tv U.S.- South Korea Relations Part 2 CSPAN September 9, 2017 11:00am-12:25pm EDT
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interesting titles from new york times articles. an alliance of 67 years is tested by north korea. i couldn't help but fear that was the situation nowadays, but after listening to strong remarks in support of alliance, by the secretary and congresswoman, i was reassured and relieved. we are facing important issues in terms of maintaining a strong alliance between rok and the united states. the first issue is, what kind of policy for both governments to pursue, to denucleize north korea and how tomplement it. both r.o.k. and u.s. governments agree on the policy of maximum
pressure and engagement. even after the nuclear threat last sunday, i think we need to focus on continuing and applying pressure on north korea. to bring them to the negotiating table. such pressure, i think, must be carefully calibrated. if the u. appears to be seeking regime change or a preventive war, a panicked kim jong-un will be more likely to lash out. according to a british historian -- more from a preemption than for a lust for war. -- had nothing to gain from war and much to lose.
instead of quarrelg with north korea, i thinke need to send a clear signal of consistency that our goal is not a regime change or preventive war, but a policy change. in addition, i think while applying maximum pressure to north korea, we need to keep our diplomatichannels open to test their intention and explore what is possible. from a concern about the north korea policy, i think our system -- our president has been clear that pressure is needed. the north korea comes to the table. for example, we emphasize that more than just a statement is needed, and proposed that most allies conduct a detectation --sile piloting drill
whether they conducted nuclear missile test on july 4. the second issue is defensive deterrence in the era of north korea's nuclear icbms. their capability to strike the mainland of the united states -- extended nuclear deterrence. the u. r.o.k. as. d probably japan, have to begin diussing what kind of measures should be taken to face these new challenges. another worry is that north korea may become more reckless. for instance, they may aack an
land in the west see -- in the west sea. thinking that south korea would not dare to retaliate because they have nuclear weapons. but, outh korean military leaders have been declaring that in case they provoke, they will strike not just at the original point of attack, but also their commence and are so this kind of initially local level conflict can easily escalate into all-out war on the korean peninsula. the third issue is how to prepare for the upcoming negotiation if it ever com.
there are a few groups in favor of negotiation. one of them says there should be -- an approach to denuclearization, a freeze on their nuclear and missile capabilities. one proposes the grand bargain between the u.s. and china. this implies that the u.s. should begin to "think the unthinkable." i really don't know what system trump is thinking about in this matter. he may have a different idea. what kind of negotiation -- what is clear is that there should be thorough preparation through close consultation and coordination between the allies. especially while trying to achieve the goal of denuclearization of north korea,
r.o.k.alliance with the should not be compromised, otherwise there would be a significant blow to strategic interests for south korea and the united states. requireree major issues close concentration and coordination between our allies. need to build a mechanism for that as soon as ssible. thank you. >> thank you, foreign minister. >> thank you for iiting to come speak. i wanted to keep my remarks brief and focus on what i see as two challenges and opportunities.
i will start with the opportunities because i think too often we get hung up on challenges. i think it's important to identify opportunities. the opportunity to strengthen trilateral cooperation, something that the doctor mentioned earlier. this was a great focus for me when i was in the pentagon, and i think there is a great deal more to be done. there is a lot of framework in place, mechanisms in place, but it will takenergy and leadership from both seoul and tokyo and washington to ke sure wencourage progress. i believe the mechanisms are already there. i think one area to think about would be enhancing the cooperation in major exercises. would have a significant role to play in the defense of
.outh or greer -- south korea i think increasing the involvement would be important as a way to move ahead beyond one-off exercises and tests. another area of opportunity i wanted to mention was the opportunity to enhance south korea's military capabilities. their community is already capable, and has made commitments to enhance its capability. there are others in process to get to the eventual condition of being able to have wartime operational control. thpresident, as i undersnd it, from the last time i checked my twitter, has also talked about his decision to open up more sales to korea and japan to further allow them to enhance their military capabilities, which i think is overall a positive trend. there is another caution i wanted to note.
