tv Senators Seek Answers on Monitored Calls with Foreign Leaders at FISA... CSPAN July 1, 2017 2:46pm-4:45pm EDT
battle of concord. hear stories about the american revolution, and you can participate in a live program with your phone calls and tweets. watch american history tv, live from the museum of the american revolution -- thursday starting at 7:30 p.m. eastern on c-span3. next, the senate judiciary committee looks at reauthorizing section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveys and -- act, orrveillance fisa. this hearing included representatives from the office of the director of the national intelligence, national security agency, fbi, and justice department. it is just under two hours. >> this is an important issue that we have before us.
today's public hearing will be followed by a classified briefing tomorrow afternoon. this committee last held an oversight hearing on section 702 in may of 2016. beat ofen, the drum to terrorist attacks against the united states and other countries, particularly our allies, has continued. this has been a month after the hearing, terrorist attacks in killing 50htclubs, and wounding 53. terrorists have detonated bombs in new jersey and new york, injuring about 30. last month, great britain suffered its worst terror attack in over one decade, and a suicide bomber killed 22 and seriously injured many more in a concert in manchester. many of the dead and wounded, as
you know, were children and very young people. underscore the first responsibility of thatnment is to ensure those who protect us every day have the tools to keep us safe. when i said government, i should have said the united states government under our constitution. these tools must adapt to the technological landscape and the evolving security threats that we face. at the same time, of course, the rights and liberties enshrined in the constitution are fixed. they require our constant vigilance to maintain those. of fisa amendments act, which provides the government the authority to collect electronic you communications desk electronic
mutations of foreign orders that foreigners located outside the united states sits at the intersection of these responsibilities. under section 702, it is against the law to target anyone in the united states or any american citizen, wherever that citizen is on this globe. prohibitse also reverse targeting. that term means targeting somebody outside the united states for the purpose of targeting somebody inside of the country. under the statute, the fisa court must approve targeting and minimize asian -- minimize asian n procedures too those supposedy
to our subject to this surveillance. this implementation of the by all threeerseen branches of the government, including the appropriate inspectors general. after much debate and much discussion, this law was passed and signed by president bush in 2008. the obama administration requested that it be reauthorized without any changes , and congress did just that in 2012. now, president trump's administration is making the same request. accounts, section 702 has proven highly valuable in helping protect the united states. the privacy and civil liberties unequivocablyound
dashboard found unequivocably that section 702 has helped the united states learn more about the membership, leadership structure, priorities, tactics, and plans of international terrorist organizations, and has enabled the discovery of previously unknown terrorist operatives as well as the locations and movements of suspects already known to the government. and of the quote from that oversight board. that sectioncluded 02 has, quote, "lead to the discovery of previously unknown terrorist plots directed against the united states and foreign countries, enabling the disruption of these plots." and and of quote.
moreover, the board, the fisa court and other federal courts , have found the implementation of section 702 lawful and consistent with the fourth amendment. in addition the board proposed a , number of recommendations in its report to help improve the privacy and the civil liberty protections of section 702 program. according to the board's most recent assessment report, all of its recommendations have been part,ented in full or in or the relative agency has taken significant steps towards adopting these recommendations. 2016, a heritage foundation 702 is a "luded that critical and invaluable tool for american intelligence professionals and officials so vital to america's national
security that congress should reauthorize section 702 in its current form." end of quote. but as is always the case with policy issues here in the congress, particularly between the freedom of the american people and national security concerns, we do have questions and concerns that persist for some about sections 702's effect on these civil liberties. some of these concerns relate to communications incidentally collected when it turns out that a targeted foreigner is in contact with somebody inside the united states or with an american. but of course there's often no , way to know who a surveillance target may be in contact with beforehand. that's in part why they are under surveillance in the first place.
and these are situations where the program can be highly valuable by letting our government know if a foreign terrorist plot might reach our shores. still, the unknown scope of this incidental collection is concerning to many. we ought to understand that. some are also concerned with the way in which is t fbi permitted -- the fbi is permitted to search already collected 702 material. however it was precisely this kind of information sharing that was recommended by both the 9/11 commission and the webster commission that convened after the fort had attack that for two at attack -- fort hood attack. law enforcement needs to be able to protect the american people.
in addition, the recent fisa court administration that admonished the executive branch for failure to comply with the minimize asian -- min imumization--min as well. although these allegations haven't been directed for 702 specifically they are highly troubling. and leaks of classified information that damage our national security seem to continue unabated. i understand that no internal or external review to date has found any evidence of intentional abuse of section 702 for any reason whatsoever. nonetheless, it is important that congress made sure that it has not been so abused and it is
equally important that we ensure that the justice department has all the tools that it needs to prosecute leaks of classified information. so taking all these things into consideration, one of the main purpose for having this, national security has to be at the top of the list. and so we welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony today and don't forget the classified briefing tomorrow. senator feinstein? senator feinstein: thank you very much. i to welcome our witnesses. welcome our witnesses. i know they are rather grim faced. i hope there will be a smile or two forthcoming. i want to say thank you for holding this hearing. let me begin by saying i fully support reauthorization of the
fisa amendments act including section 702. earlier this month the , intelligence committee, of which i am a longtime member along with senator cornyn held a , hearing on section 702 of pfizer. this will likely neen intelligence will be passing a -- likely mean intelligence will be passing a bill very shortly. in fact senator cotton and a , number of other republican senators on the intelligence committee have offered a bill which would permanently authorize the fisa amendments act, including section 702 without the five year sunset. i would note, however that , senator cotton's bill was referred to this committee, the judiciary committee, and there is a reason -- and that is because this committee has the jurisdiction over both fisa and 702, particularly given the
impact on americans' communications and privacy. so i think it's important that our committee get to work quickly on reauthorization of which as we know is a very 702, critical program in the collection of valid intelligence. let me state at the outset that i believe any reauthorization should include a sunset provision, and without it, it will not have my support. congress has an important role to play in these measures. society changes, the world changes, technology and communications change. a sunset allows us to review and revise such as may be necessary due to technology changes as well as other changes that happen at such a rapid pace. currently, the government is required to obtain approval from the fisa court every year before
continuing its content collection under 702. congress should have this same ability to review and evaluate this program on a periodic basis. a sunset provision allows us to do just that. as a matter of fact it's five years now, i would urge that it he six years because that takes it outside of an election year. let me restate that i fully support the 702 program. i believe it's a vital counter terrorism tool. the intelligence committee under both democratic and republican administrations has consistently stated that the program produces critical foreign information to protect the nation against international terror and other threats. the privacy and civil liberties oversite board that has conducted an extensive review
of the 702 program and concluded -- i quote -- "the information the program collects has been valuable and effective in protecting the nation's security and producing useful foreign intelligence. the section 702 program also includes a number of safeguards to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties. under current law, for example, section 702 authorizes the targeted collection of the content of internet and phone communications only -- and i of foreigners who are located outside of the united states. underline for the purpose of gathering intelligence information. there have been some compliance incidents over the
years, there has never been a finding of intentional abuse of 702 authorities. never. the privacy and civil liberties oversight board found and i quote "no trace of any such illegitimate activity associated with the program or any attempt to intentionally circumvent .egal limits the relevant inspectors general and dedicated internal oversight personnel at the justice department odni. the another reform we might take a look at his requiring the fisa court to appoint an outside .ounsel known as an amicus
each time government seeks court approval of its annual certification that happens every helpful int's reassuring people that there is an independent individual in the court reviewing these matters. i want to thank you for calling this hearing since we have the jurisdiction to play this role and i hope we can get our act together and take a look at the here that senator cotton has introduced and that but with a sunset clause. thank you, mr. chairman.
