tv U.S. Institute of Peace Discussion on North Korea Sanctions CSPAN July 12, 2019 4:26pm-5:55pm EDT
the question in the presence of a competition, somewhat similar to what we had going on in the "apollo" era, it was really the space race between the united states and russia. when that is presented that way nows now as a space race between china or otherwise, support shoots up to 49%. so, you know, if that kind of thinking gets our competitive juices going then we sort of have that "apollo"-era competition, spirit, happening but not right now. >> you can find all of the results at c-span.org including the findings on americans' attitude toward space force and the privatization of space exploration. now more about economic and financial sanctions against north korea. this took place after president trump's recent meeting with north korean leader kim jong-un. foreign policy experts look at conditions for removal of sanctions. the united states institute of peace hosted this event.
it's about an hour 50 minutes. all right. so woe're going to go ahead and get started. thanks for joining us despite the rain. i know it's difficult for many of you. for those of you who are not familiar with usip, we're a nonpartisan independent institute that is dedicated to proposition that peace is possible. we're funded by congress and focused on preventing, mitigating, or resolving conflict. one of the global hotspots that has eluded peace for many years is the korean peninsula, and as you know, recently, president trump and chairman kim met at the border between north and south korea, which has rekindled
the prospects for returning back to negotiations and breaking the current diplomatic stalemate. and, in fact, the two leaders agreed to resume working-level negotiations in the coming weeks and try to make progress on denuclearization and peace. one of the sticking points has been north korea asking for sanctions relief. in order for the kim regime to survive and thrive, it needs to generate hard currency and develop its economy and sanctions have impeded these goals. on the other hand, the trump administration has stated consistently that it will not provide sanctions relief until north korea denuclearizes or at least takes significant steps toward denuclearization. so this is the key question. how do we offer sanctions relief to incentivize diplomacy and denuclearization but at the same time not minimize our leverage
too quickly? and so to address these questions and others, we've assembled this fantastic panel of speakers. one of them is running a few minutes late so we'll just have him join when he arrives. but i've asked them as a group to help explain the scope of the sanctions regime against north korea including both multilateral and u.s. sanctions, the process for providing partial and complete sanctions relief. some potential practical paths for providing relief. taking into account the constraints and opportunities. and then any lessons from sanctions regimes on other countries and that can be applied to the north korea case. so let me introduce the panelists in the order that they'll be speaking. first, again, dan wertz, but he's not here so we'll have him probably speak second or third. dan is the program manager at the national committee on north koreapublications. he's the lead researcher and editor for "north korea and the
world", an interactive website of north korea's ex-personal, economic, and diplomatic relations. to my left, josh stanton, a d.c.-based lawyer who played a very significant role in drafting north korean-related sanctions laws including the north korea sanctions and policy enhancement act and korea interdiction. josh also served at the u.s. army judge advocates generals corps in south korea and he runs the website, one free korea. next, we have stephanie kleine-ahlbra i kleine-ahlbrandt right there. finance expert on the u.n. panel of experts, established purr subt pursuant to resolution 1874. providing recommendations to the security council on implementing sanctions. she also has had a long career as a u.n. official, as a director of the northeast asia program at the international
crisis group and she was a director of the asia pacific program here at usip, so welcome back to a usip alum. last but not least, liz rosenberg, senior fellow and director of the program at the center for new american security. she focuses on the national security and foreign policy implications of the usip sanctions and economic sta statecraft as well as shifts in the energy market. previously, she was a senior adviser at the treasury department overseeing the development and tightening of global sanctions on iran, libya, and syria, as well as the modification of sanctions on burma in the context of diplomatic normalization. i've asked each of them to speak for about eight minutes or so and then i will ask a couple questions to get the discussion going and then we can open up the remaining time for q&a. so i was going to have dan start, but i think josh can also provide a great overview, so we'll start with josh first. >> thank you.
good morning. the comments that i'm going to make this morning are my personal views. they don't represent the opinions of any government agency, member of congress, or committee of congress. unlike the other panelists here, my job has nothing to do with north korea. i am here on my own time. nonetheless, a few years ago, it was my great honor to be asked to come to the house foreign affairs committee and draft what became known as the north korea sanctions and policy enhancement act. it passed the house by a vote of 418-3 and the senate by a vote of 96-0. that may give you some idea of the bipartisan breadth of congress' impatience with the way american presidents have conducted north korea policy. they looked back on years of bad faith and cheating and mendacity by the north korean government, and they looked back on american presidents who had pursued the diplomacy of instant gratification. often prematurely throwing away
the nonviolent peaceful leverage of sanctions which really the only avenue we have left to disarm north korea without war. what we have learned through our experiences since 2005 is that north korea's surprisingly dependent on access to our financial system. the dollar the world's reserve currency. most of the money that sustains kim jong-un's regime has to be cleared by banks in new york. that gives the treasury department and the justice department the jurisdiction to regula regulate, to block, and prosecute people who are behind those transactions. north korea has no sovereign right to access to our financial system and as long as it threatens our core national security interests, we should deny it that right. that is, the philosophy behind the sanctions legislation which is nothing more than the denial of north korea's access to the
financial system until such time as it lives in peace with us. congress has power to control the president's authority to lift sanctions as constitutional, it's an enumerated power in article 1, section 8, of the constitution, win s which says congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. what congress expects from a north korea that has repeatedly reneged on its past agreements, it must regain our trust by accepting basic and fundamental transparency. so while i believe it is never too early to begin thinking about the conditions for the relaxation, the suspension, and the lifting of sanctions, i suspect we're having this conversation about two years too early because it's going to take so much political pressure on the cohesion of the north korean regime that kim jong-un is presented with the choice between reforming and disarming or, perhaps, seeing the cohesion of his regime undermined at
