tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 1, 2014 3:00am-5:01am EDT
rely on humanitarian aid. the use ofs apply on the gaza strip. waters are totally or partially inaccessible. they are estimated to be food insecure and unemployment remains high at 43%. the economy is more advanced. this volatile situation has been exacerbated by 24 days of conflict. thousands of palestinians have been killed and 6000 injured. over 80% of those killed are civilians. 251 children. israel has faced rocket fire. 59 have been killed, three civilians, and 56 soldiers. dozens injured.
400 and 40,000 people in the gaza strip are now displaced. almost 24% of the population. hosted whileeing others are seeking refuge buildings,ey can in hospital grounds, or families and friends. these areas are becoming harder to find. long and5 kilometers six and 14 kilometers wide. with the blockade in place, most people are not able to leave gaza even to get urgent medical attention. they come to the united nations facilities for protection when
their homes and neighborhoods come under fire. people, but0,000 over 103 u.n. facilities have come under attack including a school hosting 3300 displaced yesterday. 19 people were killed and over 100 injured. lostnited nations has several and other humanitarian workers have been killed since the outbreak of hostilities. no place is safe. the other attacks in the strongest possible terms. with direct or indiscriminate attacks.
nations must remain in viable. a parties to the conflict should protect humanitarian workers. justificationo for failing to do so. the widespread destruction of homes, public services, and the infrastructure throughout the gaza strip. 9000 homes have been destroyed according to preliminary reports. they have also sustained damage. compounds havee also been damaged. 24 medical facilities have been damaged or destroyed, some hit multiple times. this includes the hospital that julyit on the 21st of
causing significant damage to the top two floors of the hospital and killing four people. july, theh of hospital sheltering thousands of displaced people was also damaged. in addition to schools, hospitals, and other infrastructures, the only power plant was struck on tuesday, destroying the fuel tanks. parts of gaza will remain without any electricity while others will only receive electricity two hours of da day. repairs are expected to take months to complete under the best of circumstances. the immediate, medium, and longer-term impact on the functioning of water, sanitation, and health care facilities as well as food production cannot be overstated.
water and sewer systems are also severely damaged and i am deeply concerned about possible contamination water systems. hundreds of thousands of people are without access to regular water? . the ongoing violence is preventing urgent repairs. if the current situation persists, the number of people without water will significantly increase. they're working to meet increasing humanitarian needs. with other shelters as well as patients of hospital staff. it is cord knitting requests.
unicef is delivering pediatric drugs. it is providing psychological support. it is hampering our ability to move around and has made sustained delivery of systems for people in need. until a long-term cease-fire is will prevent us from reaching those in need. until they are injured, recover the fed, and allow civilians some reprieve so that they can restock and resupply their
homes. we need the government of israel, hamas, and other militant groups to comply with legal obligations including international humanitarian and human rights laws. each party must be held accountable. we all watched in horror the desperation of children and civilians as they have come under attack. there is no safe place to go. under international humanitarian law, the government of israel must distinguish between the military objectives and civilian objects. and protect them from the effects of military operations. with the different circumstances
>> we want to deliver everything from gaza city. we have assessed the situation on the ground. they admit terrible conditions resulting from the conflict that iraq did on the eighth of july -- that erupted on the eighth of july. staff to thank the providing a humanitarian lifeline for the people of gaza and under the truly outstanding leadership of the director of operations bob turner.
many lost their lives since hostilities began and they are knowledge and the sacrifice -- acknowledging their sacrifice. --ant to thank the families .hey have borne witness i have, in particular this morning, seen the catastrophic human cost of this war as a pediatric ward in gaza with in armed conflict waged with excessive and disproportionate force.
they had very barely and not yet -- like many of you around the table, i have children of my own. and what i saw today, it devastated me. i have always refused anonymity in death and injury. zonesten reports in war -- the palestinian children i saw today are not statistics. behind every death and injury there is a story and a destiny to be respected. elementary girls school, serving as the --ignated emergency shelter
including a notification that the school was sheltering displaced persons. instructed by the israeli military to seek shelter in places such as ours. i reiterate my condemnation in the strongest terms, reiterate also that it was in serious filing should of international , including the immediate launching of a transparent investigation to share its findings. we are engaged in continuous dialogue with israel on the matter. i have heard the messages time and time again. safe at school, we
are not safe anywhere in gaza. the world has failed to protect. is protection of civilians not something we want to hear anymore. also call upon all parties to respect the sanctity of u.n. premises and exercise the highest precaution in the conduct of military operations. daysttack came only six after the emergency shelter caused multiple injuries and fatalities. cause all the worse. there is something to ochoa to draw attention. on three occasions, we found rockets belonging to groups in gaza -- we alerted relevant
.arties improve procedures in a manner that does not compromise the safety or staff of civilians. said thatalso be these discoveries do not in any on justify attacks facilities. a muslim -- closely monitor competence and other parties. here members of the council, allow me to turn to the most difficult challenge facing gaza today. have 220,000 displaced people.
it is four times higher than the peak number of displaced people during the conflict in 2008 and 2009. i am not here referring to the tens of thousands that have found temporary shelter only to registered. we are doing everything possible to provide them with food, mattresses, and blankets. we are now into the fourth week of mass displacement and facility unequipped to shelter large numbers for such a duration. diretions are increasingly in the shelters. latrines are totally inadequate. withutbreak is beginning skin infection, scabies, and others. there are thousands of pregnant women.
we are sheltering newborn infants in these appalling conditions. our ability to mitigate is heavily restricted by ongoing facilities. we are gravely concerned about this situation and we are gravely concerned about any possible displacement. with as many as 2500 displaced people residing in schools, an average of 80 people per classroom, we have exceeded the tolerable limit that we can accommodate. it is with alarm i have seized accounts of new instructions to evacuate the area of gaza city. cools on six occasions, i think the population is facing a precipice.
