tv Henry Kissinger Discusses President Richard Nixons Foreign Policy CSPAN November 25, 2016 8:00pm-8:54pm EST
future. our visit to tucson, arizona, is an exclusive and we showed you to introduce you to c-span cities tour. for five years we have traveled to cities across the united states to explore their literary and historic sites. you can watch more of our visit that c-span.org/cities tour. >> tonight on c-span, an interview with nixon administration secretary of state henry kissinger. then a discussion about technology, journalism, and new media. and former senator tom harkin talks about the food marketing to children and childhood obesity. former secretary of state henry kissinger recently sat down for an interview with former british prime minister john major where they discussed foreign policy in the nixon administration. mr. kissinger also answered
questions about the syrian civil car, brexit and the u.s. relationship with britain. this comes from the bbc's briefings program. [applause] dr. kissinger: ladies and , he and i are friends. i met him before he became prime minister and we have stayed in contact the rest of our lives. when i was invited to give this speech and became evident that
hereught what i could do our interaction eades when he was prime minister. what the issues were. that sometimes we agree. and occasionally we did not agree. expected him -- respected him as one of the important figures of our time. europeh a vision for .hat is historic 1970en the tories won the election, richard nixon was so elated that he called me on the telephone, nearly every hour to
update me on the status of the returns. hierarchy, ofr course, it should have been the other way. for of nixon's enthusiasm heath was the and comparability of the roster office. -- rise to office. primewas the first tory minister to be selected by the votes of the conservative members of congress rather than by consensus of party eminences. both he and nixon were admitted into the exact-- the it.blishment not defined by
they shaped in important ways the combination of remoteness and analytic skill. case, these qualities were combined with an extraordinary knowledge and love himusic, which evoked in unexpected episodes of personal warmth. i intend this comparison with nixon as a tribute of the 10 presidents who honored me by allowing me to participate in the conduct of foreign policy. some tangentially, others more intentionally, nixon was the
in his impact on the international system perhaps the most transformational. asthe nixon administration, to its predecessors, the wartime alliance was still personal. we expect the division by which winston churchill had planned for britain's imperial preeminence in partnership with america. how together -- held together by intangible ties of shared history and buttressed through informal arrangement between leaders. britishprising, diplomats occasionally augmented
the traditional diplomatic practice of -- interest with an element of paternal guidance. evoking a sense of guilt if we deviated from our less sophisticated partners. two governments had enabled a succession of british leaders from both parties to transform the wartime alliance into an atlantic partnership. heath continued this tradition in the management of geostrategic agencies. as relates to the soviet union,
-- relations with the soviet union were closely coordinated. in the middle east, both leaders egyptian an undeclared air battle for the suez canal. the syrian invasion of jordan followed in 1970. made -- itsism systematic appearance. finally, the outbreak of the 1973 middle east war imposed a new emphasis on diplomacy. ofall of these crises, two forces,cluded -- close cooperation with britain and between the president and the prime minister was a key
element of american policy. undertook theath delicate -- passage of britain theurope -- in operation of this special relationship which was inherent in the nature of the troubles thenot in the policies of individual leaders. northjective of the atlantic treaty organization was the common security of individual states based on the shared definition of threats and strategies to deal with them. the emerging european sector, however, slow to express its
specifically european identity, by way of institutions which would over time merge into a .upra national entity the simultaneous quest for european and atlantic -- were therefore not always easy to recognize, to reconcile. international developments compounded structural issues. the nixon administration inherited a war in vietnam from which it sought to extricate itself at a pace that did not undermine the american position as the guarantor of alliances. allies our european
urged more rapid withdrawals to provide leave from their own domestic -- relief from their own domestic pressures. the nixon administration sought to overcome the domestic of session with the vietnam -- obsession with the vietnam war by putting forward a new concept of world order. it opened to china and engaged in negotiations with the soviet arms, especially on control. these openings, especially to china, needed to be conducted with a minimum of external consultation to avoid a paralyzing domestic debate. for heath, who was pursuing his
theopening to china, secrecy and suddenness of -- policy implied a sense of unnecessary preempt. in the end, he achieved the same move alongdecisive and china policy will stand as a monument to heath's time in office. these differences might have whereed some relationships it not for the mutual respect
and admiration felt by those responsible for his conduct, including on the ministerial level, sir alec hume and peter -- provided extraordinary inspiration. having said all of this, the role of the statesman is to take society from where it is to where it has never been. will count among the important statesman of this period. because the britain he and heritage as a key figure in the conservative- party and later as prime minister, had been ambivalent about its absence. it's been developing closer
relations with the united states. reimagining the commonwealth, while entering europe unreservedly. it had rejected the truman plan and the european defense community. churchill argued that if forced unified europe britain to choose between europe or the open sea, it would choose the latter. rejected the inevitability of such a choice. he was ever mindful of the fate --harold macmillan who had to the common market, and was branded an anglo-saxon trojan horse. entry intobritain's
combined a way that dramatic adaptation of traditional british politics with determination to preserve interests.ational wilsoncessor harold anchored the outcome among the public by referendum that indicated its approval. eventwelcomed this with the following statement, "i have worked for this for 25 years. i was the prime minister who let britain into the community. so, i'm naturally delighted that the referendum -- is working out as it is."
