tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN July 7, 2014 4:00pm-6:01pm EDT
me. a high level kralev. congratulations. we think extremely well of you that you are here. to me, someone who watched the middle east carefully erring for 17 years in congress and who made 25 trips to the region during that time, there is reason to worry that we could be on the cusp of a third intifada. that is something we will explore. hopefully, call more heads will prevail, but it did for cap we are watching hourly between the israelis and the palestinians is extremely worrisome. i have heard conversation on some of the talk shows today about the need for special envoys.
that is something our moderator was asked earlier today. observers think the egyptians are in the best position to play that role, but my knowledge they are not playing that role. the conversation today comes at a crucial moment. who are the palestinians, and what government governs all the palestinians, if any? does the integration of the amas into side of h the palestinian authority reflect the integration of hamas or not? is the rest of hamas operating separately, and he is that part of hamas contributing to the problem or solution? the wilson center has invested attention to the development in the neighborhood. this year we hosted an israeli minister of intelligence, palestinian the
chief negotiator. close to half of our ground truth briefings, something you know about which are telephonic conversations about hot spots, close to half of our nearly 30 iefings have been devoted to the region. our guests will be introduced by aaron, who is the brand-new father of a son. the senior fellow. a close friend of the wilson center is that faster at university of maryland, and rob former secretary of state on near east affairs. our moderator is thaaron miller. the show begins right now. much, and forery
your leadership in the wilson center. i want to acknowledge three people who are not here. they may be watching. person, who is having cataract surgery today. i know you are watching, and thanks for everything. when i drafted the invitation for this event, it read maything like syrian iraq be dominating the headlines, but -- but thelly-posted israeli-palestinian issue remains. none of us who have watched this issue and followed this seriously include my colleagues would reject the idea that violence and terror has been a handmaiden of this process for over a century. what we are witnessing may or may not be new, but it is a
reminder of the costs and implications of no resolution of the conflict. since 1967i would argue you had a different iteration, a sort of perverse dance with its own perverse intimacy between israel as the occupier and palestinians as the occupied. it took the conflict to a different level. i power is strong. palestinian power is weak, which is also terrifyingly formidable in its own right. together thesis interaction guaranteed and continues to guarantee real dysfunction, tragedy, and of violence in this content. the answer to this, we know what it is, a two-state solution, the least bad option, but that is happening right now, may not happen in the future.
we have chosen to focus on the palestinians and their politics, because i believe the two focused in the months to come. can influencend i the research -- to a certain degree my calling is -- my byleagues' presentation arguing they should stay away the peace process. i cannot control your questions. it is not a problem of one hand clapping. israel,is influenced by but we want to drill down now on the palestinian guy mentioned. i want to close by saying one other thing. it is important to focus on the palestinians. the years i was work being -- .orking we did not we focused far more on trying to understand the israeli reality, which is necessary, but by no means sufficient if in fact we really want to produce an
equitable and durable solution to this conflict. the rules are simple. five minutes each them and we will start with you. i may ask a question or two. then we will go to your questions. again, one last comment. questions, not station identification. we really want to get in as many questions as we can. there's only one way to do that -- no comments, just questions. make it so much, and thank you for coming. >> thank you. the first thing i think that ought to be noted about what is happening at the moment, in the context of this flareup of tensions to the palestinian polity and what it says about where politics are, is that it is inescapably connected to its broader regional context. what has happened to
palestinians and within the palestinian polity and what is going to result is reflective of and pendant on broader changes in the arab world. there's no way to separate the palestinians out from the broader regional context in which they participate. while we look at this, remember that a whole series of questions are being asked of the arab world, which are not resolved yet, and it is reflected in iraq and syria, lebanon, kuwait, and libya, among other places. i can mention those because they are all experiencing their own crises. i think there are related and analogous questions being asked in all of those crises as well. in this context, one of the most difficult aspects, not only for palestinians, but also for israelis and others, is nobody is in clear control of the situation partly because of where it is flaring up and partly because most of the
entities, including palestinians, are in their own form of crisis. for one thing, a lot of this has been focused on east jerusalem and other parts of jerusalem as well. jerusalem, really, the palestinian security forces cannot maintain order because they do not operate there. -- toust do not have that do it there or the manpower. president abbas' ability to influence what is happening in thatalem is limited, even is being greatly undermined, so that is one thing. even further, this is being manifested in arab parts of israel as well, and there i think the ability of traditional palestinian leadership to exercise any kind of control is perhaps even less. and so in a certain sense it is very hard to lay the consequences of things that happen outside of their area of
purview at the doorstep of say the plo or the pla because they do not control the situation. and their ability to control what happens in areas that they do have authority in is being very much undermined. in addition to which, obviously they do not have control over the people in gaza. isis fair to say that hamas experiencing a very serious identity crisis and leadership crisis as well. its politicaly of wing, particularly the politburo, but even others within the political leadership to control all its factions is certain the questionable. the extent to which anyone is could in control of the situation as it is unfolding in terms of creating a real break on it or imposing a political solution is quite limited and it is very important. this is particularly the case given the level of anger that
has been brooding over the years, that has driven the situation to the point that people can target children, knowingly, deliberately, callously, and call for revenge as a substitute for politics and policy. and that i think is the fruit of some very serious but by all parties, and there it is, for all to see. it is driving things. in addition, those calls for revenge only increase the cycle of incitement, and obviously, just behind the scenes, settlers are taking advantage of the situation to create more robust attacks on the ground than before, new outposts into digit -- thats, that are not are much more robust outposts than that, and it is very worrying. the other thing going on is that realities on the ground have been allowed to slide by a
concatenation of certain things of which everybody has the share of the blame. state andly since the institution building program rubbles bringing live to the ordinary palestinian people, particularly in the west bank, was defunded and allowed to fizzle. politicalt had a safety net to catch that fought at all. and no obviously peace process to back it up. so in that context, you have to ask where political momentum for sustaining and unsustainable status quo might come from. it has not, and everything that defines the status quo who is in crisis come in flocks, and may not survive the president's duration. i am inclined not to prognosticate, although i may be asked to, but to be analytical and rather than prescriptive, i
would say you can see all of the different feelings leading up to this current situation in almost with the dark inevitability of greek tragedy, and where it is going to go from here could be very grim or it could be attenuated, depending on how responsibly it will behave in the situation. and it is hard to evaluate how that is going to work out because as i say it is not always clear what the ultimate address is, and with that i will suck because i've used up my five minutes. >> thank you very much. >> i would like to make a couple of points. the first point is that the current situation reminds me of 1987, the advent of the first intifada. i happened to be visiting in jerusalem just as the three young israelis were abducted, and then went to ramallah after the first israeli operation that led to the death of a -- was shotand then