should further large-scale be the occupying power of international humanitarian law that will have direct results for the people. reality of israel is not sustainable under any circumstances. the continuing destruction of infrastructure. as i have stated on previous visits to gaza, the rockets -- we all aspire a middle east in which people share common interests, a stake in each other's well-being, and the commitment that the said for-general st
justice and security in the region. and those caused by the conflict now unfolding. allow me to add my voice to those calling for the underlying in full view of the world. is not enough. returnot conceivable to to the situation existing before this conflict. the blockade of gaza must be they face the prospect
that it would be unlivable in a toter of only a few years enable the development of gaza and the ensuring security for all in the region. it they to his mandate, will remain steadfast in their commitment to operations. required to ensure lasting peace to instability in the region. i thank you, mr. president. >> i thank him for his briefing and now we invite council members to continue the discussion on the
audience you know two things are happening here today. one of them is we are dealing with an issue of great urgency, and we're about to hear someone of great wisdom and significance talk about this issue and beyond. we're honored to welcome dr. salam fayad, former prime minister of the palestinian authority to the atlantic council and beyond that, we're delighted to welcome him to the atlantic council's fred scowcroft center as really our first and distinguished statesman at the atlantic council. we have the chairman of the scowcroft center general jones here who will be introducing. i'll just take a couple remarks before passing to the scowcroft center chair. doctor fayyad adds a much-ed
meed voice to the conversation on the future of the israeli-palestinian relations and what this means for the broader middle east. over the past three weeks, renewed conflict between israel and hamas and other palestinian groups has resulted in over 1,000 casualties. more than 5,000 -- excuse me, more than 4,500 wounded and displacement of tens of thousands. efforts by secretary of state john kerry to forge a cease-fire have been insufficient thus far. as the u.s. and international leaders seem unable to bring the conflict to a halt. now more than ever, we need fresh thinking, fresh approaches and strong leadership to a solution to one of the world's most intractable conflicts. i think you'll hear a lot of that sort of thinking today. dr. fayyad has a written statement a little bit like congressional testimony which will be outside at 5:00. he'll be speaking from that statement, but in an abridged
form in his opening comments before i moderate q&a with the audience. he joins us today to build upon the important work the scowcroft center's middle east peace and security initiative is doing to develop innovative strategies and analysis for a change in middle east. i salute barry pavell and his team for the work they are doing. this complements the fantastic work of the center on the middle east and i salute the acting director dannia greenfield for the work that that center has been doing on the related set of issues. he also, dr. fayyad wils also contribute to the critical work the council has been doing on long-term regional trends, including the growth of nonstate actors in the middle east. as a respected and accomplished leader in the region, he'll be an invaluable voice along with ambassador michael warren, the council's ambassador in residence as the council works to better understand the
strategic implications of continued conflict between israelis and palestinians. i'm delighted that general jones is here who, along with steve hadley, won national security adviser to democrat, and one national security adviser to a president, will play the central work in the ongoing strategy of the center and the scowcroft center but i also thank them both for helping to bring dr. fayyad as a distinguished statesman at the council. general jones is the chairman, as i said, of the scowcroft center, former national security adviser, supreme allied commander europe and marine commandant. he's been a great partner to the atlantic council, integral to the work of the scowcroft center over the past few years but really the work across the atlantic council on a wide set of issues. general jones, the podium is yours.
>> thank you, fred. and ladies and gentlemen, welcome. this is a high moment for the atlantic council, and we are honored to be here today. and it's especially exciting for me to be able to introduce dr. salam fayyad who i came to know and admire as a leader and statesman and colleague while working with him on the peace process now six years ago when i served as special envoy for the middle east regional security during 2007 and 2008. and my friend steve hadley was the national security adviser. i think jane harman was still in office and the world was a different place. i think of all the two years that i spent working on this issue that one of the things i enjoyed the most during my time in the middle east was my visits -- my regular visits with
dr. fayyad. without any fear of exaggeration, he's a man of courage. he's a man of commitment. and he's a man of peace. and i think he's, above all, a very wise man and someone that we should continue to listen to as we struggle to find a long-lasting solution in this very, very critical part of the world. at the current violence unfolding in the region underscores the importance of the middle east peace process. the regional stability. and also i would suggest global stability. and of leaders such as salam fayyad who devoted their lives to building a better future for all stakeholders in the region. his reputation precedes him. hence the turnout today. he's a leader and a visionary, one who understands that human development and prosperity are impossible without good governance and good governance is not possible without transparency and accountability.
during his tenure at prime minister, dr. fayyad championed law and in order the west bank, worked to build institutions that would meet the needs of the palestinian people and taught us all a lesson that the solution set is much broader than simply military activities. he was appointed as minister of finance over the palestinian authority under yasser arafat from 2002 to 2005 and won praise, high praise from the international community for introducing extensive economic and financial reforms and cracking down on corruption. and late 2005 he resigned from the cabinet to found and run the third white block an independent party that would run and win in two seats in the palestinian parliamentary elections of january 2006. in march 2007, dr. fayyad was appointed again as minister of finance, international unity government and in june 2007
appointed prime minister, a position he held until he stepped down in june 2013. dr. fayyad will be a fantastic a addition to the atlantic council team. i look forward to working closely with him as the scowcroft center continues to expand its work on middle east security, especially on israeli-palestinian negotiations in the middle east peace process itself. i'm sure the scowcroft center will become a leading voice an this critical issue. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming dr. salam fayyad to the podium. >> thank you so much. thank you. thank you very much, george jones. thank you for the very kind introduction. thank you. and i thank you ladies and gentlemen for the interest you have taken attending this event
which i had hoped or wished would happen against different backdrop. relative to what we all are looking at. completely tragic situation in terms of the horror that has been going on for long 25 days, past 25 days. the destruction we're talking about since the event was prepared for, more than 1400 people, including many, many children. more than 8,000 wounded. many today are in life-threatening situation. made even more life threatening given the very poor conditions in the gaza strip and health care facilities. in addition to damage to
infrastructure, housing, 300,000 people displaced. this is the extent of the damage and tragedy that's been unfolding for the past 25 days and counting. with unfortunately not there being the prospect in the immediate future of a cease-fire. of course, i hope i'm wrong on this. and we've been all following this with great deal of hope that the efforts under way, efforts that have been made toward reaching some kind of arrangement that would secure a cease-fire would be successful. still hope and pray that it would be. that's the most important thing given the extent to which the situation has been the horror it has been. of course, what is really important beyond the obvious, which is to secure cease-fire, that's the most important thing is to see what needs to happen
in the period immediately following that in order to build on that cease-fire to ensure that it is -- to ensure that as things begin to converge toward a new normal of sorts, that that new normal is fundamentally different from the old one. we've been there before. meaning specifically that a way was found on a couple of occasions before then, before this time around, where agreement was reached, tentative agreement, with not really much hope or expectation it was going to be lasting or durable. with preparation for the next round literally beginning immediately after the cease-fire was seized -- or was secured. i hope this time around will be different. but first things first, we need an urgently needed cease-fire. this is the second part of
thinking. more like a medium term to longer term context is important. i know there's a dilemma here. any time you have a crisis situation, it's very difficult to introduce elements of strategic nature or longer term implications. who wants to talk about that? who cares to listen? at time there's death and destruction, tragedy and misery about long-term or strategic dimension to what's going on. at the same time, unless those considerations are factored into the discussion, unfortunately, this situation will be one of moving from a crisis to the next one. besides, i think i happen to believe in the context of the current tragedy that we're looking at that's unfolding and continues to unfold before our own eyes, thinking strategically or seemingly longer term is absolutely essential in order to make the cease-fire promise to be a lasting one, relative to
previous efforts made in this direction. the focus of my remarks will be on this. and i think in a way, it was suggested by my colleagues an the council and i'm proud of the association. thank you for the help and i look forward to working with you and others to promote ideas related to this very conflict but also to grow the region which continues to be really going through a period of unprecedented turmoil with unprecedented violence, extremism and -- that has not been seen. one really has to go back in history a long, long time where one can find the unprecedented violence that's been taking place for a long time. and threatens to continue to be