which point he will have a diplomatic incentive to reach an agreement that meets our fundamental security interests in his complete verifiable and irreversible disarmament. why do we insist on this? because we're dealing with a government that has exported missile technology to iran, syria, egypt, yemen, and burma, among others, that built a nuclear reactor in syria, that has helped assad use chemical weapons against innocent civilians in syria, that sold man portable surface-to-air missiles to terrorists, that has sent assassins to kill dissidents in exile and to murder kim jong-un's half-brother in a crowded airport terminal with vx nerve agent, that cyber attacks the united states and threatens the bedrock of our political system, our freedom of expression, that stole $81 million out of the bangladesh bank so clearly north
korea must make significant changes and accept the transparency necessary to verify its disarmament or co-existence will not be possible. north korea is a regime that lives on a small amount of cash overhead and even a small relaxation of financial pressure will give it the option to continue its status quo. that is not an option that will be acceptable to congress which has imposed strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions. section 104-a of the north korea sanctions and policy enhancement act sets out 15 categories of conduct including arms trafficking proliferation, the perpetuation or fillation of hum human rights abuses that require mandatory sanctions. section 208 is a bypass around the sanctions for humanitarian assistance or for those cases where imposing mandatory sanctions would harm our own national security. in other words, we should not
require the president to collapse the chinese financial system when there are other enforcement options. sections 401 and 402 allow for the temporary suspension and the ultimate lifting of sanctions once north korea accepts transparency and allows for us to verify its disarmament. to those who say that north korea cannot possibly accept nuclear disarmament, i would answer that this argument is ahistorical. north korea survived for decades without nuclear weapons and it can survive without them again. the threat to north korea is internal. it is the misappropriation of its wealth. it is fundamentally a kleptocracy problem. if donald trump were to attempt to unilaterally lift sanctions now, i suspect the response would be something like it was in 1986 when congress passed the comprehensive anti-apartheid act over president reagan's veto. we already see several bills in
congress including the asia reassurance act which is law, the brink act which has passed the senate, the north korea policy oversight act which is co-sponsored by senator menendez and eliot engel, foreign policy heavyweights in the democratic party in congress. and we have the lead act by senators gardner and markkey. the direction in congress is toward more strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions, not less and all of this legislation affirms our goal is complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of north korea. we have always missed, think, the root of all evil in north korea which is money. the goal of sanctions must not to simply put -- excuse me -- to put temporary pressure on kim jong-un until he comes back for another photo op. it has to be to disarm the
country but also to force kim jong-un to make better choices for his people. at this time the only form of sanctions relief that is appropriate is sanctions relief in the form of humanitarian aid that is carefully monitored to ensure that it feeds the hungry and by the way, regardless of what kim jong-un does, whether he behaves well or badly, because the north korean people are in no way responsible for his decisions. until then, we need a long game for sanctions and the long game means coalition financial diplomacy in concert with u.s. allies who issue convertible currencies to ensure only those financial transactions involving north korea that directly benefit the north korean people can clear the financial system. thank you. >> thank you, josh, and we have dan arriving right now. i'll give him some time to settle in first. so maybe we can go to stephanie.
>> so my comments today do not in any way bind or represent the united nations, united nations security council, the 1718 committee under the security council, or the panel of experts. so the goal of the sanctions regime, according to the united nations, so we're speaking about u.n. and not any of the bilateral order national regimes like that under ofac, treasury and other u.s. agencies which might be the subject here today. the goals are to persuade the dpr to dismantle its nuclear and missile programs and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. the goal is to reach diplomatic solution through negotiation and dialogue and that's something that was articulated very specifically following resolution 2270 when the sanctions were described as not the final objective. the goal of sanctions is to catalyze, quote, effective dialogue and originally that was
seen as a six-parties talk process and now obviously the six-party talks are long gone so we're looking at different forms of dialogue. finally, the goal of the sanctions regime is to limit the negative impact of sanctions on the economy and civilian population of the country. the sanctions regime is governed by a committee that falls under the security council. it's call eed the 1718 committe established by rose loose esolu. that was set up deliberately for the execution of the sanctions regime on north korea, and there are over a dozen other sanctions regimes which have their own committees. this committee has the same composition of the security council. so 15 members of which 5 are permanent members. and the committee is set up to implement the resolutions on the dprk, which since 2006 are over
10? ten. 11. >> ten. >> ten only. and the last three of which were in 2017 and we'll talk a little bit about that. underneath the 1718 committee sits the panel of experts which i'm a member in my personal capacity. they are eight members and represent the five permanent members they are not representing because we're independent experts but we come from the five permanent members. and in addition to that, we have members from the republic of korea, singapore, and japan. and the experts have -- they bring expertise in different areas. my expertise is in finance and economics. and we also have experts on ballistic missile technology, nonproliferation, customs and x export control, maritime air transport, and the like. and the panel's mandate is to assist the committee in carrying out its mandated function and mostly to investigate cases of
alleged violation of sanctions as articulated in the resolutions of the security council. so that means gathering, examining, and analyzing information that's provided to us by very different -- various different sources, whether it's member states or experts or organizations, u.n. bodies, and other interested parties. we make recommendations on actions to the council, to the 1718 committee, and to member states in order to improve implementation and then we report. so our, you know, largest function in our reports which are public, our last report was dated 6th march. you can find it online. they are very extensive. with lots and lots of annexes. and that is a summary of the panel's investigations for the period. we report twice a year. so for the six months prior.
and we investigate through on-site inspections. we are -- we visit member states at their invitation. we interview, we ask questions, we write letters to companies in member states and we do our own research. so in 2017, there were the last -- there was the last spate of resolutions and we'll just focus on the last two. what you've seen in the dprk sanctions regime is a move away from a narrow, targeted focus only on, for example, nuclear and wmd, to a broader, let's say, broader regime encapsulating a huge amount of the former sort of north korean economy looking at sectoral sanctions, a regime that prohibits a whole swath of activities in the maritime space, vessels and otherwise. so it's become a rather comprehensive regime.