>> our staffs of the highest level have been talking about the process and we will wait for it to be delivered to us. i am going to introduce each of you and then you will speak to my left and right. we will have five rounds of questions general acting consul for the office of director of national intelligence and previously worked as an attorney at an international law form. mr. brooker is a graduate. stuart evans serves as deputy assistant attorney general of
the united states department of justice. he previously served in a number of positions within the department of justice national security division, including chief and deputy chief of the office of intelligence counterterrorism unit. he obtained his bachelor's degree from the university of pennsylvania, and his law degree from columbia university. carl -- he leads the operations and intelligence efforts in national security matters, ranging from terrorism to espionage and weapons of mass destruction. in 2014 he was appointed specially to be in charge of the washington field office is counterterrorism programs and served as assistant to the
counterterrorism division. he earned a bachelor of arts degree and a -- from washington university. he is the debbie counsel for operations at nsa. he oversees the agencies practice groups for legislation, intelligence all, and information assurance and cyber security. mr. morris received his bachelor degree from the university of maryland and his law degree in george washington university. would you please start, mr. brooker? if you have longer statements, they will be put in the record. when the red light comes on, try to summarize as best you can to finish shortly thereafter. proceed.
chairman grassley mr. brooker: , we all want to thank you for holding this hearing and having us today. as you know, intelligence election has produced and continues to produce significant intelligence that is vital to protect the nation, whether that be from counterterrorism or cyber threats. the same time, it reboots -- provides protection of civil liberties of our citizens. it is the intelligence community's top priority. i want to give an example of section 702. before rising to the ranks to become second in the race of isis, he was a teacher. his transformation to a terrorist caused the united states government to offer a $7
million reward or information leading to him. it made him a leading focus efforts. and i say, along with its partners, spent over two years looking for him. this search was ultimately successful primarily because section 702. based almost exclusively on intelligence activities under 702, nsa collected a significant body of foreign intelligence about the activities of him and his associates. nsa learned about an individual closely associated with him. nsa been used permission authorized under section 702 to collect intelligence on close associates, which allowed nsa to develop a robust body of knowledge concerning the personal network of him and his close associates. over two years, using section 702 collections and in close collaboration with i.t. partners, nsa produced more intelligence on the associates and their location.
nsa and technical partners combined this information with other intelligence assets to identify him and track his movements. this collaboration enabled u.s. forces to attempt in apprehension of him and associates on march 24 of last year. during the attempted apprehension operation, shots were fired at u.s. forces from his location. u.s. forces turned fire, killing him and his other associates at that location. collection confirmed his death. this is one example. we would like to discuss more examples of the classified section. the purpose of the authority is to give the u.s. government the upper hand in trying to avert attacks on citizens and allies before they transpired. section sunday to provide strong
protections of our citizens. -- 702 provides strong protections of our citizens. it has several legal restrictions that protect the rights of our citizens. the program is subject to rigorous and frequent oversight by all three branches of government. we are particularly proud of our oversight, and the audit is committed -- we have not once had an intentional violation of the law. there have been mistakes, but a system with zero compliance independence -- incidents. a recent example, nsa identified a compliance incident in the section to upstream collection.
they insured was identified, reported, they work together to find a solution proposed a new set of procedures, and we moved forward. before i conclude, i want to speak about one issue that has been subject to public discussion. there has been a push from congress and the active community to attempt to count the number of u.s. persons were incidentally required -- acquired under 702 election. nsa had made efforts to respond to the question asked. we were unable to develop an accurate and cost-effective methodology. i want to be clear. to determine if communicants are u.s. persons, nsa would be required to conduct additional research to determine whether individuals, who may not be of any foreign intelligence interest at all are u.s. persons. we would be asking trained analysts -- we find this
unpalatable. those analysts would have to be shifted from focus areas. he cannot justify such a diversion of critical resources, particularly at a time where we face in adversity of threats. even if we decided they were justified and had unlimited staff to tackle the problem, we do not believe it is possible to get accurate, measurable results. it would be impossible to determine every identity. with that, i would like to turn it over to mr. evans. mr. evans: thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. with his introduction as a background, we want to turn to a discussion about why became necessary for congress to enact section 702.
fisa was first passed in 1970 is eight, creating waves of government to attain individualized probable cause based court orders or electronic surveillance, suspected spies, terrorist, and foreign officials located inside the united states. originally enacting fisa, the cost out of the regime and surveillance was directed at foreigners abroad. in foreigners located abroad are not protected by the fourth amendment. individuals located inside the u.s. are. defining electronic surveillance based on technology in existence at the time. in the early 1970's, overseas communications were predominantly carried by satellite. fisa was passed in 1978 and did not require a court order for the collection of those overseas satellite communications.
an example, if in 1980, they intercepted a satellite communication of a foreign terrorist abroad, no court order was required to intercept that communication. by 2008, technology had changed considerably. first, u.s. based you mail services were being used by people all over the world. the overseas communications in the 1970's that were carried by satellite work more care -- commonly carried by fiber-optic cables. the really -- a traditional fisa court order was required to compel the company to assist. a court order can only be obtained based on a showing of probable cause, if the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. it is a difficult, time-consuming process areas
because of change it -- time-consuming process. the same resource intensive legal process was being used to conduct surveillance of foreigners located abroad not protected by the fourth amendment. by enacting section 702 in 2008 and renewing it in 2012, both times with open public debate and bipartisan support, congress connect -- corrected this anomaly and restore the balance. i will not going to extensive detail in my remarks regarding the legal framework, but i will note a few key items. -- authorizing intelligence information that the intelligence committee might acquire. the statute requires targeting procedures and minimization
procedures. targeting procedures in the guidelines set forth the rules in which the intelligence community assures that only foreign entities abroad are targeted. the minimization procedures protect information of citizens that is active -- accidentally acquired. they require each certification to make sure that the government program is complying. we have released slightly redacted versions to ensure the the section 702 program is subject to rigorous and frequent oversight at all three branches of government. the first is within agencies themselves. the vast majority of incidents of noncompliance reported are self-reported by the participating agencies.
doj and equity and i -- we have regular engagements with and extensive reporting to congress about section 702. the judiciary and intelligence committee has received relevant opinions of the fisa court and associated pleadings, and descriptions and analyses. the fisa court itself regularly chunks -- checks our work. the members of the fisa court are federal district court judges appointed by the chief justice to serve in addition to the regular responsibilities. as we have seen, their review of the government compliance section 702 is exacting and thorough.
