tv Manpower Morale After the 1968 Tet Offensive CSPAN May 18, 2019 1:44pm-3:01pm EDT
counting. 17 seconds and counting. 8, we, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, have ignition sequence start. 4, 3, 2, 1., engines are running. commits, lift off, we have liftoff 49 minutes past the hour. engines]of jet [indiscernible] entire film on the apollo 10 mission tonight at 10:00 eastern on railamerica, you are -- real america, you are watching american's trutv. >> in late january 1968 during the lunar new year, north vietnamese and vietcong forces
launched coordinated surprise attacks on cities, towns, and military outposts across a broad swath of south vietnam. this attack was known as the tet offensive. next, two historians have a talk after tet, including draft and enlistment rates of college graduates, army chaplains, and project 100,000. robert mcnamara's plan to recruit soldiers who previously did not meet some mental and physical standards. this discussion is part of an all-day conference titled manpower and morale after tet, hosted by the center for military, war, and society studies at the university of kansas. [applause] we will begin our discussion on morale, and to make this up, we are having this time -- at
this time, series of short presentations and talks by re-participants, -- by three participants and then there will be questions. is third participant jacqueline witts, the associate professor of strategy at the u.s. army war college, she tried to leap from harrisburg yesterday morning on a 7:00 a.m. flight and it turned out that the earliest she would be able to get in was 2:00 a.m. into kansas city yesterday. andhe is not here with us we have marjorie go lely, a graduate student here from military history and she will read jackie's paper. the questions will only be the other two participants, marjorie will not try to answer questions for jackie though show though i'm sure she could do a lovely job -- though i'm sure she could do a lovely job. the speakers of our second session, we begin with william donnelly, a senior historian for
the u.s. army center military history and we are followed by the director of the u.s. army museum. and finally marjorie will read jackie's paper. welcome. >> first, as a federal civil servant i would like to get the usual disclaimer that the opinions that i express your are not necessarily those of the secretary of the army, the chief of staff, or anyone else in the department of the army. president johnson and the congress in june of 1967 decide to end almost graduate school draft performance -- deferments. 1968,as until july of from july of 1968 to july of 1972 109,777 college graduates either enlisted or were drafted
into the u.s. army. total of 8.2% of all male non-prior service successions in these years. , just tome slides here give you some statistics for the framework. there are no bullet points at all in this presentation. of 1968, some college graduates were in the ranks, most notably oliver stone. but they were outnumbered by men with some college and by high school graduates, and you can see this in the two fiscal years before. and the fiscal years during the war ran from one july to 30 june, not the same periods we have today. you can see high school graduates are the biggest one for both years. this was the point of pride inside the defense department, particularly in the army. this was the best educated enlisted -- enlistment force
fielded today. when the draft deferments ended, calculations rough and they thought that 130,000 college graduates, this included people who had left college after getting a degree and were now in the workforce or had gotten their bachelor's and were now in graduate school, they thought about 130,000 of these people would become added to --ective services pool in 15 in fiscal year 1969. this was so many that the army staff feared that the fiscal would consist almost entirely of college graduates , and weect 100,000 men will give you more details about that program. in the aftermath of the tet offensive, they entered into negotiations about how to deal with this influx. the office for the secretary of defense, a valuable national resource, particularly those who had degrees in engineering,
mathematics and things like operations analysis and it would waste this valuable national resource to send them to the combat arms. they wanted these people to go into military occupational specialties directly related to their academic fields. the army staff had a very different idea, they pointed out that no mls in the army required assignments regular could swap them wherever the army felt they were best needed. and they had two other reasons for wanting to use these people outside of stem related fields. first, we need many of these men to revitalize jr. officers and jr. noncommissioned officer leadership. that's not dependent upon what your degree is in. second, and this surprised me when i found it, many of the senior officers in the army, and senior civilians in the secretariat and a lot of the field action officers thought that the current draft was immoral. that people who could get out of the draft were getting out of
the draft and people who could not get out of the draft were going to vietnam. and it was only right that college graduates, who by definition were more fortunate in their life experiences, share some of those battlefield dangers. as a secretary of the general staff wrote in 1968, someone has to fight. brokered bysers stanley reeser, who had a silver star and purple heart from world war ii. it came with four major parts, a new process would be instituted to screen draftees to match academic skills to mlss. men would be allowed to enlist in the regular army for specific mls's and men remaining after these soldiers will be placed into the regular assignment process and you are determined by how well you scored on your success -- assessment tests. finally there would be an intensive effort to get college
