Brookings Discussion Examines Trump Transition and Policy Agenda CSPAN December 17, 2016 11:03am-12:02pm EST
>> today, ohio state university is the site for john glenn who died on december 8 at the age of 95. the service begins at 2:00 p.m. eastern. you can see it on c-span. later today, president-elect donald trump speaks at a victory in mobile, alabama. live coverage begins at 4:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. next week, it is authors week featuring live one-hour segments with a new author each day beginning at 8:30 eastern. , a memoir of ay family and culture in crisis.
december 19, author charles murray will talk about his book. on tuesday, author mark levinson will discuss his book " an extraordinary time." wednesday, author carol anderson will talk about her book "white rate." james with twilight warriors. 23, thefriday, december author of the book "policy of resentment." on saturday, december 24, two withrs will join us -- tom "a nation of nations," and theert jones with his book " end of white christian america."
>> our final panel on a terrific day, and i really want to thank everyone for powering through three of these terrific discussions. havee really delighted to three of the best here. and i have gotten to work with all three of them over the last set of years, and this is really a terrific group of people. starting with our moderator and executive vice president at the brookings institution, my colleague for many years, who is twice ambassador to israel, and also worked as a special coordinator for middle east peace and the white house. he has seen this from all different sizes the equation, and he was going to be a presidentbut the vice of brookings came down sick.
we are going to ask him to do double duty because he has his own observations and input about what these transitions look like. and two colleagues from the miller center, one of whom i was fortunate enough to have as a colleague and government, and another who we have all been fortunate enough to have as a public servant, philip, a miller center.r at the miller he is a past director at the miller center executive director of the 9/11 commission, which was a report on the great first year. and eric who was very important in my first year in government. ofc has the distinction having been chief of staff, and later national security advisor
for vice president cheney. to eric, you must be the greatest foreign services officer, or a total, political e, to which eric responded, the two are not mutually exclusive. [laughter] >> two-story. >> also under secretary of policy and the defense thertment and the chair at miller center, which is endowed in the name of james schlesinger at the university of virginia, energy secretary, defense secretary, including a number of other posts as well. eric will be a senior fellow at the miller center starting in january. with all of that, i will hand it over to martin to lead us in the discussion. margin: thank you very much. challenge honor and
of serving president bill clinton in the white house in his first year in office when i was handling the middle east. as bill explained, we have a rich experience between the three of us when it comes to both years of presidents republican and democrat, when it comes to foreign and national security policy. record,st reviewing the i was reminded that in clinton's first year in office, in february, he had to deal with a world trade center bombing, that many -- that few people will remember. six people killed in 1000 injured.
in june, clinton ordered the first use of force in his presidency against saddam hussein, retaliation for the attempt to assassinate george h.w. bush on a visit to kuwait during the first year of clinton's presidency. to gauge in the military issue. ruckus and auge political blowback. the in september, we had september 13 signing of the oslo accords. some of you may remember "black hawk down," and the issue in mogadishu. impact on hisbig
credibility when it came to deployment of force. in december, we had nafta. it is just an -- it is just a -- it is inevitable that evincing to drive foreign policy in the first year -- that events seem to drive foreign policy in the first year. what is the advice to presidents in their first year to draw from your experience about what they should try to put in place in the first year to deal with the
of pressure clicking from the fire hydrant when it comes to foreign policy? >> the default tendency of government is to drift and remain on autopilot. often accompanied by noise and then things happen and you react to them, and your tenure gets defined by your reactions. that is the natural default tendency. the hardest thing to do in to corral is actually people together and accomplish something purposeful. that requires great skill. as i say, and most agencies, and most times, in some ways, that is the default mode. people just keep doing what they
have been doing of stuff happens. you will always be busy and the inbox will always be full and it will always be meetings and events and many things to discuss, and there will always be surface noise and turbulence. the dog barks in the caravan will move on. now, my advice is actually, and ,his gets more into the process there are people here who actually one of concrete advice on how to make a difference. for this sophisticated washington group, and there are some veterans here on many things, i will only single out --one, if you want to do anything big, you got to do it with the congress. do it with the congress. there is a very great tendency in these sorts of meetings about foreign policy, to be very executive branch-centric.
