tv Washington This Week CSPAN November 10, 2014 5:00am-6:01am EST
as far as iaea is concerned, our story began in august 2002 when in the media room boarded that --n was building a nuclear window media reported that iran was building a nuclear program. it acknowledged its existence and put it under iaea safeguards. let me say at this point, it is vitally important that the iaea and general should be impartial. that means applying the same principles to all countries. for me, the fundamental principle is at the safeguard agreements which would conclude with our member states should be implemented fully. resolutions of the united nations security council.
when i became the general in late 2009, i applied this principle to iran. i felt that spending out the issues was a decision and a first up toward resolving the problem. my reports from february 2010 stated that nuclear materials by , butwas not being diverted i also stated that iran [indiscernible] to enable the agency to conclude that all nuclear materials in iran was inactive. i asked them to implement the additional protocol and gratified the issues and what had become known as the nuclear program. an important question was, how
to approach? our experts have spent years painstakingly and objectively underline -- analyzing a huge quantity of information about programs from that wide variety of independent sources, including from the agencies and from information provided by iran itself as well as a number of member states. reviewing they issue, i decided to present a report in that iran had carried out activities to the detriment of a
nuclear explosive device. thatnformation indicated toward the end of 2003, these activities took place. it might still be ongoing. i would like to be very clear on this issue because there's been some misunderstanding. the iaea has not said that iran has nuclear weapons. we have not drawn conclusions from the information about what i mentioned about the iran nuclear program. what we have said is that iran has to clarify these issues because there is credible that theyn indicating are engaging in activities of the nature. iran has a case to answer. in response to my report am a both the iaea board of governors and united nations have adopted
resolutions asking iran to cooperate to clarify their issues. in order to restore international confidence in and is lucidly peaceful nature -- is lucidly peaceful nature -- exclusively peaceful nature. the agency had told with iran over the next three years. no promise was made. sometimes we were going around in circles. last year, we started to see some improvement. hranovember, i went to te and signed an agreement which agreed to resolve all of the funding issues past and present. we agreed to take a step-by-step approach. usually iran implemented the first measures, which integrate with the agency.
however, since the summer of 2014, progress on implementing measures have been limited. measures should be implemented have still not been implemented. -- invitedinvented iran for the next step of cooperation, but it has not done so. [indiscernible] is not an endless process and can be done in a timeframe. how fast goal depends on iran's cooperation. i have made clear that the agency will provide an assessment to our board of governors after it obtains a good understanding concerning issues, but possible military. decidep to the board to
in the future. -- on the issue. iran track ofa one is the p5+1 track in which the iaea is also involved. if these countries, china, france, russia, britain, a united states agreed on a joint plan of action with iran in achieve, the aim was to a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution to ensure iran's nuclear program which the is lucidly peaceful. also the countries asks the iaea measures to be implemented by iran which we are doing. the p5+1 with iran is continuing.
read is mention that i still not implementing -- iran is still not implementing. implementation by iran is the central for the agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the country. affairs is state of iran's nuclear materials under iaea safeguards is under peaceful safeguards. toorder to provide, iran has clarify the issues. the additional protocol. what is needed now is concrete actions on the part of iran to
resolve all outstanding issues. i've been committed to working with iran to restore the confidence in a peaceful nature of its nuclear program. as i repeat, this is not a never ending process. it is very important that iran implements sooner than later. the iaea can make a unique consideration to resolve the iran equation, we cannot do this on our own. the international community is needed. resolve all of these issues. i would be happy to take your questions. thank you very much. [applause]
chris thank you -- >> thank you, general amano and thank you for your presentation. i have a few questions to pose to you and i'm sure our audience has a meaning. i know iran is going to be a big focus of attention so therefore i will start off talking about the agency and its role. i particularly want to raise the concern that i and many others have about the growing theticization surrounding board of governors, is discussions about the agency's role. i remember when i used to attend the board of governors meetings, usually there was a consensus
on anyoard members particular topic and it was a rare that there was voting and they decided membership. on ait is almost the norm lot of of issues for it to be voting and differences. you mentioned that the state level concept or state-level approach and i think it is a very innovative approach to safeguarding and i think it will enhance the agency's role. but yet, you and the secretary have received criticism from a number of countries and i can name them. russia, argentina, brazil and some others have raised russians about this innovative approach about safeguarding. could you talk a little bit about what i have described as a growing politicization of the surrounding agency? the firmly believe from
iaea is a technical organization and its state so. but the reality is such that everything is very political. is veryication political. we have the mandate of nuclear power. the use of nuclear power is a very political issue in any country. is ao i think, the iaea technical organization which is operating on a very political environment. this is an irony. ourselves stay nonpolitical, technical, ummrtial, we should have -- -- objective standards. that is why i mentioned the use
of standards and the full implementation of safeguarding agreements that are relevant to obligations. we stick to this principle and we can be very impartial, neutral, and principal. -- principled. we are living in the rural world so there is 0% or 100%. of when i say -- the country have to implement the safeguards as soon as possible. they should be as transparent as possible. standard, weo the can avoid the politicization.
