tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 5, 2015 10:00am-12:01pm EDT
that report is coming from the u.s. forest service. dan from ohio. caller: oh great. i just wanted to say that the lady from texas took my thunder. everybody keeps talking about subsidies. the oil companies are still being subsidized. the fact of the matter is that research and development costs. step inovernment does in the beginning when a new company starts up. after that they are on their own. they don't need to be subsidized. the renewable energy and green energy needs to be subsidized. take away the subsidies from the oil companies and pharmaceutical companies. why do they still have it? and they fight against us for wanting it for the new energy. host: that is the last call for our program. a new program comes your way at
7:00 tomorrow. we will see you then. ♪ [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> the president will argue today that it would be a historic mistake if congress blocks the nuclear accord with iran. he president will frame the decision before lawmakers as the equential foreign-policy issue since the decision to go to war with iraq. he needs the backing of enough
democrats to fight gop opposition. the white house says it has enough democratic support to a pulled a veto. read more at the hill.com. we will have live coverage of the president's speech today at american university starting at 11:20 a.m. eastern. to post yourble thoughts on facebook and twitter. after the president's speech we will be taking your phone calls. coverage on capitol hill over on c-span3 getting underway momentarily. the senate banking committee on the iran sanctions. that hearing is underway. following on c-span3. agreement with national security experts also talking about the role of the international atomic energy
agency and monitoring their actions and facilities and the ability of the countries who signed the agreement to confront iran. >> welcome to the atlantic council. well, we have done it again. we have timed a program to follow by one day a historic agreement with iran. i would like to say that i planned it this way, but it is just dumb luck. as we all know there is a lot to digest in this 159 page document that was announced yesterday. we are going to welcome your questions about any aspects of the agreement. of theus today is on one
most important issues if not the most important issue. that is verification. iran cheats? if you run she what will we do? who is tasked with doing the verification? done?ore might need to be these issues we have a very distinguished panel including the author of a new study on this subject, former iaea official tom shea. funde thank the plowshares for supporting our program. let me say how delighted i am osting this coh event with search for common ground. iran the pioneer in u.s.
people to people diplomacy. they took the wrestlers to iran in 1998. they have done many things over the years that have really helped bring us to this day. other i introduce our speakers, i'm going to ask ambassador bill miller to say a few words. i have known him for as long as i have been focusing on iran which is about 20 years. at times i have questioned his perennial optimism about u.s. iran relations. but once again he has proven that he is more farsighted than the rest of us. if youssador miller, would come up and say a few words. >> thank you, barbara. friend and alwart source of optimism.
[inaudible] [laughter] i want to thank the atlantic council for having this event today and being our gracious host. event, weheduled this did not know the joint comprehensive plan of action would be issued just yesterday. this is an historic agreement by any standard, even by standards of decades. that this is so well-timed. and the atlantic council has talentle to mobilize the that is going to speak today.
iran began as a foreign service officer well before the revolution. this was in 1959. as it happened, this was the beginning of the iranian nuclear program. program owesuclear almost everything to the united states. physicists and engineers were trained in the united states. and as a part of the atoms for eisenhower, wef lowenthal toid iran to work out an energy program. a comprehensive energy program.
water, hydro, gas, and oil. nuclear. forgotten that in 1959 lilienthal recommended that iran have 22 nuclear power reactors. and use its gas and oil for infrastructure. legacy extends to this day. has a program that stems from that. from that time when i served in iran, i have maintained my interest.
and i want to quote from a letter that i carried with 6 1979.lark on november a letter from jimmy carter to ayatollah khomeini. and i want to read one paragraph. men to meet both with you and to hear from you your perspective on events in iran and problems that have arisen between our two countries. statesple of the united desire to have relations with equality, mutual respect, and friendship. years to carry
that out. -- john bloomberg linbderg experienced part of those 36 years in prison. he is one of those optimists who believes that relations with iran make sense. now i have the job as senior advisor for search for common ground's iran program. and searchs, iran have worked together to carry out the fragments, the fornnings, the baseline civilized relations between our
countries. we have tried everything. movies. poetry. art. astronauts. wrestlers. soccer players. basketball players. scholars. politicians. most important, scientists. and people who understand the middle east. want to describe the beginnings of the tom shea paper which is of direct relevance here today. clear to many of us that any agreement with iran would depend on the ability of the
terms of the agreement being verified. monitored fully. carefully. effectively. and it was the suggestion of senior members from the senate who anticipated that an theement was pending that key issue before the congress would be whether the terms of an agreement with iran could be so that ifffectively there was any direction away it would bel uses, detected in time to take effective action. that was the baseline problem.
question then immediately iaea good enough to fulfill that task? we havethe past year, been engaged in efforts to make that determination. ago, i asked tom and after meeting with him hearing high praise for his work century inter of a in iaea and as a scientist american institutions, to undertake a study of the
iaea, how ithe works. fact, undertake andtask of monitoring expected agreement. he has done this job. and he has done a very well. -- and he has done it very well. and i suggest that you pick up copies of the summary outside this room. thank ploughshares. en particular, jos are i cirincioni, the president of commitments and his to bringing about a resolution
to one of the great questions of arms control. owe much to his support over the years. i want to thank in particular friend slaven, a dear who brings the best of journalism and scholarship to her job. and she continues to lead the way on the best approaches to iran. friend ands a close we have struggled together in the task of bringing sense and rationality to our national leadership. project.ran bert is a dear friend.
i'm sorry we weren't able to extract you forthwith. but we have made up for it. thank you barbara. and thank you tom for your good work. >> inc. you, bill. thank you, bill. i neglected to tell you about bill miller. was in iran as a foreign service officer but he was also the u.s. ambassador to ukraine where he helped eliminate ukraine's nuclear weapons arsenal. he also served for 14 years on capitol hill. he was staff director for three senate committees. this is a man who knows of what he speaks. i am now going to introduce tom shea.
