioned hypersonics as the whole swarming uav is problem is fascinating if you look at the uav delivery probabilities, the pro liver of of that technology globally. if you can characterize how you think about the threat over the next five to ten years that would be helpful. >> anybody? >> i'll speak to it broadly. and beyond the missile defense realm if you will. i think space -- of the things you didn't mention because i agree with the ones you mentioned i think space and cyber top my list. and inside cyber i would combine -- there is various forms of that. but certainly the information
domain and the ability to shape information so deep fake -- when you get cyber with ai, the ability to really change narrative and change beyond narrative what the war fighter sees and thinks is happening in his or her operating environment. that's extremely worrisome to me. the space piece probably tells itself. but i think we have seen a tremendous aggressiveness from the chinese and russians in space. i'm very pleased to see how much of that is now unclassified and widely available. i think space is one of those places where we held so much internally for so long that the rest of society, including on the hill they are trying to play catch up to a challenge set really evident in the defense community. we are seeing some of that play out through space force. but i think generally the ability to talk about the nature of the space threat especially from russia and mcchina is
something that can help us move forward. i want to say i think the united states has strong advantages. we have talked about some of them like alliances nar more of strategic level and extremely important i would say at the operational level. beyond all the things that we should focused on first in terms of personnel and training i think our undersea capabilities, though challenged and some of the things we have talked about are part of that challenge, i think that's an area of strength for the united states to be building on. and you know, i think our advanced air capability and our -- and our information and sensor capability is -- our potential for warning for global warning is much higher. we have some work to do. particularly because we focus on warning for when things turn red and the strategy of choice from russia and china among others right now is to never let the
indicator go red. we have a lot of work to let the mts intelligence system to catch up to the gray zone element. but i think it's well within us. and then our soft power. i put with the allies we need to underscore and build up our soft power. >> general formica reminded us earlier and it was a key point that we were executing a strategy. and the strategy was focused in a different area. as we pivot i hate to use that term pif op but as we refocus the great power competition it calls for reassessment our current power capabilities during the new adversarial or competitor threat we are looking at, make assessment and incremental proechl at least initially probably the right way to go when you are a resource constrained environment. there isn't a lottery ticket we can scratch off and pay for a lot of these things. kareemle i think at this point is the prudent way of refocusing development and capacity
building. >> i'd like to give the panel a chance at any closing thoughts you might want to share as you sign off. >> sir, the only thing i would say is that going back to the theme positive panel about the army strategy we at the joint staff level are pleased to see the direction the army is taking. we cheer them on as they build the short-range capacity to allow us to do gap closing with competitors. >> thank you. >> woody. >> there isn't one thing that we're going to do that is going to make this all go away. incremental. it's across all domains. it's going to take -- it's the shared commitment. allies, lock step with the allies every step of the way. >> cath. >> the i would reinforce the durability of the commitment is important. whether talking about the army or department where the degree to which it's invested in these areas with regard to missile defense will prove out over time. and so that's what i think we should be watching.
>> just two aspects of this. one is that the army has put together i think a good template. i'd like to see the army and air force -- i want to get back in the building i'm getting in trouble -- but them put together together similar. but that puts the services working in a collaborative fashion that needs more attention. secondly just to reinforce how important it is to extend this concept the way we think about working in air and- integrated air and missile defense. we have to do this dsh extend this approach with the allies and security partners because they are the force multiply equation component in thes strategy. >> isn't being in trouble in the building normal state of lay i appreciate that risk. >> thank you i want to thank you a couple of people closing this out. thanks to you in the audience and knows online for your attention for your
participation. and for your thoughtful questions. i'd like to thank the panel for preparing for this, again for being thoughtful in not only opening comments but in your responses to these questions. i'd like to thank dr. tom carico and the csis and missile defense the project for hosting this discussion and for moving our discussion on air and missile defense forward. and then finally in every public forum that i have when we talk about air and missile defense we spend a lot of time talking today about policy and about some acquisition capability and capacity. but i would like us to close by remembering that behind all of in there are soldiers, sailors airmen, marines and civilians who will develop, deploy and operate the systems that we're talking about. and it is to them that we owe a sincere debt of gratitude. with that i'll close. thank you all very much.
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