tv U.S. Policy Toward North Korea CSPAN September 18, 2017 2:04pm-3:35pm EDT
the sixthlater, already talks at all the collapse. this was the last major diplomatic initiative to address the so-called north korea problem. today, we are fortunate to hear from two former diplomat who were involved in this past dialogue with north korea, and remain active scholars in the region. have an panelists, we opportunity to reflect on even a decade ago, and more importantly, but them into present context. it involves new leaders, technology, and ounces of power in the region -- balances of power in the region. if we try to launch a diplomatic surge with north korea, how might we go about it? what should we keep in mind? before i introduce our speakers, i want to highlight our collaboration today with the
u.s. japan research institute. usg i essentially brought -- brought this opportunity to us so we can be the co-organizer. it was established in washington, the nonprofit organization in 2009 by japanese universities. currently nine preeminent japanese universities support it. it includes research partnering, networking, and dissemination. we want to thank usji's president, thank you dr. tanaka. dr. gnosticism g who is with us today. today, oureakers chris hill, we told you yawanak a.
i will introduce him for now. ambassador hill has been the dean of use of korbel school of international studies at the university of denver. where he h -- where he leveraged his career, including rli republican camille -- korea. as assistant secretary precede affairs, and america's chief envoy to the six party talks. . ambassador hill, i give you the podium. [applause] much.nk you very let me just say what a pleasure it is to be her with these distinguished scholars and friends from japan. this is truly an impressive carnegie,be here at which is always in the search for international peace, even
when the subject includes north korea. what i thought i would do is talk about where we have been, talk about where we are, and where we might go. there's no question that the outcome isa peaceful increasingly elusive. it's very kind of you to mention, jim, what we did 10 years ago, but it seems like 100 years ago considering where we have come since then. i think there have been several efforts at diplomacy with north korea. like the proverbial sixth marriage, they are a triumph of hope over experience. been -- there has also been a certain amount of cynicism that has crept into this process, a sense that nothing can work and nothing will work. in thest yet, you see
sort of tribal wars in washington, increasingly there are those who are loyal to a certain process that went on for a certain time. they're very much opposed to the next process. people kind of line up behind the processes that they were involved in. i think increasingly, in this sort of tribal climate that we have in this country today, we have an increasingly difficult notwithstanding the efforts of carnegie and other distinguished institutions, to try to bring us all together and figure out what we're going to do about this problem. this problem is not going away, and as i will lay out in a minute, i think the problem is far worse than many people think it is. it requires a solution which will involve all of us to support. i would argue, strangely enough,
when i was doing this 10 years fromfirst i had the people the penultimate process. i always made clear that i never said anything bad about the agreed framework. it had its problems, we had our problems, everyone has their problems. i found it useful to try to be positive about what they went through. certainly didn't want to support what we were doing, because they had the same kinds of solutions in the agreed framework, if only their framework had been allowed to go forward. i had those skeptics, who had been involved in us before, and so that we had ignored the lessons and progress made from that point. detractors, who felt that any kind of negotiation with north korea was a, it would never work. was toory of the case
make sure it never worked. otherwise, they would be proven wrong. i think for now, they were supremely -- they were certainly proven right. when you are negotiating, and have people back at the home they will never convince north korea to do away with this nuclear weapons, think about the message that is giving to the north korean hardliners. convince some people in the states already that we are not going to give up our nuclear weapons, we just need to wait for the other americans to come to the understanding that we are not going to give up our nuclear weapons. ironically, the sort of tough from the i received home front was what you are doing is not point to work, because they are not going to give up their nuclear weapons. listen to your people, listen to
them. i think we need to try to come together around some assumptions , i think we need to come around to the view that we really ought to try and pull together and see -- disabusest fuse north korea of its weapons. far morehis issue is difficult and dangerous than many people think it is today. that is certainly the view after all, this is a small beset by problems, one of the weakest state in the world, it has a terrible economy. they just want a few nuclear weapons to make them feel safe. why can't we come up with some kind of system of containment? why can't we simply contained this problem? if they just want a few nuclear weapons, why can't we find a way to make this problem so that it