for 24 years in the iaea department of safeguards. he helped design the safeguards implementation arrangement for enrichment plants and research isotope reduction reactions. he supervised inspections and facilities in japan, china, india, and other countries. after he retired, he served as sector head defense nuclear nonproliferation programs. he received his phd in nuclear and engineering and was awarded the institute of nuclear materials management distinguished service award. tom shea comeave up and talk about his new paper which is available in its entirety online. and then i will introduce our other speakers. dr. shea. >> thank you very much. is there anybody here who is not
read the new agreement? if so, i would start off with shame on you and get to it. so having just produced a document, was it only yesterday? the article i have been working on for search for common ground is in a state of trying to cope with a reality of the specific agreement. so it will take a few days before the final issue is ready. starting off, 25 years ago the iaea system was overhauled after it was discovered that there were clandestine i'm nuclear weapon programs in iraq and north korea. those set a strong precedent for today, they compelled the international community to overhaul that system and make it relevant to the threats of today. place,efforts that took the technologies that have been
applied, the authorities that have been given, the size of the organization and its reach, all of those things have essentially been reinvented since 1990. with the joint comprehensive plan of action, the steps are relatively straightforward. my sense of having been in this business for 45 years, a remarkable departure from the laissez-faire kind of attitude which more often than not prevailed when there was no possibility for consensus, especially among the p5. so a new agreement which is extraordinarily detailed and in-depth will need to be studied. and what the conditions are will need to be analyzed in terms of obligations and commitments, resources. that sort. so the iaea and its application of verification measures will
have five challenges it will now have to confront. first is to discover any additional hidden facilities which may not have come to light. whether there are any or not. i certainly don't know. or whether there is any new construction from now on. the next is to verify that the known facilities are not misused as part of an ongoing nuclear or resurgence nuclear weapons program. the third is to verify that the declared nuclear materials in the country remain accounted for and used exclusively for peaceful purposes. the fourth is to track imports into the country, which may d materials, dual use materials, equipment, and make certain that those things that are permitted under the provisions of the joint comprehensive plan of action are used for the purposes indicated. and that other activities do not take lace.
-- take place. to seek to verify the limitations that are included in the joint plan of action and verify that those are not exceeded during the time that this goes on. today given the time constraints i am going to concentrate on this question of the hidden facilities, which you may prefer the term clandestine line or or undeclared. they are synonymous. i would like you to remember to note that iran is more than twice the size of texas. we are dealing with a very large landmass filled with mountainous terrain and complicating arrangements. verification this of objective in relation to these clandestine facilities, the iaea would first need to identify a suspicious location. it would then need to seek corroborative information before it makes any forward advances.
then define a location and specification in specific detail to request access. this is sort of like getting a warrant for someone's arrest. it would then define how an inspection visit would attempt to clarify the characteristics whetherparticular site, there is reason for suspicion or for determining that it is innocent. then they would define their inspection team and secure the resources that the team would require. for the analytical services that would be necessary depending on the findings that may go forward. committed to implement an additional protocol, which is an extension to a comprehensive safeguards agreement that grew kt of the situation in dpr
and in iraq in the early 90's. this instrument requires ratification. 126s currently in force in countries. the effort to gain acceptance has been long and arduous. i would say none of these countries are really hot button problem countries. it is mostly the case of building this common base of foundation for application. iran will be different. iran has agreed to provisionally its additional protocol and eight years later to seek its ratification in the parliament. the information that will be be --ble to the iaea will thank you. 1990's with iraq
and north korea, the information includeshe iaea now the following. anything that comes from safeguards and its practice. information that is gathered through inspections in the field through verification of design information for declared facilities. any activities that it takes in acquiring samples or knowledge that come to its attention. it has a program of going through open source data mining. this is a practice which has come about in the 90's already and continues to be refined. nationallike the security agency looking through e-mail or anything of that sort. it scans through all publication , scholarly publications for related subjects and the information is sometimes revealing. it looks that export information on unknown activities.
are connections to several suppliers, particularly as grew out of the situation in iraq. where companies that made such things as vacuum pumps that are essential for an enrichment where some people went to prison because of selling equipment for purposes that were clearly not consistent with the laws of the nations involved. so some of those companies now have direct links to the iaea and inform them when they have suspicious requests for 200 vacuum pumps for a hospital or something that would be equally crazy. we should also remember that earlier in a run, one of the sources of information were medical dissidents which broke the news -- political dissidents which broke the news about the enrichment plant. union of iran is not 100%. iran weree a risk if
to take a step in that direction that its own people might once again decide to reveal that. within the developing of both of those countries, iraq and north korea, the provision of intelligence information to the commongan -- became a practice which was carried out with some degree of uniformity. there is a stipulation in the iaea statute if anybody is interested it is article 8.a. hasays if a state information which it believes would be helpful to the iaea in carrying out its activities, it should make that information available. so now according to the director general's reports to the board, more than 10 countries have provided information on iran
that is a part of the safeguards fabric at this point. so the statutory permission would hopefully be interpreted more as an encouragement. eventually maybe it even becomes something more than expectation and maybe even there is latent culpability for states that fail to provide information. i will mention is environmental samples. a science which grew out of the cold war, during which time were monitoring fallout samples from china and the soviet union to track the developing of their nuclear weapons as they advanced in stages with various more modern features being incorporated. usedechnology has been now by the iaea. initially it was a technology which was made available to them
by, in particular, american laboratories but also others. it is a capability that the iaea has established its own laboratory paid for in part by the united states. both german and canadian equipment and various other countries participated. this sounds like something that is very science fictiony or more like a crime scene investigation. something swipe of and you can then put whatever comes off onto a piece of plastic and put it into a nuclear reactor. individual particles which weigh one million millionth of a gram will show fission damage. pick these particles out and tell what the chemical composition is and their
isotopic composition and the morphology of the particle. so you get a tremendous amount of information. you have to know where to look and you have to be careful that you do not cross contaminate. and you have to be very cautious about leaping to conclusions. carefulant very attention to the collection and analysis. but this is one of the mainstays. the other is access to satellite imagery. which in the time of north korea in particular, u.s. intelligence sources provided satellite imagery on north korea which was very revealing during a board of governors discussion on what was going on. today we have commercial companies which provide capabilities better than the intelligence capabilities back then. has its own contracts
and it has an intelligence -- satellite imagery analysis group that buys these images and looks at them, etc.. sometimes they have their own justification for wanting to know what is going on. sometimes they may receive information from a country that may suggest at a particular location there something they want to pay attention to. the first investigation cost relatively little. it is not interested. it gives you an information that may be very help all, maybe completely revealing. if you have a suspicion, one of the things you would want to do is to continue to look at this site as you go forward with further inquiries to determine whether or not anything would happen. with the additional they are accessed and is
complementary to inspections. they still require where a process where a request is made, and then the request is reviewed by the government of iran and hopefully they can't access and so on and a long chain of events i told you about, rations really get into place and inspectors go up and do their work. the agency has standards and if they do a report it becomes part of the database about all things known about iran and verification. if the findings are inconclusive , additional measures maybe necessary. maybe want to expand the scope, arrange for additional visits. it mayere is suggestions be connected to something else. there is a lot of information analyzed on an ongoing basis to
determine how best to steer the process. finding are suspicious, you start to ramp up political inquiries leading to perhaps the and a her general conversation with a resident representative or with a visit to the country to get information on what is happening, and at some point, a discussion may advance to the board of governors. at this point the commission being created a somehow informed. i am not clear what the process will be. in any case, the opportunity for further increase -- further monitoring will become clear. needse iea to succeed, it clear of authority for the tasks. if we go back to the time of korea, there is provision and the comprehensive safeguard agreement that all
parties to the nonproliferation agreement have to have. all identical or all according to a model. one of them is for a special inspection and not limited to any place or activity at all. the problem is it requires consultation and in effect, approval. the one time it was really important, it was tempted in north korea and the north koreans refuse to allow it. to this day have refused. was charged, in particular, the question of hidden waste facility that would be used to hide the fact they are reprocessing activity extensively more than the declaration would be revealed. whether this is a mechanism or viable or not, it has been lining in a ditch since then. whether it ever gets resurrected or not is not clear. the additional protocol, as i mentioned, and what is coming is the un security council
resolution. that will be a very important document to observe to see how it addressed -- how it addressed the task. to what extent the agency is given additional authority. things like a center fuse manufacturing, the devices are not at all in the scope of safeguards. there would be so -- some extensions appropriate as part of this agreement. they would continue financial support. i should line back again. is a member ofa the united family organizations and has its own membership and budget. -- formula forou addressing members in accordance with an approved budget to carry out programs. approval ofthe
government. that is very difficult under any circumstance. forcing it to about is not the way the agency would operate. a -- make the effort succeed is a contingency grant to the agency on the order of the 2 million which sounds like a nice, round number. it is much smaller. in addition to the police force i think itton, d.c. is very modest. in addition, technological art must be continued. there are today's member states, voluntary support programs that do research and development for ea.iea -- i e the american program is still the longer -- largest.
