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tv   Brexit U.K. Foreign Policy  CSPAN  May 6, 2018 9:47pm-10:53pm EDT

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>> this week on the communicators, house majority leader kevin mccarthy and minority leader steny hoyer talk about the congressional seminar.n's >> it is important that we find ways to come together to engage the public in a positive way, to make congress more open and more transparent. >> this year, we have electronic mail tests going into a number of congressional offices. it will transform the district offices at the same time. we become more efficient, we get better data, we understand where we can file it and we become more accountable to our constituents. communicators monday at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span two. >> friday, the council on foreign relations hosted a discussion about brexit and its
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possible implications for future relations with the european union and the u.s. this is just over one hour. >> it is really quiet. >> all right. thank you everyone for coming. welcome to today's council on foreign relations meeting on british foreign policy post brexit. i am steve, and i will be providing over the discussion -- presiding over the discussion. we have joining us via videoconference matthew goodwin from the u.k. to my right, jennifer hillman from georgetown law firm -- law center. ,nd from the financial times ed. as i was thinking about this today coming in, i was thinking
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it is really nice for once, with everything going on in the u.s., to focus on someone else's internal problems for a change. it, in manyabout , we are nowe exitlly 330 days away from day, and we have absolutely no idea how we are getting from point a to point b. i like to tell people that in washington, point a to point b is never a straight line, and that definitely appears to be the case in the u.k. i think we want to focus on exploring those internal brexit politics, because while at a council, we are interested in the foreign policy dynamics and where this is all going after brexit. as we know, all politics are local, and what happens with the policy will in
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many ways determine the prospects for the foreign policy framework. let's start there. mayerms of prime minister and the u.k. more broadly, they are on a pretty -- in a pretty tight spot right now. within the last week, we have had personal turns in her cabinet, which has made a more even split between brexiteers id remainders -- remainers. will start with our man on the ground in the u.k., matthew. layout ofve us a where the internal politics stand in the standoff that may faces? matthew: good afternoon and thanks for inviting me along to the council. you may be aware we have actually just had a set of local elections over the last 24 hours
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come a has given us even more with regardshew on to brexit. what we see in the u.k., i would suggest, is an increasing polarization between program escalated to the middle class, millennial graduates, and more urban big cities. on the other hand, more socially conservative working-class smaller towns, very pro-brexit. it is worth saying at the outset that the conservative party over the last 24 hours has actually done very well in pro-brexit areas of the country that gave at least 60% of the vote to leave. that is significant in terms of the internal politics question you ask, because i argue that in three layers, the conservative party is being pushed increasingly towards a hard
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brexit. within the parliamentary party, there is a large number, a majority of mps that view single market membership as being incompatible with the referendum result. the conservative party membership, by the way, 24% of conservative members want to stay within the single market around the same -- and around the same your wants to stay in a custom union. the conservative electorate, the most important part if we assume politics is back in a big way, the vast majority of conservative voters are fiercely pro-leave. that is going to have all kinds of implications on the key events coming up over the next year. we have the customs union debate, where most conservative voters don't want to be in the customs union. we also have the council meeting in june, and we have a parliamentary vote in autumn. thearrows point to
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conservative party being pushed further right on the issue. to addou have anything in terms of where we stand on the internal politics, part -- particularly with how you see the standoff over the trade union issue? and the custom unions issue? ed: matthew is personal the ground so i will defer to him in terms of everything, basically. but you mentioned it is hard to get from point a to point b in the american system and british system. this isn't point a to point b, this is a line, this is a circle. it is getting back to where we started because there is no consensus on what kind of-brexit deal, even within the cabinet. there isn't a consensus. some will not accept customs union, and some will not accept anything less than customs union. theresa may is stuck between a rock and a hard place. she doesn't have the kind of leadership skills to force those
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who might be wavering, either on hard brexit side, boris johnson types, or on the moderate side of the cabinet, the philip hammond, amber rogers just left the cabinet, that type, to agree to a compromise. in aisn't traveling straight, or even a zigzag togonal line from point a point b. this is coming right round in a circle. guess,s stagnated, i there is a stalemate, as much of a stalemate as you could imagine in a parliamentary system. it is hard to imagine to see what is going to give. brexit,we think about in many ways, the issues that brought us here are immigration and trade. customs,standoff over give us a context of whether the scope of problems that need to