doesn't get worse, but ultimately why can't we just live with this problem? there are those who say "poor little north korea, they have no natural friends, no prestige, if you look at the republican koreans, one of the top countries in the world, north korea has nothing." this is a never buy north korea to get some attention, to get some notoriety, and to be taken seriously because they have nuclear weapons. that's another argument, which is to say let's contain it, let's figure out what we can do about it. to you that this is a much more serious problem, what we're seeing in the last you weeks is clearly missiles that are no longer just test versions of missiles. they are not just trying to see whether these things will work and reaching for them and try another in a month. it's clear they have a production process with these
missiles. it's pretty clear that they haven't mastered some things that many people, many experts, felt that they would not achieve this time. solid fuel rocketry, multistage rockets. it's pretty clear that they are making a lot of progress here. we have to ask, is this part of a little country that wants to be taken seriously, or is there a much more purposeful issue involved? i would argue that what they are doing, what they're trying to achieve is to somehow decouple the united states from the korean peninsula. perhaps more broadly, from northeast asia. that sounds pretty sensible, how can north korea -- fanciful, how hownorth korea do that? could this ever be accomplished? if you think about what they are looking to do, which is put -- their troops are
not on a territorial defense. they have a lot of asymmetrical , chemical weapons, biological weapons, they have a lot of special forces. scenario:he following north korea invades south korea, it's happened before. in, we. says "ok, we are are going to come to the aid of our alliance partner, south korea." then the north koreans say "not so fast, americans if you join this fight, we are going to hold one of your cities at risk. we are going to attack one of your civilian centers." to which the u.s. says "you do that, we will, right after you, we will annihilate your country if you do that." then the north koreans say "game on." at that point, the american president has to decide the
south koreans can probably handle this themselves, they probably don't need our help in terms of with standing on north korean invasion. north korea has one million people in its army, but the south korean army is extremely robust. maybe they don't need our help, maybe they can handle this. why would a u.s. president blink, why would a u.s. president hesitate? because to join in the fight against north korea is to create the possibility, certainly the northan zero, koreans would attack the u.s.. given pretty fanciful, the disparity and what we know to be the north korean capabilities, why would they ever attack north korea -- attack south korea? ,he north koreans also believe just ask one of them, that
somehow south korea is a creature, and a creation of the united states. if you can just get the u.s. off of the peninsula, many south koreans would somehow welcome some kind of unification. when, pretty hard to take you look at the objective circumstances. looking at objective circumstances is not very north korean of you. north koreans often look at the circumstance they believe with a unified effort. by the way, history is full of less powerful armies defeating more powerful armies because of this unity of the spirit and effort. it is not to be ruled out. thannk it is more likely some of the other explanations that north korea believes they can, by pointing a nuclear weapon at the united states,
they can put themselves in a position of making the u.s. blink. if the u.s. blinks, with respect to its alliance commitments in wholerean peninsula, the question of u.s. alliance commitments around the world would be up for grabs. -- whether want anyone agrees with it or not, you have two but the probability rater than zero. what are we going to do about it? i think there are several things we need to do about it. one of them is to reassure our allies, which is south korea and japan, that we are not going to blink. we understand the importance of this. by reassuring our allies. , we need to make available some of our best equipment and military technology for dealing with the issues. i think that is very important as a system to be clear that we
are prepared to deploy this with our allies in northeast asia. i think assurance to them is very important. the second issue, especially for the public, is the willingness to keep the door open to negotiations. beforell, we negotiated with north korea. we did not achieve what we wanted, the process that jim referred to in 2007, was interrupted in 2008 by the fact that the north koreans did not give us adequate verification and we could not go forward with a process that did not have verification. people often say was it that you didn't trust north korea? trust had nothing to do with it, the problem was we couldn't verify anything we needed to verify. i think it's pretty clear that the south korean public and the japanese public have been concerned by the fact that the
u.s. was not negotiating with the north koreans. if you look at these opinion surveys, especially in south korea back in 2004, some 45% of south koreans were blaming the united states for north korea's unwilling -- nuclear program. why, because they saw the u.s. unwillingness to negotiate in the first bush term as being the reason north korea felt it had to have nuclear weapons. heaving backdoor door open to negotiations is absolutely critical. things.ay a few there's a third element that i think is very critical, working with china. we cannot work with china as some kind of contractor in this. work with china as something that we somehow outsourced the problem to the chinese. we need to have a serious sitdown, a serious discussion about what oure
