tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN November 3, 2015 9:00pm-11:01pm EST
this is a bipartisan piece of legislation. was introduced by senator leahy and senator michalski. bill is bipartisan and i want to thank my colleagues for all the work they have done. we will now answer any questions you may have. -- >> is there -- the bill is very expensive. in the previous version, it was also bipartisan but more new if. is there any concern this bill is going back to a more new arrow version? recall the
legislation did not go anywhere either. and to us, that was a bare minimum. criticism from the civil rights community and the voting rights community. we narrowed the bill until we excluded the states that were engaged, my state of being one of them. we were not covered. alabama, where all of this started, is not going to be covered. what we did was we decided to use what the supreme court asked us to use it in a way that would and to state if you
don't have any intentions to be mischievous, you shouldn't be worried about it. >> do have any sense of where the new speaker stands on this? have there been any discussions as an ally?be seen the chairman as opposed to this idea across the board. me speak or will shift the powers to the chairmanship. how'd do you get over that hurdle? >> maybe they have spoken with him. i have not. >> i have not spoken to speaker ryan about this. i can tell you restoration tuesday is about educating the american people, informing the american people about this issue. most americans don't understand
that the ability to vote effectively in many states has been removed. if the american people really know the import of the interaction of this congress, public opinion will rise and i believe the politicians, including the chairman committee, would be poised to move this bill. during the 1965 debate on the voting rights act, we faced similar obstacles but it was public opinion and a strong handed president that forced it to happen and i believe the political climate of this country today can get us to getting the restoration act passed. >> other questions? just about three minutes
after 9:00 in the east. a warm evening and washington, d.c. the house today starting debate on hwy and a mass transit funding bill. it starts at 41 billion dollars next year and rises to $45 billion by 2021. members debated 45 amendments to the bill. we are currently waiting to see if the committee comes back to work on more amendments and more votes tomorrow. if the committee comes, we will try to get that for you. meantime, we will go on with our normal schedule and we will start with tsa administrator peter neff injured testifying about airport security and the inspector general's report. it's a house oversight committee
we are now at 46,000 screeners and the failure rate have been time i think we need a complete overhaul. 90% of people still have no out off differentiating the screening business. they will never be able to retrain, retain. they will never be able to manage but what they should be able to do is set to the standards.
our dod facilities and other facilities and we let the private sector do what it does best and we audit and make the changes because, again, i don't care what i hear today, i am convinced cannot fix the system that will continue to fail. i yield back. >> i think the administrator along with the thousands of people serving. when problems arise, you must be able to tend to it swiftly and appropriately. we ask they act an appropriate way prior to getting on an airplane. i look forward to the hearing testimony today. we now recognize mr. cummings of maryland. much. -- thank you very
againood to have you here on this very critical issue. i would also like to thank mrs. rover. i want to welcome the administrator. when i served at the subcommittee -- as a admiredttee chairman, i the technical expertise and the steady, determined leadership. theuding dealing with deepwater horizon oil spill. i'vesure he remembers -- called the coast guard back again and again to ensure accountability and every time,
you were up to the task and i am so glad that you have been chosen for this task. i think him for his decades of service and i have fought president obama's decision to appoint him this critical position. when comes to the security of , we must always wish to stay ahead of the terrorists and anyone else who would do us harm. we must take nothing for granted. we must put the lessons we learned into urgent action. i have often said that so often, we spend a lot of time talking about testing and how things will work when we have an emergency. so often, what happens -- and we saw this to some degree and deepwater horizon -- there will come a time when we will see it
worse. when that moment comes, so often we discover there is no road. above all, we must never become complacent. we must treat every single day as if the urgency of our act -- as if they require the urgency of our actions. routine thatlmost the senior leaders received supports of security gaps in the air passenger screening operation. these reports came from the inspector general and pecialized -- specialized. they described an additional round of testing revealing more gaps. the question today i believe is whether tsa and the department of homeland security are thisnding with the urgency situation demands and as the president often says, are they
responding what the urgency of now? based on their actions over the last several months, i believe they are. but their work is far from complete and it's incumbent on both the agency and this committee to continue our oversight efforts in order to ensure improvements are put into place. last spring, secretary johnson ordered a comprehensive, top to bottom review of all tsa's procedures to understand why agencies performed falling short of its own standards. he required senior leaders to report to him every two weeks about the root causes of these pitfalls and the solutions being implemented. over the summer, tsa developed and begin implementing a 10 ofnt plan for all aspects processes. it's clear the agency has been
aggressively working to change its culture. tsa has taken the date. in the, we are early process. this agency has more than 42,000 employees responsible when securing about 450 airports, making comprehensive effort in an agency is not easy and ensuring these changes are effective and efficient and improving the agencies database performance requires long-term efforts. we must ensure tsa establishes in your business with clear metrics to measure performance. administrator, i think you know .hat i am about to say just like in the coast guard
subcommittee, you should get used to seeing us on a regular basis. this committee's job is to oversee the implementation of tsa's transformation. we will be inviting you back because the american people are depending on us to get it right. finally, let me close by noting the airlines also play a critical role in securing our security. we need to take a look at the decisions by the airline industry that are making the tsa is a job more difficult. the new feesed airlines are charging to check bags are causing use increases in the volume of carry-on luggage. although this may result in significant new revenue for airlines, it's also putting significant strains on our screening operations and i hope he will address that. i hope we will have an opportunity to discuss these issues in more detail today and
had hearings before the committee. i have full confidence we will get this right. we have no choice. i think you and yield back. >> we hold this open for five days for the administrators who would like to recognize this. administrator the of the transportation security administration at the u.s. department of homeland security. honorablened by the john ross, inspector general of the u.s. department of homeland security and mrs. jennifer grover, director of homeland security. we welcome you all. all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. if you will please rise and raise your right hand. do solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you are about to get will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you and let the record reflect the witnesses all
answered in the affirmative. we would appreciate if you limit your verbal testimonies to five minutes. you written statement will be entered as part of the record. good morning, chairman. i thank you for the opportunity to testify on my vision for evolving the transportation security administration will stop my perspective is a shape -- to administration. approach is a my well-defined statement of admission, clear standards of performance, training and resourcing, appropriate measures of effectiveness, and an unwavering pursuit of excellent and accountability. i want to thank the inspector general for the oversight provided to the tsa. the direction is a reflection of
my vision on how we approach the continuing evolution. i am four month into the job and have traveled to dozens of airports and visited our european partners in the u.k., france, the netherlands, and met with stakeholders. i have engaged service stakeholders in passenger rail and light rail across the country and in europe. i've been thoroughly impressed with the professionals and equally impressed with the collaboration across the transportation enterprise. these complex systems require we examined on and consider them as a whole and integrate the wide range of public and private capabilities to close gaps, reduce abilities. however, as i've stated in previous hearings, my immediate priority has been to pursue
solutions to the inspector general's recent testing findings. we are making significant progress in doing so. element focused on an of the aviation security system, specifically imaging technology capability within checkpoint. it identified areas for improvement. the system as a whole remains effective and has only gotten stronger. in response, tsa have lamented an immediate action plan to ensure accountability, increase strengthenss, and procedures. we've also responded vigorously by and lamenting the pen point plan. to ensure we don't repeat concern liketmost determining root causes of the problem, our conclusion is a screening effectiveness challenges were not merely a .erformance problem
the ait has enhanced our ability to detect nonmetallic threats. ande look at the people technology, strong drivers of the problem include leadership focus, environmental influences, and gaps in the system. there -- analysis revealed our officers did not fully understand the capabilities of the equipment and several procedures were inadequate. we train our officers to understand and use equipment properly. solutions require a renewed focus on security, revised procedures, investments in technology, training, a new balance between effectiveness and efficiency, and support for frontline officers. we continue to partner with the airlines to identify solutions
and's -- solutions that can reduce stress on the checkpoints. i can report we have a principle approach in place designed to correct immediate challenges while ensuring this problem doesn't happen again. our training conducted in august and september with every front-line officer has reset our focus on security effectiveness. longer-term, our self-examination has given insight into how we must evolve. we face a critical turning point and tsa and begin our investment in a more strategic approach to ensuring the transportation sector. measure is what our officers will pay attention to. our approach needs to be adapt and and risk-based. feelst be able to rapidly
new ways of operating. our adversaries remain intent on attacking the transportation ting.r are inves we must deliver an effective system and the confidence of the traveling public. i conveyed these standards to our workforce and i committed we will pursue these objectives. i went to assure you tsa is an intelligence driven counterterrorism organization and we're up to the challenges we face. we are on the frontlines of a critical fight and our workforce is willing and able to do the job. thank you for the opportunity to be here today. >> inspector general roth. >> thank you. good morning. >> if you could just bring the microphone straight up. >> my apologies. good morning. thank you for inviting me here to testify today.
