tv U.S.- North Korea Relations Panel 1 CSPAN June 6, 2018 10:29am-11:58am EDT
bill clinton. watch the r.f.k. 50th memorial service at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2, c-span.org, or listen n the free c-span radio app. >> president trump is planning to hold a summit with north korean leader kim jong un next week in singapore. the heritage foundation in washington hosted korea experts suit. t they feltbe outcome of 1 this is an hour and a half. >> well, welcome. first, if you got a phone, if you could turn it off or turn it to vibrate just so we don't get an interruption in the middle. the event today is the u.s.-north korea summit cancelled or postponed so i guess we got it right. although over the weekend one of the panelists contacted me and said, well, now that trump has officially said we're back on, should we change the title?
it's like, well, it will probablyhange two or three times, you know, before the -- our evenen. but actually there is a bit of a story behind the ent. when i finally lined up the six panelists, the first three and then we have a second panel focusing particularly on japan, i hadn't gotten around to g ou the notification flyer so i came in one morning. i was like, all right. i will do nothing else this morning but get that flyer out. just the summit, what's going to happen, what are the implications of the summit, and i get interrupted by a phone call and it's like i just want to get this flyer out. i ok, cnn, yeah. i can do an interview. 20 minutes, sure. on what? what cancellation? i was like, no! and then all of us were running around that day doing interviews. that night i just thought, all right. rather than really being behind the curve on a let's talk about
the summit, why don we still have the event but it will be -- we'll change the title to, f a are the implications cancelled summit. and then that way instead of looking like i'messly behind in getting the event flyer out i am looking brilliant in that i got six panelists about the cancelled summit. as we're editying the flyers someone said, just in case it does come back, why don't we fudge you on the title so we're good either way. that's a bit of the background how we got this brilliantly done title on this flyer. anyway, it's a pleasure to have three expert colleagues and friends today to talk about the u.s.-north korea summit and then we're going to follow with three other expert analysts about the japan aspect. to do a quick intro and you recognize all the panelists because they're on tv so often, but a visiting senior research
fellow at the peninsula fellow which is a think tank in seoul and previous an associate at the gash gee endowment for international peace. dr. yun is the korea foundation professor and assistant professor at the fletcher school of tusk university and formerly he was a research fellow with the national research program. and dr. terry is now a senior fellow for korea at the center for strategic and international studies. before that she had a long career in the intelligence community or with the u.s. government she was the director for korea, japan, and oceanic affairs at the national security council. she was deputy national intelligence officer for east asia at the tional intelligence council and then she was an analyst on korean issues at c.i.a. so with that i am going to move chairs here. and i think yun, we will have
you go first and then we'll draw straws to see who the next panelist is. so each of them will sort of talk about their views of the upcoming summit. sort of do we have hope or concern as well as some recommendations for what we hope to see come out of the mmit b reall i tnk ere's just a lot of confusion. and then we may do some cross-panel discussion or i may ask some questions and then we'll throw it open to the audience. yun, do you want to art? 10, ok? >> thank you very much, bruce, and thank you for this opportunity and than ladies and gentlemen, for taking the time out of your buedule to be here. the last time that a u.s. president geared up, prepared for a summit meeting with his north korean counterpart, great dividends, great things accrued for north korea.
kim jong un came out of his shell and engaged the world lining up the orld's biggest powers. he went from a reclusive, funny looking dictator to a legitimate, reasonable global statesman wi whom the world could do business. what kind of business? nuclear negotiations. and kim jong un set a new standard for international hakedown, extortion. in may, 200, kimong un made his first foreign visit as a national leader. where did he go? beijing, obvus why? because about a fort night he had a very important summit coming up with south korean
president. after having pocketed $500 million, that's half a billion dollars in cash, secretly wire transferred by the south korean government to come junge un's he t personal accounts, received vladimir putin. it was the first-ever visit by the top leader of russia or the former soviet union. now, after having softened up china, south korea and russia, then kim turned his gaze on the since the es and first time u.s.-north korea relations with special envoy to the white house. he came to the white house on october 10, met with president clinton and delivered a pe letr to clion from his bossnv cnton to come to pyongyang.
just 12 days later secretary tate maled linh albright was hosting kim jong un watching the spectacle games seated next to kim jong il. many don't remember that bill clinton was keen on making that historic trip as unprepared and ushed as he was. that impulse is very strong today in the white house in the trump administration, i would say, and the only reason that visit by clinton never materialized was due to the uncertainty, the fiasco in the wake of the november 7 presidential election. vote recount between al gore and george w. bush.