aspirations are and what their aspirations are. the shanghai accords, when president nixon arrived in shanghai. don't live in hats, somebody spent time putting that rabbit down the hat. henry kissinger spent weeks on and working with -- to lay the groundwork to essentially stuff that rabbit down the hat. i think we need that kind of discussion, we don't need to eat in --tweets in the dead of night, public telephone calls that i don't think really reach the level i'm talking about. we need what is called a deep dive, we need a real effort to understand each other. "ifchinese might say to us north korea goes down, we end up with a situation where it's your ally, and they are right up on our border, you will put troops
on our border, listening posts, and we can't accept that." maybe we can have a conversation about that. the conversation consistent with our alliance requirements with south korea. we should not be talking about south korea without south korea. we need to keep our south korean allies in that process. "we the chinese might say hear your assurances about troops, listening posts, what about just the perception that our public would have that you win and we lose? after all this affects the internal politics of china." these things are serious issues. china is a big country, there is not a consensus on anything in china. people have a different point of view. we need to be able to work with the chinese and understand them better. this means clearing the decks, this means all hands on deck. the 100t address
different items that we have on the agenda with china, we have to pick some priorities. i would submit that north korea is one of them. i don't think any country can live with a nuclear -- a country aiming nuclear weapons at it. for the united states, this would be the first such country to do so in many decades. finally, this is a kind of gray area, there isn't space between peace and war. the idea that somehow we should strikeme preemptive against north korea, we would not get all of their nuclear materials, and most importantly we would have to make sure the south koreans are comfortable with that. if they are comfortable with that, they have to make sure that they feel they are willing what 20he risk of million south koreans within artillery range of north korea would need. option, it an easy
would put a preemptive strike way out there as one of the most difficult options. are there issues we can do between war and peace? are there things we can do with cyber attacks, some type of sabotage? are there some things we can do, if not to end the program, but at least slow it up and see whether in slowing it up we can allow the sanctions to have mark bite just to have more bite? just to have -- we just need to look at that issue. we are going to have to get deadly serious about it, and serious now. ultimately, this problem will lead a negotiation, we are going to have to sit down. i think we should be prepared to sit down with the north koreans. the south korean public and the japanese public, also i think we
need to be able to lay out to the north koreans directly the consequences of their continuing pursuit of these programs. before,e been told this but as any advertiser knows, you have to say something 50 times before the person listening understands what you are talking about. i don't think we should fear to negotiate i don't think we should be afraid to engage our diplomacy. american diplomacy is not a contradiction in terms, we are pretty good at it. if we are going to pursue more diplomacy, we need to get more diplomats into the game. i think the trump administration, which to a great this is thederstood most serious problem out there, i don't think they have cleared the decks and are prepared to deal with this. if the trump administration comes up against the election in thatwith the prospect
north korea has nuclear weapons and they are aiming them at the united states, i think it's right to be a hard one to lay at their predecessor. they will certainly blame barack obama for a lot of things, they will try to blame him for this thing, but i think it's time that we got serious in terms of a strategy with several parts to it, and each part moving together. thank you, i will stand by for questions. [applause] >> thank you very much. it's a sobering assessment, but a useful start to our discussion. and glad you widened the aperture to include china into this. we will get to some of that dynamic in our group discussion immediately afterwards. first, we have a chance emphasizing the role of
, a longtime and while accomplished diplomat. 40 year career in japan that he culminated in 2010. time, he served as in they general and was six party talks, later rising to be foreign affairs and by smith's -- for japan. he is now a professor at to make on university in kyoto, it's my pleasure to invite him up your. >> good afternoon. i'm here to talk about north korea. japan, and living
dangerously is not how we're doing it. all tv stations at six the morning turning to an aside -- announcement. north korea just launched missiles. find some places to live. this is what is happening in japan. you understand how serious it is . today, looking back and forward. i was the chief negotiator for heard from -- i that all engagements, talks, negotiations from 20 years are all fading. i feel a bit uncomfortable to hear that.
was one of those people worked very hard. there was something about this north korean affair that we find a threat. reeserby what is called audience and approach, we all fade. we can prevent north korea from dropping its nuclear program. sense, that statement was right,. past, wasck to the there any chance for denuclearization? faded?really a case that was there any chance to achieve that? chance, that was a was 2005, september 19.