graduates to volunteer for officer candidate schools and for noncommissioned officer knownate courses, better as the shake and bake sergeants. concern about what these college graduates would bring into the army, specifically antiwar and antimilitary sentiments. and they would become a virus undermining discipline and morale. so how did this turn out in the years between two and 1968 and 1972? see the flood of college graduates did not happen. project 100,000 outnumbers them. the reason there is no project 100,000 year for fiscal year 72 is that the program was canceled early in fiscal year 72. the army came to the conclusion that the flood did not occur for several reasons, one for reasons outside of the army's control, local draft boards did not
target college graduates. that did notthing happen. navyome did list in the and air force. and this was an important factor, college graduates were good at gaming the system and avoiding induction. the switch to the draft lottery in 1970 brought in fewer college graduate inductees and depressed the reasons and motivations for them to enlist in the regular army to avoid the draft. for structure during 1970 and 1972 reduce the need for draftees and the nixon administration wanted to reduce draft calls anyway. here you can see the drafted and enlisted as a percentage of the total enlisted college graduate exceptions. for the first three years, you can see the blue, the draftees, dominate how they come into the army. and it flipped radically in the last year, primarily i believe
because the draft calls were so low and infrequent in that last year. how, onceslide shows a college graduate's progress e1 one pay grades, through e-five, private through sergeant, people graduate degrees and people with just undergraduate degrees, and you can see the big spike in november of 1970. this is based on surveys that the army did at the educational level of the enlistment forced. analysis within the staff of what this might mean, what these figures might show or tell them about what's going on in the enlisted force. shows a keyde, this concern of jr. enlisted men. [indiscernible]
of 1970, and ine found this data in a study related to the transition to the all volunteer force, the u.s. uses draftees because they used to -- before their service members before the regular army. in you can see starting 1967, those of the calendar years, it is very dangerous to vietnam bravo drafty in . the nexta little comp -- the slide is a little complicated. but it's a total percentage of college graduates brought into the army. these are draftees and enlisted. priority one was the category wanted to beed filled with a college graduate. some of the and background's down there, men who volunteer for officer candidate school or
enlisted for it, cas stands for civilian acquired skills, those are men who came in with skills that translated to an mls of they were awarded to that mls based on their skills, like legal clerks, many lawyers were drafted and wound up as legal clerks. dafnu, stands for the department men couldd forces -- be assigned that or they could actually enlist. mls -- four -- are men who an mls signed up for a specific mls. there are almost always, reams
of figures for this, and i look through all the reports, very few men enlisted for one of the combat arms during these years. that the armye was very successful in getting men to volunteer for ocs, fiscal year 69 is the first year in the war were a majority of ocs commissions go to college graduates. and when the numbers start falling of people who volunteer among college graduates, because of other changes in the program, college graduates remain the majority of people who get the ocs commissions for the rest of the war. priority twoe, were mls costs made for the -- for thede computer-driven assistant in washington, and they had technical capability. ,cross the bottom, combat arms
those are the infantry, armor, i brokengineer mls's them out separately so you could see those who are signed -- assigned. the radarall o'reilly's, the courts. and then there are the supply as well as medical care and treatment mls, and the 95 .eries is law enforcement i always find that last spike in the 95 to be interesting. i have not found any smoking gun , but i have wondered if there were more college graduates into law enforcement mls because of the deteriorating discipline within the force and they felt that they might be more reliable as mps. you can see from the combat arms
in the 11 bravo columns, that for the first three years the army was fairly successful in getting a good number of college graduates into the combat arms. thereby implementing the general's belief that the smartest people available should be squad leaders, to help men survive. they wrote that on a report about what osb was thinking about doing. and johnson, who was the chief of staff, was very much against osb's concept of using these men . i did not put these on a slide because it was already busy, but college graduate input to the shake and bake courses was 18 1% and it decreased until the program was canceled in 1971. what were some of the effects on the army of increase college graduates? first, there was use when