vote of, issues of the the past when issues were decided by consensus. if i compare the environment in york, we are not in the best shape. is --portant thing for then pointing for iaea -- the important thing for iaea is we are not a debate group. in nuclear security and nuclear power, application of nuclear technology and elsewhere. we have difficulties and we are living operating in a very high environment. i think there are ways to make ourselves impartial and nonpolitical with concrete results.
>> let me press you a little bit on this. can meet the tremendous challenges in front of you, it is going to have to be pretty aggressive, independent, strong. but there are those who seem to the agency in a number of ways. you reached the conclusion on the basis that your staff have compiled that the syrians very likely had a nuclear reactor. now that finding was challenged and it is challenged to this day . there are those who really do not want you or your secretary to have a strong, independent voice. i see this as a real problem for the future of nuclear nonproliferation. are you concerned about the challenges you have been written
eating? -- receiving? >> there are three outstanding issues. iran, north korea, and syria will stop -- syria. keeping on following this issue and the main issue was iran and syria. a visit to theve site twice. we have collected our own information. we have had quite a good knowledge of the activities. was thehe option for me drawing of conclusion on board conclude thato provide conclusion based on the findings that we have on our
own. it,ought that if i can do it is better to do it. usia did not agree to give -- to give to me or the agency after i became a. director general, we do not have as much information as we wanted. we had sufficient information to draw conclusions. that is why i drew conclusions on syria and i do not regret it , it iss of of refusing not the best way. even under a situation where we have enough information and faqs on our own, we should be able to draw conclusion. >> let me turn to iran. agomentioned a few moments how important the additional protocol is to providing
confidence that a state is not engaged in undeclared activities inconsistent with this safeguards obligations. agreed with have the p5+1 that it did a conference of solution and they will -- if they didn't cover his of solution and they would agree if their parliament agrees to it. it seems to me that for many of the measures that will be -- that will have to be monitored by your agency, it will be necessary to go well beyond the additional recall. some are saying the iranians .ave expressed reluctance to do obviously, we do not have an agreement that you do not know the provision for if you could speculate on whether the agency is going to have to go well beyond additional protocol, if
you expect you were going to be asked to do that, are you prepared to do that? we do not yet know the content of the comprehensive solution if there is any. timee have from time to from various sources, [indiscernible] the measures beyond additional protocols. umm -- foreseeable that the implementation would be given, not to us. we needed to see the content of the agreement. once it is agreed. to that casertant they need to be endorsed by the
board of governors. under authority and control under the board of governors. take up the case of a plan of by p5+1if it was agreed was askedn the iaea to monitor and limit the agreement. i convened a special board of governors. theif they agreed that agency implement these measures. statesled to the member for the necessary funds in the respondent very positively. we have received the mandate to implement the measures agreed under the joint plan of action and we have given the means to implement. we are not implementing it. and in this case, i will be up
for -- will consider the implementation of measures to be agreed and comprehensive solution. agency'sscussed the apperson -- efforts to delay -- to gain clarification on the nuclear program. it is clear from your remarks and what is being reported in the press that so far at least iran has not provided much cooperation with your investigation. so what happened if iran continues to stonewall in this regard? you do not get the clarifications you need. what you do in that circumstance? do simply report to the board that you have not gotten the cooperation that you seek? or do you draw some conclusions as you did in the syrian case on the basis of information available to you?
that ittinues to argue is a so-called evidence is based on fabricated materials and falsified documents and so forth. but i think on the basis of your analysis, you cost of the information credible -- you called the information credible. so what did you do? do you simply report we did not get cooperation or do you make an assessment based on information available to you? the possible military dimension, we have agreed and november 2013 with iran and all of the outstanding issues, past and present, to be result -- resolved.
we understand that unresolved issues past and present include issues with possible military dimension. it was a step-by-step approach. we have agreed to take up one of the issues with a possible military dimension, explosive bridge wire. we have received some and we are from iran now analyzing it. at least one measure was addressed. measures,to take up we started the clarification of these two issues with iran. the progress is limited. we would like to clarify other issues that would've agreed.