,here was a joint statement thanks to efforts by ambassador here, you're one of the most important persons at the time for that statement. sign -- at the time, north korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons. that.idn't mean i don't know about that. one year prior to the two dozen five joint statement -- that was witht statement, i with kimly discussions jong-il. , to have orssion
not to have, what is more advantageous? not to have it is more advantageous to you, because in that case we can help you. have, go for the path to you will be isolated. then kim jong-il responded. i know that. is a useless object. it is useless, because of america. the american hostile policy. that's the answer. those discussions took place. that was 2004. two dozen five september. agreed.september, they
what happened after that? 2006, they did a new test. all talks are fading, but one thing you have to remind us is the kind of movement. 2005 at 630 -- a new statement. there was financial sanctions taken by the international committee. developed into a big event that's ankorea, important element for his decisions. felt that he was an offense just in a sense received an international committee. that was what happened. maybe he went for a new test in
two dozen six. 2007 and 2009, he mentioned about tests. what happened after that? things are getting worse. know, heeader, as we went after -- he was so determined to go for nuclear --.de he launched missiles and a new contest. quality be doing that? -- the reason why he was determined to do so? domestic, and the other one can be external reasons. predecessor,n his he wasn't quite sure. he was very younger than an experience. attempt ato a coup
the time. to commence the people and north korea this nuclear involvement is one key for him. he can show his own people that he is the leader. externally, what happened to gaddafi. if you give up nuclear, then what happens to gaddafi. what -- that's in his mind. from a different way, he is not so much advanced and created a kind of situation critical the phase we are now in. what to do about the? based on those past experiences, aat we should do for known is very difficult task.
japan said that we are enjoined an alliance with the united states. this is important for japan. future, andor the all options are on the table, certainly when they talk about all options on the table that includes other options. might be the military solution. option b is sanction after sanction. to the extent that kim jong-un finally will give up the nuclear programs. is of course negotiating. option ishe military impossible. no.nswer is yes and
the united states might be military, it can certainly destroy north korea. course, unpredictable consequences. we know that in 1994, they could then it much easier. today, they have addressed so much -- they have advanced so much. that youive strike couldn't annihilate. are kind of retaliations striking back may be possible. under theare already messiah reach. eoul, they don't need any nuclear missiles. by militaryences solutions. that's the reason why it's yes and no.
desirable. option, sanction after sanction. --achieve the kind of goal to thehieve our goal extent where he will have to give up. encouraged in the most recent resolution. we havefirst time, andn a number of actions culminated to this final resolution that had 90% of their expert or 30% of petroleum report could that is very important. one is vigorous and limitation of that resolution --
big arrests implementation of that resolution. -- vigorous implementation of that resolution. i have to give up for the nuclear aspirations. i don't think so. ,ith these kind of sanctions you have to increase more pressure. farvery easy answer is how >> of course a total ban of oil. and an embargo of trade. if that were to take place, certainly. happen, for that to china must reach that point. after all, they are the supplier of oil, and the largest trading partner of north korea.
that if it goes that far ofhen certainly all kinds unpredictable developments within north korea. they may force many people to flee, and refugee programs. before that, kim jong-un would go for a much more risky response affecting the neighboring countries. that's what we can't go that far. that is the kind of explanation china has in his mind when we talk to them. the third option is negotiated settlement. of course, this negotiation
should be based upon that second option of sanction after sanction. then, you have to open some sort of window for negotiations. that's some kind of negotiation are very important. i had some concern about that. i hear a lot these days from american friends that now north korea has developed a nuclear arsenal, and is not realistic to think about the entire denuclearization. that's not achievable, that's what we hear. you have to manage the situation, and somehow
accommodate some kind of a nuclear arsenal that north korea may maintain. the reason why i say i have a concern about that is that might suffice american interests. they haven't evolved to reach mainland america, we are already being covered by the north korean missiles. if you say that realistic approach may be free, maybe some deductions, and we start giving all kinds of economic populations to north korea. that that realize sort of continued effect from north korea. that's a very important point. we have to make sure in the
that the most important thing is we have to make objective aim very clear. denuclearization. we have to stick to that point. in that sense, i'm encouraged by the trump administration. they say that they will stick to a denuclearization as their major protocol. i hope that will be the case. negotiations is also very important for us. say that we are ready to talk to americans. the reason why they are developing nuclear is because of an american threat. when you talk about the nuclear, is this only what america -- with america? they can innovate their status
as a equal partner with the united states. that's their way of thinking it. another problem for me is that president trump might be interested in having that sort countries, sixix dollars -- six powers. one ago 121 -- why not go one to one. the u.s. north korea when it talks. what happened is that the japanese or south koreans people waiting for -- they couldn't go into the room. we are told when the agreement was made, here's an agreement. and we have to do with it.