filling mls that required good academic skills, there is a noticeable lowering of the nutrition rate and a lot of the courses required skills. -- attrition rate and a lot of these courses required skills. and anecdotally they performed better in units. and second, this is also anecdotal, it increases the number of jr. leaders possessing attributes the army defined as high quality, including ocs and the shake and bake ncos. but this is on the army defined quality, the consensus among , and thenicers captain mccaffrey went to vietnam and did a study with the combat arms and what was going on within units, he found the most jr. officers and ncos were technically competent, but they lack sufficient experience and leadership training for the complex situations that they
encountered after tet, particularly after combat. when you are in the rear or a combat unit, and you are not the field a lot, that creates lots of different situations which were not covered in the courses that these men went through. about and talking undermining discipline, the consensus within the army was that while most college graduates did bring antiwar and antimilitary sentiments into the service, only a handful ever acted on them to promote dissidents or resistance. vigorousran a very counterintelligence operation against dissidents and rita resistance in the army. to there are summaries chief of staff and the secretary that never mention college graduates as a source of problems for this. so the prediction in 1969 that if we don't engage these bright young men and responsible jobs
that they will be off in the barracks, planning a riot, did not come to pass. i think that's a good topic for the question-and-answer to tease out some of the reasons why that did not come to pass. staff's the army objectives for extending the cost beyond the working class was hardly fulfilled, but not to the extent i think it desired. certain general officers, particularly like bruce palmer jr., and some of the field grade officers, earlier we heard about the gap between the world war ii vets in the vietnam vets, this is part of it, they came out of the world war ii experience, where it was the whole nation engaged in the war and they felt that it should be the same way in vietnam. at least some of them felt that way. but there's not enough college graduates to overturn any kind of consensus that this is still a working class war on the brown
and the combat arms. true, and i don't think this is challenged. i think this requires a slight modification in that in the post tet years, there are more tim o'brien's in the bush then we generally think that there were. i would like to close with a there anestion, was unintended effect on american society by ending the draft deferments? did bringing 109,007 hundred 77 college graduates into the army and an even greater number -- 190,777 college graduates help accelerate antiwar sentiments after tet? one thought from general bruce palmer jr., the vice chief from 1968 to 1972, and by the way, had a son who had a high number in the draft lottery and so he
, he came toafted believe that the real demonstration against the war did not start until they started drafting upper-middle-class whites and blacks. he said that in an interview when he was researching the all volunteer force book. say that this is one of the questions we could continue, bringing these men into the army, and premature all of them went in to the army, only a few went into the marine corps, did it actually help accelerate the other changes in greater american society? thank you. [laughter] -- [applause] flint, the director
of the army museum, and i will follow bill with a bit of an excellent nation, he mentioned something called project 100,000. for a quick show of hands, who knows what project 100,000 is? endeavor to not burning it down too much. presentation, it was going to consist solely of a smiling robert mcnamara. after my conversations last night, i decided that would be a bad idea. from the conversations last night, i did realize that we have some of my colleagues here who are going to be touching on other elements of this program. so what i'm going to do is give to a statistical background set the stage for further discussion and for the remainder of the day. so background, in august of
1966, at the same time as america's manpower requirements for vietnam were rapidly expanding, robert mcnamara was speaking to the annual meeting of the veterans of foreign wars. in that speech introduced a new program that, in his own words, would uplift america's subterranean poor by providing those young men who had previously been disqualified training, benefits, and opportunities of military service. projectect was titled 100,000, it was meant to be a win-win for the united states military and american society as a whole. in program officially began october of 1966 and ran through december 1971. and it was a disaster. the distraction that ultimately wrought on the armed services and more important the on the individuals who were on nearly inducted and on the lives of
endangeredere either or lost their lives because of the use of substandard men in military service, particularly in combat service. so how did this program come about? why was it such a disastrous -- why was such a disastrous idea made policy? mcnamara, as in a trickle of lyndon johnson's team -- as an inter-copart of lyndon johnson's team, it was designed as part of the war on poverty, the great society programs. early and mid-1960's, approximately 1.8 million men came of draft age every year. of that number about 600,000 were deemed unfit for military service due to mental or physical reasons. the split there was about 50-50. 300,000 of each type of disqualification per year.
