tv U.S.- North Korea Talks CSPAN March 27, 2018 12:59pm-4:37pm EDT
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announcer: president trump has offered to meet with north korea's leader kim jong on no date has been set. you will hear more from this discussion of the institute of korean-american studies. introductions are underway. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] dave. let me thank our speakers and our audience here. i hope yoiu will enjoy the program. moderators. >> thank you. >> thank you for this impromptu
opportunity. i hope the honorable mary beth is feeling better. i appreciate the opportunity to fill in. reach back now to be reminded of a few things, when i was in school at the advanced military studies. ehe rulesne of th of planning was making stuff up. in the korean context, this is probably par for the course. what is going on inside north korea is difficult to discern. understand -- to real north korean experts. we are all students of north korea, trying to understand what is happening. we should start a pool today. is kim jong-un in beijing or
not? interesting to see if he is and what comes about. if he is in beijing, it makes logical sense from the chinese and north korean perspective. no one would want the first meeting with a head of state to be president trump. he will meet with president moon, first. that is a special case, the first outsider from the korean peninsula in the region being president trump would be historic. it would put china in a difficult position. both china and north korea, from both are perspectives, -- their perspectives, it makes sense both meet to discuss the way ahead.
s china'sun need backing and china does not want to be left out in the cold. possible there is a meeting that takes place. the big thing is the meeting. day, i don'tl this think north korea has really acknowledged they have made the offer to president trump. allusions been some to the condition of reconciliation. certainly, internal domestic propaganda has not announced there will be a north-south meeting. a meeting between kim and president trump. i think it is unusual everything we are learning is from south korean delegation's. we can interpret back in a number of ways. -- that in a number of ways.
i thought this be a way to infuse legitimacy into the regime. i thought kim jong-un would say, i never said that, would undermine south korea. but i think we are pretty inoculated to that. trump wonder if president , being the unconventional president, i wonder if he caught kim jong-un offguard by so rapidly accepting the invitation . perhaps you thought he would say no -- had thought he would say no and the propaganda department had been fully repaired to attack the united states with propaganda in the event he said no. his rapid acceptance may put kim jong-un back on his heels.
that could be one of the ways things are playing out. is he in beijing? will there be a president trump? juries are out on those. i would like to give a couple of things i think we should reflect on. i think we should remember what president trump's policy is. maximum pressure and engagement. we forget about the engagement. he has said that his candidacy oughoutpresident -- thr his candidacy in as president that he would be happy to meet with kim jong-un on. 30, you go back to june 2000 17, the joint statement between president moon and president trump, we are seeing everything play out.
agreed that maximum pressure and sanctions would be used to drive negotiations. and that south korea would take the lead in diplomacy towards unification. things were in the joint statement, and we are seeing them play out. it is not unusual to have south korea making overtures. new yearedicted the statement by kim jong-un -- the olympics, how they played the result ofnk these sanctions and some of the toughest sanctions we have ever had against north korea have had an effect on the regime. bill are some reports, and brown could probably articulate korea is losing currency.
one report i read speculated its reserves could be exhausted by october. that may be a little far-fetched, but i think the effect of the sanctions israel. -- is real. it is having some kind of effect. the north-south meeting, the offer to meet president trump, is probably designed to try and get relief from sanctions. one of the things i think is it is important, important that our administration is not going to fall into the trap of giving north korea is something for nothing. talkready hear pundits about it is time to lift the sanctions, because north korea has pledged to talk. we should not give any relief for the sanctions until there north, beingy the
on the roof denuclearization. we should not make the same mistakes we have made in the upt 25 years, giving something for nothing. the north is masterful at that. saysdministration sanctions are going to remain, and i am confident united states sanctions will remain. it is important to they remain and we continue to work with like-minded countries, as well as china and russia, to maintain the pressure on the north. it is time to reflect. although our policy is maximum i don't and engagement, think that is sufficient. we don't really have long-term strategy that focuses on the north korea question, reminds us of the korea question, from paragraph 60 of the 1963 arm ce.ist -- armisti
i have said this over and over, i think the only way we are ever going to see an end to the nuclear program, as well as the crimes against humanity being committed by the korean people living in the north, the atrocities that are recognized way weumented, the only are going to cnn days through unification. to see ann -- going end is through unification. it is time for us to ask some key questions. what do we really want to achieve on the korean peninsula? the watchzation is word what we talk about mostly,.
the threat against the united states is significant, but that is not the only problem. what do we want to achieve? what is the acceptable arrangement on the korean peninsula and in northeast asia that will serve and protect all iances? those questions need to be answered. important that we try to determine those answers, and develop the policies and strategies to obtain those objectives. it is important we view everything that happens in the next two months, everything that north korea does through the lens of its strategy. looking at north korea is that no one can be right or wrong.
and someestimation, people agree with what i am about to say, we will never really know until unification occurs. we can read the archives and interview what is left of the regime. it is important to understand the strategy. everyone thinks about survival of the kim family. not survival of the nation-state or the korean people, but survival of the regime. i agree with that. of thees the thinking regime and its actions. but the second part is unification of the peninsula. the north believes it is necessary to ensure regime survival. unification, the north strategy to achieve unification, and how that drives their actions. i think they're unification strategy is based on three lines
of effort. the first is submersion, -- subversion, trying to subvert, the people, politics, and culture of north korea. to make sure that people in the government and society are sympathetic to the north. you can look at that over decades, whether they are sleeper agents or overtly or politically aligned with the north. that is important to watch. the second. rockion is focusing the into unification on the north's terms. it's weapons and military are key to do that. if they are able to demonstrate they have superior military power, to include nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. coercionbe used as
reunification on their terms. the last line of effort is unification by force. we see the north developing its military capabilities to be able to use force if necessary. condition that the regime seeks is to split the u.s. alliance, that u.s. forces off the peninsula, to end the nuclear umbrella, and they will have conditions that they need for collision and use of force -- coercion and use of force. north,ooking at the trying to achieve relief from buttions in the short term, seeking a peace treaty with the united states or denuclearization. verifiable,lete,
irreversible dismantling of their nuclear program. the north views denuclearization on theuclear weapons korean peninsula, or for use on the korean peninsula. their idea of nuclear station is u.s. forces off the peninsula. denuclearization is u.s. forces off the peninsula. i think if we ever get to they're going to negotiate from the position that they are not going to dismantle their nuclear program until we commit to denuclearization. that is a nonstarter for the united states and the republic of korea. to do that would be peninsula on , and ah to war tremendous suffering of the korean people.
i think as these talks occur, we need to take a long-term view. would be for us to recommend we go back to the 1992 north-south agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression exchanges and cooperation. that document is a tremendous framework for peace and reconciliation on the korean peninsula. that was signed when kim jong-un's father was in power. moon and president trump should take that document to kim jong-un and say, we would like to honor your grandfather. just as you derived legitimacy from him, we would like to honor him. he had the vision to implement this north-south agreement. he agreed to sign this. he died in 1994 and it was never
implemented, probably because of the north is following its normal method of operation, not implementing agreements. but he can say, we want to support the vision of kim gave kim jong-un the opportunity to embark on this already agreed-upon document. fear is that president box, havingt into a to agree with something we don't want him agreeing to. if we approach the north-south agreement as a framework, we are making a deal to kim jong-un, an offer he can't refuse. if he refuses, we are in the say kim where we can jong-un is not honoring the legacy of his grandfather.
that will in oculi delayed us from what ever happens in the us from- inoculate whatever happens in the talks. who will undercut his own legitimacy and dishonor his grandfather. embark on say yes, we years and years of negotiation. i. there and put it over to my esteemed colleague. and turn itop there over to my esteemed colleague. >> good afternoon. i do not realize i was going to speak. since dave maxwell covered this so well regarding the north meeting, i will briefly touch upon this.
regarding the meeting between trump and kim we are expecting sometime in may, when this first there was great uniformity in the press about the summit that is going to actually happen. remember that kim jong-un never officially invited president trump for a summit. came from the south korean envoy to traveled to north korea. the envoy had a different motivation. korean government currently is focused on engaging with north korea. something weis
have to remember. when we hear that kim jong-un is committed to denuclearization, --n i read the korean text the words "committed to" was not there. we cannot be over excited about the prospects. another point i would like to is the word "denuclearization." in the original text, it was not about denuclearization of north korea. referred toimes be as non-euthanization, of the peninsula. when they talk about the peninsula, they are talking about south korea, is south korea denuclearized?
they are talking about the u.s. nuclear umbrella, u.s. capabilities. we need to keep all these in before we get overly excited about the summit. in the north korean press, they ma, other official channels to communicate this. they were really silent about the summit for about two weeks. they finally said something, but it was more of a warning to those to not ruin the atmosphere, whatever that means. what happened in the north jong-unress is that kim about thehis cadres
potential federation of the korean peninsula, and how they will achieve federation. what does it mean? korea and about south what is happening right now, the issue of constitutional reform in south korea. bit, therea little was a committee formed in the national assembly in south korea. it was around february or march of last year. draft of up with a over 100 changes to the constitution. one of the key items was liberal liberal from democracy as the basic order of the republic of korea.
some in south korea, because the idea of democracy is so valued, they think deleting liberal in front of it does not make a positive difference. it makes a huge difference. isocracy is something that already in the name of north as well as ink, the constitution, which talks about democracy. part really gives the character of democracy that we understand in the west and in south korea, currently. constitutional protects thehich right of individuals, freedom of allch, private property,
based on the rule of law. missing, that word, liberal, that is what that means. it is taking that, the character of south korea in a different direction. that was one of numerous changes in the draft. was a huge uproar from the opposition party in the national assembly for exactly the reasons i told you. backed away from this about four hours later. president moon, while that was going on, and this was during the olympics, when all the officials were visiting south korea, he said if the national assembly cannot do this, i will do this. committee topecial
write another draft of the constitution of reform. said, i will do this if you can't get this right, he already formed the committee two days prior to his speech. committee have a very flashy website up -- had a very flashy website up. they were reaching out directly to the people. it already explained a list of items to change. soundbite,ry quick may be a sentence or two. says, do on it, and it you agree or disagree? people click yes or no. they would collect the feedback from the public.
