tv Soho forum Hosts Debate on U.S. Decisions to Go to War CSPAN January 5, 2017 3:49am-5:22am EST
for complete schedule, go to c-span.org. >> nyu law professor richard epstein and christopher preble debate when the united states should go to war. o forum.ht's soh from new york city, this is about an hour and a half. >> thank you. the resolution, the united states should be prepared to use force in defense of friendly nations, even when not subject to the direct threat of force. please vote on your phone, undecided, yes, or no. you will vote this time, and then you will vote after the debate is over. as part of our tradition, we will be closing the vote before the debate begins, but you have a little time to think about it while we have our next event. we will begin with a warm-up act of a great libertarian comic.
last month, we had dave smith. this month, back by popular demand, we have andrew heaton. you can read about andrew on the soho forum website. otherwise, andrew needs no introduction except to say that he is the author of a terrific book called "laughter is better than communism." here to defend that highly contentious claim, i give you andrew heaton. [applause] mr. heaton: thank you, james. am i funny yet? i want to thank whoever preemptively clapped for me before the rest of you. you are my favorite. so are you excited about foreign policy debates? i think this is particularly fun for libertarians, because we do not have to study is hard on foreign policy, because we don't need to know as much geography. you don't need to know the names of countries you don't plan to invade. right?
the libertarian map, here is america, and just don't bomb this part. don't bomb free-trade zones. then right about here is aleppo. pray here. -- right here. we had to learn that last time, didn't we? i think we have a raw deal on the whole aleppo thing. i buy that hillary clinton knows where all aleppo is because she planned to bomb it. of course she knew where aleppo is. does anybody think donald trump knows where aleppo is? like if during that time, if they had asked, "candidate trump, do you know about aleppo?" would he have gone, "the nexus of the syrian refugee crisis?" no. "what about aleppo?" "i will hang rosie o'donnell from a tree." that would have been the response. it would have moved on. so if anybody who runs as a libertarian, aleppo is a city in syria. and we can go from that. i am pleased to see, the neocons are starting to go on the
dissent. you know what neocons are? they are going to elaborate, these guys. but the basic idea is, they want to go nationbuilding by bombing the nations they want to build. which many of us would argue is counterintuitive. the flipside of the coin is, you have the democrats, who are the most stalwart, vociferous opponents of war, until given a opportunity to vote for war. iraq, afghanistan, westeros. all of these countries can be invaded when up for a vote. you are probably wondering, how did i develope this well-educated, nuanced position on foreign policy? i will tell you. i have a masters degree in international and european politics. did you get that, c-span? good. which is impressive, because i
am from a place in the country where there are more cows than passports. i am from oklahoma, which is the canada of texas. [laughter] mr. heaton: thank you for the lone okie back there. imagine 1956, and we're good. that is pretty much all you need to know. i grew up there, but i got educated on foreign affairs by going to scotland, where i got a master's degree. if you are not a worldly cosmopolitan east coast elite like yourself, it can be kind of confusing. did you know in scotland, they have the same words for different things than we do. what? hi? oh, aye. also, pissed and
pissed off means different things. where i am from they both mean angry. in scotland, pissed means drunk, which you should know if you are visiting an island full of alcoholics. that was really confusing the first month. i was horrified the first month. the other one, and this is a bit uncomfortable. but you should know if you are visiting, where i am from, there is an inappropriate pejorative epithet for a gay person, the word fag. in scotland, that means cigarette. i didn't know that. my scottish friends would say, "i'm going outside for a fag," and i would go, "i'm going to sit here and be quietly
heterosexual. i don't really feel to compelled -- too compelled to announce my preferences, but good luck to you." have you been to ireland? it is a fun place, a friendly place. they are super friendly there. scotland, which i love, is a violent friendly, like it is a very foreboding friendly. hello, welcome to scotland, we would like to, like something bad might happen. ireland, i went with a friend from college who is of irish descent, and pints for everybody because the mayor of the town came out. welcome home. bring a parade of young maidens you can marry. i went to england, which is like vulcan with bowl hats, and did not get a hero's reception. i visited where my town is from and i went, we are from here. they said, you probably left
because of debt. that was the extent of it. do i have a minute left? 30 seconds? the important thing i wanted to communicate to you, i got off topic, i apologize for that. aleppo's a town in syria. if you run for president, it is a town in syria. thank you so much. [applause] >> thank you, andrew heaton. now that we are warmed up, the main event. speaking for the affirmative will be richard epstein, speaking for the negative will be chris preble. is, should the u.s. should be able to use force in defense of friendly nations even when not subject to the direct threat of force. you can read about richard and chris on our website. chris is the author of a book called "the power problem: how american military dominance makes us less safe, less
prosperous, and less free." chris is apparently such a fierce debater that bret stephens of the wall street -- "wall street journal" declined my invitation to debate chris on foreign policy. richard epstein was happily willing, and in fact -- [applause] >> and in fact, when you set up a resolution between two debaters by email, it sometimes goes on for days. in this case, richard crafted the resolution, and it was written by him word for word. chris immediately accepted it. it was over in a minute. that is because richard knows how to craft resolutions. he has been called, richard, a rebel without a pause, and a force of nature. in fact, i am the one who has called them both of those things.