reviews of the program conducted by doj have shown that era rates are extremely low, consistently less than 1%, and we have never found an intentional violation in the program. this is not just our own conclusion. in 2014, the oversight board confirmed the findings. the board unanimously stated "it was impressed with the effort to make sure that it acquires only to communications it is authorized to collect and it targets only the persons it is authorized to target." when it happens, we make sure they are reported and corrected. with that background, i will turn to my colleagues from the fbi. >> members of the committee, good morning and thank you for this opportunity to discuss 702.
it is an extremely valuable tool for the fbi. every fbi division conducting investigations uses 702. let me share with you an example in which i am exercising my discretion, can be determined as declassified to help people better understand the value of section 702. in october 2013, the fbi started investigating sean parsons. this was done after he posted comments online, expressing his desire to commit an attack. we used a range of investigative pulls and techniques, including section 702.
we did this in an effort to detect any attack that was underway and assess his influence. in november 2014, parsons became vocal online. it revealed that he was a member of a prolific isis network. he was a key player in this network. the network used the internet and social media to distribute prolific amounts of propaganda. they encouraged their online followers to carry out attacks in europe and united states. they use social media daily. they spread their message, encouraging people to attack. he was a native english speaker. he appeared in an isis
recruiting video. this isis network identified american military men and women and posted their names and addresses online. they instructed online flowers to kill the -- online followers to kill them, behead them in their own homes, stabbed him to death as they walk the streets. he personally encouraged followers to attack u.s. police officers, military bases located in colorado, ohio, and soft targets in new york city and los angeles. information obtained not only revealed his persistent terrorist propaganda but was also instrumental in identifying other members of his network. the fbi share this information with the rest of the u.s. intelligence committee. we shared it with trusted international partners. sharing his contacts with international partners was critical as it led to the identification of isis
supporters in those countries. it prevented attacks and those countries as well. he was eventually killed in syria in september 2015. we talk next about the fbi's practicing the 702 collection. with regard to that collection, it is important to remember that behind me -- receives a small amount. yet they i only received a small amount of the downstream collection and none of the upstream collection. the fbi can only request and receive section 702 corrections if the selector is relativement -- relevant to a pending investigation. fbi cannot receive section 702 corrections during pleura luminary assessment -- preliminary investigation.
those queries are a small fraction of the 702 collection acquired by the u.s. government. when the fbi runs a u.s. person identifier through the database, that query is run against only the fbi 702 collection, not the total collection maintained by nsa. isis numbers located overseas. after those communications are collected, they retain in our databases. later, when we suggest that a u.s. person might pose a threat, one of the best investigative threats -- steps is to determine
what kind of threat we are dealing with. this is what helps us connect the dots. i am aware that some critics have suggested the fbi should obtain a warrant before querying a u.s. person against our 702 collection. imposing a want when severely hamper our operations -- warrant would severely hamper our operations. this is indirect, through the direction of the commission. i am happy to answer any questions you might have about this particular subject during the course of this hearing. thank you for a line me to make these remarks. i will turn it over to mr. morrison. >> mr. chairman, ranking member, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today about the amended act and specifically section 702, which is a critical
national security authority. it may only be used by the intelligence committee to target foreign persons located outside the united states. i name is paul morris. -- my name is paul morris. i have been with the intelligence committee -- community for almost 30 years. every day i had the opportunity to see the importance of section 702 to the united states national security. i also participate in the robust oversight regime that governs section 702. there are two subjects i want to speak with you about today. section 702 is one of the most valuable operational authorities the intelligence community has. it is responsible for thousands of intelligence reports a year. nsa's analysis of section 702
collection discovery communications of a member of a major terrorist group in the middle east who was communicated -- communicating about how to commit a terrorist attack. they discovery communications where the individual in europe was discussing the purchase of material to build a suicide bomb. they tried to deter further attacks. we as section 702 to learn about sanctions division activity by restricted country. it provided information that was key to interrupting shipment of goods. it goes beyond finding terrorists and stopping shipments of sentient goods. i can share for the first time publicly the example of hell section 702 protects the american public when they use their smart phones.
in 2016, thanks in part to nsa section 70 two corrections, the agency was able to obtain intelligence on a state-sponsored phone application that impacted several security and was not publicly known. as of this discovery, the app was removed from market places. it illustrates help -- how all of us are better off. the robust oversight of the governed -- government program. it begins with the decision to nominate a foreign person for targeting. and nsa analyst must conduct research to determine what the proposed target is a foreign person located at of the united states who is likely to provide foreign intelligence communication that is been executed -- communication.
after the analyst makes that initial determination, two other nsa were -- employees must review the host targeting before the targeting occurs. finally, a copy will be provided to the department of justice for external review. in addition to the targeting process, general counsel worse hand in hand with operators at every stage of the process in targeting, reporting, ensuring compliance with the law. we have a separate compliance group, which regularly performs reviews. the compliance group also examines 702 activities to look for ways to further improve the agencies pressure -- posture.
this leads me to one important finding that mr. brooker mentioned. identified a compliance matter that led to our announcement in april of the suspension of the question. they come with heightened privacy concerns. we terminated a collection after conference of review with the operational loss. ultimately, we concluded we would stop clutching the communications but retain the aspect of 702 corrections that is currently providing the most operational value. nsa extends resources examining its use of 702 to ensure that the program is operationally
effective and protective of americans privacy. thank you. i look forward to your questions. >> we will have five minute rounds. mr. evans, before i ask your question, i will give this background. some people have suggested that the government should have to give judicial or even a warned before searching lawfully collected section 702 information, using the u.s. person information, such as name, phone number, or email address, particularly in non-national security investigations. what is the administration's view of whether there is any legal or constitutional reason why this is necessary? what would be the impact of congress decided to add a warrant requirement before agents could conduct these database checks?
mr. evans: the executive branch has outlined in several filings and court pleadings that are public what our position on this is. legally speaking, under the statute and fourth amendment of the constitution, a warrant is not required to conduct the queries. the first thing to understanding why that is the case is understanding what a query is. we are not acquiring any new information. we are not conducting any additional surveillance. it is a targeted review of information already in our possession that we have gathered to surveillance previously of a foreigner located overseas. that matters for fourth amendment purposes because whether a warrant is required under the fourth amendment matters on how you acquired the information. here, all the information we are talking about was required --
acquired from foreigners located abroad and collected for foreign intelligence purposes. every court should consider this issue. they've reached the conclusion that as a legal matter, a warrant is not required to collect that information in the first place and is not required to review it after we subsequently collected it. as a policy matter, including a warrant requirement would effectively, as a practical matter, private these crews to be done for a wide range of reasons. a query is a baseline investigative techniques that is used in the early stages of an investigation to roll someone in or out, to connect the dots. it is often the case that probable cause will not exist. that is one reason it is,. if second reason is time and volume.