what is interesting is the process. you are talking about the constitution, the nation's highest law. to make a change to something that significant takes a lot of from varioust government entities, as well as the public. moonommittee of president did it in one month. they came up with a draft for that in one month. presentedwas recently affairsivil committee, which handles domestic affairs, he presented it partially because president
moon was visiting vietnam and the uae. on that he was joined by his chief of staff. wants to present this at the june 2018 elections, in the nationwide elections. country,was still in he urged the national assembly to do this very quickly. also went tostaff the national assembly to address the general assembly. them to quickly pass the constitutional reform.
has seen what this committee has produced. they were urging them to do this quickly, to put it in front of the june vote. i believe, starting the 26th, this was trickle down over three items weree of the never released. no one knows exactly what all the items are. some that came out -- the ability to recall the national assembly. they are elected to a two-year term. but they can be recalled by the
public. the other item, according to the was said on television, public can judge a trial, without any qualifications. a judge or ad legal qualification in order to be a judge at a trial. anyone can be a judge. the justification for this constitutional reform is to limit the power of the president, but it sounds like what is being limited is the power of the national assembly and the judiciary branch. aere are some other changes,
change that means labor, or workers. used in northrm i korea and in communist societies -- it means labor. labor, but it is not a communist term. it is being changed to this other term, all throughout the constitution. are all these changes, from minor to major. this also talks about decentralization. in the united states, we have the devolution of power, from the federal government to the and thevernment,
federal government to the city or counties. maybe it is not a bad thing in that case. it is not very clear. there are other instances of decentralization. the idea is to go down to the lowest levels. the lowest levels could go beyond the province level, the county neighborhoods and apartment buildings. go down to the basic cellular level. where have we seen this kind of optimization of power? -- atmoization of power? the soviet union. the councils. north korea also has something like this, down in the very local neighborhoods, at that
level. this occurred in other places as well, such as czechoslovakia, back then. things.ows two when you decentralize power to that level, it goes way below the city level, it atomizes power to the point where you are pulled in thousands of different directions. setup allows of minority number people to control the majority. i want to put that out.
opposition party, the said thisrean party, constitution is trying to lead south korea to socialism. one of the key concepts of socialism is government ownership, or private ownership of means of production. it does not to say no private ownership, but this introduces and highlights government ownership of land. the democratic party, the national assemblywoman of that party has been touting this concept of government ownership of land for some time. i just want to highlight that
part. that might give the government right to confiscate private property, which is a problem. let me wrap up. what is interesting about this constitutional reform is that this administration is in a hurry. the public is not. i am wondering if this is related to the summit between president moon and kim jong-un, scheduled for april. in this one speech, president moon said that even if he had to he willhe constitution,
achieve low-level federation with north korea. this is something that north korea suggested first. north korea has used this as a way to dominate south korea through this method. i will not get into that, because i don't have the time. if that is announced, if this low-level federation's announced or discussed or brought up, what will be the impact on the alliance? federation, the name of the country changes. it will not be the republic of korea anymore, it could be some sort of unified, federated korea. when the namework of the defense treaty changes?
is nohe entity itself longer the republic of korea, but contains an alliance and a threat? how do we deal with that? upm not sure this will come during the summit, but if it does, we need to be prepared. i wanted to highlight that. my time is up. thank you. >> even better, i got the last word. did you notice that? i am an economist. i look at north korea's economy very closely.
this is something i think the washington community -- a light of this goes back to the sanctions. goes back tohis the sanctions. few yearsld ask me a ago how effective the sanctions were, i would say they were not working. happening byis themselves, and china is not on board. that is what i would have said. if china is not on board with sanctions, sanctions are useless, because north korea and china are so close. i am changing my mind completely for two reasons. since north korea did its hydrogen bomb, there has been a lot more attention to
preemption, some ways to sort of stop it from developing further. not just the u.s., but the entire world. i am mostly looking at the chinese, who have stepped up to the plate in my mind, since november of last year, really tightening screws on trade with north korea. this started about two years ago, with tougher sanctions. it takes a while to implement. -- beginningvember in november, we saw a huge drop-off in chinese purchases the point korea, to that in january, north korean 85%.ts to china were down it, that is about an incredible shock to the north korean economy.
linked tof it as not the rest of the world. but that is not true. it has always been very linked to the rest of the world, to china. it receives important material. all of its oil comes from china, a lot of its food. its exports are basically shut off now to the whole world, to the point that exports for january are like $30 million, and their import requirements are still there. justice since november, kim jong-un -- just since november, kim jong-un is facing an economic crisis it has never seen before. it has been able to hold its currency steady, and in this kind of environment, doing so means you are making a
tremendous effort not to increase your own money. i have released a paper on this exchange problem they have. surprised kim jong-un is now reaching out suddenly to south korea and washington. as we saw last night, even beijing. he is looking for help, no doubt in my mind. this to me opens up a huge , fortunity for all of us south korea and for china, to change north korea. i don't use the term now, ition, but right don't so much talk about nuclear weapons. to me, the main problem with north korea is something that in 1945, thisem
, terribly ossified socialist command-economy system. everyone else in the world has thrown that out, even cuba. north korea looks like it is marketizing, but the command there, andstill about half of the population live in this basic slave kind of system, and they cannot get rid of it. i would say this is a great opportunity for all of us in these summits, in the moon summit, but especially in the trump summit, to change the socialist system of north korea. everybody wants to give president trump talking points.
mine would be, a simple lunch. he made that cheeseburger idea lunch in his campaign. i wrote a little piece, "the cheeseburger summit." you can google it. no one else uses that term. it will pop up. most people think this is odd because they start off with the economy. "we know you are losing money every day. up.ything is messed you need oil and you're not getting petroleum from china. you need food, aid. you are not getting it in this environment. can solve all these problems and all you have to do is back away from this socialist system
that prevents you from engaging in the rest of the world." you said in your opening remarks , we need to get rid of this hostility between america and north korea, we can do that. let's work on changing the system. we can have trade and investment with you. you will see you do not need nuclear weapons. they make you a target. you are a target right now because you have nuclear weapons. take them away, you are no longer a target. i will start with this very laying out ag, pathway for solving three sets of problems, the nuclear problem, which i connect with the normalization issue, the
economic problem, which i connect with sanctions -- and human rights issues, which i connect with tourism. you have not been good to tourists, you have to stop the camps, this incredibly old guilt by association system that we probably had in the west 500 years ago. korea had it in the 19 century. we know where it came from. you know as well as any of us it is a terrible system. experts can start meeting. three oreet back in six months, maybe in a nicer place, and see what we can bring together. but direct,mple, and with a path forward. that is the key to this summit. to set out a simple path
if he actually goes into this united, to broaden the states agenda, what you might call u.s. talking points, the nonnuclear issue. bill later that out in some about in his comments trump raising an agenda of economic reforms, and how the u.s. can contribute and assist north korea with economic reforms. hinted, whenalso he talked about the north korean strategy to divide the rok and u.s., and the north korean issue containing issues beyond the nuclear issue, i think davce e was hinting -- and i jotted
this down when i heard him -- raise thetrump should u.s. position on certain h kim-south issues wit jong-un and make it clear to him that u.s. policy on the korean question, and especially the u.s. commitments to south korea, what happens in the future will depend heavily on whether there is real change and real improvement in the north-south relationship. the script layout some of these out some ofd lay
the specific improvements that would need to be made in north-south relations. we have that theme to start off the seminar. it is a good theme. not just to stick to the nuclear ssue, or denuclearization, quote-unquote, but to broaden broader korean issue involving the economic side, and the north-southside, -- north-south side, in terms of very important policy components for north korea. i think it is important that president trump be prepared to go into these kinds of issues with kim jong-un. prepared -- be prepared. when i was a boy scout, years
there was ao, prepared." i don't know whether the boy scouts still have that motto, but it was part of our oath, when we raised our hands at each meeting. this is a model that needs to get into the white house right now. trump-kim summit meeting is to take place. realizet trump needs to , probably needs to be told, several times by his advisors, since 1994, been, through three different negotiations with north korea. our negotiating teams were led
.y highly skilled diplomats all of these failed, mr. president. our negotiators were bymaneuvered and manipulated the north koreans in each of these negotiations. trumpd tell president this is probably one of the sorriest episodes of of thislomatic history entire country, since the american revolution. we have accomplished nothing. president trump needs to commit himself to some hard homework,
to learn about why these negotiations failed. we took too much advice from negotiations. there are other reasons as well. he needs to talk with his advisors and have a good idea as to the kinds of issues and tactics and proposals that kim jong-un is likely to layout. president trump sits down with him. he will plan for what the united states response should be. layoutg-un is likely to two -- lay out two proposals.
it shouldn't be difficult to figure out what he will lay on the table with president trump. and he needs to have in mind what his agenda will be. what he will propose. not only on the nuclear issue, but perhaps on the issues that dave and bill raised as well. this seems very logical, in terms of what i am saying. president whoa does seem to believe that he can go into about any meeting and wing it. and he will come out in good shape. me, that he may not commit himself to do the kinds of preparation that it seems to me will be necessary if this
meeting takes place. i would hope general kelly and mr. bolton try to impress on him the need to be prepared. kim jong-un reportedly is in china. is inis no doubt that he china to talk with the chinese about several aspects of perspective meetings with president trump. only to find out from the chinese their perspective on how best to influence president trump, what should i say to him that will soften him up, that will flatter him? kim jong-un is asking that
question right now to the chinese. and also to lay out what you might describe as attractive-sounding proposals, and try to get from the chinese atdiplomatic commitment, th once kim jong-un lays out these proposals, china will come out and support them. phrase proposal, which i expect kim jong-il and to lay on the table. -- kim jong-un to lay on the table. you freeze testing, we will freeze military exercises. as bill alluded to, in laying out his agenda in getting he mightiplomatics,
try to get commitment from china. once he a copper shoes this, china will begin -- accomplishes this, china will begin to ease off on some of the trade .anctions i think he has these three purposes in mind. he is in beijing right now. this meeting will be important. the president needs to be prepared, will be prepared. that means a lot of homework between now and this meeting. thank you.