down while i was there. and my perfection is based on a couple of things. oft before the abduction these israelis, i had met with a prominent israeli journalist who was frustrated that there was an absence of hope in part because of the absence of urgency, that the israelis live in what appears to be normal lives and there's no sense of urgency, no cost. she was hoping for a follow-up to the european action against settlements as something. obviously, these tragic events created a sense of urgency. when i look at it, i reminded of 1987 for two reasons, and that you can capture in the mood. one reason is when you look at the advent of the first was really a marginalization of the palestinian cause internationally. 's were characterized by the rn-iraq war -- the iran-iraq
war,k in that mood is similar now, where it clearly the egyptians, and the saudi's and the qatarris, everybody is occupied with their problem and not enough attention is being paid to what is happening in the west bank and gaza, and that is what is the problem for the palestinians. if you look back at 1980 seven, it was in the marginalization of the palestinian leadership from the people. what we had seen really beginning with the israeli invasion of lebanon in 1982, was the plo became exiled in tunis and pretty much remote and effective in catering to the palestinians. leftalestinians were alone. we do not have palestinian leadership in exile, and they are in ramallah and gaza, that you have a sense when you talk to almost everybody, including
the moderates who want to work, with the palestinian authority, that they are disconnected from the public. the public does not taken seriously. in fact, one of the reasons why we had that national government is they both risk being totally irrelevant, and each individually, and they came to become more relevant. that is the context in which it takes place. add to this the fact that there is a creeping realization that twobe the days of the states are numbered if they are not gone already, and there is reconciling kind of themselves to a reality that is not happening. it is only a matter of time because -- before you will see something take place. as 1.i wanted make him and therefore we risk a major intifada because of the circumstance. the second point, when you witness the ugliness of the death we have witnessed, where there have been horrific murders
of young people, cold-blooded on both sides, and you would hope and we all have asked that question, and people start asking themselves, is this what i want to become is this what the conflict is making of me, is this going to lead to applying that breaks on violence? i have the unfortunate feeling that it wilma. and this is not -- that it will not. this is not just because of research i've been doing over the past 10 years. i ask israeli and palestinians and other arabs about emphasized -- empathizing with the civilian casualties of the others when they witness them. and the liberals and others will feel empathy and pain, but the majority, unfortunately, will not, and they will feel more resentment and say they brought it upon themselves. the first reaction we get from israelis and arabs is when the witness civilian casualties is they say they brought it upon themselves. that appears to be very much a function of one thing -- their
assessment of whether there's going to be peace or war. they have to pardon their heart to prepare for content. when there is peace, they empathize. prospect foris a peace and up, they empathize. we are at a moment where people are assuming we're headed to conflict and they do not want their hearts to emphasize -- empathize. they want their hearts to harden the bloody war, and that is the reality we face. >> under the time limit. rob? >> thank you. as we speak, this afternoon israeli troops are massing on the gaza border and hundreds of rockets have rained down on southern israel. we may be heading for a major confrontation that i would argue neither side really wants, but neither side baby able to avoid. i will focus on the israeli
side. what we have today is really the utter despair of palestinian politics. are bothajor forces reacting to events, not leading them. neither of them have a strategy for attaining their national goals right now. what it means reyna is they are -- what ithe -- is means is they are locked in the politics for survival. there've been no palestinian elections since 2008. no presidential -- or legislative elections since 2006. palestinian issue to tuitions not meet them -- palestinian and otherns to meet, groups are widening. it is against that backdrop that you have to look at the national agreement reached in april between the two sides. they did not agree on any vision, on politics, on how to
recognize -- reconcile their competing services. they set up a mechanism to try to address the absence of legitimacy, and that was elections. to somethingonse that is popular amongst their populace, the clamor for unity on the ground. now, the problem has been for hamas, patrolling gaza did not really produce anything. they were being squeezed by since he spends chile july 3, and likewise talk talk fatah wasoducing -- not producing anything. a trader has been branded for .ecurity cooperation the backdrop of the recent violence. --inst that actor up, we had
backdrop, we had the national unity government since april, and it has hurt the palestinians, where 50,000 palestinian's under, have been not receiving their salary payments since the agreement was reached. thomas is under pressure now by israel at the same time -- hamas is under pressure to rein in radicals, but it needs to show israel.t apassive to we you see neither side within palestinian politics really watching -- wanting this government to survive, but not wanting to be blamed for bringing it down. both are having a since it will just atrophy by itself. are we on the verge of a new intifada? realee that there are are analogies to the situation in 1987 and 2000. both cases was
popular discontent with the official plo leadership, when they seem to be so removed from hardships on the ground. in that situation you had ousted the leadership plate catch up with developments on the ground, not lead them, and that situation is rife today for the similar type of situation, even the absence of leadership within palestinian politics. what isdo not know is brewing underneath the surface. there've been committees that have come out that are added hating a third into the topic, but we do not know yet. what we do know is the leadership is reacting and not leaving. this is not a strategy forward. short of an intifada, there are things that count and rob will -- that can unravel. tomorrow there was a busy -- tomorrow there was supposed to be a conference.
palestinians pulled out because they felt under pressure not to go. oft this shows is any kind being seen to be cooperating with israel will break you. breakdown lead to the in security cooperation, the one major attainment we have seen in the last decade between israelis and palestinians, and the third thing is that price now for returning to negotiations is going to go up, not down, and it was already pretty high. with that i will turn it back to aaron. >> i never thought the three of you could be more annoyingly negative than me. you manage. i will post each of you a question. societies and up at some point having to take a long look in the mirror. whether or not we took a long look in the wake of jack assassination, i do
not know. i'm not assassination, i do not know. i'm not sure israelis did in the wake of rabin's murder. tribal is asian, personalization, this kind of anyway have ad in salutary or ameliorating effect on the situation, and what would it require from an external process to break a potentially as catholic tory cycle -- a potentially as: tory cycle now? >> i know my research is pretty negative on this. when people assume conflict is not on its way toward a resolution, they simply find it hard to empathize or question themselves or question the moral stance. the two things i think that actually works for both israelis and palestinians, having more reflection. one thing is what is happening in the region. people are terrified by anarchy.
know how ugly it can get. it is ugly. we have witnessed the death of several people over the past couple of weeks, horrific, but when you compare it to what is happening in syria or iraq, people do not want that. you can see the backlash. we can see it in the polling about people rallying behind the state when they see anarchy. there is a mood that does not want to see an explosion. they know it can get a lot luckier, a lot worse for all of them. the second, i think perhaps on the israeli side, more than any other time there is a real internalization that if the two state solution is going cap and now it is never going to happen. we have never seen that in the past. there was always a sense that maybe there is more time. i do not think anybody really believes there is any more time.