current funding about 15 million per year. without that, there is no hope you consult continuing programs. there are any number of new scientistsare always and engineers are really smart guys. they come up with a lot of ideas. some percentage can out. a lot of them are wacky and go nowhere. in any case, the question of finding a facility in a place twice the size of texas will require every bit of tension you can get. so that's financial support, that is soupport amazing to me, the most amazing thing about the agreement to me so far is a coalition of the p5 has held together with germany throughout the several years of negotiation. i can only hope that will continue to be the case. with that, i will stop my prepared remarks and respond to
any less gins. thank you. -- questions. [applause] thank you very much. i will introduce our others acres now. we are very lucky we have a representative of the administration was just joined us. the senior director for nonproliferation and arms control as the security council and served previously advisor -- previous advisor to joe biden for nuclear security. he is working to monterey institute, carnegie endowment and center for strategic and international studies. the co-author of " deadly arsenal, tracking weapons of mass destruction." then i will introduce the other members who will come up to speak. jim walsh is an expert and national security and research associate at ait. his research and writing focus on international security.
and topics involving nuclear weapons in the middle east. testified before the senate on nuclear terrorism and iran's nuclear program and one of a handful of americans who has traveled to iran and north korea. like the ropes. what can we say. he has served as executive director of managing that project and a visiting scholar at the center for security research at lawrence livermore national laboratory. john lambert is the class of 1960 -- 1975 professor of middle eastern studies at the u.s. naval academy. he is had a 34 year career and the u.s. foreign service.
in 2009, 2 thousand 10 he came out of retirement to serve as deputy assistant secretary for middle eastern affairs focused on iran and help to craft some of the language that president obama has used in his messages, topped the u.s. government how , and he shouldn know. .e served before the revolution he was a guest of the ayatollah for 444 days. he holds a phd from harvard in history and middle eastern studies. he has also authored many books including negotiating with iran. come up will ask him to and talk about verification. is this deal as foolproof as we can make it, and any other comments you would like to make about the agreement yesterday and then we will take your questions.
>> good morning. thank you, barbara. on the one hand i want to congratulate barbara so farsighted she's thrilled this event on this day, or she has a very good source inside the u.s. government or both. she was obviously not -- she did not need higher brain function to assemble the panel today and i am happy to be in a group with tom and jim and the ambassador. what i will do for a few minutes is talk about a deal we have negotiated, and why we believe it is very much a good deal and in our security interests, and we will have a chance to talk ea and we recognize that as a political component. this still works at the provisions work. the agency capabilities that are proven, demonstrated, and the
agency is the only organization on the planet today that has a track record and capability to do this job. i'm very thankful they are there. one of the reasons we support them so insistently. there is a sickly and briefly this is a good deal. this is a very good deal. we exceeded the benchmarks we weeeded and the country would have been scriptable but we have been able to achieve that. it was built on verification, not just the interim, but the long term. of responsibilities to abide by additional security is in perpetuity. agreement to abide by the agreement of the nonproliferation treaty and not to seek or pursue nuke their weapons is permanent. we have the ability to verify that under the agreement. sanctions really, which a lot of criticism has been focused on. it does not take lace and tell
iran comes back to full compliance. there is no signing bonus. there is no big pot of money they get and open up the suitcases and we all do our laundry. iran has to do very difficult things in order to get sanctions really. once that is achieved, we have a significant time where sanctions can snap back into place on our authority. it is a remarkable conclusion, but if you read through the documentation, the president can with -- resend his limitations within the wave of a pen. we have the authority, as does any member of that wielding members of the p5 can call for security council resolution, and through the exercise of the veto back intohe sanctions place. we don't need russia, china, and they cannot use their veto to block things and over this time. there are a lot of people who getting let off the
hook. since not been there 2006. over the past 10 years they have paid a significant penalty. billions and billions of dollars of scrutiny, tension, conflict in the region. this is a price they have had to pay because they violated the legal commitments. this agreement if them up halfway to come back to compliance, and therefore, once they come back to compliance, can do what other states in compliance can do. in the case of iran, it will be limited for a significant amount of time. in some cases 10 years, in other cases 15 and 25 years in a way that other nonproliferation treaty members are not limited, so they are paying the price for their behavior, and it is one i think is very significant. we talk about the four potential pathways iran has to a nuclear weapon.