>> i think that microphone is over there. i was supposed to to give a isech myself, but it interesting to hear all of the things my colleagues have said. is about the potential summit meeting, whether this will happen or not trump. it is very possible that kim in north korea now. can jump up and who went
to beijing, or was it his sister -- was it kim jong-un who went, or was it his sister? they have never done -- in summitrst korean had happened in june of 2000. chinese foreign minister is saying, if we have something to say, we will do so, but we don't have anything to say right now. it has huge implications. the chinese don't want to be marginalized or bypassed by north korea, meeting with
trump. the chinese are their -- reasserting their position on the matters of the korean peninsula. that is a new development. my topic is also about the potential trump meeting. if it should happen. i will ahve to -- have to cover a lot of the same topics being discussed so far, with a slightly different insight. i will try to be very receptive, and constructive, to contribute to a successful
summit meeting between dprk and the united states, to address you haveconcerns expressed and how it will end up at the end of the day. a lot is going, between north korea and china, the summit jong-un.oon and kim goingnts to know what is on in washington. ofy have been paying a lot attention to everything that has been happening in this town. i will reserve my comments. the microphone to claudia. >> thank you.
claudia, with the independent women's board, . i would like to ask you, is it possible we are all being played? when you look back, you presented it yourself, look at what is going on in south korea, when the surprise new year's speech, it is unlikely kim jong-un would having -- suggested sending the delegation to the olympics, unless that you was already -- deal was already cooked. the only surprise is trump's response to the summit suggestion. otherwise, this is a predictable script. i could write this years in advance. lou correa new that with the
next test -- north korea knew of look, they are working and we move onto the next thing and they stop. meantime what terra just described is very alarming about what's going on in south korea. the whole thing suggests to me a play that by sometimes gets us all discussing the same things all over again and here we go. once to tell me i am dead wrong i am wide open to it. thank you. >> thank you, claudia. ok. let's reserve those questions and get into the second speaker. ed? i call him eddie. i will briefly introduce you. you may or may not
know, it has been characterized -- u.k. dailyn newspaper -- a machiavelli. i think that should be adequate. it's all yours. >> my only claim to that is i went to school in italy. the reason i'm here is because i have been involved in korean affairs for a very long time. not in the capacity of the gentlemen on this platform in terms of ongoing negotiations, but rather as an noncommissioned military contractor. i started when jimmy carter announced the withdrawal of all u.s. ground forces in korea. this is the thing that evolved into the withdrawal. the pentagon gave me a contract to go through south korea to
basically walk the dmz and assess the state of preparedness of the military forces. what we found was very large forces which were operating in a very procedural your craddick pro forma ritualistic -- bureaucratic pro forma ritualistic manner. it was a fraction of the potential combat capability because they were not serious uses ofployment or combat preparation. our first point in the report economic andor sense of -- incentive programs in order to decentralize the -- toment and move it give incentives to private companies to move away because so much of the vulnerability back then, we are talking a long
time ago, depended on the old -- of north korea and therefore all you had to do was to engage in very ordinary and by the way otherwise economically interesting the centralization and you could reduce the threat level from 100 5.50 to 25 to 10 and to we also recommended air shelter program. -- every apartment, every building. this was much too much. of zurich, one switzerland. there have not been too many wars in recent times there and very isn't a threatening north switzerland. therefore we felt that the rules
-- they require every building to have a shelter. on the ground that the shelters in the rocket bombardment environment when you go from your apartment to the neighborhood that's when you get killed. made this recommendation and we had wonderful celebration dinners. i learned several made this recd we had wonderful celebration dinners. good korean folk songs that i am still very fond of. everybody was terribly happy and off we went. by the way the next thing was tech -- tank deficits. north korea has many more tanks than we do and it is terrible terrible. we came up with a program to nothing,r almost putting a new gun on them and providing 1500 francs at a very low cost and very quickly.
u.s. was only making 60 tanks a month. the recommendation was accepted. we had wonderful and errors. i learned some more folksongs and more korean cuisine and then we discovered that they took the money to start the multi-year long range r.o.k. independent tank program. i said what the hell are you doing that, you are telling us that the korean tracks -- tanks were about to drive to your city we hoperoy you all and to start and r&d program. so i have learned from that a long time ago that the united states worried about the security of korea and the security of korean men women and children. the r.o.k. authorities military and civilian were worried about commercial programs, export programs. they felt the americans take care of security and we don't.
then came the arrival of john to one. securityspecial advisor. he invites me over, pays a lot of money. i am a contractor by the way. it says here probably i am a consultant. anybody. consultant to i am a contractor to the u.s. government and allied governments. this is a mistake. somebody wrote a year that i am a consultant. that is simply not true. i go back and now they some of these proposals. antitank buying and reworking. all that kind of stuff. the national security adviser was a professor from the national defense college. was a highly educated person who had been running the national defense college. he becomes national security adviser. these were a bunch of korean
generals who did not speak english but were much more serious than the english-speaking predecessors. the english speaking predecessors were people who spent a lot of times in american military clubs. these of generals and they actually liked american club food better than korean food. much more korean, much more serious and we were really hopeful that he would get serious. in other words do defense seriously instead of just going through the motions. let me tell you more money, contract, dinners, folksongs. i really think korea is a superpower musically. symphonic music, korean folk music, foreign folk music. lots of good dinner parties. nothing was done. the last time was a few months ago. i went through and i was given a tour of the shelters and it's a joke. these are not shelters at all.
there's no food provision. no first aid kits. absolutely nothing. and of course nothing has been done on decentralization and nothing has been done to buy intercept devices. company isaytheon selling the golden israeli thing. large production capacity. you reduce the rocket fall by 95%. if you do even a partial last-minute evacuation of a few people with bicycles or maybe on foot and you install this iron dome and you neutralize 95% of the rocket threat you neutralize it 82% of the artillery thread which is also limited. the northernmost fringes of the national capital area. nothing is done. after doing nothing the same
thele from south korea say united states can't do this and can't do that because we are vulnerable. the united states has had many allies ranging from luxembourg to norway to italy and they all have vulnerabilities but the united states is not usually defer to self-inflicted vulnerabilities. i don't blame the r.o.k. government's refusal of seriousness. i blame our successive four stars because the guy is the commander for start generalissimo of the u.s. army in korea. generalissimo of u.s. forces in of thend commander united nations for korea. got 12 starse's basically. he never tells anything to the r.o.k. government when he sees
them not buying the right tank or the right equipment. the latest thing, spending a mountain of money to develop a large to engine heavyweight fighter which would be equipped with european missile systems because why you buy a large two engine heavyweight fighter given that north korea isn't very far. it's just across. it's because it's really aimed at japan. that's why they are buying european missile systems. four-star, wean should call them in and say i am going on strike until you stop this nonsense, never says a word. a word when the r.o.k. navy named its largest helicopter carrier which again has no use against north korea. which actually administered by korea but supposedly claimed by japan. in other words there has been a pattern here of colossal
irresponsibility aided and abetted by the u.s. military in korea who presumably enjoy some of the dinner parties even if they don't pass -- really like the old style folksongs with the original instrumentation. so this is the context and one more thing. last september i went to the beach and as i did the president was arriving for the gathering of putin and his friends. then i went down to the north by,an border and i stopped there's a very wonderful restaurant. you can have really great fresh oysters right from the sea. i'm sitting there and the guy says to me there is a bunch of south koreans here.
never seen them before ever. the moon is scoping out the free trade area on the north korean border. the calculation appears to be that since you can't reopen the existing free trade area without noticing that you are opening up a system to money north that you will do it sneakily. there are wonderful restaurants and all kinds of things but it's not exactly a very famous tourist center, the north korea russian border. two daysdent moon later made one of his spokesman denied that when he arrived he asked the russians for this. the minister who is putin's kremlin advisor told me at breakfast that that is what he wanted to do. korea's attitude to north korea is the following.
we are 50 million people. that's true. they are 20 million people. that's true. we have a trillion dollar plus economy. they have the economy of the united states -- not of maryland, but of hyattsville. the most exaggerated criteria. if they spend $20 billion on everything it's a lot and for navy andave a large air force, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and the satellite in space. if this is all true out of $20 billion i suggest we shut down the pentagon and we just forract with north korea our military requirements because what the pentagon budget billiong up to $637 provides for $20 billion for stationery office supplies and
things of that sort. code hangers. that's what they buy with it. these north korean military forces do not exist. there is not a million man army. there are a large number of people who may or may not show up who may or may not be healthy enough to cross the street for the drop dead from hunger. -- before they drop dead from hunger. hisguy had large wounds in stomach. sneakily digthey out the -- straight from the ground and not able to wash it because if they are seen to be washing it they get arrested stealing the people. property for them to start. there's a million people with worms. has aircraft which are mostly archaeological. most haven't flown. north korea does not have an air defense when it comes to manned aircraft.
which are things like guidelines or something being counter measured 30 years ago, 40 years ago which are completely ineffectual. all this means having no defense that can be very easily bombed. now comes the issue. in the declaration that came out in all the newspapers about the impossibility of doing anything , the complete impossibility. first the million man army, the air force, navy, formidable military power. the impossibility of finding the target. as if we have no satellites and we don't see them taking the whole first in bringing some cement. when you have so little money you can't do things quickly and you can't do them in a concealed way.
so taking all of the known targets, all the probable targets, all of the possible targets you still are below what the aircraft already in country without needing to send b-17s or be 24's. now we go to negotiations. you all remember what a large effort the iranian negotiation was. several people were involved. and then there was a separatist date who went camping there on the premises until they would agree. and then there was another factor. the other factor was while the negotiations were taking place there were -- in abu dhabi who were getting ready for the israeli airstrike. the irradiance on the one hand were being offered a lot of money. secondly, very nice conditions. for example the heavy water
which was supposed to be shipped to patagonia or siberia is instead across the border in oman and is guarded by revolutionary guards. they were offered a lot of money and then these -- who were in abu dhabi not to take the waters. -- strikers commandos, what are you doing here. we came here to take the waters. you say to them, this is a desert. answer, wepposed to were misinformed. all of this is taking place. i believe that trump did something great during a campaign when he said if he gives up nuclear weapons i will receive them as an honored guest in the white house. in other words he split regime change from denuclearization. now what he can do is simple
things. he cannot do a complex negotiation. he does not need to be briefed by experts. all he can do in the actual issting trump administration to say to kim jong-un, listen, if you give up nuclear weapons we don't care. we have got to do nothing against your regime and we will not stop the south koreans doing what they always do which is to give you money, shove money northward. every time you do something provocative, murderous, aggressive, they respond by giving you money. and we want to. so that might work. engage in ato complex balance negotiation, somebody pointed out involving the chinese in any way. the chinese and the way our innocent people.