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be addressed, there is what they would like to address, what really needs to be addressed? onnifer: the critical thing trade is, what will you do about the border between northern ireland and ireland? i totally agree, coming back. oh. to get a sense of context, when we think about it, the u.k. is the world's fifth-largest economy, but within the eu, the second-largest economy, 16% of gdp of the european union is in the u.k. and importantly for the trade issues, 42 percent of all of the uk's exports of goods and services are going to the eu. the trading relationship between the eu and the u.k. is really what is at the heart and soul of this debate and what it means. the problem for theresa may has all along been, what do you do about the border between ireland and northern ireland? once you brexit, you have ireland that will remain a member of the eu and you have
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northern ireland, which is now not going to be in the eu, and under the treaties of the eu, you must have a border that judges goods moving across eu and non-eu border. you have to put on tariffs, of persons movement and services, and more importantly for the u.k. come all the regulatory issues that go along with the movement of a good three of the question becomes, how do you put a border between ireland and northern ireland without completely upsetting the peace accords that ate about after the result the end of the troubles? this is the heart of the soul of the problem. 310 miles of border between northern ireland and ireland, with more than 400 crossing points, and nobody has been able to figure out how to get around that. what is on the table right now, the eu put forward a withdraw puzzle, which was their tactic
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to mother proposal for a way to fix it, which effectively creates a border along the irish meaning treat northern ireland and ireland as sort of one area and allow the free low of goods across that order. that is complete and asthma -- it is, to theresa may and her coalition, governing they can't live with the idea that you could separate northern ireland from the main part of the u.k. what theresa may put on the table is a customs partnership, where somehow, the u.k. would collect the tariffs on behalf of the eu and would do all the clearances it -- on behalf of the u.k. and pass it along. that failed this week in her cabinet. the second option they are looking at is what they call a customs facilitation approach, where we are supposed to use will have everybody the equivalent of an easy pass system in their car and we will madura -- measure these goods
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through technology, and everybody in brussels says this will not work. we are still, it is a difficult place, where the language on the table is for this division along the irish sea, and everything that has been done in the u.k. not got sufficient support. we will come right back around to the ability to solve the ireland-northern ireland problem, what could take brexit down, if you will. >> to give you a sense of the hopelessness, the second customs fudge, maximum facility, which doesn't command support, is now known as cluster fac. it was known as max fac. theseis easy and situations to talk about what is not going to work. something has to be done. what, in terms of a fudge, talk
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about where -- what the fudge looks like. how do they get past this gordian knot? >> i will defer to matthew, but to give my top and's worth -- tuppence worth, we may come up with words that is less than norway, but more than canada. to explain norway, it is a single european market which is unacceptable to boris johnson. canada has a bilateral trade deal with the eu, which is unacceptable to the remainers. she has to fudge in between that union that gets through the cabinet. if she gets it through the cabinet, it must get parliament. most importantly, it has to pass the eu, and we are talking about negotiations going -- if she gee
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cabinet, it has to get through parliament. it also most importantly has to pass the european union. we're talking about negotiations going on here. there are no negotiations essentially between britain and europe happening. all the negotiations are inside of britain and not just inside of britain, they're inside london. not just inside london, but inside the conservative party between people who don't like each other, don't trust each other, who think theresa may is worst leader possible except for all the others. that is the kind of climate we're talking about. matthew can give a more authoritative answer to that question. >> to that point - >> and jennifer. >> let's talk about may for a second,because it sounds like no one really loves may. no one wants this job, at least until after exit day. so, how safe is she between, you know, over the next 330 days? but give us a sense of her range of manueverability. let's talk about continuities, if she was to go, jacob mogg, is he a real possibility? >> according to all reports of the cabinet meeting on wednesday
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which was, of course, when the infamous moment happened when our new home secretary who replaced amber rudd effectively cast the vote against theresa may's customs partnership model, thereby giving the room over in effect to the euroskeptics. according to all reports, theresa may, i quote, veriably -- visibly shocked she lost the room. that moment may yet come to be seen as perhaps more significant than we even appreciate it is now. we may be seeing the beginnings of a stronger euroskeptic turn perhaps within the cabinet. we've seen jacob reese mogg and erg group, which is 60 strong, in beginning to mobilize very vocally around this argument that there can not be any form of a customs union that would jeopardize what brexit is really about. so i describe theresa may, you remember those "die hard" films,
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at one point bruce willis would grab somebody who'd already been shot and hold that person up. [laughter] theresa may is that body that is being dragged along. [laughter] opening up the bad political capital from brexit. inevitably she will go. the question is who will replace her. that will almost certainly be a leaver. the conservative parliamentary party is very pro-leave. that means that jacob reese mogg has a very real chance. the two most popular candidates according to conservative party membership surveys are boris johnson and jacob reese mogg. those are the two top contenders. everything will happen real quickly. in the next two weeks, theresa may will have to bring back to the cabinet a new customs proposal. if that is signed off within the conservative brexit subcommittee, that will then