requiring a court order for them would effectively grind the whole fisa process to a halt. >> before i ask you a question, and a recently declassified april 2017 decision, the fisa court revealed that it was concerned about an institutional lack of candor on nsa's part concerning its reporting and compliance with section 702 minimization procedures. in addition, the court seem to have very hard words for the fbi, saying "the court was concerned about the fbi's apparent disregard of minimization rules and whether the fbi may be engaging in disclosure of raw section 702
information that had not been reported." i think it is really important and satisfying. what are the nsa and fbi doing to address these specific concerns of the court? this will have to be my last question. both answer, if you would. >> i will go first. we take our duty of candor to all of our overseers mary we're very seriously. collier be for judge what she meant specifically when she wrote that in the opinion. my understanding of what happened is as follows. we had initially identified that we made some errors of u.s. person queries against our
upstream collection. since 2011, our minimization procedures have prohibited any u.s. persons queries running against upstream collections, largely because of issues. we reported the initial query in 2015 when we made our initial report. our inspector general and compliance group had separate reviews on going to try to determine the scope and scale of the problem. during the course of filing the renewal for 702 certifications pending, the court held a hearing in early october 2016, when asked about various compliance matters about the improper queries. we reported on the status of awe reported on the status of those investigations at that time. about two or three weeks later, the office of inspector general completed its follow-up review
of u.s. person query and discovered the scope of the problem was larger than we originally reported. as soon as we identified the problem was larger than what we thought it was, we notified the justice department and odni. the court was notified. it led to a couple of extensions of the certifications, and ultimately our decision to terminate a bounce collection. my sense is that the institutional lack of candor referred to was frustration that when we had the hearing on october we do not have the full scope and scale of the problem until later, which was reported october 24. that that was how i take it.
the agency believes it is absolutely essential job full transparency with overseers. in terms of how we're using the authority and to report only make errors. seriously takes very its reputation for candor whether it's before this committee or the pfizer court. the fbi welcomes the oversight by the fisa court. critical to what we do to make sure that we have other eyes ensuring that we are compliant with the laws and the constitution. with this opinion, there are two general issues that were identified. the first issue involved the evidence of a crime query that the court focused on, and there
was an issue with respectively porting that particular matter in a timely fashion. we had a situation where a national security analyst was conducting a query against 702 collection, during the course of that query, identified potential evidence of a crime involving child abuse. following up, trying to determine if there was any other information with respect to that incident conducted a second query which can be considered searching for evidence of a crime. no additional information was found by the analyst, but that information was asked to the appropriate authorities to ensure that the victim child was to -- protective. there was an issue with reporting that matter in a timely fashion. moving forward, we are going to ensure with him i.s. with the policies already in place.
we will ensure our national analysts and agents are educated with respect to those pitfalls. senator feinstein. >> thank you. unwanted to talk to about issue. staff my intelligence your today. we have been trying to look for an amendment. let me see if i understand the issue correctly. nsa is itis year the to be and the as practice in gathering part of upstream collection and 702. as i understand it, an example of an about is an email that includes the targeted in mail emails in the body of the , even though neither the sender or the receiver are themselves targeted areas that correct?
>> yes, that's correct. just added important to remember that at least one of the centers are recent bands. -- recipient. >> the nsa have noted the intent retain the upstream collection that provides the greatest value to national security while reducing the acquireod that nsa will communications of u.s. persons or others who are not in direct contact with one of the agencies , foreign intelligence targets. about --sa statement upstream activities. approach, with the nsa work with us on trying to work something out that covers this issue properly? can do that that we
legislatively, but i would like your comments. >> yes, ma'am. from nsa's perspective we would be nervous about a legislative prohibition about the collection for a couple of reasons. the reason we terminated it, we did not have today the technical means to make us comfortable that our analyst would be able to comply in all cases terminated it for that very reason. do you believe that the way to handle it is to terminate it over all russian mark --? given an of time we might be able to come up with a technical solution that addresses the arts concern. the courts concern.
off.is always a trade what is the foreign intelligence loss? --we are able to recover >> is that notable for an intelligent loss -- intelligence loss? from a counterterrorism standpoint we would be interested to know that to people we did not know about already have a gmail address of a terrorist who practices really good communications security. that is an interesting fact to us. why we have hesitance about a statutory bar to resuming -- >> the other thing that is important to keep in mind if nsa were to develop a tech knowledge he or additional to address this
issue we would have to go back to the fisa court. is turnedre if this back on it is done so in a lawful and appropriate way. >> what do you suggest we do about about? nothing? try to work with an essay on an amendment? we would rather get it right than wrong. if everybody could comment. this is going to be a big issue. >> we should not do an amendment to rate authorization. for the dni. >> from a justice department perspective the fisa court has on occasions found the about collection to be lawful under the statute and constitution. from our perspective, this isn't so much a legal issue is it is a technical issue. whether nsa can develop more
robust technology and more robust procedures. senator, the more data we have that is at our disposal, the better and more efficient we are at finding potential attackers here in the united states. if there is a technological way to resolve the issue and if we would have a lawful manner in which to conduct dark worries -- conduct our queries that will be helpful to us. opposes a statutory itnge at this point because would possibly have unintended consequences. we don't think it will be a good idea at this time. >> thank you. >> mr. morris, i have numbers , in 2016 3914 702 reports
contained identities. in that number come from their agency? >> that can provide dni transparency report. one thousand 934 of u.s. persons identified were originally masked but later unmasked. is it possible for this committee to find out who made those unmasking requests? >> i believe we have a request like that pending, i would have to take that back. if i plug into the russian ambassador in the u.s. and he has been nominated as a >> target, with my conversations be incidentally collected? >>on those facts are russian ambassador inside the u.s. could not be a target. >> with every a warrant required? >> you would have to get a title
i order. >> senator from a legal perspective, -- >> ford officials inside the u.s. surveillance would have to be conducted conducted to a traditional fisa order. the nsa assume that advisor in transition is talking to the russian ambassador and the ambassador is outside the u.s.. can you collect about a war rent? warrant?nd- abroad wasoreign -- >>ably expected to then yes. if years in the u.s. you can only collect if you have a traditional warm is that correct? >> yes. >> is impossible to find out if
was incidentally collected talking to a foreign leader abroad? is that possible russian mark -- question mark us fromstricts deliberately -- >> am i entitled to that information? the minimization procedures permit us -- am i entitled as a u.s. senator at you know if my conversations with a foreign person overseas was collected and if somebody made a request to unmask me? >> if it is a member of congress, there is an intelligent report that reports on activities that include you , bya foreign minister default your identity is going
to be masked. if there is a nine request to unmask the identity there is the gate or seizure that was thatlished in the 1980's requires the agency to seek approval from the dni to -- >> at my entitled to knock that happened to me? nobody has notified me i assume i was not collected upon. the notifications go to the leadership. >> i am asking about may not the leadership. i want to know if i'm overseas -- if i'm talking to a russian ambassador in the united states y'all are listening. if you believe the papers. i don't know how you are listening, i don't really mind if you listening. i do mind if somebody can take that conversation and use it against me politically great is that possible under the current system? >> i agree that any political
use of intelligence is wrong. >> would you agree that whoever leaked the conversation between mr. flynn and the russian ambassador did damage to the surfline? >> -- to mr. flan? if they are collecting on the foreign leader i want to know is it possible for somebody in the a hold oftion to get the conversation and unmask me? is that possible? yes -- i mean -- >> is it possible for me to know if that happened? >> the notification that happened-- >> can i find that out, yes or no? to find outal right if my government has monitored a conversation between me and it for later?