so maybe they have to figure out another way, or they are going to have to come to grips with the reality. those are the only -- that are providing some restraint at the moment. when you get a netanyahu looking at the moderate right now in the to restrainrnment, in the reaction to this, it gives you a flavor of where things are. i think that is a point. whether that is going to be enough, it does require leadership. i think in the end, events on the ground can preempt leaders, and we see that now. neither thomas nor nothing -- ands nor netanyahu wants escalation, but they might find themselves on the path that is unavoidable. leaders can make a difference,
and we do not see that. way, what came before, might actually be an ally, including what happened in the first and second intifada. men, are there any hopeful stanceds here? >> if the majority of the intifadaans want an they could have one. it does not mean that things could spiral out of control. you asked about third parties. i will take you up on that one, if that is ok. that is an area for hope. i think there are two ways, where you look up why -- look beyond the immediate isis, the lend themselves to the question, what can be done by third parties, whether regional or
international, including the united states, to help change this dynamic. one is palestinians are very dependent on their external supporters for budget support and other things. and gives regional international players more of a say in the way the palestinian political scene defaults than normal, then usually occurs. of been a great constriction palestinian politics over the past few years. a much smaller group in, and thought how that before. tah than before. there has to be an opening up. third parties can play a crucial role in that. the frustration we see on the palestinian side does not only have to do with the political frustration that was explained shutting downso a
of the space that opened up in terms of civil society and economic growth that was there during the era of instead vision building and state building. goes to very straightforward things that the israelis can influence, like access and mobility, and third parties can't influence in terms of economic growth. there is all kinds of things that funders can do in terms of projects that cannot be hijacked, small projects that cannot be big political gains for small groups, that can really transform the mood there. it is very possible. but i dot been tried, not see why it should not succeed if people wanted it. question of violence, what we have seen the last few days is a convergence of violence in three areas. one is israel itself with the
israeli arab communities corrupting, the second is the west bank, the third is gaza. the israel violence, and it is in gaza where i see a cycle that is worrisome. keep ite possible to from interrupting, although i'm skeptical at this point. that seems to be the best one could hope for, and absence of violence. in terms of it clinical breakthrough, what i was trying to suggest was until there is a fundamental change within it israeli and palestinian politics, i do not think either side is going to the ripe for the political movement that is needed to make a political rrs. question,htning round and that concerns john kerry, and not the broader issue of his framework agreement or comprehensive agreement. what should the u.s. response be now? i preface this i saying in the
bad old days when there were only two sides to this complex, and right now there are three, it used to be our phot and israeli prime minister and hamas, we have been preparing to pack our bags by now. it september 1990 six we ended up spending three months in pursuit of agreement, which we bron and have ron -- he may saved a few lives in the process. in the end it proved to be more or less worthless. the question is, should john kerry, given his commitment and that tiredness of the situation that exists right now, should john kerry pack his bags? bags, no.s the u.s. has a role to play, whether it is juncker personally going there in this moment.
whether we want it or not, this administration believes it has one more shot at trying to get them back to negotiating tables. if i'm in their place, i would say what we have seen is horrible, but this is an opportunity because there was no sense of urgency before. now there is a sense of urgency. i can try to turn the sense of urgency into ways to get them back to the negotiating table. that is the way he will think. therefore, a real escalation might take us away from it, because we will lose control. we need to figure out a way to prevent escalation and we have to prevent -- we have to figure out how to stop it and have a role to play in that. the question then, where is the influence going to come from, the leverage? it is interesting, if you look confrontationsor of israel and, as over the last three years, when morsi
was an ally, that brought it closer to the u.s. because obama worked with him to apply restraint on hamas. right now there is not such a player on the, side. thomas --he a way for h toa getm closera --s to get closer to the egyptian government, because it might be an opportunity for them to do so. the u.s. undoubtedly will be working with egyptians to figure something out. be an israeli decision because i do not think hamas is interested, but there are decisions to escalate. it would come from the israeli side. i am just wondering whether there's anything that the u.s. can do to stop the israelis from carrying out that if they wanted, or whether this is going a public opinion
issue for israelis. i do not see the u.s. of having a particularly strong hand in stopping israelis from doing something that israelis want to do in gaza. with ground incursions, israelis have had very unhappy experiences. >> that is self-restraint on israelis. yet people who think it is a bad idea, including the prime minister. the people who think it is a good idea to escalate. from the happy lessons past. those are going to be part of the mixture. i do not think the american side of it is going to be a big part of the equation of the decision whether to launch this attack or not. >> i agree. >> i think right now the objective for american diplomacy has to be conflict management, crisis management, not conflict resolution.
so let's be clear about what the goals of american diplomacy can and should be at this time. we've gotten trapped into a way of thinking that either john kerry does it or does not get done. there's a huge state department edifice. we have thousands of the mats. now is the time -- we have thousands of diplomats. now is the time of active american diplomacy at a level low john kerry, to be engaged. two anecdotes, i was just in the region a week ago, in jordan, and israel, and palestine, and the one thing they said to me, where are you guys? you're missing. you're not here. i got a whole today from a palestinian minister who said, do you think the administration is going to send anyone? there is a yearning for the american visibility that is not it mayand i would argue not end the conflict, but it could save a few lives and a few thousand dollars for airplane
tickets, that is a worthy to price. clarification, i think if israel does not go in, and i do not think it will, israel has a dilemma about gaza, and it is not about whether it is winning to sustain a ground incursion or sustained casualties. do with itsas to strategy or its objectives in gaza. israel looks to hamas as the enforced order in gaza. it's concern is not as much but the radical forces in gaza, and is looking to hamas to the enforced. willing to play this role, but it has to be a face-saving out. right now it is refusing to stand out because it wants the show it got something for it, and that leads to the potential for a great deal of miscalculation. reluctance to go into gaza is a fear not from its own
casualties, but in the absence will get something even worse, which they might get anyway, which is the tragedy and dilemma of the absence of a real strategy right now on either side, either the israeli-palestinian side, so this is a tactical objective to keep quiet, but a strategic act because there is no way out for reconciling the two sides of palestine that are divided or any political division that exists today. i will point you, and then we will go to -- >> i'm not completely convinced this is only about israeli self-restraint, because i do think that there are factions in i will point you, and then we will go tohamas that are happy o escalate. that is clear. it is clear today amid because not only have you had quite a indefensibleible rockets coming from gaza into southern israel, you have hamas taking responsibility for those for the first time in a long time. there are factions in hamas that
are interested in escalating. who they are aligned with, permitting that forward, -- promoting that forward, anyone can guess, but why bother? the point is, i think there is space for several parties to choose about escalation and de-escalation. i would not ask secretary kerry to pack his bags, if he asked me, but i would say that this whole conflagration we are shows again how and why the united states should not stop its engagement with this issue. when you drop back down to the point that it seems to be a question of denying -- but nine neglect beyond the level of conflict management, this type of thing tends to happen quickly. and i already explained where i fork the opportunities are serious stuff that can have an impact within days and weeks. >> thank you.
now to your questions. wait for the mike, which hopefully is coming. please identify yourself, and then ask a question. it is coming. sec.ll be here anin a >> hello. thank you so much for your time for doing this event today. he talked about and i'm wondering if i could put a finer point. what is the exact nature of the failure? parties did not reach a solution on the two state solution, did the failure of the talks contributes to the and ferment conditions that led to this violence? does the u.s. government perilous possibility for raising expectations by pushing a process that parties had not walked into in what critics said
what was the wrong way at the wrong time? >> the actual beginning of the violence, the abduction of the of thes and the killing palestinians, that could have happened any time without regard to any piece process. these things happen unfortunately all too often. we have seen it historically. i do not think that businesses fairly connected. what is connected is that mobilization that we see, the unbelievable, it is reasoning, it is generating all that, that when not have happened. the environment is ripe for who is going to light up the match. anybody could light up the match, but it does not always catch because the environment is ready for it to catch fire. i think that is in part a function of many things, including the collapse of the peace process, the increasing realization that it may be too late for a two-state solution.