very innocent. tourism across the border and as you drive up before reaching the japanese the onlyich is connection you come across the most magnificent huge bridge jinping built by xi when he had the responsibly for this project and they built a huge beautiful bridge. is a potato side field. all the time when the chinese were building a bridge the north koreans were doing nothing. they also built a customs house which is much bigger and beautiful and about 50 office buildings. all of it completely empty. built factory space is
also empty. so the chinese can indication with north korea is about as good as the communication of iceland with paraguay. in other words, they are neighbors but they know nothing about them. that they are while on thelions other side the north koreans did not even have the courtesy to make a dog path for that bridge. absolutely nothing. it lies in a potato field. that is two regimes not communicating at all. we also know that they put on which was ar talks wonderful thing for years and years with a guarantee of non-achievement. since that time things have changed. the people when you drive into
the northeast road you come to a town where actually i saw a demonstration. there was a demonstration in signs and handwritten what they said is the government has forgotten us. the government has betrayed us. whense the buildings shook north korea tested and the people wrongly believed of course that there a lot of radiation came out. every time somebody has the flu they blame the chinese government for not stopping north korea. in beijing they made it very clear to me as a casual visitor at a nice lunch that if the united states bombed north korea cleanly and did not advance and made no move to go north of the dmz, if they took out only the nuclear things, they would love it. however we would not love it necessarily because the north korean nuclear weapon and's
while being a huge danger only because they are liable to sell it because they sell missiles, they sell everything. -- waitress girls in the restaurants, they sell everything. we concerned about selling nuclear weapons. if it wasn't the danger of selling from the u.s. point of view there is an ambivalence here because a north korea with nuclear weapons is a north korea that is independent of china and north korea loses its nuclear weapons in the kind of airstrike which i would favor but nobody else would. having north korea as a chinese crime is very dangerous because south korea would quickly become one, too.
a lot of koreans are making a lot of money in china. one of my friends in beijing who is a wonderful woman who runs a very successful hairdressing salon where all the elite goes told me china is wonderful for south koreans. much better than america. i went to new york to open a salon, it would not be fashionable. because i'm korean. because i'm korean it's very .ashionable those of you who would like to go to hairdressers the most magnificent hairdressing establishment in the -- hotel in beijing. thank you very much. >> ok. all right.
now the floor is open. would you respond to eddie's presentation? ideawant to ask about the of a preventive attack. unless of course is pretty -- isnt right now because becoming national security adviser and he has been a pretty consistent advocate of a preventive attack. you have also had reports that one type of preventive attack would be called a bloody nose strike in which one or two sites in north korea would be hit.
the idea being that this would jong-un and cause him to back off from proceeding ahead with his icbm program. this is a legitimate proposal and should be debated legitimately. my problem with what i have heard so far and i have seen many interviews about this both on television and on the radio that the questioners never seem calling up what you might the unintended consequences of doing something like this. and how what we often call the law of unintended consequences might come into play and create something very different from what we intended.
so i guess this is my question. and i'm going to ask this specifically related to china. china still has a mutual defense treaty with north korea. severals issued statements in the last three or four years outlining when it would commit its military to support north korea. the circumstances under which it would but also the circumstances under which it would not. support north korea. how would you expect or how would you anticipate the chinese reaction if in fact the u.s. carried out some sort of preventive strike against north korea, even a limited one?
first of all, if you ask me now whether i would tell mr. bolton to go ahead and do it, i would never do that. because first of all the u.s. air force does not offer this service. the u.s. air force does not fly somewhere and destroyed 17 buildings. it consists to carry out its idea of an air campaign whereby you have to have a complete suppression of enemy air defenses so the u.s. pilots should fly more safely than the passengers of many third world airlines. that involves destroying countless numbers of ancient surface to air missiles whose wiring has been eaten by mice and a attacking 2000 targets when you want them to attack 17. so i would first of all say if
it's the u.s. air force doing it through the planning mechanism it's not actually u.s. air force it's the air component of the for in effect it would start honolulu and then korea and so on. if those guys do what they usually do i would never go for it because it would be devastating the entire country in order to destroy 17 buildings. second point in regard to the chinese. one of the unfortunate things about my life is i actually don't like chinese food. lotve been going to china a and unfortunately i don't associate with all of the nice people in china but the notorious people from the so-called imf who are the staff commission of the central -- commission and these characters are the worst people in china. the nationalist militarist and so on. when it comes to russians and
they come to my house and they like brisket and all that kind of good stuff. anyway these people i have known for 40 years. successive generations. they are very kind. they are very generous and so on and we have many conversations. when i came back from my visit to them ider i said saw demonstrations against you guys for not protecting them. those guys said to me, that's what i just said in public. if the americans don't move north of the dmz it would be much better if they would move south. if there's no trace of doing that and they take out the stuff we would be happy to do it. no certainty of defense matters in south korea and after taking $553 billion off me said the solution must be diplomatic here it -- diplomatic.
i said i'm not going to do it. they said our military are only good for parades. when we asked them to do something they bring up the million man army. because xi jinping reduced the ground forces drastically to build up the navy and the air the chinese would love it if north korea could be denuclearize to. -- denuclearized. we would not love it. force did the same thing under george bush. george bush said, go and bomb the towns. are the same.
heesident xi reduced te chinese gun forces. our boys are parade boys. what people say. that is the reality. thing.ot a simple the uranium success was due to generosity, when we gave them privileges.ble we gave them water. children were scoping out air strips in abu dhabi. there, they even are much closer.
air force. the u.s. they fly there, destroyed buildings, and go home -- detroy buildings, and go home. we have a bureaucratic reality. somethinguggesting sophisticated in the white house, something properly balanced. give itove you if you about youron't care missiles, your behavior. nuclear, you get everything. period. as for mr. bolton -- i hope he is good. there is no strike plan coming
from his office, either. >> that presentation proved my initial remarks about north korea. it is a closed society and there are no experts on north korea. we talked about "making stuff up." in makings to korea, that asssessment -- for visits making thatn assessment, knowing what four-star generals have said to the korean military and the not going to am assess that, because i don't think it is really necessary. what i would like to ask you, because you have expertise, i
would like to know what you would think would be the cost of an iron system, if it would be able to handle the amount of not rockets,millimeter hundredsthe guns, the of systems that can range all of seoul. i would like to know what the cost of that would be, and if such a system could provide effective defense against those systems. srael the face the number of artillery and rocket systems that seoul faces. i would like to hear your assessment of the iron dome. >> before answering your fly up toi need to
boston and negotiate a contract with raytheon. this is a small country, with a population that is 12% of south korea's. if they can afford to have coverage against crude and ro korea the republic of if afford it, particularly they stopped long-range, heavyweight missiles aimed at japan. 130 millimeter, which only reached onto the province, massive artillery.
there are difference between the rockets. the money is now being spent for foibles. tanks, tanks, the two it have the distinction of being the world's most expensive, $8 billion. tanks, there was an amusing and interesting project that enriched a lot of people in the middle. announce $8 billion -- how do you announce $8 million? if you have the money, you could announce it quickly. these are probably not being used for the purposes of protecting the population. the rok wanted to protect its population, but buying the iron
e,me would be a measure to tak which they could, within their existing defense spending. you would have to have other measures. seoul and hear on the radio things are going badly, and you get on a bicycle, you can diminish the threat by biking away, just by moving. this is a situation in which serious people would have answers very easily. as for the 152, the old 130 was comparable as a threat. carter decision that, theday, between
number of bombardment rockets has not increased by more than 70%. the quality may have gotten better. it has been resting there for 50 there for 50ing years. >> tara? earlier, one of your if north korea gives up its nuclear weapons, it would fall under china's sphere. if we successfully attacked , that would have political consequences.
at the end of the day, we might chinese c korea under ertainty, and south korea would fall under chinese certainty, given the proximity of many people their. -- of many people there. this is not a simple thing. weapons,ose nuclear they give up nuclear weapons to donald gives and the green light to south korea, so the regime has a lot of money, this will not be wasted money. regime would be strengthened.
we haveuclear weapons, a stronger regime in north korea. simple.re not these north korean nuclear weapons are a sign of the independence of north korea. china does not dominate the korean peninsula. the united states has a very high interest in the south korean peninsula, that it should not be dominated by the south. we can use it south korea in terms of our strategic purposes. no one has been doing anything to ensure the protection of south korea because of the noncooperation of rok authorities.
a russian airline to fly from seoul. with that airline, you fly over north korea. to fly over aul completely dark country, like flying over the belgian congo in the old days. there is no light pollution. that is a very good location to meet. we would not want to lose south korea as the united states. they are going to sell their nuclear weapons. we don't know who they are going to sell them to, maybe two mexican cartels. the president would be capable of it. weapons, everything.