all four are cut up under the agreement. they are uranium enrichment facility. it will be under 24 7, 365 monitoring and human presence or and promote access monitoring, live camera feeds, radio identification, tamper seals. we will know everything that goes on at the facility. if iraq takes up residence, we will be there and know about it. they will have centrifuges and can do stabilization. once that happens they will no longer be usable. no uranium is permitted -- no nuclear materials permitted for a significant amount of time. even once that takes place, they will have permanent access to the facility. reactoronium reactor or that can produce weapons grade plutonium, the hearts will be ripped out and treated so it can never be again used and
redesigned so it cannot predict weapons. how do we know that you go we designed the fuel, help manage the reactor. we get to verify and is backed it 24/7. the declared facility. is they attempt to misuse it, we will know within days. more likely we will know within hours. they will still be a year away from their ability to look are enough materials to build a new air weapon. it will be functioning. what is very important because the breakout scenario, what people think is less likely is this sneak out scenario. we believe given the knowledge this will give us into iran's nuclear activities, our ability --detect and declare undeclared nuclear activities greatly increased as a result. given that ability and rights under the additional protocol, modern technology equipment we will be able to use under the additional protocol, it is
extremely unlikely iran could build anything of significance and began to operate it without being detected. , aare being asked already nuclear weapon. will not suggest it prevent any and all minor activity related to a possible new or interest. nothing could get them closer to building a nuclear bomb. and anything of significance, trying to build a reprocessing facility, which they are not allowed to have for 15 years, trying to enrich uranium at another site, they are not allowed to have centrifuges at any of the facility, but if they tried it, we would be able to detect that facility through satellite. they would have the right to go there, and if they refused access, they would be five definition in violation of the
joint comprehensive plan of action and the united states can reimpose security council and domestic sanctions, so we don't verificationhis plan for? iran cannot get closer the nuclear weapon under verification plan without us knowing about it. that is the standard we're trying to achieve. it is one that quite frankly, is well within their ability to implement. this was the organization back on it right in iraq. they had no nuclear weapons program. they said so. they were right. ai knew ithat, the ie was a fort stock unit. they know they can do the job. the united states and the p5 partners will be working with other member states to ensure a have the technology, the resources, and the people needed
to do the job without draining resources from other important responsibilities. that will take money, but quite frankly, it is a partner. it is a bargain compared to what it takes to unveil the nuclear program on its own. a bargain compared to the military preparations we would have to take in order to head up a nuclear program in iran and a bargain in terms of what the iaea does for national security. it do what they need to do in order to ensure what they need to carry out the work. it is only the inspectors to spend weeks. months away from their homes on the patient doing the job in the most professional manner possible that we will be able to have an agreement like this that we believe will withstand the test of time. with that, i am happy to turn things over. [applause]
>> thank you so much. very useful remarks. i'm going to start with a question to john lippert who has to leave a little bit early this morning, and then we will get back to the technical discussion. i just wanted to ask for your reflections on this agreement as somebody who has a unique x .ariants in iran you have written an excellent piece that i recently read about the ghost of history. to what extent are we exercising for ghosts, and what is your personal sense of knowing iran as you do and having suffered the worst, do you think it will ,mplement this will faithfully andy you think it does represent some sort of turning point for the regime
? >> thank you. let me thank ambassador miller who undertook a political mission back in 1979. what we're seeing now is essentially president carter's --ter getting a letter after getting a response after 36 years. we are also seeing president obama's outreach efforts, which he began an fast as senator obama back into thousands seven -- 2007 with the opposition i would say of then senator hillary clinton. efforts also bearing fruit. the word comes down to that you hear. much of what you hear is trust and mistrust. what you hear from the opponents similarcapitals is very
. you hear we cannot trust them. you can interchange the we and the them according to where you are. this is a real issue. just to give you one quick example, just a few years ago the iranians announced they were ready to switch on the nuclear power station. this project going back to the 70's, which i believe people told me at the time they bought obsolete german equipment to build this thing in the mid-70's. in 2010 and 2011, they were ready to switch it on. someone asked secretary of state
clinton, what do you think about this yet so she said don't worry about it is, we know the awarelogy, we are well and something we are concerned about. then they went back and asked an iranian official, i don't remember who it was, and they said what do you think about this? the secretary statement? the answer was, well, i don't know what it is, but i know there is a trick somewhere. don't sayans just that. what we have seen, we have seen variations in both places. we are seeing what i call the rise of the geneticist. like from ad things senior official, things like deception is in iranian dna. well, geneticist talk about dna.
we have also heard something similar from a very distinguished retired military officer who has now the president of one of the great universities of this country. ,e talk about imperialism persian imperialism is an iranian dna. where does this death come from? stuff coming from? where do people start becoming geneticist that though if i were talking about it we're physics and to talk about genetics. to quote lyndon johnson, paraphrase, i will not quote him in this g rated presentation, he wants said, i don't much, but i know the difference between chicken soup and chicken salad.
he used an earthier expression. hear people pretending to be geneticist, you know the difference. the issue does come down to trust. we can't trust them. if you go to events in this town particularly, iran events in this town, these are some of the outstanding once. things like we know the iranians are working for a nuclear bomb. the question is, how do you know? the answer, because they are bad people. variations of that. but -- i would answer your question with a long answer, get back to the answer this way, the issue of trust people say asked me to do you trust the iranians. do you trust the iranians? what i say is no.
because, to quote the president, the president said you don't make agreements like this with your friends. two years andnd 100 some pages of the details with a country you have immediate trust with. someone who practice diplomacy for 30 some years, not when isuccessfully, but hear these comments, here is where i come out. ?iplomacy, what is it basically, making him perfect agreements with people you neither like, nor trust. imperfect agreements with dubious people. ,f you think about the history that is what kept us safe in the cold war for 40 or 50 years.
that is what this agreement is about. it is not about trust, it is about verification. >> thank you. i will ask all three of the other speakers to look specifically at the verification issue and the nature of the iranian nuclear program. as was pointed out again in 1959 , the united states largely responsible. of 22ported the idea civilian power reactors. there has been a certain momentum to the program. it stopped for a while and started again. are you all confident iran is satisfied with the level it has reached for now, that it is satisfied with the agreement and will carry it out faithfully for the next 10 years or so and the
object is not really a weapon, it is satisfied with being at this threshold state, however you want to describe it. starting with you, john. i want to be very clear, ran having signed the agreement have determined it is in their interest. the clarification is they will a fully implement the agreement, but we're not leaving that to trust. the verification revisions will give us ready ability to determine whether or not iran will comply with the agreement, and that is true and a 20 as it is in day 2020. in terms of satisfaction, i can't tell satisfaction as an emotion what iran is a quiet -- required to do is lay out a detailed research and development program and a clear what the prospective players
are. those plans have to be consistent with the spirit and letter of the joint comprehensive plan in action. it is then for the united dates and under members to determine whether the plan is consistent. because of the details of the plans, boat that we have and will be provided, we are very high confidence of predictability in transparency, the plant well into the future, where some of 10 the restrictions expire, but many remain in place, particularly a cap on enrichment strictly defined progression in terms of uranium and development, that they are satisfied. what -- where they will go in the future in terms of nuclear power plant development, which is their right in terms of a nonnuclear agreement is for them to decide, as long as it is in conformity with their obligations. all of ways, obviously it is complicated, but in some ways it comes down to a basic
principle, under the treaty they are obligated not to seek or pursue in any way new their weapons. if we believe it is -- through joint to list -- intelligence information, we can find her self right back in the situation we inherited when we took office 2009. that led to the negotiations that accommodated the agreement. in terms of how they feel internally about it, that is for them to choose. >> let me ask you about the possible military dimension. they have to satisfy the iea a -- they have to satisfy the iaea by the 15th. john: actually they have to satisfy the iaea by october. >> there is no sanctions relief without that? > john: none. the 15th. this issue lingering well before
-- for many years as they conducted a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003 has an lingering because the iranians felt they would have to give access. that they would write a report and would use that to impose the sanctions. we found a says if you abide by the principles of access, and the iaea is satisfied, and that five years from now they cannot say you did not need to go into the facility back then, then we are prepared to move forward with this. without that commitment and follow through to access, there will be no sanctions released and we will not have a deal. >> your thoughts on the iranian program and whether they will implement it. >> i think it is important to step back and put this in some sort of context. this is not our first rodeo. this is not the first time we have wrestled with the problems of verification.