over the succeeding decades, a political european union was built. and the essence of both the atlantic relationship and the special relationships were preserved. four decades later, the global context has changed. facing the issues of -- time in a new and even more complex form. ton the challenge was how maintain atlantic unity under approachingns of nuclear parity. that was from the soviet union and the soviet bloc.
today, the threat is far reaching, ambiguous, new forms and posing of danger. new capabilities. of technology have emerged in multiple aspects. and artificial intelligence from which -- the strategy does not yet exist. forms ofaccompanied by international conduct unimagined a generation ago. within theaval continents from multitudinous cultures -- and they are not always in alignment.
globalt significant questions then become, what c anes of the world order -- c restore stability or even establish criterion by which to fashion a common design? should the atlantic alliance as global? what is the relationship of the european union to the creation of world order? or will the world evolve -- into regional spheres of influence which combine the relations on constrained by the system? and if so, how will it be possible to avoid an even more
callousl cataclysm outcome thane two world wars of european heritage? brexit, circumstances, which was at first seen as a primarily british domestic issue, has taken on a more general significance. towhat level it will lead britishotiations on relationships with europe? that relationship needs to be close and organic. an outcome is in the overwhelming interest of both countries, of both parties, and of world order.
and america's interest is to encourage that process of li nking europe and britain and to temporaryrocess if dislocations occur. in a deeper sense, the resolution of brexit will intoect the issues of 1973 ne structures. there will be three elements. the european union, written with a special negotiated -- britain with a special negotiated relationship with europe, and the u.s. as the custodian of common security. how can europe forge a sense of unity and maintain a sense of
diversity? how can the articulation of a european identity be combined with atlantic partnership? can a monetary union be maintained without a common fiscal policy? and how can a common strategy emerge from such a structure? to understandant about the present world is that the world has been organized on principles first developed by europe. the idea of the nationstate, the theon of sovereignty,
concept of a rules-based system, in the operation of the system, britain, and the united states have played a decisive role. and whatever emerges out of the present negotiations should keep in mind that in order to restore world order and to act on the principles that led to its greatness, europe and america must not difrift apart. they need to resist the siren -- thef thei respective worldwers all around the should not be tempted to exploit
the disputes of the atlantic in unity or the disputes europe in the structure emerging from brexit, britain could perform its historic and global role, contributing to a world order that is stable and forward-looking through an atlantic partnership. rge question of how to fo european unity while honoring diversity that inspires loyalty and creativity is not a bureaucratic, but essentially a moral and political task. a few personal words.
heath before he became prime minister. and i stayed in friendly contact with him until his death. discussionated in a group that i chaired under the auspices of the aspen institute which met in the united states and iran in 1978 and in germany in 1980. with tedounter heath was at catherine -- funeral in 2001 which he attended on his own as a token of friendship, because of their common service. parliamentired from him to tellrote to
hishow much i admired service to the cause of freedom and to the relationship of britraiain with europe. onreplied telling me that dhe big issues he and i ha always seen things in the same way. i was proud of this note. ted'sired -- admired integrity, his courage, his service. and strange as it may seem, to those who knew him only as a leader, his capacity for personal -- he performed great services for
europe and the cause of freedom as an essential, rich -- bridge between each country's past and the future. his is a legacy worthy of recognition. as britain, europe, and america hopefully together face the challenges that lie ahead. [applause] major: there are many people in this room tonight who knew ted heath extremely well. he was a statesman, but i think as we all know, ted could be pr ickly. i remember a douglas heard telling me on one occasion ted was dining at downstate with a lady he totally ignored. -- at downing street.