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conceivably go forward to the european union, who may then whether that is credible plan or a unicorn model, something that is not realistic or in line with their current regulations or so forth. so there are, the chances of a hard brexit have and increased significantly over the last two weeks and they may yet increase even further. the last point i will say on this, however, there is nobody in the conservative parliamentary party who seems desperate to grab the wheel. another movie analogy might be "speed" where the bus is hurtling along at 150 miles an hour. there is no keanu reeves in the conservative party that wants to take the wheels. everybody knows the conservative
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party, as edward just mentioned, is completely divided down the middle on this issue. it may well be, may may bring that customs model and only way to get through parliament. that is something will to -- that is something to consider. >> you want to jump in. >> i was only going to add this underscores how significant the timelines are here. again it is march of next year where the brexit actually happens. the perception is you will need whatever this withdrawal agreement is to be finished by at least october of this year, in order for it to get through the european union's process, in order to be done before march 29. this agreement is out there in draft, for those of you really into it. it comes in with certain sections in green that have been agreed to and other parts in yellow close to agreed to. remainder in white, still under negotiation. well over half of it is still
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under negotiation. we're a long way even having an agreement on the withdrawal itself. and that only covers this very limited number of issues that used to be called the divorce issues. how much money will the u.k. continue to pay into the eu budget? what will we do about all the eu nationals living in the uk? what are we doing about the uk nationals living in the eu? what are we going to do about northern ireland? that is all the withdrawal agreement really covers. what it says about everything else, meaning what's the economic relationship will be with europe down the road, what is the economic relationship going to be with all other trading partners, that is to come later. that is in theory supposed to be done and worked out during the transition period, which is going to occur between march 29 of next year and december of 2020. and as a former trade negotiator i will tell you good luck getting a trade agreement done in less than 18 months. it is not going to be possible for the uk to have in place its trading relationships with the
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eu, much less anyone else, by december of 2020 particularly if we're still fighting over the withdrawal agreement up until the end of the summer. we needed to have already been moving on in order for these things to come about. so the timing becomes more and more urgent as each day goes by. >> and not that it is not complicated enough already, but as ed pointed out, so rightly it takes two to tango here. we've been very much focused on all the problems internally with the uk, but what about the european's view on this? there is no monolith there either. >> there are 27 european members. interesting thing how europeans have changed since brexit happened, the referendum happened. there was a portion of europe, good riddance. you've been slowing us down.
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you've been vetoing for too long. you've been half in, half out. there is an anglophobic portion in france, really good riddance, whatever your history, we want you out. there is german perspective, which is it's a pity, but if you have to go, you have to go. i think that mood has changed into a genuine alarm. here is a great democracy ruining itself, entirely self-inflicted, showing no signs of resolving its internal -- in fact they're deepening as matthew pointed out. this isn't just a sad spectacle to watch. in the context now you really didn't have two years ago, worry about liberal democracy in europe. concerns of poland, concerns of hungary. but also in the context if britain will do this much dan it -- much damage, it will wash over to us.
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this will detablize europe. they have a lot of problems to deal with, migration is huge -- a huge one. to have an imploding britain on their hands is not a good thing. one other point i make in connection with that, that is the potential silver lining here, that europe will have more appetite to give britain leeway and have extensions of deadlines than it did a year or two ago. the other point i make, britain might not, theresa may might fail to get a bill through parliament. so, britain might flunk out with absolutely no deal and in complete legal limbo land next march. generalre might be a elction. corbyn might win. we would have a government of sort of brexiteer, but a hidden one led by jeremy corbyn. with whom the europeans would have to negotiate.
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they don't want to negotiate with corbyn. they don't want to pull the plug on theresa may's career, for that reason. if there is a silver lining, it is things have got so bad that europe is actually going to pick up some of the slack britain is incapable of creating for itself right now. >> you see that a little bit, i think, in the line that european union has always had to draw. where the perception is if they give the u.k. too good of a deal on brexit, then the concern is, then you will have brexit, every other member of the european union saying, i want that deal, if you are to give that much to the u.k. you've seen that line move a little bit. where the perception is that this has been so perceptively agreed for the u.k. that you can give a little bit more and it actually won't necessarily entice the netherlands or someone else to come along and decide to go down this same road. >> quite right. >> go, jump in, matthew. >> sorry, thanks.