we need to be careful how this is done. in the past, as the united states has called for its allies to do more, i don't think it is interpted by our partners that the united states is taking a step back. we recall the effects that vietnamization, the guam doctrine, had in the 1970's -- the united states should make sure this is seen, done in tandem with an increase in american commitment in the region so as to undercuor answer any concerns this might have, that this is a potential signal that the united states is looking to take a step back.
to move on to challenges, and i will try to keep it brief so we can keep going. the first challenge is deterrence. i want to make it clear. i am not talking about strategic deterrence. it has been mentioned before, the concern our allies will have about the implications of a credible nuclear icbm from north korea. i actually feel confident that stratec deterrence remains robust. the united states has successfully deterred major conflict with nuclear conflicts -- with nuclear powers for decades. i don't see why that should change with north korea. that message needs to be sent clearly to our allies, that is development, as north korea gets closer to this capability, we will not slack in the defense of our allies.
it is important to send that message. there is a concern i have and that others have about conventional deterrence. as north korea feels more confident in its capabilities, that it could feel embolned to act more aggressively at the conventional level we have seen before. it was mentioned the showing of various islands -- i have concerns that with a nucle capability, north korea may feel emboldened to attack -- to act more aggressively and we could incidents like that happening more often so that requires both the united states and korea enhance conventional deteence. the doctrines that came out are part of that, but the other piece is enhancing our capabilities, to make sure we have the ability to defend and deter those types of attacks. the second challen i wanted to mention is reassurance.
i mentioned it early, i referred to it the need to assure our allies that the nuclear pability is not going to prevent us from defending our allies. there is a lot more to it than a simple statement. there is the constant meetings, phone calls. as a former official, i would rather theesearch phone calls come from high above them the low level i was at. enhancing that confidence, maintaining that cohesion, is important, rhetorically, at the .ommand level and cnc
and also throughout the alliance on the economic and political levels because of the concern that the united ates might be pulling back or concerns about a nuclear capability. i mentioned the nuclear piece, and my conces. i think it is important that the message be sent clearly, publicly, and loudly, that we ensure we are maintaining that cohesion. i will stop there. >> thank you. i have nothing to say. all the points i was going to raise have been covered in previous speakers. [laughter] >> at least fo areas of coordination, both of them bring challenges and opportunities. north korea,egional cooperation between the two countries, global issues, and the alliance management. let me start witthe north korea issue. the should be no daylight between r.o.k. in the u.s.
about handling those issues. suspicionside has oth. the you mention, south koreans are concerned that the u.s. might strike a deal with china over the north korea issue. during the month of april and august, korea was mainly concerned by nuclear action taken by the united states. there was focused overseas -- all kinds of things. it seems to me that how we are going to manage it has not been figured out yet. the problem we have is that we have not reacted to north korea's actions, rather than preventing them from doing something. it seems there is no clear long-term vision, and how were
going to achieve our goals step-by-step. first of all, we have to clear out the suspicions. -- and we are going to press when we are going to engage north korea. otherwise, there will be a constant suspicion between our two sides. that is not good at all. the buzz word in seoul is to .lear passing that's no good at all. we should be clear on our common stance on north korea. you have to think about --
-- political,ions economic, social, and also the issues -- we need a more comprehensive approach. nuclear missiles are very threatening, a clear and present danger, but we have to think about how we can bring about changes in policy. what kinds of policies we are going to pursue with north korea. the second issue is the regional level. talking about the regional cooperation d a meaningful alliance and the regional context. -- the regional issue has been left out, unfortunately. whene to think about how we are going to strengthen the
foundation -- we need to think about. -- about how we are going to strengthen the foundation. we cannot contain china, but we have to think about how we are going to engage china. and the trilateral coordination between japan,orea, and the united states, going beyond north korea, what kind of roles we can play. i hope the alliance can be a tool to provide public and regional context, going beyond the korean peninsula. third is relatively easy, a global issues like public health , resource management, human rights, democracy,
nonproliferation. but i ha a different take on the nuclear corpation between korea and the united states. -- has announced he is going to depart from nuclear energy. that could be problematic. in general, you can think about energy corporations, but not just nuclear energy corporations. you have to think about the other ways of enhancing the cooperation between the rties. there are many things we can do at the global level, but each statement i have contains regional -- global issues. how are we going to institutionalize andixed momentum for global cooperation between the allies is critical for our r.o.k. and u.s. alliance.