he conceded defeat. president clinton had not given up hope on a historic moment in pyongyang. in recent days president trump said to take his time on denuclearization. there is a wonderfong by red velvet called "take it slow" and it's a love song and somewhat reminiscent to that ethos. take your time. president trump also said he believes that north korea can change, reform its economy under the stewardship of kim jong un. history suggests otherwise. we see still of course a persisting tendency on the part , americans to underestimate patronize to north korean leaders and the reasons are quite obvious. because they are so weird. but north korea has been
weaponizing its own weirdness since the early 1970's under thetewardip of the founder. n 1972 as the mood dramatically changed in the egion, in the aftermath of the opium rush between u.s. and china, they called on american journalists and reporters to come see him. in may, when two "new york times" reporter sat down with kim, he and a month later he gave an interview to "the washington post" and kim received harvard law professor, jeme cohen. to all three parties he said u.s. troops should leave, yes, that they are a hindrance to genuine peace and unification the korean people
themselves. and that japan was remilitaryizing, set on making south korea and northcallya an economic collie. well, what does he seek today after having affected what is in my view the most dramatic image makeover in history? in just a few months, kim has gone from man yak, mad man -- this is what president trump called kim in the past. rocket man on a suicide mission to in recent weeks very honorable man, very smart and very gracious. that's what trump has said of kim. pompeo has said of kim that kim was very well prepared and personalable. back in the old days one said of the father, kim jong il, he's very smart, capable,
supremely confident and not a lunatic. here's the point -- whenever americans meet with the north koreans -- and this is true of south koreans and others -- they come away impressed that the north korean dictor is not only not a raving lunatic but actually quite reasonable. kind ofraous. self-efacing. has a sense of humor. at times they even say strangely pleasing things like, oh, we understand that the u.s. troops will have to leave but they do play a stabilizing role so we're not calling for their immediate withdraw. and then americans come away totally impressed, uniformerly certain in the belief that they have made some kind of deep emotional connection with the north korean dictator by their own charisma, intelligence, empathy that they can now trust him. what kim jong un seeks is a protracted negotiation process,
not a final agreement, not an agreed resolution. with which to buy time and ney to perfect his own nuclear posture review. this is more rambo 4 than the first installment, "first blood" which was kind of fresh, creative and critically acclaimed but by the time you've seen the fourth installment you have a good idea how the movie will end and not end. time after time, u.s. administrations fall for this trap. why? because north korea is dangling before the international community, the want liesing prospect, possibility of denuclearization. so i believe it was president trump's first mistake to agree to the proposition for a date by kim back in march and i think president trump is rushing into this meeting. so in closing, how to salvage
this very ominous situation? well, the two men will meet in singapore next week. at the meeting suggest, i would suggest that president trump needs to use the law, u.s. law as lever instead o political drama. whaty that? klinger knows very well and many of you, the terms for the gradual suspension and ultimate termination of u.s. sanctions against north korea are codified into law. sections 401 and 402 of the north korea sanctions and policy enhancement act of 2016. president trump should tell mr. kim the truth. no one is above the law in the united states. my hands are tied. until you release political prisoners and until you take meaningful steps toward the denuclearization of not only your nuclear programs but as it
is stipulated in those sections, your chemical and biological weapons programs is an i can't even suspend sanctions for one year until you stop counterfeiting our currency, engaging in proliferation and money laundering activities and until you abide by the norms of international society, community, as an aipient nation and allow for some basic transparen monitoring. so this is the truth and furthermore, i call on you, mr. kim, to tear down the walls of your inhumane gulags. until you do that, there's not much i can do. have ae day. what kim will call for is continual sequelization of this very basic two-act play, provocation and postprovocation
peace ploy. he will call for follow-up summits because, as everyone knows, when youre courting somebodyyo su lee open the possibility or even when you are being courted yourself, yeave on usually the possibility of another meeting even if the first date doesn't work out very well. soim will say, come to pyongyang. kim will say even strange likes, i am aminnable to this in thees uni one year, maybe next year, speak at the u.n. general assembly. and mr. trump, president trump will be engaged, interested by that possibility of continual dialogue. i believe this is a trap. it's not going to work out. but if mr. trump, president trump can muster up the courage to tell kim the truth, then that will be a summit, that will be political drama worth the visit. thank you. bruce: good. thanks very much. just a little more background on the gevt government meetings
that wereurri -- the government meetings that were occurring before it was decided clinton would not go to pyongyang, i was attending the white hous it's called the plus one. i was the assistant or the bag holder, note holder for the d.c.i. and other c.i.a. officials for meetings at the white house talking about north korea. and after north korea invited president clinton to go in 2000, some in the clinton administration were saying, well, we should do this. the force of bill's personality is so strong that if we just get him alone in a room with kim jong il we will get everything we want and we will save nine months working its way up through bureaucracies. but the majority view was in my view wisely against that. and it was predicaon ccs in meetings between u.s. and north korean officials where they were talking about a potential missile deal.