i have served in many executive branch jobs and of only worked with congress when i had to, but i had to work with them several times. let me just illustrate what i mean with a couple of concrete examples. one from the past and one right now that could be informative to this administration. one from the past -- all of you obama,at president-elect fit in one of his first acts, i am going to close guantanamo. in preparing this, they put everything in motion, the executive order, the speech. they did not deeply consult with congress before they made their move. move,ey made their whether people in congress who would quietly have said yes, we will help you? there were such people and
republicans. senator john mccain for example. the challenge is if you are going to close guantanamo, replace it with what? then if you have a plan, let's replace it with this, and then we have a plan developed basically, which state is going to get it? atn, you might have a chance getting political support among the representatives of all the other states. [laughter] and get it out of the way. announcing we are going to close guantanamo, and then you have not done the homework with congress on where and how. what happened. every member of congress gives out a statement. the politics of this become poisonous and movement is impossible, and here we are eight years later, and guantanamo is not closed.
i believe, this was a possibility, might -- could have been done, but because you are thinking executive branch-centric, it did not work. i will give you an example right now. all of the discussions on terrorists and questions restricting trade. how many of you -- racial hands if you know what i mean when i say -- raise your hands if you know what i mean when i say destination taxation? all right, there are six or seven of you. this is hugely important with respect to trade right now, right now -- right now. the house is developing corporate tax reform.
all of the stuff having to do with income and profit shifting, which is a long, broken problem, very serious, porting of gigantic costs piles overseas -- cash piles overseas. they are dealing with destination basis that would turn our corporate tax system into an income system that is a simile of a taxes to miller trading partners using the create a more equal playing field for companies. because of the border adjustments that will happen in limiting the system, not you buy a to when product and take it out, this will have the effect if their plan goes through of having a huge impact on import-intensive products. there will be no taxes on things sold for export.
it has enormous implications for terms of trade. a people who were watching misunderstand. there will be lots of adjustments and arguments over compliance and someone. i happen to think it is a creative idea of great interest. you can is this -- if the executive branch, if the people who are on the landing , and the people interested in doing something to show economic nationalism, and thinking about whether or not to withdraw from nafta and break , or hold theires fire, you cannot work that agenda, and also do what paul ryan is trying to do at the same time. and if paul ryan has a chance of getting through his package, it is going to have such an impact that you are going to want to wait and see what that impact is
before you decide whether or not you want to do a lot of other stuff. it could result another page creation of hundreds of millions -- it can result in another repatriation of hundreds of millions of dollars. partnership --al i spent a lot of time on those two examples. i will not spend a lot of time on the other two suggestions because i want to hear from eric and martin. putting a one is premium on policy staff work, written policy staff work. in my professional experience going back more than 30 years, i have seen in a norma's decline in the quality of written --regardless of administration. what happens is people make their staff larger and they hold more meetings because people don't know how to do with analysis.
crichton, concrete operational analysis where they detail choreographies, describe pros and cons, and how to do things. and then isolate the key issues to concentrate time and focus. like a trivial procedural detail. quality staff work is a matter of life and death. it is not hyperbole. it is a true statement that i have seen happen in the wars in iraq and afghanistan. it is a matter of life and death . taughtis scarcely even with people going to mid level office. there are a lot of discussions we will get into with the staff. to attack something that does not get much attention, which is the need to link policy planning and policy
analysis to budget development. budget development. if you studied the staff and did not notice, what is only be -- where is omb fit into the staff system, not much really. everyone who has private sector experience knows this is the first principle. of course you manage budgets, of course in national security. that is very large consequences and we are about to enter a period and which there are going to be fantastic budget strain and budget arguments, which i hope will be resolved. maxim wasat is a remembering. martin: thank you. so, eric, what is your advice? you, first of all, thank martin. it is great to be here.
thank you, philip. let me start off with a confession cash yesterday, when i should have been preparing to speak your today, i was watching the redskins instead. [laughter] managed to beat the hapless philadelphia eagles, as i was -- and i -- and was having the pangs of bad i wanted to talk about blocking and tackling, the things we need to get done in government. i would say two things. one on personal and one on policy. the first is on the personnel side. one of the biggest challenges the president has in national security is getting their arms around the apparatus of the government that conducts national security affairs.
henry kissinger made this observation back in 1866 before .e became secretary ago, i think i was here on this brookings state doing an event for a book, which makes the same observation. this is the first and most enormous challenge the president has. and so, the focus on personnel is really important, but as one of the earlier panels noted, the tendency tends to be on the high-profile cabinet positions. think,ugh attention i gets focused on putting together teams of people both within the agencies can work together and across the agencies can work together.