douglas being a good private secretary wrote a note, that said, " prime minister, please speak to the women on either side of you." ted replied, "i have." that was the end of their conversation that evening. was engaged did do on a very big issues. you have touched on a number of them this evening. let me turn to something that what youcit in i think were saying. when you were secretary of state and ted was in number 10, we spoke of the international order and we knew exactly what the international order was. i'm not at all sure to many of us that we are quite as clear these days exactly what the international order is or what it stands for. and i recall a quarter of a century ago now, george bush senior referring to a new world
order emerging. again, i am not sure entirely what that world order may be. i welcome your thoughts, given what you had to say about the atlantic relationship and the importance of utilizing a prestigious both of the united states and of europe. the world order which i studied at university and in which i grew up was based on the nationstate. and it developed in europe as the end of the 30 years' war in ofch the doctrine sovereignty emerged as a ideas of and international law that laid down certain rules of conduct. at that time, at the end of the
war that had been taught in part about the religious beliefs within societies, it andtacitly agreed explicitly agreed that intervention of the domestic affairs of other states was not a subject of international -- ont international aggressi consisted of the crossing of borders, as a violation of borders of established dates. -- states. there were periods in which this was violated such as during the french revolution. but the basic structure of the international order when i was heath came into
office was essentially based on the nationstate. and the principal elements of security were still, the state of europe plus at the which had been center of the international order through all of its existence. , was only beginning to emerge in the 1970's. were justlike india beginning their international role. the middle east, for all of its all a conflictr
among various states, some of them radical and some less so, the current condition is radically different. this speaks of a system. feelajor countries that that they did not participate in the creation of the system and they are not therefore obliged to observe it. in addition, states are now emerging that are based on principles of legitimacy that are not based on the concept but on the nature of their domestic structure. so that in the middle east, at the time that heath was in new relatively
.ittle about the conflict it was just a contributing element. but now, the nature of the structure of the domestic itself becomes an issue of international insecurity. we are also dealing of extraordinary scope. far beyond what we experienced. in our period, we were deeply concerned about the catastrophic impact of nuclear weapons. them wasuse of essentially confined to two it turned out to
be more or less correct -- that the damage they would do ticket -- that would do to each other was so catastrophic, they would not take action. but now, nuclear technology has proliferated to many countries and new forms of technology have emerged like cyber or artificial intelligence which create totally new concerns. and in that world now, formerly peripheral countries have enormous dislocations. and formally dominant countries have not necessarily defined what their role is in these new circumstances. we have of pupils in many continents simultaneously -- we upheavals in many
continents simultaneously. it is a totally new challenge. and this is why i paid such attention to what can be done within the atlantic region at least to get a coherent view. but this is a sketch of the difference between the period in was in office and i was in office and the challenge we face today. sir major: let me pick up a part of that then and a bit most relevant to those present this evening, the atlantic alliance. what do you think the atlantic alliance actually means in practice today? do you think it needs refreshing? is it working well? on the waycerned
that europe has sharply different views from the united states? you once asked a very famous question -- what is the telephone number of europe? do you know what it is today? dr. kissinger: i know what it is today but i may not like what it says. the fundamental challenge for the atlantic alliance is to define what it is trying to do. what is it trying to prevent? and what is it trying to achieve? and what is it that we will achieve only as allies? are we obliged to do without allies?
our allies should understand that it is a dialogue that has yet to take place. sir major: how do you think in present circumstances we can bring the collective will of the united states and europe closer together then it at present appears to be? course, soer: of brexitpends on how the period is resolved. atlanticimagine an strategy in which britain and states arethe united find commonng to access.
this point of view, while i took my position during the brexit debate, thinking that decide, i britain to extent thato the britain plays an active role in trying to evoke an answer to this question, it will play an extremely important role and in order to get an answer, it cannot we that the united states prescribes all of the answers thenurope passively criticizes. in a well understood alliance, we would know -- we would come
to some conclusion of how to resolve issues like syria and not continue to do things that morethe situation difficult rather than resolve a. sir major: if you look across the major -- middle east, you see the most extraordinary complication of relationships. where would you begin were you secretary of state today -- where would you begin to unravel in anaos that is syria effort to bring an end to what we see happening, the destruction of a nation and the deaths of huge numbers of people will happen to because in the wrong place at the wrong time, in the midst of the run dispute? dr. kissinger: in the present inucture of the middle east,
the agreement in 1990, it was based on the concept that there would be a british --. the spears would be constant -- the spheres would be constituted as states but not in a -- not in concept.ean there were religious groups. together in a put way that facilitated the management from the outside. , which has a shia majority was governed by a sunni minority. syria, which has a sunni majority was governed by a shia
majority. and that worked tolerably well as long as britain influenced the situation and where the .ajor custodians of the region with the decline of british and french power, and in the absence of any other outside power, these states became extremely them thend to apply to principle of the system, made the situation more complicated. iraq, we removed the sunni roller. -- ruler. and we thought this would lead to democracy.
