tv U.S.- North Korea Relations CSPAN June 2, 2018 10:01am-11:13am EDT
next, a panel discussion about diplomacy between the u.s. and north korea. then a look at global implications of refugee migration due to armed conflicts. that is followed by a discussion about the future of women in politics with kelly ayotte and lauren underwood, who is currently the youngest african american woman running for congress. trumpterday, president the previously canceled summit between the u.s. and north korea was back on for june 12. next, a look at the applications of the upcoming summit and the status of u.s.-north korea diplomacy. from the stimson center, this is just over one hour.
>> welcome to the stimson center. i'm the codirector of the program here. we are delighted to have our four very interesting speakers here to chat with us a bit about what is beyond the trump kim summit. when i give that title, beyond trump kim summit, please imagine the heart attack of me seeing that news, but sure enough, it now seems that the summit seems to be back on. we are basically getting whiplash moments every day on this one where the summit is going to be on, off, on, off. who knows what happens. in light of that, we are delighted to have our guests here. one formally served on the past committee expert panel. and jenny town from 38 north, which i am now proud to say is a part of the family.
and my other codirector, my better half of the program is here as well. what i'm going to do is open the conversation with this four people by asking a brief question. i want this to be a dialogue rather than each of them giving 10 minutes of presentation each. i want to be fluid and get moving. let me start with you, frank, by asking -- can you walk us through, from your mind, if the trump-kim summit happens in the good, what is outcome? what is the bad outcome? and what is the really ugly outcome? frank: thank you for the question and for the invitation to be here. i will answer your question and i will briefly set the scene by saying it is important to understand how we got here. we got here because of three strategic changes. the first, president moon jae-in , a progressive, being elected in south korea and reaching out to north korea as a number one agenda item as president.
from may of last year to may of this year, it's his top priority. he is known and trusted by the north. kimsecond big change is jong-un. kim jong-un on has consolidated his powers. he has elevated generals senior ranks that he trusts. and he has also consolidated a limited nuclear deterrent and is feeling much more confident today than he was even 12 months ago. the third main strategic change is trump and his maximum pressure campaign. and he deserves some credit for changing the dynamic on the peninsula. but unless we understand those previous strategic factors we , are at risk of misunderstanding what is driving the whole process. as the distinguished fellow at the mansfield foundation said
about the summit, there was a good bad outcome, a bad bad outcome, and there is a catastrophic outcome. the best we can hope for is what he calls the good bad outcome. the good bad outcome is that the two leaders sit down and agree to the basic principles. denuclearization, peace, hand-in-hand with some kind of a phased reciprocal plan of action. but the end goal will be clear. kim jong-un will promise denuclearization and president trump will promise peace and i think we will get that outcome. i think that we will get the good bad outcome. why is it a bad outcome? because none of the details will be agreed on. not even necessarily what it means. for instance, south korea is a nuclear power country and if we
are going to denuclearize the korean peninsula, do south korea have to up nuclear power? i don't think so. does that mean that north korea is entitled to nuclear power? if so, under what circumstances? the devil is in the details here and that's whether is a risk of a bad bad outcome that would be essentially be the summit breaking down and trump agreeing to maximum pressure and there is the risk of a catastrophic outcome, if the summit breaks down quickly, trump leaves in a uff, and launches a preemptive military strike against north korea a month later. i think we should be aiming for the good bad outcome, setting in motion a process that hopefully won't break down before november of this year. because it can't for political reasons. and it sets in motion a difficult negotiation that will hopefully their fruit. yuki: thanks, frank. looks like south korea may be heavily impacted.
jenny, how could this affect his standing in korea? jenny: obviously -- well, first of all, thanks to the stimson center for taking us in. we are the survivors. obviously, south korea has a lot at stake here. moon jae-in has invested a lot of personal capital in this process as well. as frank said, this is one of his top agenda items, one of the first things he wanted to do, a summit was one of the first things he wanted to do. even before he was elected, it was very much a top priority. he's already had the inter-korean summit with all of that success, they got all the commitments they needed to move the process forward and he has been very successful in dragging the u.s. along and getting trump involved in the process, getting the u.s. and dprk talking directly.