finally, i have to come to the alliance management issue. when president trump mentioned that how we are going to solve this problemithout any difficulty -- i am sure we are going into intense rounds of negotiations. for the first time in the president's agenda, i think, it will be very tough to have mutually acceptable, satisfying results. it is not simply the amount south korea it is paying, but it is about the way to formulate positions. what the unitestates can provide in exchange for an increased share of south korea. -- thatnd issue is
actually requires the south korean government to spend more. is goingthe president to increase the defense budget 2.9%..4% gdp to whether thats good enough to we would likerams to have at the end of the administration, that is one thing. we will maintain combined forces. the other thing i am sure with, what kinds of new operations do we have by taking into account
the changes taking place in the and is love, we have to think about diffent operational control for now. that will be discussed between thtwo parties. we have some concerns about the u.s. commitment to the defense. the u.s. commitment to defense, there is a concern. actually, of course you mentioned if it was good enough for defending south korea or other countries or if we needed updated defense in the region because there are more overlaps betwn korea and japan because of the changing nature of north korea's capabilities. i strongly argue for the missile system, but sometimes it is very controversial in politics.
i like to do more on defense with our allies in defending ourselves. thank you. >> great start. our presenters have covered a lot of ground. prompted by all of your comments i have a couple questions i , would like to ask you all and then we will go to the audience. , it is toquestion is all of you, but particularly be and -- to a this whole point about trilateral coordination, u.s., japan, korea. this is something we have heard quite often almost a reflex
whenever north korea does a but in particular , from your perspective. can you say specifically what you would like to see done? specifically, dig down. one of the things you would like to do, abe mentioned more integrated exercise. does that mean japan as part of the spring and fall exercises in korea? what exactly do we mean by "digging deeper"? what are some of the things you're thinking of when you talk about greater trilateral cooperation? >> ok, sure. maybe i can take up two or three . we have to think about acquisition and service agreement between the two countries.
for example, we are very concerned with north korean submarine activities around the korean peninsula. the other one is like for example is the minesweeping example the operations we can think of. it seems to me that it is necessary to have some kinds of types of exercise amongst three countries. if not, figure out something what we're going to do so we can clearly identify where we can go together or where we cannot. so seriously think about this grandiose design pushed by north korea. >> i thought that was a very good suggestion. i do think that enhancing or
bringing trilateral is them into -- trilateral cooperation in is good. start small and demonstrate how this all works together. that would be important. beginning with tabletop would be a good way to go. access i think is an important step after two and handset -- and hence that military cooperation. maritime cooperation as i mentioned is important. that we have some baby steps in the past couple years of missile warning coordination. but really taking the next step and turning that into a more full-fledged cooperation focused
on north korea missile threat i think would be very important. and then beyond that, beyond the military skill. looking at enhancing economic ties, cultural ties. you know, one of the things that surprised me is somebody in government, considering how careful people were talking about trilateral cooperation, actually moving ahead on it. compared to china, there seems a -- the people seem to be in front of the government in that way. there is room to move forward in trilateral cooperation but it will take leadership to ensure this is moving forward. >> so all these things you have mentioned asw, minesweeping, tabletop, missile defense. do you think this is something,
because obviously there are political sensitivities. is this something you leave should happen at sort of below the headlines, like at the -- or it needs to be embedded in some bigger brother trilateral declaration between the three countries that publicly mandates the three countries to work in this direction? i mean, i have heard arguments on both sides. some people say no, do it quietly. others say, no you need some sort of high-level anointing as a position for this going forward. what do you think? >> i think keeping it at a lower level is good but there will need to be some kind of declaration.