throughout this year, i had testified for this committee and others regarding my concern .bout tsa's ability to execute to testify these challenges were in almost every area of the operations is problematic. its control over access to secure areas, including management of access that program, its management of the workforce integrity program, oversight of maintenance and screening equipment, and other thees we've discovered in course of over 100 inspection reports. we may be in a different place now then we were when i last testified about this before this committee. i believe the administrator bullet -- brings with him and your attitude about oversight. ensuring safety is a massive and
complex program. it will take a sustained and disciplined effort. the first step to extend the problem is having the courage to radically assess the efficiencies. creating a culture change within tsa and giving the workforce the ability to identify and address the risk will be the administrators most challenging task. i believe the department and leadership has begun the process earn auation and position to address some of those issues. in september, we distributed our report on our most recent over testing. while i cannot speak about the specifics, i'm able to say we conducted the audit with efficient rigor to satisfy our professional auditing standards and the tests were conducted by our auditors without any specified knowledge or training and the results were troubling. we run multiple tests at eight
different airports of different across the country and tested airports who were using private screeners. results were can distance across every airport. our testing was designed to test checkpoint operations in wearable conditions. kelly was included technology, human heirs. the departments response has been swift. within 24 hours of receiving preliminary results, the secretary summoned senior tsa leadership and directed that an tsadiate plan of action for has put forward a plan consistent with our recommendations to improve checkpoint quality in three areas -- technology, personnel, procedures. the checkpoint must be considered as a single system. the most effective technology used without the right personnel and personnel needed to be
euided by appropriat procedures. we will be monitoring tsa's efforts and will continue to conduct covert testing. we will report our results to this committee and others. believe this episode serves as an illustration of the values of the office of the inspector general when coupled with department leadership that understands and appreciates independent oversight. this review was possible only because my office and auditors had unfettered access to information we needed. speak for the entire community and expressing my gratitude to this committee for the legislation tending in the house. -- pending in the house. this would fix the misguided attempt to restrict access to
records. this legislation would improve and streamline the way we do business. i written testimony gives an example of a powerful results we can obtain from data matching, which the legislation streamlined. concludes my prepared statement. i welcome any questions. >> thank you. director grover, please to have you here. you are recognized for five minutes. >> good morning. thank you for the opportunity to discuss how tsa can improve the effectiveness of airport passenger screenings. jo haspast six years, made 80 recognitions -- recommendations. tsa has fully implemented more than three quarters.
yet, every year our reports continue to find vulnerabilities in this system, many related to questions of security effectiveness. why is that? work over the past several years -- is tsa has consistently fallen short and basic program management in several aspects. bash shortcomings stand in out. first, failing to evaluating effectiveness of new technologies and programs. second, not establishing performance measures that reflect program goals and third, failing to use program data to identify areas for improvement. there are many reports that in eachte shortfalls area. i will provide one example for each. should fully evaluate effectiveness prior to adoption to insure acquisitions and to make sure money is well spent. ofone example, in a review
the body scanning technology, we found tsa evaluated the system in the laboratory for effectiveness but had not addressed how airport screeners were using the system. if airport screeners don't carry properly -- and we know this is an ongoing challenge -- the effectiveness of the overall screening is diminished. when tsa issue is designing studies of effectiveness, it's critical they follow established study designed practices to make sure the results they get at the end of the day are valid. tsa has struggled with this. a da juste we found study of behavioral detection indicators did not demonstrate their effectiveness because of limitations including the use of unreliable data.
my second point is that tsa should adopt performance measures that reflect program goals to make sure programs are operating as intended. in 2014, we found tsa did not have performance measures to the passengers were identified on the no fly and watch lists. that tsapoint is should put systems in place to monitor the data it collected in order to identify areas for 2013 --ent or step in improvement. in 2013, officials collected data on the effectiveness of their canine problem but were only considered. tsa was missing the opportunity to determine if there were specific search areas or types of explosives to which the canines were more or less affected and identify training needed.
responsiveistently to our recommendations and tsa has addressed to some degree most of the examples i've mentioned. its ait testing to more fully evaluate effectiveness and implemented new procedures to analyze canine testing data. they are in the process of testing behavior detection activity and developing new secure flight performance measures. by, addressing findings one one will not solve the underlying problem of an organizational culture that has allowed programs to be stood up without sufficient evidence of their effectiveness. it is critical that tsa systematically addresses the weaknesses i just described. through well-designed evaluations of their programs continuingtions and
reliance on appropriate performance measures that allow them to monitor key program goals over time. tsa would be well positioned to achieve long-standing improvements in aviation security effectiveness and other operations. statement.des my i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we will move to the question portion. we recognize the gentleman from florida. >> thank you. pleased to have you aboard. you come aboard when there has been unprecedented amount of criticism and findings of failure with your agency. intent -- ire very had a chance to speak with you on trying to improve things.
