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tv   Hudson Institute Discussion on Nuclear Arms Control Part 2  CSPAN  June 13, 2019 2:00pm-2:16pm EDT

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. >> thank you all for sticking around, for the second portion of this event. now, we can spend a little bit more time considering together some of the policy implications and how the trump administration is navigating the current arms control landscape. and with us, i don't think we could have put together a better panel for this, so thank you all for being here with us and taking the time to do this and helping us think through these. directly to my left we have mr. timothy morrison, tim joined as a national security council in
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july of 2013 and special director to the president in weapons of mass destruction and bio defense and in this role oversees and coordinates the programs to reduce global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, including biological threats from deliberate occurring or accidental sources. each of them will give a brief introduction so we optimize our time together. but like the director, he has an illustrious biography as well. dr. james h. anderson, directly to tim's left, the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities. dr. anderson was confirmed by the u.s. senate on august 28, 2018, as assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, an capabilities. dr. anderson is responsible for advising secretary of defense, the undersecretary of defense for policy on national security and defense strategy. the forces, and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy, nuclear deterrents, and missile defense
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policy. and security cooperation plans and policies. dr. anderson ensures the department's program budget, and posture decisions support and advance senior leaders strategic direction. and directly to his left, mr. thomas dinanno, deputy assistant secretary for defense policy emerging threats and outreach bureau of arms control verification and compliance. mr. dinanno was appointed by president trump in october 2018 as deputy assistant secretary of state for defense policy, emerging threats and outreach to the arms control verification and compliance bureau. in this role he oversees the implementation and oversight of missile defense and space policy in support of u.s. national security policies, and objectives, promoting and implements bilateral multilateral arms control transparency and confidence building measures with allies and international stakeholders, and managing the bureau of strategic planning and outreach activities. and what i intend to do is have each of our panelists provide just a few minutes of opening
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remarks, of what they think are some of the key points that we should take away with us today. and then we will have a little bit of a conversation here, on the panel, and then i will leave some room at the end again, just like the last opportunity, for questions from the audience, so please do be thinking about those. and with that, i am going to turn it over to you, timothy. >> thanks, rebecca. first of all, i would like to express my appreciation to hudson for hosting today's event on the administration's new era of arms control. it is fitting to be here, in the institute that herman kahn created to talk about this subject matter. i keep on a table in mi office his seminal volume on thermo nuclear war which is a testament to both the importance of nuclear till low tons and intellectual meg tons and the challenge for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence so i'm lear to discuss the work under way in arms control and administration. the president has charged his national security team to think
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more broadly about arms control in terms of the countries and weapons systems involved. the world has moved 0en from the cold war and the bilateral treaties that cover limited types of nuclear weapons or certain ranges of adversary missiles. the president wants effective amps control that delivers real security to our american people and allies and to achieve this, he has concluded that we must negotiate with both russia an china. and so the national security council staff is coordinating options to how best to proceed of the administration has been consistent, beginning with the u.s. nuclear posture review that arms control can contribute to the national security of the united states and our allies. but unlike some true believers, who worship at the altar of the current arms control apparatus, we see arms control as a means to an end and not an end unto itself. which is why after examining the record on the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty we saw that after six years of trying to restore russia's compliance with that treaty, across two administrations, national security demanded the choice about whether or not the united states could be the only country
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effectively bound by that treaty. and in the end, the answer was obvious to almost everyone. we could not permit the situation to persist for the united states the only country in the world effectively constrained by the inf treaty. beyond russia's lack of compliance with other ingredients some of which general ashley referenced we must condition the trends in russia and chinese modern nuclearization expansion. and general ashley has addressed these trends. this is stark picture previously only known to us in the united states government. so we are implementing the president's direction and considering arms control options that could achieve the following objectives. first, it must be in the national security interest of the united states as well as our allies and partners. for example, we would benefit from an agreement that halts the growth of russian and chinese nuclear stockpiles while not undermining our ability to deter pack. for russia, the advantages of this could be it creates a new channel to have a dialogue with
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the united states. too often our efforts to have a positive relationship have been challenged by russia's maligned behavior. this is an opportunity for russia to demonstrate its interests in our bilateral relationship. and for china, which is concerned about avoiding an arms race, as are we, in fact, we are the only one not racing, here is an opportunity to match words with actions for a country that purports to have a minimum deterrence policy. second, the next arms control agreement must constrain potential adversaries current and military came abilities and prevent unnecessary military competition. with russia causing the demise of the inf treaty it is creating a situation where the bulk of the nuclear weapons and modernization is exempt from arms control. we know russia will seek concessions on missile defense. the president has been clear. we will not negotiate away our missile defenses. not ever. and as you know, it is ironic that russia, a country with 68 nuclear capable interceptors surrounding moscow, that it spends so much time worried