>> i am not a military expert. the only thing i take away from you, i have been there a long time, in korea, too. the united states has spent, since 1945, and i am just guessing, i am guessing we spent $2 trillion in korea. it is not going down. we are spending more today, every day, billions and billions of dollars. everyone in the world knows north korea needs to change? in all vested interests these millions of dollars spent every day. the -- one of the
things i ever really not like is the buildup of the tax base. -- tech base. we have spent $7 billion and -- we have spent $14 billion, building our biggest army base ever, and it is like therefore 100 years. that is a tragic mistake. we should be ready, in north korea, finishing the job, getting out of there, and saving hundred billion -- $100 billion per year. this is a huge responsibility and i hope president trump can grasp it. i am not optimistic. but if he can scope out a logic, not to do it
himself, that would be crazy. a ceo scopes it out and gets the experts working. we have the whole world on our side, even china. i don't think north korea wants to along this problem. let's do it that way. this speaks to the incredible expense we have done in korea, and we have done a part -- a fantastic job of protecting it from communism, but we keep staying there and spending more money. i am tired of spending all that money. i would like to address claudia's points, if i could, and others, too. claudia, you spoke well.
you are saying there is no surprise. we should expect north korea to be doing all these things. i agree with you. there is not much surprise, but that does not mean to me we should not take advantage. smart, say they are so they have a plan to get more aid from south korea, but we can see through that. there is no reason we need to play into their crazy plan. they are in very tough shape, right now, especially with the chinese being nasty to them. --y can't officially seles sell a shirt into china, as of november. i don't think north korea expected that much toughess. they are in a tough box and
trying to wiggle out, with the whole u.n. it is a unanimous will on the security council -- rule on the security council. russia and china are all ruling against them. >> i never got to the 2006 resolutions. rown: until then, russia and china said, let's not hurt north korea, we will only hurt the nuclear establishment. a year and a half ago, that changed. after the fourth nuclear explosion, they said, they will pitch the north korea and economy. y. they stopped -- they will hit the north korean economy.
they constrained north korean exports greatly. on board with constraining the economy and they are seeing results. you are quite right. lastanctions will not forever, that is why i want to jump on it right now. tougher everyng day. than theyosing more are exporting. they are vulnerable and i want to take advantage of it quickly. >> ed? luttvak: there were two things that happened 18 months ago. one was another test. there had been several under obama. a year and a half ago, plus one
more nuclear test. that is one more test than the previous test, or am i missing something? been noote, there has reaction to the previous tests under the obama administration. think the chinese message, which brings about civil that sends a message incongruent with the message they gave me privately. we don't dream of moving north, better if you move south. ok united states bases are ay.
this is a very painful subject to me. you are facing an energy that has a missile capability. keepingn general said troops under tents made them ready for war. tents! >> i agree. dr. luttwak, i would like to ask you about something that troubles me able to bit about the sanctions of the north korean economy. disagree with what bill has been saying, including what he has been saying about china, but we saw in the press recently the reports of the u.n.
committee that monitor sanctions about,h korea, talking up to the last couple of years, 40 shipments of chemical weapon north korea,om that had reached assad uin syria. when your ago, the israelis heading big convoy, into the government control areas of syria, and the israelis proposed that convoy contained about 100 advanced missiles, bound for has been lost. -- hezbgollah. beleives north korea -- believes north korea is
supplying missiles to the yemen. attack l was a missile the saudiainst arabian capital. all this means a huge flow of iranian money going into north korea. assad cannot pay for this. money from earns iran for its assistance to assad the houtis,h and all of whom are big clients of iran. 2017ook at the worldwide u.s. intelligence commitment, a report that the
director of national intelligence presented to he talkedin which about significant collaboration between north korea and iran in missile development. all of this represents big cash flows coming into north korea, which iabout significant collabn between north korea and iran in missile think may push in the effects of what is being talked about. do you have any thoughts or insights about that, whether these north korean activities in the middle east are so lucrative financially to them, that it could have a cushioning effect on sanctions? luttwak: once you get to this level of sanctions, the sea food imports -- north korea's seafood was important
qualitatively. once it gets to the level of sanctions, you have to stop ships leaving ports in north korea. you cannot have this level of sanctions without it. you are preventing them from exporting iron ore. you did this before with coal and the wonderful seafood they were shipping out. the only thing they can export is weapons. they have supplied the ballistic missiles the iranians claimed on their own, and they have supplied the other ones that reached
the portion of south yemen. they cannot export anything peaceful. they are going to export weapons. north korea sends a ship off the coast of australia to sell to enterprising australians. it does not make sense, to force them to export things other than peaceful. the only thing i would talk about is the volume. the iranians do not have a lot of money. this is just enough to pay for the smuggling of luxury goods, for the nice people in pyongyang. ago, i went to a
seafood place, a pizzeria, and all kinds of other stuff. exist inng people south korea. car-driving is elite. this is a luxury. they don't have a lot of money. bouquet --ons or a or a blockade in my view. you are making it more dangerous to have sanctions if you do not have a blockade. putin told a group of us, several people, including governor jerry brown, we had a private dinner with putin. doin said, the north koreans
not give a dam about the people, meaning even less than he gives a damn. kim jong-un would make everyone else each grass. -- eat grass. he does not have a great regard for the population at large, even that he killed his own brother. the chinese are on board and they are from italy dangerous. -- formidably dangerous. you drive them into doing those other things. please?phone, an intel analyst and former diplomat. this notion of selling arms is just nutty.
notionto challenge the north korea is going to sell these nuclear weapons. forensics - nuclear - they sell one of these things wehezbollah, they drop it, will know in about two weeks. [indiscernible] the return address is pyongyang, so these weapons are essentially useless. one customer is the united states. sell 20-20 five weapons to the u.s. for a billion 5ollars a piece, -- 20-25 weapons to the united states for a billion dollars a piece, covers denuclearized, hold on to all your knowledge, so the nuclear weapons may be gone, but the bio and chemical weapons and
all the missiles which will stay remain. you can buy 10,000 runs for a thousand dollars a pop -- drones for a thousand dollars a pop from china and deliver biological weapons. >> i just want to address the north korea is trying to buy time, and i agree. i think that is the case. a betterto have analysis of the situation we need to pay attention to what is going on in south korea. regarding the question, let me point out the money aspect -- the government, even before he became president -- north korea has rebuffed him. year,ometime late last there was reporting that said
north korea was demanding $80 billion for a talk, and that is more than twice the north korean gdp. what people thought was north korea was not serious to demand such a serious sum of money. a was interesting is in early december, the chief of staff to the president made a trip to the uae and lebanon. this was announced after he left and he was sent there as a special envoy. a chief of staff was sent, and the reason given was he was there to cheer the troops. don't sureat if you the troops, it should be to administer of defense or staff, or military chiefs. but that was not the case. the assemblyned, wanted to know why he was there and what happened.
while he was gone there was speculation that perhaps he is meeting north koreans to transfer money. we don't know, but that was the speculation. because of that the national assembly wanted to know -- he decided to go on leave that afternoon, and he never appeared to answer any questions. then the press asked them questions, but after a while, the story went away. this is something that came out to the other day. during the olympics north korea sent several teams, hundreds of people to south korea. people that the north korea sent were state security agents that were sent -- redeployed from china, they
were recalled and sent to south korea for collecting intelligence purposes, and what ever else there were up to. ship to thent a cheerleader state. there was a government that basically announced a no-fly zone over that ship. at the time they also had a covered area where trucks mysteriously went in and out. the press were asking what are those trucks and what are they carrying out what is going on? aain, it was in the news for while and then it went away and nobody can explain that. thing -- there was a cripple currency incident in south korea. limitation, and prior to that the government was
involved in getting the prices up, and then one day they announced restrictions on corporate currency and the price fellglobally -- the price globally. this surprised south koreans who voted for him. we don't really know what happened, but something drastic happened at that time. and on january 1 we had the statement -- it was really late, jong-unh korea and kim was expecting willingness to participate in the olympics. i wanted to provide extra background. all these are questions that are not answers, but these questions were raised because these are strange incidences that happened. much.nk you very
korean language interpreter, including secretary of state meeting in 2000 with kim jong-il of north korea's nutshell defense commission -- national defense commission. afterward he talked diplomacy and negotiation at korean university and seoul as a visiting research professor. and at the johns hopkins university school of advanced studies in washington dc for two years as an adjunct professor. he currently remains the status of the visiting scholar at the institute of international relations at korea university. he has been a regular eye weekly columnist of the korean times for over 12 years. he has done research on
diplomatic security issues u.s. and khe orean peninsula. received a bachelor of arts and master of arts in international relations from john hopkins. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming tom kim. [applause] >> she is a junior in high school but we bring this --ngster to the military this is how we do it. thank you. >> thank you for your kind introduction and also, i want to thank song joo for allowing me
to have this valuable time with you to talk on the korean topic. potential summit meeting between kim jong-un and president trump, a timely topic, and all this afternoon, speakers all mentioned about this thing. -- let me bring up my speech on the computer first. i don't normally use a script but this topic is important and i have a tendency to talk long and i have to discipline myself and confined to a script.
maybe i have to call my research assistant to activate this thing here. let's see, what is happening here. -- i start off by saying will talk about the backdrop against this important meeting might happen, then i will way of trump's unique conduct a foreign policy after -- how he was doing in the past 14 months in office. ofn i will discuss all kinds warnings, caveats, risks
involved with his policy. all the concerns discussed this afternoon by various commentators -- and then i would discuss what talking points trump will be likely to present to kim jong-un. and kim jong-un back to drop, and then i will give my conclusions and comment what can happen. how trump can conclude his meeting. ok. i need my wife, who is my
the korean peninsula. will soon witness summits the next months. beenis morning, there has unconfirmed reports that kim was-un and his sister touring home after a visit to beijing. i will not say what the implications -- what this visit and what they discussed. invited kim jong-un was to see from the chinese in terms of easing sanctions and whatnot. continue, president trump said he will meet with the north korean leader kim jong-il and i the end of april. no change has been announced to this plan as of yet.
the latest poll from fox news released on sunday shows 63% of the public approved trumps meeting with kim jong-un. and 30% disproved. of april, the south korean president will also meet with kim jong-un on march 29. the unification minister will meet with the committee chairman to discuss the time and agenda for the summit meeting. moran said if these two meetings said if thesen meetings go well another meeting can happen presumably to see a that could take care of contending issues related to
denuclearization. moon is also seeking a summit with japan and china as well as another meeting with president trump. japan will meet with trump soon, and he also reported yesterday a summit with kim jong-un. all these summits can happen prior to a trump-kim meeting. moon make a perplexing comment. translations is from north korea. the south and the north should not harm or interfere with each other, but should prosper together in peace, whether living together or separately.