the case. against the backdrop of all of this and the title suggested for this conversation which i'm eager to have with jeff camp in short order, try to access breaking the vicious cycle. the choice of title, which was not mine, imparts the dimension to this conversation that i have just alluded to, which is what do we do in order to ensure that the new normal is fundamentally different from the old one. and if that's not really enough, and i think in the words of a woman in gaza sitting by -- specifically and i make mention of this in my prepared remarks which would be made available to you at the conclusion of this conversation, sitting by the remains of what used to be her home only two weeks ago destroyed completely by an air strike, and pointing to it and saying, you know, even before this, she
said, we have much to lose. even before this, so much misery. we are alive simply because there was not enough death to go around. i thought it was important significant words of this kind in addition to what we just talked about in terms of the title as defining this conversation today. this is really as good a reason as any for us to engage in this kind of conversation, discussions as to what needs to happen to place this in a context that ensures the tragedy what has been unfolding the past 3 1/2 weeks. and as we do, there are some ideas that have been put forward that involve certainly not, you know, rushing back to a political process that has gone through yet another round of failed diplomacy without adjustment, nor to focus on that exclusively to the point where
efforts that need to continue to be made in earnest now to secure a cease-fire, but rather to consider what it is that has to be done. in the experience over the past 20 years or so and particularly over the past 15, since the presumptive date of end of discussion or negotiation, so-called permanent status issues, what is it in light of that experience that should be taken into consideration? to inform a process that could lead to introducing badly needed adjustment to promise delivery so that we would not end up doing this over and over again, expecting different results we cannot possibly obtain. that is really the direction in which i decided to take this conversation in the form of the remarks that i have prepared for this conversation which, again, will be made available to you. and dare i suggest, as a matter of fact, the importance of
taking a new look at some of the more important precepts of the existing framework. what is a framework, negotiation framework or peacemaking framework, if you will. one fundamental question. who represents the palestinians. what is it that that party actually represents. and the other one, the other element or the other area of possible adjustment i feel would be necessary to take a good look at is the design of the original framework that's oslo. i would make to make it clear to you, this is not going to be an argument for ditching the existing framework. this is not about a statement that says let us abandon the two-state solution concept to the contrary. in thinking through the adjustments of the kind that i'll be talking to you briefly about, actually what i had in mind was steps necessary to be
taken and undertaken in order to ensure that viability of the -- steps necessary can be restored in order for this framework to be successful. and very briefly, those two key areas of adjustment or possible adjustment that need to be examined thoroughly, on the question of palestinian representation, there is an issue, quandary, if you will, of there being essentially two camps. one that happens to have the power of representation. that is the plo. but without much effective presence with one that has really waned over time, for a variety of reasons including most importantly as a direct consequence of the failed political process. and on the other, another group,
another camp that does not have the power to represent but has real strength and field presence in ways that cannot be ignored. the doctrine has referred them, deal with what exists, and the framework that does have the power to represent, reach a peace agreement that the process itself plus the outcome would be transformative enough to really take us all to a successful end, if you will, conclusion. that has not happened. that has not happened over the past 20 years. i would say over the past 15 years since may 1999 when this was supposed to have been concluded by agreement and through negotiation and it wasn't. if anything, the goal achieved and developed out of this political process looks more
distant today than in 1999. that is a really serious problem and one that did contribute to the plo being what it is. so that's a point that needs to be considered as we really move forward. both in terms of its implications for overall peacemaking effort but also in terms of its relationship with the question of national palestinian governments. how much longer can you keep on going with the countries separated and with this much marginalization going on and without adequate representation and various factions, parties having enough presence and sense of partnership that goes on. so the international requirement on one hand, the requirements of peacemaking but also the requirements of governance that would require taking a good look at. last, it's the second issue. the second issue that needs adjustment, that's the overall design, if you will, of the framework. once again, i'm emphasizing
that -- i am not talking about -- forgetting about that framework, but really fixing it. also, many people forget was about an arrangement. it was not a permanent arrangement. it was supposed to have ended. it was supposed to have culminated in successful negotiations on so-called permanent issues. was supposed to and implicit in that construction was the emergence of the state of palestine, something that was not elaborated with this explicitly at least in june 2002 when the emergence of a viable state of palestine living side by side with the state of israel was put forward as the way forward, as the solution concept and thereby making it by george w. bush, thereby making it a universally accepted doctrine. you know, a lot of things did not happen the way they were
supposed to happen. and that is why i think we need to go back. oslo itself was supposed to be a long-term arrangement. may 1999 was supposed to be. it did not happen. the arrangement may have made sense or could have been because it was interim. because actually, by virtue of signing the oslo accords, the palestinian side by virtuing of signing the accord in a formal sense accepted the occupation or continuation in a formal way for a maximum of five years beyond the 26-year period that had elapsed since then. that's the oslo accord and could be understood this way. but not forever. it was accepted as an interim period. that's the sense of it. may 1999, past that nothing made sense anymore. once that threshold was crossed, it became an open-ended
agreement. and hence, understanding of the plo in the eyes of the palestinian public. beginning with the signing of the accords hinged critically on its success in delivering life, freedom and dignity in a country for a percent of people. and that obviously has not worked out. and past 1999 it became open-ended. to put it bluntly, palestinians being told go on, continue to negotiate with israel. accept what israel has on offer for you or else except continued occupation. that doesn't make sense. and that's why i say, you know, this side, this part needs to be looked at again. that's not what oslo was supposed to be like. how do we make sense out of both of these considerations? how do we put them together in order to come up with a concept
that can, on the one hand, reinforce the effort under way to securities filed but then important to sustain it. with this introduction, i submit and to questions and answers, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, very much. thank you. >> thank you for submitting to interrogation. thank you for those opening initial comments. i missed saying something that in these modern days you said there's in different times i was supposed to say at the top. and that is for those of you tweeting it's #acgaza. #acgaza. this is all on the record, obviously, and not only will the full comments be made available
physically outside of 5:00 p.m., but we'll also have them on our website if i know our team right at the same time. so i think it should be at the same time. i do want to give a special greeting to steve hadley. i didn't see he was in the audience right at the beginning. he's been so much a part of bringing dr. fayad here. it's good seeing jane harman and many board members throughout, thank you for being here. let me start by drilling down on what you were saying. you were essentially saying we don't have the representation, right, we don't have the framework right. essentially. >> yeah. >> could you tell us what should the representation be, what should the framework be? >> there's more than -- i hope this is okay. can you hear? >> yeah. >> there is really a very complicated problem here. on the one hand, you know, the oslo accords were signed on to by the plo acting on behalf of
you' all palestinians. and those accords involved early on. and that was the declaration of mutual recognition presented to the palestinian people. and that defined the process. and that defined the palestinian counterpart. and as i said, that point in time onward, this is the criterion by which the plo was to be judged, the extent to it was not supposed to be successful in delivering freedom to the palestinian people and palestinian statehood. that didn't happen, as i alluded to in my opening remarks. and if anything, that appears to be more elusive today, more distant than it did then. not surprisingly, the standing of the plo has eroded over time. consistent with an erosion in the terms of reference of the
political process or the peace process. things that used to be taken as for granted in the past like, for example, discussions about 1967 being the presumptive boulder in negotiations. all of a sudden in more recent years, having become an issue of contention, whether or not it can be included in a policy document, including one put forward by the united states, not israel. this is a remarkable erosion in terms of the process. this is not something that is easy. thereby, i mean, this failure was very costly. it made the difference involved between the maximum offer by israel and the minimum acceptable palestinians progressively wider and wider. so you had a plo that had failed to deliver by the end of the five-year period, which was all of it was, but then stack on to that, going through the second