there needs to be some sort of political declaration. -- i think for the united states , that is really a question for those two countries. as americans, my focus would be and iftical cooperation either japan or korea feels they need a political declaration that a high level, then our leadership can get engaged. >> i agree with abe on this, going for a higher level of at least a declaration. it seems to me we can go along with the political declaration
and agreeing to this trilateral cooperation for regional. but a nontraditional security issue which is actually very tangible in east asia. so we used to have a cooperation. all these things can be together but actually that can be well if reflected in the political declaration. in the meantime, maybe security forces can be pursued at the working level for practical enhancement amongst the allies. >> great, thanks. i want to ask now two questions and then you could choose which ones you want us to respond to but i have a feeling i know which ones you will want us to respond to. youfirst question is
mentioned about the importance of signaling to avoid miscalculation or avoid putting -- i mean, the last place we want any country to be in is where they feel like there is nothing to lose in war and good luck to lose in peace. that is a very dangerous situation. so i guess one of the questions isave and maybe others do there signaling that other countries can send to their current military regime that has not been signaled already or could be signaled in a way that would actually make a difference? and then, related to that also is the 800 pound gorilla in the room and any discussion these days about korea is china. mike, you have studied china. you know china very well and you have vast networks in china.
i guess the question there is, in your well-informed opinion, is china ready for, are they ready and willing for a long-term strategic conversation about the future of the korean peninsula? because china is such an integral part of any tactic that is implemented with north korea but as a number you mentioned, helpfulctics are not unless we have a long-term plan. we participated for many years worthy mandate -- we should've had korean involvement. those of the two questions i would like to ask. maybe you would like to talk about the signaling question. >> that is a very difficult question for answer but there are three points i would like to make.
the reason why i emphasized the importance of setting clear signals consistently to north korea is that quite often because of misperception or misunderstanding or overreaction. if we send confusing signals to the other side, there will be increasing chance of misperception and misunderstanding and overreaction. so, think it is important, very important, to send a clear signal consistently. the second point your question is that i think if we want to have a successful negotiated solution of any conflict, i think we should provide maximum
pressure and at the same time, maximum incentive. side has whether our done enough to provide maximized incentive so that kim jong-un thinks that without nuclear weapons he can survive or even prosper. we did try hard to pressure north korea with maximum strength or force or something like that. but i think if we have provide provided maximum incentive so the leader of north korea really believes that it is better for
him to give up nuclear option, calculation should provide to him some kind of incentive that it is better to give up nuclear weapons to survive. to strengthen the mystic political legitimacy or something like that. for example, in the 1994 refrain there was an important clause included that was improvement of political relationship between the united states and north korea. i think north koreans had high expectations of what the implementation of that clause but i think it was regarded as that agreement of just a simple military technique called
agreement. so, from their point of view, i u.s. and-- i mean the south koreans should have done more or tried harder or something like that. that is my answer. >> mike? >> victor, i think it is unfair because you are asking me easy questions to abe and you are asking the minister and myself the harder questions. [laughter] i think there is a link between trilateral cooperation and u.s.-shiite battle relations. book, "the 100 year marathon," there is a level of cooperation with the united
states that has been very high. extremely high. far more than the public has known until i published my book this of course with being permission from the cia and the pentagon. we cooperated with china on the largest covert action in the war in a range of ways. i list 12 examples in the book and i think there are even more that did not make it through security review, so it is actually a good thing for people in seoul to be suspicious of the korean passing over the heads of soul. i do not deny that possibility. the relationship between the u.s. and china is widely misunderstood as being somehow antagonistic. as china rises, we get these strange stories about the
chinese military guy says let's divide the pacific in half. there is kind of a conspiratorial thinking that the united states and china are about to go to war, but at the same time, this cooperation continues. and this comes to bear particularly with trilateral corporation between japan, south korea, and the united states. it would be a nightmare, one of china's nightmares. actually i read an article on 12 chinese nightmares and survival several years ago. , the trade-off is if we could persuade south korea and japan have what abe is proposing. regular exercises that involve japanese, chinese, and our forces and perhaps others if -- who might want to come.
