tv Brexit U.K. Foreign Policy CSPAN May 4, 2018 10:32pm-11:38pm EDT
the conversation. is landmarkcases. and we have a link the national constitution center's interactive constitution and the landmark cases podcast at c-span.org/landmark cases. a council on foreign brexit isdiscussed scheduled to happen in march of next year. this is one hour. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> thank you everyone for coming
and welcome. stephen myrow: i will be presiding over today's discussion. we're lucky enough to have joining with us via videoconference, matthew goodwin from the uk. to my right, jennifer hillman from georgetown university law center and ed luce from "the financial times." as i was thinking about this today, coming in i was thinking it is nice for once with everything going on in the united states to focus on someone else's internal problems for a change. as we think about it, that in many ways we have, we're 330 days away from brexit day. yet we have absolutely no idea how we're getting from point a
to point b. i always like to tell people in washington, point a to point b is never a straight line and that definitely appears to be the case in the uk. what i think we wanted to focus on today is explore those internal brexit politics because while, at the council we're interested in the foreign policy dynamics and where this is all going after brexit in many, as we know all politics are local and what happens with the internal brexit politics is in many ways will determine what the prospects are for the foreign policy framework. so let's start in terms of prime minister may and the uk more broadly, they're both in a pretty tight spot right now and just within the last week we've had some personal churn in her cabinet which made it more even split as
brexiters and remainders or some people say moaners. i will start with our man in uk, matthew, give us an idea where the internal politics and the standoff that may face in her cabinet. >> well, good afternoon and thank you for inviting me along to the council. you may be aware that we've actually just had a set of local elections over the last 24 hours which has given us even more evidence to chew on with regard to brexit. what we're seeing in the uk i would suggest is a increasing polarization between pro-remain voters in areas, loosely, this relates to the middle class, millenial graduates and the more urban big cities and on the other hand more socially conservative working class, smaller towns but very
pro-brexit. and worth just saying at the outset the conservative party over the last 24 hours has actually done very, very well in pro-brexit areas of country that gave at least 60% of the vote to leave. that is significant in terms of internal politics question you ask because i would argue on three layers now the conservative party is being pushed increasingly towards a hard brexit. within the parliamentary party there is now a large number, majority of mps that have you single market membership being incompatable with the referendum results. the conservative party membership, only 24% of conservative members want to stay within the single market and same figure want to stay within a customs union.
the conservative party electorate, the important party you might suggest if we assume that politics is back in a big way, the vast majority of conservative party voters now are fiercely pro-leave, about 70%. that is going to have all kinds of implications on the key events coming up over the next year. we have obviously the customs union debate when most conservative members or members don't want to be in the customs union but we've also got the council meeting in june and that crunch parliamentary vote in autumn. all arrows in my mind point to the conservative party being pushed further right on this issue. >> ed, do you have anything to add where we stand on the internal politics particularly with respect how you see the standoff over the trade union issue or customs union issue this week. >> well, matthew is a person on the ground so i will defer to him in terms of the on everything, basically. but you mentioned that it is hard to get from point a to b in the american system and british system. this is not really point a to b.
this is not a line. it's a circle. it is getting back to where we started because there is no consensus on what kind of post-brexit even within the cabinet, there isn't a consensus. some will not accept customs union and some will not accept anything less than customs union. theresa may is stuck between a rock and a hard place. she doesn't have the leadership skills to force those that might be waivering, on hard exit side, boris johnson or more moderate side of cabinet, phillip hammond, that left the cabinet types to agree to some type of compromise. so this isn't traveling in a straight or zigzag diagonal line from point a to b.
it is coming right around in a circle. it is as stagnated i guess, there is a stalemate, stalemated rather as you can possibly imagine a parliamentary system being and it is very hard to see what's going to give. >> jennifer, as we're, when we think about brexit in many ways the issues that brought us here are immigration and trade. and so with this standoff over the customs give us a context of whether the scope of problems that there is, what needs to be addressed and there is what they would like to address. what really needs to be addressed. >> the critical thing on trade front what you do on the border between northern ireland and ireland. i fully agree. when we get a sense context, we think about it, the uk is the world's fifth largest economy, within the eu, second largest economy, 16% of the gdp of the european union is in the uk.