intefadeh, 2014, there's failure after failure after failure. one round of negotiations giving way to the next. except that the next round of negotiations started with it having eroded even further. so the plo acting on behalf of all palestinians, having the power to represent, the privilege to represent, the responsibility to represent, but then looking at the situation, it's becoming more and more difficult to handle. at the same time, there were these other factions that never were part of the plo framework. from the very beginning. they did not accept oslo as a framework for resolving the palestinian/israeli issue, from the very beginning. and over time and in parallel with this decline or erosion in the standing of the plo, their power, even though, you know, field presence, if you will, strength, the extent to which
their ideology resonated with people, you know, understanding the ups and downs of political cycles and sentiments and all but over time, one cannot really see there has been rise. and that happened to be enforced by federal diplomacy. and as a matter of fact, become even more pronounced, especially more pronounced at times like these when you have a most dangerous escalation. you have death and suffering and distraction and tragedy and all. with them really actually saying look at what this other faction has brought you or this other school or thought. it has brought you nothing, failure. so you have a situation where you have these non-plo factions standing on a platform of this kind, gaining strength over time. at the same time, the plo acting
on behalf of palestinians losing ground. this is something that needs to be fixed. >> so you have to somehow bring these factions into the representations. is that what you're saying? >> you know, it's very important for two reasons. one, i said there were two dimensions to this. international in terms of engagement to israel and the international community, but then there is the governance issue. what do you do about, you know, government and about overall government framework when certain factions are excluded? when they have at the same time this much power and field presence, if you will. not to mention the arms and what have you. i'm talking about what appears to be -- again, perceptionwise. superior ideology. at the time when unfortunately it started to develop, that after all, violence pays off. who's going to really win in a situation like this? not the plo had had really
committed to nonviolence to peace, but those all along said that's not really going to happen. and they would say -- and i think that's a really strong argument -- that where else in the history of national liberation movements, national liberation movements had to lay down their arms before they secured independence? it's difficult to argue against that. if you really look at the history. but you'd understand that in the palestinian context only to the extent that oslo was supposed to be an interim arrangement. promising delivery five years later, the commitments undertaken by the plo on behalf of all palestinians, the right of the state of israel. also denounce violence made sense in the context of it coming to an end and delivering. but once that happened, once we crossed that, it started to become difficult to really argue. additionally, the number of things that happened over this period of time that in a way
validated that kind of thinking. and you can't ignore that in this day and age. it's not the 19th century, even 20th century. you have to make sense to people you govern. you can't ignore them. there are many things that happened over the course of the past 20 years that actually validated the theory that says violence pays off. many things. not only in an independent context. we were talking about lebanon, for example. and this all happened over the course of the oslo framework, has nothing to do with the oslo framework separately. and several instances of dealing between the palestinian authority and israel. take, for example, just one example, the prisoner exchange deal. where in one goal, israel traded the freedom of more than 1,000 palestinian prisoners to secure the release of -- contrast that
with the experience that we and the plo authority had to go through on the same, trying to release palestinian prisoners. what does that tell the public at large? belligeren belligerence. you can't ignore the perverse events like this on perceptions. and you can't ignore perceptions. you can't govern without people. it's not good enough to say the right thing. the question is can you carry. and, you know, in light of the experience and failed experience of diplomacy for the past 30 years, it's very difficult for me to see the palestinian framework as is able to carry. and that's the bottom line. that's the bottom line. that can't be ignored. you know, what i'm saying to you here, that drives people away from their comfort zones.
this is not really -- i would exclude myself from many. but look, there is tragedy going on. and it will repeat itself, time and again. and there are consequences to failure. you can't keep doing the same thing. and really in the process do nothing more but kick the can down the road and pretend that you can go back to the old framework and do it. you just can't. i'm sorry if this pushes some outside their comfort zones. now, how is a question. how can we do it is the question. it's not that we're starting from principle with the luxury of designing things to the liking of everybody. but we need to take into account, you know, these complications. >> well, let's go to the how to
do it question because it seems to me that you're saying very passionately and articulately this vicious cycle we're in can't continue. and violence pays off and we're also experiencing unprecedented violence. it sounds like you're prescribing changed representation in the palestinian part because it's necessary and it's urgent. but without saying specifically what that should be. and the changed framework without saying specifically what should be but just saying that it has to change because it's not working. but you're not being specific. you're not prescribing a new framework. >> i'll do what i can to be more speck. specific. i don't know if i can be too specific. for the reasons what i have in mind is a set of ideas i'm putting out for consideration. what or the extent to which we'll be successful and start a discussion on this is important here. and i think it's really up to,
you know, various factions, whether domestic or foreign to somehow coalesce on something. what i'm really talking about here is, if you will, the broad architecture of this but not the specific details in terms of, for example, you know, i talk about time-bound commitment on nonviolence. what does that really mean in terms of length of time? the concept is there, but it's really up to all concerned to define it. but the idea is the following, the substance, to be more specific, it needs to be adjusted. i started to make the point that adjustment was necessary, but then in what direction? what does it really need? first you have a plo as a matter of course and legality and national legitimacy had entered into an agreement going back in 1993 that has a great deal of
significance. that cannot be ignored. and the power to represent was certainly there. it continues to be there today. but then what do you do to make that adjustment? my own suggestion would be to leave the plo alone. i mean, do not really get to the point of saying let's undo this or, you know, open it up without any criteria anywhere that makes international engagement very difficult if not downright impossible. just keep it as it is with its right to represent in the way that's referred to in nose agreements. but in a way that has come to be known, leave that alone. but in parallel, in parallel, having a unified leadership framework that involves participation by everyone. you know, old fashioned. whether there are plo or
non-plo. they're all sitting at a table. and there together collectively are to inform decision-making by the executive committee of the plo. what does it really mean? is this really asking too much? let's just say that the plo doesn't like that or doesn't want to do that, let's assume. this is just for the sake of argument. i don't think they would. but you know, what is the basis for the plo or for the plo to continue to engage in international diplomacy when it's not sure it will be able to carry. you know, again, we could really choose, you know, the kind of game we would want to play. but we're not going to deliver unless we have good answers with questions. it is in the interest of the plo and its leadership, tourism. to really have its decision-making process in full. in order for it to be able to
secure the consensus needed in order to deliver an agreement. you know, this is not going to be just an agreement between two people. this is a formality of it. but is it going to be delivered to a point where it is going to be this moment? something they've lost their life for? it's very important to prepare and not to continue to pretend. so no, i don't think should. and i think it should welcome it. what kind of processes are involved? and that's why i say this is really open for discussion. this is as much intended on our own domestic political team as it is international. ideas. exactly how we're going to concentrate ourselves in order as a consequence of dialogue that's taken place to achieve reconciliation. how to authorize it in a way that meaningfully informs the
decision-making by the plo which continues to serve. that's one element of this. another is how to govern domestically. anyone out there who thinks there is going to be an end to this conflict and palestine emerging. without gaza, you don't need to really rethink the position. it's not going to happen. it's not going to happen. look at it from the point of view in israel who are in favor of a two-state solution. clearly, the element is based on the kind of government and country they would like to have. and so demographics are important in that argument. and time and again, i've seen one after another making the case for a state of palestine. without gaza, if you take gaza out of that mix, they will --
it's very important. so what do we do domestically? we need to have all of them adequately presented. this is in the interest of everybody. and at some point, two final elements. one that needs to be basis for -- there is a critical mass that is absolutely necessary in order to permit a takeoff here. especially on security. it would be a case of two missing ingredients. something needs to be agreed. and so far as violence is concerned, i think there really needs to be an understanding of the need for there to be preventable violence. how long? let that be discussed and agreed. that's in the interest of everybody. and use the time on the palestinian side.