this may mean, number one, in a vacation is not a priority -- unification is not a priority. the president of south korea should pursue it peaceful denuclearization with north korea. for religion,es but i don't think moon has discussed -- he has two thirds of the military and his national it, so he to pass would need the approval of the national assembly and would not be able to put the amendment in the form of a referendum to local elections.
coming back to his statement, a onecond -- he may seek state with two systems making a vast difference, and he has implications on a lot of comments we heard this afternoon. coexistence isd the greatest good that the two koreas should seek now. criticism of president trump said the decision to meet with kim jong-un were based on two grounds. the regard of normal process and risk of his policy decision. decisionp made his during a briefing by the south korean delegation.
he did so after hearing of kim's commitment to denuclearization and kim jong-un's eagerness to meet with president trump. kim's message was conveyed to drop by south korean security advisor, and the president let him announce the surprise decision at the white house on march 8. concertident did not with his advisers before the decision and did not go through a normal decision making process of an inter-agency discussion or a principals meeting. in addition, the president departed from the traditional does not-- a president
directly negotiate a deal with a foreign leader. he waits until all the details of agreement have been worked out. normal context, negotiating process seems to iversed fromn bottom up to top-down, however, president trump has constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy as he pleases. anybodyire or higher for his administration, although most high-level positions are subject to congressional consent. that is the senate confirmation. he was elected that he was going to be different from his predecessors. but, if the president this regards totally any advice or talking points prepared for him by his national security advisers -- as we heard was the
case in his recent call to putin. trumps unpredictability can be a source of risk and element of surprise at the same time. as a matter of policy, and the president chooses for his national security team matters. employment --s the replacement of h.r. mcmaster and mike pompeo as secretary of confoundingce a message of the direction of trumps foreign policy, especially as policy on north korea. affect a looming u.s. summit? shareompeo and bolton
similar views on north korea and it is well known as we heard from commentators this afternoon. wk,tics call him a super ha , andical, a warmonger the second most dangerous american. then others have called him scum. they have the capability to strike the united states -- a military strike is a dangerous, but most of koreas military missile is more dangerous, he said. in contrast, pompeo does not strike.or a military he advocated for the removal of kim jong-un from the north
korean nuclear program. like, the capitation operations. shortly after trumps announcement of a new security said, frankly, what i have said in private is behind me. the important thing is to what the president says and the advice i give him. many are already concerned by bolton. cnn reported that bolton promised the president he will now start any kind of wars. aborted colin
powell's efforts to bring north korea to six party talks after he criticized kim jong-il, to aen leader of north korea as tyrannical dictator. last week bolton responded to concerns that a person of radical views should not be national security adviser. role ofoes not view his brokering views of competing agencies and recommendations to the president. he said his job will be to discuss, coordinate the views with other members of the security team, then make a list of options with comments to the president to choose from. prospect ofeven the trump-kim meeting will depend on trump. and on kim jong-un.
will he canceled the invitation? he is closely watching what is happening in washington. the president is the ultimate decision-maker on matters of war and peace and the white house spokeswoman or person, sarah huckabee sanders made it very clear that the president will be the ultimate negotiator on the north korean their issue. issue. it is amazing to see what happens under the trump administration. for the past 14 months fitness becomes real news. reality tv shows becomes politics and he changes subjects on the kerley. momentarily.
foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics so one should look into washington politics to understand his north korean policy. we should do the same on south korea and north korea to understand their policies. today, to understand u.s. and north korean policy, one should study trump. what do we know clearly about what trump wants on north korea? ands to denuclearize neutralize north korea. regarding negotiations of denuclearization, starting from top is not a bad idea. you can save a lot of time if it comes out right. prefer toaditionally
favor a general agreement on top that allows lower tiers to work out the details for implementation. worse tot would be consider a comprehensive package encompasse, including denuclearization controls and missile normalization, and economic cooperation. prefer this format beenttlement and this has discussed and used a few times in the past. statement of six party talks was a good example of a comprehensive package deal.
the u.s. andment, north korea and south korea, china, japan, and russia agreed toachieve -- not just denuclearize the north, but others as well. this is in the statement that the six party adopted at that point. and also to support a process of normalization between the north and the united states to build a regime.gime -- peace and to offer assistance to the north. the problem was there was no sequential order of documentation with these agreements with the u.s. focusing only and primarily on denuclearization. a presidential team is expected
to start working soon with the north koreans to set up a summit determining a time and agenda. in the meantime, joint military views with the u.s. and south korea will begin on april 1. north korea is expected to show their concrete and verifiable actions as demanded by the white house in support of their framing from the nuclear and missile tests and other publications during the exercises. if they fail to keep their word in this regard, it can effectively cancel a summit. fails, it could trump-kim summit.
ofre is a lot of speculation his motive for why he wanted to have a meeting with trump all of a sudden. nobody really knows, in my view. perhaps it could be a combination of the pressures from sanctions and threats of military action. and their confidence and negotiating leverage from the advancement of their own nuclear and missile program. the propaganda outposts have facing pressures of sanctions or military threats . it appears though that the sanctions affect the north korean economy. considering the viability, i
doubt it is going to lead to a collapse of north korea. ann you look at the risk of upcoming -- they include that trump can be played i kim jong-un, who has been recognized as his counterpart on equal footing. and the response to this concern, i would suggest we rust trumps judgment. he may be erratic, but not stupid. two, north korea will never give up their nuclear weapons. the goal is denuclearization, not arms reduction.
the north has a different concept of denuclearization as toy want -- they may want stop and freeze and keep the stockpile and also demand denuclearization of the south as well. the term andd, scope should be defined from the a complete dismantlement instead of denuclearization. dismantlement. this term was used in the agreed framework and we did not use the term denuclearization, but dismantlement on north korea's materials. that administration or international communities effective maximum escher effective national
campaign are in control over sanctions and can do whatever they want to do. so far they made it clear they are not going to weaken any of the sanctions whatsoever. in this regard, cooperation of china and south korea will be critical. five, north korea will cheat again on any future agreement while buying or earning time to complete their nuclear program. that is why we need strict measures in place, like ronald reagan said. trust by verifying. 80 negotiator will be protected for many years going back to several phases, and it depends on the political
views from the top negotiators. kim jong-un and donald trump. implementation should take longer than reaching an agreement. treatyseven, a peace will precipitate u.s. withdrawal from south korea. their goal is to unify the peninsula under communism. elaborated on this theme, precisely. the military presence is based treaty and defense colonization of the peninsula is an north korea's pipedream. number eight, no negotiation is needed because of emergent collapse from mounting pressures andanctions and isolation, from a possible uprising from
within. response, theories of the past 30 years have proven wrong. it is very unlikely there will be an implosion. nine, kim's offer of denuclearization talks is a trap to drive a wedge between south korea and the united states. it is up to south korea and the ..s. to keep strong alliance now they are trying to reach washington through seoul, instead of bypassing it. number 10, it is morally wrong to compromise with the regime of kim jong-un, who killed his ande, half-brother, hundreds of assistance.
he violates human rights, and i the u.s. policy representative said in his final report that we should take north korea as it is, not as we wish it to be, if we want to see a negotiated settlement with them. improves andy tensions are removed, there will be a fair chance of improving human rights in north korea. most of these concerns and -- they areoncerns based on experience and current assessments of north korea's intention. what north korea's intentions are today.
validity ofipe or these concerns should be tested through a couple process of negotiation. with optimism under the prospect that trump may be able to pull off from a historic summit with the north korean leader -- if it takes place. news of a potential face-to-face meeting between trump and kim has already brought about a dramatic turnaround from talks of a war to talks of a peaceful resolution. the current mood in the korean peninsula -- that began with the olympics, even after the announcement of a joint u.s. and south korean military drills. newo not hear any more of a north korean provocations of talks of going to war.
website -- henew reported that there was no activity in the north korean sites for nuclear tests. bolton may be able to moode this very current back to threats of a war. moon is keeping the u.s. engaged with the north while pursuing the same goal of denuclearization through peaceful means. to trumpgiving credit tough policy for kim's turnaround and trump seems to on's complement. this is something the chinese does not like.
there is a promising site of the --oming trump-can meeting two leaders who share a leadership trait for making decisions for a quick solution. a similar penchant for quick and decisive action. and the north kim jong-un is the only one who can make a strategic decision that can change the course of north korea. under his autocratic system he is the only one who is immune from criticism or opposition from within. kim startedd exchanges of insults and threats , have beenowever silent on trump's decision. kim jong-un is yet to respond to trump's acceptance of his invitation.
to conform his commitment to denuclearization, kim jong-un can deliver a letter to the white house, perhaps through china. there are a few other things can can do to improve the atmosphere before the meeting can happen. he can release three americans detained in the north. cap express willingness to resume joint recovery operations of the remains of americans missing in the korean war. the display ofo the north as a symbol of victory of america. in addition, if he can announce his willingness to suspend the work of expanding his nuclear arsenal while renewing his promise of a moratorium on new tests. as long as talks are underway.
considering trump's statement so far and his views of a new show security advisor, the president may include the following statements and talking points to kim jong-un. this is my guess, of course. if i were to write talking points for trump these are the things i would write. the u.s. will not tolerate a north korean nuclear missile capability threatening the u.s. we are seeking a complete irreversibled denuclearization of north korea through all means possible. will not exclude the use of military force if necessary. will never recognize your country as a nuclear weapons state. we are not seeking fees and i don't want to repeat past
mistakes and don't want to waste your time. i want to succeed in our talks. war, we is not seeking are not seeking regime change for north korea. we will not have to keep sanctions if you abandon your dangerous nuclear programs. states be willing to provide security assurances aideconomic cooperation to in to denuclearize north korea and will be willing to work with your government to improve human rights in your country. in intert progress korean relations. but, the u.s. presence in south korea is not negotiable and not subject to negotiation.
north korea's demands on the other hand -- several very well policy- they include against the dprk to lifting economic sanctions and normalization with the u.s., and a peace treaty and withdrawal of u.s. troops from north korea. and economic assistance from the international community. kim jong-un's talking points may repeat -- previous statements as the following. he was repeating what his father used to say and said to former secretary of state when she was visiting kim jong-il. now i start kim jong-un's talking points.