of course we are told that peace and security. we did take it. time, why do we appreciate of japan alliance, that kind critical security problems may be from japan and the united states. there, we have to state clearly. japan was one of those key , iters, for the first time involves rater in the nation. the sort of venue we have to seek. smallng so, i have one
personal position. that is why not for japan right within the frame of the six party talks, but we call upon the new initiative going forth -- calling forth emergency countries minister meeting. united states, china, south korea, and russia. the scenario -- it is a scenario where countries on theided, then that's north korea enjoys me much. use this. heard that time is running out. it is that sense of crisis, we should express our kind of new
initiative. in doing so, we have to ask china why you should do more. far may going too disrupt all kinds of situations in north korea. that i understand. at the same time, you have to do barclays if you north korea becoming a de facto nuclear power, certainly that will he followed by, as we'll know more than 6% of south koreans say they have to devote their own nuclear's. japan is probably committed to nonnuclear policies. we have two say to chinese friends that if you let north ,orea be a de facto nuclear
certainly that will lead to open and --. for systems that's a choice. of talks on all kinds of security matters, peace matters, should be down in those countries. to face with north korea. hope.re's any it's very difficult. much of ad like too dreamer. if anything could succeed, that sort of new attempt, new sense of emergency, and new sense of -- is very important. that's my personal thought. thank you much.
>> now i would like to invite we arelyst and speakers going to have a short group discussion. before we open it up to the audience. the opening presentations by ambassador hill have given up blocks tobuilding carry on this conversation. we have been joined on the stage by two discussants. professor of international relations where he's taught since 1998. he was dean of the graduate school there. fall --r left don't dough paul, our vice president
of studies and leader of the asia program. doug has had a long career in government, at the state department, the cia, the nsc, were reserved served for presidents reagan and george h.w. bush, for whom he was senior director for asian affairs. later, americas director of the american institute in taiwan. i want to begin with you a he is given his personal view based on his experience in this long saga. i want to ask you a little bit about the political diplomatic context in japan, this dynamic of missiles flying over japan, death sirensff, going off, japan is mixed helogue and pressure, advocated discussions for the
north koreans in 2014 a couple of years ago. they signed an agreement to relook at the issue. every once in a while, we hear rumors that prime minister abbe is ready to jet off and have some kind of meeting. now we are hearing this dialogue is a dead-end, and it's all about pressure. i want to ask you to build a little bit, painted picture of the context and the view from tokyo -- paint a picture of the context and view from tokyo. >> i'm not quite sure whether i can direct your question. putting emphasis on japanese perspective, i would like to sort out the north korean issue by my own capacity. i'm a historian by training. i would like to provide some lessons for you to study.
on the petroleum and embargo -- petroleum embargo. i would like to bring you back to 1941, a few months prior to the pearl harbor attack. the united states imposed petroleum embargo. tojo knew that so,in half a year or japanese men would become inactive. to start were with the united states -- to start war with the united states. in that short time the japanese decision, may not be called irrational, but in the whole picture it was prematurely irrational decision. , in your lifetime
there's a moment that you have to jump from the subject of the temple. and not sure how many of you have been to kyoto. built in a valley area. there was a sundeck for visitors. if you don't from the sundeck, it means death. i appalled how irrational he was. at that time, can say. might have been executed. is petroleumg embargo is so critical of a
decision. we have to be very careful about that. appreciate restraining. in this particular matter i agree with china and russia. difference between japan and north korea today, japan was invading china. north korea is not invading anything. .his is a very serious matter this might induce nuclearization domino effect. this is a very serious matter. what i would like to say is i'm not sure quite whether prime minister abbe understood or understands the gravity of this particular oil embargo?
jong-un one seems to be running lessons from the case of some of saying or currently. rather than from the shopping or doma you go vietnam. case of running history wrongly. -- learning history wrongly. >> >> i like to invite you to comment on what you've heard so far, invite your thoughts about china's perspective on this. really trying to make china a partner in this process, seems critical. what are the prospects for that? >> the first point i will make>> -->> the temple is close right now. you can get access to jump to your death from the deck. time.e a little bit of
another lesson from history that something ime is don't think heard mentioned in our presentations. of the acquisition of nuclear capabilities, some definite military capability, really changed in 2011 after our negotiations had come to a halt. when more market off the died in the desert, having some years reavis surrendered his nuclear chemical -- previous nuclear chemical weapons to the united states. if this is repeated from north korean outlets that if they disarm themselves, they make themselves vulnerable to other kinds of economic sanctions, military moves, strikes to decapitate the regime. for them, it's an element of
survival that they've developed special weapons to drive this forward. that seems tong be dominating is that they are so close to having a capability. testing has been more successful as -- four missiles and nuclear weapons. to give up at this point would failure in various measures of governance, but it would be a failure of a historic mission to get into talks with premise ofn the ultimate denuclearization. the fear factor and having fun in your hands factor really make this a tough one. then you go to the chinese question.