very importantly for the trade issues, 42% of all the uk's exports of goods and services are going to the eu. the trading relationship between the eu and the uk is at the heart and soul of this debate and what it means. the problem for theresa may what you do about the border between ireland and northern ireland. once you brexit, ireland is remaining a member of the european union and northern ireland is not in the european union. under the treaties of european union you must have a border that judges goods moving across to eu to non-e.u. border. you have to have a way to put on tariffs. you have to have a way to control the movement of persons and services. more importantly for the uk, all of the regulatory issues that go along with the movement of a good. so the question becomes how do you put a border between ireland and northern ireland without
completely upsetting the peace accords that came about after the result of the end of, as they call it the troubles. this is really the heart and soul of the problem. it is 310 miles of border if you look at all the craggs and crannies between northern ireland and ireland with 400 crossing points. nobody has been able to figure out how to get around that. what is on the table right now, the european put forward a withdrawal proposal, their tax or their way to fix it which effectively creates a border along the irish sea. treat northern ireland and ireland as one area and allow the free flow of goods across that border. which is complete anathema to theresa may and particularly to the members of the dup, part of her governing coalition. they can not live with the idea you would separate northern ireland from the main part of the u.k. so what theresa may put on the
table initially, this idea after customs partnership, where somehow the uk would collect all tariffs on behalf of eu, and would do all clearances of goods on behalf of uk and ultimately pass that along. that failed this week in her cabinet. did not get support. the second option they're looking, what they call a customs facilitation approach where we're supposed to use high-tech, everybody will have the equivalent of an ez pass system in the car and measure all the goods, et cetera, through technology. every one in brussels saying this will not work. so we're still at this very difficult place where the actual language that is on the table is for this division along the irish sea and everything that has been done in the uk cabinet
has just not got sufficient support. and we're going to come right back around the ability to solve the ireland-northern ireland problem what could take brexit down, if you will. edward luce: give you a sense of hopelessness of that picture, the second customs that you described, maximum facility, maxfac, which doesn't command support is now known as clusterfac. it is not a solution. [laughter]. >> so i think it is very easy in the situations it talk about what is not going to work but something has to be done what in terms of a fudge, what does a fudge look like here. how do they get past this goard ian knot? >> i will defer to matthew but give my it up tuppenance. what is less than norway but more than canada.
norway is part of a singular market this is unacceptable to the boris johnsons et cetera, canada has a bilateral trade deal with the european union which is unacceptable to the remainders. she has to have a fudge in between that includes a defacto customs union that gets through her cabinet. if she gets through the cabinet, it has to get through parliament. it also most importantly has to pass the european union. we're talking about negotiations going on here. there are no negotiations essentially between britain and europe happening. all the negotiations are inside of britain and not just inside of britain, they're inside london. not just inside london but inside the conservative party between people who don't like each other, don't trust each other, who think theresa may is worst leader possible except for all the others. that is the kind of climate we're talking about. matthew can give more authoritative answer to that question.
>> to that point >> and jennifer. >> let's talk about may for a second because it sounds like no one really loves may. no one wants this job, at least until after exit day. so how safe is she between, you know, over the next 330 days. but give us a sense of her range of manueverrability. let's talk about continuities, if she was to go, jacob mogg, is he a real possibility. ? >> according to all reports of the cabinet meeting on wednesday which was of course, when the infamous moment happened when our new home secretary who replaced amber rudd effectively cast the vote against theresa may's customs partnership model, thereby giving the room over in effect to the euro skepticses. according to all reports, theresa may, i quote, veriably shocked she lost the room. that moment may yet come to be seen as perhaps more significant
than we even appreciate it is now. we may be seeing the beginnings of a stronger euro skeptic turn perhaps within the cabinet. and jacob mogg and erg group 60 him, which is 60 strong beginning to mobilize very , vocally around this argument that there can not be any form of a customs union that would jeopardize what brexit is really about. so i describe theresa may, you remember those "die-hard" films, at one point bruce willis would grab somebody already shot and hold that person up. [laughter] theresa may is that body that is being dragged along. [laughter]. opening up the bad political capital from brexit. inevitably she will go. the question who will replace her? that will almost certainly be a lever. the conservative parliamentary
party is very pro-leave. that means that jacob reese mogg has a very real chance. two most popular candidates according to conservative party membership surveys are boris johnson and jacob reese mogg. those are the two top contenders. everything will happen real quickly. in the next two weeks, theresa may will have to bring back to the cabinet a new customs proposal. if that is signed off within the conservative brexit subcommittee, that will then conceivably go forward to the european union whether they decide that is credible plan or a unicorn model, something that and is not realistic or in line with their current regulations or so forth. so there are, the chances of a in and will hard brexit have and increased significantly over the last two weeks and they may
yet increase even further. and and yet increase even further. the last point i will say on this, however, there is nobody in the conservative parliamentary party who seems desperate to grab the wheel. another movie analogy might be "speed" where the bus is hurdling around at at 1 miles an hour. there is no keanu reeves in the conservative party that wants to take the wheels. everybody knows the conservative party as edward just mentioned is completely divided down the middle on this issue it may well and middle on this issue it may well in be, trees is may may bring that customs model and and in only way to get through parliament. that is thought i will leave athat is thought i will leave and in and with you, something will to consider. only a >> you want to jump in. >> i was only going to add this and>> i was only going to add this underscores how significant are in the timelines are here.