succeed in our talks and our country will have no reason to keep our nuclear weapons if you and your hostile policy and guarantee the security of our sovereign the move of military threats against our country. denuclearized korean peninsula is my grandfather's last will. my father once said the u.s. does not have to be a sworn enemy for 100 years. coexistence,ful and want to improve good relations with the united states. but, he might say will not surrender to your pressure. there will be no nuclear or missile tests while talks are underway.
normal u.s.t oppose joint military freeze with south korea. are for deterrence, for defense, and we have no intention of attacking the u.s. we will not transfer our nuclear capability to a third-party. dprk wills settled, not a post discussing an adjustment to the rule of u.s. presence in south korea. this is something that was discussed in for party talks in the late 90's, and kim jong-un that we can tolerate the presence of u.s. military in south korea as long as they are to invade us.
presencele of u.s. should be shifted from invasion to peacekeeping, and also for regional balance and power initiated by the u.s., which all right responded upon -- which albright responded upon. it is not expected to resolve but, they cane -- set the tone for a negotiated solution. they can agree on a general roadmap towards denuclearization. through this path of negotiation before.
therefore, we should do better this time. be -- we should be mindful of the big changing game, that is today's north korea has a considerably advanced nuclear and missile bombs and icbms. warned that the icbm will complete a capability within a few months. pompeo's prediction of his timeline of the three months is passing, the north has not -- what is important the north has not conducted a new test to the entry capability of their missile, yet.
we know bolton's approach will be seeking a quick removal of the entire nuclear arsenal from north korea. this would require kim jong-il's complete and unconditional surrender, and i don't think that is going to happen. instead, negotiations -- negotiators could consider and discuss a two state solution -- or three stage formula for a dismantlement of the arsenal. measures are very important and should be built and each stage of implementation. solution to kim jong-un owns missile program could be even trickier or more treacherous.
on thetors should focus elimination of north korea's icbm, while allowing their right to explore space science. for trump, time is a critical factor. office -- he may wish to resolve this issue in time so you can take it to the next presidential election campaign, or to the november elections. kim jong-un has no term limit to his power and in toview it is not impossible have a concrete pass to the nuclear missile issue before the u.s. presidential election. whether trump can pull off a successful deal during his first time in office will largely reward he is much ready to give to north korea,
bit more of how north korea perhaps starting with the summit -- is going to play what i would call its icbm card in negotiations, which has not been a factor in previous negotiations. it seems to me they are now likely to be a big factor. and what do you think north korea's strategy will be in terms of dealing with the u.s. were approaching the u.s. under the icbm issue? think they are going to start with an argument we are familiar with -- the u.s. has icbms, and also modern,
powerful, military assets which the u.s. easily mobilizes to attack and invade north korea. we wantgument would be, these threats to be removed. not just a single sheet of paper, as we have seen it before, this has a lot to do with our experience of implementation and why they failed. just largely -- but solely by north korea's responsibility or failure to carry out their obligations. some agreements we botched contributed to the bunching up of those agreements, like the framework for example. even the six party talk agreement, because as i pointed
no briefly, there was sequential order for these agreements. the u.s. and other parties only dealt with the denuclearization aspect of the agreement. we were supposed to start off by a process of normalization, but that has never taken off. building should have taken off. it was just denuclearization vis-a-vis and with other countries can contribute to aid the north korean economy. the u.s. resisted joining to provide any economic aid to north korea at that point. i think it isme, very important -- i think north
koreans are learning constantly -- play their for example after the transfer of power in washington from clinton to this is onesh, countries commitment doesn't hold any longer, and he learned that. they have been watching that. is different, so they are learning how things work in this country. i think the problem is they are studying trump and what he might do. as i pointed out in my presentation -- their focus will be on the icbm issue. we didn't have to develop these things if you are not threatened, but it is the turn to measures -- the current measures.
if they get rid of the nuclear that they can attach it and mounted to international --listic missiles intercontinental ballistic missiles, there is no use for icbm without nuclear warheads. that will be a good argument. iom our point of view -- think the emphasis will be on the removal of hostility. when you to define what they mean by hostile policy with the u.s. at 1.i said that anything they don't like about what we do can be branded as u.s. hostile policy because they are so vague and broad and it includes every response. question,k to your the question is how are we going to assure them of their safety.
not just the assurance of safety but, how areme, we going to convince north koreans that we are not going to invade you. we are not going to try to get rid of you. a different setting and circumstances -- i think that is the key. call to the toughest to convince north korea. grandfatherg-un's when jimmy carter went to the 1994.nuclear crisis in problem started with the lack of mutual trust between our country and the
americans. which is true. do we have better trust nowadays? no, even worse. to build mutual trust takes a long time. tong, for a, scholarly and expert analysis. question will, my become totally different focused. i know you do have time to answer this, but what i am interested in based on your experience and atmosphere in negotiations and talks -- the but he has been more time with north korean delegation then you. i would like to know what the mood is like and what it is like dealing with the north korean delegation and what kind of smalltalk kim jong-il made with secretary albright and how prepared are the north korean delegates? do they understand us?
if we had time would like to hear an anecdote that would feeling andt the atmosphere is like in these negotiations. because we are out of time -- >> we have plenty of time. can i answer? pattern of north korean negotiation. how they start, how they discuss issues, and how they usually end. at the beginning they are good students of history and they bring up all the things that has happened between north korea and beyond., going way back previous agreements.
they also review statements the directly tols made counterparts of u.s. negotiators. and wed this and that, said this and that, and what is different? and they would say this is worse than before, and they would repeat. they would say we are serious -- and i think one thing that people don't pay much learnion to is -- they from the encounters and meetings about us. the things we say -- but, on the u.s. part, we are trying to understand what they are saying.
we can understand through interpretation, but we don't care to know why they are trying to say what they are saying. words, we -- in other have diplomats. a specialist doing this, that is why i said in the longer experience with north koreans -- i don't get any other assignments. [laughter] i don't get assignments other than talks with north koreans, so they learn from us. understand what they have
gone through. to really study, what we did ourselves. why are they how they are today? it has a lot to do with what we have done ourselves. isir pattern of approach that they start tough. statements,opening they are not going to stay for the rest of time we actually agreed because there is nothing more we can come back to. then usually we break and have internal discussions, and say what you think of this? college, start tough, which is true. is in thisl message particular line, so we have to
focus on this and not the narrative aspects. they always start strong and tough. so, to me, it is a learning experience for them to learn about us. and also, a learning experience for us to learn about them. the u.s. has not taken good advantage of. thank you, tong, for a very complicated this of how you are looking at the situation. i think i agree with most of your points, especially on the top down part of it. we have tried to bottom-up for so many years -- it just frankly
has not worked. it seems it is a good idea to try a different way. i think a lot of the discussion -- athe negotiations summit is not a negotiation. it is exactly like you said, studying the framework for negotiations to proceed out of that, if it looks like that can happen. the summit would be incredibly important to set that framework. i >> i would say both president clinton and president trump should telegraph to make sure -- president moon and president trump should telegraph ahead of time that they are both willing to walk away from the summit and not meet again. in other words, none of this
prolonged back-and-forth. lunch.o know you kind of we can work something out and then give a specific timeframe, three months should be plenty, and then we meet back in three-month if it looks possible. during those three months, that is when you have these tough negotiation. teams, andferent they would present proposals to the top. and the two leaders can check them off. we will do this, not do that. on the u.s. side it has to go through congress, the president doesn't did take foreign policy. -- dictate foreign policy. we have accompanied government -- we have a complicated government.
there is overreaching in the media that this summit has to solve issues. not at all. i think the important thing is they meet, both sides walk away if we don't like will be here. if we don't like will be here doesn't mean we won't meet again. but maybe i will see you in a year instead of three months. in the meantime crank on the pressure -- crank up the pressure. you said there might be time pressure. i think it is the other way around. i think north korea is under frightful time pressure. that is why they are moving so quickly. i think we can relax a little bit. as long as these sanctions are in play and as long as we are not hindered in our own exercises, and there is no hindrance on our side, i would probably not have exercises during the talks.
but there is nothing that is hindering us. to me, the pressure is on them to come up with something. in that way we are in the drivers seat. a lot of people make a deal out , north koreahs could have an icbm. well, maybe they have it now, who knows? to me the icbm is important and one way -- important in one way. proves to us, if we are convinced that they can attack us with a hydrogen bomb, that changes the game entirely. from the american point of view, that makes it a two-person game. i am a tennis player. what is the nature of a two-person game? it is winner and loser.
it is a zero sum game. i am sure north korea does not zero-sum game. with south korea there it is complicated. once they have demonstrated that, we're obligation to protect ourselves. preemption becomes the new of the game -- the name of the game. if we think they're going to attack us we will shoot first. themputs the pressure on and away they've never seen a pressure and i think they don't want it. i think that is why they are not finishing the program. they want to be close but not quite out there. i think time is on our side. . the one thing i worry about is, as you say, the sanctions can come off too quickly.
i think the chinese and the south koreans might start feeling peaceful to quickly and that could be a tremendous mistake. it's not even a coalition, as the whole world, sanctioning north korea. as long as the whole world is sanctioning north korea. if we give them a three-month time limit, i think it's a great chance to make more progress. >> in response to some of the things you said, with who was under pressure timewise, kim jong-un or trump? politically it is trump but economically it could be kim jong-un if the sanctions really bite. one of the goals that kim jong-un must have had to get from the chinese was to find an
exit or in easing, or a wheezing -- eating of the -- the sanction regime. they have pressure on the north just a signt is not of the dprk relations but they can see what is happening economically between china and the united states as well. we have literally declared a trade war ends china is defending, he is not going to --perate with yo economic going to cooperate with economic measures that the u.s. wants.