and they were saying, send your president to pyongyang, he will be happy and officials said, no, that's not how it works. we don't deploy a president to do a grip and grim photo. we don't deploy a president to negotiate. we only deploy until we know what's on the paperwork. and the north koreans were not defining the parameters of the deal. the decision was not to the president. it's quite different now where we will have a top-down proach. trump is seeing himself as a negotiator in chief. it's quite a different situation from what it was in 2000. just a little bit more background. and i do think the uncertainty of the election kind of added, over w, kind of a cloud the decision. the name -- main reason was the north korea wouldn't be forthcoming what the missile parameters would be. contrary over the to secretary of state
albright's auto biography, we wereot this close to macele agreement. we were that far apart. duyeon, you look like you have more on your paper than suh so go ahead. duyeon: thanks, bruce, and the heritage foundation, for having us. thank you for being with us today. very timely events. 's always hard to go after sung-yoon. to answer some othe questions that bruce laid out, and i will be as brief as possible. the first is i think the summit will be successful because trump will define it as success. will he package and sell it to his constituents as such and it will not matter what we, the experts, or all of you in the the nce, how we view actual text that comes out of the upcoming summit. it's pretty clear that there's a strong inclination by both leaders to have the actual text that a good show, a good p.r. opportunity.
and this is where it gets risky and dangerous and this is where my concern is is that the two leaders, especially trump, would want to declare peace because it sounds good and it's historic and uredentedt the problem is even if you declare peace it doesn't mean peace is suddenly on the korean peninsula and you need to declare peace with a nuclear korea. also, we, you know, president trump clearly is unconventional. so we need to -- the reality is we need to work with what we have and try to make the best of what we have. so becserump has all conventional diplomatic orthodoxy, i don't think we will expect president trump to be or try to mold him into a typical lead negotiator to a typical international nuclear deal. he's operating like a typical business tycoon who likes to meet his counterpart first,
maybe play golf, chitchat, then make a move for a deal sometime later. we may see something. we may not. it's true when predent trump says it like that. we just don't know yet. but because he is unconventional, i think we need to have some unconventional thinking for ourselves. and i would offer and i would suggest that a good outcome, even if this is going to be a show, which it will be, it's still a very rare and unique opportunity, good opportunity for a sitting american t tre clarify from a kim leader himself key concepts and fundamental concepts like what is a denuclearization, what does kim jong un want, exactly what type of security guarantees does he what, what kind of format? this is a good opportunity that president trump needs to seize and take advantage of. i think a good outcome would be to, you know, i would love to ee a very detailed nuclear
deal with verification, barters, give and take, but i with a ually be happy joint vision statement that lays out key principles and goal and the end state picture for the two sides and build pathways for the experts, for negotiators to then go in and negotiate the details and implementation. and so key -- a joint vision statement would include vious components that we've seen in the past and that we know are still issues today and clearly would have to be a commitment to denuclearization. it would have to include even a peace regime. include normalization of relations and other intertwined regional issues. of course try to as such a peaceful resolution to all these issues. what president trump should not do at this time clearly is he should not aim for a peace
treaty before denuclearizn rea but kim jong un, his game plan will try to go the peace route. that's another way to get to loosening sanctions another route to rid u.s. forces from the peninsula and eventually break the u.s.-south korea alliance. a lot of these negotiations he doesn't have to go in head on and demand president trump get rid ofhe troops. he d t wayndhat wais the peace process. of course, president trump should not treat away u.s. -- trade away u.s. forces for north korea's nuclear weapons. i'll just lay those points out for further discussion later and hand it over to suh mi. suh mi: thank you. both of you did an excellent job.