now the problem becomes that in this scheme of things, as much moonve wants -- as much as wants to be in the drivers seat of the process, north korea doesn't necessarily see south korea as an equal partner. now that the u.s. and china are involved, it sort of marginalizes south korea's influence in the process as well because a lot is really going to rise on how those relations move forward. moon sort of gets caught in the middle of that. and i think there is another fear that if it doesn't work out well, there will be huge repercussions for moon jae-in and for his personal reputational capital. because he put so much into this, because he has invested so much money and resources on this as well, to the detriment of the domestic issues. you start to see this as president trump suddenly canceled the singapore summit. you did see the opposition
party, the conservatives, start to come out quickly and hard on moon jae-in, sort of accusing him of wasting time and resources. you will see more of this the heart of the process becomes and the more hardline north korea gets towards south korea in the agenda because it still doesn't solve the domestic issues. especially the younger generation is really going to be pushing for it in terms of jobs and in terms of these political scandals that have been going on so far. at some point in the process, the euphoria of the inter-korean summit will wear off. the novelty of kim and trump being good friends all of a sudden will wear off and when you get into the details and start the actual negotiations on how to implement these commitments, you are going to see a lot of criticism and opposition along the way that is not going to be easy for this
administration to shoulder. yuki: thanks, jenny. a lot of media reports suggest that this is how it has been portrayed. kim jong-un's rhetoric began to shift after he had a couple of meetings in beijing with xi jinping. how does china feel about this now? negotiation's for the summit are back on track? where do they stand? >> i think at this point, china wants to see the escalation happen because it offers some hope for denuclearization. although, like frank has been pointed out, there will likely not be details. if the two leaders could in principle agree to denuclearization, i think china will see that as a bad good outcome. they are having speculations
about what happened during kim visit to chinad on may 7 and may 8. south korea apparently changed their attitude one week later. the speculation is -- what did the chinese tell him? what was put on the table that made the north koreans change their attitude? i think the chinese have a different interpretation of what happened. they definitely the leader model .2 as referred to by john bolton as a key reason for the change of heart by the north koreans. i will stop there. thanks. yuki: finally, japan seems to be the outlier in all of this. there is lots of news reporting about how japan feels marginalized. i think it was in yesterday's voices of america that the prime minister said he may try to have a face-to-face with president trump before the singapore
summit, if it is indeed happening. where do you think japan stands on this? are they really marginalized? or do they have a more quiet and invisible role in all of this? >> mr. abe was the only person -- leader in the world who supported the trump decision to cancel the summit last week. i'm sure that whatever decision trump makes in the future, mr. abe will support. to be honest, i think there is not a small number of japanese arele and experts who concerned about president trump and understand the issues he was talking about. when mr. trump rejected the idea of the so-called libya model in front of mr. john bolton, it appeared he was talking about
bombing against libya rather than libyan denuclearization. i'm not quite clear as to whether he had criticize what the libya model is about. other experts are concerned about the oversimplification of the concept of the libya model. libya had been known to have , andred 22 centrifuges they had attempted to procure a huge number of parts and spare parts. but at the end of the day, they only ended up completing one small cascade that consisted of nine centrifuges only. when it comes to nuclear, we are talking about a country which appearedo have thousands and likely over 10,000
centrifuges for their parts. the scales are totally different. this is only about highly enriched uranium programs. we have plutonium, a range of programs. we have no credible information but they have the capability. when we took the libya model, that reward comes after the so-called cbid, complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament. we were just talking about the scale of nine months, the intensive part of the libyan disarmament process took only throughths from january september of 2004. but in the case of north korea, i'm not aware of any experts who
are expecting to see their intensive parts of disarmament to be completed in less than five years. take morery is it may than five years. maybe president trump may not be there. i'm sure prime minister abe will not be there. how do you assure mr. kim jong-un that we are going to reward you after all in this summit process? i'm sure that my successors and the u.s. congress in the future will call to carry on this commitment. it's a very big pill for mr. kim jong-un to swallow. one thing people completely forget about is i hear so many concerns about north korea's proposal of a step-by-step approach allows north korea to