use the time to rebuild. use the time to reunify the institutions of the people. gaza and the west bank have been separated for seven years now. there's a lot of work that needs to be done to unify institutions. you put all of these things together. let's say a consensus could be formed on these credits cal iit. that's when we should feel powerful enough to go to the israelis and the international community and say this is what we have. this is what we can and expect to do over the next period. can we now -- and this is really the most critical, the adjustment that's intended to deal with the design flaw in the overall framework. can we now agree on a date certain for ending the occupation? that's how you really put all of these elements together.
can we agree on a settlement for action? we can't keep on going like this. we need to agree. the default to failure to negotiations cannot be denied occupation. this has to be the certainty of an end to an occupation. can we agree and then work backward. and then the international front will begin to proceed with the degree of a sense of coherence that makes sense to the people. and that's we important. for us to expect the process to succeed and deliver. >> dr. fayed, thank you for that. t some in israel would say and let's come to the present tense, the situation on the ground. some in israel would say to break the cycle is to defeat. >> host: once and for all to ensure its safety. that's exactly what michael orrin argued in "the washington
post" recently. last week at the aspen security forum, lieutenant general michael flynn, head of the d.i.a., warned if. >> host: is totally defeated in the current round of fighting, it's likely that a more extreme group would rise in its place. i'd like to know your vision on this. and i know your job is not to advise the israeli government, but what would your advice be to the israeli government in this sense? you know, you see the popularity figures of what's going on right now. of netanyahu rising. so first this question of what replaces. >> host: would be more extreme. this tension between say what ambassador orrin said and the head of the d.i.a. and then secondarily if you were sitting in a room advising the israel government, what would you say to them? >> i'd say stick with it.
this notion that somehow you're going to really continue to engage in this escalation until it leads to the alienation of. >> host: and other factions of the same kind, apart from the tragic consequences and implications of continued fighting of the kind that has been taking place. this is not really -- i mean, we're talking about people's lives. and loss of life that simply cannot be tolerated. this is completely unbearable. and then what? everyone has to remember that we are dealing here, at least so far, with unsafe actors. you know. >> host: hamas is in control of
gaza for sure, has been since 2007. understanding the unity arrangement that was brokered recently or agreed to recently. effectively is there. but still it has not acquired the status of a state operator, a state. and this is really a quandary. not only insofar as factions of the palestinians are concerned, but other activists of the world. a criteria of winning and losing, you know, are different when you are dealing with state actors. we've seen this happen time and again in the united states with a country like afghanistan, for example. in terms of firepower, you know, bombing and the rest of it. the situation is like this. we talk about survival of a few.
who after the extensive damage, loss of life and misery and all and say we won. what are we going to do about something like this? this is serious. and lives are at stake. with futility. absolute futility. that's number one. number two, whether or not you agree with hamas and likeminded factions is not as significant as realizing the need for any palestinian leadership to carry in order for that leadership to deliver an agreement. and you simply cannot ignore the ideology. even if you disagree with it. that's the kind of work we live in. these are the kinds of standards by which developed and advanced countries you will live by.
it isn't a set of standards for the developed advanced world, another set of standards that should apply to others. it's time for all of us to be taken on board. then i think it should not really be beyond strong leadership, enlightened leadership. at some point you need to pay for failure. this is not 1990 or 1991. more than 20 years past oslo and more than 15 years past, you know, the end of the time line under oslo. and to somehow pretend that we're just starting this and to really take a purist approach to this in a matter that conforms to the highest standards, what someone would like to happen is, i think, extremely unrealistic. inclusiveness.
inclusiveness. you need to include and you need to govern in a way that's effective enough to ensure that there is sufficient support for that which we stand on. otherwise we should not be there presenting to the conflict. this is essential to what we're looking at. it's a necessity, in other words. but to think, you know, this way is i think is constructive and productive. unfortunately 1,000 more lives and more suffering, people come back to the same conclusion. it's not hamas, per se. it's that ideology. what do you do? what do you say to people who look at the record over the past 20 years and tell you what have you done for us? what do you tell them? forget about hamas. let's just put hamas aside. unless you're able to be convinced and to make sense when you say, you know, we have an alternative. you need to really provide an
answer to that question. if a solution is what you're interested in, we need to show enough courage to be accepting, of being pushed away from our comfort zones in the direction of finding something sensible. finally, on the other point that you raised, the region, and i sort of alluded to this in my opening remarks. really when it will end and how it will end, only god knows. but there are very few people i know who would have expected things to be the way they are today. but they are. i mean, in terms of extremism, violence. this is unprecedented, and i think defies expectations of many in terms of what's going on. the degree of extremisextremisme this, extremely grotesque and certainly alien to any kind of decency if you really think about it this way.
what do you really need to do to somehow understand this and prevent this becoming an ideology. if it's managed by and led by few, you know, unless something is done, i'm afraid this is really going to be most dangero dangerous. the key to the solution lies in good, honest, responsive government. one that responds to the needs of people. good governance is really key to do this. it's not a luxury. something that's absolutely essential. >> let me ask a quick question and quick answer, then i want to turn to steve hadley to start the audience with the first question. i want to pick up on what you just said. tom friedman in april 2013 when you resigned wrote that that it was an arab spring before there was an arab spring. he described you as a new generation -- what was needed
was a new generation of don't leaders whose primary development, their own people, not the enrichment of tribe, sector, party. and part of the difficulty and failure of the arab spring was noncorrupt, that there was not enough support and the arabs, u.s., israelis for noncorrupt institution-focused leadership. do you agree, has the arab spring failed and are these the reasons why the arab spring has failed? >> i'd like to still believe it's a nature of a work in progress, although it's hard to use those words to describe the state of play when you're looking at the extent of violence and extremism that has taken place and continues to take place. nevertheless, you know, from time to time, i think it's really important to try to take a step or two away from what you see, to put it in perspective.
i think it's useful to look at the experience of other nations and other revolutions, going back -- not that far back in history, recently, and see if things like this happened before elsewhere before we would come to the conclusion that, you know, things are impossible in the region. that somehow, you know, arabs are or belong to a species that cannot handle both democracy and stability at the same time. somehow you need to choose, you know, either democracy or stability. that's the wrong conclusion. we're like everyone else. we can handle democracy and we need stability. democracy sustains stability. you can't achieve stability on the strength of force, but you cannot sustain it with a strength of force of governance. that's what we are missing.