-- again, looking at this over 14 years -- our objective is to keep the american people safe. screenedtatement, you 600 million passengers. percentage of those folks actually pose a risk? it's got to be less than 1%, would you agree? >> a very small percentage. >> but most of our resources are spent on building a bureaucracy. billion on tsa.3 bureaucracy to manage the 46,000 screeners congress has put a cap on. we've seen a failure rate is
closed publicly -- disclosed publicly. you stated in your testimony there are a number of actions that have been completed, including requiring screening leadership at each airport oversight and training and thankful i got -- and thanks like that. you when you get this done, have created a system that doesn't address the risk. your chances of failure are almost 100% with the current system even with the training you employ. -- thwart the ait machines. place andt we had in under the threat was there for explosives and it still there tried to put in
different programs to make up for the layers that fail. behavior detection, $1 billion spent on behavior detection. thousands of officers -- here's a report here. it says 50,000 travelers have been flagged. zero of them are terrorists. 60 known terrorist past through 20 occasions. the point here is you need to get out of the personnel business and back into the security business. turning tsa back into the things , intelligence us gathering, setting parameters for someone else. you're not a good personnel .gency nor will you be the recruitment, the training, retention is horrible.
matter what you do, if you don't address the risk and put our resources -- we should put our resources -- every instance in which we have stopped them has been first to the public. that morningince they found out on flight 93 they attacked a terrorist and took them down. it was the crew and passengers that stopped him. the liquid bombers -- they woke me up in texas and told me about that. that was british and israeli intelligence but it has to be our intelligence that saves the day. of theu to get you out personnel business and back into the security business. we still don't have that right according to some of the folks who have testified the evidence
i have seen. i don't mean to give you a hard time but please consider this. when we devised this system -- i told you this story -- a , whenm-security facility you go into those come you get body cavity searches. -- which were not going to do with 659 million americans -- still stuffy gets through. again, i look forward to your response. you don't have to give it today but i think if we change that into the security business, that's the best use of our resources. >> i would like to put this report and the record if i may. --reedom to travel failures
i think it's very enlightening if you would >>. -- if you would like that request. >> the gentleman from virginia. welcome. welcome your ascension to this office. my confidence in you was reinforced when i read your .estimony on the root causes he said the underlying screening effects of this and technology you said a-- disproportionate focus in the past has been on screening rather thanficiency security effectiveness, which is the mission. would you expand on that? >> thank you. , we look at root causes -- and you really have to
look at root causes and determine why we saw the same failures repeatedly. operating agency that observes the same thing over and over, it tells me you haven't figured out what the problem is. just would -- it goes beyond whatever happens at the check point. daysu recall in the early of tsa, there was concern about the wait times. there was a great deal of pressure on tsa to get people through the screening check points faster and there's a reason for that. you have to be very careful when -- inject a concern like that because what you measure is what you are going to get for performance. i believe over time, a great deal of effort to ensure wait times were kept to a minimum -- that puts pressure on the
screeners to clear passengers versus resolving the alarms they present. difference, it can change they effort you put into looking for that. -- it'smportant important, the point you were making. we have improved efficiency but that's not the goal. that's a means towards reaching the goal and keeping one's eye on the mission, making the main thing the main thing is really important. or miss grover, there have been more than 25 specific reports over the last 25 years. -- your agency conducted a proper
screening process. what did you find from that operation? >> the specific results are classified but what we found in a series of tests that took place across the country at different airports using a variety of concealment methods by people withallies training is a -- by people with no special training is a disappointing performance. we look at the entire screening checkpoint. >> would it be fair to say that without compromising security that some significant breaches occurred? >> yes. very troubling. you are aware of those findings. >> has the agency taking corrective steps to address what
mr. rock and his team discovered so early? >> one of the first things i did when this became public during , i had amation process chance to meet with mr. rock and i met with him again after swearing in. i wanted to understand the exact nature of the failures that occurred so we can begin to address the root causes. we have put a tremendous amount of effort into not just determining the instant failures but reaching back through the organization to figure out what systemically was going on that brought this. we have had other discoveries of failures in the past. -- it be useful to have may be useful to have a classified briefing on that. racef the problems you that had -- raised that has
charging for baggage forces passengers by bringing an overhead luggage as much as possible. this affects your business and mission. can you just address that? >> there's a lot more baggage coming through the checkpoint now than there used to be and it's much more packed with gear than it used to be. this is a challenge for anybody screening. i know the airlines have been one plus enforce their one rule but sometimes that doesn't take place until you get to the loading gate and multiple backs have come through the checkpoint. we have in working closely with the industry to see what we can do to reduce that stress but it's a fact of modern life. there's more stuff arriving at the checkpoint been used to. >> thank you. recognize the gentleman from michigan. >> thank you.
onesn't here in congress tsa wasn't -- 20 essay was instituted. i don't have a lot of the answers to how you do it. i just know when i entered an airport in detroit, i go through multiple contacts with multiple agents, including tsa. to say weso hasten have to deal with his problems and overwhelmingly, i have been treated well by tsa, even when they didn't know i was a member of congress. the fact of the matter is during only two instances i can i was not treated well. that says for the most part, their personnel is doing a job i wouldn't want to do are at least attempting to work with -- i
want to applaud you for that. i think there's something to say about having this job. fortunately since 9/11, as a efforts, we have not had a downed plane and we want that to continue. i do want to ask you some questions. in our hearing today, you pledged to fix some things. other administrators have pledged to fix things. what will be different this time? >> it really goes to what i was saying earlier, and that is -- i have been an operator my entire career. in the u.s.ears coast guard. a lot of similarities between the coast guard and tsa.
both our mission-based organizations. they both have missions that have a no fail quality to them at a distributed frontline workforce responsible for carrying out the mission. what makes operating agencies exciting is you have something you have to do every day. that tyranny of the right now when we need you to simply address the problem in its presentation -- by that i mean you have a failure at a checkpoint, you work with the team at that checkpoint, that airport, say this is how you failed and don't do it again. the may seem like it fixes problem but it doesn't over time. typically if you have failures like that in a dedicated , it meansworkforce you have something more systemic going on and if hard at times
for an operating agencies to take the time to do that. >> how do you monitor that? >> it starts by recognizing there is a bigger picture. anytime you have multiple overres that look the same time, something else is going on stop and lookg to at the entire approach to the organization. how will have where ticket would that mission in terms of what it needs to succeed. how will have we deployed the equipment that addresses that need, how well have we trained our people to work that equipment and what kind of processes have we given them? tasksnd there were 3100 we expected a screener to memorize. that's impossible. say ife to step back and this is about the mission, it's about the performance of that mission in an environment in which we have so much at stake.
you have to look at what's already been done by third-party independent auditors. value the work of the aig's office because they get me a third-party independent assessment of what those challenges are and i can use that to begin to dig into the deeper issues. what mr. add on to connolly started with. it goes to this idea of a bigger picture. how will you work with airports, airlines come others who can have the size -- who can emphasize? >> all of the major airlines in the u.s. i have met with and their associations. it starts by recognizing this is an interactive system. tsa doesn't work alone inside the aviation system. everyone has a role to play. it's not simply a handoff.