it led to a civil war, not democracy. proposed that the shia leader be removed. that this wasg the will of the people but the didle of these countries not want to be governed by any of the other principles that existed there. and so that started the civil war. libya -- the same thing happened. the issue is can we salvage the situation by finding a coalition government?
essential thatis the region quiets down. beyond the tactical management of the situation into hopefully, some consensus with our allies as to a solution that is more likely to bring and it takes peace into account some of the elements that i mentioned here. because i think a pure tactical management of this crisis will guarantee that it gets worse and worse. questions.coming to who would like to ask dr. kissinger the first question from the floor? a dr. kissinger, you played
remarkable role in stabilizing the world. you left it in a much safer place not least because you made this great contribution by developing detente, it translating common interests into rules and developing detente on many fronts. having left the world a safer place then in the mid-1970's and comparing it with the world now, would you say it is a safer place now, still, or a less safe place? dr. kissinger: the world in which i worked in policy was more dangerous in the sense that if something went wrong, it would be catastrophic. the world now is more complex. term,erefore, in the long more dangerous.
because there are means at the disposal of more people that do not have to take sense of the limits that existed then and it could lead to complications. if you look at the couldr problems, you assume that the damage to both sides in a nuclear war would be would upgradet it. but now that so many countries have nuclear weapons, and they get them from a major country, they can affect the balance between major countries and major countries can be tempted to intervene.
much as when world war i started. in modern technology, it creates opportunities for pressure that you can use to manage it. if you look at the history of world war i, the crisis that led was no different from 10 others that had been solved the previous decade. 1914, it wouldf not automatically evoke a of a global crisis.
in theould add at least world that i know best, at the end of that world, the that are trained to react instantaneously and not do may benge thinking less good custodians of extreme vulnerabilities. so, i think we need -- we live in a more dangerous world. even though the immediate consequences. and this is why we need more long-range thinking. >> is there one final question? at the back. >> i am formally of the financial times.
ago, i had a long conversation with hans dietrich denture, the former foreign minister in berlin on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of britain joining the european community. and the one question i asked him is why was germany always so much more enthusiastic about british membership of the european community then france? and he did not hesitate at all. it was because we were convinced that if britain was in the european community, america would trust us but if britain was not, they would think it was all a terrible plot. if,ou think that if britain european union,
america will trust it last -- will trust it less? the basis of the relationship was created before a european community. i did not like the argument during the brexit debate that britain would go to the end of backede if it were not by europe because we have a historic relationship. thatlso, because i hope britain would play a role in emphasizing the importance of the atlantic relationship. i would hopenking,
that from these discussions will that has closen links to europe but also conscience of an atlantic relationship. and so, i would not think it is necessary to make that choice. but i do think that britain -- that britain's greatness was developed in a period before there was a european community. and so i think britain can rolenue to play a major within the development that i
have tried to explain. kissinger, sir john, on behalf of everyone i would like to say how much we have enjoyed tonight. it has truly been a memorable occasion thanks to your participation. thank you. [applause] here is some of what we are covering monday on c-span. at 2:00 p.m. eastern, former defense secretary's and secretaries of state will the fifth -- will discuss the future of u.s. alliances. we will have todd coverage from the center for strategic and international studies. at 6:30 p.m. eastern, michael turnoff is part of a discussion on domestic security in the age council onthe foreign relations and washington, d.c. live coverage on c-span and at c-span.org and the c-span radio
app. every weekend, book tv brings you 48 hours of nonfiction books and authors. here is what is coming up. eastern, at 6:45 p.m. david behrens, circuit judge for the u.s. court of appeals for the first circuit provides a history of the debate between the executive and legislative branch over the constitutional right to declare war. war: theok "waging clash between president and congress." joining him at the national constitution center in philadelphia is the it or ruger, dean of the university of pennsylvania law school. >> the two branches are in a dance with each other all of the time. congress checking the president. backing down from the president. the president pushing congress. the president being worried about taking it too far. >> sunday at 9:00 p.m. eastern on afterwards, guardian journalist gary young looks at
gun deaths in america over a 24-hour period in his book "another day in the deaths of america: a chronicle of 10 short lives. interviewed by a staff writer for the atlantic. >> it is impossible to only discuss guns. there is a broader societal thing that dehumanizes people which means when their lives are been, it that has already accounted for. i think there is a real problem -- once you start saying -- he was a a student. it suggests that there is a great you can get that you would be worthy to be killed. >> go to c-span.org for the complete weekend schedule. c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1970 nine, c-span was created