that's what's really important to keep in mind. looking at history of this, the arab spring is the nature of a revolution. people standing up for their citizens' right, for being respected, listened to, taken seriously, if you will. not thinking that the most important task in life -- the arab spring, its essence was about this. its essence was about this. and i think in that sense, it was overdue. you know, it took a long time. deep sense of injustice, you know, thinking that there was too much double standards in the way the world was managed, the region itself was managed. the way the global west was relating to the region.
the arabs were siding with regimes that were not doing the right thing for their own people. only they would present the case for them was the case against the alternative, with the alternative first being communism and then muslim brotherhood. you get a region that's unhappy, and so therefore in that sense, it was overdue. but it happened. it's in the nature of the revolution. what else are you going to really tell me that experienced a revolution that delivered stability immediately afterwards. it did not happen even in this country. i found the french revolution, it took three of those. it didn't happen in the chinese refuse solution, the russian revolution. and so yes, the extent of the violence is important. there's no question about that. but to think that somehow the
arab spring, if it is really about a revolution, i think it is fundamentally, to expect, you know, to deliver, serenity, stability, tranquility in the aftermath of a major upheaval like this is expecting too much. two things. we need to place it in that kind of perspective to get a better handle on it. but i think it's really time for everyone to begin to think that this is a region like all other regions. these are people like all other people. people are people. and stand and have to be laid out for systems of governance that respect their own citizens. this is so basic, but it's basically obvious, but somehow you -- and they think they need to find a solution immediately. you're not going to get there unless they respect them.
that's it in a nutshell. >> fascinating answer. thank you so much, doctor. steve hadley. >> i have to make a disclosure that i had the opportunity to have lunch with salim fayed, and i'd like to invite you to share a little bit of that conversation, and i realize there are some sensitive pieces to it. the reason i say that is because i think there's a lot of despair in the united states that the current situation in gaza can lead anywhere positive. and i think it's useful if you could share some thoughts about that both to give some hope but also to stimulate some thinking. and i'm thinking specifically some comments you made about the kind of cease-fire that might allow both what the israelis want, which is the demilitarizization of hamas and what might allow hamas to get
what it wants, which is the opening of the borders for flows of goods and services. you talked a little bit about that. what kind of arrangement might permit that. the role that the p.a. might play in that. and also, the issue of reconstruction of gaza and how that might be structured in such a way that actually could begin not just a reconstruction process but a reform process that could begin to do what you talked about, getting these institutions in a line between gaza and the west bank. i admit these are sensitive questions. i think what you said was very interesting and would be useful, and i would just simply invite you to share that portions that you're comfortable with. >> thank you very much. no, i would be extensive on those issues. i think it's really important to place this in the right context in terms of how to deal with gaza and to begin to bring that into this course. as i said in my opening remarks,
it's hard to use thinking in a time of crisis. but in this particular case, i think bringing that forward may help in facilitating an agreement on a cease-fire. people really start to get a sense of what happened afterwards. understanding divergence. take, for example, what you said about demilemilitarization of g. i'd said that would be a tall order now. gaza was not demilitarized even when he was there. minus the rockets, there was just about everything else. this is the reality. so for someone to come and say hamas and gaza should be demilitarized as a condition for cease-fire, that really is setting the bar too high.
death, injury, misery, epidemics, water and the power plant having been bombed and water stations and the rest of it is simply beyond -- and there is, you know, on the palestinian side, the legitimate demand and expectation for lifting the siege on gaza. one really needs to separate issues here. it's a key point. there was a lot of focus on rafa. i think it's important to really take rafa out of the discussion in terms of not completely out of the discussion but not to make the debate on access exclusively one of what to do about rafa. it's now an issue of egypt and palestine. i think all along the idea -- i mean, post 2007. but since then, after 2007, it
became exclusively a palestinian/egyptian issue. i think it's important. but even before -- and i think really sadly didn't happen, it should have happened before. you know, nobody really needs to get to an he saescalation like . it should have been dealt with before. and discussion between palestinians and egyptians. and the solution to it, even at time of separation, would have been to open it subject to it being run by the palestinian authority. something that really made sense, even at time of separation. it would have brought the p.a. back into gaza for the first time since june 2007. important. something to build on. it could have paved the way for the government afterwards. but to begin with that something basic. something as basic as that, didn't happen. it should be approached this way. it should not mask the need for
resolution, of access issues elsewhe elsewhere. for sure. but from our point of view as palestinians, opening gaza northward, connecting it with the best bank, is strategically a lot more important. it should be open. subject matter. focus on rafa and pushing gaza southward, if you will. or peace in the region, a two-state solution concept. something that requires immediate attention. it didn't happen before. it should not be something about cease-fire or no cease-fire. cease-fire is absolutely necessary. and that discussion needs to
begin. you know, egypt needs to say, you know, in order for my national security interests to be protected, the following arrangement should be respected. and i think palestinians would be more than willing to accommodate. the statelike structure of the palestinian side. and now that there is unity even though it's not deep enough and has not taken hold. regardless of what happens elsewhere. but then again, at this moment, what can happen to immediately change the landscape? history tells us that it takes time. you need to really secure the cease-fire. but you need to give people a sense of what is going to come later. short of demilitarization. and again, if you could everything, you'd have everything. this is natural. this is what economics is about, after all. but you have to make choices. here is a proposition. you look at a situation where
you're the state of israel demanding demilitarizization. i don't think that's really realistic. i don't think it's really in the cards. again, they were not able to achieve this even when they were in gaza itself. let's face it. what kind of nonaccepsense is t? that doesn't work. but short of that, what if there was serious consideration of a promise of a period of calm, calm, total commitment, by consensus, by everybody on the palestinian side. not the ultimate objective. we surely look forward to the state of palestine to be one that is based on co-existence and total respect for agreements and renouncing violence and to assume nonbelligerence. including state of israel.
but in the run-up to that. what if we say -- a long time with this in my pocket -- what if we could commit everybody on the -- that's not demilitari demilitarizati demilitarization. we need to really look at the situation. fortunate fortunately, it's not between good and bad. it's between better or worse. in this particular case, number one, the cease-fire. two, the promise of people. that's better than not having anything. but it gets things going. it requires a greater role for the palestinian authority. not of the crime that's happened post-unification which has not happened. it's for ballistic, if you will, so far.
what we really need is one that is inclusive. one that is seriously supported by the factions but one that can gain strength and presence possibly in a way that could make it an effective player. and remember, that was part of the thinking early on in terms of what the palestinian government was supposed to do, going back to the road map and in-power person of government. this is not a small issue. this is something that gives all four people to be included. and i prefer personally for it to be guilty of factions am themselves. this is a time of national crisis. you know but doesn't require commitment?