it's a continuous interaction. that requires they be aware of the challenges their system imposes upon our responsibility. we have to be aware of the challenges imposed on them. they have been very receptive to that. there's a lot more work we can do to connect more effectively. i've established a number of regular meetings now with my counterparts in the private sector and across the system. we begin to address these long-standing come overarching issues that have been attended to. now recognize mr. cummings for five minutes. thank you. director, when you were talking
about the problem, i wrote two wordsand i wrote the "coulter gap." i think from just listening to you, a culture has been established and i think that it is in part -- and i want you to comment on this. the chairman will tell you that when we deal with the secret service, one of the things we worried about was a culture of complacency. not the people are not good people but you get used to nobody jumping over the fence at the white house. everything is going to be all right. is there is ans lull in the culture. thathen when you combine
with this thing about making sure you get the people through quickly and you put the , ickness over the mission think you have a combination for problems. i think those kinds of problems are very difficult to address. i am trying to figure out -- first of all, would you comment on that? >> thank you for the opportunity. tsa was originally stood up in a culture of crisis where they had to be responsive fast. but at this point, it's time to transition to a culture of accountability for effectiveness. tsa definitely is aware of the importance of ensuring their programs are effective and i appreciate the administrators remarks about enhancing that
culture throughout the workforce. at the end of the day, it comes down to a very simple question, which is, does the program work and how do you know? no matter how much of the staff are educated in the current , no matter retrained how much there is an emphasis on new sop's, there has to be measurement and a have to have a systematic process to follow through to make sure the programs work and that's what lies beneath a strong culture of accountability for effectiveness. >> you don't know what you just said. you just hit the nail quite well. they started with a culture of emergency so everybody had to make sure we protect ourselves. then when the emergency seems to ne, we can move into the
culture of complacency but now we have to change our entire dynamic and create a new normal and that's a new normal of accountability. you have a plan, right? >> yes, sir. byit's been implemented march 2016? >> there are a number of steps there. >> what will the status of the screening process be at that date? will it be what you envision or will it still be in the process of improving mode? me say i think you always have to be in a continuous improvement mode. otherwise, you do get complacent. the day you think you have the security process right is the day you will be the fetid. this is a continuous focus on
the mission and continuous evaluation. done to address immediate challenges? retrained the entire frontline workforce. i know that sounds easy to say but let me explain what it means. we call it mission essentials. it's about reminding people we have a mission first and foremost. and to reactivate that desire they exhibited when they raised their hands and said i swear to support and defend the constitution. >> how do you do that? >> first, you say it out loud. it starts by the top of the organization saying what to do is critically important and i will make sure everything i do is designed to make sure you succeed at remission -- at your mission. i start with the junior most
person in this organization on a screening line and i think about what it means for that individual to do their job effectively and what i do -- need to be focused on two take that happen. this isn't about me as an individual, making myself look good. it's about all of us remembering we serve a higher order. that is surprisingly important for a frontline workforce to hear. it may seem simple but that's the most powerful thing you can tell somebody is what to do is important and it's so important i will spend every waking moment paying attention to getting that done. >> i hope that you took note of and inrector grover said your sessions with your staff that you remind them about what she said. at one time, a culture about emergency and now it's about
accountability. that makes a lot of sense. thank you. recognizes gentleman from south carolina. >> thank you. we are all kind of creatures of our own personal experience. most of us travel on a regular basis. , i have that i use never had anything other than professional encounters with tsa. there's not a single instance where i can think of where it wasn't a plus in terms of professionalism. -- and i don't wear a member pin. don't think it's because they what i do for a living so i don't think it was for that reason.
without progressing into a broader conversation, it has become toss in the last couple years to be in law enforcement. the last couple years to be in law enforcement. where are your applicants coming from? what is the source of the poor more out -- morale? if there is a tsa agent involved who doesng or something wrong, that's when you make the news but you don't make the news for simple professionalism so what's the rale issues ando what is your plan on bolstering it? >> thank you for your question and did words about our workforce. i think the majority of the tsa workforce are truly dedicated, responsible come and patriotic
americans. these are people who took the old to do a job many people in this country would not want to do. what is the source of morale? it's a clear mission of importance. i think we have a clear mission. i don't know if we have always clearly defined that to our workforce. it's reconnecting them with the desire they had to join, to become a part of something important. that's what the military is all about and that's what my experience tells me. then it is having clear and unequivocal standards of importance. highi mean is what causes is at people who know they are held to a high standard
, you have to be consistent across the organization. then you have to train them appropriately. you have to train them and how to gauge the system, how it works. discoveredthings we in the analysis is that we had not explained what can the machines do and what can't they do? inone ever did that to me the military, they never handed me a piece of equipment and said, a correct it out. and we never asked their opinion on the challenges of working the checkpoint. you need feedback from your frontline. this is not a one-way transition. you have to engage. is importance of more out the clear and important mission, support for the mission,
training to accomplish mission, understanding of the equipment, and engaging you and getting feedback and letting you be part of the solution that goes forward. there is no one who knows that better than the people conducting it every day. those are the things we are putting into place. it is going to take time to see the results. i see lots of opportunity on those points to reengage the workforce in a much more effective way, and actually activate that which brought them to the job in the first place. with respect to recruiting, we currently use a third-party contractor to help screen recruits, but we recruit from all over the country and all walks of life. theastonishing thing is talent that exists in the workforce. i have people with phd's who are front-line screeners, who are retired and come back. i have people with the music degrees, all walks of life. as you might expect in a workforce of 44,000 screeners, there is a broad range of people
at all ages. >> one last question. if we were to interview 100 folks who had left, not for calls, but just left, what would be the dominant reason they decided -- either their expectations were not met gore they lost interest -- or they lost interest? why do people leave? administrator neffenger: i will give you some thoughts i have, because i have not done those interviews myself. i think it's probably a combination of factors. you always have people who decide it is not the job for them and they move on. let's address some of those concerns with morale. i think it is not feeling like you are doing a mission you thought you were going to be hired to do. i think if i'm a screener and it's about effectiveness of screening properly and i'm being told to move people through more effectively, i will probably cause me to say i'm not sure
this organization cares about the things they said they did. i get the proper training, -- do i get the proper training, do i have advancement opportunities, do i get continuous development over the course of my career? all of those are the things that go into deciding whether or not you are with an employee or you would like to they went or you want to move on and looked rather opportunities. >> we now recognize mr. lynch from massachusetts for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you to the palace -- panelists. thank you for your help. i think you have been very honest in your testimony, both on the strength and failures. mr. gary'sp on question, have you ever thought bountyffering a bonus or for a screener that actually get somebody with a gun coming through the checkpoint?
or with malicious intent? administrator neffenger: we have looked at all sorts of new incentive protection programs. i'm a big fan of incentivizing. >> this is such a target rich environment where we have so many problems. class-size meeting with the chairman and ranking member. general roth has used disappointing and troubling, i would use the word pathetic in looking at the number of times people got through with guns or bombs. these covert testing exercises, it was pathetic. when i say that come i mean pitiful, the number of times people got through. i fly a lot, my family flies a lot, and just thinking about the breaches, it is very thick. -- horrific.