engage in these salami slice techniques and that we should be concerned about this. i understand that. but there is a significant difference about the situation in north korea today and 10 years ago. today, north korea is wrapped literally in layers of sanctioned regimes. u.s. sanctioned regimes, e.u. sanction regimes and other , regimes. we have so many sanction regimes surrounding north korea. but now currently, we only have the discussion about whether we do nothing until the summit is completed or we give everything up after the total disarmament. this advantage that we did not use them -- have 10
years ago. we have only been talking about two different options. it does not seem to be credible enough. if you are concerned about the salami slice cutting techniques by north korea, we can do the same if we wish with these sanctions. also, the issue is not only korea'sutralizing north existing program and facilities we also have to ensure long-term , monitoring to prevent north korea from using the list resuming -- prevent north korea from resuming the capabilities they have already acquired. , it took almost 20 years to satisfy that south
korea is suddenly committed to nonproliferation. iraq u.s., george bush administration, ran through the iraq survey group which over a experts thousand supported by military and took less than two years only to prove that there was no wmd stockpile existing in iraq. we have to be realistic about the scale we are talking about when we are talking about north korea's program and also the long-term commitment that would be required for us. if we were to lift all sanctions after disarmament, we might expect to see a revival of of iraqnt play
sanctions. we don't want to have -- i mean, the iranian nuclear deal, they complied with the deal. but the trump administration is not happy about the ballistic missile program and other activities with iran, which were incorporating the previous u.n. sanction regimes. the iranrded in nuclear deal. we have to have more long-term comprehensive perspective when we are talking about this. let's be pragmatic. sorry. yuki: that's a really good point. i think it is rare to hear all of this complexity within the sanction regime that we just kind of categorically use. the time span he is talking about, it looks like the only
technically able to commit to such a long-term process is president xi jinping, because he doesn't have to worry about election and given what happened in china last year, you know, my question to you is do you think that president xi jinping would be comfortable supporting such a complex denuclearization program that is long-term? even if it is step-by-step? talking about the lifting of days sanctions as north korea does abc's through the d-? do you think that china is ready to support something comprehensive and long-term like that? when it comes to if it means that it will provide the stability which i think you will
china's strategic interests. sun: the question is, china has three proclaimed goals coming to nuclear issues. peace, stability, denuclearization. if i don't really want these three goals, china should support it because they will be d and it will be see full. i think that the issue here for china is not just a technical issue about what it will look like. without the political agreements associated with denuclearization, as frank talked about, the peace regime or peace treaty or peace mechanism, what role would china play? any declaration, it mentioned a trilateral mechanism or a mechanism that includes china. for china, trilateral is not an option.
quadrilateral is the only option. any deal that excludes china will not be welcome or supported by beijing. i think the politics are key here. yuki: in light of that, and given the complexity and long-term nature of the sanction, our president and the south korean president seem to have a shorter tenure in office. i guess for a lack of better words, do you think that both leaders, when they talk about this denuclearization of north korea, is this something that they are thinking they are heading into? something that is this complex, that takes this long a time, and even then at the end of the road we could see what happened with the agreed framework when
the north korean program was more limited in scale. we thought that we got there in terms of dismantlement of that program or freeze of that program, if you will, but only about 10 years ago, it popped back up. there's always that point for south korea. jenny: i would speak for the u.s. side first. i think the biggest problem is when america thinks about this issue, they think about it in their simplest of terms of we can buy off north korea, not wanting it to last long or putting a lot of effort into it, and we have narrowed the north korean choices down to the point where they have no other choice but to deal with us if they want to survive sort of thing. this is completely the wrong approach. when we talk about either korea, a lot of times we couch it in big power politics and not
actually -- and really discounting the actual strategic interest of the koreas themselves. when northorea i approaching this process it isn't just about , denuclearization or just about weapons are sanctions. you cannot just buy them off because they do not trust the u.s. they have seen the cycles run, they have seen deals fall apart as far back as the agreed framework that was working that could have been renegotiated at a time when it could have made thempact, to as recently as iran deal. even if it is a multilateral agreement that is proven to be working, the u.s. can still walk away. when north korea approaches this process they are looking more , for a fundamental change in the political relationship and that part of denuclearization is not just getting quick rewards. security guarantees mean nothing on paper in an agreement until