again it is march of next year where the brexit actually happens. the perception is you will need whatever this withdrawal agreement is to be finished by at least october of this year, in order for it to get through the european union's process, in order to be done before march 29th. this agreement is out there in draft, for those of you really into it. it comes in with certain sections in green that have been agreed to and other parts in yellow close to agreed to. remainedder in white, still under negotiation. well over half of it is still under next. we're a long way even having an agreement on the withdrawal itself. and that only covers this very limited number of issues that used to be called the divorce issues. how much money will the uk continue to pay into the eu budget. what will we do about all the eu nationals living in the uk. what are we doing about the uk nationals living in the eu. aboutre we going to do
northern ireland. that is all the withdrawal agreement really covers. what it says about everything else, meaning what's the economic relationship will be with europe down the road, what is the economic relationship will be with all other trading partners, that is to come later. that is in theory supposed to be done and worked out during the transition period which is going to occur between march 29th of next year and december of 2020. and as a former trade negotiator i will tell you good luck getting a trade agreement done in less than 18 months. it is not going to be possible for the uk to have in place its trading relationships with the eu, much less anyone else by december of 2020 particularly if we're still fighting over the withdrawal agreement up until the end of the summer. we needed to have already been moving on in order for these things to come about. so the timing becomes more and more urgent as each day goes by. >> and not that it is not complicated enough already but as ed pointed out, so rightly it takes two to tango here.
we've been very much focused on all the problems internally within the uk but what about the europeans view on this. monolith there either. >> there are 27 european members. interesting thing how europeans have changed since brexit happened, the referendum happened. there was a portion of europe, good riddance. you've been slowing us down. you're vetoing for too long. you've been half in, half out. anglophobics portion in france, really good riddance, whatever your history, we want you out. there is german perspective it's a pity but if you have to go, you have to go. i think that mood is turned into a genuine alarm. here is a great democracy ruining itself, entirely
self-inflicted, showing no signs of resolving its internal -- in fact they're deepening as matthew pointed out. this isn't just a sad spectacle to watch. in the context now you really didn't have two years ago, worry about liberal democracy in europe. concerns of poland, concerns of hungary. also in the context if britain will do this much dan it will will do this much will wash over to us. this will detablize your pop. they have a lot of problems to deal with, migration is huge one. to have implodeing britain on their hands is not a good thing. one other point i make in connection with that, that is the potential silver lining here, that europe will will more appetite to give britain leeway and have extensions of deadlines then it did a year or two ago. the other point i make, britain might not, theresa may might fail to get a bill through
parliament. so britain might flunk out with absolutely no deal and completely legal limbo next march. there would be generally shun. she would lose the vote of confidence with the house of parliament an house of come mons. corbyn might win. we would have a government of sort of brexit, but a hidden one led by jeremy corbyn. they don't want to negotiate with corbyn. they don't want to pull the plug on theresa may's career, for that reason. if there is a silver lining, it is things have got so bad that europe is actually going to pick up some of the slack britain is incapable of creating for itself right now. >> you see that a little bit i think in the line that european union is always had to draw. perception is that they give the uk too good of a deal on brexit, then the concern is, then you will have brexit,
every other member of the european union saying, i want that deal, if you give that much to the uk. you've seen that line move a little bit. the perception this is so perceptively ugly for the uk, you can give a little bit more and it actually won't necessarily entice the netherlands or someone es to come along and decide to go down this same road. >> quite right. >> go jump in, matthew. >> sorry, thanks. one quick thing on this parliament vote in the autumn because this is a very important crunch moment in the brexit timeline. let me just put forward my view on this. i think theresa may will win that vote and i'll tell you why. she is effectively going to bring the deal to parliament. so just park this customs union issue and let's assume there is
some kind of fudge that keeps the wheels turning and we get european council meeting in june and we get through the next meeting in october and theresa may brings back this agreement to parliament and they come vote for it or effect testifily vote against it. the reason i think she will win that vote because it is not entirely clear yet, at least, what you would be voting for if you voted that down and i think the labour party will probably make a big hurrah applying five or six tests to make sure, this is the brexit they really want but i think in the end labour may end up voting for it. at least we have emily thornberry at chatham house two months ago and she alluded to that possibility. let's not forget too, even within parliament theresa may has a slim majority with the dup. if you only focus on the formal numbers you overlook the fact there are also around between six and 10 labour politicians who are likely to support the
deal because they're in 67% voting constituents. my money is on may. if she government that vote by the way the conservative party would almost certainly seek to replace her without going to the country that would be politically very difficult and there would be an uproar from the opposition parties but they would almost certainly move to have a internal leadership election without going to the country because they are aware that jeremy corbyn only needs 2% swing to get within coalition territory. he only needs 4% swing to get within majority territory. i can tell you from my own interviews in london there are a lot of people in the city saying that they like where the labour party is on the customs union because it is now supporting a customs union but they don't want the labour party in power. so there is a curious paradox almost within london.