the thinking was that of the 300,000 who were disqualified for mental reasons, a good portion of them were simply victims of circumstance. they were men who had innate in ellet -- intelligence, but whose poverty prevented them from gaining the education necessary to qualify for military service. psw,s 1966 speech to the he cried that these young men had not had the opportunity to earn their fair share of this nations abundance. and through military service, these disadvantaged men could return to their communities with skills and experience, and by extension, better those depressed and marginalized communities. the road to hell is paved with good intentions, that keeps coming to mind. the goal of project 100,000 was to induct annually through voluntary or compulsory means, 100,000 as the title, previously
disqualified men into the military. each branch was assigned a percentage of men from this program, what officially became known as new standard men. another marvelous euphemism. the army received the bulk of the new standard men, followed closely by the marine corps and believe it or not the air force and the navy were required to take a certain percentage of these new standard men as well. so what were these new standards? for the purposes of induction classification, the military has five mental categories ranging from category one of a very high iq, down to category five a very low iq, with category three being average iq. throughout the late 50's and early 1960's, utilizing results from the armed forces qualification test, which the military adopted during this period, the military services were able to be selective. period, almost 15%
of draft age men were disqualified. and so the military was able to only induct personnel from the top three mental categories. 100,000, large numbers of mental category four was now eligible and available for military service. this meant men who scored between a 10th and 30th percentile on the armed forces qualifying test could be inducted into service. thesed the induction of low iq men impact manpower? hadsimple answer is that it a positive attack -- effect on manpower. it provided the bodies needed for vietnam. and 1971,between 1966 354,000 new standard men were inducted and served. of that, 47% were drafted. volunteered or
were induced to volunteer by the threat of the draft. from a straightly manpower standpoint it works. it brought in the bodies. but to the program truly work as advertised? no. it didn't. in my opinion the program was a failure, and i would like to take a minute and show some statistics to illustrate what the impact was on the armed forces, particularly on the army and the marine corps. 50% of new standard men have an iq of less than 80 -- had an iq of less than 85. the south, when compared to 28% of the general population that was in the military at that time came from the south. 40% were african-american, compared to only 8% of the american population at the time. 40%were college dropouts, could only read below a sixth
grade level with a further 20% reading below a fourth grade level. relatively -- within a relatively short period, the negative impact started to become clear. army68, the u.s. continental commander, the predecessor to today's training , theoctrines command organization responsible for the training of all soldiers, including new standard men, they had excluded new standards men 230 seven the entry-level military occupational specialties. after they continue to identify more problems with training the new standards men, they started excluding them from more and more mlss, to the point where they read now excluded from said -- they were now excluded from 74% of entry-level mlss. in short, new standards men were
a drain on resources. they were difficult to train, they took longer, they had a much lower completion rate. overtaxed instructor staff, from basic combat training all the way to individual mls training. the army in particular was not given additional resources. they were not told that you getting these new standard men and they are going to require more training so we are going to give you more resources in terms of manpower and other resources to be able to train these men. now taking their instructor staff and having them work a lot harder with less result. when you are spending all of your time, for those who have been that jr. leader and you find yourself spending all of your time with that 10% of your troops who are your biggest problems, these instructors were spending all of their time trying to train a tiny -- a very small number of new soldiers and
they are neglecting all the others. so project 100,000 was a failure. the negative consequences of utilizing substandard manpower, especially during wartime was understood by military leaders. and i want to set the stage for further discussion, but i want to end with a sobering statistic. of the 350 4000 new standard men who were inducted between 1966 and 1971, 5478 died on active duty, the majority on combat in vietnam. new standards men were twice as likely to die in combat as their higher iq comrades, and it's also estimated that over 20,000 of them, we had to extrapolate this, but over 20,000 new standard men were wounded in combat as well. on the hold the program was a
failure and i hope that this overview sets up further discussion. i am followed by marjorie. [applause] >> i know you are hoping for dr. witt, i will try to do her talk justice, the first thing that she put on these pages is a traditional disclaimer that this presentation represents her view and is not the official position of the dod, u.s. army, or the war college.
everyone, i'm so sorry i could not join this fantastic lineup today. i was struck with a terrible curse from the travel gods with no reasonable way to make it to kansas. i hope you will except my sincerest regrets, and i hope i will be able to catch up with many of you at the meeting in may, or sometime in the future. and i will happily field questions through email and social media. in the short time i have, i want to use the narrow lens of religion to examine the question of morale after tet, this allows us to ask questions about morale and public opinion. to ask for this relationship i focus on the first person accounts of chaplains and records from the chaplaincy. i want to ask two primary questions, first, how to declining support from religious organizations at home and their first-hand experiences affect morale in post tet vietnam, and how did military chaplains,
specially those who served in vietnam before and after tet observe and interpret changes in troop morale? the basic trend in public opinion are well-known. as the war escalated, american casualties mounted and this increased pressure on young american men, support for the war declined. the national media played a critical role in shaping public opinion about the war. when the national media portrayed religious people in vietnam, especially after 19 six t7, it's coverage was itrwhelmingly -- 19 six t7, was overwhelmingly about religious protest. 1967, it was overwhelmingly about religious protest. fathers daniel and patrick there berrigan burned draft cards and aided draft
deferments. 1960's, thef the sentiment of vietnam had taken on a sharp edge in religious communities and revealed a deep divide. by the late 1960's, even conservative denominations like the southern baptist convention adopted resolutions advocating an end to the war. without support from religious communities, alongside first-hand experiences, resulted in a significant decline in morale amongst chaplains. offensive,et chaplains were increasingly aware of religious dissent at home, and waning chances for military success. a chaplain recalled thinking during the spring of 1970 i knew what the national news back home could not tell. we were not winning the war. shoulderso reassure -- soldiers, even though he considered the situation helpless.