they have had time to be played out and have a consistent pattern over time and to show that this is a fundamentally different political relationship in order to take those bigger steps of actually dealing with the core of their backup plan, their nuclear deterrent. i think that when south korea approaches this, moon has five years. we don't know who the next president is going to be. we have all seen how drastically the policy can change from one administration to the next. it would be difficult for north korea to believe that whatever happens in this administration can last with the next administration as well, unless moon starts to work on gaining that political buy-in from the opposition party and south korea, which so far he has spent no time on and has actually silence so itof second
looks like there is greater buy-in than what there is. there are fundamental problems that will make denuclearization even more complicated because north korea also knows the dynamics of this and will hedge in that direction. frank: building on excellent and katsu asnny well. there's a practical problem and a political problem. a fantastic estimate out of stanford estimates between five and 15 years for denuclearization to be accomplished in north korea. i think it is a very realistic estimate. plutoniumore about than any other person on the planet. it is a very carefully done study. they are saying 15 years for denuclearization. so the bolton, libya model is
completely unrealistic. as north korea, the problem is kim jong-un's span in office he hopes is 40 years. trump only has -- trump is counting on three terms after humans the constitution. [laughter] but trump will not see this through. moon jae-in is not going to see this through. in the united states, we have to either embrace a declaratory policy that puts us on a path towards denuclearization or reject it because of the timeline which is too long and yet is the only realistic timeline available to us. given that choice, i think president trump will make the pragmatic choice.
ithink you will accept -- think he will accept a declaratory piece. i'm betting he is not a policy wonk. trump thinks the wall is already built with mexico. when he comes back from singapore he will come back and , say denuclearization has been accomplished even if they don't have inspectors on the ground yet. and congress will not do anything. they do not want a war with north korea. they want a peace process. if trump gives them a credible row forward, they will jump at it. that is the good news. the bad news is all of the difficulties of getting the job done are going to remain in front of us. and thank goodness for the deep state has we have some really and some really
talented civil servants who will do some hard work and begin to unravel the sanctions. that is the optimistic scenario. today is tuesday. i'm supposed to be a pessimist on tuesdays, but i'm feeling more optimistic. yuki: thank you. what is striking is there a steep practical challenge, but each country has their own political dimensions to it. in software, how the opposition in south korea, how the opposition will react and how it might affect the next administration. for the u.s., we don't have to argue too much because it has been out there. but even for china what works
for the problem might be a different thing. so when it comes to japan, japan also has its own political problem when it comes to trying to play any role for this, what is bound to be a multinational scheme. if you are the national security e,visor to prime minister ab ?hat would your advice to him the clock is ticking on his time in office already. what would you advise him to do to make japan stay relevant? japan is likeor
the u.s. hostage situation in iran in the 1970's. hostage situation could really invoke complex national feelings which is still a center of japan's policy towards north korea today. speaking, wely have to have reasonably peaceful situation on the korean peninsula before we have the tokyo olympic games in the year 2020. position of south korea today is exactly that of japan two years afterwards. frankly, i see no way to have a clear pathway other than having
diplomatic interactions improving relations with north korea because the previous on making breakthroughs involves diplomacy. total solution may take as long d. cbi stated, the countries have to be able to trust. it did not exist until last week. maybe not today as well. it takes time to build trust. let me cite the lessons learned experience inn
.he words of the negotiator keyambassador listed lessons learned, which included saving face for colonel qaddafi and creating a win-win situation. appears to bedafi forced into abandoning the program, that would totally destroy his political base and endanger libyan politics as a whole. this was one of the key lessons learned from libya. look at what we are doing to north korea. between leaders, threatening the use of force
against north korea. moment leaders make such a state, it should not be called the libyan model because it is different. trust building really matters. as frank stated, the details matter. trust, we have to at some point start lifting sanctions. the problem is north korea uses commercial products for the nuclear program. so how can we effectively maintain meaningful control and regulate the flow of commodities that would not be diverted to north korea's program but ensuring korea's economic growth? this is going to be the challenge.
yuki: very good if iis ok for point. everyone, i would like to open the floor for questions. first question goes to chris. can you wait until the microphone gets to you? >> great discussion and releases the--succinct which really helps. i love the way frank organized the win-win and all that stuff. i find myself wondering at what point and is it the role of the u.s. or a moon issue to say i cannot do anything with you as long as you say armed unification of the peninsula is the agenda.