one of the things we can do is be honest about the degree of the breaches in the scope. i think you have looked at the cultural problems here and what we have to get at, and i appreciate that. i'm supporting you, not just criticizing. i'm supporting you in your changes. but the nature of the threat has evolved as well. for loneve isis asking , which probably presents a greater vulnerability to passenger rail security than it does to the airlines, perhaps. i'm just wondering about what way of doing, to evolve with that threat. the other big gap i see in terms of people with credentials in we ares, insecure areas,
having major gaps there. we are letting people in that have connections with terrorism. they are getting through the screening process and getting into secure areas of the airport, and being awarded credentials. i think we had 73 instances of that. and also ig this, would like inspector general roth to speak to that issue. i know you have been relentless in very good about this. in the past, there has been denial. i don't think we are hearing that from you mr. deat neffenger, but in the past there is a culture of denial. disaster on a major a commercial airline or train and we are not going to be able -- people will say, we did not see that coming, but we did. we had and we see it now. i wonder what our response is
going to be to address that issue. let metrator neffenger: see if i can address a couple of the points you made with what we are doing. the last point on the insider people withrn, badges in airports. there has been some concerned that security of the bad population. it should be a trusted population. how do you determine whether they are to be trusted? what safeguards do you put in place, inc. think there is work to be done there. i'm encouraged by secretary johnson's reach, earlier this year prior to my confirmation, he asked the aviation security thatory committee members advised the department and the administrator, they took a hard look and came up with 28 recommendations, with which tsa is fully concurrent, and they
are looking for an implementation plan. that said, it was a challenge. having real-time access to the appropriate databases to screen people. that against the terrorist database. it taking off a lot of time to give me a little answer. administrator neffenger: the 73 members, 69 discrete individuals were not actually on the terrorist watch list. in what had incomplete is called a terrorist information data environment. that information was not sufficient to raise the known or suspected terrorist data. it is clear they were not -- we don't make those determinations, that is the fbi. with respect to ensuring we pay attention to the evolving threat, i am directly connected
to my counterparts across the intelligence community. i get a daily briefing that is the synthesis of what everyone is seeing. i'm very concerned about how complex and dynamic threat environment is, in some respect it is the most complex we have seen since 9/11. silt makes groups like i particularly concerning his they are intending to inspire, and the intent and operation phase is compressing. >> can i ask the inspector general at it he could give his version? i still think we have a problem and i'm still worried about it, and i'm not hearing decisive action being taken. we are well over time, but if the inspector general will care to comment. thank you for your
indulgence, mr. chairman. inspector gen. roth: this goes what i call beyond the checkpoint. our focus is in the check point but there is a lot of security risk the on the checkpoint. aviation worker vetting is one of them. we did an audit of tsa's job as a regulator, in other words the airports have the duty to manage the restricted access badges. and adjudicate criminal histories of those workers. what we found in a recent audit as a regulator, tsa only examines perhaps 1% of all the adjudications that the airports do. anytime you have an issue or the airports have part of the responsibility and tsa has part of the responsibility, you have seams. that is what worries me. i think we will be paying more attention to that as time goes on. >> thank you. thank you mr. chairman. >> i recognize myself for five minutes.
administrator, quick answers if we could. to bring a gun threat checkpoint and you get caught, what happens to that person? administrator neffenger: depends on the airport. but it's turned over to local law enforcement. >> do they go on a database that you administer? do you know that person in your database? administrator neffenger: we do know their name. >> do they go on a no-fly list? administrator neffenger: it depends on the nature. break away from his hearing and take you to the house rules committee working on the highway funding bill. live coverage will continue here on c-span. >> i want to thank each of the witnesses who came in particular the committee and our staff who sat through long hours, and we find out the product going forth. the german from north carolina for the motion. >> thank you mr. chairman. i move for a structured role for
further consideration of senate amendment 22, the higher more heroes act of 2015. rulesting of the .ommittee print 114 -- 32 each further amendment shall be considered only in the order printed in the report and be offered only by a member designated shall be considered as read shall be debatable for the time. the proponent and upon and may be withdrawn by the opponent and in time before action thereon shall not be subject to amendment and not subject to a demand for division of the question. be inle provides it shall order to anytime for the chair committee on transportation and infrastructure, or is designated to offer amendments insisting -- consisting of --
amendments should be consider as read shall be debatable for 20 minutes equally dividing control of the chair. section three makes an order only those further amendments to the senate amendment as part b ofprinted in the report. each further amendment should be considered only in the order printed in the report offered by a member designated shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report and eat the dividing control by the may be withdrawn by the proponent. at any time before action thereon shall not be subject to amendment or demand for division. the rule was all points of order against the further amendments
printed in part b of the report. section four provides of the committee of the whole reports the senate amendment as amendment back to the house, with multiple amendments, the question of their adoption shall be put to the house, and with that division of the question. if the committee reports a senate amendment as amended, back to the house without further amendment or the question of adoption on gross sales, no further consideration shall be in order except pursuant to a subsequent order of the house. section five provides post on for the consideration. uponon six provides that adoption of the further amendment or amendments in the house i mentioned that the house concurrent senate amendment with such further amendment or amendments shall be considered as adopted to the clerk shall
engross the action -- action. finally, section seven provides that the chair of the committee on armed services may insert the congressional record not later than november 16, 2015. such material as he may deem's explanatory of defense or the station -- defense authorization for the fiscal year 2016. >> you've heard the motion from the gentlewoman from north carolina. i would like to defer to myself quickly to review this. it makes an order another 81
amendments. this is in addition to the 45 amendments that the house debated today. at the conclusion today the rule provides for a final vote on adopted amendments. that means a package will be put together, everything that passed and then voted out. it also provides for the authority for the chair infrastructure committee. i think this was a lot of good, hard work. open upt said, i will the floor to any amendments or discussion. >> the ayes have it.
gentleman from georgia. >> thank you. before we -- thanks to the hard work from the committee. also, from the greater holland chamber of commerce, i want to say thank you to them for being here and being here. >> i recognize this young man both -- with the mustache. it is great having you. my mother looked at lily then said, just so you remember, you are my a bit member of congress
tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. for general.ages 12 noon, legislative business. that is the highway and mass transit funding bill. it is a six-year bill and we expect more debates and more amendments tomorrow. coverage always right here on c-span. of course, you can learn more at c-span.org. let's take it back to the hearing. deep -- tsa the regarding screening practices. thank yougen. roth: for that question. we had a number of recommendations that tsa did not agree with. those are set forth starting about page 20 of my testimony. what i wanted to do was highlight those that have changed in the last six months. it is significant. there's almost no disagreement between the tsa and inspector general for wendy's to be done. there is a fairly narrow point,
unfortunately because this is an open setting, it is not possible to discuss it. there is a certain profile, a type of passenger we should not be in -- we do not believe should be in expedited screening. these are good-faith discussions as to what is an appropriate level of risk and i'm confident we will get to a place that will protect the american people and passengers in expedited way. >> i yield back. >> the gentleman from north carolina, mr. meadows. five minutes. >> i thank each of you for your testimony. inspector general roth, i'm glad to hear you say a lot of the disagreement has disappeared. previously, that was a major the aig making
recommendations and tsa somehow believe they had had on and they were figuring out what to anticipate. continuedcourage that partnership. speaking of partnerships, i want to focus on the partnership for public service. to lowcally with regards employee morale. we have held hearings in this very room about some of the worst basis to work -- places to work, which perhaps that title was not the best to pick. but we have also found that there is a tremendous opportunity in terms of employee morale on how to encourage the workforce. consistently,s let's just say it is not something you would try to attain.