-- i foundmyself myself telling them everything was not all right -- hung them that everything was all right -- telling them that everything was all right even though in my heart i knew that he could not be all right. chaplains collectively believe that a sincere approach to god could possibly help any man solve his problem and live a better life. them feelr made theess and helpless, and more seriously you take the role of the clergyman, the more you feel the weight on your own morale. this was critical not only for the chaplain personally, but also for the unit. an ineffective chaplain could only damage the military michelin -- mission. service chaplains were not subject to draft, even after many other exemptions were
eliminated, because serving as a chaplain required credentialing from the military and from a religious endorsing agency. chaplains had an unusual amount of agency and rick -- in determining whether they would serve in vietnam. were asked tome deploy for a second tour. but if a chaplain did not want to return he could simply ask his endorsing agency to withdraw his endorsement, rendering him ineligible for service as a chaplain. and because he was a member of the clergy he would not be subjected to the draft. the army chief of chaplains wentted that fewer than 12 through. some exquisitely compared their fears and their first-person accounts, and these perspectives are important to understand change over time. this also reported the -- they also reported their observations about morale of the end ethics.
we ought to read narratives critically, they wrote for public audiences after the war and for their religious communities, working to make sense of the war. to place blame for loss and to navigate the dramatically shifting political and social landscape in the 60's and 70's. as the war went on, many chaplains became disillusioned by the apathy towards religion and with their behavior in general. early in the war, chaplain saw a potential for ministry in their own effectiveness, but they were gender -- but they became despondent. in 1973, as the total number of men diminishes, the possibility of those attending religious services becomes even more apparent. simply a sense of boredom et cetera, all
menributed to making the apathetic and lackadaisical. the member religiously immature and grossly under instructed. and therefore they failed to see any relevance or applicability of religious practices. the official reports about the number of services conducted, counseling sessions, and other functions indicated a decline in religious practices and tradition compared to earlier in the war. attendance at religious services, and inattention to concerns, chaplains complained about the simple and hedonistic lifestyle of soldiers and officers in vietnam. one wrote that the overwhelming majority of men are either actively engaged in excessive drinking habits, cohabitation, or prostitution and drugs, or at least they are immersed in a
ieu ofou of -- mil blasphemy which renders them unfit and unworthy to come into contact with the sacred, or whatever represents it, so they stay away in droves. war had changed dramatically by the early 1970's, not only because of an increased drug use by american service members, racial tensions, and protest, because the nature of the war had changed. individual chaplains recalled a profound effect these changes had on their militaries. not want toho did leave his church in 1967 recalled having a different attitude at the end of his second tour in 1970. in 19 six t7 i returned to an 7 i returned when america where religion was --
for patriotism was invoked, and when i returned in 1970 was increasingly held in disdain. identifiedplain civilian attitudes towards the war and soldiers as one of respectful support in the 1960's to hostility in the 1970's. sentiment, antiwar and racial conflict affected the troops. he determined his work as a chaplain was greatly effect by these changes. he moved to a somewhat defensive , and he in the second recalled having two approaches ministry as one of restricting immoral and improper acts, rather than encouraging religious faith and provident actions. account, we see significant evidence of a declining morale and cohesion in the waning years of the vietnam war. chaplain morale was affected by
the declining support of religious communities, and a sense of hopelessness in the war effort. chaplains also observe changes in morale as the war went on. changes andso ethical, religious, and the philosophical orientations of their soldiers. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. >> ok. [laughter] me,ou will have to excuse i'm used to always being behind a table for the questions and answers. >> that feeling of exposure. >> very much so. >> can everyone hear me? good.