those phrases have stuck. he is probably willing to debate anyone in a public forum on the many subjects he feels strongly about, which go on the list is incredibly long, provided that his opponent promises to refrain from physical violence. chris and richard have both to myusly contributed book review section and they never complained when i paid them the measly sum of $700 per review that rupert murdoch, my boss, you have 15 minutes to defend the proposition. the u.s. should be able to use force in defense of friendly nations. even when not subject to direct threat of force. the voting is all closed. richard, take it away. that is your timekeeper, watch him. he will hit you over the head if you go over time. >> i am happy to be the second of three debaters on this particular issue. sandwiched between two people who have taken the negative. let me see if i can describe why i am not quite a neocon but
nonetheless would classify myself as probably somebody who is more or less in terms not particularly appetizing to many people, a modest dubious cautious libertarian hawk. the question is how does one start to get to this decision. my own view generally speaking is to take the same attitude that we heard earlier on, about how is it you try to organize events that have very strong categorical rules to dictate the way in which governments ought to behave. i wrote a book some years ago called "simple rules for a complex world," which set out six basic rules which if understood, would in effect in a sane and civilized society to get rid of most of the ailments that have befallen modern -- befall a modern america. the question you have to ask yourself is, why do i take that kind of a categorical position on these particular issues, that i don't take it with respect to foreign affairs? i think it's the right question to ask. let me see if i can give a
question to ask. let me see if i can give a couple of cause of the right answer. the first thing to understand is that simple rules for a complex world deals with the way in which the overnment tries to regulate an regulate an economy. with these particular circumstances, it's not that there is a discretion and confusion in the way in which various things ought to be done, but the basic intuition is if you have a relatively fixed set of legal rules, the discretion will be lost in private parties and they will try to figure out how it is they are going to be best able to deal with various kinds of uncertainty. if you look at the private organizations that have to make these kinds of choices, they do have a fairly complicated governance structure, but one of the features apart from separation of powers, is there is something known as the business judgment rule. what that means, when you are faced with uncertainty and two kinds of
errors and you're not conflicted out of the situation, no matter which particular choice you make, you will be insulated from liability with respect to your shareholders or other constituents. the reason this particular role has such incredibly powerful roots is you can imagine if you try to do it the other way around. if you got it right, heads you win, tails you lose, you will be exposed to some kinds of serious sanctions, including financial ones. at the front and expected value of positions of power will be negative, and so the organization shut down because they will not be able to get anybody in order to operate. with the business judgment rule, it is designed to say we don't look at these things one tick at a time, we look at a market basket of ideas straight you get the right people in the right is that you choose overtime to do better in a rule of outlines than you are going to do and a world in which it turns out, you have it. why don't you apply this with respect to foreign affairs? the answer is unfortunately the definition of the state is that it has some monopoly of power within the jurisdiction in question and there are no private parties to
which you can delegate the question of what kinds of judgments you want to make when you start to deal with foreign function. if it has to be a public function, the same kinds of rules have to give you discretion on which particular way you are going to go, whether you will stay in or out. then people are going to start to say, why do you really need that kind of discretion, and let me see if i can give an explanation. if you start talking about most situations, essentially the world is a relatively simple place if everybody starts to play by the rules. if you don't cross the middle of the road to hit somebody else, they don't have to run and hide an explanation. if you start talking about most situations, to get out of the way. but anybody who spends any time worrying about the rules associated with self sense an individual and private cases will quickly realize it is that shrouds with a kind of irreducible uncertainty that no amount of clever analysis can reduce. if somebody comes that you, one of the things you can do is sit there and take it and after you
are dead, bring a cause of action, which is nuts. now you are entitled to use force, but the question is how much force are you entitled to use. now we have elaborate rules about excessive force. and it turns out that the moment somebody deviates from the rules, you have to give a degree of discretion from -- to everybody else. one of the other great problems in the area in which you are talking about is as follows. what are we supposed to do with respect to the use of force in those circumstances where we see a is attacking b, and we as an individual have to decide whether or not we are going to intervene. one of the things you can say is, it's not my business if they want us to kill b. b better defend themselves, but i not going to risk anything. most people say a categorical rule would not only be hardhearted, but positively dangerous, if you thought the
repetition of those kinds of events would continue to take place. what happens is now we say, you are allowed but not required to intervene. how do you decide the way in which the particular intervention is going to take place? whatthis is not a particularly easy question to answer. you certainly don't want to say you always have to go in. it may be there is a serious conflict that exists. you start to go into the situation, not only dose b get slaughtered -- does b get slaughtered, but you get messed up as well. whether or not there is time to get other -- before you start to intervene. you are right back to the kinds of serious problems about the use of judgment and the way in which you have to handle these cases. the question comes, how does this particular work when you
translated from the individual cases into the cases having to deal with public affairs? it's interesting, those who study the classic sources, when you read only in translation, we will in effect discovered that they always try to figure out how you dealt with the international relations question by figuring out the way in which you note the question as it arose in ordinary disputes between private individuals, recognizing the stakes would be vastly higher when you're talking about nations, but understanding it is more difficult to figure out exactly what the right answer is. what you have to do is approach the front of them with the appropriate sense of humility, knowing that both kinds of errors you have and he's kinds of issues are going to be extraordinarily hard. hard. there will be some cases in which you don't intervene and you will regret it to your last day, and there are other days in which you will start to intervene and think it was premature, foolish, and unwise. it cannot be done on either side of this debate to simply announce this, that, or the other successive failure. one of the reasons why this debate is so difficult to
undertake and how it is supposed to work is that it turns out that you have to look at a huge number of cases before you can decide whether a rule was some kind of muddy, uncertain position of the short i'm defending, is in fact the appropriate way in which to look at it. i think when you start to do that, the strength of the middle position starts to become a little bit more clear than it would otherwise be. let's start to figure out what it is that we mean when we start to talk about this particular resolution and the way in which it's going to start to work with respect to the use of force trade the operative word we use is prepared. how do you prepare? but suppose we have decided as an abstract matter that we are not going to intervene unless there is a direct threat against the united states. can we enter into any treaties or alliances with otherresolution and the way in
which it's going to start to nations and commit us to use force in exchange of a commitment by them to use force to defend us? this is not a simple abstract proposition, if one were to try to explain what the success of nato was in the postwar years. this was a great success because before the treaty was entered into, there was a genuine question as to whether or not the russians would continue to march westward and impose their free society upon helpless nations, and once it was clear the united states put themselves into the game in this particular fashion, that is a very effective counterweight to the way in which things went.
it was also clear it was not just an idle treaty arrangement. you have to put troops in harm's way in order to be able to stall the situation. about the same time we had another difficulty, and here is a we are going to do. there was a famous resolution which put south korea outside the protective zone of american interests, and one of the short-term consequences of that was the korean wall, which turned out to be bloody and rather difficult to deal with. if we had taken a firmer line going into that, it seems to me we would have had very much greater resolve. if you want other kinds of situations which are generally ambiguous, one has to think of 1973, when there is the snake attack on the israelis, and the question is whether or not if you are prepared to go to war, are you prepared to rearm your friends if it turns out they are running out of munitions, which was the case of israel for about a week or 10 days into the
particular operation. the israelis managed to survive, the munitions, which was the case of israel for about a week or 10 soviets were driven out of the middle east. if you then look at the situations later with the famous red line in aleppo, the unwillingness of the american position to enforce anything with respect to that is resulted in hundreds of thousands of people died, millions of people displaced, immigration pressures moving you into europe, the breakup of the british situation of being attributed to the migration question, you have paid a very high price under the situations. people can start to say, there is some notable fiascos. you can look at vietnam and argue that was one. and there could be a huge dispute about what is going to happen in a place like iraq. it seems to me the lessons you want to learn from this is not that you always stay out, but the lesson is quite different. if you are going to get in, you do not get in with just enough force to make it a fair fight.