and if anybody had access to the conversation. >> we have worked with the chair the ranking members to support member request for questions on gates. >> is it legal or not for me to make that ruling? >> is my understanding we have a request from you and we are processing it. >> mi ever going to get it in my lifetime? if you're not going to give it to me tell me why. i wish my colleagues would appreciate what he is trying to do and give him a little extra time. so what's the deal. there is anything people are entitled to it is entitled to an answer to the questions. >> if i were you i would answer my question, because he is mad.
what is the answer here? am i ever going to get to know the basic facts. if i'm going to be monitored overseas, maybe there's a good reason to monitor. i want to know what consequence flows my way, if somebody in my own administration doesn't like me, the other administration doesn't like me, should i be worried about that conversation falling into the hands of political people that one day may be used against me? as professionals, i don't think you should be concerned. my question. i'm very concerned until i get an answer. >> we have your request and i and we are working on it. >> what is keeping you from answering that question. we try to narrow it with your staff they said anything and everything which require every news clip-- >> i don't want news clips.
i want to know four people were monitored. we are working with your staff to try to get you an answer as quickly as possible. answerhere an a legal why you can't answer that question. >> are you satisfied? >> noble will move on. >> senator franken. >> senator klobuchar. thank you very much. this is following up on what senator graham was talking about. oversight inur more general terms. --now that -- just a phone
testified recently and he said that section supplement to surveillance provides critical born intelligence that cannot practically be obtained through the muslim. and i agree -- other methods. maybe we can give some examples from you about that. see from senator graham's questions we have a lot of reasons to want to do oversight on behalf of the public. notably, your joint testimony urges congress to reauthorize without a sunset provision. this would effectively mean that congress would not have to take up pfizer reauthorization, we could have hearings but no leverage to get changes or work on things. we would not have the opportunity to discuss what is working and not working as we did today. can you provide more construct -- context as to why the
administration wants this reauthorize without a sunset provision? is that set in stone? >> all-star. i will start. we have a decade of experience. review after review have shown there have been mistakes but nothing intentional. i think the statute is built with a significant amount of transparency into it. whether or not there is a sunset, this body, through oversight, has the ability to do the exact oversight you are talking about. to report client -- compliance -- there are mechanisms built into the law to allow congress to do the oversight whether there is a sunset or not. dealing with important
privacy issues and that balance between security and rather see, what we have decided with bipartisan support is that we want to be able to have that leverage to be able to make changes. a lot of our laws have sunset provisions. i still go back to is this set in stone that the administration doesn't want to have a sunset provision and hair? >> i would say we would like a sunset. mr. evans do you want to add anything? reinforce one of the points made about the continual producet, we were -- we not just significant sisal --fisa court opinions, those are then subject to three things
from staff as appropriate. it's a continual oversight process that congress is engaged in. should there be something troubling that congress becomes congresses it is prerogative. you did hear the senator's remark that she would not support this without a sunset. very good. i think we all agree there needs to be a balance to strike between protecting the civil liberties of american and protecting the public from attacks. the value of this section in terms of helping us protect the american public. , ats a critical tool for us the same time we respect the privacy issues.
echo what my colleague said, in additional to the doj, weional oversight, all have procedures we comply with every day. we have our monthly audit set are conducted. we have training systems -- sessions that are conducted. the lack of a sunset provision will not do away with those layers of oversight, or the authority of any of the intelligence committees. one of the reasons we are seeking a permanent reauthorization is a sunset the status ofes the law unsettled and you don't -- is thisr you are something i will have to worry about next year or the year after that.
we want some sense of continuity because it is not just the government implementing this. the providers have requirements i have to consider. important for the intelligence professionals who do the work every day. the reauthorization is a vote of confidence that they are doing the work well and the tools that they use to produce valuable for intelligence will still be there come january. >> i think it is pretty clear, , i have a lotein of respect for the people doing this work. i sighed more on the security .ide in terms of that necessity i think when we have these unsettled issues, i don't think everything is settled. as you can see from the exchange with senator graham, this is why want the sunset
provision to stay in place. you to all of you for being here and for your testimony. there arebe clear, good reasons for us to have concerns about the application of this law. the american people have long understand that the power can be abused. up about 40oncluded years ago that in every presidential administration from fdr through next and, the administration preceding the work of the special committee. the intelligence gathering agencies have been used to engage in political espionage. this is very significant. it is a concern to anyone who works in this city or in government in any way. in addition to that, there is a reason why we have the fourth
amendment. there are all kinds of implications that extend beyond the political round. the right of the accused need to be protected and we want government to be able to do its job to protect us from those outside our country. we want to make sure the same authorities cannot be used to harm individuals. the fourth amendment makes government less efficient and makes it more difficult to be the government. it is also necessary. regardless of which political party is at the head of it, it is important that we do not lose touch with the fourth amendment. 702 authorizes the surveillance of certain foreign intelligence activities. that definition includes information that is directly related to things like national security and national defense, things that are directly related
>> this later category is much broader. it is used to target most anyone abroad, including political activists, human rights volunteers, business people, students, journalists, doctors -- just about anyone traveling abroad. at a hearing before this committee earlier this year, the fbi director testified that it would not be automatic for the fbi to limit election of foreign intelligence information to information that is it self limited much more to the national security universe. so let me start by asking mr. evans and mr. brooker, would this be problematic question mark is there any reason why we could not and should not limit the use of section 702 two something that is related to a national security threat? >> thank you senator. i am family with the exchange you had with then-director comey during that priority hearing. and while i certainly cannot speak for what he was thinking with his answer, as i understood his answer i think he was referring to the fbi use of 702, which as mr. gaddis described, the fbi can only receive section 702 information when it is part of an authorized investigation they are conducting which typically relate to the kind of threats director comey described. as to talking about potentially changing the definition of foreign intelligence information more broadly, that would be difficult to do in an open session here without having the ability in the classified
section, which we could do tomorrow, to describe to the specific types of collection that are ongoing now and how any changes might affect that. >> is section 702 currently used abroad to target people who are themselves not related to national security threats? >> section 702, i will walk through the statute briefly. it could be used to collect on foreign intelligence information as it defines the statute. within that, there are certain certifications executed by the director of national intelligence which describes specific kind of foreign intelligence information. those certifications are classified, so i cannot get into them here. and importantly, to your point about targeting an innocent foreigner overseas, a foreigner overseas can only be targeted under section 702 if there is a
reasonablebelief leave that that person is likely to communicate or possess foreign intelligence information as it results -- relates to specific certifications. that justification laying out why that person is likely to communicate or possess that information has to be documented by the analyst and is subject to back end auditing by the department of justice and the director of intelligence to make sure it is directly related to the actual topic of the certification.