do i have your commitment to date to reach out to some of those agencies that get good marks on that survey to i doubt the best actresses that they have -- practices that they have? nasa and particular gets high marks. do i have your commitment? administrator neffenger: yes sir, and so does the workforce. >> director grover, let me go to you. it you could briefly summarize your concerns as it relates to the ait machines and procurement thereof, and some of the challenges we have had their. re. director grover: that's a really important issue, because it is one of the main technologies tsa relies on for screening passengers. what we originally found was tsa had consider the effectiveness of the technology in a laboratory, but had not consider the broader picture of employees who use them in the airport environment, and they have taken
steps to address that in the procurement of the next version of the aip system. -- ait system. they have started measuring the effectiveness of the entire system and that is very important. one recommendation we start open is tsa should pay close attention to its understanding rate offorce -- alarm weigh the machines. it has repercussions for security effectiveness because screeners are used to a high farc false alarm rate. it also has repercussions for financing, because every time that machine alarms, the person has to go pat down. if the false alarm rates would be reduced, it would have financial implications as well. that is something tsa is working on. they do not yet have systemwide understanding of the operational false alarm rates. >> administrator, i see you
shaking your head. you are willing to work with that and make sure we come out with a matrix? here's one of the concerns i have. we want to work on it but we don't put parameters to judge whether we are successful or not. thatork on a matrix satisfies gal as it relates to fox -- false marks. administrator neffenger: and not only death that we are working hard to restructure the process we use for this. i think director grover has raised important points, and they are the key challenges we face, but we can do it unless we change the way we do business. that has given us an opportunity to completely restructure the way we do business. >> when we talk about restructuring the way we do thatess, one of the things happens a lot is administrators come here and say, we need more money. in a bipartisan fashion, we are
willing to give you the resources necessary to do it, if you are willing to look at not only the recommendations the ig and tao have looked at, but look at re-creating the way you do a businessom standpoint. the chairman mentioned a k-9 unit. is there a plan to look at canines to bring them in during high peak, high times of travel? not 1:00 in the morning, when two tsa tsa -- personnel. but to alleviate the backlog, are you willing to come up with a proposal and submit to the committee on how you can implement that? administrator neffenger: i will, and i thing to have a good story with respect to the canines. i looked at the current disposition of canines across the nation, and repositioning a number of those from small,
lesser traveled airports to the large high-volume airports, we are bringing a number of new teams onboard.i will get you a full report for the committee because i think it is a good we are and it shows moving, i believe, in the right direction with respect to the system. that you havegree to take a systemic view. if you look at discrete elements all you do is look at discrete elements, and you will not think about how the internet -- interact for another. the entireng at aviation security and understanding all components interact and how effective they are. it speaks everything from false alarm rates to the proper use of canines, two other things. i'm happy to provide a much fuller brief at the committee's discussion on how we are doing that. >> field that. >> we recognize the gentlewoman from the district of columbia for five minutes. mr.hank you very much
chairman, this is an important hearing. before i ask my question, administrator nothing your, this license. of the we have had to have the administrator in, because it changes from washington dc, to saying district of columbia. this has befuddled screeners, and some of them have hassles the placeorts because where you are is not recognized. i want to provide you with a copy of this before you leave, so that periodic reminders can be made. i understand it was changed from washington dc. there was an attempt by the administrator, the deputy administrator works closely with me. i want to make sure this does not have to come up on your watch. --neffenger, i
have set and seeing what is going on at the airport, for example at the r federal people who know something about the human mind and how it operates. you will always get that they in fact don't have bonds or pistols. -- bombs or pistols. we need to learn more. we are getting the same results no matter where they are. whether they are magnetometers or tsa. for example, for tsa, we have had people do -- bring bombs in shoes to try to detonate their shoes. we've had a so-called underwear bomber.
and it's interesting to note that, with respect to those went throughhey multiple layers of security and, , who, passengers, not tsa in fact, were called on to put peopleose very dangerous . this leads me to ask whether or equipped, forlly example, to discover -- we have this matter before the congress, these plastic handguns. if they can't find ordinary ands like bombs and pistols they are, as you can see, very inventive, what i'm wondering is, does tsa have access to the intelligence to meet their adopted next, -- they are
adaptivenessheir in light of emerging threats? they are not going to do the same in that passengers did before. do you have a intelligence, or do you have to depend on some other agency? if so, how do they relate to you what the emerging intelligence reveals? neffenger: think you for that question. just to be clear, the underwear bomber and the shoe bomber, those were not screened by tsa because they came from overseas. it is one of the reasons that we became concerned about the nonmetallic threat. i do have access to intelligence. as i noted earlier, every morning, i get intelligence briefing. it is a compilation of thelligence from across intelligence community. i meet regularly with other members of the unity. we have people embedded in all of the major intelligence
components, the national counterterrorism center, the csa -- cia, nsa. norton: do your screen yourselves? neffenger: we do. and then continuous recurrent vetting of individuals who are in the trusted traveler programs. norton: is understand the screeners often pass their own tests when you do your own internal vetting. when someone has to stand in the same place, doing the same thing, seeing the same thing, don't they need to know more about the human brain operates, so that we can better equip screeners to do this, frankly, very boring job? r: i think that is a
key point. one of the things we look at is what are the repeated causes -- holmes norton: who is looking at that? neffenger: it is the root cause analysis team. now that i have found these causes, can we correct them ourselves? rep. holmes norton: when you consider getting an outside study from people equipped -- would you consider getting an outside study from people who understand how the human brain works, so that we can get a hold of this? neffenger: i think it is important to look at human factors, so i would look at it. >> we now recognize the gentleman from georgia, mr. carter. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. i understand some of the information may be classified and, certainly, if i overstepped my downs -- if i
bounds, iy understand. would ask more detailed questions. it has been reported that the undercover investigators were -- what areas where they, specifically, looking at? wasn't the typical area that a passenger goes through? the typical area that a passenger goes through? it is a typical area that a passenger goes through and tries to get items through the checkpoint. for example, if they were part of managed inclusion through no action of their own, but sent through a magnetometer, going through that way as well. they acted like normal passengers, except they had things hidden on them. r: it did not look at
where employees are going. it was typical passenger? covertth: we did some testing gw's ago, trying -- testing two years ago, trying to get into those areas. the results were disappointing. carter: you mentioned the imaging machines. were their guns or simulated bombs you were able to get through? did they get through the imaging machine as well? i.g. roth: i cannot talk about the specifics unfortunately. we did test the machine. the results were disappointing. carter: as well as the x-ray machines? i.g. roth: correct. carter: earlier this year, you testified before the homeland committee. you said that your testing found layers of security something missing. and then you seemed to indicate
.hose results were expected is that true? i.g. roth: yes. the results were expected. the degree of the results were i think a bit surprising to us. we have done covert testing over the years with very similar results to the ones we did this year. and i would add that once we get the results this year, we discovered that tsa itself had done covert testing with very similar results. so everything had been consistently poor for a number of years, which, of course, was both exasperating and troubling to us. neffenger, given these results and these findings, what do you plan to do to address what has been called missing layers of security? neffenger: first, it is a full system review. it started with understanding the nature of the failures that existed, to look at how those were similar to other