i do not force that to say the raised -- they raised expectation topoo high. expectations were low before. we have seen that. john kerry succeeded in extending the. of hopeful that's extended the time for hope for a little bit longer. two or three years ago, we were seeing the majority of israelis and palestinians thinking it was too late for a two-state solution. it's not like here comes this administration that says it is coming and then it collapses. i think that is wrong, and i think there are -- they ought to be commended for trying. whatever mistake they made or failure, i do not think itself is a problem. >> is not linear. you could look back to july of 2000, where you had a full-fledged presidential summit. expectations were at that time
running dangerously high. there was a sense of drift in the wake of the failure of that summit. even though the united states followed up to the best of its capacity. here, alas,,roblem the absence of a monopoly over violence. of when it comes to the palestinian authority, but increasingly, i think you see even on the israeli side, and that in fact goes a long way to explain this as cycle. >> that is what i meant what i meant when i said no one was in control. look, i would not draw it agreely either, and i that the secretary deserves to be commended, rather than criticized, for trying. look, the minute that that kind -- the granular level of palestinian politics got pushed aside in favor of big picture
-palestinian negotiations, and the question of reality on the ground got him to in favor of the-picture stuff, there is a certain loss of way. it is not just the united states. it is the whole international community. all the third parties that exist, and there are quite a few of them, combined to drop the ball and let the state an institution-building program he come kind of a secondary indispensable project, when it was not that at all. and if there is any linear progression that i would draw, it is between the collapse of that entire approach to palestinian politics into promoting a better politics, allowing the politics to constrict like this, and allowing hope to dry up on the ground on the one hand. and this sort of out-of-control
situation that we have today. i think there is a much more direct cause and effect during those two factors than anything to do with diplomacy. >> thanks. one thing to keep in mind is the violence did not come out of nowhere. there had been a civilian uptick in what is called price tag of violence that has been taking place in the west bank over a period of time now. none of it came to the point that it came to recently come up at the violence is part of the landscape, unfortunately. what we have seen is a relative diminution in violence, not an absolute one. so i do not think it is fair to blame john kerry for the violence. diplomaticis a say vacuum, and i am concerned about the way that diplomacy culminated in april was that there was no plan b. it seems there should be some
sort of the paramedics fallback short of all or nothing type of approaches, and that is what i was alluding to previously. >> there was a neglected part of plan a, which was this in put on the ground into the question of daily life, and all the things i keep coming back to adjusted died on the vine. there was no need for it to go with the rest of plan a. it was a viable part of plan a that should have continued to thrive in spite of the restriction of facing the rest of it. yes, thank you very much. there has been a lot of first,ion of intifada intifada second, and third. but conditions have changed in a major way, and that is the new focus on -- by the palestinian leadership on nonviolent
struggle through reliance on international law, the u.n. and its agencies, and also to mobilizing supporters worldwide to put political and economic pressure on israel, specifically andugh the boycott sanctions movement. yet, while this is happening -- >> me that question. the u.s. has frustrated these efforts. isn't it time for a shift or a more nuanced position by the u.s. on these important nonviolent initiatives? >> should the u.s. aqueous or support -- acquiesce or support this? >> the american position has been consistent, that the biggest obstacle to progress and one reason why the two-state
solution is dying is the building of settlements. every administration has opposed us, and yet we have put it into the policy. that is why there is no urgency and what a lot of liberal israelis are frustrated with the fact that there is no pressure to stop that from happening, even though it is eating up at the two-state solution every single day. and so you can't argue, and i think probably credibly, that one reason why the israelis agreed to get back to the negotiating table when kerry started the peace process was this pressure that emerged from europe to boycott products from , that arettlements expanding as we speak, and just in the past week, up to 17 countries have announced that they are warned against dealing with israeli settlements. itselfinistration actually looked at that and in fact one option on the table was always if they are not going to
do it, at least give the green light to other allies, including europeans, to do it. becauseseparate, boycotting the settlement is something very specific as opposed to boycotting israel. the problem, particularly for american officials as it is for people who carry about israel, broadly in the u.s., is how do you separate the two? the signal that you support israel, but oppose the policy of s does not dobc doesd that. target action matters. morenk you will see a lot pressure in that direction. what i found them i carried out in the past year a major public opinion poll in u.s. about american public attitudes toward the israeli-palestinian conflict, and i asked the question, what role would support if they concluded that a two-state solution is no longer an option?
would they support a one-state solution with equal citizenship, continuation of occupation indefinitely, or is really annexation of territories? of those people who said initially they would support a two-state solution, the majority said they would then sit port -- support a one-state solution with equal citizenship, because americans have a problem with an idea that you have an indefinite occupation. in a way when you have a piece process, yet a sense maybe it is going to come. when you do not have a peace process and you have a is a nation that is not going to happen, and it looks like what you have is a permanent situation, it will just do not want to deal with it, do not want to accept it. including people who care a lot about israel. we have seen that in the polling. you're going to see something moving in that direction if you don't have a lot of violence. if you have a lot of violence,
all bets are off because pilots creates a-- completely different environment. it is about survival, a narrative, and everything takes you in a different direction. that is what we see potentially happening if there is an escalation. >> next question. >> yes. my name is herbert grossman. i'm retired judge. why would you think the state couldment officials contribute to peaceful solution there when you have no credibility with the israeli side? loydg back to l anderson, the working official in the state department have always been antagonistic toward israel. maybe you have had clinical leadership that is not.
secretaries of state. as far as the working people in the state department, they have always been anti-israel. you have no credibility there. >> i have a comment on this one. speaking -- 50 or 60 years of state department experience of the anti-israel people. has historicf that residence, it does not reflect the way the state department is today. things have changed cingulate, i would argue. yes, there may be test right now between the prime minister's office and the white house, but across the broad spectrum of u.s.-israel relations, there is a close and intimate working relationship here between the two countries at all levels of the relationship. statek this facile department arabists who hate israel so israel will never listen to us does not correlate
to the reality in which we live today. >> i could create a fictitious wouldrpart to you who stand up and say that the problem is precisely the last 30, that over the years, that the state department as well as the white house has been consistently, fundamentally and avowedly pro-israel to a degree that it basically can still look at israeli need dinner garments as a point of departure for any american policy. i would argue that that is frankly more correct and incorrect. so i do not think that is the case. >> yes, here. i am a research assistant. my question is, with netanyahu coming out last week icing he is in favor of an independent
kurdistan, what is your take on that with him being i guess more pro-settlements than anything? that he isonic pro-kurdistan and not pro-a two-state solution? the israelis have had a long-term relationship with the kurds dating back decades, 2003 warafter the anyway. years they in recent have built a close corporate of relationship with kurdistan, and kurdistan looks like it is region. as an economist from the israeli point of view they see it as a strategic asset in the middle of that region. it is not surprising to me that they would call for that. the problem for them that is for the israelis is that they actually have a lot of common interests with other arabs who
do not agree with them. look at the new egyptian government of president sisi who has been cooperating with the israelis, who wants to just call this a calamity, if it were to happen, the kurdish independence. i think they are going to have a lot of pushback for a lot of countries that they are turned to get close to. they have this strategic picture turned to get closer to sunni arabs versus the air rainy and -- the iranian influence in the region. arabs are opposed to independent kurdistan. i see it as not a particular meaningful call or more programmatic -- problematic for israel. for kerry problematic and others who are trained engineer this over the long run. it is not helpful to have the
israelis as one of the few middle eastern powers that have come out in favor of an independent kurdish republic in northern iraq and before the kurds themselves have made that a public goal. i think it is entirely unhelpful frankly. >> we have an overflow room filled with at least 50 people, and there are several questions. so i will take that and we will go to -- would there be a piece process between israel and palestine if religion was taken off the table? >> would there be a piece process? >> would it be any more successful than it has been, the if it wereomponent somehow eliminated. >> as you know i have argued for a long time that the minute you start adopting religious
language justify nationalism and conflict, the minute you are in trouble, because essentially, ultimately you are allowing the most fanatical religious groups to claim the upper hand because alwaysll always be -- have more legitimacy to speak in the name of religion then you will have as a nationalist. the only reason this conflict led itself to relive to a resolution is it moved to a nationalist confit where people would be satisfied with a nation of their own on part of the territory, rather than assuming some religious claims. it is undoubtedly the case that the intrusion of religious symbols and meanings in the struggle have made it harder to resolve the conflict, undoubtedly. jane? >> fascinating panel.