lee recommends what president trump should do. no one is above the law. include him issues, counterf, moy lang, l of this. i agree with him. the problem is we're dealing with president trump. no one, i won't go there. so we have to deal with the reality of what we have. i don't know if president trump is going to even -- this is a president that didn't raise human rights issues when kim jong un came. he didn't raise it at all. i'm concerned that this is -- it's an ideal goal it's not going to happen. it's interesting, there is a competing narrative that's out there. you might say that kim jong un is different. we've heard this argument made that somehow he's different from his father, he's different from his grandfather. a lot of things that professor
lee talked about happened with kim jong il. it's not reallyong . i am not sayinree g agth this assessment. i am giving another narrative that's out there that kim jong un is a young man has to le for the next 30 to 40 years. he doesn't want to rule a poor or backward state. he cares what the world thinks of him. this is why when he came in, he gets -- he wants to be a modern leader of a modern country, that he actually wants to reform and do different things so we'll have a fundamentally different relationship with the united states so that potentially there might be -- he could actually put nuclear weapons on the table. i will sort get into why i don't think that's necessary. iving it out there what hat. another narrative is out there on kim jong un. the problem is for all the reasons that duyeon laid out, i am concerned -- first of all, before even getting into this
summit, i think north korea already has gained. kim jong un has been playing this really, really well. i have to give him credit. after almost seven years of spending all that time just really accelerating towards trying to complete the nuclear program, he stops right before he has to -- he didn't go all the way. there's a couple more hurdles that he has to cross to complete the program, but he quits right before and says hes a completed the program. then you see him engage in the last few months of diplomacy. that has gotten him a lot. he had a complete image makeover already. he got to meet with president meings twice with president moon, has hosted russian foreign minister. now he does appear like a normal person of a normal country. he is popular in south korea. some groups are saying, he looks like a nice guy, normal guy at least. he had this makeover.
d i'm concerned that all the maximum pressure we are talking about, it's already -- it's hard to achieve because we are already seeing, we're hearing reports of in china not really implementing sanctions. there are reports a seafood, north korean seafood in border areas of china. there are surface-to-surface transport of fuel. i am already concerned there's relaxation in terms of implementation of sanctions. you are probably going to see that from russia, china. and even south korea. regardless how this meeting goes with president trump, there will be already some activity nothing south korea will pursue activities that wie in violation of united nations security council resolutions or sanctions. there will be more movement. kim jong un has already gained. now by prutch just agreeing to sit down with him, we have
given him the -- so north korea is actually much better off today than it was just even a few months ago in november, olast now, in terms of what to expect frhe summit and what a successful outcome will look like, i agree withuyeon completely. whatever we see, they're both going to spin it as a success. i don see them -- the summit failing to the degree that will be some drama and kim jong un walking out or president trump walking out. they have invested in spinning this summit as some sort of success. but he's set himself a high bar. he called the iran deal worse than ever, insane, an embarrassment. when you look at the iran deal, they all agreed to give up some 97% of their nuclear material. they already shut down thousands of centrifuges. they acceptedrict limitations on their nuclear program for 10 to 15 years.
now having called that deal insane, that means whatever deal we have with north korea has to be permanent, right? ran deal -- iran accepted in perpetuity intensive monitoring, including putting all iaea monitors in all falities that are not military installations and they had allowed sort of a right to challenge inspection for facilities that we suspect are involved in covert activities. my point is, having called that al insane and it could be argued it's a flawed deal that it's a very, very bad deal, now whatever deal that has to come out with north korea has to be a lot better than that, right? i do think if he doesn't come away with declaration from kim jong un and absolutely what denuclearization means and the denuclearization of the korean peninsula, none of that that
north korea was willing to unilaterally end their nuclear weapons program, it has to be permanent, no time limit and allow unlimited, no notice inspections. it has to include chemical, biological weapons as well as conventional forces. if we don't have this kind of agreement, then it's not -- you cannot call it a success. we talked about already how president trump isoing t call it a success, but then it's going to be -- all the korea watchers will be all over it saying that is not successful. i think president trump finally understands that this is not something that can be done maybe first try. this is why you have been hearing his backing away from the initial very high bar that he sit up for himself. but what i thinkould hpen, there are two scenarios -- obviously, i don't know, and nobody really knows. we'll find out very soon, next