the chinese would have very good ground. the purpose of the sanctions was to bring them out to the table. they've not only come to the table, they have comes the table with actions. and they've asked the chinese to ease up the sanctions. i would like to start with a couple of comments. first of all, thank you to all. i agree with bill. i would like to address one of the various items we talked about later. we talked about the national assembly, there is no two thirds vote, you need to thirds vote to pass the national assembly in south korea. you are correct to point that out but i don't think that it --uld be assigned to
situation. administration is supporting this, they act like it does not matter if you need to thirds majority vote or not. -- reason i'm saying that two thirds vote or not. if you want to work with the opposition, you need to figure out why their people going back and forth. but that didn't happen, it happened in secrecy within a month. the full text is still yet to be released to the public. it seems like he is not very serious -- or concerned about the opposition of the national assembly. i find that very puzzling. why does that not matter? he talk about -- we talk about candlelight revolution quite often.
we've seen that happen with south korea. maybe that is what he is counting on. i want to say that we should continue to watch that situation. the second item, the collapse. i am not saying it will, i am just saying if it happens we need to be prepared. that, just because it hasn't collapsed for the past 30 years does not mean that is it sustainable -- it is a sustainable system. we talk about putting pressure on china, saying reduce me about north korea's nuclear weapons. we say china is not doing enough. what can they do? they can stop economic trade and aid to north korea in which case it will collapse. north korea, it is not their system is that they get external support from china.
and in the 90's when they were going through famine, i spoke with defectors who believed it would have collapsed if there wasn't any international support. we had aid of flying in from the time for the united states, south korea, and elsewhere. ishink the question to ask not because it hasn't collapsed. it's more, why has it not? and what are the factors? if it disappears, then what we do -- what do we do? let me move to my third point. you mentioned a long list of north korea's demands at of a negotiation. i'm going to pick one. wants to feel secure before it can give up its weapons.
what is the definition of north korea feeling secure? a lot of people think it is noth korea's military -- north korea, u.s. military on the peninsula. fearsk that north korea the very existence of south korea. the fact that south korea has very attractive and successful system that its people would want as well if they had the choice. antiauthoritarian dictators, they need legitimacy as well. authoritarian dictators need legitimacy as well. system cannot feed its own population. in that case, north korea needs to reform, needs to open up.
but if it does that, then it invites external information in. and then that information will compete with the official narrative. and the official narrative, that is what north korea needs in order to prop up the regime. that helps support the legitimacy. if you bring in something that is going to erode that legitimacy is dangerous to the regime. it is stuck in a place where it needs reform but can't because either way it weakens the regime . this is where i bring in south korea. ways north korea keeps things under control is to suppress the freedoms and human people and also
information. if they did improve human rights that means it would create more choices for people. and in that situation people would prefer freedom, they would ander a liberal democracy market economy that is south korea. as long as south korea exists evidence, it is going to feel insecure. how can we ever satisfied north korea's insecurity? aboutwondering if a talk that. what i was going to say what this collapse idea. paper on claps a wild back.
-- a wil .- a while back from four years ago, now it is a shell from what was. it's control is weakening everyday. the main aspect of that is money. now everybody uses money and the .razy thing is, u.s. dollars regime.ronts to the that tells you how weak the state is, economically and socially. they still have the command structure and they still own country. that is the part they are holding onto.
i would offer that they could refow a chinese roots to -- route to reform. could help them take apart their socialist system, the party is ok, people can get rich, people can maybe survive. they are in a very tough place. that is where i think we have to recognize the very difficult position and try to work with awaited they can climb out of it. david: as someone who david: as someone who co-authored the plans for north korean instability collapse, i have to say that we never projected when north korea would collapse. as she said, only when it
happens will it be catastrophic and we have to prepare for that. in terms of the theory of collapse however, robert collins theory of collapse has been the most comprehensive theory. it explains why north korea is where we are today. said, i like the description, only a shell of what they were. but they still have the mechanisms to suppress their people and to keep the elites satisfied. and that is why, they are only in the third stage of collapse. there has only been small .ockets effect grows, it will be continue to be suppressed. once the regime no longer has support of the military and security services, and can no longer govern control, that is
what we're going to see regime collapse. but those conditions have not arrived yet. ,verybody talks about collapse since 1994, i think the agreed framework or unspoken assumption is that we didn't have to worry about the agreed framework for too long because the regime would collapse. if you look at the sunshine if youof 1997 from 2007, look at it as we talked about particularly china, ensuring that the regime doesn't collapse, that is why we have not seen collapse. but if it happens, it will be we, thephic and alliance here but also the broader international community, needs to care for that -- needs to the prepared for that. tong: i've gone over a couple of
scenarios that could happen, and at the time george w. bush had just come into the defense --, and the deputy defense secretary of time. they were discussing this topic. invasion andaqi south korean participation in it. -- the most influential foreign-policy maker. -- we've been talking about collapse for the past 10 years and i will think this will happen again. oese realistic in dealing with this -- but we have to be realistic in dealing with this.
jong-ilsidering, kim , it was gorbachev who of openingthe policy and reform. jong-un billkim -- kim jong-ilin was interested in reform. opening theds, leaders of a clash of the north korea systems. himself had asked putin, he was president of hesia then as well, he said didn't have a clear answer to opening. was 20 around with the
around -- he was playing with the idea of a system of government. systemd's kingdom possibly. didn't want toil give up his power. he doesn't want to give up his style of life. but he can still maintain that under his new system, this kingdom. that was interesting. this was during his meeting. .oing to the topic of collapse every person who studied collapse agrees on one thing. time.a matter of
we have an opportunity to listen to my couple of months ago. i must have read a dozen different scenarios for that to happen, -- a dozen different scenarios and that to happen, i don't -- evidence of this collapse is still happen. there are a lot of mechanisms that are automatically protect -- the north korean regime. given the structure of a , aboutphic population
50% of the north korean population are somehow related, orcousins and second cousins north, are related to korean leadership or at least a party with allegiance and loyal .ommitment people have no room to organize or staging uprising of any kind. i don't see any evidence that this is going to happen anytime soon.
if there is involvement by the and northinsula, korea's no longer a threat to the south or their neighbors or the united states, or any system of government, you'd have to involve how to see. they can only be better than worse. if you look at other governments on the globe. -- i didn't do the but the president with vietnam, made an apology with the vietnamese leader that south koreans killed a lot of
vietnamese in support of the u.s. war in vietnam. these things happen in history sec. mattis: that is why i am against the possibility of going to war because were kills people. >> in your presentation you use the word "we." who are we in that context? >> i grew up in korea and i've had friendship to korea. but i think it is important to separate america and korea and when i say we i mean america.
>> we talked generally, approvingly, about raising other issues with north korea if a negotiation for dialogue starts. but maybe we need to be more realistic. we have had three successive administrations left basically d close to if not 100% the nuclear issue. so we may not see the trump administration veering from this almost total concentration on the nuclear issue. there has been some attention paid to human rights.
but at most, in terms of u.s. priorities, it seems only about a 10 to 15% priority. i would like to see what dave and bill were talking about. but i don't expect to see it from the trump administration. see ak you're going to concentration of a nuclear issue. made the point that the north is very broad about what it describes as the u.s. hostile policy. of the in terms terminology they use, it is probably more important to zero in on what they talk about. when they talk about the nuclear threat from the u.s..
this gets into the definition of the nuclearization of north korea versus the meaning of denuclearization of the korean peninsula. because when the north koreans use that term, they are talking about the u.s. nuclear threats to them. exists in south korea, which they often say is accomplished in the u.s. activities which amounts to a definitive u.s. plan to attack them with nuclear weapons. they have said over the years a lot about what these activities are. them think we can define as three areas. number one, the united states .k. exercises.
there is one that we are will begin in a few days and another one called fall eagle which is taking place in august or september. a lot of we rotate very sophisticated weaponry into south korea. training within south korea. they come out eventually after a number of weeks or even a few months to the we bring in f-22's. the f-15s from okinawa. we will bring in periodically an for that kinder of training in south korea.
that is the second north korea definition that we're talking about. thirdly are the heavy weapon exercises related to korea that are offshore. that are not directly over or within the korean peninsula. -- our heavy bombers that we bring out of guam and flies the korean peninsula. in theirese things definition constitutes the 'nuclear threat to north korea. i think this race the question. one of the -- i think this raises the question. talked aboutt tong
is how this calls for a total u.s. withdrawal, but then kim , saying thatnce the u.s. could keep a peacekeeping force in south , and that would not be aggressive and we could live with that. is thet we're seeing now least itcentrating at would talks about. on these three activities of forces, i think we need to be on guard. the north may come into a negotiation and say to the americans, you can keep your present numbers, south korea, but these three areas of nuclear
threat activities, you have to stop. in terms of a denuclearization settlement. i have heard several former u.s. commanders in korea who have said in seminars like this -- -- these are army commanders "if we can't train in south korea we won't stay in south korea." and i think the north koreans are well aware of that in the u.s. military. we may see a shift in the approach. i would watch for that very closely. i hope the trump administration and the defense department is and how itout this
>> on c-span this week in primetime tonight on a pm eastern. perspectives on gun control for the march for lives rally. wednesday at 8 p.m. eastern, former white house director of communications anthony scaramucci. job, just got the like building a condominium or just like building a golf course or developing a television show, job, i ok, i got this got to go down to the swamp, i to drain the swamp, i got to hire people that understand the swamp. i think what he is learned is that you are not going to drain
the swamp hiring swamp monsters. >> thursday at 8 p.m. eastern, embedded journalist in their experiences in mosul, iraq and the fight against isis. >> try to get you to care about someone that space a different language, comes from a different country, has a different background than you, and make you care about their life. and you can understand the parallels between yours and theirs. 9:00 p.m. eastern, .ormer reagan advisor it is -- >> it is really true that there are consequences to taxation. you cannot tax and economy into prosperity,. time onweek on prime c-span. post is reporting that facebook has signaled its
chief executive, mark zuckerberg, to testify before congress amid recent data privacy issues. the story says discussions at most -- have moved to images of --se and the question is to and has moved to question if he will testify. including the senate judiciary committee and april 10 meeting. next, a conversation on data privacy after recent reports of cambridge analytic obtained personal information on at least 30 million facebook users in america. from the washington journal. roundtable onsday facebook's issues securing user data and the recent issues with cambridge analytica.