what the panel has found in its reports is the expansion of the regime has not been matched by the requisite political will of member states to actually implement the regime. it has not been matched by the requisite coordination, prioritization and resource allocation to actually drive effective implementation. so the resolutions, resolution 2375 adopted in response to the dprk's largest ever nuclear test of august 2017 in resolution 2397 adopted in response to the icbm launch of november 2017 really introduced very, very sweeping sanctions, including a ban on work authorizations on all dprk nationals, and that actually comes into full force on 22nd, december, 2019. it's a requirement of member states to repatriate all north korean individuals working in
other countries. so you can get a sense of how broad the regime has become. prohibits all joint ventures or cooperative entities with dprk entities or individuals. strengthens measures regarding supply and sale of all petroleum product. it introduced a crude oil cap. a ban on all dprk exports of textiles, foods and agricultural products, and a ban on the transfer to dprk of all industrial machinery, transport vehicles, iron, steel, and other materials with the exception of spare parts to maintain commercial civilian operations. so the panel has found that the -- not only have member states insufficiently impleme implemented this regime, but invasion tactics by north korean entities and individuals have effectively undermined implementation as well, and the networks behind the elicit activity consist of a core of very skilled agent who are very
experienced and can cross borders, mobilize money, they can mobilize people and goods, they can engage in sales and trafficking of arms and represented materials. they can conceal financial activity by using complicit foreign nationals, front kp companies, and other methods to obfuscate the flow of funds. and through that, north korean actors have full access to the global financial system right now. despite all the efforts put forward by ofac and others. and the business conducted by some of these networks is generating significant revenue, and one of the recent areas of investigation of the panel is into actors, north korean actors' activities in cyber space. so that includes attacks on financial institutions, attacks on cryptocurrency exchanged. laundering of proceeds through attacks through cryptocurrency exchanges and even mining of
currency which has been done through, like, taking illegal control of companies to create, literally create money, is what's happening. and the panel has determined these types of activities are an evasion of financial systems. by going into bangladesh bank, reaching in and stealing money from the bank, the asset freeze provision is rendered meaningless. the bank never has an opportunity to freeze those assets because they're being stolen from under sort of the watch of the bank. so it is the view of many member states that this kind of activity given that the pie has sort of -- the way in which north korea is able to gain foreign currency is rishrinking. obviously given the wide-ranging sanctions on a swath of areas of economic importance. and yet this activity in cyber space is taking on a larger and larger proportionate -- larger
and larger proportion of the ability of dprk to make -- to generate revenue which under the resolutions, if that revenue is applied to its prohibitive programs is by virtue illegal. with that, i'll turn it over. >> thanks, stephanie. just to clarify, so the sectoral sanctions, they cover the prohibition on north korean exports. like coal and textiles and seafood and labor. all of -- that's pretty much 95%-plus of north korea's entire export economy, right? >> yeah. thank you. >> okay. dan? >> well, thanks, frank, for inviting me to speak today. my apologies for coming in late. there was a few road closures and heavy rain as folks might have noticed. frank asked me to start off by kind of giving the purpose of the sanctions regime. and i think this is an important kind of first-order question. i think it's useful to view most sanctions regimes certainly
including the north korea regime as having an implicitly a thr threefold purpose. signaling, constraining, and coercing. signalling in the north korean context that provocative actions such as nuclear missile tests will come with a cost and that future such provocations will come with even higher costs. constrange, meaning that sanctions are meant to impede north korea's development of wmd and military capabilities. and finally coercing, which is i think the most important part of the sanctions regime, the idea that sanctions pressure will force the north korean government to make concessions to abandon it's nuclear program in return for the promise of sanctions relief. so the coercive part of sanctions -- i think that's the most difficult to get right, getting coercive bargaining right. because it's difficult to translate economic pressure into
political concessions. and even with maximum economic pressure that's not going to necessarily translate into achieving max mali say objectives. sanctions policy has to be braurt part of a broader strategies. sanctions are not a strategy in themselves but have to be used with diplomacy and other tools of foreign policy to be able to be most effective. what are the explicit goals of the sanctions fweem? there are key differences between the u.n. sanctions and u.s. sanctions regime. the u.n. security council resolutions are premisesed on north korean's abandonment of the nuclear ballistic missile and other wmd programs. the u.s. sanctions specifically through knicks pia, the north korea sanctions and policy enactment ant of 2016 which my copanelist had a role in drafting, premisesed not only on north korea's wmd activities but
also on human rights abuses, illicit activity such as currency counterfeiting, cyber-attacks, et cetera. so for the u.n. sanctions to be lifted according to the various resolutions the security council is quote prepared to strengthen, modified or suspend or lift the measures as needed in light of the dprks compliance. that is to say the security council if there is a political consensus for doing so that's a big if -- can adjust the sanctions regime in accordance with the north korean behavior on the wmd problem. for u.s. sanctions to be modified, the executive branch has some leeway in administering sanctions, waiving sanctions on a case by case base but under nixpia for sanctions to be suspended in block, the white house has to certify to congress not only that north korea mass begun the process of denuclearization but has made
progress, left undefined on issues including human rights, illicit activities, et cetera. and for sanctions under the u.s. law to be lifted north korea must meet an even higher standard. so in theory there could be a clash between these two -- the u.n. and u.s. sanctions regimes. if north korea is to totally abandon its nuclear program but not change on human rights or other matters you could have a situation where according to the text of the u.n. security council resolutions it you u.n. sanctions should be lifted but u.s. sanctions would remain in place, including secondary sanctions on north korea's foreign trade partners. i think that possibility is pretty remote, though and not necessarily something to worry about. i think there is certainly reason to be skeptical that north korea will ever completely denuclearize. but if it does that decision will almost certainly come in the broader context of a strategic shift in north korea's
foreign recommendations and domesticic political economy. not necessarily a wholesale reform and opening. but would involve the north korean government going on a very different trajectory than the one its hittinger to been on. nonetheless, i think there is value in taking steps that would reduce the immediate threat of north korea's nuclear program that would lead to a reduction or end of its production of fissle material and other nuclear components or that would stop its advance of more advanced ballistic missiles and nuclear programs. i think a phased program of sanction relief in return for meaningful concessions on the nuclear program could be in the u.s. interest and in the interest of u.s. allies and could perhaps push north korea in the direction of going on that different trajectory down the road. so if there is negotiations trading sanctions relief for
north korean concessions on its nuclear program i'd articulate five principles about how that should go forward. first, any trade of sanctions relief for north korean concessions should be premisesed on the ultimate goal of denuclearization. but it should also make sense on its own terms, assuming the process doesn't go any further. second, i would start with sanctions that have the least direct connection to the north korean nuclear program and the -- that can be most easily adjusted or snapped back. injury sanctions relief to facility things like that cultural or educational exchanges are an easy first step. certainly sanctions relief to facility greater humanitarian access to north korea is important. though i don't think that should be died to north korean actions on the nuclear program. that should just go ahead regardless but beyond theess easy first step i think the um sector
alsanctions are the prime candidate for the major tranche of sanctions relief in return for meaningful north korean steps towards denuclearization. i think that sanctions on commercial trade are more easily adjusted up or down, more easily snapped back with the right u.n. mechanism in place than sanctions on things like north korean access to the international financial system than things like investment in north korea, which are really difficult to turn on or off. third principle, don't ease up on measures intended to deny hard currentry so pyongyang until we can reasonably confident the hard currency won't be funneled into producing more nuclear weapons. that is to say until there is a freeze on nuclear material production and at facilities for icbm production as well. that's not to say no sectoral sapgss should be wound back until a total freed fwreez is in place. i think you could perhaps sout start out with adjustment of
some of the sanctions on north korean commercial imports, things like fuel, metals, machinery, vehicles that do not have a direct military purpose, since relief of those sanctions would have certainly benefit to pyongyang. but at the end of the day if north korea -- if all its avenues to access hard currency are blocked and those sanctions are effectively enforced, it doesn't matter mouch fuel can you import if you don't have the money to pay for it. fourth sanctions relief should be structured in a way that pushes north korea towards opening its economy and showing a minimal level of respect for labor rights, for example if the kasong industrial complex is reopened it should be premisesed on the north korea workers receiving wages directly among other things rather than payments going for the north korean government and the nacren workers there essentially being paid in rations. and finally if a program of sanctions relief is to go