week. but two scenarios. one would be just what duyeon was talking about, some sort of joint statement, that's minimal. talking about denuclearization in principle. in return for normalization of relations or a peace treaty or some sort of statement like that and everybody else sort of work it out. but that's the extent of it. ordent trump could get something out of north korea. i think if north korea is willing to potentially give something to trump that looks like a success, like looks like it's even more, maybe even an agreement to ship out intercontinental ballistic some aect of a missile program, fissile material, blow up something, some visual, something that looks like that's kind of big and all the media will hyperventilate and say this is a very, very successful meeting, successful similarity, that we are headed in the right
direction, and north korea b time. i agree with professor lee. that's their goal. to buy time and money but i think they might put up something to really convince the world that this summit is different, thath something different, and then even prent trus, oh, verification, this will be a this will take he admitted that. then north korea can drag out -- drag the rest of the inspection or everything else, drag it out and wait out the trump administration. this administration leaves and then they'll see what they would do. there is no question in my mind weill see verifiable dismantlement of north korea's program. we can see what it will look like, it's headed in that direction. of course, we'll never know whether something is successful or not successful until many
years down the road. but i think this is sort of the two scenarios. one is very minimal statement which will be spun as a success or even something more if we n find -- that's what we can expect with this meeting from kim jong un. . bruce: just to pick up on some of the points. characterizing kim jong il better than expected, we saw back in 1994 when many, including some in the u.s. government, were describing kim jong il as a bold economic reformer, we were on the cusp of massive economic reform in north korea. eoplhave made a caricature of kim jong il and come jung un, it undermines the assessment of -- kim jong il, it undermines the assessment of it.
when new york has a successful or nuclear test people are surprised. experts have saying they have been making progress along the way, they learn from their mistakes. but then people are like why wasn't i told north korea is an actual military threat or cyberthreat? well, we have been trying. we have all seen the cartoons of kim jeong une -- kim jeong-un as weaponear when someone meets with him and if he doesn't drool or stumble, great ey are amazed that international statement -- statesman and we can do business with him. then you also e rtf even just this weekend when a few defeofficis were replaced in north korea, sort of this automatic jumping into, they are replacing the hardliners with the moderates. they must have been resisting kim's bold new direction.
a moderate north korea is a relative term. of replacing sonny corleone with mike. he dresses better, talks better, but he's still from the same family. it's of really a relative term. we couldn't know -- don't know why they were replaced. it could have beenorption charges or other things. we're hoping for not a very detailed joint statement. one of my big criticisms of every previous north korean agreement was it was so vague, it was so short. i worked arms control at c.i.a. so i'm used to and i like the very detailed arms control treaties with the soviet union and the warsaw pact. we didn't like the sovts, we didn't trust the soviets. but by having a really detailed treaty, like a contract, where everyone knew their responsibilities, and then you had very good verification, so
if you have detailed text and verification, can you have treaties wpeopleou don't like or trust. i was always critical of the previous agreements because there was -- sort of so vague so that weould have greeme and everyone got to have tir own interpretation. what i was looking for is more a traditional, i want 100-page arms control treaty coming out of this summit, at least a very detailed thing. i kind of also see the mr. president, put the joint statement down, walk away, just leave it or or -- for the experts. that's another theory. duyeon: aim with you on that. i would love to see -- i'm with you on that. i would love to see a detailed agreement as well f we put this into context, such -- well. if we put this into such a ntext. i was with an american president who clearly does not seem to understand the complexities of
these issues. if you put it into that context i think the best scenario, safest, would be to have a simple statement so that there flippages or or flippages slip of the tongue or inadvertent giveways he dew point understand what the implication would be. bruce: i think another point that sue made was -- others have said, it's going to be a success. and then i think you're going to have very loud responses. i think it's going to be very partisan. the trump supporters i think will say, look, i haven't read it but i know it's bert than anything before because -- better than anything before because it was a strong president and he wasn't going to do something fd like the iraneal. the critics will criticize it because it was trump and wasn't well prepared and wasn't as good as the iran deal he walked away from. the lane in the road in between
for analysts and experts is sort of ahead of time identify wh we think should be in an agreement or what our recommendations, and then assess the -- whatever comes out of it against the merits or lack thereof of the agreement. picking up on a point that sue critot oical ny of the iran deal, but all previous agreements. i put it into kind of a math rma of t.a is greater than one plus eight plus 11 plus v. what that means is the trump agreement has to be better than the one iran deal, the eight previous agreements we have had with north korea, the 11 u.n. resolutions which have been imposing penalties on north korea, and the verification has to be equal to or greater than that in the i.n.f. and b.c.w. treaties. that's one of the ways we score it. i take off points for