they like where jeremy corbyn is at the moment. they think he could deliver a soft brexit but they don't want jeremy corbyn anywhere near power. stephen myrow: so if you talk about if you wrong and had an initial vote against may in parliament in autumn, one point ed and i were talking about before we came in here the markets often get to vote as well. the financial markets won't like that. from my own personal experience we saw two votes on tarp. so maybe it takes a failed vote to maybe get a vote to pass. >> to concentrate minds. you remember that 800 point drop in the dow that day. boehner used it for a second successful vote on tarp. that is only hail mary you can think of, if may is unable to pass a bill.
she would get it a week later after the markets had their say. edward luce: before we move over to inviting members to ask questions, i want to, we've been very, since economics have been a big part, we're looking foreign policy more broadly. diplomat side, defense side. we're talking about europeans and how the uk plays into that, we've seen in the most recent german defense budget, defense spending down, so it doesn't seem like the europeans are necessarily, necessarily anticipating even if the uk is pulling out of the eu, that it is going to offset the role of, from a defense perspective. any thoughts, matthew, on what how the brexiters approach the kind of national security, diplomatic side of the equation.
>> i'm a columnist, so i'm allowed to give my opinion and i'm not a fan of brexiters. one of the reasons i'm not a fan of brexiters, they have not gone through those scenarios. they relied on very general statements of hope, that britain will strike trade deals with the commonwealth, whatever that is, in economic terms. >> jennifer, in terms of the commonwealth, would that save them in anyway. >> no. 42% of the uk exports go to eu and none of the top commonwealth countries are their trading partners. >> britain exports to ireland then most of the rest of the commonwealth behind. to ireland. >> yep. >> that there is a what i call a fancy. there is the idea that there will be a u.s.-uk bilateral trade deal. that trump will not only sort of
do the heavy lifting on this side of the atlantic to get the deal through and have the negotiating team enthuse asi can enthusiastic about it to negotiate it, but also it would be a deal acceptable to the british public. i think, what would, what would american interests, advising the ustr like from the uk. chlorine nated chicken and national health service which is national religious symbol in some ways. allowing more contracting out and outsourcing out, it would be in britain.deal won't like it. brexiteer vision of british foreign policy outside of europe
post-brexit where my columnists have, pure fancy. they run away from informed interviewers whenever the offer is made. they do not want to be questioned on this subject. >> what about their role, matthew, in other multilateral an arrangements. th ande and and and and and and and and g7, g20, nato. how do you see uk using their leverage in these other arrangements post-brexit. >> yeah, thanks. quickly say a couple of broad points relating to foreign and security policy. the first thing to say is, that yeah, i think despite the, diplomatically, this sort of challenges that surround a brexit process, what rob wainwright who recently left europol made this point, put that to one side, there is still goodwill on both sides to insure that they come to some kind of a mutually beneficial arrangement around security and foreign
policy initiatives. but that said, the second i think broad consensual point that everybody, implicitly accepts or overtly accepts that britain will be less influential as consequence of this decision. and and and and and and and where we are now the uk is looking to create what it call as new post-brexit special relationship between the uk and the eu on foreign and security and and and and policy we've seen theresa may talk about new security treaty that would allow joint initiatives with the eu and action on areas of common concern. the refugee crisis being one that's particularly animated british voters but it's going to be much harder to with any significant influence you might argue an area like the balkans, ukraine, north africa and turkey were i think the key will increasingly play a secondary role to the eu. where the eu is going to be able to use a lot of leverage relating to markets, the
prospect of the eu membership is very powerful incentives for encouraging changes within those states. that said i think uk influence on european security is going to remain very significant. i think the uk will remain of global power. given this position within nato, as was one of most capable willing powers that unlikely to dissipate in the major way. it will become harder for the uk translate that commitment into multilateral political influence.