you think about this in the same way you think about predator and prey when you are talking about a state of nature. if you're going to be aligned, you're willing to take on a hyena. that is the only fight you enter into, those you can win with overwhelming force and given the position of the united states and its productive mind, we can bring about the circumstances. part of the problem you have with respect to vietnam is we have all sorts of constraints on what we were prepared to bomb and how we were prepared to behave. if you go in half way, you get yourself chomped to bits. the mistake wasn't the war, it was a dance. when they get to iraq, there's going to be mayhem and so forth. it turned out saddam and nothing left and it was a victory party marching there. if you win the war, you have to win the peace. you put somebody like petraeus in charge, and he was not just a military man. he understood the social
commitments it requires to maintain a difficult kind of occupation, under circumstances where you hope the steady amelioration by not only having force, but making deals with people you don't like and defending against force by people you do like. situation in iraq as of the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 was one of uneasy stability. by the time the president comes in, he doesn't want to commit ground trooops, which is a version of the stay out. the day after we pull out, the prime minister decides to arrest the deputy prime minister and the whole place false to pieces. when you have to understand when you're dealing with these military type situations is if you take half measures, you can be worse off than if you stay in. so now, the last question i want to mention, how do we know what is or is not a direct force.
sometimes it directs, sometimes they are slow. we don't want to limit our defense to direct force is only because sometimes if you wait a little bit for an indirect force to manifest itself in a more serious fashion, the situation has gone out of control and you will be in a much worse position than you were than if you decided to intervene early on. you could've asked the israelis in 1967 -- that saved everything enormously. understand there are two kinds. understand further that using forces always a difficult question, the judgment becomes
an essential portion of the way in which we have to start to deal with these things, if you stall with the frame and make it very funny. when you don't use force, that is when the real calamities will happen. thank you. [applause] >>15 minutes to speak for the negative. >> is it ok for me to sit? >> absolutely. >> i have notes. this man is a force of nature. not only does he have no notes, i was searching for him taking a breath. i'm not sure he's in that. it's a great honor to be here. i thank jean, don and julie. i think richard epstein, who i've known by reputation for many years. three years earlier than that, richard had co-authored scalia versus epstein. this is how i knew, richard, and
we agree on many. we will also agree on one big thing, and that is when should the united dates don't want. there is this long-standing liberal versions of the use of force, john stuart mill, explain there is no difference of opinion among honest people on commencing an aggressive war for any interests of our own, except when necessary to avert from ourselves and pending wrong. as a practical matter, the nonaggression principle is a presumption against the use of force, not a prohibition against the use of force. i'm not a pacifist. i served in the united states navy. nor is richard and advocate for the use of force in any and all cases. we are trying to clarify this
elusive middle ground between the two extremes of never and always. that is a useful discussion. there are several different legitimate justifications or rationales for the use of force. this debate is not concerned about self-defense and i merrily about self-defense. the resolution if of -- focuses on those instances when the united states is not directly a threat. i imagine in the q&a and back and forth we might parse that direct threat. we could say that this particular debate is focused exclusively on the altruistic use of force on behalf of friendly nations, not in the expectation that they will reciprocate that efforts. it turns in large measure on the word friendly. i was in new york today, i love new york. i see people on the streets, not all of them glare at me, they are friendly. i'll concede that's not what we
are really talking about. we are talking about an actual friend, so when you have reason to believe wishes you well, and may even help you in your time of need through thick and thin, is that are merely of convenience. i have not memorized washington's farewell address, so that's why i have notes. founders were concerned about the issue of unnatural attachments to foreign nations, friendship as a guiding principle of u.s. foreign policy from the farewell address. the nation which indulges towards another in habitual hatred or fun this is in some degrees a slave to its animosity or affection. either of which is sufficient to lead astray from its duty and interest. history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. this was an idea that the founders thought about long and hard, whether or not this country should be guided by interest or bonds of friendship. was washington right?
maybe he was right back in 1791. maybe it's not true any longer. when i googled this, i said, america's friends -- who are america's friends? the first people that pops of is canada. canadians are our friends. you have to recognize that we don't agree all the time, our interest do not always align. another example which we have seen play out recently is the canadians did not agree with us on our policy towards cuba, for example. in another case, the united kingdom went to war against argentina over the falkland islands. ronald reagan, 1982, refused to help our great friend, the u.k., much to the chagrin of maggie thatcher. what other kinds of friends?
richard mentioned the korean war. for many years the united states continue to help and assist south korea, even when it wasn't a democracy. does that matter? about turkey? which did fight with us in korea, and is a nato ally, but does the character of that country affect character changes? i submit perhaps the character of the government in turkey is changing before our eyes. other cases, saudi arabia, they helped us fight the soviet union in afghanistan, and right now we are helping the saudi's in yemen. another case that is interesting
is, what about friendly nations that are threatened from within? i'm thinking of egypt at the time of the arab spring. the united states had good relations with hosni mubarak and the egyptian government, which was not a democracy in any sense of the term. i've been reading or rereading john stuart mill's essay on nonintervention. i commend it to all of you. here is what mills said on this question of helping a friendly government threatened from within. a government which needs foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens is one which ought not to exist, and the assistance given to it by foreigners is hardly ever any but the sympathy of one despotism with another. fair enough. is mill arguing the united despotism with another. states should have intervened more decisively on behalf of the protesters against mubarak?
no, he doesn't. this is what mill says about that, would it be right for a government to intervene, to help people overthrow a despoted government? as a general, mills -- general rule, mills said no. they are willing to brave labor and danger for their liberation. if they have not sufficient level of liberty be able to arrest it from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hansd than their own -- hands other than their own will have nothing real, nothing permanent.
be asked to pay? that can apply across a broad range of contingency. what is the limiting factor to the from it to's position -- affirmative's position? he implied in the case of iraq that we should have been prepared to stay there longer adult americans would favor using force to defend poland. 29% would favor using force to defend turkey, and 21% would use force to defend latvia. these are all nato allies. that might strike you as audrey the same poll found a mere 56%
of americans would favor using horse to the end britain. if you can barely get a majority of americans to support a defense of written, it's clear the american people want no more wars of choice. -- britain, it's clear the if you can barely get a majority not wars, even, to protect the american people want no more wars of choice. american people or secure vital u.s. national interest, including our rights and liberty. we are debating whether the united states should be willing to use force more often that it has been, and use whatever it takes on behalf of others. so, i ask you, is the central flaw of u.s. foreign policy over the last 1/4 century that we have waged war too often, or not often enough? the affirmative position believes the latter, we should be seeking more opportunities to wage war. i think is a dangerous proposition, one that ignores this nation's founding principles and ignores the wishes of the american people. >> 4 1/2 minutes left.