what do the chinese see as motivating a real shift in their own position toward one of putting extreme pressure, whether it's petroleum cut off or other forms of pressure/. the spark, we have nothing of from china. the ambivalence in beijing has become more clear. very credible scholars, people that we know retain influence in government circles, are increasingly saying north korea is now fundamentally threatening chinese interests with his behavior. approximate thermonuclear test to chinese borders could go wrong, it could hurt chinese. i can think of many things. on the korean peninsula would fundamentally and danger chinese interest, they have refuted that if you're a refugee to has a need to intervene
prevent them from falling into the hands of reckless elements of the exported to terrorists. the cascade of regions -- reasons they haven't gone forward. they're beginning to think they don't have a choice, either. the chinese, and the latest resolution of the security council have gone further than they have before. on those things where they have a say, they have come a long way. in thebsolutely written chinese dna, communist chinese to avoid legally binding themselves. we saw this in the iranian case where they have extensive contracts for providing the iranian military with etc., etc. they never legally broke those
contracts. they just put the flow working on each of them. we are seeing something of that now. the chinese are putting on these informal pressures. we will not have the satisfaction of being able to point to them. they will have the satisfaction of being able to a we did not do it. they did it. they can take it off without telling anyone. subject toth enough the court trials of legal findings, as they are in the west combo chinese have a lot more maneuverability. factors,troduced those let me introduce a third. we are in the period leading up to the party congress in china. china,ublic signal from over the past year, has been .nder the chinese umbrella term we want to get smoothly through this 19th party congress and not
have factors emerge. he was a obliging. -- very obliging. trying to keep china as an international actor, responsible stakeholder, china doing the right thing. we are not looking to ruffle feathers externally or to have that blowback internally. what will we do after the 19th party congress? need a category of diplomats that are concentrated effort. not to pursue efforts would be irresponsible. to believe negotiations can arrive easily at a solution or that we can verify a solution one would we get to
also be responsible. a lot of work between now and sometime after the 19th party -- to put on the table privately and publicly with respect to payment and deterrence of north korea. there is a lot more military work to be done. inducement. the characteristics need to be set out more clearly. that is a job for diplomats. not to have that conversation over and over again. do the diplomatic spadework. that gardening needs to be done. it is a midterm set of objectives.
,hey are meeting this week fantastic opportunity to do that kind of work. i hope you will see signs of it being done. i have a feeling we will be seeing demand for short-term action. we need a much more serious framework. that will give china a better set of choices to be a party to bringing this crisis to a cooler state.-- head is now in my part of my yard that i have let go. it is like a great place to begin regarding -- gardening. a couple questions before we open it up to the floor. i cannot help but listen to the conversation so far and that if we take that broad definition of , sanctions
negotiations, action at the u.n. come outreach to southeast asia, and middle east nations to help put this whole this balance together. we are either trying to compel north korea to change its calculus and have no other choice, or we are trying to influence and change the calculus. if you just have north korea with a couple nuclear weapons and all they want to be is left alone, perhaps that is manageable. oris the aggressive use aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons that is really the most dangerous. i want to ask in general, what do you think is a productive balance of all these different affectf tools to try to
come to the table. >> i think that is right. what you are trying to say to them, what i said to them many times as we are not going to live with a nuclear north korea. we just cannot accept that. we are going to -- i was talking directly to the north koreans -- we will not walk away from this. we're going to continue to come after you. aly half joking, if you open bank account on the moon, we will go to the moon and shut it down. if you think your security is better with nuclear weapons, think again. i think sharpening the choices, making them understand that this is not a cost free endeavor, they need to be clear that they .re setting on a course
it is not just isolation. that does not seem to be their worst nightmare. we will go after you wherever we can and never give you a nice sleep. sleep.t's that has to be clear. what i worry about is this idea that we can accept some element of a nuclear north korea. i think it is an extremely mixed message and extremely dangerous message to suggest that somehow there is some level of nuclear north korea that we can expect. and -- accept. i would call people's attention to things that north korea has said of late, including japan,
saying geography notwithstanding, they can somehow imagine a future without japan. this is the sort of stuff that prized fighter is say before us fight. -- fighters say before a fight. it sounds something a little more serious. that onceution people they have a couple nuclear down, ithe signal quiet do not support that. we need to be very clear about our concerns. >> that is a matter of timing. as long as the destination is doing -- denuclearization, we are halting the momentum in the wrong direction we are going in right now. i was enjoying reading your book "outpost."