it's going to have to work a lot harder to ensure it's not an afterthought when it comes to the u.s. and eu conversations. macron has been very aggressive rightly so very opportunistic trying to build the void with the us. talking about their special relationship which carries particular resonance in the uk. so i think the two broad points i i would make is the uk will remain a key player obviously but there are going to be specific areas where it's going to have less influence. we end up in the heart of brexit scenario which i suggested looking at increasingly likely given the customs union face,, then there may be specific witnesses that will materialize around arrest warrant and so on. let's wait and see. >> great. at this time i'd like to invite members to join our conversation with their questions. a reminder that this meeting is on the record. wait for the microphone, speak directly into it. please stand, state your name and affiliation, please limit
yourself to one question him and keep a concise to allow as many members as possible to speak. right there in the back. >> jamie from brookings. what are the implications of the jeremy corbyn becoming prime minister. particularly on foreign-policy. >> i think matthew should answer that. [laughing] >> i'm more interested in your views because let me take a punt. i think the implications of the jeremy corbyn government i think, actually the interesting implications are integral because somebody wants to nationalize most of our key industries and deliberate radical economic reform around taxation and other areas. and i think this will be an economic shakeup of the kind that britain has not seen really
during, since the '70s but you lots of businesses are anxious about what that means. on brexit, germany corban has a fine line because its coalition to been set. this is party that is caring seats in the north of england that gave 70% vote to brexit and seats in in front of the gates 10% vote to remain. jeremy corbyn has the remarkably ambiguous about what he believes should be the best brexit model. on the one hand, he is saying let's get out of the single other hand, he is saying let's be for customs union. that's seem to be roughly where he is and as far as he is willing to go. there's a lot of pressure inside to get them to commit to the single market but if he hasn't already then when willie. on the broader foreign-policy issue this is somebody that has
been very critical of the uk's foreign-policy interventions pretty much for the past 30 years. somebody who was willingly engaged with terrorist sympathizers with groups and organizations that really have had no formal channel of communications to uk government in recent history. somebody that is very unorthodox from a radical left-wing position in his used towards things like israel, and his use views towards latin america, in his views towards syria and libya. this is somebody that would not only cause an economic shock, talk about the market drafting, watching the markets recto labour majority election will be something worth watching but also if this is someone with significant shakeup british foreign-policy and not i would suggest in a personal capacity for good reasons. >> one quick point. the russian poisoning in salisbury a few weeks ago and theresa may's reaction to it is
an interesting case. in the first place she went was brussels. she got a major practical cooperation from macron and others. then went to united states and got likewise tough action from across the atlantic, transatlantic behavior, classic british rule in transatlantic behaviors. go to your and interpret america. go to america and interpret europe to america and be the key bridge between that. that's going to be still possible to do as matthew outlined. you can have a security arrangement and britain will remain in nato. and so the sort of predictions of british geopolitical doom or extinction after brexit might be overdone. but if corbett is prime minister
they wouldn't get it done. labour will probably get back. i won't belabor why. >> right down here in front. >> retired state department. franco british military cooperation has been an important activity in recent years. would you expect that to continue under hard brexit. is that the kind of thing that you would expect to see going forward. >> again, i think matthew should take this one come after that. i'm actually not up to speed on that general punting. >> i mean, i would say that there's going to be, look, making predictions in the brexit, brexit climate of the moment is probably not one should be doing. i personally would not foresee any fundamental changes in bilateral relationships between the uk and france, or the uk and germany or even the uk and the u.s. i think the uk will at the same time feel itself increasingly sidelined from france and
germany, within the eu or the european orbit. it won't be going to meetings during transition where it doesn't have any significant voting rights. it would be going into security and foreign-policy conversations where it might be able to express doesn't have any significant a e able to lease in the european level to wear with any formal and significant influence. it would be the first time that you casually found itself in a situation. i think as well watching where macron wants to go is interesting. he has clearly decided that the anglo franco relationship is going to be rebooted in a major way, i do think people say that he will be a leading player in the eurozone, eu reform agenda with angela merkel. is very good at smelling