[indiscernible] i think they took care of that. and jackie is available through twitter. if you have questions -- [indiscernible] >> i'm going to move a little closer. >> i have a question on manpower, especially after 1968. what prevented the u.s. from inducting more soldiers, there was no shortage of soldiers in europe, and there was still the cold war, so why were these shortages? fiscal reasons? political? if you look at, there's a political reason for it. we have enough qualified men,
especially with the project 100,000 to lower mental standards, there were plenty of men. but immediately after tet, there were so many deferments. sony people were able to get out of it. , from mywas deliberate readings, the johnson administration did not want to tap into the reserve component. we had an enormous reserve component, how it was utilized during vietnam and today is black-and-white. reticence toeal dip into that already existing resources. and they wound up not really mobilizing anyone in sizable numbers and it was reasonably small after the tet offensive when they were forced to. >> i was a little distracted their. camera i had to be,
ready. >> i was curious about the dynamics that drove -- especially in the u.s. army, because of the requirements of europe as well as [indiscernible] why were there such shortages in 1970? in why couldn't the u.s. government figure out ways to bridge the gap? >> while a third of their soldiers were in jail. [laughter] in some ways it's deja vu all over again, because the army had the same problem during the korean war and could not keep calm that unit up to full strength. is that the answer congress and the president never gave the army a big enough pack of strength to do everything he called on the army to do in both wars.
theyind in the korean war increased the catoosa program and put korean soldiers into american units. ,hey did not do that in vietnam so the u.s. army in vietnam was short, pretty much as soon as the first rotation finished in 1966 and the individual replacement system became the dominant way to get people into the country. the army just never had enough bodies to do that. there were some cases where there were officers, particularly pilots, who are supposed to get 24 months between tours in vietnam and they don't. and the retention rates for these people collapsed and it creates a vicious cycle. vietnam, butitized that's why jim has the size of the platoon he does. -- they don't have a bigness big enough
>> i have a question. [indiscernible] >> talking about the consequences of college graduates been part of the army, do think one of the consequences may have been the college students started the postwar narrative? coms very contract -- bat-centric. when you look at the stories in what went on , it seems that college graduates were able to articulate their experiences in with that had resonated .merican public culture
is that one of the consequences -- that there were those on the ground in vietnam that had the capacity not just to see and conceptualize what they were seeing, but to write it down in a way have been able to consume? >> i would agree that is true but i would also say that is a long tradition between world wars. many if not most important narratives of those wars are from men who were either college graduates or college students when they went in or after the war and went to college and moved into that part of american society. there has been a long tradition there. i did review a number of oral histories. here you get men who didn't go theollege as well or
college graduates. i think their experiences in much the same.y i think that is one reason the college graduates do not become the vanguard and the resistance is that the troops do not need a vanguard organizations to show what is wrong after tet. graduates may dominate the most popular and well-known narratives of combat experience, i do not think it is radically different from other backgrounds and men experienced in the war. >> do you think -- really wanted to provide opportunity for soldiers? one person said that it started
out that way and they do really want to help and they do really need to -- it originated from a desire for that. it was a study done that looked at him part first committees and theyn different ways and 1964, i think it was one of the first times we said this is before the large-scale commitment in vietnam. the administration wanted to utilize and lower those standards to bring more people into give them the benefit of returning them to communities and of those communities by extension. militaryught off by
leadership who said we have been in korea withre low iq soldiers appeared they were able to resist it at that point. by the time mcnamara amounts his knowledge0,000, to my he never said this is another way to get bodies into vietnam. ofalways still have even air being a social program to better society as a whole but in we get to have families and young men were better off. you're able to leave them alone. you do not have to dip into the reserve component. it was a program to funnel folks into vietnam. when you read the correspondence within the army staff, they never like project
100,000. see when theou college graduates now become a source of manpower, there is .ery explicit comparison we want the college boys. may press come if you're going to keep given us new standards for quotas, we need access to other high-quality manpower. in several cases they said they were afraid they would get a flood of college graduates. the said you need to cut quota and all through the program, at least what i have was from the programs it wasted on them.