i had not realized that you had raised the interest of an intersection. he wrote it with the approval of president bush. the north koreans were not interested. >> was interesting because the chinese were pushing that. they really felt the interest aftern worked very well the shanghai accords. they would often described north korea as china, several decades ago. i am not sure that is particularly accurate. they really pushed the idea of an intersection. looked at me as if i were some crazy accommodationist. they could be nice if we could be in that position, i would show we are prepared to move ahead.
finally, i had to go right up to the president. it did not get anyway. another message again pretty --sistently was with the denuclearization, anything is possible. my only regret about exercises as we did not have them in the spring of 1950. contextll them in the of denuclearization, i can andine mutual backs measures. we can look at everything. denuclearization, we cannot look at much of anything. i want to give our audience a chance to ask questions.
we have microphones that will come to you. please let us know who you are and your question. i am going to begin right there. the gentleman there and i will work my way around. a question for ambassador hill. i would like to play up the scenario that you laid out that north korea's motivation is either to use a nuclear's shield for the purpose of aggression to teacup -- toto the decouple the united states. is what would you china's view of that outcome be? would not that serve china's interest?
it would be distracting the u.s. diplomatic. i think i will defer to my colleague on chinese interests. i will say i do not think there is a consensus within china. i think the failure to develop a tosensus has been harmful china. this 19th party congress, there will be more of a consensus. i wouldn't say there is a body of opinion, especially in china's security system. if steve bannon thinks we have a deep state, he should get a load of what is going on in china. among those 20 million police men in china.
on the u.s. troops korean peninsula are a bigger threat. i think that exists. my sense is that it is less prevalent. it is very much there as a view. point, when china and russia joined with a freeze for free proposal, suggesting they tests, in return for our freezing exercises. if i were in north korea, i would have gladly accepted that. that does represent what you are addressing. i will close by saying, if we solve this thing and turn around
and say how do we solve it? i think it is very unlikely that we would have solved it without cooperation with china. to the extent that we can solve it, we will probably find that working with china, being focused, being relentless, and tweets, but a serious effort with china is one of the main ingredients in having solved this. i feel the u.s. china relationship is one i would call for. we have to see what we can get out of it. >> any additional thoughts? >> at the most generous level, picking up on his comment on solving the problem, chinese
generally do not see problems to be solved. they see problems to be dealt with and channeled. they have -- and handled. solvenow they will not the others. they will deal with what may come. americans try to jump in and solve things created there is a deeply held body of opinion -- things. there is a deeply held body of opinion to keep the u.s. busy with resources so they do not focus on china. part of the important decision to put the high-altitude system and south korea -- in south korea. there was hostility towards
korean industry and fewer taurus. they turned this issue around in south korea where the popular polls were showing real affection growing for china and declining to the u.s. that has been reversed by china's heavy-handed approach. a lot of people i mentioned earlier, the commentators who have credibility are starting to say this is hurting our interest . and china isdamage aligning itself with the wrong end of history with north korea and not stopped korea -- south korea. it would be a decision they do not want to make. to ouromparable continued american focus on the middle east. we have a lot of cabinet senior people who are all figured -- focused on the middle east.
that is china's long-term interest. focus on these other areas where china does not have a dog in the fight. i have a question here and i will work my way back. have any of these been multilateral investigations? how do you assess the role of south korea? a civil government that is happy to act and talk like it is a conservative government. how does all of this parse out? have my viewpoint, we oppositions.
south korean positions may differ from president to president. the benefit -- it is a bit different. can unite together. that is hopeful. we have reasons to say all sorts of things. the people in south korea have different views than other generations. i am confident we can overcome any differences. japan, south korea, and china have a concerted interest. we have to use it. different views from south korea
and we can create a unified position. even with differences. that is my understanding. aspect is a key keeping the allies together. when we go from one administration to another, it is not the list. .e have had our problems the south koreans have done ok. think the rule i of these progressive government for the good cap that cop, the u.s. can stand tough and other allies can be tough with us. south koreans will have their interest and humanitarian relief , so long as they are firm of this on security side, there should be room for them to explore what might be available through various ends.