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one quick thing on this parliament vote in the autumn because this is a very important crunch moment in the brexit timeline. let me just put forward my view on this. i think theresa may will win that vote and i'll tell you why. she is effectively going to bring the deal to parliament. so just park this customs union issue and let's assume there is some kind of fudge that keeps the wheels turning and we get european council meeting in june and we get through the next meeting in october and theresa may brings back this agreement to parliament and they come vote -- can either vote for it or effectively vote against it. the reason i think she will win that vote because it is not entirely clear yet, at least, what you would be voting for if you voted that down. and i think the labour party will probably make a big hurrah applying five or six tests to make sure this is the brexit
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they really want, but i think in the end labour may end up voting for it. at least we have emily thornberry at chatham house two months ago and she alluded to that possibility. let's not forget, too, even within parliament theresa may has a slim majority with the d.u.p. if you only focus on the formal numbers, you overlook the fact there are also around between six and 10 labour politicians who are likely to support the deal because they're in 67% -- 60%, 70% brexit voting constituents. my money is on may. if she lost that vote, by the way, the conservative party would almost certainly seek to replace her without going to the country. that would be politically very difficult and there would be an uproar from the opposition parties, but they would almost certainly move to have a internal leadership election without going to the country because they are aware that
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jeremy corbyn only needs 2% swing to get within coalition territory. he only needs a 4% swing to get within majority territory. i can tell you from my own interviews in london there are a lot of people in the city saying that they like where the labour party is on the customs union because it is now supporting a customs union, but they don't want the labour party in power. so there is a curious paradox almost within london. they like where jeremy corbyn is at the moment. they think he could deliver a soft brexit, but they don't want jeremy corbyn anywhere near power. stephen: so if you talk about, if you're wrong and you had an initial vote against may in parliament in autumn, one point ed and i were talking about before we came in here the markets often get to vote as well. the financial markets won't like that. from my own personal experience, we saw two votes on tarp.
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so, maybe it takes a failed vote to maybe get a vote to pass. >> you need something to concentrate minds. you remember that 800 point drop in the dow that day. it did concentrate minds. boehner used it for a second successful vote on tarp. maybe that is the only hail mary you can think of, if may is unable to pass a bill. she would try again a week later after the markets had their say. stephen: before we move over to inviting members to ask questions, i want to, we've been very, since economics have been a big part of this, we are supposed to be looking at foreign policy more broadly. the diplomats side, the defense side. we're talking about europeans and how the u.k. plays into that. we've seen in the most recent german defense budget, defense spending down. so it doesn't seem like the
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europeans are necessarily, necessarily anticipating even if the u.k. is pulling out of the that it is going to offset , their role from a defense perspective. any thoughts, ed, matthew, on approache brexiteers the kind of national security, diplomatic side of the equation? >> i'm a columnist, so i'm allowed to give my opinion and i'm not a fan of brexiteers. one of the reasons i'm not a fan of brexiteers, they have not thought through these scenarios. they relied on very general statements of hope, that britain will strike trade deals with the commonwealth, whatever that is, in economic terms. >> jennifer, in terms of the commonwealth, would that save them in any way?
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>> no. 42% of all of the u.k.'s exports go to eu and none of the top commonwealth countries are their -- among britain's top trading partners. >> britain exports more to than the rest of the rest of the commonwealth. >> yep. >> that there is a what i call a fantasy. there is the idea that there will be a u.s.-uk bilateral trade deal. that trump will not only sort of do the heavy lifting on this side of the atlantic to get the deal through and have the negotiating team we are enthusiastic about to negotiate it, but also that it would be a deal acceptable to the british public. i think, what would, what would american interests advising the ustr like from the uk. things like chlorinated chicken and national health service
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which is a national religious symbol in some ways. allowing more contracting out and outsourcing out, it would be very easy to demagogue this deal domestically in britain. trump is not liked.. the brexiteer vision of british foreign policy outside of europe brexit, to where my columnists have, pure fancy. they run away from informed interviewers whenever the offer is made. they do not want to be questioned on this subject. stephen: what about their role, matthew, in other multilateral an arrangements? the p5, the g7, g20, nato. how do you see u.k. using their leverage in these other arrangements post-brexit? matthew: yeah, thanks. if i could quickly say a couple of broad points relating to foreign and security policy. the first thing to say is, that
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i think despite the, to put this diplomatically, this -- the sort of challenges that surround a brexit process, what rob wainwright who recently left europol made this point, put that to one side, there is still goodwill on both sides to insure that they come to some kind of a mutually beneficial arrangement around security and foreign policy initiatives. but that said, the second i think broad consensual point is that everybody implicitly accepts or overtly accepts that britain will be less influential as a consequence of this decision. those are two sort of general points. where we are now the uk is looking to create what it call a new post-brexit special relationship between the uk and the eu on foreign and security policy. we've seen theresa may talk about a new security treaty that would allow joint initiatives with the eu and action on areas of common concern.
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but there are specific areas of work that are going to need to be dealt with quite urgently. the u.k. is going to need to invest far more seriously in bilateral relationships, beefing up diplomatic representation in other european capitals. it's going to be much harder for the u.k. to maintain its influence over key issues, the refugee crisis being one that's particularly animated british voters, but it's going to be much harder to with any -- wield any significant influence you might argue an -- in areas like the balkans, ukraine, north africa and turkey where i think the u.k. will increasingly play a secondary role to the eu. where the eu is going to be able to use a lot of leverage relating to markets, the prospect of the eu membership is -- are very powerful incentives for encouraging changes within those states. that said, i think uk influence on european security is going to remain very significant.