closessage to beijing is to a stab in the back. that we are organizing northeast asia against you because despite our years of cooperation and all the things that jody charney , we really don't like china anymore. so that is the kind of trade-off when you raise the grant strategy issues, which i was so impressed by your book, victor, "the power play" to mention it again -- why didn't we originally, the days of truman, why didn't we have a joint treaty involving south korea and japan? you actually have the thinking on american policy planners at the time that these were two different issues and only a full would put them together. but now that the grand strategy assessment level has changed, as china begins to draw close to us
in terms of its economic strength in a way the soviet union never did. the soviet union may have at best reached what if i percent 25% or 35% -- 25% or 35% of our economy by china could just go buy a imf. china is closing in on us. there are some of their economists who estimate by 2030 it will be double our economy. despite gordon chang's saying it is going to collapse. they are quite a different view. so in this overall economic picture, looking at 25 or 30 , a newll at one time united states president who comes in the business world, has to look at the overall strategic context and my view is, trilateral cooperation among south korea and japan and denied
-- makes a lot more sense so to answer your question to them, i do think it needs political framework of some kind. it will probably help a lot with both japan and south korea for them to say, the americans want this. there is an american framework here. we're not doing it because korea and japan love each other, we are doing it because americans want this. but the damage to our relationship with china, that will exist and we will need a good explanation for why we are doing this and i would suggest one of them can be, the chinese are invited to this exercise, too, as long as they meet certain conditions but the conditions may be very difficult for china to meet. democracy would be one of them. [laughter] >> sorry for the long answer but i think what you're raising for all four of us is really the
grand strategy going forward the next 10 or 20 years. when a new president comes in, he asks certain kind of questions that if you are a what tank person you think a stupid question but actually some of the new president's questioning is really quite profound. how did we get here and where we trying to go over the next 25 years? >> we have not much time left but i'm going to take some questions. please try to keep your questions read. -- these try to keep your questions brief. i'm sorry, not brief, concise is a more polite word. yes, right here. and, please identify yourself. >> hello, my name is mike bucklew. what kind of lessons have you learned and on the american end, what lessons do think president
trump should draw from his predecessor's experience dealing with russia? -- dealing with north korea and rok.liance management with other questions? right here. >> i address this question to dr. pillsbury, the president tweeted this morning that he would authorize the sale of advanced capabilities to japanese in korea. besides that, what do you think south koreans need to deter and defend north korea and what a fact to these additional capabilities have on china and the sense of security dilemma? >> right here, yes. >> steve winters, independent
researches. you mentioned the chinese a rational fear of encirclement. to what extent you think the chinese see the increasing chaos on the peninsula as something that would increase their suspicions of why this is happening because in their statements they have suggested a double freeze and this and that, said they seem to think there are two sides, neither which is willing to deescalate the situation so is this going to increase their paranoid view? >> great. let's start with those. first questions are, what lessons do we think president moon has drawn from his predecessor and mentor ? and i guess for the american
side what lessons has he learned -- what lessons has president trump learned from his ' attempts at dealing with the north korea issue and then to specific questions for mike on arms sales arms sales -- arms sales to north korea and then on chinese encirclement fears. i think we have a kind of -- >> i think we have a kind of liberal code in terms of policy in north korea in which she emphasized the importance of person to person and to relationship between the north and south, cooperation, peaceful co-existence. that kind of belief was shared
by the presidents. i think that is kind of legitimate because we have some examples like german unification unifiedany could be because of very excellent people like helmut kohl but on the other hand, we had politics initiated by social democratic leaders there, the unification could not have been made possible. so, it is, it has that kind of appearance, experience. that kind of dream was the
reason why he pursued the engagement policy toward north korea which was also shared by other presidents. i think many, probably most koreans, have been dreaming of peaceful coexistence. that is a reason why those three leaders emphasize the importance of korean cooperation. but the problem is that north korea policy of developing nuclear weapons narrowed the space for those leaders to implement that kind of engagement policy. even though they may be dreaming and to have idea of engaging north korea, in his mind he is a
realistic political leader and recognizes the limitations to fully implementing the policy and that is exactly why he has been trying to strengthen that andtionship between r.o.k. the united states to overcome this very difficult challenge posed by north korean threats. but personally, i still think that it is desirable for korean government to pursue some sort of inter-korean cooperation. it appears outside national sanctions. like maybe providing medical assistance to north korea where many people are dying because of lack of medicine or an environmental cooperation, or something like that. there is no reason for not trying that kind of cooperation.