andoveries in past years, as i mentioned before, to really figure out what is the systemic recent for this. because if you assume you have a generally talented workforce that really wants to do a good job, but they are failing, then he tells me there is something else going on. and i do think we have a generally talented workforce that wants to do a good job, that once to come to work -- wants to come to work to protect this nation on a daily basis. so, there must be a reason for failures systemwide. it is recognizing it is a system that operates, not just a point of failure at a given airport were a number of airports. second, it is looking back over the way in which you -- what is with theership organization, what are the environmental influences, so on and so forth, then beginning to core, essential mission facts. what is it we are supposed to do? do we understand the mission the
way we should? carter: all of that is good and fine, but what about specifics. can you tell me something specifically, we changed this or that? neffenger: properties use of the technology. we dramatically changed the way people use that. we had not taught them how important it was to use it properly. without getting into classified details, i would be happy to provide those in a closed session, i could tell you specifically why some of those failures existed. we fixed that. we told them how the equipment worked. that is something we had not done before. we streamlined the number of procedures that we expected them to memorize. i mentioned there were 3100 separate tasks and 88 different forms of pat down. no one can do that. we have now streamlined that down to about 25-gauge quick quickse guide -- 25-page response guide. we have significantly improved
our ability. we trained specifically to do things very differently at the checkpoint. carter: my time has expired, mr. chairman. i yield back. chairman: the chair recognizes mr. cartwright from pennsylvania for five minutes. thank you, mr. chairman. tsa is a front-line counterterrorism organization, and it is transportation -- and its transportation security officers, the tso's we have been talking about, they have to get it right every time. you forenger, thank being here. do tso's receive annual review testing? neffenger: they do. knowright: do the tso's when they are going to be tested for their annual performance reviews? neffenger: typically, yes. cartwright: on average, how do they perform? neffenger: on average, they perform well.
cartwright: but what we find out is the covert tests conducted by the inspector general, jl, and your own internal teams -- , and yourgeneral, gao own internal teams, they bring their a game when they know the sot is coming, but not much at other times. inspector general roth, would you say covert tests there out the concern -- covert tests bear out the concern i'm talking about? i.g. roth: yes. majority havee been focused on wait times for passengers, rather than safety concerns. i want to ask all of our witnesses, including you, director grover, would you agree that, if tsa employees are being
told they are being judged, at least in part on how expeditiously they move passengers through the system, this may signal to screeners that speed takes priority over other considerations? you are absolutely right. i could not agree with you more. that's exactly what i found in the course of our analysis of the issue. cartwright: under tsa's new plan, it appears to put the focus back on security. am i correct? >> you are correct. thewright: responding to new safety before speed goals, was ts -- one tsa employee reported to be glad that "the agency finally is going back to basics, emphasizing security over customer service and wait times," but another employee did doubt that the new plans would be implement it. he or she thought that management will still be very focused on wait times and throughput.
i want to ask you, mr. neffenger, how will you convince front-line employees that the metric on which they will be evaluated will be security? you have to get a little trust upfront. you teach them over time. i will assure you that one of the first things i did was to eliminate wait time as a primary measurement. it is not that wait time is not important. there are some issues associated with people packing up outside of a sterile area. but if effectiveness in security is a primary measure -- not just myid to -- leadership team, but everybody in the organization, through direct contact, through video messages, through weekly messages from me, i said, your number one job is to screen effectively. management's responsibility to work with the airports and airlines and others to do queue management.
we were putting that burden on the backs of the screeners. it is no surprise to me that if you hold them accountable for moving people more efficiently through the line, they are going to do just that. you get what you measure. you get what you emphasize. it is no surprise they do well on the performance test and do poorly in other areas, because that is about keeping their job. it tells me they are capable of doing the job well. we have to back them in that score 100%. cartwright: all right, fine. let me ask you this, administrator, when will performance assessments using the new metrics against the used and will -- metrics begin to be used and will the performance evaluation process be changed to track performance over time rather than performance honesty will test? in other words, how will you and short tso's are at the top of their game every day, not just tso's are at the top of their game every day, not just when performance reviews are happening? neffenger: those changes have
already been made and expand -- explained to the workforce. cartwright: how you balance increased wait times with a focus on security and ensure that security considerations don't give way when balanced against increased weight times -- increased wait times, particularly during times like the holiday season? neffenger: we are seeing times, notwait significant. two things. -- i want to to grow the trusted traveler population in a smart way. we are working very hard with both the current vendor, who you may have seen some of the opportunities in the airports. we are looking to expand it considerably through a request for proposal that is out, also working with the industry itself to look for opportunities to market it more effectively. we are seeing a significant increase in enrollment. the second is to provide search staffing to the airports under the greatest pressure during the
upcoming travel season. at the same time, not to put any of that burden on the backs of the screeners, but to move that into the management chain where it belongs. cartwright: i'm out of time. i yield back. you.man: thank the gentleman's time has expired. hice: thank you for being with us today. in my short time in congress, i have already seen and heard far too many reports, be it from the office of inspector general or csaor wherever, detailing -- tsa's prohibitively expensive technology. either not working to properly screen passengers or the tsa thets not properly reading technology, one way or the other, in the various red test -- red team tests that have
taken place. as you well know, hartsfield-jackson, atlanta international airport, hundreds of thousands of people flying out of there every day, one of the busiest airports in the world -- i fly in and out of there myself every week. i could not agree anymore with my colleagues here today that the recommendations that come is just vitally critical for these to be implemented. and you, mr. neffenger, just being in this position four to you.have -- hats off i thank you for your comments here today and your willingness to admit the problems you are facing and willingness to attack those head-on. as some of the results have come back from some of the various tests, a word was used earlier describing those results as pathetic, and you yourself i
think are fully aware of that. earlierword that hit me is the word "culture." it has been within tsa. and i believe inspector roth said that the culture is the most important issue that you saw that means to change immediately. so, that being said, what have to done to this point transform the culture at tsa in such a way that the vulnerabilities are adequately addressed? neffenger: mr. hice, thank you for that question. that is a key point. as i looked at tsa, i tried to understand. i come from an agency with 225 years of culture, the coast guard. that's a lot of time to build an identity and a sense of who you are. tsa is still largely an amalgam of the places that everybody came from. it has not had time to grow a leadership core from within. so you have this combination of
people. what do you do to jumpstart culture? there are a couple of key things that you can do from both the top and the bottom. let me start with the bottom. first, i think one of the greatest challenges tsa has amongst its workforce is that we train on the job across 75 different job -- 75 different airports. if you hire into tsa right now, if you hire into atlanta, you just joined the atlanta hartsfield workforce. it's not. there is a real engagement with the broader sense of who you are part of. havef the things i proposed for and asked for in the fy 2016 budget is to begin almost like the boot camp training at the federal law enforcement training center in glencoe, georgia, so that all new hire training is conducted there. that's one way to connect to the larger organization and a sense of culture. takes top level, it somebody at the very top of the organization, and that's mean right now, saying, this is important -- saying the word
"culture" out loud and identifying where the culture is not connected, then identifying what you expect that culture to be. i'm about to issue my administrator's intent, in which i very clearly, in a very few sustain pages -- in a few succinct pages outline what our culture is, what i intended to be, and how we intend to work towards that. so, there is a series of efforts that i have planned over the coming months to begin to talk and training the culture that you expect -- top and train culture that you expect. it takes tenuous attention. this will fade away if you don't pay attention to it. hice: it is a huge task. in the middle of that, you have both safety and the efficiency issue. you mentioned some metrics you are currently implementing.