we are encouraging iran to come up with new measures to be taken . so far, well not yet received the concrete proposal from them. important -- is ongoing. path.ve a iran and iaea we need to do everything past and present. case or then iranian case, i think like i said in my statement, the art of reading syrian case are very -- the iranian and syrian case are very different. each case is different. volume and information is different.
complexity of the issue is very different. the possible military dimension of iran, the best way is to continue with iran. we have already the basic understanding with clarity that was included in my report in 2010. i repeat and provide the same assessment in my other reports. report ini provided a which i identified 12 areas to clarify. for questions to be answered are clear now. cooperation. the best was to implement it. up, when youen it have questions, please identify yourself and ask a concise
question. david, could you -- >> if you do get cooperation in the list you provided in 2011, these issues, is it important that the iaea make public the possiblef iran's military dimensions and what you determine were not? it seems to be cumbersome on the part of the iranians to have a public account and would've heard some indications it might be more willing to be cooperative if they thought answers to the questions would remain confidential within the system. some people say that is why they have been less cooperative with you even while you continue to
with the p5+1. just wonder what your stance is within need to make public the answers to each of the 11 or 12 issues you raised. umm, all of the safeguards are confidential information. quiet.ll be kept needed, i would share the information with iaea member states. respect tot, with the military dimension, i included relatively detailed information in the annex. that is the confidential report. agreed amongt is the members to make it public, they can do so.
rarity, their report of 2011 was made public and the reports of iaea are made public by the decision of the board of governors. in the future, if i provided an assessment of possible military dimension and the board of governors agree it will become public. >> from "the atlantic council." you that iranse is not providing this information giving it is involved in very detailed negotiations with the p5+1 on a long-term agreement? a it your feeling that long-term agreement should somehow be contingent on progress or can that be something that is resolved over the course of a long-term
agreement? >> i visited iran in august of occasion and i had an to talk about -- to talk to president rouhani. he stated that i read is willing -- iran is willing to accelerate the process of the issues with the possible military dimension. for now, the progress is limited. i sense his intention on the clarify the to issues. important to the negotiation ongoingp5+1 and iran is and now is not the best time to make rapid progress.
it does not mean there will not be progress in the future. g that decisionu up with a possible military asension will be clarified soon as possible. iran toe intention of accelerate the process and also the intention of iaea to accelerate the process. -- and is not an endless this is not an endless progress -- process. can clarify these issues within a reasonable timeframe. >> there are experts who say it is going to be difficult to get iran to provide a full
confession, especially activities that were directly directlyhted -- related to a nuclear weapons program. it should be sufficient to have confidence that those activities are not continuing today and that we have monitoring measures in place that would enable us to determine whether they have resumed in the future. what do you think about that approach? simpleable timeline, arithmetic. we have identified areas. one step is normally for three months.
how long does it take? it is easy to foresee. month, but it one will be a reasonable timeline. you can do the arithmetic at home. about -- ion is >> about whether it is necessary to get iran to confess, even providing incriminating evidence that those activities were pointed at a nuclear weapons program. to have confidence that those activities have stopped and we have monitoring measures sufficient to know whether they will resume. is that sufficient, in your
view, or do we really need to get clarity? iaea is committed to do its best to clarify the issue. iran to be a true transparent be as as possible. we would like to have people -- i have full confidence in the agency. they have been doing a good job and they will continue to do a good job. the next up would be to report on the assessment after having a good understanding of the full
picture to the board of governors. how to move from that point is a decision of the member states. we are guided by the board of governors. >> thank you. future toant for the make sure there is a peaceful that your people from the agency would include searches, unannounced visits to military sites? >> military sites. >> i believe you mentioned earlier that to look at the country as a whole and i was -- to conduct unannounced visits and searches.
>> i would like to give you an example. if we have a good reason to believe that activity is undertaken in a military site, you can request access to the military site. the country can refuse the has to, but that country give a good reason why. offer managed access, in order not to compromise their military interest. managed access to a military site is already
, and existing safeguard. in certain cases, we want to and they need to give that to us. >> thank you very much. youuld like to ask what think in terms of the dialectic between nonproliferation and nuclear safety. recently, a number of iran's neighbors in the persian gulf region have been talking about the very scary prospect of an earthquake or some type of a meltdown. nuclear
it is dangerous to the future of stability in that region. i was wondering if you are also focusing on that side of this debate. thank you. >> yes, we do. countriesre that many ofe interest in the safety the rainy and nuclear -- iranian nuclear activities. we have given some recommendations. the highest level of safety in iran. the case of an earthquake with also raced by some member states. we are ready to review the but on theects,
safety of security is responsibility of each country. the role of the iaea is to provide assistance upon request. therefore, if we have a request from iran to address and review and give advice, we are prepared to do so. what do you think you redo if tomorrow iran declares -- thank you. >> it is too difficult a question for me to answer.