he started by saying this was not a panel about a two-state solution. here is a political question. last.was in aspen he was the prime minister of the palestinian authority. he still is in the region. yearrafted a two- attainr palestinians to statehood. the rap was he did not have a lot of street credibility, but he is obviously still interested in palestinian the elements. my question is, could a fayad come back and could make a difference? >> fascinating questions. >> these ideas that he has propounded in which he has enacted when he was in power are not his sole possession. they could be put into practice by others.
the concept of having accountable, responsible meetnment that looks to the needs of the people as they exist today and to build this eight up from the bottom up as well as the top down, this can be connected by anybody. and so i do not want to think it's specifically only to mr. fayad, whom i respect enormously. the ideas are universal. that approach could and should be an acted immediately -- enacted immediately. the international community that should be to suggest the donor community and other third parties try to promote that kind of thinking, among palestinians. it was a terrible pity that the space for that project was shut down in a kind of fit of not understanding at all the
consequences of international policies on palestinian political life in the aftermath of the first unsuccessful and even more the sexual -- the second and successful palestinian bid. of main consequence creating a cost for the plo was to constrict the ability of the the government and of the prime minister to stay in office, and therefore, that whole approach to proceed. as i talked about the need to open up palestinian political space, that is what i have in mind. as i talk about lots of little projects all over the occupied territories, financed in a way that renders them non-hijack a and by the suspect, politically as well, that is what i have in mind. future for there a that, there has to and will be a future for that no matter who is
putting it into place. yes, and a very big way to all of that. >> i think what we have seen in last two years, there has been a backsliding of the fayadist approach, the bottom-up approach, and we have seen a constriction of palestinian politics, freedom of speech and expression, all sorts of things. part of that is contributed by the top-down focus. the interesting thing about fayad is the degree to which his popularity still adheres, although it is hard to measure. salaam's father passed away recently, and the mourning calls turned into demonstrations. that is good news for those who support fayadism. there's no mechanism between palestinian parties to translate third-party efforts, given the fact that fatah has a lot colder
on palestinian part of sex -- palestinian politics. a real political change from elections may be not the only one. we have talked a lot about the need for reform since is lost in 2006. it has not happened and i think most people in the west bank are skeptical that it will ever happen. the good news is that the majority of palestinians are sick of it as much as they are sick of hamas. led poorly.- pol there is still no mechanism to translate it. it may even contribute to why we have violence in the streets today. >> i have a lot of respect for salam fayyad. he is capable and through that, but no matter how good he is, economically and management, the
problem is a political one. no one can transform and as long as occupation continues and as long as there is no political horizon. that is not something salam fayyad can deliver. newsnet network in kurdistan. mores there so much international support for palestine as opposed to the kurds? is it because they are kurdish, not arabs? is it because they are predominantly sunni muslim? >> i would challenge you on a. on an emotional level, you can find that most that more people thepeople are interested in palestinian conflict because it is such a national issue. if you look at the way that the kr g has been moving towards
independence -- and i believe, my personal opinion, i think it is inevitable and i think the rubicon was crossed earlier this year, if not before. it is completely inevitable. it is not going to change hands again, in my opinion. this is virtually a done deal and it is a question of when, not if. while certainly there are a lot of players in the region that do not want it, i think the key ones either do or will and i think by dint of a very good strategic sense as well as a willingness by those who might have opposed this movement towards kurdish independence to start to acquiesce to it, to start to smile on it, to start to cooperate with that, whether it is in baghdad or elsewhere, i think you see that.
i think kurds are much closer to their independence and palestinians are. >> just a brief comment. unrequited kurdish nationalism may be the largest single unrequited national movement and will. this is where geography is critically important. the palestinians and israelis walked on the stage of history at an extraordinary place. a place that is not only resonant with symbol, but remarkably transparent. coverage of this conflict is easy. it is accessible. western media understands this, which is why it is disproportionately covered to an extreme degree given the other conflicts in this world which are far more barbaric, far more costly. three key religions all focused and concentrated in one place the center of the world, so to speak. kurds did not have that. >> there are a couple of things
that are different in the attitude of the international community. the international community broadly has really up close to -- really opposed the integrationist state. in this case, the consequences are not from one state precisely because you have roughly 30 million kurds. most of them are in turkey, iraq, iran, syria. there has been a version -- aversion to readrawing the borders. with palestine, it is a different conflict. you are talking about territories under occupation. huge difference. >> [indiscernible] >> the boundaries are determined by what the u.n. excepts. >> generally, the international community perspective on borders
is really as it is excepted and andtimized -- accepted legitimized through the united nations. the history of every country can be questions. are relatively new. if you look at the premodern states in the middle east, you can raise questions about the legitimacy of any of the states. that is not the way the international community is set up. club set up based upon a that is legitimized u.n. resolutions. >> the question is asked in reverse by palestinians. where the kurds more than us? i hear that all the time. >> that in itself is intriguing. butwed i would not do this, we have one additional, final question from the overflow room. i should not do this but i will. thatll implicitly agree it may be too late for a two
state solution. if that is the case, gentlemen, what is the solution? just briefly, all right? close her eyes and imagine the worst. that there cannot be a two-st ate solution, not conflict ending in character. what is the solution? >> let's differentiate what is likely to happen from what we would like to happen. to reachked if i were the conclusion that two states is impossible, i would support one state with equal citizenship. that is the moral thing to do. that is the only one i could say that is in my -- in harmony with my moral beliefs and justice. is that likely to happen? probably not. the only reason the two state solution is alive is that the majority of israelis and palestinians inc. that if the
two state solution is no longer possible, don't believe there would be one state. there will be violence for years to come. the question is how do you manage it from exploding? if you are looking at it from a -- not a moral point of view or something i made advocate as an individual -- i might advocate as an individual point of view, but how you manage the conflict, we will be in trouble. no matter what you do, we will have eruption. there is no obvious equilibrium. be for thelity would israelis to increasingly controlled the west bank even more in terms of even if they do not call it annexation, possible annexation. possible legal annexation but not gaza. it does not solve the problem of gaza. it does not solve the problem of palestinian refugees outside and it does not address a lot of the questions that palestinians
would have on the west bank. that is not a prescription for stability. you are going to have violence for years to come. >> is a proximity problem in essence, right? >> first of all, i do not think it is too late. 1937 if, since at least not earlier, everyone who has looked at the problem has come to the same conclusion in one form or another and that solution is partition in some form or another. third, i don't think there is such a thing as a one-state solution. there could be a one-state outcome but that is a prescription for continued violence at best. we come back to the two-state solution. differente that has a approach is pursuing recognition of israel and palestine in the security council now so you enshrined the idea of two states between israel and palestine but that is a diplomatic answer. the short answer is, i don't