weakness and then acting accordingly. and i think westminster, are very aware of that. i don't personally pursue foresee any major ruptures in bilateral relationships, but at the european level the uk will feel more alienated over the coming years. i totally agree if the jeremy corbyn is prime minister, special relationship with us is gone. mr. trump and mr. corban speaking for any kind of common sheet of music. but the defense budget in britain is under tremendous threat right now. the british army is all that are special operations forces. i think there be be more at most than surface ships in the royal navy. so my question is, if there is a hard brexit and the economy in britain is not going to
skyrocket, what's the going to do to british defense. doesn't render moot what we've just been talking about. because if you get no ships and you've troops, you don't have much to say. >> one thing that i would weigh in here is you have to think about what does the uk does have going for it. they have very capable special operations capability, although not tremendous amount of lift capability. they are still a powerful global nuclear state. so i think in those terms i defer to matthew in terms of the direct impact on the budget. we've seen this and a lot of of the countries whether it's australia or whatever. i think when we see people focus on the comparative advantages. >> i mean, i certainly agree with much of that. i would come back to the question asked. let's fast forward to guest: 2022.ah
it's a shocking thought that the anglo-american relationship might be actually really on fire with jeremy corbyn and bernie sanders as your [laughing] it's possible. it's entirely possible, right. but on a more the economic question that i think was the backdrop to your point about defense spending, i mean, the one unpopular point in these debates perhaps that i do make is the british economy is without doubt suffering as a consequence of the referendum vote, whichever forecast is your hobby horse, broadly consistent story compared other advanced western nations we're going to have a bumpy ride. but the other point i would make is the british economy has proven quite resilient, and certainly true some may say brexit hasn't really happened yet. the fundamentals of the british economy overall unemployment, growth rates, productivity, some
manufacturing, you know, trying counterto paint a picture which is overall given this rather seismic political shock the british economy has proven to be quite resilient. i would add to the point at unsure, ed will have thoughts on this and will probably disagree with me but the new defense minister williamson is clearly angling for the top job and if somebody who is already been making very strident statements about the defense budget, wanting to increase that, wanting to match some of the commitments to increase in the budget that had been made in brussels with regard to eu defense spending, not matching terms of money but in terms of broad principle. it may be over the next year and half the defense community finds itself perhaps surprised by his positioning.
he seemed within westminster as somewhat of an amateur, and i as a novice. who was promoted very quickly after being the chief whip. but he somebody is very ambitious, and it may be using the defense budget partly as a way of projecting some of those ambitions. >> just a quick point, if i may. that's entirely plausible that there will be higher defense budgets but it's consistent with the brexit worldview that britain will struggle that going alone and so forth. that might have, go some way towards making up some of the cuts with you and less 15, 20 years so the numbers favor british army and navy. but there is a problem. right using the british economy is resilient, it was the first -- in 2015.
this year it's at the lowest, slowest growing of the big economy in europe, even italy is going faster than britain. that is the projection whether you ask imf or the europeans, asked the bank of england, the all have british pretty much at the lowest from highs coming out of the guest: mr. shah: mr. 2009 recession. that has implications on affordability, but if it's been an of the kinds of things and the nhs since that was the central promise of brexit. what i think we're going to get is a brexit indeed happens and it's not even nor waste of brexit, we're going to get incrementally slower british growth. it's not going to be a disaster but we're going to get back to the 1950s, 1960s where britain is like half a point each year below with the europeans are cumulatively, it gets up to quite a lot. the gap just widens and widens. by 2030 we wake up, go, we are really quite poor. i think it's that kind of scenario that is more likely. then defense budgets, well, you
know, they will be cut. >> what is what i will only add on the sort of economic trade side that the degree to which the growth is affected dentsply at least in the scenario very differently whether you get a hard brexit or a soft brexit. it's very clear if you end up with a hard brexit, in other words, no deal, then the uk is subject to whatever arrangements they have with larger would be the wto rules which for most goods means that you have to tarrif, going between the uk into european union, and more important your subject to new records are requirements -- an automobile that moves free would have to pay 10% duty and somewhere between one and $2000 to be reinspected just to move between the uk and the eu. you multiply that by every other scenario and then the real one to watch for in terms of judging how significant is the effect of brexit going to be, is what happens to the regulatory barriers around trade and services particularly financial services.