and potential cheating. we have done this for decades. we have had agreements with bad actors. we find ourselves now with that decades of experience in a situation where, like with every arms control agreement, you are trying to identify how risky this is, and what is our level of confidence. it seems to me the first place to start is where the director of national intelligence begins. he says iran had a program which it ended in 2003. it had the basic nuclear capability. but that they have not made a decision to pursue nuclear weapons. every time you hear that iran is racing to the bone, that is in , that is in direct opposition to what the u.s. intelligence community has
resolved. i think it is actually quite -- when you compare the other verification challenges we have had, this is a pretty good situation to be dealing with. it is the most-watched country in the world. i assure you that opposition groups are going to look for the slightest hint of noncompliance, in addition to everything else that we will be doing and the iaea is doing. i feel pretty good about it. it would be odd for iran to negotiate an agreement in which there was more intrusive inspection. where there were more inspectors on the ground with greater mandates and then sheet. that would be a pretty dumb -- and then cheat. that would be a pretty dumb thing to do. you would not open it up and then cheat. now, that may change. the regime may change. what we are doing now is locking them into a situation he for they have made the
decision to pursue that nuclear weapon. i don't want to go on for too long. your remarks were right on. understandably the american public and members of congress have an idea about verification frozen in their minds that goes to the 1990's. >> anywhere, anytime. >> to iraq and north korea. obviously the iraq situation is very different. that is the way people think about it. as you suggested, this is not your father's iaea anymore. i remember what my first computer was like in the 1990's. it was a lot of putting this in and out and things like that. we have tools. science and technology is available to us that the agency could not have imagined then. including open source, digital, all the rest of it.
the way the regime -- it has been dynamic. there have been crises and the international community response to that crisis by writing new rules that are stronger. that came from columns with iraq. crisis, iteration, improvement. crisis, iteration, improvement. that has been the story of iaea. i will say, there will continue to be help. i think on-site inspection will be critical. one of the things that the snowden revelations would suggest, is that the u.s. has robust intelligence capabilities. i will conclude with this one quick story. it points to the fact that there are lots of ways to do verifications. you might have for the story of -- have heard the story of the overanxious lawyer who was defending a client accused of biting off the finger of a man in a bar fight. at the witness is on the stand.
he says, well, were you in the room when this happened? yes, sir, i was. did you see my client bite the finger? no, i didn't. no, you didn't? yet you are appear. why are you so confident that he did that? the person replied that i saw him spit it out. [laughter] that is a way of illustrating that there are lots of ways to find things out. the most powerful of which will be the iaea. but it is not the only, by far. >> i would like to talk a little bit about how verification measures have improved. i remember when there were intual physical seals on -- facilities in north korea. what are the methods now used?
>> i will address that, but i want to come back to the pmd's for a moment. in 2011 one of the papers sent to the board of governors contained in annex with a list of 11 or 12 areas which iran had allegedly investigated aspects of developing nuclear weapons. they included weapon design work, high explosives for triggering, fusing, and now the director general has traveled to tehran a week ago, and has come back with an agreement that will allow the iaea to enter into this activity and reach a conclusion -- i think it is 90 days after the implementation of the security council resolutions , that date is still sliding somewhat, but it is not a long time and none of us knows what is in this agreement.
to my mind there are questions of if you are given an explanation that this was peaceful activity it does not mean that the activity was also carried out for other purposes. and that the only thing you are being told about is one dimension. so how the director general will formulate his report will be a question of artistry and diplomacy as far as i'm concerned. so what about these activities? in the one sense, if you assume that these activities were carried out and were successful, it means that iran has more knowledge than anybody would like it to have about the nuts and bolts of putting weapons together. and if it does have this, it would mean that the time between if there were to be a breakout, that the time to actually build the first bomb would be shorter than it would otherwise be. that is an important consideration. but it is already factored into
the fact that the agency will be doing inspections and gathering information on critical things on a daily basis, essentially in real time. it does not really affect what could it do other than that. that is one aspect that i am ok with. the other aspect is supposing it finds something down stream that is going on. how can it determine that this is something new versus something that predated the report that will be coming in december? that will be a thorny issue along the way. as far as the technology, it all depends upon what kind of facility you are looking at. what the materials are, and so on. the iaea today has over 100 different verification systems that it maintained and procures, etc., and are approved for use in the field. to get there is now a much more demanding process.
you go through a specification evaluation of prototypes until you ultimately get to equipment that can be relied upon. and the reliability and efficacy -- it is still some of these old seals that are in place. because they used 10,000 of them a year. they are cheap compared to -- >> digital. >> exactly. digital ones that have fiber-optic receptors that can be reviewed automatically. the surveillance cameras of old were the movie cameras that were used and engineered so they would start and stop and stretch it out so that you could get a period of surveillance that would be maybe three months. information given and the fact -- now you have large-scale digital storage. the equipment is nothing like
what it was. the reliability is phenomenal, and the performance and the information given and the fact that it incorporates protective features, so that you simply cannot fiddle with it and expect you can defeat this equipment. you can kill it, you can heat it up, you can put the wrong voltage into it, but that would be a separate matter. it very much depends on an enrichment plant and the equipment that is appropriate. an isotope production reactor is very different. it is all designed according to those looking in the field. obviously you are more concerned with eyeballs. an intelligent inspector who is trained and knows what to look for is worth any number of items of equipment. >> we are going to open it up to your questions now.
please wait for the microphone, say your name, ask your question and say if it is directed to one or the other of the panel. -- panelists. wait for the mike. >> this is a question for tom. the iranians in the past have demonstrated great sensitivity to the nationality of the inspectors. i wonder if you can tell us how much of a concern that is for the future, both in maintaining the integrity of the inspections of iran, but also the precedents set for other countries around the world vetoing inspectors. states ofre today 176 the iaea. inspectors can come from any one of 176 countries. any country can say yes or no to any individual inspector that is proposed.