how can we give you a peace treaty if you cannot give us one? is that something that needs to be frontloaded or is that one of you phased in when you built in more trust? we get really upset with how the iran thing is handled. but every time you get really upset, one of the ayatollahs which just will die cuts everyone off at the knees. as far as dealing with the iranians. am i too far ahead of things or is that something that needs to be more clearly articulated upfront? that gets us into all the things we say we are afraid trump will ignore. yuki: jenny? jenny: i think the problem here is both sides have this
commitment to peace regime and even talking about peaceful unification. i think they have both sort of given that insurance. the problem is i don't think anyone believes it. i think it is too early to have those assurances when there is no trust. the declaration prior to that. they were threatening each other back and forth. so you can't change that political reality overnight. in the declaration, i think that is the starting point to start to work on these issues whether in a trilateral or carter quadrilateral format. those will have to be addressed. but just to have them on paper is not going to have much meaning. >> i was trained as a military analyst when i began my career at the state department. capabilities matter more than
intentions. i think the declaration provides sufficient political assurances from north korea that they do not intend war with south korea. but what matters is the capabilities. we will not see any dominion luring capabilities for the north or south. the other good news is the south koreans have a strong u.s. ally at their back. so i'm not worried about the north koreans having to disarm as a prerequisite for peacemaking. i think it is an unrealistic expectation. i think there will need to be some sort of peace declaration and peters regime/-- peace regime declared early in the process. you cannot practically end the korean war without china's support.
crucial providing security assurances to north korea that gives north korea the confidence to proceed on peace with the south. i don't think we should worry theirthe north revising documents to forswear unification of the south. i think as a practical matter, it is already off the table. >> thanks for the panel. i wanted to follow-up as a sanctions experts and ask about your impression of the maximum pressure campaign. a big part of that were the security council resolutions in it seems like maximum pressure 2017. is off.
the second we had the korean things were flowing for reunification. they are not in the mood for pushing the sanctions further. first of all, do you think they international sanctions were being effective? did they have any time to set in? and also, can you reinvigorate summit does not produce what it could? >> in my assessment, i think the sanctions have had some effect encouraging north korea towards dialogue. but i don't think sanctions played a decisive role because of two reasons. when people talk about the effectiveness of sanctions,
i think there are two different parameters of judgment. one is its impact on the north korean economy as a whole. theoretically, north korea was prohibited from 90% of its trade as a result of the series of u.s. and you and sanctions. -- as a result of the series of u.s. and e.u. sanctions. having said that, several have reported on the price of gasoline or other key commodities. despite sporadic spikes up and down in key commodity price overall for the previous one year, it is stable.
i don't know why, but it is stable. currency exchange rate, again it is stable. i cannot find quantified evidence to show critical impact brought by sanctions on the north korean economy yet. we heavily rely on china to implement sanctions. previously, we focused on implementing smart sanctions against north korea. smart sanctions are about the target sanctions. target the people, goods, and services related to wmd.
north korea was smarter than the international community. smart toot so implement the sanctions. this is the reality. pipe inagine a huge which lots of economic activities funnel through to the external world. the pipe has many loopholes. goods andhere, many funds are diverted to wmd programs. there are so many loopholes. because china is constraining the entire flow, so the amount of water leaked appears to be small, but once the flow levels return to the previous volume, we will have the same problems.