forward the u.s. and like-minded countries should continue to implement and enforce the sanction nas remain in place. but they should be clear in communicating intentions about sanctions enforcement and shouldn't expand the scope of the sanctions regime while negotiations -- meaningful negotiations are under way. so with working level negotiations set to restrooumsume after the imprompt eye ewe visit to the dms i think north korea may be willing to give more and accept less in sanctions relief in return. but at a minimum i think that having a high but reasonable standard for phased sanctions relief would be a good diplomatic tactic, leaving less room for pyongyang to pin the blame on washington if talks collapse. and if on the other hand north korea is actually ready for serious negotiations that leads to a tangible roll back of the nuclear program, i think the
u.s. should be ready's well. so thanks. >> thank you, dan. i appreciate you proposing affirmative the five principles. i hope we can talk about that later. liz. >> thank you. and thanks for having me here to anticipate participate with you all in the important conversation. so i -- it's great to go after you all have gone so i can respond to some of the things you've already said. actually i have appreciated how you all have laid out some of the purpose of sanctions as they are in place, including the law and the authorities that underlie them at the u.n. and in the u.s. system. and some of the modalities of their use and indeed potential ideas and principles for unwinding them through their modalities. but i want to make a point about the politics of this. and the practicality that the united states and indeed other international players must bear
in mind in order to proceed or operate in in legal environment -- in in heavily legal environment with lots of constrictions. and the first practical point that i want -- the point i want to make on practicality here is that what you say, for example, makes good sense for people who are familiar with the laws and have a lot of awareness and strong compliance programs in place. but as has been said, including by you, stephanie, we see a world of lack of awareness, inadequate if existent compliance programs for all of the -- including in the riskiest of jurisdictions and industries. so for example the shipping industry is sort of just beginning to wake up to the challenge that has been outlined explicitly over a long period of time in publicly available
information by the u.n. and by investigative journalists, by advisories from the u.s. government, the japanese government with photos. i mean there is actually a good amount of information out there if you are able to look. but there hasn't been enough awareness and compliance protocols internationally within the industry with the exception of the biggest money center banks globally who are pretty hip to the situation. but everybody else -- all other industries that have a requirement and other national governments that are bound as member states to carry out these sanctions and manage their enforcement are functioning with willful or in some cases -- or willful blindness and inadequate political attention to dealing with these laws and enforcing them.
so that's a major challenge to thinking about an environment of sanctions unwind, is that there is tremendous lack of knowledge and lack of formal coordinating mechanism to manage and unwind scenarios. so the point i want to make is that it's valuable to think about what an unwinding of sanctions could look like. and in fact it's necessary as a diplomatic measure to lay out a future where relief from the sanctions could occur. and in exchange for north korean denuclearization. but it's impractical to set expectations around what would be a small for small incremental future of removing these sanctions for a variety of reasons. the first of which is that lack of knowledge and compliance basis, which means that it will be very difficult to execute something that is small for small or incremental.
there are other challenge was a small for small, slowly phased incremental approach to sanctions. one other point i want to make before explaining why i think it has to be big for big instead of small for small. and that's the practical framework that should underlie any thinking about removal of sanctions. the point i want to make is is coming back to the premises, which was frank you said sanctions to relief to incentivize denuclear i guessation and not minimize leverage. sanctions can't be removed as a matter -- or rather they should not be removed. and it would take a lot of lawyering to remove them for an arbitrary win. which is to say, you can't pull them down just as an incentive. rather you have to see behavior change. they are put in place based on a specific concern. and there are many kerps that underlie north korean sanctions.
of course, proliferation and nuclear activities and then a whole host of others at the u.n. and in the united states and in other jurisdictions as well having to do with destabilizing activities human rights abuses and other reasons. so to incentivize that may be -- incentivize behavior change in north korea, that may be the domain for other engagement and not sanctions relief. this is the confidence-building, the establishment of communications between north korea and a variety of other important players in this -- in this diplomacy, the establishment of multilater forums for effective communications. and those kinds of engagements can include -- as mentioned already, diplomacy, particular kinds of exchanges, cultural or
educational, diplomatic as well, particular support for humanitarian -- rather particular humanitarian support, none of which requires sanctions relief. that may involve exceptions to sanctions authorities as they are in place, but that kind of communication and confidence building on a road to denuclearization is not the domain of sanctions relief. we're keen to think ofs because of historical precedent, not least because of the iran example. but there too there wasn't a remove of of sanctions for behavior change. in fact i think it's dangerous to think about that as such and to set a new precedent for the north korea program to offer relief to cancel sanctions in hope for -- in hopes for policy or behavioral change on the part
of north korea will have ramifications across all other kinds of use of sanctions by the united states and by the u.n. for any other kind of security threat to the global community or to the united states. and that is not something that the united states or the u.n. should trade away as dire as the potential threat of north korean destabilization, and nuclear, chemical, biological weapon use may be. so i'll say just one or two other things about not -- why not small for small and incremental, and why it has to be big for big. and then we can -- i look forward to engaging with you all and you all in a conversation. so why not small for small and incremental? this is a methodological approach that some have favored. and we heard a lot about it in the run up to the iran nuclear
deal or in the period of the jpoa, the predecessor to the jpcoa, what we know as the iran nuclear deal. and in addition to what i mentioned earlier about the difficulty in coordinating international community around small for small in an environment of lack of awareness and knowledge excellent compliance programs, there are other problems that are very familiar to any north korea watcher over the years, which is that there is a -- an excellent track record of north korean cheating on sanctions. and there is -- they are very skilled as stephanie was saying -- and i think everyone here who has dug into this issue would agree. and to pursue a path that favors small and incremental, it may just be a facade for allowing north korea to do whatever it wants, not just in competing on
the sectoral sanctions but also in the more insidious and threatening proliferation activity which is of course the ornl basis for the sanctions and the international community concern about north korea. viqueira the last dozen years this sanctions regime in particular. another issue that i want to highlight is that this small for small, small incremental concessions will touch a dangerous nerve in the u.s. political system that may undermine and unravel any progress, constructive progress towards denuclearization. and that is that in washington we have two important power centers to attend to when it comes to the execution of foreign policy and sanctions in particular. of course i'm talking about the white house or the administration and congress. so as you all well know -- and at the time of the -- right
around the time when congress took its opportunity to offer its approval or not on the iran nuclear deal, it created for itself -- it created a precedent for itself, which is absolutely in the living memories and the voting record of most members of congress today, where it would decide whether a removal of sanctions in the case of iran was okay with congress or not. and that -- congress has improved upon that authority and enshrined it in law a couple of years ago with respect to the potential for removal of russia sanctions. and so what we have now is a congress that is highly atuned to the idea that they should have the final say about whether any sanctions can be removed. and if there is to be removal of sanctions, in this case on north korea, it must be to congress's satisfaction. and that does -- it wouldn't be
by a supermajority of congress. . it has to be by an amount to override a presidential veto. but there are -- the bills in congress, so a number of members who staked their claim on this issue and who are very serious about wanting a big are for big exchange. what i mean by that is a whole lot of north korean kwon sessions that have been proved and verified and only there after would they be willing to offer major sanctions relief from the united states and even then i suppose it would -- people would be most comfortable with it following a progression as the iran sanctions relief did, which is to say you are starting with a lot of transparency, including on how money flows, and how it's underseen and understand in the international financial system before there is true freedom for it to flow for the north korean government and economy. so for those reasons i think the
only politically viable way ahead for the united states, notwithstanding what president trump may suggest by tweet or related to in summit diplomacy for his close friend, mr. kim, there is only a politically practical way forward in the united states for major sanctions relief after north korea makes major and verified concessions on its nuclear and probably skrchlt bw program -- excuse me missile program as well. stop there. >> thank you, liz. and thank you to all the panelists for providing what is a very sobering perspective on -- on the -- not only the legal but also the political obstacles for providing sanctions relief. and maybe we can start with that point. you talk about political viability. and what's possible from the u.s. perspective. but i would also point out the north korean perspective, what's politically viable for them.