contradictory policy statements. i take off points falling off of what was unalienable never going o give in on a policy point. i don't give or sub tract points because it's a republican administration. we should assess it the way we would obama or bush or anher statement. there will be a very partisan reaction to whatever comes out of it. what we can do is put some analysis to it. and one last point is, just as when we saw a lot of the experts who looked at the interkorean summit, and pointed out the similarities or even the plagiarism from previous agreements which north korea had repeatedly violated, it's also up to all of us to point out where, especially if there are declarations that something is new and historic, never been done beforraiso our hands and say, oh, paragraph 2 sounds
very much like paragraph six of the ed framework, so it's not breaking new ground. why don't i -- if we have any questions across the panel. lee: tre will be mitigating factors. there will be factors that would implement to kim jong-un eve if nothing happens in terms of actual denuclearization. what kinds of events? some pageantries will go on. i would not be surprised if he visits putin in moscow in the next few months. i would not be surprised if he holds a summi meeting with prime minister abe. japan is concerned its issues, is sidelined and let me remind you that prime minister shin zue abe, the last time he was president, he had that of being mginalized all of a
sudden by the united states. in 2006 and 2007, when the u.s. acto re-engi north korea in the wake of north korea's major escalation, its first nuclear tests on october 9, 2006. kim jong-un as a reformer, we have heard this even before he assumed power in the wake of his father's death in 2011, and the reasons have always been solely iant he was exposed tre pea events as a boy. that he lived in switzerland unlike his father who had not studied abroad. for every ping there is a pol pot who lived in france for four years. yet managed to kill about a third of his own fellow trym for every ping there is one who studied medicine, an ophthalmologist in the u.k., but has managed to kill hundreds of thousands of his own people.
kim jong-un first became a reformer when he visited china n june, 1983, and then successive years he's always been reborn as a new reformer. i remember in january, 2001, so after that flurry of diplomatic activity in 2000,im jong-un made another visit to china, to the southern provinces. he visited the city on january some flat sc t processing maker plant, and next day he visited china industrial commercial bank software producer, and then the next day he visited a telecommunications company and the media and everyone said, look, he is trying to flow in
the footsteps of ping, so-called sohe poors in january and ebruary of 1992. kim, that is the current one, will visit those regions, special economic zones, and that will lend further false credence to the wishful thinking that kim jong-un is a reformer. please, let's be patient. let's not rush to judgment and give him some time. that will be the faulty narrative we will hear. i would say in the next six . bruce: i wonder if one of the that kim mi sort of present is turning other the eys to the pueblo. presenting the american ship that north korea capturedn 1968, has kept as a museum and is a propaganda tool, if they would just return -- offer to return the pueblo back to the
u.s. that would be quite a big gesture. why don't i throw the questions open to the audience. i'm not sure if we have a microphone going around, but if not, if people would announce their name and affiliation and th a questioi guess no mike. >> question about the next six to 12 months. wh the negotiation as a way of not necessarily dragging but stoppingss but further nuclear tests. even though it wou require or expenditure of time by trump, he doesn't seem to have a
problem with that. nobody in europe wants him. canada or mexico. most of our traditional allies were at a stand still on trade matters. trump's got lots of time to do ng-u second or third summit if it nontest ort of don't know nuing. op on not. anyone? duyeon: thank you for that question. if i understood your question correctly you are ainwh just a long-rmreeze is better than nothing. if that's the ok. ok. kim problem that i have jong-un's recent announcements that he willo longes nu devices and missiles, sure it's a step in the right direction, it's the right thing
to do, but it doesn't solve the problem and it's trying to talk the talk of an advanced nuclear power. he's basically saying i'm an advanced nuclear power, therefore i don't need to conduct explosive testing anymore. advanced nuclear powers after some poiy don't have to conduct full testing. they can refine their tecinhat'. critical nuclear testing. so that's a problem i have. the other problem i have with a deep freeze if t that callt is that just says that yyo stl be a threat to south korea, to japan, and of course to the united states. ve that, again, doesn' the prle either. and that is a long term -- if this problem continues to be intractable indefinitely, it would lateread to the potential for south korea and even japan to flirt with their
own nn. that will then make being react to that situation. it a bad to new nuclear aspts. would just leave a host,laundr headaches foth unies future. so i think, yes, sure, we need to stop testing, but again, doesn't solve the problem and that does not lead to any real rogress in the nukelar shoe. -- nuclear shoe. lee: i don't think kim jong-un needs to conduct another underground nuclear tests. the ti ced six we know, to date and the most recent one on september 3 last year was the most powerful. d a yield ofy ov 150 kilotons. indian and pakistan have each