to unify, but at the same time to agree with israel and for a date certain on ending -- we can't really push on the domestic front with the international front. something like this i think would be necessary. >> thank you, doctor. jane harman. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to see a dear friend in washington. >> thank you. >> really a pleasure. congratulations to the atlantic counsel for this enormous cow in getting our friend to join you. two things. first of all, everyone in this audience wishes you were still prime minister of the palestinian authority. i speak on behalf of everybody here. >> and dissenting voices, please be violent. >> uh-huh. and we all remembered the two-year plan to improve so sfa.
that is what my question's about. they've done a pretty good job of running the west bank. and ramallah is, and build settlements and other things that israel has done. is there a fact that given the arab neighborhood is not fond of hamas to use that story with their support to help build a coalition for enhancing the pa's role. something you've just suggested. as part of the solution which would include a cease-fire, which would include an agreement for i would hope demilitarization of gaza. i understand that's a hard thing to do.
but also an agreement for a version of a marshall plan to rebuild gaza and run gaza as part of -- as part of the demonstration program and hopef hopefully in the state of palesti palestine. are there more to find out how much it's earned in light of the governance of the west bank? >> when we say fees fire, agreement by whom? mainly hamas. but they're the ones calling the shots. on the other side, who is really
committing to this? and the fact that they've -- a difficult situation for me to watch doesn't have the formal presence in gaza, and that has been the case since 2007. without, you know, putting together an arrangement that is open to being more inclusive, being capable to act only, you though, again, i think it's really a question of choosing a it. what, you know, governance, framework. procedures followed and something that made accepts to
peop people. it's a most interesting area for consideration. and two, up with needs to keep into account that there are elections elections. i haven't said anything about the election so far, but it's important. moving toward having a democratic state. it militant, strong show values of open communication, what have you. we need to rebuild our political process. as this process moves on and the system begins to be opened up for more participation, grow the base of participation, opening it up and then have elections at the point -- you know, if that
happens, i think that is something that's a lot easier. given where we are, we need to somehow find a way. we need to improvise and find a way between now and then. because we're going to d-- you know, give right-of-way, someone el else. we have the ones on the front li lines. how to really approach this. think seriously about putting something that could enjoy critical mass of support, adequate, just enough to enable it to begin to deliver, rebuild and implement policies that do all of these things and open the
system, political system and then have elections. >> thank you very much. questions, please. >> good afternoon, sir. 22 years ago i was the staff author of a law that requires the state department to report on the rights of indinl nuss peoples around the world and its annual human rights reports. in terms of yl and t, there is . and if you use the term indigineity as used by the united states, it would force israel's neighbors to israel to the area, but will they then recognize the palestinians having a right to their homeland. nerd, a nation state has viable.
why isn't the question of indiginetity part of the new paradigms that need to be discussed in the future once the bloodshed dies down? >> you know, i've argued for something less than that. among other things, you know, going back to 1993, so-called declaration of mutual recogniti recognition. the pla -- plo. the right of the state of israel to exist in peace and security. that's what has not happened. what did not happen then and has not happened since was for therr right, the palestinian's right to an independent state.
that, i think, should be adequate, to really put the process in a more symmetrical path going forward. that, in some way, begins to address the deep sense of security. and impossibility and disillusionment. that's so prevalent on the palestinian side when they see -- the expansion of settlements and what all of that is doing. the settlement and the state of israel on the part of its rail in terms of the prospect country and -- you have a form of recognition of our right -- is this too much to ask for after all -- the right of the state of israel to exist in peace and security since 1993? contrary to conventional wisdom, have you thought given the name of it, the declaration of mutual recognition, it recognizes the right for a palestinian state did not happen. for much of the period, much of
the period, since 1996, governing coalition of israel, the platform of the partners were to say there is not very friendly to the concept of the solution. and so it is important for it to be that recognition. but i agree with that. you have that taken it beyond that. that's the basic requirement that's really needed. i wouldn't really take it to the next level in terms of what kind of state and in terms of the characterization and all that. let's make sure that the -- is adequate to carry out and move on. >> thank you. fred hoff, senior fellow here. you may want to add a sentence about the role you've played in middle east peace. >> dr. fayad, you mentioned that a possible creative way forward in terms of all in terms of
negotiations would be to set a date certain by which the occupation would come to an end. could you expand on what that actually means in terms of procedure and what would it look like when that date is arrived at? >> i think that adjustment is necessary, you know? also, by the way, not many people know this, also, it's time for conspicuously and curiously silent on the issue of palestinian sovereignty and state. it's presumed it was presumed when oslo agreed that this was what the outcome is going to be but you won't find any reference to palestinian state and sovereignty in the documentation itself. very strange understanding is exactly opposite. and i think, again, that may
have given the history and given the difficulty in getting people together to sign on to something and i wouldn't -- or take away anything from the huge significance of the signing on the white house lawn in september of 1993. that's very significant given the history. and i know many people that were there personally. very significant. to be fair to those engaged in the process, those who were actually involved and did it on the palestinian side, maybe, you know, at the time with thinking that this was was going to be a maximum of five years and you know, it was going to happen and justifies having gone it into it but there's no justification for the possibility to go on with it without an adjustment that
created t created the presumption of that which we palestinians would like to see happen and i would argue is equally as important to israelis. they require that, to be honest with you. when you're looking at the situation all of a sudden the flamework is flawed. there is examples in history where that happened. other cases where occupation or authority of settlement over it ended and, again, to invoke the first rule, the way hong kong was. in order to -- and over to china. it was supposed to happen within a certain time period and in 1997, clockwork, it happened. a lot of discussion and negotiation up to that. but the negotiations, you know, should be about arrangements and assurances but not about principles. 20 years past oslo talk about
whatever palestinians do have an inalienable right to live as free people with dignity in a country of their own as an express of their natural right to exercise a substantial life. we shouldn't be discussing this. it should be behind us. that's what's missing. so with the wars having come to an end we really need to define this. let's talk about one that's feasible. this is not to end negotiations. having agreed on this for ending the uk authority over hong kong did not preempt the need for negotiations with china and others who produce the outcome that was produced. but everybody knows what's prospect. you negotiate an arrangement, assurances, the principle of solution are out there. there's enough in the body of international law as it existsable with various solutions of the united nations and that provide inner guidance
so far as the solutions are concerned. but we can't really approach it in the way things are happening right now. this is, asymmetry in the framework right now between the occupying power and the occupied. and without presumption of an end to occupation that is enshrined in a binding agreement what this framework is telling the palestinians, go negotiate with israel for however lodge it takes and as long as you fail to agree -- meaning as long as you don't take what is an offer you have to accept the continued occupation, oppressive occupation. that's -- there's something wrong with this. that's you know what i'm really saying, needs to be fixed. so everything needs to be assured about this. the palestinians and that, i think, could make a huge difference. the escalation, demille
tearizatitea tearatitear -- demil demilitariation. and even if they went to them and said, we have a commitment. winding commitment and enshrined in the yes as a solution. this is one trip to new york i'd like to take. to end the occupation. negotiate, yes, we negotiate when the settler is -- but there's no -- you know, illusion as to what the outcome is going to be. the outcome cannot be continued occupation. exactly what is this incentive? when you look at the framework and the huge imbalance, listen to what is said by cabinet officer after cabinet officer on