and they would argue that step by step is the only way that's viable for them because they need to build trust. and they can't give up all of there or even a significant portion of the nuclear program without gaining concessions. as we know from hanoi that they prioritize sanctions relief in the particular sectoral areas that affect the civilian economy, right. maybe we can start -- i want to start with the u.n. sanctions, because that's what north korea specifically asked for in terms of relief at hanoi. and this may be just sort of an easy question backup but the u.n. security counsel resolution language is a bit vague on the requirements for lifting sanctions and basically say that the security city council will continuously review the north korean actions and they can take steps to strengthen, modify or suspend measures as needed. is this just a political calculation, or are there, you know -- are the things that north korea needs to do that are sufficient to the merit
sanctions exemptions or lifting? maybe stephanie can. >> that's what you -- what you read is simply you need agreement in the p-5 and that's it. whatever the p-5 agrees they put through the security council. and within that political discussion, yeah. >> and because china and russia have already called for sanctions and already in support of that it really looks like it's the u.s. and maybe, you know, other like-minded partnering who really have a say, right. >> well, yeah, i mean -- i think the important principle is that since you need all five onboard that one or two that are not onboard can block it. so, yeah. >> okay. >> let's turn to the humanitarian side. because there are humanitarian carve-outs. >> yeah. >> as part of the u.n. sanctions. can you talk a little bit more
about how those come into play? >> yeah. so this is more 17, 18 committee related. but there is an important -- what they call a comprehensive humanitarian exemption mechanism which is established by the 1718 committee. and this was deliberately done to facility the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the dprk. and this is under the third principle i told you that sanctions operate -- under which sanctions operate which is to ensure that you are limiting the negative impact on the civilian population of a given country. and that is the result of decades of research about impact of sanctions, on civilian populations across the board, and a sort of a -- a focus in recent years on targeting the sanctions regimes to the extent possible to prevent harm to the civilian population. so the basis for in exemption mechanic tim para the 3825, president one you spoke of, the
last resolution in 2017 and gives the committee broad that is right north to grant exemptions on a case by case basis in order to facility the humanitarian assistance. and it reaffirms that sanctions measures are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population or in any way to restrict legitimate activities, including food aid, humanitarian assistance and other kpk activities in cooperation. and the sanctions are also not intended to negatively affect the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out humanitarian assistance and relief. and it's stressing the -- the resolution also at the same time stresses the primary responsibility of the dprk government to meet the needs -- the livelihood needs of its people, right. and the resolution then decides that the committee may on a days case by case exempt any activities from the measures imposed by the rfrmgss if the committee deems that that exemption is necessary. now, added to this was an
implementation assistance notice, number 7, that was adopted in august 2018. so just less than a year after the paragraph which formalized this practice. and the ians are very important because they clarify, you know, resolutions are compromise language. it's often difficult to decipher. it's things that you could get security council members to agree on but they weren't necessarily looking at what it meant to people in the field. the implementation assistance notice gives very specific requirements for member states, international organizations and ngos that carry out assistance in how they submit requests for exemption. and there is very is specific requirements, including that, you know, all requests for exemption need to be submitted either by member states
themselves, or the office of the united nations resident coordinator. so non-governmental organizations have to get a member state or united nations resident coordinator's office to submit the exemption. which is sort of a step before the exemption even gets to the committee. and the exception for that are united nations agencies, international committee of the red cross. ifrc and others. but most non-governmental organizations have to do it in this very formal process. and then they have to -- they encouraged to do it elbow once every six months and the requirements are all very specific and laid out. so you know, obviously an explanation of who are the recipients, the criteria that was used to select the recipients. detailsed descriptions of quantity specifics of goods and like. the planned dates of transfer, routes and methods, all parties involved, financial transactions, and then an annex containing an itemized of list
of all planned transfers of good and service was the quantities and planned shipment dates. so, you know, havre the committee has this information it then decides whether or not to give an approval letter. the approval letter is then published on the 1718 committee website unless the organization has a problem with that. and then the organization that submitted the exemption request is required to undertake whatever was agreed in the approval letter. so the panel does not have any -- the panel of experts has no role in that process. pits an entirely a committee process. so it's determined by the member states that are sitting on the security council. the same member states, the five permanent members, plus the non-permanent members that decided to essentially adopt resolutions that are trying to convince the dprk to come into conformity with international law and principles.