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i think the u.k. will remain a global geopolitical power. given its position within nato as one of the most capable, most willing powers, that's unlikely to dissipate in the major way. -- a major way. it will become harder for the uk to try to translate that commitment into multilateral political influence. it's going to have to work a lot harder to ensure it's not an afterthought when it comes to the u.s. and eu conversations. macron has been very aggressive -- rightly so. very opportunistic, trying to fill that void with the u.s., even talking about the special relationship which carries , particular resonance in the u.k.. the two broad points i would make is the u.k. will remain a key player, obviously, but there are going to be specific areas where it is going to have less influence.
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if we end up in the heart brexit scenario, -- hard brexit scenario, which i suggest is looking increasingly likely then , there may be specific witnesses that will materialize around arrest warrant and so on. let's wait and see. stephen: great. at this time i'd like to invite members to join our conversation with their questions. a reminder that this meeting is on the record. wait for the microphone. speak directly into it. please stand, state your name and affiliation. please limit yourself to one question, and keep it concise to allow as many members as possible to speak. right there in the back. >> jamie from brookings. what are the implications of the -- of jeremy corbyn becoming prime minister, particularly on foreign-policy question -- foreign policy? ed: i think matthew should
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answer that. [laughter] matthew: i'm more interested in your views. let me take a punt. i think the implications of the jeremy corbyn government i think, actually the interesting implications are integral -- internal. this is somebody who wants to nationalize most of our key industries and deliberate radical economic reform around taxation and other areas. and i think this will be an economic shakeup of the kind that britain has not seen really , certainly since the 1970's, but you might argue since the postwar era. lots of businesses are anxious about what that means. on brexit, corbyn has tread a fine line, because his coalition demands that. this is a party carrying seats in the north of england that gave a 70% vote for brexit and seats -- a 70% vote to remain.
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jeremy corbyn has been remarkably ambiguous about what he believes should be the best brexit model. on the one hand, he is saying let's get out of the single market, on the other hand, he is saying let's keep the customs union. that's seem to be roughly where he is and as far as he is willing to go. there's a lot of pressure inside to get him to commit to that single market, but if he hasn't already, then when will he? on the broader foreign-policy issue, this is somebody that has been very critical of the uk's foreign-policy interventions pretty much for the past 30 years. somebody who has willingly engaged with terrorist sympathizers, with groups and organizations that really have had no formal channel of communications to uk government in recent history. somebody that is very unorthodox from a radical left-wing position in his views towards things like israel, and his views towards latin america, in his views towards syria and libya.
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so, this is somebody that would not only cause an economic shock when we talk about the markets reacting. watching the markets react to a labour majority election will be something worth watching but also this is somebody who would significantly shake up british foreign-policy and not i would suggest in a personal capacity for good reasons. ed: i'll make one quick point. the russian poisoning in salisbury a few weeks ago and may's reaction to it is an interesting case. the first-place she went was brussels. she got immediate, very practical cooperation from akron, merkel, and others. -- macron, merkel, and others. then went to united states and got likewise tough action from across the atlantic, transatlantic behavior, classic british role in transatlantic behaviors. go to europe and interpret america. go to america and interpret
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europe to america and be the key bridge between that. that's going to be still possible to do as matthew outlined. you can have a u.k.-european security arrangement and britain will remain in nato. and so the sort of predictions of british geopolitical doom or extinction after brexit might be overdone. but if corbyn is prime minister . we will probably get back to that in a minute. i won't belabor why. stephen: right down here in front. >> retired state department. franco-british military cooperation has been an important activity in recent years. would you expect that to continue under hard brexit? is that the kind of thing that you would expect to see going forward? ed: again, i think matthew should take this and answer that. i'm actually not up to speed on
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that, so i'm not hunting. -- punting. matthew: i mean, i would say that there's going to be, look, making predictions in the brexit, brexit climate of the moment is probably not one -- not what one should be doing. i personally would not foresee any fundamental changes in bilateral relationships between the uk and france, or the uk and germany or even the uk and the u.s. i think the uk will at the same time feel itself increasingly sidelined from france and germany, within the eu or the european orbit. it will be going to meetings during transition where it doesn't have any significant voting rights. it will be going into security and foreign-policy conversations where it might be able to express a view, but will not be able, at least at the european level, to wield any significant or formal influence. it would be the first time that
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the u.k. found itself in that situation. i think as well watching where macron wants to go is interesting. he has clearly decided that the anglo-franco relationship is going to be rebooted in a major way. and i think he has clearly decided he is going to be a leading layer in the europe -- player in the eurozone-eu reform agenda with angela merkel. macron is very good at smelling weakness and then acting accordingly. i think whitehall and westminster -- i know this for a fact, they are very aware of that. i don't personally foresee any major ruptures in bilateral relationships, but at the european level the uk will feel , more alienated over the coming years. wondering -- i totally agree if jeremy corbyn is prime minister, special relationship with us is gone.