>> mr. chairman, is it ok if the answers? >> thank you. this is about the discussion for tomorrow when we can go into the detail of the type of targets under 702. >> thank you mr. chairman. i would like to thank you and the inking member for holding today's hearing. the subject of today's hearing strikes at the heart of the debate about how to safeguard national security without trampling on americans fundamental right to privacy. as i said before but i think it bears repeating, when the american people understand the scope and scale of our surveillance programs they are better able to judge for themselves if the government is appropriately balancing private and public safety. that is why i am focused on the issue of transparency, most recently back in 2015 when congress debated and passed the usa freedom act. usa freedom was a bipartisan bill to reform our surveillance programs and i was proud to join mike friend senator dean heller
in writing the bills transparency provisions. when the public lacks even a rough sense of the scope of surveillance they no way of knowing if the government is striking the right balance. so we wrote the provisions that now require the government to detail annual reports collected under our surveillance authorities. certain surveillance programs, the government must also say how many times the information was searched or americans information. that is important stuff. as a former general counsel for the office of dreck of national intelligence said, "with secrecy inevitably come both suspicion and the possibility for abuse." so in my view, transparency is critical to gain the public trust and guard against misuse. transparency was critical with respect to the reporting required by usa freedom and it is critical with respect to the number of americans inadvertently swept up in 702 i remainn, so
disappointed that despite bipartisan demand for this information, we still do not even have an estimate of how many americans have had their phone calls or emails collected under section 702. members of the senate intelligence committee have asked for an estimate. civil society groups have asked. for an estimate. other representatives have asked for an estimate, but no one has received a satisfying answer. do you agree with former odni counsel general about "there would have been less public outcry from the snowden leaks if the government was more transparent about its actions activities beforehand." you believe without transparency that we risk suspicion and the possibility
for abuse? >> i think we all agree that transparency is important. you can see in our transparency report that we released, largely with your leadership, we went beyond what the law requires. transparency is continued in this administration for the first time of the targeting used under these procedures. i want to stress, our inability to release a number on the number of incidental usp's collected is not for want of trying. we can collect this tomorrow and nsa can walk through the herculean efforts they have gone through in order to find a way to do it that is responsive. coming to a conclusion that there is not a way to produce a transparent number that is meaningful to the debate. it is not something that is raw,
accurate. we are happy to get into the tomorrow. sen. franken: director coats said it would be infeasible to come up with a way to count the number of americans whose communications are collected under 702. help me understand this -- is your contention that our intelligence agencies, while they are capable of collecting vast quantities of information
-- phone calls, emails, and sifting through that data for specific info like a name and phone number, but agencies are somehow not capable of counting how many americans are swept up in that surveillance? mr. brooker: that is right senator. if you look at an email, our target will be in that email. we don't know our targets are talking to. you can't tell whether firstname.lastname@example.org is a u.s. person or not based simply on his email address. we know our targets are foreign or overseas but cannot identify with out significant research more. sen. franken: claim out of time, but i would ask if there is possible to come up with an estimate in those specific numbers. it seems to me we are already capable of coming up with the estimate. a 2011 opinion by the fisa court revealed that the nsa previously reviewed a random sample of "internet transaction" in order to determine the number of those communications that were wholly the mystic. i think we can come up with an estimate. thank you for your indulgence. >> thank you mr. chairman and thanks to our witnesses for being here to talk about the crown jewels of the intelligence committee when it comes to keeping america safe. i can't help but offer a thought on the questions my friend
senator franken asked about wanting to identify the number of americans incidentally collected against. as i understand from the director of national intelligence coats, why the intelligence community cannot produce that is because of by regulation, the intelligence community is prohibited from gathering intelligence against domestic targets like american citizens without a court order and showing of probable cause that some crime has been committed. and so, it strikes me as not intentionally unfair, but in the sense the design and structure of the intelligence oversight and regulatory framework would then ask you to produce the names of americans incidentally collected against when the whole law is designed to liimit if not prohibit that
collection absent a court order. i know that on the intelligence committee, which i have had the privilege to sit on, i know senator wyden has been an ardent advocate of producing a number. if it were possible, which i agree under the circumstances is not possible to come up with a reliable number, and for the reasons i mentioned, but i think it would add fuel to the flame of some of the conspiracy theorists who seem to think our intelligence community is doing something that is prohibited of doing, targeting american citizens without observing the formalities of constitutional rights under the fourth amendment. under the circumstances, the political environment we find weselves in is how do preserve the crown jewels under 702 and reserve this important
tool used by the intelligence community, and also reassuring reassure the public that the oversight that takes place, whether it is internal at the nsa, or congressional oversight at hearings here, or the judicial oversight that takes place in the fourth surveillance foreign intelligence surveillance court, how do we reassure the american people that those mechanisms, those checks and balances, are working the way they should in order protect the civil liberties of americans and while still empowering intelligence communities to keep our country safe? so the kinds of questions that senator graham were asking, if isfact warranted, the answer not what i help it would be, the there are either inadvertent or intentional violations of the law and the regulations, that
would certainly help to undermine confidence and make it harder for congress to do what i believe we have to do, which is reauthorize this very important statute. that would include any unauthorized unmasking of names under the previous obama administration. we need to find out what the facts are there, and we need to come if it is not warranted by an investigation, we need to make that clear. that is the kind of thing that i think does undermine public confidence, and indeed undermines congressional confidence, which makes it harder for us what we need to do when it comes to reauthorizing this legislation. finally, let me just say i know it is hard to debate these topics in public because so much of what you do is classified, and necessarily so. but i would just ask, would you add a little more color and context to some of the success
stories, if you can, of how this tool has been so useful in protecting the country? >> yes sir, i would be happy to. i spoke about an example in my opening statement regarding an individual overseas who was part of an isil facilitation network. i can also walk the committee through another example that occurred overseas and also impacted americans overseas. this occurred on december 31 of last year in istanbul, turkey. there was a particular individual who was targeting a nightclub in turkey and was going to carry out an attack. he did in fact conduct that attack, as i am sure you know by now, and was responsible for the deaths or injuries of 38 people of 14 different countries. one of those was an american
shot in the hip. in working together with our foreign service partners in turkey, we were able to identify the individual who conducted that attack. we were able to go up on 702 collection on that particular individual. based on that collection, we were able to identify where that individual was located and pass that information to the appropriate turkish authorities, who apprehended him and took him into custody. it was instrumental in helping us find an individual who perpetrated an attack in another country. it helped us find an individual who had shot an american citizen, and helped to prevent that individual from acting anymore on his planning and ideology. sen. cornyn: my time is up. i would just encourage you all, and i know that is something -- go ahead, mr. morse. mr. morris: whenever we declassify one of these
operational examples, we literally sweat every word so that we do not reveal any l something to our targets that will allow them to evade detection. i think it is very illustrative of the program. in 2009 during the summer, nsa had 702 coverage of a terrorist in pakistan. we noticed that the terrorists terrorist received an email message from somebody indicating that it looked like they were involved in an imminent attack planning here in united states. we tipped that information to the fbi. the fbi folks subsequently determine the name of the his confederates were planning to do a bombing of the new york city subway. that tip from 702 allowed us to
avert a very credible threat from the new york subway. it is a dated example because we feel now we will not reveal sources and methods that would help the adversary. again, it is a difficult process. we certainly appreciate the need theexamples like this so american people understand how we are using this authority. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first question, why are we here? we need to reflect a little bit on history. after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the bush administration secretly began spying on american citizens in the united states without judicial approval required by the constitution and without the authorization from congress. years later this committee heard dramatic testimony from former deputy attorney general jim comey about efforts of white house chiefs of staff to
and gonzález to pressure attorney general john ashcroft into reissuing surveillance while he was hospitalized. after the new york times revealed the existence of warrantless surveillance programs, the bush administration demanded that congress passed legislation authorizing the program. this led to the fisa amendments act in 2008. i opposed it, as well as its reauthorization in 2012. i still have serious concerns and it doesn't include adequate checks and balances to protect the constitutional rights of innocent americans. we all support giving the intelligence committee tools to keep americans safe. we also live in a democracy. all of us are sworn to defend and uphold the constitution, which limits the power of government, as senator lee has said. morris said in defining 702 in the simplest terms, it is only used to target foreign persons living outside of the
u.s. if that were all, we wouldn't be talking about it. i think most of us agree, keep america safe. someone outside the u.s. plans to do us harm? we want to know about it. stop them. then we want to stop them further by arrest or even more, but we also know that caught up in the information of those so-called foreign sources is information about americans. and to hear the exchange with senator lindsey graham, did you note the emotion in his voice as he thought about the possibility that his privacy was being invaded by his government? that someone might use that information through 702 against him as a united states senator? you just witnessed something that was rare in the u.s. senate, this chairman said let's extend the time of the senator and keep asking. because we are all concerned about that because it is our privacy senator graham has raised.