more comments? >> you're welcome. [applause] >> i yield the balance of my time. >> richard, you can't -- the war of aggression. easure of time. don't let that affect the voting, that chris gave up on 4 1/2 minutes of time. you have 5 minutes to rebut what chris has said. >> five minutes, and -- never mind. >> i will not engage in aggressive activity against a friendly nation, even if i might engage in aggressive activity in order to help a friendly nation. let me see if i can unpack what i think are some of the difficulties. first of all, i think everybody agrees with the proposition that ordinarily, it is simply under the circumstances inappropriate to use aggression against other individuals. but there are some kinds of
exceptions. and on the question is just how broad to the exceptions start to it becomes rather tricky if the self-defense you used to defend yourself against an actual aggressor has collateral effects against some kind of third-party or the kinds of complications we always have to fix. it also says to me that in fact,
if you're going to say there are some exceptions, may be coming to the assistance of friendly nations, by which i mean more than cocktail friends, people who have been with you through thick and thin, different degrees of friendship, the proposition i'm not making is that we do it all the time, and it's the only debate you have is whether we have done it too much or too little, then you have accepted the proposition that you ought to do it sometimes and then you adjust this agreeing on whether or not you have done this too much. for this proposition to be defeated, you would have to say there were no circumstances under which this particular activity would be undertaken, and that would be the mistake. if you start looking at this, you have to be careful about relying on early authorities to understand the application of the modern debates. there was a very famous washington farewell speech. this was the guy who i been very active in the french and indian wars, but that was maybe a war of self-defense, may one of aggression, who is not sure.
he didn't have any immediate enemy sitting around his border, and it would take weeks and days to get involved, and the thought active in the french and indian wars, but that was maybe a war of self-defense, may one of aggression, who is not sure. he didn't have any immediate enemy sitting around his border, and it would take weeks and days to get involved, and the thought that somehow or other the united states could influence things going on in europe under those active in the french and indian wars, but that was maybe a war of self-defense, may one of aggression, who is not sure. he didn't have any immediate enemy sitting around his border, and it would take weeks and days to get involved, and the thought that somehow or other the united states could influence things going on in europe under those circumstances, it would have awnings that we see most recently in afghanistan, in iraq, and you can treat thes trial runs against the united states. it's hard to know whether or not these things are in direct or direct threats, but it seems to me to be appropriate to say that if we can have some intervention which would start to stop this stuff from taking place, that is something we really ought to do. what we have done is we talked about john stuart mill. john stuart mill was something of a -- he was a great idealist but not a particularly good realist in the way in which he ran his behavior. i certainly agree with him that there will be corrupt nations who you cannot root out from the outside. the key mistake in the argument he made was he used the word people as if this was a homogenous whole, when in fact many times the threats you have in dealing with other kinds of nations is that a tiny fraction is willing to take over, staging coup, and the rest of the world is disorganized and helpless unless somebody from the outside comes in.
to say these people could not move quickly enough to deal with that sort of >> it is an extraordinarily harsh and misguided judgment. if someone could of topped the coup that took place in 1933, that would have been wonderful. if taylor had occupied the rhineland and the -- if hitler had occupied the rhineland and he had been countered. if the lusitania had not been sunk, thousands of lives would have been saved. the categorical decision is indefensible. what is defensible is the united states made some harebrained decisions. turkey has become authoritarian, so it is not the good places to go in. it is sensible american policy to send some tanks to poland and latvia to stop the russians. i am not prepared to announce that we had a categorical rule that says that we keep our hands clean and hope the direct threat comes. there is too much
and the drafting of the constitution, it paled in comparison to the threats that we face in 2016? my fair in saying that -- am i fair in saying that? >> i will give my response. >> what strikes me is that the founders were confronted to quite an urgent threat to their security and liberty. every single day. at the time they were drafting the constitution, british and french are ships would routinely round of american sailors, saying they were deserters from the british navy. and in some cases they were. but this impress met -- impress ment of the americans rubbed us the wrong way and we also had the native americans wearing about the fact that they were being -- worrying about the fact they were being run off their land by the american military.
that was in 1781. christoper: we did have the native american tribes and nations that were rather anxious about the fact that they were being driven off their lands by the europe in. on aking the frontier regular basis. that was the state of play in 1781. today the united states military is the most capable military on the planet by a wide margin. our ability to project great power over great distances is vast. much of that power is not actually necessary to defend
this country from hard -- from harm, which is what tempts us to expand our definition of what is required to a safe and secure. so, we are debating whether or not we should be using that power because it is not really needed all that much for ourselves, it is rather a simple thing to defend this country from foreign threats. when was the last time foreign troops tramped on american soil? a long time ago. need toeed -- we don't have that military to defend this country from hard. we have expanded our defensive privet -- forever there to roughly 8000 miles away. so, should we use that rationale , friendly nation, should that be the rationale guiding foreign policy? that is what we are debating tonight. richard has not yet clarified
the circumstances of friendly, under what circumstances is friendly. in fact, he allowed that what was once a friendly nation may be an ally, but if they change their character, maybe they might not be a friend anymore. i was still required to defend them? it does not matter what the turkish government is doing to its own people, we are still required to defend it. i find that problematic. we should at least have some exit clauses. the last point is this, we should not skip to lightly passed the credential question of whether or not our intervention is actually going to work. i think there are reasons to question whether or not preemption, prevention, and anticipatory self-defense should not merely assume that that sort of action is going to make a
situation better. i can point to examples, just in the recent past, where our intervention is made that situation worse. richard interprets that are failures -- our successes outweigh our failures, that is not what we are debating. it seems to me the presumption against the use of force is very high. we should not expanded to include cases that do not involve our own self-defense. thank you. [applause] we now go to the question and answer. that is 30 minutes. i believe there is a mike where people can lineup. i'm going to take moderators prerogative to ask a question of each of the debaters. first question for you, richard. all by whatted at libertarians will be concerned about with the moral hazard
problem yucca one problem is that government tends to screw things up. monday morning quarterback are disastrous policy in iraq. if we had only had the right guy in, we could of done that right. isn't that is this as usual that arernment screws things up? you concerned about the dangers of the standing army that the rounding others spoke up that they will want to go to war. third, the moral hazard problem that if we tell various countries that we will defend you, you have the power of the u.s. behind you, those come trees -- those countries may be tempted to misbehave as they have the u.s. defending them. do you see those downsides? as a libertarian, do they concern you in any significant way. they absolutely concern
me which is why i'm not saying the rule is categorical that when someone is in trouble we have to help them. the question is a fair one. there is the famous line from janus dass james madison that in light statements will not always be at the helm. that works a little bit with domestic legislation by this utterly useless as a maximum with respect to foreign policy. you cannot diversify the situation so you have to make sure you have better people. in fact, this problem exists when there is a case of direct attack. -- exists when there is an indirect situation it is why people should then time in corporate, academic, and the political world in choosing their leaders is that it turns out there is nothing you can do to stop them. one illustration of this is the following question, who is responsible for disarming at the
end of 2003? you cannot get a straight answer from anybody. it was not congress. it was certainly not george bush. this was a terrible lack of presidential leadership. is there in fact a kind of difficulty with this because government always screws things up. yes, but then you have to figure out how you improve governments rather than pulling this out and assuming you stop there. you can also have problems with your allies. here the question that we have in europe is the one that you mention. the united states is a pretty strong shield and the useless allies of august at their military down to 1%. we are down from 62% over the past couple of years. we have to try to get them to live up to their treaty commitments and bring themselves to governor -- doubleday treaty expenditures. that is why diplomacy is required.