>> can you comment on the effect of manpower, especially project $100,000 and elaborate on the elites? >> i think they are all well known. we are not going to name names. if you could clarify a little elites --e impact of are you talking about the ability of people who are better off to avoid military service or -- they put a lot of pressure on mcnamara and johnson. [indiscernible] >> i don't know the specifics but it gets back to in its
implementation, project 100,000 went after the most vulnerable. i think that is why it became so egregious. in short order, everyone could see it. throughout training no one was supposed to know who the new standards men were in the organization. i do not have the data, but anecdotally, every vietnam associate i spoke with new who they were. it was clear who these folks were. >> as i said, the army did not like this will them and felt it had been hoisted upon them. in the army, many of the senior officers, the world war ii generation had this whole feeling about what a good war or a well-run war should be which is the nation should be all in. that thea real feeling college boys as some of the
feel-good officers would call them were putting one over. one anecdote sums this up that i found that a physicist who was drafted out of the phd program was one of the army laboratories and he wrote into physics today, the premier journal for the field and said, i am being wasted. i am not being treated as a scientist. i'm just an errand boy. the officer who covered this put it out and sent it to his division chief and on it he wrote, the students specialty was high particle physics, high-speed particle physics. the colonel roback and wrote -- -- colonel roback grain?ack he said, 180 within a lot of the career
officers it was a feeling of a segment of america is putting one over on the less fortunate people. suggests and i just wanted to ask jackie if she were here would be, could you think about what we were talking about related to own scholarship about the experience. we were talking about the connection between american life and what is happening in vietnam . questionlso ask a about the officer corps. -- they claim within
officer corps during vietnam, it religiously more conservative and evangelical. you can find a person having a religious experience. i was thinking that i wanted to meditate on the question about where they telling stories on permissivence of a soldiers. made that also be covered by their own experiences and perceptions about what is preventable and what is not and what is acceptable and what is not to their own increasing religiosity. 1970's when they
were reflecting on their experiences and what went on in vietnam. many he can circle back around to it. it may be something to think about and go forward. >> i have a question about the return of the men to their beauties did anybody look at whether they in fact benefited? >> yes, i found the information somewhat scattered. hearings were held at the congressional level in the 1970's and some of the 1980's. plus when i found record of was 1980. the initial report showed that it was a failure and that they went back and performed worse than their cohorts. testimony that i just
found a few days ago says, in the long run, as a cohort, they ultimately performed better. over 50% of new standards men when asked about what their feelings were towards their military service, over half of them said it was a positive experience and felt it made them better and that they were able to look at economic and employment data and found that initially in the 1970's and 1980's they were less likely to be employed but by 1990 they were more likely to be employed. since then i have not been able to find any data. initially it look like it didn't benefit the men and the communities. we can assume that if they did better than their families did. by 1990, there was evidence to show it did have a positive impact. >> tenures are 20 years after,
is it possible the data reflects experiences after they got of the military? years or 20 years after, is it possible the data with bucks expanse after they go out of the military? data we looked at -- reflects experiences after they got out of the military? >> if we looked now into issues like homelessness, i'm only tangentially aware that occurred in the 1970's and into the 1980's but maybe is the economy was improving maybe they became with the attitude toward the v.a. benefits. piece of it. there were more resources become available for them to utilize. i doubtless some in 1989.
it was number one in the charts in 1965 and number one overall in billboard. --er examples would be [indiscernible] where have all the flowers gone? i really don't know. there seems to have been some .ole played i was reading something. >> we have to get out of this place. >> that was a most popular song
with those in and out of vietnam. that was a reflection of popular culture. there are american and are influenced by what is going on back in the states. >> [indiscernible] they take it on the year-by-year basis and track the most popular songs and relate that to political and cultural sediment and changes in attitude. >> are we making too much out of the volunteers because of the
motivated volunteers that they might not be serving as a volunteer. [indiscernible] do with moral matters. when i was there, the only people despise more the need psychiatrists where the -- they cap looking to us for some sort of justification for what they were doing. they suffered because there was no place for them. >> i would say the army was very much aware of the power of the draft.
they counted on it very explicitly. this went back to right after korea. graduate and list to avoid being drafted in between the two wars. speaking of the reserve components, army national guard and army reserve recruiting publicity exclusively says join us to avoid being drafted and starts after the korean war. is most evident -- [indiscernible] but having any chaplain about having a specific flavor of
chaplain. do you think in the late part of the war it was due to spirituality and morality? >> [indiscernible] [laughter] the chaplainss and officers are not immune from the conflicts and trends back at home. increasing distance between military virtue even when it is imagined persons -- versus realized. after vietnam war, it is especially concerning with the social trends and military personnel and churches and clergy in essence of bad behavior within military hurt the opposite point that the military has a corrosive influence on virtuous young men. it is primarily conservatives that are saying that the military was corrupting them.