i fully support that kind of initiative. and i think here we recognize it is not the right time to pursue full-fledged economic engagement with north korea. he is technically i think realizing the difficult situation. >> thank you. mike, do want to talk about, particularly about chinese encirclement fears. >> there is a debate that has broken out and beijing. i tried to cover debates in my previous book that happened in china. the debate is part of this initiative that china and then russia joined them, put forward double-suspension as they call it.
i agree with nikki haley of course that it is a nonstarter. but, it does show chinese willingness to take an initiative. and, it does show an interesting betrayal in some ways of north korea. as joe told me a long time ago and i will keep mentioning his name because he is sitting here at the front table and i like to tease him, a magazine that closed in beijing. a high-level magazine with many sponsors, just for publishing an article that we should consider whether north korea is more of a liability than an ally. that is almost 20 years ago now in china, there is much more widespread discussion about really getting tough on north korea. so part of what you see in china
is for the past seven years or so, they have tended to drop the they have tended to drop the old abide your time, hide your but the rest of the world and especially friends of mine in asia have sort of missed this and think they are still dealing with the old china. one reason for that, victor, and this is what i'm going to get back to trilateral relations, we do not have, we do not have a lot of net assessment sharing activities in europe. we have not really done a net assessment collaboration with south korea, and i think we should. done of formal net assessment cooperation study with japan, and i think we should. what a wonderful idea to do it in a trilateral way. and this time i will plug
another georgetown, see i.s. -- cis guru. he admits when he was at the nci has for years he could not lay his hands on american strategy document so he decided to write this book and look them up and present them. it is a fantastic study of how the military balance has been crucially important in american strategy over and over again. over and over, he finds americans having meetings over 100 years ago to assess the military balance and what to do about it. that is so important today and yet who really understands the military balance between, let's say, japan and korea, whether you add them together or they fight separately. who knows what kind of scenarios there would be that is the very meat of net assessment studies and government-to-government cooperation.
so, behind a lot of these questions including the gentleman of here asking about president trump's tweets and what were can we sell to them? -- what can we do to south korea to do what denmark called strengthen traditional deterrence. behind that is the military balance and the trend that is occurring. because if it is weakening, if deterrence is going to get harder and harder of the next 10 years, then we will wish that back in 2017 and 2018 we had done more to strengthen our side of the balance. if it is getting stronger and stronger, that is a different story, we can be more complacent . so i would like to put that on the agenda of think tanks in washington and seoul and tokyo. what is happening to the conventional balance and strategic balance? my fear is it is getting worse but i'm not sure in less is the sustained effort and we cannot
answer the more technical questions. do we want south korea to have longer-range missiles or not. if the balance is getting worse, then we do. do you want to make any other comments on the question of arms deals or lessons learned from the previous administration? >> the president is underscoring -- in solving the north korean problem. r.o.k. u.s.zing cooperation. not seeking autonomy 100% from the united states. so cross culture data is going to be pursued between the two parties and also the other thing
is, of course, conditionality. except the humanitarian front, that is the different because actually normally the argument goes like this, despite all of the problems done with north korea, i do not think that is the case. if you read his statement, he always attests to the conditionality. whatever there is a meaningful program for the nuclear we can have, even including the -- but there is conditionality attached. so i see key differences between the administration. so i think the president has become much more practical and pragmatic. >> first on the lessons for the president. i cannot comment on the lessons he has drawn.
i could comment on lessons i think should be drawn from previous experience. i will focus on two. the first is the importance of asia.liances in to realize that u.s. alliances are at the forefront of american power in the region. and that enhancing collaboration in holding ties of the military and political and economic level absolutely essential as asia grows more important and as china continues to rise. without our allies, the united states would not have nearly as much influence and access power as we do with them. the second is to not put too ke in personal relationships with china.