there is nothing which says we will give them a blank check. what we need to do is figure out what combination of carrots and sticks we use with people. the things that libertarians need are the things that are central in foreign affairs. libertarians do not like discretion. they do not like uncertainty. if it turns out you are in government and doing these kind of things is all you face, the question is how to do it well? the last thing you mentioned is the wiki to all of our allies, as a matter of first principle you would want to renegotiate something like article five of the nato treaty. this is not a debate about if this is a perfect agreement. the more important question to realize is that if you take the position, that we do not do our cells involved in overseas defense, we cannot get involved in any treaty that would bind us later on. that seems to me to be an unacceptable position.
gene: my specific question to christopher, could you tell us which is the last war u.s. five that you would have supported? u>s.e u.s. fox -- the fought that you would have supported. retaliation for the attacks of 9/11. the great error that we made was in redefining the mission 5-6 months after it started. into thew 15 years war, america's longest war, with no end in right. i do want to come back to something that richards said. it is a pretty fundamental point. richard suggests that i would
reject the concept of alliances under any circumstances. that is absolutely not true. alliances, temporary alliances but together to advance a common interest make absolute sense. what the founders warned against were permanent alliances. alliances that were not specifically directed to dealing with a specific threat. even the nato alliance was developed to deal with a particular threat. the threat is gone away and changed dramatically. gene: thank you. richard you will get a chance to comment. i want to give it to the floor. please ask a question and you will get a chance to talk to these guys afterwards. take it away. >> or richard and chris both. adults are at the end of world war ii we had a murder -- we had a meeting of her chill and stalin.
-- at potts them here -- pott sdam. should harry truman have demanded that the russians and stalin remove their troops from eastern europe and we come to the aid of these innocent people after world war ii echo -- world war ii? richard: the answer is no. this was the man who intervened in korea. yourselfto try to move and powerfully. the right thing to do is what they did do. you fortify the west. you have the marshall plan. you put the pressure in places where you can actually make a difference like australia that was righted in for parts. greece,places like where was not clear how it was coming out.
then he had the nato arrangement. the difference between permanent and temporary sounds great except nobody knows what this particular line is. if you can see the wind, you have to recognize the other. the principle is the longer the alliance, the more courses this should be about making it. there is no per se rule. >> this is for mr. epstein. i'm very humbled with your rhetorical ability. [laughter] c feels compelled to step in. in that situation it is clear to see if somebody is being amoral or being friendly. i want to go into the issue that helping somebody, going back the
last 30-40 years, the actions of war or military actions have been with not to or altra state reasons. america has something behind it, whether it is for security reasons, geography, or empire building. we spelt a sense of duty to help our friends. calling it can treat friendly or this country moral or not moral -- gene: what is your question? richard: go back to the individual case and it is easy if you know that a is the good is the bad guy. but you may not be sure who started it. you may want to present -- prevents bloodshed but not want to take either side.
nobody in the history of western civilization has been able to come up with a way that is not completely useless. you can try to clear cases on opposite sides. when you venture into the international arena, you gave away the game. you said there are going to be mixed motives and we are not sure whether we are doing it to help the other guys. or we might have strong strategic interest to keep an oil line or military base open of one sort or another. you get those mixed situation and you have a rule that says you cannot go in when there is a categorical -- when there is a invasion of the third party. evenannot defend yourself on some things that may be indirect. you do not want the line between the two of them to be divisive. you take the circumstances on both hands of the problem and see how you put it together. christoper: richard raise the issue of interest. when the united states
intervenes to advance its interests. maybe he gets it wrong, maybe it guesses inter--- incorrectly, attempts to it advance american strategic interests, and safety. the question that you asked invokes a metaphor that i use in my book. the question is if we come upon a person drowning in the water, are we obligated to throw them a life raft yucca if we are there standing next to it, are we obligated to throw it in the water? should we feel a strong presumption to do so? -- what isebody throwing the life ring is not enough to save them. what if the person tries to come after you for saving the person in the first place. we have become involved in the middle of the dispute raps we do not on -- understand very well.
it is not as simple as it appears. i'm not accusing richard of saying it is simple. there are number of questions in ofrospect that had we known those things, we would've done something differently. that hindsight is 2020. it does not work. richard: it is a question of how you under these circumstances try to deal with uncertainty. the moment you have high levels of uncertainty, that is when categorical rules become more dangerous. in the good samaritan case, there is some interesting empirical work of a number of cases where people and easy rescues do not intervene. maybe one case in 1964. a number of people end up drowning people -- when they're trying to rescue people because they do not know how to do it.