and any other reason that it doesn't really have to cite why. iran does not except american inspectors today. whether it will in the future, i milleropeful as bill that it will prove a circumstance in which iran will change his attitude in this regard. that would be a very helpful thing. i think there is a need for more americans on the staff. at the present time, the iaea budget -- one quarter of it is paid for by the united states. that is the u.n. formula. in almost every other agency of the u.n., the budgetary constitution was reduced a few years ago to 22%. the iaea has kept the full support of the united states government at 25%. not only that, the u.s. government donates about $50 in extra year budgetary contributions that allows the agency to do things
that it otherwise could not do. in effect, it entitles the united states to have one out of every four staff being an american. a few years ago the united states gave up about 5%. otherwise they would be dramatically honored to represent the -- dramatically underrepresented it. the last time i checked the numbers were running about 12% for americans. part of the problem that we face is that we don't send enough people -- good people over there. and this is in part due to the fact that the experts would come from national laboratories, the federal government, from academia, and from the industry. and we don't have a mechanism which makes it in the u.s. interest for people to go. i am hopeful that part of this legislative review will be to
address what things could be done to assist in this regard. >> are they any other nationalities that are barred? i would assume obviously israelis, but beyond israelis and americans? >> if you didn't ask, i wednesday -- wouldn't have even remembered the israelis. i just don't know the answer to that. >> i know a lot of the inspectors have been from scandinavia, latin america, and italy. >> china, also. >> over here. cunningham, i'm a senior fellow here any for murder ambassador to the u.n. so i have some experience, some very painful experience, in dealing with iraq. the criticism has already been made that the verification has too many steps. we have seen with iraq how easy it is to play cat and mouse.
by the way, i want to say i found your presentation, by all of you, very reassuring in that regard. but how would you answer the criticism that there is so much time lag built into this, giving iran numerous opportunities to barricade, obstruct, whatever, that the purpose of the inspection could be mitigated by that? >> you're right that this is a criticism that is being led the. -- being levied. i think it is one of the reasons why we have talked about the agreement. i am sure you have read it, but the fact is that under the additional protocol, the iaea can request access to a site, and under normal circumstances, whether it is an military sites, sensitive sites, you know, shish kebab sites, they can get access within two hours. no authorization. there is an inspector in the
country, they are properly equipped, and they are able to go in a short amount of time. however, the state in the case of iran does have the ability to say, what you're really looking for other blueprints, let them give -- let me give them to you. they have an opportunity to say will this satisfy you? if the agency says no, and the state then says, well, you can't get in, immediately the red flag goes up. there is no cat and mouse. everybody, cnn, us, fox, the russians, the chinese are going to be watching this one piece of desert, right? in the agreement there is a process that no more than 24 days can pass. within less than four weeks, the iaea gets in, or they are in violation of the agreement.
if we see anything going out the back door, iran is in violation of the agreement. because they are not applying with the additional protocol, which is to facilitate access. that is the broad scope. let's talk specifics. what are we worried about? are we worried they are going to build an underground facility? if they are, you cannot get rid of it in 24 days. uranium has a half-life of about 4 billion years. it is kind of a pesky element. we still have a facility in kansas city you cannot go in the building. radiation and nuclear materials last a long time. or if we go in, you cannot say it is a baby milk factory. we are going to know what it is. again, it is for us to decide if they are in compliance or not. there is no scenario that i can
envision where iran would say we are going to take the chance. i don't want to be reassuring, because when i talked to a nuclear engineer and they tell me, don't wear, that nuclear facility -- don't worry, that nuclear facility is perfectly safe, i get nervous. there are things that can go wrong. but if they but if they try it, we will catch them. the agreement that george w bush negotiated with the north koreans in 2005, which contain no verification provisions at all, was five pages long. the treaty of moscow, which was between george bush and vladimir putin, was three pages long. it had no verification provisions. it got 71 votes in the senate. this is over 100 pages long. it is like no other nonproliferation agreement that
has been negotiated. it pales in comparison to the most detailed arms agreement with the soviet union and russia. the details are here. as jim says, we have done our homework. we are very open to understanding and constructive criticism. we are giving a defense to a -- to what we believe is a very effective agreement. not that iran won't try to change. we are not assuming they are going to comply. we are assuming that they are going to cheat and we know that we can catch them. >> right there in the middle. >> richard with the national foreign trade council and a member of the barbara's iran project. while we're on the subject of criticism of the deal, i think that everything that has been
said in terms of the strength of the agreement in the nuclear space is accurate, is a good deal, is a win-win in terms of diplomacy, as john has defined diplomacy. the criticism that i worry about over the next 60 days, within the body politic, is you are giving iran over time all this money with which to conduct the activities in the region that we put them on the state-sponsored terrorism list year after year. i would be appreciative of your comment about that space. >> i would like to talk about that for a second. >> good. >> so, i am confused by this argument. it seems to me if you don't like iran, they are terrorists, then
you don't want them to have a nuclear weapon. what is worse then iran involved in terrorism? iran involved in terrorism with a nuclear weapon. i am not getting this. , the argumentg goes, we can get them any of them -- can't give them any of their own money back because they will spread it on terrorism. what does that mean, then? what that means is those people are saying we cannot have any nuclear agreement. because they are imagining that there is going to be a nuclear agreement where iran does everything we want them to do on the nuclear, and they get zero in return. they don't get any relief. i am not aware of any agreement in the history of humankind that would work like that. if you are saying we cannot give any sanctions relief because they will use it for terrorism, you are essentially saying no nuclear agreements relief restraints. that is my reading of it. you may have a different view.
>> pardon me to put words in jim's mouth. i think people are brought to be -- right to be concerned about iran's behavior. they are a state that does things that we do not alike. they threaten our neighbors and americans. they're holding american citizens. they are engaged in activities in countries that lead to real regional instability and insecurity. we are not blind to that. this is not as if, you know, barbara started with the question of is this a turning the page. we are assuming that iran will not change. we don't want them to have access to a nuclear weapon or get there quickly. we intend to increase our capability to challenge iran throughout the region, because we do expect that some of this money may enhance their act of these. please, go ahead. thank you very much. the thing i would point out is
that iran is under the most crippling sanctions system that has ever been imposed on them. it is not a shortage of money that is preventing them from terrorism or sending arms or supporting his side. they are doing that anyway. is there an incremental risk? yes. are we going to be taking steps for allies to match that? you bet. but we will be much more effective at doing that with a are not hiding behind a nuclear shield. there is also a very interesting set of steps that is coming out. by how much does saudi arabia outspend iran? uae is 50% higher. this is not just purely a money scheme. it is a capabilities scheme. it is a sharing scheme. that is why secretary carter is going to the region. it is why we have the gulf leaders here for the camp david summit. it is going to say, how are we going to work together on