the ability to let off steam from time to time. i think this particular government came into office not equipped to do that because they have won the popular vote for presidency but are far behind in the national assembly. their immediate priority is domestic. it will focus on getting the next elections to raise their level of support in the assembly. they are focused on domestic reforms, not on foreign policy. attend to do whatever we ask them to do. that seems to be a source of trouble. have a view of the prime minister of a -- abe. maybe taking advantage of an extreme posture. decouplingcussed the
ability of our alliance system. it seems kim jong-un is connecting us. prime minister abe has been taking advantage of north korea issue to implement and realize his nationalistic policies. this time around, kim jong-un is doing too much. we are having not perfect but still very important coalition between the powers. >> managing the alliance partners is perhaps an even greater task than managing the relationship with china. careful,e need to be especially of how we manage south korea through internal transitions. this is about internal politics.
would start by suggesting it is not very helpful to call the south koreans appeasers. >> a question here with the gentleman on the end. side, we are.s. hearing a lot about talking about states. -- stakes. i wonder is it time for the u.s. to make some offer to the north, some carrots? what kind of carrots? what kind of offer?
given that in the united nations security council, there are already a lot of sanctions on the supply of oil. thehere enough room for u.s. to make such an offer to get north korea back to the table? all, north korea -- to to do nuclear eyes denuclearize. to complete the nuclearization of the country. tried tos later, they say we no longer agree to it. for ise u.s. has asked rejoinrth korea needs to the talks on the basis of what the talks are. the purpose of the talks is not to talk, it is to have the
denuclearization of the korean finance love. that is not preconditioned. the alternative is to just have no sense of what they think the purpose of the talks are. sometimes we hear the north koreans say one nuclear country to another. that really does not work for what we have in mind. i do not call this a precondition. i call this north korea's case of not acknowledging what it previously agreed. let's say we have a situation where north korea does want to get back to talks on the basis of the nuclearization but they do not want to say that. they do not want to simply reversed themselves and agree to something have not agreed to in years. that is what talks about talks are. you sit down and say we understand. we will meet next tuesday and
reaffirm your position. i the end of the week, by certain dates, you will have an agreement on north korea rejoining the talks on the basis of the purpose of the talks. you could work this stuff out. you want to emphasize is north korea has shown zero interest in talks. they continue to say they will not talk about denuclearization. this is a bit of a problem for us. we are to blame for the fact that they refuse to join the talks. i am a career diplomat. i always support talks. i think we need to be realistic of the purpose of the talks are you -- the talks.
we need carrots or indication that you are trying to do something positive rather than all negative because we do not want to say that we are denuclearize in from the sanctions have taken. .e can work that out -- we can work that out. they have not started the conversation at all. anyhis is the time to show carrots. north korea is launching missiles. carrots.showing the they show a readiness and fearlessness. they will come to the table. gathering, when people say the time for talks is over, maybe that is for now with north korea. clearly there is a lot among the five countries to work out together that would strengthen
our engagement with the north. the woman here over there with her hand up. >> my question is a follow-up of the previous question. i understand the consequences of accepting nuclear notes. ago -- talk to in years irreversible denuclearization of north korea did not work. north korea develop more advanced program. wouldn't it be more difficult to give up nuclear program when you have more advanced and more powerful program? when wenderstand approach north korea there a unified voice.
his do nuclearization first -- is denuclearization first? >> this will be our final question. i do not think we have the chicken and egg problem. that is what talks about talks deal with. >> northridge had it another give us any kind of their -- verification into thousand eight. -- 2008. us a declaration, it wasn't complete but we accepted it. we needed verification that is an international standard. they refused to give us any verification. they did not want
to do with the bush administration anymore? whatever, they did not give us any verification. they continue to develop weapons, very serious program that has continued. that wethe argument continue to work someone harness, is hard to give it up, again, if they want to get out of the issue that they put themselves into, there are plenty of channels, they know our telephone number. something,mphasize japan needs to be there, evil party to the top, south korea, washington two, i think it is
very important that we all be there. sometimes when you can't make any progress you say we have six party talks, maybe it should be seven parties or 66 parties or whatever, the issue is that north korea has refused to engage in these negotiations. that is the problem with facing. >> into 10, we didn't have these kinds of functions. -- we did, we do that thi not do these kinds of functions. >> i would appreciate you sharing your experiences and your insights that i.