the thought that you are going to compel people to rescue is not going to compel it in the international arrangement. you have to work long and hard before you get in there. it turns out there is not any way you can get read of discretion and discretion is an inescapable portion of human life. this is something that cannot be delegated to the private sector. christoper: i would say we do thateally disagree except there are two types of errors. intervening too often or intervening not often enough. we have disagree pretty strongly on where we draw that line. gene: next question. >> a special case of the good samaritan where i am walking down the street and there is an old woman getting beat up by a thug. i'm not sure where the aggression started. i know for certain that i can take the thug.
i know for certain that she will get hurt if i do not. how should i act? christoper: your obligations and your conscience are on you, the obligations of the u.s. government are borne by everybody. richard: this is true in every single case whether or not it is in defense of itself or not. the united states get involved in a case of direct force and it turns out there are huge numbers of dissenters. to go back to the question of representative government is a copout in this circumstance. we take them, they bind us all, it is always more difficult in the international arena because you have to figure out how you organize yourself. you are a representative of a corporation. some of your shareholders may disagree with you, but you are there on the scene and you start to do it.
our casesasy rescue the law is always taken the position in easy rescue cases, we do not compel you. the best reason for that is not the highest individual of autonomy, but there is not a problem to be solved. internationally, the stakes are higher. gene: next question. chrisquestion is for because i think i can deduce richards answer. but if i am wrong, he can tell me to should britain and france to the declared role -- war on germany? tould they have waited poland in 1939 as they did? or should they have waited longer until they were attacked. christoper: in 1938 the decision was a credential one. the british at that moment did not think themselves ready to wage war with not see germany
all by themselves. recognizement, they the nature of the danger but , they-- they guest wrong hoped they would have additional time to deal with that problem. the problem that the french undertook was a foolish one. they invested in the wrong defenses. the impulse at that particular moment was correct. trying to buy themselves time. it did not work. that does not mean that every subsequent decision along the same lines, no two cases are identical. it does not mean it is always wise to wage for before you are ready to do so. richard: this is a discretion question. the french were prepared to go in after hitler's and the british were not. and talk about britain never old chamberlain as though everybodydentical,
who look at what happened in the case of germany understands the banality motives. there is a wonderful thing about the heart of the beast of the american ambassador to germany in the 1930's. his instructions were be nice to the germans on anti-semitism so that maybe they will return the war dead. in poland is attacked by russia and germany, you do not have to intervene because it is not a direct threat on england or threat. gene: next question please. high, this is a question for both of you guys. fdr and his cohorts deliver early manipulated so american could complain -- declare war.
treaty between japan and germany, if one is attacked, so japan was clearly not attack. the roleermany enter with japan? there were no diaries kept in germany. ?ny of you guys know why christoper: that question i cannot answer. i can say the historical scholarship on the back door to war is unconvincing. i never believed that fdr did this to draw the united states into war. i will also point out that by the summer of 1941 the united states was already in coalition against germany. before that time we were already providing assistance. richard: do you think that was right or wrong? christoper: i think that was
correct that there was no direct threat. richard: the word direct now becomes -- christoper: no, that is not true. we have framed this question around whether or not there is a threat. i think that the justification, the legitimate justification for the united states to become involved in these disputes is the nature of the threat presented. the question is about when we are aiding friendly nations when we are not under threat. that the direct threat of a force means an attack on the united states or its citizens. the germans are now willing to move into a nonaggression treaty with the united states at the same time that the british are asking the assistance. -- under your view, either one of these are fine and the german one is better because they are going to keep you out. they have basically said they
are not coming across. let's go back to the washington thing. washington was right. we have one billion direct threats and no ability to help everybody at home. you want to make sure you defend yourself because you cannot move anywhere else. domestically, there is something known as the republican form of government clause. there are huge amounts of stuff in the original constitution, not only about foreign threats, but the view was if you are attacked by another state you could go to the u.s. government and get them to defend you under these circumstances. internal and ah little threads on you, the fact that you have energy to go thousands of miles away, he was right. thank god roosevelt did not follow him. great that roosevelt was or at least an excellent war president i do not want to talk about. gene: next question. >> question for both our
speakers. years, we have00 gone from a population of one billion people to 7.5 billion people. suggests is that we have plenty of resources and we have the capacity -- the technological capacity to meet our human needs. rather than limiting ourselves to game theory, which is what we are dealing with here, why don't we go beyond game. think about how we can cut everybody in. how we can include and cover everyone instead of going to war over resources? that is what we really go to war over 99% of the car. -- 99% of the time. takes to not like when they are talking about
wars. the reasons you get arms races is at this point in time, the russians and the chinese are vastly more dangerous than they were 10 years ago. that heagree with you was wrong. one of the things that chris and i do agree about is that global warming has been rather good to the extent it has increased the amount of biota out there which has basically increased the amount of arable land. which is one of the consequences not generally discussed in this debate. the cato people, you know, pat michaels have done some very good work on that. gene: forget what you guys agree about. richard: oh god for bid. gene: next question. >> being half british and half-korean i find this event rather interesting. my question is aimed directly at mr. preble. with the current norm with most countries being that if their sovereignty is attacked, that some sort of repercussion will be enforced by their allies do you not think it a more sensible
policy position to take that if your sovereignty is attacked unfairly, there will be repercussions, whether it is from the united states or global allies? rather than saying that if you get attacked, we will not do anything. what kind of precedent does that set for russia with estonia and lithuania literally shaking in their boots? when trump says, we're just not going to do anything. christoper: well, i'm glad you brought up mr. trump. he did, for the record. you all heard him. the situation that the united states has created for the world and that richard has been a great defender of, has written quite extensively about this, is pax americana, that the united states will be the de facto guarantor of the security of states that are not otherwise capable or willing, critical distinction, to defend themselves. i think that is a fundamental vulnerability in the current international system.