because if you cannot get that kind of teamwork, you will inevitably have all sorts of dysfunctions, particularly in the first year when a lot of people are not confirmed. on average, it takes about nine months, and i believe it will be longer in this transition, to get everybody in place. philip and i both were part of the romney transition team planning in 2012. , andgan our work in july by the eve of the election, we prepared -- we were prepared to go in. prepared to go in and we had slates of candidates for all the senate-confirmed positions that could be presented to the cabinet. and we had focused at least on the defense transition, very much on the question of how we can get people who can work together so you don't get the kinds of dysfunction you sometimes have when, right now, with secretary carter and the navy secretary.
we have had another defense department, with the subcabinet appointees and the difficulties they can present. second part of that personnel issue is to understand that the career elements in the department of defense and other agencies are not the enemy. the other subject matter experts who can help you succeed, but only if you establish a relationship of trust with them, and also provide the leadership. they have to know, they have to -- they have to know what direction the new team is trying to move in. come on thatay score, they have to overcome the new team, whoever it is, has to overcome a deep bias. my foreign service colleague used to have what she called her i am logged transition, which is
no matter how much you hated the appointees, the new team makes you have nostalgia for the old one. [laughter] which i think is a testimony to the sort of rough shakedown crews that almost every first year of administration turns out to be. the second piece of advice i would give is to try in the early period, spent time in the first few weeks before something happens, to actually understand the policy before you try to change it. inevitably, there are caricatures of what the policy actually is. the folks in government have been working this in extraordinary detail. there is a lot that can go wrong when you start to make
adjustments, and it is not that you should not change the policy. every administration wants to come in, but you need to understand what you are changing before you start changing it. all too often, people come in , anda lot of bright ideas have not been adequately staffed . the first order of business for orderly staff work is to understand what is in place before you start to change it. martin: thank you. what other things i like to focus on is the relationship between the white house and the different departments and agencies of national security. nowlearly have a situation where there is a good deal of tension between the incoming president and the cia. and the standard tension between the cia and the fbi.
you know, when you think , alsoo kissinger's day with brezinski, the nsc and the a part ofrtment were that for the early years in the mix of administration. the carter administration, the same. and bush 43 between rumsfeld and cheney. what is your sense given your experience with all of that? how to ensure that it does not end up dysfunctional? thes it in the nature of personalities rather than in the structure of things that you are going to have these kinds of tensions? can bee anything that
thatto avoid the battles we have seen in the past? >> yes, there is. first, let me talk about the nsc staff issues for a second. -- is theaff issues staff to large, yes. it is because it is extremely large and they are holding constant meetings because they don't know better. but it is not a democratic /republican phenomenon. there were 50 professionals with the bush staff. martin: was it too small? phillip: not too small.
when franklin roosevelt won world war ii the largest establishment the country has seen in running 50% of the united states economy to boot, they did that with nine white house staffers. this was not because roosevelt was disengaged. aboutells you something what you are doing is important. an eisenhower system that was totally different, but highly functional. the point about that is rather than get into that it is trinket by a third. shrink it by a third is a meaningless thing to say. what do you want the staff to do? and what you want the executive department to do? and then work on the staff numbers that flow from that.
if you are clear about how these jobs are defined. most nsc staff jobs don't even come with a written job description, much less any training. and i mean, not one day of training. if you work on the substance of what these people do, what the different roles are, a lot of this stuff will begin to take care of itself. if you begin to realize that the more you bloat the staff, you make staffers more powerful. you don't actually make the president wiser or more powerful. aboutc staff -- we talked the fbi cia issues. i am an easy about this. when i did the 9/11 commission work, one of the administration we looked at was the clinton administration. which you may remember had a dysfunctional relationship with the director of the fbi. he had suspected that his white house clients might be engaged
in criminal activity and that you have to investigate it. no matter who is going to be elected in november, a difficult relationship with the fbi -- that was one of the reason congress try to get the fbi director a high degree of independence in the way they set up a job. we will see how that works out. if you keep the current director, it is strained. if you fire the current director, it could be worse actually. are -- so, there's the problem. here is a kind of point i wanted to make about this -- all of this flak is undermining a condition of trust. i want to stress, the value of trust is not so that the will salute when the
intelligence community talks. that is not the point. you get the trust not so that they will always agree. you get the trust so you can have healthy arguments. distrusta condition of results in frozen relationships were each side begins behaving and passive-aggressive ways, throwing their assessments of crossed -- assessments across the other one. what you don't get is the healthy give-and-take and interaction that can be tough-minded. the greatest intelligence disaster of my lifetime but the the-- of my lifetime was wmd catastrophe. there should have been the tough-minded argument going on.