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can't see mr. trump and mr. corbyn speaking for any kind of common sheet of music. but the defense budget in britain is under tremendous threat right now. the british army is smaller than our special operations forces. i think there be be more admirals than surface ships in the royal navy. so my question is, if there is a hard brexit and the economy in britain is not going to skyrocket, what's that going to do the british defense? does that render moot what we've been talking about? because if you get no ships and you've troops, you don't have much to say. >> one thing that i would weigh in here is you have to think about what does the u.k. have going for it. they have very capable special operations capability, although not a tremendous amount of lift capability. they are still a powerful global nuclear state.
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so, i think in those terms i defer to matthew in terms of the direct impact on the budget. we've seen this in a lot of of the countries whether it's australia or wherever. i think when we see people focus on the comparative advantages. matthew: i mean, i certainly agree with much of that. i would come back to the question asked. let's fast forward to 2022. it's a shocking thought that the anglo-american relationship might be actually really on fire with jeremy corbyn and bernie sanders as your -- sanders as your -- [laughter] plausible. it's entirely plausible, right? the economic question that i think was the backdrop to your point about defense spending, i mean, the one unpopular point in these debates perhaps that i do make is the british economy is without doubt suffering as a consequence of the referendum
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vote. whichever forecast is your hobby horse, they tell a broadly consistent story that, compared to other advanced western nations, we're going to have a bumpy ride. but the other point i would make is the british economy has proven quite resilient, and certainly true some may say brexit hasn't really happened yet. but the fundamentals of the british economy overall , unemployment, growth rates, productivity, some manufacturing, you know, trying perhaps, to paint a counter-picture which is overall given this rather seismic political shock the british economy has proven to be quite resilient. i would add to the point that, and i'm sure ed will have thoughts on this and will probably disagree with me, but the new defense minister, gavin williamson, is clearly angling
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for the top job and if somebody -- is somebody who is already -- has already been making very strident statements about the defense budget, wanting to increase that, wanting to match some of the commitments to increase in the -- increasing the budget that had been made in brussels with regard to eu defense spending, and --m it may be over the next year and half the defense community finds itself perhaps surprised by his positioning. he seemed within westminster as somewhat of an amateur, and i as a novice. who was promoted very quickly after being the chief whip. but he somebody is very ambitious, and it may be using the defense budget partly as a way of projecting some of those ambitions. >> just a quick point, if i may. that's entirely plausible
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that there will be higher defense budgets but it's consistent with the brexit worldview that britain will struggle that going alone and so forth. that might have, go some way towards making up some of the cuts with you and less 15, 20 years so the numbers favor the size of the british army and navy. but there is a problem. while matthew is right using the british economy is resilient, it was the first -- in 2015. this year it's at the lowest, slowest growing of the big economy in europe, even italy is going faster than britain. that is the projection whether you ask imf or the europeans, asked the bank of england, the all have british pretty much at the lowest from highs coming out the recession. that has implications on affordability, on defense spending, and on all kinds of other things. what i think we're going to get is a brexit indeed happens.
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we are going to get incrementally slower british growth. it is not going to be at disaster, but we going to get back to the 19 50's, 1960's. to get back to the 1950s, 1960s where britain is like half a point each year below with the europeans are cumulatively, it gets up to quite a lot. the gap just widens and widens. by 2030 we wake up, go, we are really quite poor. i think it's that kind of scenario that is more likely. then defense budgets, well, you know, they will be cut. >> and, for what it is worth i will only had on me sort of economic trade side that the degree to which the growth is affected dentsply at least in the scenario very differently whether you get a hard brexit or a soft brexit. it's very clear if you end up with a hard brexit, in other words, no deal, then the uk is subject to whatever arrangements they have with larger would be the wto rules which for most goods means that you have to both pay a tarrif, going between
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european unionhe and more importantly, you are subject to new automobile requirements. an automobile that now moves three would have to pay 10% duty and somewhere between $1000 and $2000 to be re-inspected just to move between the u.k. and the e.u. you multiply that by every other scenario and then the real one to watch for in terms of judging how significant is the effect of brexit going to be, is what happens to the regulatory barriers around trade and services particularly financial services. in the absence of a soft brexit, that's where you were really going to see the due determination in growth and uk market. right now and put events with past 40 we get a particular financial service instrument at the insurance contract, particularly a derivative, approved in the u.k., you sell it throughout the european union. all those incidents will have to
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be re-approved again at considerable expense in brussels and what it would mean is many, many people predict it literally, if there is a hard brexit, one day you would see more than 10,000 of the jobs in the city, the financial services , moving. you are seeing significant movement into paris, and to some degree dublin but the perception is a hard brexit could make that all of that sort of much worse. >> in the back. >> good afternoon. the jurisdiction of european court of human rights, ask a part of the canceled your. of the councilt of europe. i would like to bring up a different part. it played an important voice in this area. at a time the night dates has clearly abandon its role. i wonder about the boy said human rights issues if the u.k. is less as well after brexit.