the international system has grown too dependent upon the power of a single state. a single state, that i would point out, is 5% of the population of the planet and 22% of its economic output, and both of those things are shrinking. our ability to sustain this over the long term is diminishing. it is getting harder for us to do this. meanwhile, the message that we have sent to our allies is, do not defend yourselves. or, do not feel a primary obligation to defend yourself because at the end of the day the united states will do it for you. now, an interesting thing as occurred in europe over the last six or eight months. when the mere suggestion on the part of mr. trump that he would revisit some of our obligations under article five. for example say article five, he did not say it quite this cleverly, but article five only applies if you only spend the minimum of 2% of gdp. the mere suggestion that donald trump might become the president
of the united states has invoked a certain measure of caution and hedging on the part of other countries. they are actually thinking seriously about defending themselves. i would never have recommended this process to arrive at that end state. if four years from now the average military spending in europe is closer to 2% of gdp, i don't think it will cross that, but if it is closer that, i ask you is that a bad thing? under the pax americana model, let's recall the purpose of that , was to discourage that sort of self-help behavior. richard: no, that is not what pax americana is as i understand it. it is a situation where you take a leadership role and that in taking that leadership role, you use your power not only to give force to other people but to encourage them to do it themselves by a constant carrot and stick kind of negotiation. to give you the other half of mr. trump, which i actually kind of welcome, i think his statement that the one china
policy is now at issue is an extremely welcome development. those guys have been much too thuggish making islands in the middle of the sea and then claiming sovereignty with respect to them. he is a very odd man to deal with. what i think is true about donald trump, unlike hillary clinton, is he is a high risk and high return man. we are going to be on a roller coaster for the next year. there's nothing whatsoever about pax americana which says don't do anything. so that when we did the first invasion, with respect to iraq, it was a coalition of 15 or 16 other nations. was it a good or a bad thing? well, it was good because you had it, but it was a bad thing in another way. to get the coalition, you could not overthrow saddam. you could only liberate kuwait. then you fought another war, and that one the united states essentially did alone. all i am saying is that all of these things are permissible. but if you have a rule that you cannot use force unless you are directly attack, they are all off the table. christoper: the use of force is always justified by any country in self-defense. so why would the united states
even imply that it was better for us and them, other countries, to rely on the united states primarily for their own defense. i want to emphasize that the way this was conducted and negotiated in the wake of world war ii, both in europe and in asia, it made perfect sense. these countries were broken and broke. they were in no position to defend themselves and we did not even really want them to. but the question is when were we going to revisit this bargain? when are going to say to other countries around the world that your primary obligation, your primary duty, any country's primary duty is to self-defense? that is what this debate is about. richard: no, it is not. christoper: but the primary obligation of a country is to self-defense. that is a core principle of international relations. gene: quick question. let's get the next question. you can save your observation for your summary. go ahead.
question? >> this is for both of you. how do you think our policy towards allowing or not allowing war refugees to immigrate to the u.s. how, if at all, will that affect future military intervention? richard: i will give the answer. to the extent that this problem results from passivity on intervention, what happens is it creates an impossible human situation. i understand the concern of trying to absorb huge numbers of individuals. but i think it is also a huge concern trying to put people in refugee camps without any visible account of your support. one of the reasons why i think that having gone in and wiped out isis, or not treated them like a jv like the current president has done, this would've been a situation where you could have averted these tragedies. you're talking 10 million refugees. you're talking maybe one million people dead because somebody says red lines in the sand do not matter. christoper: i struggle to
determine a policy that would have resolved the syrian civil war in a way that would not have driven millions of people from their home. that is what i'm struggling with. i'm trying to discern. you have conflated two related but not identical issues here, richard. there is a civil war being waged in syria since the arab spring. the assad government is not strong enough to win decisively and not weak enough to be defeated. another faction is fighting against them, and a third which happens to be isis and other extremist groups. i struggle to identify a military mission that the united states could have undertaken in syria that would've brought this conflict to a swift end. that is a tragedy. we have to recognize that. but i do not see it. gene: we have one minute to go. just one final question. go ahead. >> i have quick question to mr. richard.
i'm sorry, mr. chris. you're talking about necessity versus choice. i want to ask you about the practical application of that theory when it comes to a superpower. what mr. richard just said regarding a leadership role. being a leader indicates that you have to take a step when you are not attacked because either you do not want anymore bloodshed or you want to preserve your image as a superpower. practically speaking, when we talk about the middle east, what are the consequences of staying passive and taking no role which is what the obama administration did for syria? which is more bloodshed. and, what happened after the arab spring, a lot of casualties and mortalities. christoper: the passive role involves the obama administration arming individuals, groups, and organizations that they determined were the good guys in syria. they were the moderate
opposition, so to speak. that is the passivity. i think that did not work. meanwhile, our allies in the region, our so-called friends, are fueling the civil war. i do not see evidence of passivity on the part of outside actors. on the contrary, i see our various actions fueling this conflict. that is a great tragedy. gene: richard, you have five minutes. think about how you're going to vote. richard is now going to summarize for five minutes and then chris will summarize for five minutes. then we will go to the final vote. richard: there is a real question as to what is the exact proposition on the table about what america can do and what pax americana believes? when i say that you do not take the passive strategy of only intervening under those circumstances where there is a direct threat to you. i'm not saying that you go in in all cases. i'm not saying that most of these things are going to be right. i'm going to say that there is a panoply of strategies that you have to adopt.
what you do when you play pax americana is you start thinking about strategic alliances you could make. and these alliances are going to have carrots and sticks in which you try to give some assistance on the one hand and try to control people to move it. it is not just a military way in which this is going to be done. if you are engaged in a serious international negotiation, there are going to be all kinds of issues having to do with trade that are going to matter. when it comes to running these things, there is no automatic rule that i or anybody else can think of which will tell you when you do it and when you do not. what you can do is to be aware of the following proposition. i think the syrian situation illustrates that. right now, our options are vastly inferior to what they were four or five years ago when this thing started. russians have moved in and started an air zone. it turns out that the syrian government has retaken a number of towns like palmrya and all the rest. isis has started to move in there.
this has become a complete and total disaster. we are still sitting on the sidelines doing nothing. if you ask me whether there's anything we can do now directly in syria to deal with this, i am very pessimistic because i think the previous errors have created it. what about the situation in iraq? you have had -- god knows how many have been killed taking over mosul and other cities. it is very clear that the united states is already in this, but it is the same mistake that i mentioned before. you never going by half measures and that is exactly what the president has done. he has decided that ultimately we will win and in the short term there will be endless casualties, confusion, uncertainty, expenses, and so forth. if he had sent in a defensible force to take after 50,000 people in isis, he could've wiped them out. i think that would've been a better thing in these circumstances to do. right now it is just endless forms of senseless brutality that are taking place. it turns out the financial sanctions cannot work. oil can always get through. money can always get in.
what you have to do is look at these things. if you can show me we are making a mistake in a particular case, that is perfectly consistent with what i said. the question is whether there is any per se rule that you can do. the two per se rules are never get involved, the position chris is taking, and the one that obama is taking, never take commit yourself to the use of ground forces in any theater. that has created this situation. i cannot see to the bottom of the well today, but that is not a function of the position that i have taken. it is a function of the fact that we have a president that does not want to take this particular kind of position. what he does is that he decides to temporize in ways that are designed to compromise. what does this tell us? one of the reasons that we fail in international affairs has to do with the question that was raised previously about the difference between individual interventions on the one hand and collective interventions on the other. individuals do not have to make majority decision.