the should've been going on back in the clinton years when the assessments originated. so, you are building trust so you can have those kinds of discussions with different intelligence agencies, quarreling over different things, and the fbi has this taken the cia has that take. but no one in the conversation feels like they are threatened by that. as the atmosphere gets frosty or and frosty air, it is not a matter of who agrees with home, but it is a matter of the quality of the discussion. care: i largely agree with philip. it is natural that your cabinet members and other members of national security council, when they meet in the various forms, are going to represent the view of their agency, which has a
specific mission, and therefore, will look at things differently. in the department of defense, we look at things differently then the department of state. from the white house, you have a different view. at various points in my career having been in all three positions, it is natural, and you want some disagreement. you don't want unanimity. is last thing you want groupthink, premature closure on issues where people think they have the answer before they have talked it all through. that is a very hard thing to orchestrate, particularly when you have very the personalities and previous reputations, etc. thing i would like to know is, .
on the one hand, they're the instrument of the president imposing his agenda on the respective institution. on the other, they are the voice of the institutional interests and prerogatives of the institution they sit on top of, trying to make that point of view heard in the interagency deliberation. and maintaining the balance of those two roles is very hard for individual cabinet officers i think. an emotionally intelligent president will be looking for people who can rolese those two goals -- when they pick their cabinet officers. martin: do you expect to see the kind of bureaucratic warfare we have seen between previous andonal security advisers
secretaries of state of secretaries of defense? of course we don't know who the secretary of state will end up being at this point, but we have defense of national security advisor and views about the intelligence agencies. like it is baked into the system already. panelistsof the earlier said, who knows? i think it will be hard to tell. i will say this -- anybody who thinks that it does not matter whether someone was a three-star or a four-star never worked a day in the pentagon. be verythat i will interested to see how the dynamic -- >> glenn having been a three-star.
>> and kelly. the dynamic between generals kelly and madison were fantastic. it will be interesting to see how the dynamic plays out. my three have a general responsible for -- >> i do think it matters. i think a lot of traffic pretty irefully in 19 pretty 7 -- think they drafted that pretty carefully in 1947. maybe the urgency is less than it was. think, are as, i number of issues that come along with it. i know general mattis is an outstanding, thoughtful, extremely well read officer.
i'm sure he is well aware of the pitfalls and dangers, and trying very hard to avoid stepping in those. there are issues having to do with democratic, political, civilian controls that arrives from this. martin: let's go back to congress and a different dimension. phillip: i was conquering of this mental image -- conjuring of a highntal image school chemistry class gone wild, letting students use any compound a want to start mixing them up, and who knows what will happen? you stand outside in the hallway and hear all of the fizzing and smoking and fuse began to leak you say, ihall, and wonder what will happen? >> i wonder what will happen? >> that is what we are all
wondering. we have not had a president that sees disruptive diplomacy as a constructive productive ways moving forward. what kind of challenge is that going to pose to the national cies?ity agen was with thetance president of taiwan. billion conaway said presidential will the embassy -- kellyanne conway said the ofsident will move the ends -- will move the embassy to jerusalem. [laughter] do you have any experience with this on how they're are going to do it this disruptive approach?
phillip: this is what they thought what would happen after reagan was elected. they thought that the apocalypse might be coming. it did not white -- quite turnout that away. this is different. --this is a different situation. on the one hand, no one who went through this campaign thinks, a natural one diplomat is he. [laughter] hand, this isher a man who has written a book called "the art of the deal." have any thousand and say "the art oftarting the global deal."
things the interesting that i think they will encounter. things they will want to get done. the domestic agenda alone, i can see where that is going, and are serious people involved in that. 150% of theke up oxygen in the room. martin: tax reform, infrastructure bill. phillip: there is this thing with health care. they are serious and it is moving. that is 150% of the oxidant in the room. do i want foreign policy to make in the first six to nine months? when president bush came in to office in 2001, he was not looking to make a lot of indlines and policy -- foreign policy. --n there is another factor
if i can find someone on this fightso will one to pick with about three quarters of the countries in this world. therejust about get without working hard. thatrns out that if you do , you are going to make a lot of noise. i think the last years have been very bad for the united states in the global system. thaty big take away from is, ladies and gentlemen, we need to enter a time of preparedness. we need to make our country stronger. as if it wasthis 1975 after the vietnam war, or 1935 if you like darker counsels, we would preparedness. it does not mean picking fights with everyone you can find.