in the absence of a soft brexit, that's where you were really going to see the due determination in growth and uk market. right now and put events with past 40 we get a particular financial service instrument at the insurance contract, particularly directive, approved in the uk, you sell it throughout the european union. all those incidents will have to be re-approved again at considerable expense in brussels and what it would mean is many, many come some people predicted a literally if there's a hard brexit day one you would see more than 10,000 of the jobs in the city, the financial services city moving. seeing significant movement into paris, and to some degree dublin but the perception is a hard brexit could make that all of that sort of much worse. >> in the back. good afternoon.
the jurisdiction of european court of human rights, ask a part of the canceled your. i like to bring up a different aspect of foreign-policy which is human rights can uk is played an important voice in this area at a time with the united states is clearly abandoned its realtor i wonder about the voice of international human rights issues if the uk is less local as well after brexit. >> ed or matthew or jennifer. jennifer. >> i am happy to comment. part of this if you remember back to the lead up to brexit one of the issues that theresa may at least was commenting on is one of the things that she initially had said she would love to see is the uk out of the jurisdiction not of the court european of the
union. or in addition to getting out from under the court of justice for the european union. she wanted out from under the court of human rights. because there's been a number of decisions handed down of european court of human rights that were anti-uk, and the review was i would like to be out of that jurisdiction. we haven't heard a lot more of that talk. part of it will depend i think, so don't think there's been a discussion that's entirely separate legal regime. in other words, whether you're a member of the european union does not affect your legal status as a participant in the overall human rights regime that set up within your. europe. you have a lot of non-eu members that are subject to the jurisdiction of european court of human rights and are subject to the overall treaties with respect human rights. at this point i don't think there is a move afoot literally withdraw the uk from any of the major treaties or the conventions on human rights that nonwithstanding that original
flirtation with it, but it does beg the question whether there's a gap between what is the freestanding uk law on human rights versus what is the european regime. and there is a lot of concern among a number of the human rights groups that existing uk laws are less robust and that there would be some significant concern about whether or not that gap does result in dimunition to some of the human rights, particularly some of the more recent decisions coming out of european court of human rights. >> i think that's an excellent summary of the situation. though i think i would add is there is a bandwidth question. britain is going to have to get bilateralessively before brexit happens agenda getting resources in terms of deals with treaties with america, china can indicate it's going to have less, it's not in the big club anymore so it's going to have less clout. so it's going to have a
bandwidth problem in with the human rights remained a big party but it's also going to have a leverage problem. it's just not going to have the same clout if it's not speaking with the european union as it is alone. i fear it's not disaster human rights because it's not like the upheld by britain, but it is a good voice on a lot of these issues and if you're the voice will be more faint as a result. >> if i could add on the bandwidth issue. this is one of the other things i don't think is been very well recognized as part of brexit, which is how much the uk is going to miss access to many of the agencies of the european union. i taught a seminar on the lot of brexit last year and one of the things i asked my students to do is keep a running list of all of the agencies of the european union that potentially could need to be replicated in the uk upon brexit. at the end of the class we ended up with 96 agencies on the list. the bandwidth for the uk to have
to re-create the inspectors are nuclear power plants, those approving patents, those approving certain chemical additives, the entire panoply of regulation, what all of them need to be re-created. no. is it a significant amount that creates a substantial bandwidth problem. yes. the question is how fast is uk going to be able to get up to speed in re-creating all of the many apparatuses of the european commission and the many other agencies within european system. i think there i would think it's the uk is very far behind. >> are you feeling cheered up? i'm going to be swinging from the rafters in a minute. >> i want to follow up on what he was talk about. two trends talk about their point is the british giving up their defense capability which is little to do with brexit and
then of course brexit causing the brits to lose the voice in the eu. they been are interpreted into the eu, the of anger speaking people for some time we now have neither of those things in britain. we are used to the british being the robin to our batman. if they no longer are able to bring this long-term presence. yet their special forces, the marauders and the polls of special forces. what the brits have brought for years is long-term presence and ground forces to supplement us. i guess my question is how long is is going to take to sink into the u.s. for a policy community that they are no longer the ally of choice, that the special relationship is no longer so special. and maybe the brits are our partner. they are still an important power but maybe we need a partner that has voice in you
eu and maybe we need to call paris. how long is a going to take to sink in? when it does, how long does our history continue the special relationship with the british-u.s.? trading partnership really is that important if there is no longer our default partner. >> for another piece i've been writing, to form national security advisers here under previous presidents, and it's quite unrelated to the uk use special relationship. each of them in interviews i was doing brought up their feelings of worry and sadness about britain sent to a walking off the chessboard. one put it very well. he was my security advisor to obama. he said whatever issue it was , his first instinct, even if it didn't involve britain was to call his british counterpart or british ministry of defence. their answers would be really good. there was a caliper of mines
ds there. i guess of course the linguistic thing. i don't necessary think it's going to go away. the british has very high-caliber people. their patients is being tried by i asked the foreign office with whether the been a decline in graduate applications. there hasn't been. they are still hotly contested. they still have the pick a a of pretty good graduates. i don't think that will change. a lot of the come and teach question but special relationship will be useless or completely ghost form of itself, will depend on whether jeremy not.n is prime minister or i don't think the all turned out prime minister will want to slash defense spending are radically alter britain for policy priorities. >> down here. >> hazel, georgetown university. i wanted to pick up one of phrase that ed has used a couple times.