the great problem in american foreign policy today is that we have some hawks, a minority, and some doves, a majority. but the doves are little bit wonky about this. they would like to do something. when you have these two extremes, what you do is you compromise. you have some halfhearted intervention that does not work. the central theorem in this business, if you're going to go in do it right, otherwise you stay out. that was the position that powell took after the difficulties with respect to vietnam. it worked after the first and second iraqi invasions. pax americana, the use of force, does not just simply mean force, it means all complimentary resources. someone that thinks you can go in and bully these kind of things and not worry about the social structures on the ground and various kinds of systems you have to put in place does not understand it. for those of you who would like to see a model account of how the iraq thing was run between 2007 and 2008, read the story that petraeus wrote of what he
did on all fronts in "foreign affairs" in 2013. this was not some kind of mindless, stupid situation. you had a man of extraordinary competence. as i said before, in international affairs, there's no way you can dilute the authority. either you get good people, or your are going to pay a very high price. gene: thank you, richard. [applause] five minutes left for chris preble to speak for the negative. think about how you're going to vote. christoper: thank you, gene. thanks especially to richard for agreeing to do this. thanks to all of you for coming. i had a lot of fun. i hope you guys did too. let me close with a little story. i knew this guy in college, we will call him bob, that is not his real name. bob was one of my very dearest friends in college. he was a great guy, tell stories, have fun, do college things. everybody knew bob. he was gregarious, outgoing, everybody knew him. he also had his moments of
embarrassment. he would drink too much and be found stumbling around. i never stopped calling him my friend. i never stopped thinking of him as my friend. after we graduated, we stayed in touch. occasionally i would see him. i bailed him out of jail one time after a night of barhopping gone wrong. another time he asked me for a loan. i remember -- i don't remember how much it was, several hundred dollars. it seemed like a lot to me at the time, i was on an ensign's salary, which is not very much. i handed it over without hesitation. he was my friend, and i could do whatever i wanted with my money. he was my friend. friends do good deeds for friends all the time. all the time. i found this and i have to look -- i did not memorize this. there is a case back in 1367,
edward of woodstock, also known as the black prince. he went to war in castile for his friend, pedro, who is also known as pedro the cruel. pedro had been engaged in a long running fued with his brother, henry of trastamara. have you heard of him? henry was befriended by bertand du guesclin, nicknamed the black dog of broceliande. him and him these black dogs and black princes and cruel princes waged war on behalf of one another and the result was pretty nasty for the people who had the misfortune of following them into battle. they met in april of 1367 at the battle of navarrete. about 7000 killed and an equal number wounded. the black dog was captured but eventually ransomed by charles v who thought him a great military commander. he died of illness at the age of 60. but he died a hero's death.
not so lucky for those who followed him into battle. 300 years later, a guy you probably have heard of, louis xiv, began his personal reign as king of france. he too waged wars on behalf of his friends. he, like the black prince and the black dog, did not really much care about the people who suffered on account of his foreign adventures because, he said as we remember the immortal words of mel brooks,"it's good to be the king." somewhere along the way, between the time of the black dog and the sun king and today, somewhere along the way we adopted a different approach. our rulers are not expected to wage wars on behalf of their friends or distant relatives with their subjects serving them. our rulers are expected to serve us, our interests.
we who elevate them to high office. indeed, lest they be tempted by ties of friendship or kinship, we have created institutions that constrain their powers. richard epstein has written eloquently on the fact that this document -- richard: the cato version i hope. christoper: of course. 7 million copies or something like that. this document includes these enumerated powers. i can point to them. i know what they are. i find no enumerated power in this document that argues for the united states waging war on behalf of our friends. so, i submit that we can choose and should choose more wisely, guided by our interest.
that is consistent with the wishes of the american people. that is consistent with the wishes of the american people. that is consistent with our founding principles. vote no on the resolution. thank you. gene: thank you, chris. ok, please take out your cell phones and smartphones. the united states should be prepared to use force in defense of friendly nations, even when not subject to the direct threat of force. naomi brockwell, who is in charge of electronics, is looking at the screen as you vote. vote yes, no, or if you are still undecided, vote undecided. whoever moves the needle wins the tootsie roll. christoper: seems like we should have "jeopardy" music playing or something. gene: yes. richard is going to be singing a medley of songs, i believe, after the debate ends. he has been eager to do so.
whoever wants to stick around for that can do so. of course we will also be serving wine and cheese. you can enjoy richard's singing a little better on a couple glasses of wine. as you vote, as you consider. naomi, please come up to the stage if you would. i think the voting is coming in. naomi, where are you? there she is. when do you want to declare the vote is in. naomi: there are still lots of votes coming in. gene: there are still some votes coming in. >> tell a joke. gene: your vote will only be counted if you vote both times. this was a program, by the way, developed by our friend. if you vote both times, your vote will be counted. if you did not vote the first
time but you but the second time, it will not be counted. if you voted the first time but do not vote the second time, it will not be counted. it is only the people who vote both times. excuse me, do you have a question there? >> vote early and often. gene: no. this program is so brilliant that you can only vote once each time. yes, i'm sorry? the results are in. i'm going to announce this. now, all right. those who voted yes on the proposition were initially a little less than 38%. those who voted yes on the proposition after the debate were up to 45%. so that is the figure to beat. in other words, richard picked up about seven percentage points. those who voted no on the
proposition were 33%. those who voted no afterwards were 37%. while it was very close, richard takes the tootsie roll by about one percentage point. richard: what is interesting is the high number of undecideds. gene: high numbers of undecided. >> it was hacked. gene: a lot of undecideds. those numbers will be posted on the soho forum website for you to check out more precisely. as i said, it was about one third on each case. richard picked up a couple more points. they both moved up, but richard picked up a couple of more points than did chris so richard wins the debate. although, indeed, there were a considerable number of undecideds who were not the least bit influenced by either guy. thank you very much. [applause]
behind closed doors yesterday morning some members shared pictures on social media. conversations] >> he conveyed a sense of decency about the new administration coming in and donate to stay in the game and make sure that we protect to 20 million people who vote for the affordable care act would not have health care today to make sure that the role of government continues to look