but what about the privacy of the americans that are not in this room? now we run into another problem. senator franken asked to do the most basic information, how many americans have been swept up into this 702? you can't tell us. how are we supposed to believe that transparency is the guiding principle and we have such great data collection if you can't even identify how many americans have been instantly swept up into this effort, and can't answer senator graham's most basic question? so, mr. brooker, how are we supposed to have confidence that you are being careful not to involve more people than necessary to keep america safe, not to avoid the constitutional requirement of a warrant if you want to know something? mr. brooker: it is a hard question, senator. you, like everyone at this table, is concerned about the privacy of our families, my folks in arizona, my in-laws
in alabama, something we think about day in and day out and take very seriously. i think that is why the oversight of this committee done by the fisa court and department of justice is so critical to this process. while we are unable to provide absolute metrics on the number of u.s. persons incidentally acquired, we report a lot of information to this committee in classified form, and a lot of information public to relating to the number of u.s. persons -- sen. durbin: senator graham couldn't get the basic information about himself. i have been with him on trips overseas. we are in conversation with foreign leaders on a regular basis. the notion that our government has captured that conversation is something we ought to know about. if you tried to do it in the u.s., you would need a warrant. if you didn't overseas, did it overseas, apparently not. it comes down to the very basics. we have seen over time since the creation of these fisa act
amendments, a broadening of the power of the united states, the lifting of the requirement of warrants from the fisa courts. we have given you more and more authority. all we are asking is how carefully are you using it? how closely are you following the constitution as you use it? what efforts are you making to protect the innocent americans who have done nothing wrong but happen to be caught up in a communication? you tell us, hard question, we will get back to you later. it is a hard question, but it is really fundamental, and i think it really raises questions of what we need to do if we want to uphold the constitution and keep us safe. thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, chairman, and thank you all for being here. to follow-up on the point that senator durbin was making, each one of your agencies has
internal administrative procedures that allow the agency to police the use and misuse of 702 information. we on the judiciary committee do not have a comprehensive or consolidated statement of what your own internal protections and safeguards are. i would ask you as a question for the record to get your heads together and create a document that explains for us all the different ways in which you, through privacy counsels, inspectors general, procedures, police, the use and abuse of 702 information. i think part of what we are seeing here in terms of the frustration is that we don't have a clear explanation of that. you ought to be able to give it to us. that is pretty straightforward information. i will ask that for the record. second, there are concerns about
the unmasking of individuals who former as -- i am a prosecutor, so let me say unindicted co-conspirator -- not a real name, just subject a or whatever in the intelligence. there is a specific allegation that has been floating around that the conversations between michael flynn and ambassador kislyak came into the white house with flynn masked. and that a decision was made in the obama white house to unmask him, which then led to leaks in newspapers and so forth. i think we can all agree that an unmasking for a political leak is not a good thing, but it is important for us to get the facts of that right. tomorrow when we are in classified setting, i want to
give you a preview of coming attractions. i would like you to be able to answer the question whether or not that state of facts actually transpired. what happened? come in masked or unmasked? was it as a result of request of the white house, and do you have any information about the leak? you don't have to answer that question now. a lot of what you tell us is in a classified setting, so we can't talk about it. we will have to sort out what is classified and what isn't. but at least be prepared to answer that. my last question is with respect doesis question of how big 702 reach, penetrate, into ordinary american's lives -- a s. and a lot of this boils down to what we mean when we use senator
durbin's phrase "swept up." as i understand the process, you have identified overseas targets who you are allowed to collect on under 702, correct? >> correct. sen. whitehouse: ok, and you don't know who they are in touch with until you query that selector in your database, correct? >> there are a number of different ways, senator, that we can review collections. there may be a target where our analysts will review every communication -- sen. whitehouse: it takes an act of selection to pull up that review, right? >> yes, correct. sen. whitehouse: once you have your target, you have your query that calls up everyone they have been in touch with. once you have called that screen in, you still don't know the nationality or location of the
individual because all you have is electronic metadata. and it takes individualized research to figure out the location and the identity of those people, is that also correct? >> that is also correct, yes. sen. whitehouse: so in order to find out who was swept up in this, what you would need to do is to look at your roster of legitimate 702 targets, query every single person they have been in touch with, which would reasonably be a massive undertaking, then do address by address to figure out who was on american soil at a given time. is that the problem to this? >> that is right. there is often not a lot of electronic information to determine who they are or where they are. sen. whitehouse: and the fact
data has beenthe sitting in a place where no one has looked at, if we pull up that data to look at this count, that is looking at their privacy in another way. there are human eyeballs on that , whereas before, they were just in electronic database and may have never turned up to any human eyeball. >> correct. we would have to do research outside of what nsa would normally do to figure that out. sen. whitehouse: okay. see you tomorrow. >> thank you, mr. chairman. on these questions, everyone is everybody has asked you, you can see the concern of this panel heard earlier this year, the nsa
terminated their bulk collection. there has been a number of complaints issues in regard to the incident, discover these compliance issues, did a broad overview of the 702 program and decided it was too great a breach of privacy. when was the last time the fbi undertook a comprehensive review of searches and uses of 702 data? >> sir, we have measures in place through which first of all we train our agents -- sen. leahy: when is the last time you did a comprehensive search about how you use it? mr. ghattas: we have regular audits we conduct internally. we are also overseen by doj, who conducts periodic audits as well.