think there is such a thing as a one-state solution to read -- solution. >> i agree. there are two outcomes. it is not a smorgasbord of choices. we could have a workable solution and their are only one. a two-state solution for would meet the minimum needs of both parties and it could be done. it can be done in theory greater the big problem is, can it be done from two parties in this degree of asymmetry of power. is it possible for the palestinians to extract the concessions from israelis? is it possible for the israelis to make those concessions and enforce them? that is the question. the other outcomes are only that, outcomes, and they involve further conflict. there is one solution versus a series of outcomes, none of which could be called a solution. like rock and roll, the peace
process will double by -- will never die. by the end of this administration, there will be another serious effort in a changed environment. theuse on the israeli side, history of peacemaking is the history of transform blocks. i think there well may be an opportunity for an outcome, perhaps on the road to a two-state solution that is better than the one we see right now. please join me in thanking our terrific panelist. thank all of you for coming. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> from here at the wilson center, we go live now to the atlantic council to hear from nato secretary-general anders
fogh rasmussen. he is giving a preview of the nato summit in september. it is getting underway now. >> it is wonderful to see you again. thank you for your remarkable service over the decades as a marine, as supreme commander of nato forces, and as national security advisor. i remember with great leisure our cooperation -- pleasure our cooperation during her term as national security advisor. you know nato from the inside and you know what it takes to keep the alliance united and your commitment to the transatlantic relations is firm and strong. thank you very much. also, a big thank you to fred and damon and your dedicated team here at the atlantic
council. i truly value your strong commitment and service to the transatlantic community and to nato. fred, it is a great privilege and a pleasure to work with you. you have done an amazing job in making the atlantic council such an influential forum in international affairs in washington and worldwide. council shapes and informs an important debate. on the challenges we face and the opportunities he must grasp in a world that is more competitive, dynamic, and disorderly. through your tireless work, you play a key role in keeping the
bond between north america and europe strong. now and into the future. the 70thly marked anniversary of the d-day landing. a stark reminder of the horrors of war, but also of what is possible when our nations unite against tyranny. alliancen, the nato has underpinned freedom, peace, and prosperity across europe and north america. ,rotecting our values individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. today, those values and our way of life are once more under threat. conflicts,ounded by danger, this order, and
autocratic regimes. in our -- an arc of instability from the middle east to africa and the sahara. rising territorial disputes in the nation and a revisionist russia breaking international rules and undermining trust. but russia is not just trying to re-create a sphere of influence. has dealt a dangerous blow to the internet jewel -- international rules-based system we have built over the decades. it's illegal and illegitimate actions encourage other autocratic regimes to follow suit. the best way to face some threats is clear. we must be confident in our values.
reinforce our readiness. transatlantic the bonds that remain the bedrock of our international order. ii, the solution to every strategic challenge has been transatlantic. the cold war, the balkans, afghanistan, or the financial crisis. america and europe together, training together, and when necessary, fighting together. this is how we have protected our nations and promoted our values. even the most successful relationship needs work. we cannot take our transatlantic bond for granted.
we must renew our commitment and continue to invest time, energy, and resources to keep it strong. to meet the challenges we face, we need a truly integrated transatlantic immunity -- community. a truly integrated transatlantic immunity. -- community. i believe there are three things we must do. ties,rce our economic deepen our personal and cultural links, and strengthen our security. first, the economy. trade encourages the creation of wealth. it discourages conflict and
conquest. it generates greater prosperity -- in turn turns we leads to greater security, as people do not want to put their prosperity at risk. so a healthy economy and sound security create a virtuous circle. in today's interconnected world, the link between economics and security and between peace and prosperity is stronger than ever. it is particularly strong in the relationship between europe and north america. together, we represent the most powerful economic bloc the world has ever known. greater local competition, we need to work
harder to ensure our prosperity for the future. areansatlantic free-trade is a unique opportunity to reinforce our economic task and to lock in our prosperity. the trade deals currently being negotiated between north america that ande are the next the right step -- next step in the right step. the transatlantic trade and investment partnership will eliminate terrorists, cut red tape, and open up new markets. it is potentially the biggest trade and investment deal in history. as a former prime minister, i know just how difficult trade negotiations can be. but we must look beyond the
technical details to see the big gains within our reach and to move forward, because this is an opportunity we cannot miss, to promote growth, create jobs, and improve our quality of life. we also need a new focus on energy security. much of europe is now reliant on russia's oil and gas. we have, so to speak, burned our way into a position of independence -- of dependence. as we see in ukraine, russia is quite capable of turning off the taps. end to that
dependency is now up the utmost strategic importance. nations are already doing more to reduce this dependency. they are increasing their storage reserves, engineering pipelines to redirect energy to where it is needed, and bringing in energy from other sources. we must also find new ways to generate, extract, and distribute energy. renewables. gas, or we need to open our markets to each other because if you have to depend on anyone, it is better to depend on your friends.
and those friendships must be fostered. point. my second we have to even the personal and cultural ties that bind us so closely. ago, i came to the united states as a guest of the international visitor leadership program. i can tell you, a life-changing experience. it helps me to know and appreciate this great country and its people. as many people as possible should have that same opportunity. further strengthen the personal bonds across the so in preparation for
our summit in wales in september, i asked young, emerging leaders from all nations of the alliance how they think we should do it. i would like to thank the atlantic council facilitating this work. the results have been truly enlightening and valuable. one of the main recommendations of the emerging leaders is to enhance mutual understanding between spin -- between the nations of the alliance through personal ties, and i think they are right. we need to increase our transatlantic student scholarships and exchange programs. to increase our scientific and cultural cooperation, to appoint honorary ambassadors to spread the word about the value of the transatlantic on end of nato --
transatlantic bond and of nato and to form those lifelong relationships that have bound our people together for so long. my third point underpinning everything we do is we need to strengthen our security. the english philosopher thomas hoppes wrote of a world without rules. a world without security. he described this world as ,aving no industry, no movement no culture, no society. fearng but the continual , of a worldeath where the life of man was nasty, brutish, and short.
security is necessary for us to live free from fear. security takes work. for 65 years, that work has been led by the countries of the nato alliance. in today's dangerous world, nato to respond to whatever threats we face, to act quickly whenever, wherever, and however needed. this means europe and north america consulting together, acting together, and sharing the responsibility together. i know that from this side of
the atlantic, it can appear that european allies expect the united states to defend them but they are not prepared to defend themselves. say, this is simply not true. , during the cold war european soldiers were confined to barracks. not so now. europeans have placed themselves in the line of fire in the balkans and over libya, in afghanistan. two american soldiers that have served, one european soldier has served with them and many paid the ultimate sacrifice in our common cause.