conducted x underground nuclear tests. the last time was 20 years ago in may, 1998.ny ose were sml in yield. some even smaller than one kiloton. theycontlled tests, but no one scoffed. no one said that's not a nuclear test. and today no one presuat they wouldive it up. by virtue of not having tested in 20 years. what kim jong-un i believe needs to do and will do at a time of his own choosing, tec ing, wil through on the foreign minister's threat made in new york last year of a nuclear test hydrogen bb, icbm born from a nuclear test in the either's at moss sphere or outer space. e s. and former soviet union carried out these tremendous tests quite routinely between 1958 and 1962. it would be a serious
provocation if north korea did that.woulthat lead to military response? oneannot rule it out. i think kim jong-un at that ment of tensionl out his l. i dn't mean it, let's talk. having done that he would have tablisd full credibility that north korea can nuke any major u.s. city all across e united states. then he would be very firmly positioned to extort the u.s. and south korea and even japan and get what he wants. take the u.s. troops from new york, perhaps even from japan one day. a peace treaty, and be able to bully and one day prevail over the richer south. sue mi: i have a slightly different take. i think north korea's done with missile testing and nuke testing. i don't think the will be atmospheric tests during this administration. they'll be giving a gift to the trump administration. john bolton in particular. particularly it doesn't gain
nuclear. they might do that fully. but they are going to wait out th administration. the playwright now is all the diplomacy, the play normal guy, they play a reasonable this is a reasonable country. d goal is to show and get international acceptance as a reasonable country with nuclear weapons. you can trust us with nucar weapons. we're going to be a responsible power. that's going to be the play. otherwise we'll get back to the maximum pressure when they are just loosening it on the sanctions font with china, russia, and everybody else. and back to the bloody nose preventive strike. i actually give kim jong-un credit. i wish in a way if id that he will make it easier for us to know what to do with policy. it's easier when new york acts bad. it's harder in terms policy when north korea acts in this manner and the whole world pressure is against us, the
united states, and we look like a bad guy. we look unreasonable. i understand the rational. i just think that's going to be some time down the road after the change in the dministration. >> gerald, why do you think the south korean leader have been better negotiators than all of the u.s. presidents, t recent ones, clinton, bush, obama, and secretary of states? in particular i recently heard madeleine albright on her book tour, she didn't admit to any faults, you seem to think she had some. why do you think that? and secondly, you have said that the north koreans have benefited greatly by these recent negotiations, what concrete benefits have they gotten? lee: was that question directed
me? bruce: did you say the south korean negotiators? >> i corcted myself. the north koreans were thetter you. and why? secondly, you said that the north koreans have taken great advantage and gained by what has happened. sue mi: i just thought kim jong-un how he conducted himself last year was very smart. that instead of after nuear te of 2017, the hydrogen bomb test, three icbm tests, i thought he was going to keep going. to my surprise he stopped himself from keep going. ihot might be asibility. he stopped himself. he needed to show re-entry capability, but stopped himself. then he engage in this olympic participation diplomacy, and now he has emerged with a better image to the rest of the world. than the one previously described. what bruce was describing, sort
of like baby with a bomb. he has emerged himself as much more likable person. even myself when i was watching the whole korea summit with that spontaneous, hopping over the d.m.z., back and forth with laughter, he does appear to be nor normal. all i'm saying is, not that he doesn't -- i think kim jong-un has positioned himself in a better sightowha where we were in the fall and winter of 2017. lee: i believe kim jong-un to date has made no concessions whatsoever. he has simplys. he's nownable talking about denuclearization. but that is just a near utterance of abstention from contributed -- prohibited activities. activities prohibited over 10 u.s. security council resolutions. to say that i'm going to hold
off on missile and nuclear tests and be wined and dined for that statement is a bit absurd. this image makeover has implications. over the past several months, kim has affected, byg gestures meaningless gestures like domssning this exhausted undergroundar site. by releasing three u.s. detainees who never should have been detained in the first place. nd by coming out of his shell, kim jong-un has not only transformed himself from a pariah to a global statesman, but he has basically reshaped the geopolitical stage on which he is now being courted. by the leaders oe biggt powers in the world. and this trend, i thi, will continue. i don't take the view that south koreans are better negotiators
than americans. sorry. bruce: whether it's north korean negotiators are better or u.s. negotiators are bad. i might define it more as the agreements have been flad. in that, again, if you compare it to the arms control treies we had with the soviets and warsaw pact, i was chief of the c.i.a.'s arms control branch, if you compare the very detailed documents we had with them, with thry vague, short, not detailed agreements we had with new york, i think those were flawed because they o s shortened and lheetail that we needed. if you tried to buy a car from someone eight times and they cheated you every time, what you need to do if you go back into negotiations is make sure you finehat a r is. it has four wheels and a carburetor, etc.