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>> ed or matthew or jennifer. jennifer. >> i am happy to comment. part of this if you remember back to the lead up to brexit -- one of the issues that theresa may at least was commenting on is one of the things that she initially had said she would love to see is the u.k. out of the jurisdiction. not of the court of justice of the european union, or in addition to getting out from under the court of justice for the european union, she wanted out from under the court of human rights. there had been a number of human rights decisions handed down that were anti-u.k. her view was, i would like to be out of that jurisdiction. we have not heard a lot more that talk. i do not think there has been a discussion. it is an entirely separate legal regime. member of the a european union does not affect your status as a printed cement up the overall human rights
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regime set up in europe. you already have a lot of non-e.u. unions subject to the jurisdiction of human rights courts and therefore subject to the treaty. at this point, i do not think there is a move afoot to literally withdraw the u.k. from any of the major treaties are the conventions of the human rights, notwithstanding that original flirtation with a. it does beg the question of whether there is a gap between the freestanding u.k. law on human rights versus what is that european regime. there is a concern that they existing u.k. laws are lest there would be concern about whether or not that cap does result in a diminish and in the u.k. to some of the human rights. particularly some of the more recent decisions.
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>> i think that is an excellent summary. the only thing i would add to that is there is a bandwidth question. it will have to get quite bilaterally if brexit happens into putting these resources in. not just with china, with india. it is going to have less in those bilateral deals. it is going to have sort of a leverage problem. ith the human rights remained a big party but it's also going to have a leverage problem. it's just not going to have the same clout if it's not speaking with the european union as it is alone. i fear it's not disaster human rights because it's not like the upheld by britain, but it is a good voice on a lot of
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these issues and if you're the voice will be more faint as a result. >> if i could add on the bandwidth issue. this is one of the other things i don't think is been very well recognized as part of brexit, which is how much the uk is going to miss access to many of the agencies of the european union. i taught a seminar on the lot of brexit last year and one of the things i asked my students to do is keep a running list of all of the agencies of the european union that potentially could need to be replicated in the uk upon brexit. at the end of the class we ended up with 96 agencies on the list. the bandwidth for the uk to have to re-create the inspectors are nuclear power plants, those approving patents, those approving certain chemical additives, the entire panoply of regulation, what all of them need to be re-created. no. is it a significant amount that creates a substantial bandwidth problem. yes. the question is how fast is uk going to be able to get up to speed in re-creating all of the many apparatuses of the european commission and the many other
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agencies within european system. i think there i would think it's the uk is very far behind. >> are you feeling cheered up? i'm going to be swinging from the rafters in a minute. >> i want to follow up on what he was talk about. two trends talk about their point is the british giving up their defense capability which is little to do with brexit and then of course brexit causing the brits to lose the voice in the eu. they been are interpreted into the eu, the of anger speaking people for some time we now have neither of those things in britain. we are used to the british being the robin to our batman. if they no longer are able to bring this long-term presence. yet their special forces, the marauders and the polls of special forces.
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what the brits have brought for years is long-term presence and ground forces to supplement us. i guess my question is how long is is going to take to sink into the u.s. for a policy community that they are no longer the ally of choice, that the special relationship is no longer so special. and maybe the brits are our partner. they are still an important power but maybe we need a partner that has voice in you eu and maybe we need to call paris. how long is a going to take to sink in? when it does, how long does our history continue the special relationship with the british-u.s.? trading partnership really is that important if there is no longer our default partner. >> for another piece i've been writing, to form national security advisers here under
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previous presidents, and it's quite unrelated to the uk use special relationship. each of them in interviews i was doing brought up their feelings of worry and sadness about britain sent to a walking off the chessboard. one put it very well. he was my security advisor to obama. he said whatever issue it was , his first instinct, even if it didn't involve britain was to call his british counterpart or british ministry of defence. their answers would be really good. there was a caliper of mines ds there. i guess of course the linguistic thing. i don't necessary think it's going to go away. the british has very high-caliber people. their patients is being tried by i asked the foreign office with whether the been a decline in graduate applications. there hasn't been. they are still hotly contested. they still have the pick a a of pretty good graduates. i don't think that will change. a lot of the come and teach question but special
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relationship will be useless or completely ghost form of itself, will depend on whether jeremy not.n is prime minister or i don't think the all turned out prime minister will want to slash defense spending are radically alter britain for policy priorities. >> down here. >> hazel, georgetown university. i wanted to pick up one of phrase that ed has used a couple times. he said if brexit happens. i've seen fleeting references in the press to the possibility of a revote. is it a realistic possibility. >> i'm going to defer to matthew but i'll give you a quick answer. sorry, matthew, please. >> i should maybe >> i will -- it will be a quick one. and then you can give the richly and foreign one. [laughing]
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>> first of all, sort of how question of how we get to political situation with is a second referendum and what the wording is. but leaving aside that very difficult, leaving aside the nature of british politics right now, let's say there were a second referendum that just simply offered the reversal of brexit and there were a reversal 52-48 in favor of remaining this time as opposed to the other way around. would that settle anything. i think it could sort of leave the more deeply voice that made the country even less governable. on the second referendum, those of been hoping for second referendum, advocates to think along these lines. i had a slightly dramatic conversation with the ecology of the day he said where you stood in terms -- remain or brexit is almost like set of identity. it says you are. you will live with the cessation the rest of your life.