if you speak softly and carry a big stick, get the big stick ready. ideally, that would mean you would avoid all unnecessary fights while you are getting stronger, making your institutions stronger. and you would try to track all of the friends you possibly could if you really were worried about our situation in the world. you see, that begins to drive you, even if you are worried about the condition in the world, which the president-elect says he is. second drive you into thinking about -- that could drive you into thinking about diplomacy. whileunnecessary fights focusing on diplomacy. eric, we are going to go to audience questions, but since you worked for vice president seems -- cheney, and it like vice president pence will take on a lot of the load when
it comes to national security foreign policy, what you think about that? how does it work itself out? eric: there is one big difference between a relationship that president george w. bush and dick cheney , and andy carter is in the crowd so he can correct me if i am wrong, and the relationship that president electronic device , anddent-elect pence half that is vice president cheney had no higher political ambitions. the relationship he had with the created by the natural tension. vice president pence clearly is someone who potentially has a elective future in
politics and that will introduce, i think, potentially some tensions. that, and i have very high regard for vice president-elect pence. i thought of all the statements made by any of the candidates in the three debates on foreign affairs, he was the most articulate and compelling when discussing syria and russia. but in the second presidential debate, it did not take too long before the president-elect disowned him and threw him under the bus in terms of those positions. i think there is potentially some danger here. to your earlier point on disruption, if i could. the foreignsy for affairs heresy. byersonally was not troubled the call.
the taiwanese president. perhapsit is fine to throw the folks in beijing off balance a little bit, but that does not bother me. what does bother me is that one would have hoped that it was the result of a deliberative process and part of the clearly thought out strategy with a plan for how you manage all of this. and it is pretty clear from the president-elect's comments that that was not the case. you know, i also think that the reaction from beijing, which was pretty mild, and should not have elicited a tweet storm. part of the issue is that it is fun for the president to try and change our policies. he was elected and has the right to do that. it is fine to decide that you don't want to be bound by the one-time policy anymore.
but to just say that we will not be bound by things we have undertaken a relationship through multiple administrations have a ripple effect he may not yet be aware of in terms of the way it will call into question both our allies and our potential adversaries, america's commitments to other parts of the world. i think that is a very, very -- the credibility of our commitment cap already been undermined to some degree by incumbent president was not paid enough attention to that and who has been pretty dismissive of harping on credibility, but i think it is very important. phillip: just to give you no illustration of what we mean about diplomacy strategy. eric just talked about the phone call with the president of taiwan. we both shared the view that in itself, that is not necessarily shocking. then there is the following tweets.
we are getting ready to adopt an economic approach that will confront china economically in some fashion. there are arguments about that. we're already planning to push them fairly hard economically. the question is a strategic matter. if we are actually going to have an economic confrontation with china and the coming years, you have to say to yourself, let's escalate this and make it confrontation with them on their other core interests having to do with her definition of sovereignty and other things in the region, and let's confront them on all of those core interests at the same time. is that a smart play? think the president of taiwan would have a little bit of a problem being a card used in the trade-off. , iflip: you could imagine
henry kissinger on steroids was available, -- [laughter] he is not taking steroids anymore. if you confront them all these fronts simultaneously, then good, you are worried about everything. we are going to construct this very elaborate deal. we are going to roll back our relations where it was in the mid-1970's, and then try to re-cracked the whole bargain from scratch on all these issues. oft would test the skills the wisest and most experienced statesman we had. maybe if we thought we could pull that did -- if we could pull that off while doing the domestic stuff -- but you see the problem.