you can have good meetings, good engagement, you can even say good things to each other but in the end, both countries, both leaders are going to represent the interests of their countries and just because you have a good meeting or a good engagement, make sure that we are not putting too much at stake in the quality of that arrangement. i think in the past, this is not specific to any single person or every single meeting, but ensuring that you have a good meeting and also that you are realistic about what to expect from them is very important. the other piece i wanted to mention before china is its fears of encirclement. obviously, there are people in -- people in china
who believe crazy things about the united states. going back decades. a more recent example is about -- is a conspiracy theory about thaad., -- the key to understand is this is not based on technical reality. china's concerns is not based on the range of a radar or missile, it is clinical. and a lot of these conspiracy theories that are fairly popular in some circles of china reflect instead of their literal believes that this thing actually happen but more of a fundamental suspicion about american tension and the role of america in china. my take on this is that america's role or any american leader is first to defend itself, first to defend the united states, first to defend our allies. reassuring china of baseless suspicions is secondary.
to me, making decisions about thaad cannot happen if you are allowing chinese paranoia to get too far in. the first question is, what is best for the united states, what is best for your allies and once a question is made, you then you can talk about the chinese. so to me when thinking about enhanced trilateral corporation or any decision that involves the defense of the united states or our allies the only question , is, is this helpful for the united states, is it helpful for our allies? once we come to that answer, the secondary question is how do we talk to the chinese? how will the chinese react. then the engagement plan comes in. i think we have to keep that priority in line.
>> are we out of time? we're out of time. ok. really, i found it a very interesting and informative session. thanks to all of our panelists for their presentations and for answering my questions as well as the questions from the audience. let us give them a round of applause. [applause] lisa: we will now have a 30 minute lunch break. if you would grab a lunchbox and come back and eat, we will convene here a little after 12:30. members of the florida delegation have been tweeting this morning, including senator marco rubio, saying time to wrap up prep for those living in hillsboro. the storm surge threat is great. said atan congressman
florida center providing last-minute updates on irma. charlie crist tweeted our gratitude and prayers are with our first responders working around the clock to keep our communities safe. president trump is at camp david meeting with cabinet officials while receiving updates on hurricane harvey and the approach of hurricane irma. we will keep you updated if the president delivers a statement. 2'shis weekend on c-span on his, bernie sanders thoughts on how to bring about change in america. >> what is the agenda. what should we be doing as a nation?
if you have millions of people living in poverty and sometimes the firstte hoppity, thing we have to do is demand that if you work 40 hours a week in iowa, vermont, or in america, you're not living in poverty. then fox news contributor and pollster discusses his book "america in the age of trump." >> my book tries to forge common sense why partisan solutions to the problems we are facing. thosed argue that problems are getting worse and worse by ourg made political leadership. sunday at 9:00 on afterwards, danielle allen examines the issue of mass incarceration. >> a prison system as big as
ours, 25% of the present population is in our prisons despite that we have 5% of the worlds population. it affects everybody. by not telling those stories, we are letting this thing live. we have to get the stories out so we can see the damage we are doing and fix it. >> for more of this weekend's schedule, go to a book tv.org. night, intelligence gathering and sharing. they stressed the need for the intelligence immunity to access communications of non-americans outside the united states. the event is hosted by the national security alliance. see it tonight at 8:00 on c-span. right after that, texas
congressman michael mccaul discusses terrorism and its evolution since 9/11. he is the chairman of the house homeland security committee and looks at the challenges the intelligence committee currently faces. he spoke in front of the bipartisan policy center and we will show you his comments at 9:50 on c-span. c-span's washington journal. live with policy issues that impact you. coming up, eleanor clift of the daily beast will join us to discuss the news of the day. the executive director of the centrist project will be on to discuss his group's efforts to support centrists candidates in 2018. join the discussion. monday marks the 16th
anniversary of september 11 and our live coverage of the remembrances begins at 8:00 eastern on c-span two for the ceremony at the national september 11 memorial. in the morning on c-span, live coverage of the ceremony at the pentagon, and at shanksvillerom pennsylvania on c-span3, the commemoration of the flight 93 memorial. watch it online at c-span.org, or listen live with the three -- with the free c-span radio app app. next, the ambassador to the united nations, nikki haley discusses the iranian nuclear program. she also announced her meeting with the iranian nuclear agency.