north korea are agents connecting to the wmd programs or illegal procurement activities. they are still there around the world. living inan nationals a luxury apartment in kuala lumpur. they are still there. i don't know why. korean agent possessing a cambodian passport and traveling around the world. and no government stops these people's activities effectively. dialogue, it the has never been good at implementing effective sanctions. so this relates to the future of the north korean regime. it is not only about north korea. control the risk of
for theg technologies wmd program? no country in the world has been good. ofee no good examples addressing this challenge. this is going to be an issue. >> the professor had a question. >> this is basically for frank. says you mr. kim cannot guarantee a post-trump , that the united states would continue with the agreement. states would continue with the agreement. if he says he needs something from congress which would guarantee a continuance in the given the human rights situation in north korea, would congress agree? >> wow. on thed for 15 years
staff of the senate foreign relations committee and they worked closely with senator brownback to draft the north korean human rights act. worked international, i to shine a spotlight on north korea's human rights abuses. it is an issue i care deeply about personally. may be one of those "only nixon can go to china" moments with respect to trump and a north korea deal. i think it would be inconceivable that a republican-controlled congress would approve any deal that obama could have negotiated with north korea for precisely the human rights issues and other issues you have raised. but i think with trump in control of the white house, they can with republicans in control of the house and senate, that they will set aside those
concerns if president trump asked them to. as a democrat, i can either choose to whine about the unfairness of that, or as an american i can celebrate the fact that the united states and north korea might be able to put themselves on a path towards peace. which is the only path that can eventually lead to improvements in north korea's human rights situation to begin with. i think we need to keep our eyes on the objective. nothing about north korean human rights will improve in an adversarial relationship with south korea and the united states. i cannot predict what this congress will do, but i hope they will see these are not mutually exclusive outcomes and it is arguably the best way to try to make progress on human rights in north korea. i have been told that by north saidn officials who have
kissinger did not go to beijing thelecture mao about revolution. he me a strategic opening. and addressed human rights issues later. frankly, i wish nixon would have mentioned there were 30 million in prisons when he visited but , he didn't, but i think trump will probably finesse this issue with congress. jenny: i can't imagine that the north koreans would even ask for a congressional mandate. realistically, that is what they will build into the deal itself. that is why having a short-term deal is unrealistic because they will want to build in assurances over time. it is not just about congress, but the administration as well. as we have seen with president trump pulling out of the iran deal, it is not a congressional
decision. it is an executive decision. that is not necessarily who the north koreans would target in this kind of deal. it would be the terms of the deal and the details. it seems the dynamic has changed but the fundamental , question we have to ask ourselves has not changed. do we tolerate north korea as a nuclear power or not? my feeling is not. it is too dangerous given their proliferation for one thing, but the dynamic has changed. we have seen this before where we are going to have talks. in 30 years in the state department, i saw this many times. we start focusing on how to continue the dialogue rather than our strategic objective to
get rid of the weapons of mass destruction programs. my question for the panel is, do you really believe that kim jong-un woke up one day and said i have to get rid of this for the future or is he just buying time as we have seen before? you said the good outcome is we do not define denuclearization, at the summit. but if he is really buying time, is that a good outcome? i don't think so. you said the bad outcome is we go to the meeting and trump says no deal because you guys don't agree to concrete action before we remove sanctions so we go back to maximum pressure. if he is really buying time is , that a bad outcome? on the issue of japan being marginalized, people are
overlooking some things. japan played a key role in getting these sanctions put in place. japan was playing a much bigger role than most people realize because they can now because they can do collective self-defense trade things like escorting b-52 bombers, the north koreans and the chinese know this. they see this. that is my question. >> a great question. can we tolerate them or not? we have been tolerating north korea as a nuclear weapons state for 12 years, so clearly the answer is yes, we can tolerate them. i respect the question. but i think there is another question. we have dialogue or else what? what is the alternative. the sanctions regime has not led
to a fuel price spike or a shutdown of the north korean economy. the north korean economy is growing in the face of these sanctions. unfortunately, the "or else supportestion drives my for a flawed engagement process that will allow north korea to sustain some level of human diet -- wmd activities for years. i don't expect that trump will be able to negotiate a deal as good as the iran deal. the iranians gave up 95% of their highly enriched uranium up front. does anyone think donald trump could negotiate a deal that good with north korea? i doubt it. i doubt it very much, so i wish