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about our missile defenses which are primarily to rogue states. based on the national security strategy and the national defense strategy the united states has moved to address a new phase of strategic competition to countries like china which means it no longer makes sense for china to be unconstrained by arms control measures. china has nearly completely fielded his nuclear triad growing capability rapidly so we should find a way to persuade china that limiting now, before it is a costly arms race. the united states and allies will be safer as a result. third, while each agreement must be tailored to its objective, the most successful arms control tre treaties have robust measures to look at compliance and detect violations in a timely an enforceable way. finally, we must ensure compliance with timely and substantial consequences for violations of arms control. the previous administration said the right thing. and i quote, rules must be
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binding. violations must be punished. words must mean something. end quote. but failed to follow through with action. this administration has actually held those who violate arms control treaties accountable as we have done with the inf and open skies treaties. by doing so we have attempted to not only make russia pay a price for noncompliance we have upheld the arms control as a viable national security tool. we know bringing russia and china to the table will be challenging so we are considering what inducements we may have to use in order to convince both countries that this effort is in their interest as well. we're clear-eyed in this administration, that arms control is a means to an end. a signing ceremony is not the goal. in a piece titled on the objectives of arms control, herman chan stated that arms control goal is to improve the inherent stability of the situation. decrease the occasions or the approximate causes of war within the system, and decrease the destructiveness and other
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disutilities of any wars that actually occur. end quote. and president reagan reasoned that, quote, everybody would be a lose fer there is a fallujah war. these are i think the the motivations behind president trump's push for a new era of arms control. if we break out of the cold war thinking about arms control we may be able to achieve a truly effective treaty that provides real threat reduction and not simply a treaty that defers what is easy and defers what is hard to someone else on another distant day. thank you. >> i would like to thank hudson as well for hosting this event. earlier in my career, i worked in a think tank myself, so i'm well aware of the value that think tanks provide, contributing to the public policy debate and certainly, this issue here, carries a lot of weight. and it's a great opportunity to discuss this with this audience. i'm james anderson. i'm the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and
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capabilities, as mentioned, i have nuclear weapons and missile defense in my portfolio. i'm going to pick up on a couple of points that lieutenant general ashley mentioned in the previous hour. i'm going to amplify a few things contextually about russia and chinese modernization programs. i will also contrast those modernization efforts with our own. because i think there are some sharp contrasts. and then i will close with a thought on how this impacts what this means for the potential of multilateral arms control. so russia's modernization is broad, it's longstanding, it's well resourced, and it includes a lot of different systems. the size and the scope are particularly noteworthy. as mentioned by the director of di. aichld they have a considerable capacity to upload nuclear warheads on their
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existing and projected systems, and they have the significant capacity to produce nuclear warheads. they have an estimated 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads that are not covered by the new star treaty. we have but a fraction of that number. they also have as announced by vladimir putin in march, 2018, they are developing some novel systems. and some of these are really strange loavian in their orientation. with nuclear powered autonomous submersible vehicles that can transit oceans to deliver multi-mega ton warheads. but stepping back, the numbers are significant, but it is even more significant, i think to put this in a broader context. and here i'm referencing russian
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behavior. particularly in the last decade, as we are now in this era of great power competition. things are done to try to remake the map in georgia, and crimea, and they're sertive, sometimes bellicose rhetoric when it comes to nuclear matters and veiled threats, it is all very troubling, in a larger context. and we also have to kind of sort of concern ourselves with the prc, because here, too, there are some important and noteworthy developments. china has the estimated double its defense budget in the past decade. and as mentioned in the last hour, our projection is that they will at least double their size of the nuclear arsenal in the coming decade. they are moving towards a nuclear triad. they would be the third country
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to have an air, sea, land component of nuclear deliverable vehicles. president xi has also called for a first tier military force. and we see not just in the nuclear realm but across the board, very assert tive chinese modernization, with intermediate range missile, with hypersonics, building aircraft carrier, amphibious capabilities, artificial intelligence, and so on and so forth. so this combined with the context of their behavior, in the indo-pacific region, in particular very assertive efforts in the south china seas is very troubling. and it is something that we are, the pentagon deeply is concerned with. having touched briefly on russian and chinese modernization efforts let me say
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a few words about u.s. modernization efforts, since this came up in the past hour. i think it would be a mistake to say, or to assert that russian efforts or chinese efforts are simply somehow in response to our efforts. if that were the case, then how is it that the russian modernizations, by, or roughly, you know, more than 80% complete, by vladimir putin's estimate, and those of the senior defense officials. where as we are in the early stages of modernizing frankly our legacy triad systems that go back quite some time. in fact, our ohio class fleet of nuclear submarine, the first one was launched in 1981.
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and it is scheduled to be replaced in 2031 beginning with the deployment of the next class of submarines. the columbia class. we also have our minute man three, a land-based portion of our triad. that is a system that was first deployed in 1970. and we expect to field the next class of land side cbms beginning in 2029. and then thirdly we have under development the d-21 radar long-range nuclear capable bomber which is expected to first supplant and then eventually replace our aging b-52 and also the b-2a intercontinental bombers. so these systems -- >> we're going to leave this discussion for a moment and take you live to the state dtm

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