the panel does not have a role in that process. all the panel does is it reports in all of its reports to the security counsel on unintended consequences of sanctions for the civilian population. unintended consequences on humanitarian -- humanitarian operations. and in the panel's last report there was a substantial section included, which was -- it was derived from discussion was more than 20 non-governmental organizations that are administering assistance directly to the dprk civilian population within the dprk, with the united nations country team, and with all other actors that are actually involved in distributing the assistance. because as i said before, the panel's mandate is to undertake investigations. so if we are unable to investigate a matter generally we are not going to report on it. in this case we had to rely on those actors that are themselves subject to this process. and from that the panel was able
to glean six areas of concern with regard to in exemption process that have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to continue to be delivered to, again, the civilian population. i think this is all relevant to this discussion because there is ways in which the kissing sanctions can be better implemented such that you can create good will. and certainly providing assistance to the civilian population or ensuring that their assistance is not diminished would be one of the ways to do that. and so the panel had found that the process is very- it requires a very generous lead time. because the non-governmental organization has to seize first a member state or the resident coordinator. that can take weeks, right to get a member state -- you have to connect with the ministry of foreign affairs, et cetera you have to know exactly with your poonen playing shipments, looking at splieter bes
financial agents willing to bid or contract. all of that has to be lined up many months in advance and agreed. any changes to planned suppliers, shipping routes. item specifications or quantities can render the exemption completely invalid. that is these are just practical issues, right. and then the long lead time can also make it difficult for humanitarian agents to respond to what are humanitarian crisis, right? the whole nature of humanitarian crisis are sometimes unpredicted, right. there are natural events, acts of god that precipitate this. the panel was articulating a view amongst organizations nar delivering aid on the ground that in particular the sectoral sanctions imposed to appraiser 7 of resolution 2397 have had unintended consequences on humanitarian delivery. and that is -- that is a prohibition for transfer to the dprk of all industrial machinery transport vehicles, iron, steel
and other metals, and obviously this type of a wide swath is going to affect a number of humanitarian sensitive items, right? that includes food processing fabricates pumps filters pipes, drill equipment to address critical humanitarian needs such as providing clean wert, and you know, just the entire distribution. equipment. the spare parts for tv assistance as we know dprk is a problematic fl the global community in terms of tb and resistance for tb pch i think they only have the ability to diagnose 14% of cases due to lack of equipment. and so you can -- that's just one practical example as how one sanctions measure can affect a wide swath of humanitarian. and what you get is the ironically, after, you know, articulating how badly sanctions are implemented, you get supply nerps neighboring countries that
won't touch anything north korea-related, right, or there is nail clippers going into packages helping tb patients or something like this and the nail clippers fall awrie on the prohibition of anything that's iron. this type of thing. it's very easy to see that along with derisking in banks. and that's essentially a phenomenon whereby a bank sees anything related to pyongyang, dprk, north korea, and decides not to help it. that's linked to a humanitarian banking channel which was established in part just to get money to united nationss agencies for operations on the ground. and they are having dsh dhesh a very difficult time until a banking channel was established. it was circuitous. it went from the united nations headquarter to german bank transferred to you're hes to a russian bank transfer transferred to rubles. and the russian bank was getting cash to pyongyang. a lot of middlemen on the way.
and that was working until it broke down. right now you have a lot of difficulties due to the fact that diplomats are carrying cash in on their bodies. these are can- dsh these are ways that there are provisions -- it's laid out. this is something that's articulated clearly in the resolution that it shouldn't have the impacts. there is a process for it. and so the, you know, having faithful implementation and ensuring that the delays are not too -- not too stringent or too -- the delays are not too excessive -- and that means the delay between member states receiving with be member states submitting, the approval letter, et cetera. those are always to ensure that the parts of the resolutions that aren't necessarily focusesed on just sanctioning but that are focused on ensuring a principle, i think that
underlying sanctions which is let's punish the people responsible for the negative behavior and not have consequences for other civilians that are unrelated. it's an important principle. >> thank you, stephanie. >> yeah. >> i want to leave enough time are time for audience q and a but i have two pressing questions i really want to ask. i'll ask them quickly hopefully i can get quick answers these are directed to liz and josh. liz, you mentioned not wanting to set a bad precedent in terms of doing sanctions relieves in a small for small or step by step fashion. so i want to segue that to snap back provisions. so it seems like there isn't a long history of using snap back provisions at least in terms of sanctions enforcement. do we know how effective they were in the case of jcpoa or did the u.s. withdrawal from that agreement prevent us from testing the effectiveness of something like snap back provisions? >> yes.
so to be brief, okay, the jcpoa example of the trump administration reimposing or snapping back sanctions that had been -- u.s. sanctions on iran, imposed on iran but removed pursuant for the jcpoa, that -- that's the most recent example that we can look at. there are other examples of reversals that are smaller scale. but this is not a bad parallel to look to. the effect that that had was much stronger than many people anticipated, which is to say it was much more effective for the sanctions. the community of financial institutions and significantly commodity traders and shippers and insurers ship brokers and
port authorities and anyone connected to iran's financial system and its significant trade in petroleum and refined product, any got the message from the united states and significantly complied with the reimposition or the snap back of the sanctions. and thats suggests to many people that it's possible and effective to snap them back or reimpose them with great effect. but -- this is the really important distinction -- the iranian economy is very different than the north korean economy in many respects. to be brief, its size is much smaller than -- the north korean economy is much smaller than the iranian economy and much less connected to the broad international financial system than iran's is. most of those international economic -- or rather financial connections flow through china which is different nan iran, where it's much more -- has been
much more diversified internationally. and also north korea has -- as we have discussed, a very effective history of evasion of sanctions which makes it less susceptible or vulnerable to the use of u.s., essentially, correspondent banking restrictions which are what we know as financial sanctions on iran. so north korea is likely to be more capable of functioning in a removal and snap back scenario than iran is, for various reasons. so we should not overlearn the lesson of iran with respect to north korea. >> thank you. and thank you for being very concise. last question to josh before we open it up and don't want you to feel left out can be dan maybe you can take the first question from the audience.