rebuttal, the kind of strategic approach that eric and i are counseling, which is not so much ducking a fight with china, but how to restructure it. the chinese leaders know that it -- nobody difficult phase is coming, but they will try to channel that constructively. martin: disruption with a purpose, instead of destruction. let's go to the audience and take three questions. yes. is jack karpinski. simple question about how many major initiatives can the new and i wouldndle, use but that between domestic, where you have a legislative clock for the first year versus international, where there is a
lot of things that are not under your control, but a lot of things in portland china and russia? philip, you talked extensively about before we get too much involved about preparedness. i would like to know what your definition is. what we are hearing is a big military buildup, the budget, which of course, if things go domestic, that will become a fight. i would like to know your definition of preparedness. martin: third question. ok, eric, do you want to start with priorities and repair ms.? ?preparedness president-elect is
going to take advantage of what he said to seek a refill the budget control act and a move back to a topline, i would argue as we did in the bipartisan wasonal defense panel that reported to years ago, that it be at the level that bob gave said it back by the proposal before the question hit. restore assentially lot of the money that was cut out of the defense budget during the last eight years. onhink that will be going for having an effective diplomatic effort. i am fond of quoting george innon, who gave a lecture
at the national college where he said, you have no idea how much more civil and polite diplomatic exchanges are if you have a little bit of military power sitting behind you. i think that is an important facilitator for a president. i would add that there ought to , an emergencytal supplemental. to deal with some of the reading this problems that have been identified by the obama administration and the chiefs right now. phillip: on the question about a number of priorities, it is a shrewd question. andy carter who is here, looked after this question and 2001. were two big ones -- taxes and education on the domestic side. this administration currently is planning to do at least four or
five huge lifts. it immigration, tax reform, health care, supreme court. that is four. you want to throw when infrastructure, whether you , wet overall budgeting could go on, but you are seeing a sense of the scale. you do have an unusual constellation of circumstances and people in which much may be possible. and the question will be how much and that is implications for how you want to manage your confirmation side, foreign policy stuff. if you're thinking strategically. the question about preparedness. eric's point is exactly right. i would only at two things -- one is, think about, i believe
the foreign policy and defense policy institutions are fundamentally still stuck in the late 20th century and are highly during the cold war and remain so 25 years later. i think both foreign and defense institutions are in need of profound overhaul and thinking of the kind that occur to many respects in the 1920's and 1930's, but also the memory of what we did in the 1970's and which ister vietnam, interesting, especially on the defense side. but we need that kind of gravity of thinking now. take the example of cyber security alone, which is very much in the news today in terms of the level of our capabilities as we are contemplating, and we had made negative conclusions. if itould be do about it
came to negative conclusions about foreign intervention in our country's politics? what options could a president consider under the current circumstances and someone? you begin to see concerns about preparedness. it is not just a defense matter. if you make it about just spending money, and if you spend in a dysfunctional and broken institution, you will get 20% thermal efficiency for your spending. you will make a much better case with congress and spending if you couple that with dramatic and vivid interest in a different story of how the money will be invested. after 9/11, rumsfeld was effectively given $1 trillion of additional defense investment, not counting the ocl budgets. more than $1 trillion.
worth oflion dollars at a petition for that book? i contend we did not and we should not do that again. martin: donald trump tweeted about the 747 president and said that boeing was essentially overcharging. that f-35s ared too expensive. the ideathink about that we need a new story here, and should we expect the donald trump is going to take on the defense industrial complex? .ric: i agree with philip i would not invest $1 trillion going forward. the truth is, the department of defense has been living on benefits of the carter/reagan buildup for a very long time and
we have not been investing, or maintaining our qualitative edge over our potential adversaries for a very long time, which is why secretary hagel and carter have been very focused on the potential of losing that edge, and the importance of what they call the third offset strategy, which is an effort to find ways to lead ahead a new technologies. that is a very important effort. it will be interesting to see what the new administration does as a comment office. i am troubled by the way that has beendent-elect attacking boeing and lucky -- lockheed. the president of the united states has a norm is power. -- has enormous power. i don't think the onsident-elect appreciates
what he is doing is affecting the stock price of these companies and will shape the way they respond to different kinds of defense requirements. there is a chain of things that will flow from this that i am not sure he is thinking all the way through. i think it is troublesome. programs -- its problems as a program, but i do not think tweeting is the way to deal with it. [laughter] >> we will leave it at that. thank you all very much. [applause] i wanted to say thank you to the people who pulled this altogether, on the governance study side at brookings and the general staff, our own staff from the miller center, particularly care mcgrath -- karen mcgrath, and the advisory
council for the first year .roject, many of who are here i would try to name them all but there are handouts in the back that have them all, for fear of leaving one out. thanks to this terrific panel. [applause] >> today, ohio state university is the site for a public celebration of the life of john glenn. the former u.s. astronaut and senator died on december 8 at the age of 95. the service begins at 2:00 p.m. eastern and you can see it live on c-span. today, resident elect donald trump