responding to russia's aggression in error eastern -- in our eastern neighborhood, all 28 allies have stepped up to the plate to reinforce our defense. from the balkans to the black sea, we have more planes in the air, more ships at sea, and more troops on the ground. remainsed nations crucial. but most of the planes are european. most of the ships are european. many of the troops are european. this is nato solidarity in action. all for one and one for
all. we must also plan for the future. and be ready to deal with any threats from wherever they come. so for our wales summit, we will ensure that nato was always prepared through our new readiness action plan. we are looking closely at how we deploy our forces for defense and deterrence, what combination of forces we need, where they should be deployed, and the ess.iness -- their readin we are also considering reinforcement measures such as necessary infrastructure, the designation of bases and prefers
a shooting of equipment and supplies. we are reviewing our defense sharingssessments, arrangements, and early warning procedure. we are also adapting a new exercise schedule to the new security environment. we want to strengthen our nato response force and special so we can respond to any threat against any member of the alliance, including when we have little warning. readiness requires resources. obama's $1resident
billion reassurance initiative. it shows the united states' endu ring commitment to the security of europe. now, other allies need to andngthen their commitment i am the first to say that some european nations can and should do more. is an insurance policy, an insurance policy against instability. must they their premiums -- pay their premiums. that premium has just gone up. wales, i expect all allies' leaders to commit to the changed cost on defense
decline,to reverse the and to back up their commitment with concrete action. example.as an estonia has shown that despite a severe economic crisis, it can be done. estonia has shown that allies that invest at least two brent -- 2% of the gross domestic product in defense and i welcome the commitments of lot the a, , lithuania,- latvia poland, and turkey to do the same.
if all the european allies spent 2% of their national income on defense this year, we would have .nother $90 billion to spend that is the equivalent of today's defense budget of germany, italy, netherlands, and norway combined. now, i am not naïve. i know we will not achieve this overnight. , weat the summit in wales need to turn a corner. to start to see defense spending in europe rise in real terms for the first time since the end of
the cold war. of course, national budgets have been under incredible stress. things are changing. public finances are coming under control and error economists are econoing -- our mies are beginning to grow. increasing defense spending is never easy. in light of the threats we face, it has become a necessity. course it is not just about what we spend. it is how we spend. we need to focus on what we really need to keep our nations safe in the 21st century.
on capabilities and skills for the future. together asore .llies and partners in afghanistan, we fought the guest coalition in history. 50 nations from many continents united in a single cause. , from therations balkans delivery of -- the balkans to libya, they have made valuable contributions. we must maintain our political and military cooperation with them to build stability in the world. more to helpdo those who require our assistance to develop effective local forces. launch a we will
defense capacity building initiative. this initiative will allow us to help other nations build up effective defense structures and forces of their own. are better able to take care of security in their own region. can project stability without always deploying large numbers of our own troops. so our wales summit will ensure that nato stands ready, robust, and resolute to face the future.
ladies and gentlemen, we are fortunate to live in lands that are free. but freedom is not a natural state. for, sufferedught suffered for, -- died for. to safeguard the flame of freedom, we must stand ready to protect and promote our values, stay strong, confident, and oured, and strengthen transatlantic community. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much, mr.
secretary general. i'm the executive president -- the vice president here at the atlantic council. we have about 25 minutes to speak. then the accu -- let me add code to thank you. especially since you have just come off the plane arriving at ellis. and to remind everyone who is covering this online or the television audience of the #futurenato. thank you to your shout out of the nato future leaders. i think we have two of them with us today. they are both over here. thank you for being with us today. andly important program thank you for your leadership and getting it off the ground. mr. secretary-general, you just delivered a pretty strong message about how to strengthen the transatlantic bond and capture the spirit of an atlantic council meeting -- mission. the solution to every challenge
has been transatlantic. strategyyou began this by talking about the economy and energy, talking about cultural ties and third, only getting into the security components that. let me start there and i want to get into today's crises. as the nato sect jen, i think that is an unusual point. what is your rationale for leading with messages that would typically be outside the scope of the alliance? >> it is true in the nato treaty. if you read article to in the nato treaty, you see that already be founding fathers stressed the importance of closer economic ties among and i don't think we have reached the full potential of that economic cooperation. of course you could see the european union as part of that
strengthening of economic ties among allies, but i would very much like to see a strengthening of the transatlantic economic ties. i think that is very much in accordance with article two in the nato treaties. it is legitimate for a neck -- a to talkretary-general about economics because security and economics are interlinked. >> that is an important point to point out. to the issues most immediately at hand. you have been working on the wales summit agenda for a while. you have been talking about nato for a purpose ever since it was clear since the alliance would be drawing down its forces in afghanistan and potentially moving away from an operational alliance. now you have two pretty compelling crises on nato frontiers.
one in the east in russia undertaking aggression in ukraine and you have been plainspoken about that, but also on turkey's frontier. another member. what is happening not just in syria but iraq, with isis. i think you said that we are surrounded by conflict, danger, disorder, and autocratic regimes. how are these two immediate crises, which were not part of the planning horizons for wales, how is it impacting your agenda and shaping it heading into wales? crises willhese have a major impact on our agenda in wales. aggression toia's will put a lot of emphasis on the need for a strong, collected defense. the summit, i hope
we will adopt a readiness action plan that will improve our ability to respond swiftly and if needed, to defend and protect our allies. expect theould summit to be very much focused on the situation in the east. but at the same time, we have seen the crisis not only in syria but now also in iraq but i could also mention libya and north africa as examples that the alliance must never become a one-dimensional allies -- alliance. it is of the utmost importance that while we focus on strengthening collective defense, we protect allies against the potential threat from the east, we should not forget other security challenges from the middle east, from north africa, even from cyberspace.
the wales summit will focus on the broad range of security challenges and address all three nato tasks. territorial defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. >> if you think about what is playing out in the east in ukraine, it is clear that the alliance has made a few moves to reassure and reposition many eastern allies. what about ukraine itself? what about the eastern partners, if you will, right now? the focus of the kremlin is on ukraine and moldova or georgia and less so on romania where the alliance is taking action. how do you grapple with what is essentially nato's eastern partners? >> we have decided to step up our cooperation with our eastern partners.
ukraine, we have a nato-ukraine commission and we have had several meetings, recently also with a new foreign minister and we have adopted a comprehensive cooperation program. you will see enhanced cooperation between nato and ukraine in the coming years, .ncluding military cooperation it remains to be seen at the summit how far we can go, but and i am outspoken about it, personally i hope our defense capacity initiative could also apply to ukraine. we will see. >> what does the military to military type of relationship expect to do for the military -- defense capacity initiative? >> i think it is clear to everybody that ukrainian armed andes need modernization further capability development.