not get get o to get too much into the weeds of the north korea policy enancement act. you josh you talked about sections 401 and 402 providing a high bar for a temporary suspension or termination of the sanctions. and so it's not only north korean behaviors related to the denuclearization but also, you know, north korea taking actions on counterfeiting, human rights, financial transparency, so that's the high bar, 401, 402. then you talked about section 208 c which is the president has an ability to waive sanctions under that act if that waiver would be important for national security interests. now, that's a very vague term. and it seems like that's a lower bar. why wouldn't the president give sanctions relief to north korea on that basis, the vague -- saying hey diplomatic negotiations are important for national security interests. i'm doing a waiver on that, rather than trying to get north
korea to meet all of the onerous requirements under 401 and 402. >> because that's not what congress intended. and when congress enacted section 208, sort of the by pass to mandatory sanctions, it specified that this was a case by case waiver authority. now there is a broader humanitarian waiver of course. i think everyone here thankfully agrees that we should do everything we can to spare the people, right, the poor and the hungry from the effects of sanctions. but with regard to donald trump simply invoking the national interest waiver of section 208 c, there are a few reasons which that would be problematic. and one is that it says case by case. the career intent of congress is to say that we impose mandatory sanctions for money laundering, with you by the way that doesn't mean that you are required to crash the bank of china because it was laundering money for the
chin po shipping company in singapore. actually case. doesn't mean you are necessarily required to crash the three chinese banks that are currently subject to a contempt of court order in the district of columbia district, federal district court. it says in essence that we have other interests in addition to north korea that we don't want to affect. and so the president has a temporary limited case by case authority. and if the president were to exceed that, again, i think what you would see is a reaction by congress to legislatively reimpose the sanctions. sections 401 and 402 do set a higher bar. and that was intentional. let me talk about a place called camp 16. camp 16 is a political prison camp as large as the district of
columbia that holds estimates anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000 people. one survivor from the camp said that people there were buried up to their necks and killed with hammers. and that women in the camp were raped and murdered to silence them forever. now, leave aside the question of whether the american people choose to give the government of north korea which perpetrates these crimes against humanity access to our financial system and perpetrate that system. and i would argue as a child of the '80s when we all grew up boycotting aparted that it far less morally defensible to perpetuate a system like this. but fine, be completely pragmatic. how many flow-forming lathes or computer -- computer numerically controlled lathes -- or how much
fissile material can you hide in that camp that size? it's not the only such camp. we have camps 14, 18 and 15 still in operation. and any number of other places inside north korea. what those conditions are designed to do is to extract transparency from north korea. i'd also like to just associate myself with elizabeth's comments on snapping back. with north korea, it is a financial intelligence and enforcement and a diplomacy problem to get countries to enforce the sanctions in the first place. and that requires years of patient diplomacy and law enforcement. you have to put this in the context of the fact that until 2016 our north korea sanctions were quantitatively and qualityively weaker than the sanctions again bell ruse and
zba sim bab away. >> to see there is a magic lever behind the curtain in the oval office and turn on and off sanctions within by has all flomcy we need to a to enforce and b to lift sanctions completely regardless of what congress thinks of all this, i think is just out of context and would not work in this one. >> thank you. and so with that, i will turn to the audience. we have paul there with the microphone. please raise your hands if you have a question. and when you do, sbrus yourself your name and your affiliation. >> you are so stunned by the riveting remarks. question here third row. >> hi, thank you. ben marks with flk japan broadcasting. reflexively. it seems that hanoi the trump administration tried to get the big deal for big deal but
failed. and now we're waiting for working level negotiations to start. does the panel think that now the administration is going to try a small for small approach? and if so, i mean -- elizabeth mentioned sort of the road blocks for that. do you think that that will be any more effective than going for big for big. >> and i will direct that to dan first. because it gets at the -- the central problem of how do you overcome this -- this fundamental tension about small for small which is what north korea wants and then what liz says is you can only go big for big. >> yeah, thanks for the question. i think -- i mean, i don't know what the administration's internal strategy is for working level negotiations right now. if you look at the remarks from stephen biegun, the special representative from north korea of a week or two ago, he said that in a one -- basically the u.s. is willing to talk about
what's essentially a phased approach i don't think that's his the exact wording but essentially what he said. and number two, he reiterated that although things like that, exchanging might be possible, you know -- no sanctions relief at this time. i think if we do get -- you know, serious working level dialogue going, though, the question might be, you know, the trump administration has found that big for big at hanoi isn't getting them anywhere, what might be a reasonable for reasonable approach? what's enough that north korea could do that justifies some suspension of certain sanctions while keeping other elements of the sanctions regime in place? i think that, you know, north korean actions like a shut down of fissile material at at sites
that could have vam. and foreclosuring on the possibility of getting those kind of actions and holding out for the hope of you know, getting everything all at once, i think that would be short sighted. >> can i just respond to this too? i think that the appropriate thing for the united states government to do in the face of that, there was not immediate smashing success in and capitulation, you know, based on this first proposal. that's okay. this is certainly wove been at this for a very long time. but i think that's a -- of an impetus to get creative and thoughtful instead of backing down on the u.s. position. and by creative within o and thoughtful i mean thinking about the kind of concessions that the u.s. can give nar not sanctions but that are still meaningful. for example, the freeze for freeze we have right now, that has enabled a period of can i say stability -- is that too
strong? but for the summit diplomacy it actually doesn't have anything to do with sanctions relief, right. in the areas of diplomatic engagement, perhaps cultural, humanitarian, considering what else could occur around modification of military exercises if there is any give there, those may be meaningful as well as political exposure and continuing with this summit diplomacy which clearly has social capital, political capital value for the north koreans. what may happen -- what may be available there? and so another way of saying that is can you think of a sequencing where there are gives on the united states side or in the international side that are meaningful to north korea but that hold until a later point after which north korea has made verifiable and substantial nuclear commitments that holds until then the relief of economic sanctions from the
united states or the international community. and just to say they have to proceed in coordination, otherwise we have a truly difficult, non-functioning mess around compliance, even worse than we have right now. which is pretty bad. >> i feel like that should be plausible, especially if you take into account what north korea says about how they try to downplay their desperation for sanctions relief, right. so after hanoi you had the foreign minister or the vice foreign minister basically say actually what we really want is security guarantees and not sanctions relief. if you take them at their word you feel there should be other gives we can give. on the other hand, then, if we're getting creative on -- on concessions that aren't necessarily sanction relief, maybe north korea might get creative and not -- and maybe ask for things that, you know, where they don't provide concessions on the nuclear program but it's on other things like, say, conventional aspects of their military, right.
next question. the lady in the green. >> hello. i'm a academic based for the university of berlin. i came for a few days for meetings about north korea. i saw your event, i thought, oh, that's a wonderful occasion to come here. so thank you very much for really interesting discussions. thank you also to stephanie for mentioning all the humanitarian aspects. i had some meetings in seoul and new york before coming here. and we had some good discussions about the sectoral sanctions and what could be done in that regard. and one of the ideas or one of the thoughts was that actually if you look at the situation from the internal domestic north korean perspective some of the sectors especially seafood and textile industry are those who are, let's say, if i can use the word privatized in north korea.