>> when was the last one? >> i believe the last instance was monthly. sen. leahy: was that a complete audit of the whole program? mr. ghattas: it was not, it was a segment of the program. sen. leahy: so i am looking for the whole program. mr. ghattas: i would have to get back to you with the answer on that, senator. sen. leahy: could you get back to me today please? if not, before the meeting tomorrow. as mr. brooker and mr. morris, we have heard that the intelligence community opposes the statutory restrictions on collections. they say it is a technical issue, not fundamental privacy issue. so i ask you both, is the nsa currently working to fix this
explain earlier, if the operational environment changes, our target start acting differently, we may determine that we need to come back up on a bout, and haing a statutory restriction would make that difficult to do. if we could have a technical fix that is satisfactory to the court, bringing them up would be a matter of court permission. sen. leahy: when do you think you would have a technical fix? mr. morris: i can't hazard a guess. i would have to get back to you sir. sen. leahy: let me ask a question mr. evans, when testified, he said compliance instances are always reported and are always corrected. well, not everybody feels that way. the fisa court recently said otherwise. in april, the fisa court chastised the government for failing to fulfill disclose compliance instances. this is in their words, an institutional lack of candor on on a "very serious fourth amendment issue." that is tough language for the fisa court.
what reforms are the justice department undertaking to ensure there is full and immediate disclosure of the government's activity to fisa? >> thank you senator. as to reforms and measures, i think mr. morris would like to comment on that. the nsa takes very seriously its relationship with the court. i believe with the director of the nsa made some comments as to the additional measures he is taking. from a justice perspective, compliance incidents do happen. i have been inadvertent. candidly, they are frustrating for us when they happen. they are frustrating for the nsa when they happen, and clearly in this instance, they were frustrating for the judge. but the two points i would take away from that is that the judge clearly indicated in her opinion , that this incident was self
-identified and self-reported by the government to the court, but much to our detriment. if you find one like that, you immediately report it to the court? >> it is routine to do so. some of the issues on timing, these are complex matters technologically and legally. sometimes it takes the agencies a little bit of time to wrap their hands around what is the problem, and how to describe that to the court. we as agencies look to do that as fast as possible, but we also want to be right andy accurate about how we do it. >> if i may expand on his answer slightly, in the particular query incident that led to the court's, that led to an institutional lack of candor, the timing is exactly correct. that is the primary issue for us. we reported the issue in 2015
when the report was filed to the court. the problem was we continued to do continued investigatory work. the inspector general's office was conducting studies to determine what is the scope of the problem. the full scope of the query problem did not become evident until 2.5 weeks after the court had held a hearing in october about the renewal of certification.
and we went back to the court to say our ig just finished its study, the court was naturally unhappy because this was new information he was being resented with just before it had to rule on the certification. sen. leahy: the language of the court, they did not disguise their unhappiness. unlike the nsa and cia, the fbi concerns u.s. persons communications obtained under section 702 for evidence of conventional crimes, totally unrelated to foreign intelligence for national security. they can do that without a warrant. this raises questions here. can you use that to go after things like drug offenses, or tax fraud, anything of that nature? >> if i could address that from a legal perspective first. then comments on an operational or policy perspective. why is it permissible in the first instance from a legal perspective? although the collection we are doing is directed against foreigners abroad and must be for an intelligent purpose, congress recognized with section 702, just as with traditional
fisa, it is possible that national security surveillance might reveal evidence of a domestic criminal offense. that is why the fisa statute itself, for traditional pfizer fisa and section 702 requires that there be , minimization procedures that provide for the retention and dissemination of evidence of a crime for law enforcement purposes when we come across it. as judge hogan declassified, because the evidence requires us to disseminate, it would be perverse if we could not look through the queries we had to see if we had evidence of a crime. >> so that is with respect to the doing of the queries themselves. in respect to the use of the information, if we are using any information obtained from fisa in a criminal case against a communicant on that
communication with the statute terms and aggrieved person, they would be notified in a criminal case. however, as a policy matter, we have a department policy back in 2015 that says we will not use as a matter of policy use communications to, from, or about an american as evidence in a criminal proceeding unrelated to either national security or a significant list of enumerated crimes. so a routine minor offense, we will not use that in a criminal case. sen. leahy: i have further s when we go intogo classified, but i appreciate this. >> one more question and we will call the second panel. >> this question is for mr. ghattas. your answer can be brief. former fbi director james comey testified before the senate intelligence committee on june 8
about one-on-one conversations he had with president trump. two of these discussions took place in person, one during a private dinner on the white house on january 27, and the following, a briefing in the oval office on february 14. the president also called him on the phone, including calls on march 30 and april 11. director comey said that he discussed some of these conversations with his fbi leadership team. without getting into what was said, were you involved in any discussions about president trump's interactions with director comey? a yes or no would be sufficient. >> yes, senator. >> i don't want to get into detail now, but the committee may want to talk more with you about this. will you commit to getting us the information that we need? mr. ghattas: we will work with the committee, senator. sen. feinstein: thank you.
thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank to all of you. we will probably be using you for resources in the month ahead. second panel, please come forward. did i cut somebody off? okay, second panel then. >> thank you. announcer: on newsmakers this weekend, kevin brady talks about the latest hurdles to passing a health ca replacement and what t means. watch the interviews on c-span. aftercer: sunday night on
words, gender identity in the book beyond trans, does gender matter. mr. davis is interviewed by glad president and ceo. abouthink we are talking the predicate of those stereotypes, not so much what you should do or not do as a man or woman. there is something else going on when we talk about transgender, which is sex identity discrimination, belonging to the categories themselves. >> you put forward in this book
that we should eliminate those categories in a lot of different places, right? from the birth certificate to college or professional level sports, right, and most things in between. after words onh c-span twos book tv. next week during the july 4 recess during prime time on c-span, monday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, author david horwitz. socialism inand the social justice movement are modeled on christianity. they look on the world as a fall in place, although they would never use those words that way.
it is a place of injustice. announcer: tuesday, a debate on technology and privacy and whether tech companies should disclose data. tosome suggest we ought build a backdoor to allow law enforcement access to data. the problem is you cannot build a backdoor that works only for the u.s. government, good guys, or other people with good motives. for them,ld it encryption will be weakened for everyone. wednesday, supreme court justice bullock. >> the most important decision of president whatever make is who to appoint to the united states supreme court and the federal judiciary. at 8:00 p.m.ursday eastern, hillary talking about women in politics. >> women are often the first to spot conflict on the horizon coming their way, and when their
insight and information is ignored, it often leads to consequences that might have been averted. announcer: friday, harvard university sociologist -- citizens do not fully understand the complex forces that have increased for example their economic woes. economic insecurities create breeding grounds for racial and ethnic tensions. announcer: next week at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. next to, republican senator markey or rubio talks about the need to combat transnational organized crime and the drug trade in ac latin america. fromhe