the israeli said about the two-step solution including the words by prime minister himself. that something to the effect that he was right all along that he wanted -- that the scli people to know that he was right all along about them not being a possibility admissible possibility of israel relinqu h relinquishing control over jordan. what does that do to the conseventy of a two-state solution? so the rhetoric is out there and it's significant. what do you do to provide assurance? what do you do to begin to -- this is something that they'll really have to contend with. it's not a matter of choice. you know, there is -- the question of you know, a people that is living under oppressive occupation, which it does not want, and you know, you can't continually vote on this forever. it's time for everybody to go up
and approach it sensibly but to ensure that as we move forward, they are able to bring people along to carry, in other words. >> i'm going to ask you a final question because we've run out of time. it's off twitter from henson paris and i'll put in a different context as well. the question is can gaza in ruin and the west bank economically ailing could economic development hold the key to solution of the conflict? i'll also put it a different way. you predicted when you were prime minister we'd have a palestinian state by 2011. a lot of your approach is what people called unilateralism at the time. which was you were less interested in the symbolism of recognition of a palestinian state, the u.n., and more interested in what could get done on the ground. so take that question, but also, lay on to this, when do you now predict there will be a palestinian state and what would you do unilaterally right now in the palestinian position to push
this along? >> that was constructive unilateralism as opposed to something else called settlement activity and the rest of it. and i did not predict actually at the time the person what would happen in two years. what the program was about, specifically, you know, was inspired the motivated by political thinking. w45 i predicted and said we would be ready for was statehood. the program was about putting everyone on notice, similar to what we're saying today, in a way. put everyone on notice. free the palestinians. expect to be ready for a state in two years. that was meant to say, if we are successful and somehow become ready, in the sense of being able to govern ourselves effectively and handle
obligations responsibly and seen this way by the international community and, therefore, effectively answering the questions that were really put forward in 2001 and 2002 and 2003 and all that. if we were able to do this and reduce this whole issue to occupation period, not occupation but the idea was that this was going to be strong enough to bring about the transformation necessary to settle the solution. what the problem wasbility inspiring ourselves to get ready for statehood in three years and tell the people beforehand. the idea was not to try to say, we took a test and passed it without announcement. but to preannounce the. that was an important part pof it. to go out and say and this is what we did in august of 2009, two years we expect to be rae t ready for statehood. we actually said the same thing
in a good way. we'll be ready. are you going to be ready for us? do the necessary things. you know, in a technical sense we succeeded because year and a half into this, we got the commission. recognition of the reality of this and it was -- people gave us the reality of state of palestine. april of 2011 was very significant date for us for the palestinians. very, very significant date. a year and a half into the adoptation of that program we got testimonials by relevant international institutions. and the united nations.
capable of delivering stap cards of countries that have been around for a long period of time and what's really most significant? it's too bad that it is not regenerated the information necessary on the political side. it's relevant today. that process of transfar maorma is needed. in order to bridge that gap between the maximum for israel and the minimum acceptable to us, that needs to be allowed to evolve and to emerge. it's not going to really happen to anybody or for anybody. it's going to be in the interest of everyone. it certainly would be -- the palestinians have been so desperate looking to be able to learn with dignity and freedom of country and that's really what this is fundamentally about and that's something that required building and fluid and serious transformation. that's what this is about. >> thank you. there are so many more questions in the audience and i'm sorry we haven't got time to get to them.
let me just close by saying, first of all, the text of his full statement will be available out in the foyer and also, online at atlantic council.org. secondarily, let me quote my friend tom friedman one more time in the article he wrote when you resigned as prime minister. he essentially said to the palestinians, had messages to various people from -- in his excellent column. people may want to look at because but he said if there's no place, quote, if there's no place for a solemn fayad type of leadership and independent palestine will forever allude you. i think we heard today in these comments why tom wrote that and i think a lot of us in this room and perhaps, jane harmon is right. all of us in this room may agree with that. thank you so much for your service and joining the atlantic
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now a hearing on how transportation safety is affected by marijuana users. this house oversight and government reform subcommittee focused on how to test for marijuana use and the challenges in creating a federal standard for driving under the influence of so-called recreational drugs. this is a little less than 2 hours. good morning. i would like to welcome everyone to the committee on government oursight and reform, and summit -- subcommittee hearing this morning on government operations. welcome, my ranking member mr. connolly. is title of today's hearing planes, trains, and auto bills
-- automobiles, operating while stone. this is the subject of the impact of changing laws and increasing use of marijuana in our society. our subcommittee in particular has jurisdiction, and part of our charter is the difference between federal and state laws, and the relationships and issues that deal with federal, state issues. certainly, in our most recent history there has been nothing that has provided a greater difference in current federal andutes and changing state
local statutes then marijuana issues. it is an important matter. the order of business this morning will be opening statements. i will start with mine and yield to mr. connelly. i see we have in fleming. i don't think mr. fleming is a member of the can he but we'll ask unanimous consent and without objection that he be permitted to participate in today's proceedings. there are cn around the hill. with that, after the opening statements, we will -- we have four witnesses. we will hear from them. we will withhold questions until we have heard from our panelists and get to introduce and swear you in. let me begin.
again, we have an important responsibility to look at changing laws. this subcommittee is investigating the federal response to state and local government legalization and change of laws relating to marijuana and examining the administration's sometimes chaotic and inconsistent policies on marijuana. sincef our proceedings the beginning of the year have been based on a statement the president made. he said marijuana was not much and went than alcohol, brought in the national drug control policy who differed with the president's statement. we looked at that issued. then we heard from the law enforcement agencies, the dea, they disagreed with that statement.
then we solve the conflict in colorado and other states, the department of justice issued guidelines and statements relating to enforcement. the u.s. attorney from colorado who testified about some problems, we heard from other agencies as we were doing other hearings, the district of columbia changed its law. theession, tampering down fine to $25 for one ounce of marijuana. iowa's traded by fellow -- , it wasup a joint designed to illustrate that you can have 28 of those joints now in the district and that would be the result, $25 fine. i held out in the other hand a
thatof 26 federal agencies were charged with enforcing conflicting federal law and created a delimiter. .- and created a dilemma today is important. having shared transportation, you see the results of the devastation. on our highways, probably in the last dozen years we have had a quarter of a million americans slaughtered on highways. we have gotten it down. did 40,000.ng that is the talent he's. half of those totality's are related
of those fatalities are from alcohol or drugs. marijuana is still a schedule .ne narcotic, and more potent we are going to have more people stoned on the highway. there will be consequences. , and have federal agencies we would hear from the department of transportation to see how they will deal with those. vehicles, commercial vehicles, and i don't know if we can get some of those charges to see the devastation, but the photos, aviation is another area. we having gotten into
commercial. we will talk about that. these are civil aircraft. every one of these were involved with people impaired. the way we find out now if they bye impaired wise in fact testing the corpse blood. this are some are the results we have seen. the worst train incident we have , keep recent memory flipping that. this is the metrolink. 25 people killed. the engineer was impaired on marijuana. again.iles, i think we have one on automobiles. there are thoan