>> they talked about the resistance toward army command and it was excited about the college graduate program. do you think there is any element of race that played into this? he said the new ones were african-american at 40%. to there a race dynamic resistance of the new standard? i can't speak whether the resistance was racially based on behalf of the army command. but it is clear that when you look at local draft words and once they dropped the iq requirements and you are drafting new standards men, draft boards now are able to
more readily induct people who are on the whole disproportionately ethnic minorities. whether it was delivered racism on the part of the army command i couldn't say. it was so in here in our culture and society at the time. i don't believe you can discount it. he addresses the issue and races it. -- from the internet to raise the african-american community up/ >> [indiscernible] >> it definitely had a racial
component. what i'm asking is, you talk about the army command resistant to the new standards but they were resistant to the new standards program. with a resistant because it represented a large group of african-american? to say that at least level of the chief of staff and deputy chief of staff for now, if they thought that way, they didn't leave any marks on paper. , for them it was more a matter of combat effectiveness, military utility more than raise for that issue t,cause particularly after te the army step was sensitive to this question of the perception of racial disparity in different fields. for example, with college guide to its, the overwhelming
majority of college students who were getting into the army reserve and national guard to avoid active duty are white. at one point, an assistant secretary of the army says, to drop the away reserve components because it is clearly up place for white people to hide out for them -- from the war. the army staff says no, we need this to keep the reserve and national guard up. selling been the big point for enlisting in these new components since the end of the korean war. they are also concerned about this was part of why some of them thought it was immoral to have student draft deferments because the majority of college students who were using those to avoid active service were also white. it was a clear perception that this was a way for white kids
not to have to go to vietnam. of this is the thinking in talking amongst themselves, we don't have any way to capture that. pretext period, the that theme sensitive more disproportionate. tothey do try to take steps put more african-americans in noncombat. i haven't looked at any details and i cannot say how effective that effort was. it is something they are sensitive to these issues, whether it is from a moral point of view, strict military
utility, or the public perception, public affairs part, i am not sure what the proportions would be in terms of what is motivating their actions. >> [indiscernible] >> this is a totally different topic. raciallyraft itself biased on the ascension that all african-americans in project 100,000 were lower iq? the truth was the test was not really a test. >> yes, and muhammad ali is great example of that. before a lowered the standards for project 100,000, the draft order in kentucky had brought times, andor three he had been examined for military service and rejected
because he had failed the mental category tests. i don't think it is because muhammad ali has a very low iq. it is because of how the test was designed. then when they lowered the called him in again. because the army crazy no control over the selective service. when they brought muhammad ali and for his next one, the army sent a psychiatrist from the surgeon general's office down to watch him take the test, and he passed because they lowered the standards. they immediately set about getting him an invitation from general hershey. when he showed up at the armed forces entrance examination, that is when he refuses to be inducted.
the army because he refused induction. >> thank you for an excellent question area [applause] [applause] the city of milwaukee, then is more than just a motorcycle company in a lot of ways. it captures the arrival of milwaukee is one of those cities for great american machines. the word iconic is overused but miller is iconic in milwaukee's history and present. it is a tangible expression and at an economic expression it was to tear and remains. -- tour is onore the road. we take into milwaukee, with the help of our spectrum cable
partners located on the shores of lake michigan and the city has one of the highest concentrations of german ancestry in the country. it was also here that the american socialist movement got its start. >> milwaukee in the late 19th entry was coming new machine shop of the world. you had huge for a largely immigrant workers who were very receptive to the message that i must to benefit in class. and we will visit the black holocaust to learn about james cameron, a survivor of an attempted lynching. >> the reason the story was so in orton and he wanted -- so important was he realized that lynching was such part of american history that is never taught. he wanted people to get an eyewitness account of a survivor of a lynching to see what the dynamics of a lynching were very
-- were. >> watch today at 5:00 eastern he spent tv and sunday at 2 p.m. -- 2:00 a.m. on history tv on c-span3 working with our cable affiliates explore the story. >> president nixon ordered the end of u.s. draft in 19 the one, but it did not officially end until 1973. next, military historians us the transition into an all volunteer or's and the question -- force and the question residents reason for ending the draft and whether it is better for wartime morale and this is part of an all-day conference hosted by the center for military, war, and society studies at the university of kansas. about an hour. ,> this is the final before the keynote address.