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families will debated like the british and english civil war in the 17th century. whether you're a royalist or parliamentary. this is becoming a deep thinker i'm i'm not sure this magical of a second referendum is quite so inviting today is maybe it was a year ago. i'm not there. matthew is there. i might be sort of over dramautizing it. >> well, i think if you start, i work a lot with surveys and opinion polls and someone and certainly more reliable academic surveys. we have a standard question which is in hindsight do you think the vote for brexit was right or wrong. since the referendum you've seen a very polarized electorate, typically 42, 43% say it was right. about 44, 45% say it was wrong decided to wear a lot of of the questions which
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ask but with a like a second referendum. if you are being as generous as you could be, you would make two points. the percentage who would like a second referendum has been going up, but you would also make the point that it remains at about 37, 38%. so a sizable chunk but nonetheless a minority. i think thirdly, i don't call the anti-brexit but while the camp has been mobilizing about this idea of a people's vote on the deal when it comes back in the autumn and if theresa may loses they were out and say this is just justification for going to the country and having a the best outcome for the community, and i'm trying to stand in the middle here, but outcome, would keep
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britain linked of. the other issue is a second defeat which is putting the issue to bed for a generation, if not more. certainly every election we have had since the referendum and seen a growing polarization with the conservative party becoming far more pro- brexit and the labour party straddling an awkward coalition. i would be dubious about holding a second vote and not one to hold it this year. >> we have time for one more question. >> going back to the question, british foreign policy has been
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influenced in a nuanced direction toward russia. largely because of the inflow of russian wealth into london. that is taking on an ambiguous tone. with china's wealth, where is our economic future going to be? what are the foreign policy going to be in a post-brexit environment? >> he rolled out the red carpet. he got rebuked by the obama administration. before brexit was considered -- britain'stten's
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mercantilism has been showing. i think it will continue but more so. i have to say mentioning cameron, i feel quite angry with the man, i really do. the consequences of that are going to long outlive our memory of what it was like to live before brexit. >> matthew. >> quickly, one of my colleagues said to me after the vote, david cameron will be remembered as the third prime minister who forever be remembered for one thing. tony blair and barak every david cameron will be remembered for brexit. i think that is a fair summary. seen through the eyes of the brexit supporters, the next few
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years will be full of bilateral meetings with pakistan, australia. what do you need to do in order former commonwealth nations. to encourage that trade? one of the things i will end up offering is a liberal immigration policy. it may well be that actually what many voters thought they were voting for, a more restrictive and perhaps white britain, they may end up facing a rather different reality with becoming, reaching new levels but perhaps becoming more diverse. it is going to be an interesting interplay between foreign policy on the one hand and britain immigration policy on the other. that, i would say, a lot of uncertainty with brexit and at home. the only certainty we have is we stop at a 1:30. i want to thank you for this. thank you very much.
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[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] announcer: monday, a landmark cases, a case on capital punishment. did armed convict robbery and murder challenged his death sentence. his case and four other cases were considered by the court. the supreme court ruled against him but established stricter guidelines. line, one of the nation's top capital punishment legal scholars and a professor at harvard law school. she has argued against the death penalty. she was a clerk for justice thurgood marshall.
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advocating in favor of capital punishment and a more swift moving system, kent scheidegger. watch landmark cases monday on c-span and join the conversation. c-span.s at we have resources on our site including a link to the national constitution center's interactive constitution, the other links.k, and >> connect with c-span personalize the information you get from us. go to c-span.org\connect and sign up for the emailed. the program guide is a daily emailed with the most up aided primetime schedule and updated coverage.
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word for word gives you the most interesting daily highlight. the newsletter is an insiders look at upcoming authors and festivals. the american history tv newsletter gives you the upcoming programming exploring our nation's past. sign-up today. >> now, a preview of some of the action expected on the house floor this week. by jeremyjoined dillon, who is energy and environmental reporter with cq roll call. the house set to take up legislation on the yucca mountain nuclear waste storage site in the coming week. give us a short and condensed version of this issue that goes back many, many years, if not decades. what is the situation in the yucca mountains? jeremy: this is a big bill's tackling nuclear waste. in the 1980's, it was established that yucca mountain would be the place with the nation's commercial nuclear waste would be.

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