the agency verified the documents? what exactly is the reason behind not making this documents fully available to the iranians? sharing documents was discussed in the negotiation between iran and the iaea. when we have discussed the structured approach. the name of the negotiation that we engaged after the vote of governors -- the board of governors in 2011.
we have discussed the modality of sharing information. that negotiation did not come to an agreement. progress inome -- many areas. unless everything is agreed to, nothing is agreed. we have discussed the issue of sharing documents, but there was no agreement and no specific reference to the handling of documents. we are prepared to share documents. i don't say which one. when we consider appropriate and
necessary. >> authenticity, it was quite frequently discussed before i came to the iaea. it was not often discussed after i came to the agency. we are asking questions to clarify the issues and we elaborate our questions. we have given the questions in writing. -- the processed , the activities in iran.
>> i have a slightly different question. you were talking about the and theirctors ability to acquire the nuclear weapons. i would like to know your opinion, how should it work when will the government be held accountable? thank you. ensuring the highest level of security is under the responsibility of each government. controlling trafficking is the
responsibility of each government. however, the international organization has an important role to play. database and they collect information on them. information is very useful to analyze the trent and understanding -- the trend, to understand the trent is very useful. -- the trend is very useful. a bigclear reactor is
>> j kramer, i'm a lawyer with practice focused on international trade and export controls. let me turn you from the nonproliferation to the disarmament pillar. what has the agency learned in the last decade or so with respect to its investigations in iran that would help it to verify a general treaty on nuclear disarmament, perhaps expressed as a multiple of the resources.rrent what level of resources would it --
they are more likely to accelerate the process. learning to cooperate with the iaea. i think there is some political will. gratification is not making meetess, but we continue with iranian counterparts to clarify the issues. >> what do you think is the biggest challenge in achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the middle east? -- to learn from the
we need to continue the dialogue. the iaea is in support of the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in the middle east. and weot an easy issue keep following this issue. >> let me come back to the agency'sof the investigation of the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. you mentioned access to individuals, access to locations. individuals that we believed were engaged in some of these activities. we know locations where we believe some of these activities
took place. how would you assess the relative importance of gaining access to sites, gaining access to individuals. how successful has the agency then? , thereto the facility were two occurrences in the past when the agency went there, did not look exactly at the place, and it has been rebuffed constantly in recent years. what about access to individuals? it would seem to me that one of the most effective ways of keeping tabs on iranian nuclear activities is to have continuing access to individuals, not a one-time interview where the subject might be misleading.
continuing to gain some confidence that people who love the greatest expertise in some of the military related aspects of nuclear energy are working on civilian programs and are not applying their expertise to military programs. relativeu evaluate the importance of these different forms of access? ? access toas information related to issues with possible military dimensions. these are very difficult issues. access from ated very early stage. accessthe access has not yet bn granted. people -- it is a
very sensitive issue in iran because of their experience in the recent years. we keep requesting to have access to the site. -- it is a >> i wanted to ask, you got the object he to work with -- you got the opportunity to work with two heads of the iaea. could you touch on the difference in approaches between the two heads and your them?onship with both of
>> the house republican conference will hold leadership on friday. begins on thursday and continues into next week. you can watch live house coverage on c-span and the senate on c-span 2. ♪ >> this week on "q&a," our guest is tavis smiley, out with his new was the book "death of a king: the real story of dr. martin luther king jr.'s final year." it explores the tumultuous and difficult final year of dr.
king's life as he clashed with the press, the president, and leaders of the civil rights movement. >> tavis smiley, your book, "death of the king," it says there is a story hidden about mr. king. what is it? >> from april 1967 to april 1968, it shifted against him because of his opposition to the vietnam war.
i have seen three biographers on here before. without the heavy lifting by the historians, i cannot have written a death of a king. no one has ever focused on the text. they have not focused on the last year of his life april 4, 1967 to 1968, one year to the date. what is the last year like? how does he navigate? how is america treating him? he left five years after i have a dream. he involved in the five-year period. >> into the back, you say you didn't 19 interviews for this book. which one did you learn the most? >> good question. i suspect there is nothing like talking to correct coretta scott king. i talked to coretta scott king many times. mr. hardy passed away who wrote the vietnam speech for dr. king. he believed and he said to me many times that he believed that speech beyond vietnam put a target on his back.