i think nato has expertise that could be used to reform and modernize the ukrainian armed forces. to we have also decided enhance our cooperation with moldova. by the way, recently we saw moldova take a significant step ourroviding troops to operation in coso. vo.coso bow -- koso we have decided to develop a substantial package of cooperation, elements with georgia. with all our eastern neighbors, we want to step up our cooperation in the coming years. >> we are not quite ready for enlargement. is that the message coming out of nato headquarters right now? >> now you put it in a negative way. i would put it in the positive
way that we continue to take steps within our open-door policy. our door remains open to european countries that fill the necessary criteria -- fulfil the necessary criteria. it will be for the summit to take decisions, but we are preparing a substantial package and in regards to montenegro, we have decided to talksfocus, and intensify and foreign ministers will assess the situation at the latest by the end of 2015 and decide whether the time is ripe for inviting montenegro. i think it strikes the right "hence to ensure that our -- our open-door policy remains
credible, but at the same time we do not come from eyes on criteria. >> let me follow-up on the defense capacity initiative. a this initiative in part reflection of lessons learned in libya? this is an operation that nato was not planning for. at the end of the operation, we ate a trip amount of work the council on libya today. has that influence the information today? >> yes indeed, but i would broaden it. i would afghanistan as one of the lessons learned. seen retrospectively, i think we started our mission in afghanistan much too late. we did not start in earnest until 2009. i think we should have started much earlier. to train andtter
develop local security forces. politically it is better to give the defense of afghanistan an af ghan face and economically, it is a better deal to make local security forces capable to take responsibility for security that you deployed our troops -- than to deployed our troops for a long time. afghanistan is an example and libya is an example and last year, we received a request from the libyan government for assistance to help them build their security sector. we responded positively, but for well-known reasons it has been a bit difficult to implement that positive response. we stand ready. once the libyans are ready, we are ready to assist them. beforeme shift the gear i turn to the audience and take questions back to the transatlantic part of the relationship. you refer to the alliance is an
insurance policy for its members and that the premiums have just gone up. what i took away a strong statement that you are prepared at wales, you expect alliance leaders to commit to changes in defense spending. i think -- that is a pretty big goal you later. you mentioned president obama mentioning the $1 billion initiative. at capitol hill, there is a political instinct that resonates. people understand the challenge that we are facing from putin's russia, the national -- rationale behind. i think people have been with their own investment and resources. you just raised the bar pretty high with what you articulated. do you think you are on a path of actually recovering from the bottom of where we have been in the recession on spending and reversing that trend? >> i see the momentum.
i would not suggest it would be easy. on the contrary. i think it would be uphill. but because many countries are still struggling with weak , it issts -- economies important to cut deficits and ndebtedness, because countries are volatile. having said that, i see a positive development in europe. i mentioned in my introduction that countries that have already decided to reverse the trend, and that is not hot air. that is commitments based on broad political agreements in their parliaments. estonia has already achieved the 2% go. via, lithuania,t
turkey, poland have promised to work in the same direction, spending from 2017-2020. i think more will follow. in addition to that, it would also be important if nato allies would commit to fulfill the initial benchmark -- the nato benchmark on spending at least defense budget on research development and equipment. it is not just the size of the budget but how the money is spent and we will focus on both issues at the summit. >> i think as the hill the liberates how to respond to this $1 billion package, it is important to get that message out there. then return to the audience and taking questions and comments. let me start in the front. then they collect a couple if i may. please introduce yourself.
>> my name is korean. i am the former conductor -- kareem. i'm the former vector of the national orchestra. i was an advisor as well. theuestion concerning current situation in the middle east and focusing on iraq. if, and only if there was an initiative of awakening similar to the situation back in 2006 in areas that are not necessarily under the control of the central government, the central, legitimate government in baghdad and theuch groups initiative requires the assistance of nato directly, that that be something would be even a discussion or consideration? >> thank you.
then you pick this up as well. i like the idea that you started with economics and moved to security later on. but as you know, the relationship between the nato and eu is imperfect. is there any chance between now and wales are afterwards to get -- maybe this is a strong phrase -- to get the three recalcitrant countries, great, turkey, and cyprus, to get the institutions to work together, and an idea that has been around a long time, to have an extra half they at the end of the summit to bring be european union leaders in so there can start being some kind of active, serious coordination between the two institutions for common purposes? >> maybe take these two and we will pick up a few more. first on iraq, if i understood the question correctly, it was, in essence, could we imagine nato assist
iraq upon request? >> and awakening. the social populist community fighting back against isis. [indiscernible] see nato engaged directly in iraq. but as you know, the iraqi government has requested assistance from individual nato allies, primarily from the united states. as regards to nato, we are effective providing defensive protection of our allies. in this case, of course, turkey in particular is very much
focused on the security situation in the region and i visited and cora recently and discussed in depth. we have also had consultations in nato upon request from turkey. that is how i see nato right now. nato-eu, you are right. we have not reached the full potential of a nato-eu cooperation. but having said that, i would add that we have made a lot of progress during recent years. operations, weo coordinate and cooperate seamlessly in theaters where the eu and nato operate together. from a practical point of view, it works quite efficiently. when it comes to capability development, we have achieved a lot of progress. as the european defense agency
and allied command work very closely together. thatnk i could safely say we avoid duplication and waste of resources through close coordination. i would say an efficient division of labor. finally, on clinical conservation, i think we have the biggest problem. because of these well-known , it isand disputes sometimes difficult to organize nato-eu meetings. there is one area we are allowed to discuss informal meetings, namely bosnia. operatespper -- the eu a 30 plus operation which means use nato -- eu can
assets to conduct operations. so we are allowed to have formal nato-eu meeting. while bosnia is important, i can easily think of other issues nato-eurant close cooperation. even in this area, we have seen progress recently. actually, we have had two meetings. it is an example when the situation so warns, -- so warrants, it is possible to have a pragmatic way forward. all in all, i would not buy such a bleak picture as you did. -- yeah. i see some light. i see some light. there is still progress to be made. ultimately we need to
conflict.ution to the >> let me move to west clark. >> wes clark here. me like in ukraine, they are fighting back pretty effectively right now. helpis nato able to do to the other countries deal with the internal challenges that are present in the baltics and countries like bulgaria? do we have a role in that or are we ceding it to the you -- to the eu? >> let me move to the other side of the room. is there a mic there? >> thank you. leandra bernstein. my question is, you have created quite a narrative as far as
russia, giving it an anomie mage, and itenemy i is questionable whether creating that image of russia is intended to reinvigorate somehow the nato alliance, which has seen a lot views,certain analysts' defeats in the 21st century in particular, and significant struggles economically and likewise. is this creation of russia as a attempt todefensive try to pull the alliance back together? >> them the go-ahead and pick up the ambassador as well. -- let me go ahead and pick up the ambassador as well. mentioned the necessary
conditions for the enlargement of nato. could you describe more specifically what the necessary conditions are? are they measurable and will enhance cooperation cover those enhanced conditions? as a result, will it pay to wait towards nato membership for countries? thank you. first, to wes clark, what we are witnessing is maybe not entirely a new kind of warfare, but we call it hybrid warfare. a combination of traditional methods and more sophisticated covert military operations combined with sophisticated information and disinformation operations.
and you are right in pointing to that hybrid warfare could be used against some nato allies. for instance, in the baltic crowd --aking into a account of the russian doctrine that they preserve the right to interfere or intervene, to protect what they consider the interests of russian-speaking communities. as we all know, and estonia and we have substantial russian-speaking minorities. bulgaria is another case, but we know from historical reasons that there are special ties. it is irrelevant. -- it is relevant. it is a highly relevant issue. we are dealing with that.
this particular issue is part of our readiness action plan because it is also necessary to be ready to counter such hybrid warfare. headings said that, is this purely a nato issue? militaryn traditional means. propagandaludes information and dis operations, and that goes beyond traditional nato operations. it is an excellent example of an area where we need close cooperation and coordination with other organizations like the european union. but i would also think about other organizations. is of utmost