military missile defense, counterterrorism operations? we are expecting the neighborhood is going to be bad, because the neighborhood is bad. but it gets worse if they have a nuclear program. >> wait for the microphone. >> thank you very much for the great discussion. i have a question for the panel. of all the joys and jubilation s that we are getting clips of, it is all young people out there impatiently waiting for the sanctions to be lifted. with all these measures that have been put into this agreement to stop iran from making a nuclear bomb, it seems to me that this regime will be on a suicide mission if they do not comply with this agreement. they have a lot of answering to do to their own domestic population and also to the world
, so i need your input on this, thank you. i i may grab that one, if may. people say it is the regime, and the regime makes all the decisions and public opinion has nothing to do with it. this is not north korea. public opinion does have something to do with the policies undertaken by the government. they do a lot of things in the region that most iranians do not support. they do not like to see their money going to syria and lebanon and iraq. they would like to see it spent at home. but in 2009, there was an earthquake in iran called the green revolution. the government stole an election to reelect a leader. millions of people came out on the street and said where's my vote. even though the regime crushed the protest, it shook them to the core. so they made sure that in 2013 when there was another
presidential election, there was a reasonable choice of candidates. and the most pragmatic individual one. it is hymns -- his team that has been able to negotiate this agreement. this is their second time around. this is their second time around and they have succeeded in they -- succeeded. they are well aware of popular sentiment. they know what sanctions have done. unemployment is extremely high. brain drain is extremely high. the new leader gives hope and economic development tops. some of the billions of dollars that iran will receive lines up deal wills from this end up with hezbollah, yes of course it will. but i will argue that if this government wants to retain legitimacy -- and remember what the supreme leader here is doing , he is making a pact with the
great satan, and everyone knows this -- if the system wants to continue beyond him, it will have to meet some of the aspirations of its people, i would argue. yes, ma'am. wait for the microphone, please. you for a fascinating panel. i am a barbara. a few questions. first of all, in parallel to the inspection regime that will be led by the iaea, is there any provision unilaterally for the administration to collect the best minds? i know you mentioned the lapse and all that for the iaea, but in parallel to have experts cover the pentagon and the arms control community two alleviate
a lot of this inherent suspicion? on another issue, the president gave an interview about one month ago to israeli tv, where he conceded that the breakout time could be reduced to nearly zero? i know that there is an explanation, but i would love to hear from your experts. how can that be ameliorated and reinforced? in your 13 or 14. >> sure. if i understand your first question, how are we going to make sure that the best people are working on this problem and that the iaea and government have what they need? that is why we are here. that is how we got to the stage. the iaea received a tremendous amount of support from the
united states, including from people like tom shea and other experts that are provided. they get a great hickey's from the national laboratories. we help train their people. in terms of the technical capabilities and leadership, the iaea already has that. we are working closely with them to understand what more they would like, what more they need. -- that will instantaneously be checking the enrichment level. sort of like a thermostat. when it hits 36.38, it sends a little alarm out. so i think that part we will continue to work for. we believe right now our intelligence in --
capabilities properly resourced. we are looking at how we will organize our selves for organization. there are still some decisions that have to be made. just as we learned lessons from the north korean agreements, we are learning the lessons bureaucratically. in terms of the breakout timeline, what we have been able to achieve and in the jcp oa is a predictability to iran's enrichment capacity. that extends through the research and development plan will receive from iran. there is a strict cap on enrichment level.
they cannot go over 300 you 235 for 16 years. the on that, there is a research and develop and that iran must provide that divides predictability in assistance with their energy needs and the development. the let me2014 -- rephrase this, right now, we have a plan through your 13. so let's say in your 10, they of data their 15-year plan and it says, ok, we are going to have 5000 sure, 5000 true, 5002 -- 9 million. that is the right to say is inconsistent with us. we can work to get our allies italy concerned. -- in equally concerned. get access to the
r&d plan so iran has an incentive to have what we described as a soft r&d landing. has is what dr. moniz ignited. moreure he will get accolades when he gets back. the agreement does not provide for this exponential increase in enrichment capacity or a drop-off in terms of breakout time limits. they asked what criteria do we need. i offered several of them. assessment is not about managing all the bad things that could go wrong. you try to put parameters, measure the risks.
how do you do that? you compare one thing to another. we talked about to this being exceedingly strong agreement, arguably the most robust non-corporation agreement negotiated industry. compared to the others, that should give you some confidence going over. second and separate, evaluation criterion is how does it compare to the alternatives? i hear some say that 15 years isn't long enough. resists the song i've heard this before. a few weeks or months notice before iran do something. a few weeks or months. and then john kerry comes and says where at six months
breakout time. then he was told six months isn't enough. then they come back with an agreement that says a year, doubling that. suddenly, actually we need two years. i don't know there is any number we could choose for breakout time that could satisfy people. it seems to me 15 years is a really long time in nuclear program years. let's compare it with the alternatives. let's say we use military force to decimate the program. iran would be able to reconstitute its program in roughly four years. right? we wiped it out. rebuild it -- they rebuild it in four years. we are talking about an agreement that goes for 15 years compared to the four years that
they would take to reconstitute it if we use military force. again, all these debates the details are important. but how do you judge this? you compare them to other things. you compare them to other agreements. you compare them to your alternatives. iaea beingthe involved, which is an organization that grew out of president eisenhower's proposal. one of its obligations is to respect to the sovereignty of each of these states. so he cannot act in an impromptu or whiplash effect. it has to proceed with due caution so as to avoid false allegations on the one hand while being mindful that, if there is something going on, it must act insufficient time to
allow for an adequate response. that will be a problem, i think, depending on what goes forward. the questions of that when it for days, etc., that is a sort a a period gearing which degree of certainty would -- maybe itbuild up is denied or not permitted to go to a particular location, but there will be a lot of other things going on in a mycumstance like that area own perception may be clouded by the fact that i am an optimist and i want this to succeed. but i think this is a new era and i am hopeful that iran will seize upon this as a chance to demonstrate its commitment to the obligations that it is entering into. if it doesn't, we are going to know about it. interference with activities are just the color of how much
copart -- how much cooperation is there, which is something that is demonstrated on a daily for the providing assistance that the inspectors can actually do their work or are there things that get in the way. so that will be known soon. barbara: we know the iranians have abided by the interim agreement back in 2013 quite safely, for the last couple of years and that is a good precedent. >> everybody here agrees that the agreement is a good agreement. since there is no longer any state secrets, when you use the word tough negotiations, what did they not agree to? at this particular point, only what they didn't want to do is relevant. what did the united states want that iraq did not want?