we had a better outcome, but i don't see a good choice. we are choosing among bad choices. >> there is a second part to kevin's first question. morning?ake up one has said he woke up one morning thinking i can trade my nukes for the economic assistance and the peace treaty i want. nukes ast i can use my collateral to get economic stuff that i want. jenny is shaking her head and i think she is right. spencer and that crowd are
telling me this guy is different, we are going to make the deal. i was taught if i don't know the answer to a question, i should say i don't know. i don't know. i think the problem is, what is the nature of the dialogue or can we tolerate that or not? the question is has the u.s. tried to address the core issues to get north korea to be in a space where they felt they could give up their nuclear weapons? that has never really happened. we keep going back to this, we assuming theyff, don't have larger strategic interests in this. that has always been the problem. when we approach the deal, we don't have the patience to get the 90% upfront because that
took 12 years to negotiate. we want this to be quick. we don't want to spend a lot of time on it. we don't really care what they think because we project on them what we think they want in the process. we know they are poor, they have limited access to resources. we assume a lot of things about them and there is probably some truth to it, but in the meantime, the north koreans talk about the core issues. it is not just on paper a security guarantee saying you will not attack us but it is a , broader, political relationship. they want the legitimacy, assurances, sort of normal relations. and the question is are we , willing to give them that in order for them to denuclearize? and i think that has always been tension between these arguments. we are not willing to go there,
but those are there strategic interests. >> we have a minute or two left. let me get a question and go back to the panelists for their final words. >> i'm an independent consultant and recent refugee from the state department. my concern is that the trump administration and president trump himself will lose interest in these negotiations if there are not big achievements between now and the midterm elections. if that happens, who is going to continue with this process once the president has let the genie out of the bottle and met with president kim jong-un? the second thing that keeps me up at night is, i don't think the u.s. and china share the
same perspective of what negotiations with north korea should actually entail. i don't think they don't have the same understanding of what the elements of a peaceful nuclear program in north korea would be. so how do we arrive at that kind of understanding with the chinese? >> i will say that, in the unlikely event president trump removes himself completely from the dprk issue after the summit, we should count ourselves blessed. [laughter] >> her second question was about the u.s. and china having different goals when it comes to the negotiations. >> i think you are right. the u.s. and china do not share the same definition or the same perspective on the future of the korean peninsula. when the chinese talk about the denuclearization of the korean peninsula, they are not talking
about the denuclearization of north korea per se. questions about what that would constitute. the other question is what is going to happen to the u.s.-south korean military alliance? the south koreans have a peace treaty with the united states, so that is one issue. the other issue is that we hear a lot about this linkage that china is making, the linkage between broader, u.s.-china relations and linkage to what china's position on korea really is. i see that on both sides. a year ago, president trump's position was that, if china cooperates with us on south korea, the trade deal they are going to get is going to be much better. guess what? one year later, it's not much better. unappreciatedel that china did deliver on north
korea. as the trade deal is as bad you can imagine. i think there is a transactional issue here both sides are butaiting to talk about, that is there. >> let me go back to you for whatever the final thoughts are, that you were dying to say today. >> i think i said a lot. i think we are in a space now where a lot of the media is focused on will he or won't he in terms of the summit itself. i think the bigger question should be, are we close to having this understanding on the substance, rather than just on the pomp and circumstance. , as much as he has been instrumental in starting trying to encourage the process too much has put too much pressure on it and backed us into a corner.
and by raising the expectations and by cozying up to trump and playing to his ego, i think for is and we need to tamp down expectations if we have a summit, what it can accomplish and we do have the framework of a deal and outlines, not just to have it to be historic. >> i will have my flip answer. summit has happened bottoms to talk, and it is backwards of the normal summit. you are going to have the top leaders meet. normally, you would have careful preparation to the top. what needs to happen at the end of the summit and to have it filter back down is so details can be worked out, not by trump
but by competent people to do the job. i would hope that the administration would therefore have the patience necessary to see through the tough work that will be ahead and i agree with what jenny said. the united states in this situation -- we have an chol coming,ith the most senior person to come to d.c. since 18 years ago. and that clinton agreement remains to this day the preferred north korean state of relations between the u.s. and north korea. i would urge people to read it, but that joint statement lays out the totality of what north korea is trying to accomplish this round. leade that the visit will
to something comparable to the joint statement or if they will not make a joint statement but that is what i think we should aim for. caller since you traveled all the way -- >> since you traveled all the way from japan for this, i will give you the last word. >> thank you. north korea was not supposed to be the most important charge. the most significant charge relates to china because china is trying to realize the international rule. originally, we were not supposed to spend so many resources on north korea and the nuclear capabilities -- capabilities increase. the cost japan has to invest in