mr. ross and mr. grover, do you believe those metrics are adequate -- mr. roth and mr. grover, you believe those metrics are adequate to provide the safety and security and efficiency we need? i.g. roth: i agree that you get what you measure. it is part of our audit process. 90 days after the completion of our report, we will look back on it in a rigorous, systematic way to determine whether or not these metrics are going to work. until then, we are going to be skeptical about it, because that is our job, to be skeptical. we will keep congress informed as we go forward. grover: time will tell. our biggest task will be to make sure they put in place a systematic, coherent approach to measuring outcomes that they want to achieve and then monitoring them and following up on them with the workforce, because that's the only way to make sure they get improved. for yournk each of you
accountability, working, partnering together. mr. chairman, thank you for the time. i yield back. >> mr. neffenger, let me just say how encouraging it is to hear your forthrightness and also your comments about knowing the root cause and human factors . when we look at human factors, and i talk to people in my studies on human factors in different environments, and all they are learning from narrow signs, one of the things that comes up is making sure those individuals can focus on what their jobs are . that also reinforces the things you say about culture, that you are trying to eliminate things that are distracting them. individuals are not getting paid a lot of money, but healing in her stressful retail environment, where -- but dealing in a stressful retail environment. i want to ask of your relationship with the airline industry.
it strikes me that, having been a frequent traveler for years, going through the experience, you don't go to tsa to find out what's the best way for you as a customer to go through wherever you're going, whether it is the general customers going through pj -- through pre-check -- the more we continuously this is what you should expect, this is what you need to do." and on the back end, charges for checked baggage, which you stated that this trend in more checked baggage creates stressed environments. how do you deal with the airlines, so that when some of the airlines start checking for -- start charging for checked baggage, and we have people trying to carry on more and more, it seems as an observer to create more stress for screeners. how do you help with the airlines, so that we are going s, they are helping
you reinforce how to get customers and educate customers on how they can be best prepared to get through the line? neffenger: thank you for that question. i'm still relatively new in the game, but i've met -- spent a lot of time over the last four months meeting with most -- both industry and ceos of the major u.s. airlines. i have been very encouraged with their openness and their response. they recognize some of these same challenges. i think there is a great deal of work we can do to tie ourselves more closely together. there is nobody with a higher vested interest in security of the system than the people who are flying in the system. and i think that recognizing that, that gives you a lot of grounds -- we have the same objective in mind, even if we approach it from different motivations and different requirements. i'm encouraged that a number of airlines and travel associations that support them have begun to do more to advertise the trusted
traveler programs, like global entry and pre-check. i think there is a lot we can do to signify the application procedures and to make them more common across the various programs that the government offers. i think that you can never market that enough, but i do believe that it really comes down to understanding that we are all in the same system together. we have different roles to play, but we can play those roles in a complementary fashion. the airlines have been working very hard to enforce the one plus one rule, meaning one carry-on bag and one handbag or briefcase. they are challenged as well. it is not my business to address their business models, but i can tell you it is just a fact that a lot more stuff is arriving. it is packed more full of things. people have electronics in there. challenge for the screeners to deal with. they have to be very attentive. rep. desaulnier: you work with the airline industry. you new york -- you knew that it
has the potential to put more pressure on the screeners when they were going to start charging for checked. neffenger: i think that would have been the expectation. rep. desaulnier: we have a mechanism for this going for? neffenger: both sides have to be aware of the impact of the decisions they make. i'm interested in the decisions and the business models of the airline industry and how it affects our business. because we support that business. rep. desaulnier: also, they may be transferring costs that you might pick up that they might normally expect to be part of their costs. neffenger: at a minimum to let them know what the consequence of that decision will be, that it may indeed be to slower ,hroughput at checkpoints because we have to screen and clear these bags. rep. desaulnier: would there be some type of analysis that they are making more money by charging for checked bags, but it is costing us more money, either by putting more stress on the system, adding more people,
working overtime? do you have a relationship with the revenue stream, should they compensate you? it shows there is a cost-benefit? neffenger: i would have to take that back for action. certainly, i want to know what the impact is on me, if it requires me to have additional resources. rep. desaulnier: thank you, mr. neffenger. chairman: the chair recognizes mr. russell from oklahoma. russell: thank you for being here. thank you for your long and dedicated service. with regard to some of the issues on the screening partnership program, would you say that the partnerships have been better or worse performers than tsa, and what concerns do you have about that, if any? neffenger: in my initial look at
the difference or the potential differences between private and thecreeners public, we have not seen any significant differences in performance, assuming they are trained appropriately. if i have any concern, is that we have a clear set of standards and expectations and those are consistently maintained across that program. but again, i don't see any evidence that there is any particular performance differences between them. mr. russell: thank you. and with regard to the turnover, what percentage of new hires would you say turnover within one year or two years, just ballpark? neffenger: you know, i just saw these numbers. i will have to get you the exact number, but it's a fairly high turnover rate. it depends. part-time is different from full-time. in the full-time workforce, it's about 10%, i think. in the part-time workforce, i
think it has been as high as 25%. rep. russell: you had mentioned some of the resources -- the reasons before. that has to be a drain on longtime personnel. you have the expense of the train up. these are dollars that are lost. how will you mitigate that in the future? neffenger: some of that goes back to the overarching discussion we had about connection to mission, connection to agency. as i think about what is it that would make somebody decide that this is not for them, aside from the odd individual that just says this is not what i thought i was signing up for -- it is typically, the thing i thought i was going to do, is that what the agency expects me to do? am i connected to the mission, to the agency? i have a future in the agency -- do i have a future in the agency? are there opportunities for training? some of these are beginning to
be addressed by the establishment of a common training program and engagement, a sense of belonging to something larger than you. i think it continues with a clearly defined sense of progression in the organization and understanding what your opportunities are, incentivizing performance, understanding that if i perform well, i will be rewarded for it. and a feeling of engagement with my leadership. ssell: thank you. what concerns do you have with cargo screening? neffenger: cargo, as you know, has been a concern for some time. there have been a number of procedures put in place for that. i think the question is recognition of the fact that this is a much larger system than just the checkpoint. even assuming you can get the checkpoint 100% right, there are many other potential vulnerabilities in the 80's and environment -- in aviation