he said if brexit happens. i've seen fleeting references in the press to the possibility of a revote. is it a realistic possibility. >> i'm going to defer to matthew but i'll give you a quick answer. sorry, matthew, please. >> i should maybe >> i will -- it will be a quick one. and then you can give the richly and foreign one. [laughing] >> first of all, sort of how question of how we get to political situation with is a second referendum and what the wording is. but leaving aside that very difficult, leaving aside the nature of british politics right now, let's say there were a second referendum that just simply offered the reversal of brexit and there were a reversal 52-48 in favor of remaining this time as opposed to the other way around. would that settle anything.
i think it could sort of leave the more deeply voice that made the country even less governable. on the second referendum, those of been hoping for second referendum, advocates to think along these lines. i had a slightly dramatic conversation with the ecology of the day he said where you stood in terms -- remain or brexit is almost like set of identity. it says you are. you will live with the cessation the rest of your life. families will debated like the british and english civil war in the 17th century. whether you're a royalist or parliamentary. this is becoming a deep thinker i'm i'm not sure this magical of a second referendum is quite so inviting today is maybe it was a year ago. i'm not there. matthew is there. i might be sort of over
dramautizing it. >> well, i think if you start, i work a lot with surveys and opinion polls and someone and certainly more reliable academic surveys. we have a standard question which is in hindsight do you think the vote for brexit was right or wrong. since the referendum you've seen a very polarized electorate, typically 42, 43% say it was right. about 44, 45% say it was wrong decided to wear a lot of of the questions which ask but with a like a second referendum. if you are being as generous as you could be, you would make two points. the percentage who would like a second referendum has been going up, but you would also make the point that it remains at about 37, 38%. so a sizable chunk but nonetheless a minority. i think thirdly, i don't call the anti-brexit but while the camp has been mobilizing about
this idea of a people's vote on the deal when it comes back in the autumn and if theresa may loses they were out and say this is just justification for going to the country and having a the best outcome for the community, and i'm trying to stand in the middle here, but outcome, would keep britain linked of. the other issue is a second defeat which is putting the issue to bed for a generation, if not more. certainly every election we have had since the referendum and seen a growing polarization with the conservative party becoming far more pro- brexit and the labour party straddling an
awkward coalition. i would be dubious about holding a second vote and not one to hold it this year. >> we have time for one more question. >> going back to the question, british foreign policy has been influenced in a nuanced direction toward russia. largely because of the inflow of russian wealth into london. that is taking on an ambiguous tone. with china's wealth, where is our economic future going to be?
what are the foreign policy going to be in a post-brexit environment? >> he rolled out the red carpet. he got rebuked by the obama administration. before brexit was considered -- britain'stten's mercantilism has been showing. i think it will continue but more so. i have to say mentioning cameron, i feel quite angry with the man, i really do. the consequences of that are going to long outlive our memory of what it was like to live before brexit. >> matthew. >> quickly, one of my colleagues
said to me after the vote, david cameron will be remembered as the third prime minister who forever be remembered for one thing. tony blair and barak every david cameron will be remembered for brexit. i think that is a fair summary. seen through the eyes of the brexit supporters, the next few years will be full of bilateral meetings with pakistan, australia. what do you need to do in order former commonwealth nations. to encourage that trade? one of the things i will end up offering is a liberal immigration policy. it may well be that actually what many voters thought they were voting for, a more restrictive and perhaps white britain, they may end up facing a rather different reality with
becoming, reaching new levels but perhaps becoming more diverse. it is going to be an interesting interplay between foreign policy on the one hand and britain immigration policy on the other. that, i would say, a lot of uncertainty with brexit and at home. the only certainty we have is we stop at a 1:30. i want to thank you for this. thank you very much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span's washington journal come alive every day with news and policy issues that impact
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