so you know, through the kind of black market system. so in a way if we sanction those areas we are sort of discouraging the internal economic developments which we should probably try to make work and you know sort of which are also undermining the system from inside, right? so that would be one point if i may ask for some direction to that. and as a european i would also like to ask about the european sanctions, which -- which are sort of those which should go farther than the u.n. sanctions and also kind of fill in some loopholes in the u.n. sanctions. so if we think about rolling back sanctions, we could also potentially think about starting with the eu sanctions and sort of go back, that could also be in coordination with the united
states, and you know, i was wondering also what dsh did dsh what the other partner sanctions with the rpk or potentially japan whether that would be some -- some system how to -- how to do it. and within iran, deal sanctions, obviously europeans are now trying to save the deal as much as possible. one of the ways in which they are doing it through is the mechanicsism providing financing to iran outside of the u.s. financial system. obviously that's not something which the u.s. administration like to see. but to some extent it would also be a mechanism how to finance certain issues with north korea but at the same time keep the financial -- financial sanctions in place. so kind of, you know, learn the positive lesson from mistakes rather than the negative lesson. so thank you very much. >> yes, any thoughts on that
tension between hindering, the organic growing of the private kme versus hindering the nuclear problem problem and thoughts on eu sanctions or south korea's may 26th sanctions james peterson all the other sanction that is could be part of the regime. >> can i talk about the sooefrd piece of this. >> sure. >> i've looked at the seafood question actually very carefully. so i am familiar with the research by andrea lonkoff and peter ward and others that same the seafood industry is privatized. i disagree and challenge the premises of that research. i've had dialogue with peter ward about it. i think it's based on old information. what has happened since the research that is the basis for those conclusions is that, first, the north korean military took over most of the boats. a lot of the ghost ships that first began to arrive in japan in 2015 before the sanctions, by
the way were even strengthened -- which is an important point that a lot of journalists miss were army boats. what you began to see about that time is two things. one is, that the fishing industry came under the control of north korean government agencies, including bureau 39, the reconnaissance general bureau, a money launding agency. the ministry of state security, which is sort of the north korean version of the ge stapp o. and the internal security force that guards the political prison camps. and they began to push aside the army. so -- and then the other development you began to see is that the government was selling off the fishing rights to chinese trollers so that the waters close to the coast were badly overfished. that's why a lot of the boats were going so far out to sea that the winds which below east
in the seas japan caught them and blew them into the open ocean. most of the -- the sanctions are against the export of fish and seafood. we're talking about a country where the population is badly protein deficient. the question is why are the north korean people not eating the seafood? why is it exported for hard currency and who who do you suppose is using the money if in fact the industry has come under the control of a few government industries that are at the apex -- they're sort of the apex predators of the north korean pecking order. the other point that i would make is that internal reports from north korea tell us that at times when the seafood export sanctions are enforced local market prices inside north korea for fish and seafood go down. people -- consumers -- the poor in north korea will say, oh oh,
my god, i've never been able to afraid fish and seafood in my lunch before. you know, we have -- i think it's the hensiatic league that first the taught the word to salt and preserve fish. the seafood industry should be salting and drying and preserving fish, trading it around the country and providing for the nutritional needs of a population that does not have enough fish and seafood. so i would say that these facts bring us to exactly the opposite conclusion that we should enforce the fish and seafood sanctions, and any, frankly food export sanctions very, very strictly, because north korea's food production should be feeding a hungry population. >> yeah, can i -- can i move on to the other question. >> yes. >> so regarding seeking to differentiate more than they
already are the various sanctions regimes on north korea, eu, u.s., south korea, the u.n., et cetera, there is -- i don't -- i admire the creativity and thinking about how to consider different options or whether incrementalism is appropriate or not. you heard me make my argument why i think it's not the strongest foot forward on the issue. but in general i would say there is not a lot of success to be had by trying -- seeking to differentiate the eu sanctions significantly from the u.s. one. and that is because virtually any company, bank or non-profit aid or relief group of sufficient size to handle connectivity, permitted connectivity with north korea
has to -- will find itself in some way subject to at least u.s. sanctions on north korea. and what that means is that they can't choose to abide by a different set of measures that may be more -- sanctions measures in a different jurisdiction that may be perceived as more permissive and plan to remain a going concern, which is to say they will violate u.s. sanctions potentially and then put themselves out of business and face insolvency. so try and encourage -- to take your example, a rollback of european sanctions on north korea, and encourage eu banks or companies to try and expand economic connectivity with north korea would be encouraging them to engage in activity that would put them in a conflict of law situation and in vials of u.s. sanctions, which is sort of the
fast road to -- to insolvency, and not carrying out the whole point of what they were doing which is to try and create economic incentives or opportunity for north korea, or the people of north korea. on insects, i would say it is fragile at best and the u.s. administration given its overwhelming hostile view towards iran will be quick to make insolvent everyone related to it or otherwise subject to major u.s. criminal liability, if this can be accomplished. as soon as it violates iran sanctions and to court connectivity with north korea would i think skrermt that process as well. so i don't expect that that is the conduit towards moving money into north korea. and the kind of leap frogging
through jurisdictions sump as germany or russia as problematic as that has been may be the best kind of modality for achievingf humanitarian financial flow into north korea whether or not that improves upon cash careers is a different question. >> let's go back to the audience. over here. >> i am with the school of public service over by the national cathedral and my question was, with the recent situation with ron where the u.s. has let the wrong deal despite their seeming compliance and the verify compliance with international community, would north korea see this as an issue as the next administration can pull the rug out from underneath them and undo everything that has been done? is north korea more skeptical
of the u.s. to keep steady heal in foreign policy? yes and so is everybody else including our closest cdi. >> i would add that congress passed a law that it passed in the bipartisan way in the hope that we can let north korea know what the conditions are that they have to meet and that those conditions can hopefully go from administration to administration despite changes of partisan political control so it can be steady. democratic presidential candidates are campaigning through new hampshire this weekend. we have live coverage saturday at 5 pm from new hampshire with new jersey senator cory booker. on sunday live at 1:15 california senator kemal harris speaks in guilford. watch live coverage of democratic presidential
candidate from new hampshire on c-span. watch any time on c-span.org. this marks the 50th anniversary of apollo 11. a new poll shows there is widespread interest in the event. neil armstrong and buzz aldrin both continue to enjoy broad name recognition greater than even more famous astronauts like sally ride and mark kelly and it nearly 3/4 of americans say they watched it live on tv or softeners of it later. the poll also shows there is little interest to return to the moon. we spoke with laura today space reporter about the findings. >> i think the headline is that americans really support nasa overwhelmingly have a positive and favorable view of nasa, but
very really think a returned manned mission to the moon is a high priority. >> does that number surprise you? >> it feels like it is surprisingly low especially on eve of the anniversary and considering only months ago the trump administration charge nasa with returning to the moon within five years so there is a lot of talk and a lot of press about this excitement and this new mission and yet polls are still coming out showing very little in terms of support what was interesting about the poll is that when they phrase the question in the presence of a competition somewhat similar to what we had going on in the hollow era it was the space race between the united states and russia.
when it is presented that way now as a space race between china and israel support up to 49%. if that kind of thinking gets the competitive juices going and we could've have that competition spirit happening, but not right now you can find the results at c-span.org and american attitudes toward space expiration.