barbara: it is his prerogative not to answer. cannot provide you with an answer to that question. barbara: we have run out of time. ifse of you with questions, our folks have time, they would be happy to answer them. check the report of tom shea. on theld be available common ground website in a couple of days. take you so much for coming. at theer: we are live university in washington, d.c., where president obama will be speaking surely, a speech scheduled to start at 11:20 eastern, obviously running a bit late. the white house motorcade left the white house about 10 minutes ago. university, daring good traffic, is about 10 to 15 minutes away from the white house. we will be taking your calls after the president's speech and
hearing from you on facebook and twitter asking the question has the obama administration made its case. so if you want to post your thoughts. president kennedy spoke at the university in 1963 on the verge of a nuclear test ban treaty with the soviet union. "the washington post" writes about that, the most consequential form policy debate since the decision to go to work -- to war in iraq. president kennedy more than 50 years ago and turned into a diplomatic agreement with an adversary of the united's dates --t did succeed in advancing
united states did succeed in advancing. we will have a life for you once it starts here on c-span. we follow that with your phone calls and your comments. we look forward to hearing from you as well. preview this speech, a of what we might hear from this morning's "washington journal." guest: what we have seen so far, the white house has released some experts of this reach and the president will make a strong case that, if either this deal
or war with iran, essentially. part of his argument is to deal to democrats by framing this as the most consequential vote that will have taken since the iraq war authorization. quiteis going to be forceful and detailed. this is one of his favorite platforms for outlining his policy, a -- a big speech like this. and he is also going to use it to defend his foreign-policy diplomacymeaning that first and military action as a last resort. host: have we heard the president before make the comparison, either this or either -- when talking about the nuclear -- the iran nuclear deal? guest: he has increasingly done that. it really angers opponents of the deal who say that the president is boiling down, simplifying a vary complex issue by pitting this as either war or
this particular deal. secured oneal is , in 14, the white house particular the president, leaned more heavily into this argument that it's either war or this deal. part of their case, which is undermined a little bit by some of the folks in -- currently in the administration who supported the iraq war, part of the president's case is that some of the same people who are opposing this iran deal are those who supported the iraq war, which as you know, the president was famously against and that helped him actually win the democratic nomination in 2008. john kerry and joe biden as well as hillary clinton, who is running to replace president obama on the democratic side, all supported the iraq war resolution. there is some irony being
pointed out by the's president's critics -- by the president >'s critics. host: there are some meetings with jewish groups. who is participating? guest: the president met with about 20 representatives of pro-israel groups, including some folks from aipac, which is -- leading organization pro-israel organization that is opposing this deal. they are spending a lot of money to launch a campaign against the deal. they plan to be out in lawmakers ' districts in august a drink recess to convince them to not -- during the recess to convince them not to agree.
what came up in the discussion is the way the president is framing this, that it is either war or this particular deal. and some of the folks in that meeting were upset about that. you: i was going to ask about the reception overall about what the president was saying. the president and the white house is not expecting to win over critics, such as aipac. they feel vary strongly about this and they are not out there to change their minds. it is more to give them the opportunity to hear the president's case and, at the same time, try to give other groups and pro-israel organizations, american organizations, to get behind the president as opposed to the view particularly prime minister benjamin netanyahu who also addressed some of these groups and is an ardent opponent of the deal. host: what strategy for the
white house in reaching out to people who are still on the fence? guest: they are reaching out to anyone who is still on the fence. if you look at the way the strategy has taken shape in the last three weeks, they are really focused on democrats. the white house increasingly ,rivately and somewhat publicly they think the president is going to have to implement this deal by using his veto authority. their main focus is by getting democrats either in the house with the senate to support the presidentialin veto of the resolution to reject the deal. they feel vary confident that they have those votes in the house. you are right, there were three democratic senators yesterday who came out in favor of the deal. barbara boxer, tim kaine, and jim nelson. time, the white house lost some folks on the house side, including ted deutch
. -- it is very unclear. the white house feels more confident about the house than they do the senate. the main reason is the senator they are looking at is senator chuck schumer who is in line to be the next democratic leader of the senate, who is a vary important person in the jewish community, and a senator from new york. he has not made up his mind yet. yhey are really closel watching that. they are focused on getting enough house members. host: talking about the space today and the iran nuclear deal. carol lee, thank you. announcer: that speech was originally set to have started an hour ago. the president on his way to american university in the nation's capital for that speech deal. iran nuclear
after the speech, we will open up the phone lines to hear your thoughts on whether the administration has made its case for the iran nuclear agreement. several comments already on facebook. youleen posts, yes, if listen to or read rational reporting instead of the hair-on-fire warmongers. another says it is indisputable that the obama-hillary-kerry have the worst foreign-policy ever. look on twitter and take your phone calls after the president's speech this morning. -- senate banking community committee is hearing the sanctions on iran after the lifting -- the lifting of the sanctions after the iran nuclear deal. you can follow that over on c-span3. we will show to you later on our c-span schedule.
the only obama administration official to view confidential side deals between iran and the international atomic energy agency admitted today she had her team have only seen early drafts. "i didn't see the final documents. i saw the provisional documents, as did my experts." , testifying sherman now before the senate banking committee. we will show it to you later. the president speaking shortly. we will follow-up with your phone calls and comments and give you another chance to see the president's speech later in the day. in particular, we will re-air it tonight at 8:00 eastern. onting about the lobbying capitol hill, this will go before congress in september. a month of heavy
lobbying and television advertising by opponents led by the pro-israel group aipac, the president and members of his team are leaning on democrats to declare their backing of the agreement before they leave washington to face their constituents. president obama will have limited personal contact with wavering lawmakers. but his team has been instructed to make the president and other senior administration officials available to any skeptic with an unanswered question or concern about the deal. "anyone who wants a phone call will get a phone call," said one official. that is from "the new york times." waiting for the president and the speech coming up shortly on the iran nuclear deal.
underway half an hour ago and should get underway shortly. we will re-air this tonight at 8:00 eastern here on c-span. the president not only speaking to the american public. announcing he plans to sell his deal directly to the israeli public. he will talk to the israeli press next month to sell the iran deal in israel. according to two sources who attended the meeting. they say obama was asked bring a meeting whether he thought about taking the case of the deal to the israeli public. the chairman of the national jewish democratic council told buzzfeed obama pointed out that the delegation of israeli reporters were visiting washington this week. that is from buzzfeed.com. president obama speaking this morning after his speech -- this morning. uper his bees, we will open
announcer: here on c-span waiting for president obama' speech to get underway on the iran nuclear deal and while we wait, we will show you some of the conversation today is "washington journal." guest: i started it back in 2010 when congress -- 2011 when congress was hitting the depth of what i call legislative futility. there was good luck everywhere. i came up with a system of measuring how much action, legislative action was going on in congress. given where things were, i called it legislative futility.
the latest one suggested things are getting better. if that is the case, if that trend continues, i may have to rename in the next couple of years. for now, we are sticking with legislative futility. pres. obama: thank you. thank you so much. everybody, please have a seat. i apologize for the slight delay. even presidents have a problem with toner. [laughter] it is a great honor to be back at american university, which has prepared generations of young people for service and public life. i want to thank president kerwin and the american university family for hosting us here today.
ago, president kennedy, ,t the height of the cold war addressed this same university on the subject of peace. the berlin wall had just been built. had tested then most powerful weapons ever developed. china was on the verge of acquiring the nuclear bomb. after the endears of world war ii, the prospect of nuclear war was all too real. with all of the threats that we face today, it is hard to appreciate how much more dangerous the world was at that time.
in light of these mounting threats, a number of strategists in the united states argued we had to take military action , to hasten soviets what they saw as inevitable confrontation. but the president offered a different alternative. in his view, included powerful armed forces and a willingness to stand up for our values around the world. but he rejected the prevailing attitude among some foreign-policy circles that equated security with a perpetual war footing. strong, he promised principled american leadership on behalf of what he called a practical and attainable peace. peace notot on -- a based on evolution