upgrading the system is in span -- expanding, which is sucking up our resources. wayave to find a reasonable the programs before is notus on china neglected. we need space to cope with china. regard, i am always concerned about u.s. government. it occurs to me the u.s. involvedt is always with iran more than north korea. myself and my colleagues are really happy because of the
nuclear deal. now, the obama administration will focus on north korea. once again, you are opening up this iran nuclear deal. realityhat operational on the ground in influencing sanctions, you have resource allocated for iran and north korea, and they are frail relationships. i hope u.s. government will continue to pay attention to north korea so it is not going to be a much bigger program in the future. >> thank you. you notice the banner, and everybody, whenever the banner toup, everyone is used seeing that and they want to change things up. they run the crisis simulation three times a year. they picked up the north korea scenario, and it was interesting
to see the panelists. all the scenarios played out. i cannot get into details, but cussed -- but it was a critical role to force -- the shape that game. it is fascinating that all of these points made by the panelists, they all came up in one shape or form. even if everybody that plays the game is japanese, the minute you assign them to the team, within the minutes, they assume personality of the country they are assigned to. it is fascinating. i would also like see igs -- i would also like you to share your thoughts. we thought he was the best person to do so because it is north korea. and like i said during the session, we often do not get these technical difficulties. i don't think we give enough appreciation to that, said thank you for traveling all the way and thank you to our remaining
>> north korean officials were at the white house yesterday to deliver a letter to trump from the north korean leader. president trump told reporters the june 12 summit was back on after they left the white house. president trump: we will be meeting on june 12 in singapore. it went very well. it is a get to know you situation. doing this.wo days we have gotten to know their people very well, and we will have to travel to singapore because we will be there june 12. i think it will be a process. i never says it goes in one meeting. i think it will be a process.
the relationships are building and that is positive. >> the visit from a north korean official is the first in two decades. president trump said they did not talk about human rights, but he probably will during the upcoming meeting with the north korean leader. the president said current sanctions in north korea would remain in place for now. >> this weekend on c-span, tonight at 9:30 p.m. eastern, the weekly standard's political summit in colorado springs with a debate on president trump's foreign and domestic policies. sunday at 9:00 p.m., former u.s. attorney general eric holder at the politics and eggs events. on c-span2, saturday at 9:00 p.m. eastern, a syndicated novelist and a republican trump'sst on president
swing state voters and how they could impact future elections. shortly after 11:00 p.m. sunday, an author discusses his book "the flying tigers: the untold story of the american pilots who waged a secret war against japan." on american history tv, c-span3, saturday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on the civil war, the 150th anniversary of the ratification of the 14th amendment to it clemson university history professor orville burton. onday, 6:30 p.m. eastern, oral histories, dennis haynes talks about experiences and long recovery during the vietnam war. watch the c-span networks this weekend. sunday on "q&a," patricia o'toole discusses her book "the moralists." >> there is a huge psychological literature on wilson. i read it, but i had the sense
it just reduced him to tangles and things like that that i did not feel i could deal with on the strength of my own knowledge of the theory. his father, you know, some people have said his stubbornness in later life was the reaction to his father strictness, -- his father's strictness, and they point to one story where his father made he wrote asomething bunch of times. suppositions are wilson resented this, but he was a good boy and put up with it. when you read every mention in letters of his father, they are worshipful. he never had an unkind word to say. >> presbyterian minister. >> presbyterian minister. >> sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's "q&a." ♪ journal"'s "washington
live every day with policy issues that impact to. morning, a harvard law professor on his new book "to end the presidency: the power of impeachment," which examines the history of impeachment. and anthony scare mucci, former communications director talks about the trump administration. watch c-span's "washington journal," live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on sunday morning. join the discussion. the senate is back on monday to debate president trump's judicial nominations for u.s. district court in kentucky, texas, and alabama. the house returns tuesday to work on 2019 federal spending bills, funding energy, the va, and house operations, and work on water infrastructure
projects. you can watch live coverage on c-span, the senate on c-span2. next, they look at the impact with thee immigration mayor of dallas, and a former u.s. trade representative. the discussion was held that strategic for international studies. it is about two hours and 15 minutes. started.get i am dan runde. i hold a share here at csis. we had a bipartisan task force, a diverse group focused on also said perspectives in the united states on this issue. we are pleased with the result. i am particularly grateful to