you need to make very, very clear for all sides what the requirements are. in talking with some of the u.s. negotiators when some of the ta under way, when i would talk about, again, the arms control treaty, well, north korea's different. we're not going to have a thousand page document. we have to do it one page at a time. we we ad -- trting north korea differently from every other country we negotiated with. well, if we're going to do one page at a time, make sure each page is good. i'd ask about certain provisions. well, the north koreans will never let us have that so we're not going to ask for it. that's not how you do negotiateations. also when i asked about verification, it would be like, well, we're going to ask for this. some of the provision that is we normally have in arms control treaty. short notice challenge inspections on nondeclared facilities. they won't let us have that. they are a very proud nation. so the soviets would let us have it but north korea won't let us
have those kind of verification measures. what would you have us do, bruce, kill all the scientists and destroy all theld down to the ground? no. i just want a handful of short notice challen inspections every year. think went into it was allowing vague text, allowing short text, allowing north korea to create a separate category for itself that we agreed to. the nonproliferation treaty, all nations in it have a certain responsibility. except north korea where we carved out special exemptions for them. duyeon: i would characterize your question as north koreans are savvy negotiators. the reason for that and the simple answer to your question is, look at the result today. they have come away decades with better nuclear weapons. more advanced. they see american democracy. they see it changing american
add m., changing american policies, changing personnel and policymakers in america as america's strategy weakness and north korea's advantage. theans one way they game the system. they try negotiations, but they waitt out. ok, if you don't want to deal th us, give ushawe want, we'll wait until the next administration n that time they can advance the nuclear capabilities. that's the short answer. bruce: one other thing is. whether it's negotiateations or the text, the previous attempts have failed because noh korea kept cheat the -- cheating on the agreements. even as they signed it they were already in violation with uraniumgr whethewe blame the negotiators -- i think the underlying factor has en north korea kept doing what t never to do even as they were signinghe documents. i think that has been then theme thathit.
yo mentioned how north korea's . changi the geopolitics of the region. i wondered if you could look at south korea, japan, and china and even russia and talk about what their expectations are of these talks. what they actually see coming woullike to see coming out of hem. duyeon: i thinkpectation is the president moon was so invested in this in bringing everybody to o occur.nt that they want the sue : i think the -- our japanese counterparts, are the y what c out of the meg. and potentially even a deal that could -- that'sot
interest.is is why prime minist will come again, when? very soo rht? meeting with president trump again. one of the l personses to see president trump saying a deal like a deal does not helpapan. leave nuclear rangesiles and leave japan under threat. they wou le to have reduction issue raised by president trump. we'll see if he does. i think japan is most concerned. south koa, i think they just -- i think they a lesser expectation. they are just saying theay thehave -- i'm not sure they need a specific success -- i think the joint statement, i think south korea, still push it along. president moon has -- dealing with north korea ili delicate crystal ball you have to move delicately and
patientl i think china and rus china's interesting because i do agreentike peace ould gain from treaty. any kind of reduction on u.s. troop presence that would lead to reduction in u.s. troop presence in new york. it would be helpful to china. when kim jong-un raised joint exercises, i think it was a's ask. i don't know if he was ok doing a couple exercises a couple months ago. and raised it recently. that was china's ask. of course china still does not want -- it's complicated because they don't want overly like u.s. and north korea to really get into a better space because i think china's interest is still ilung to have most over north korea. and the korean peninsula. that's their number one interest more than anything else. >> i agree. duyeon: just to add. for president moon, he needs a summit. needs it for a very basic
reason, the trump-kim summit and diplomatic process to stay alive in the months and years going forward because he needs to achieve and drive his peace process. to do that he needs progress on the nu chute. that will then lead to listing of in order to completely achieve president moon's pce agenda he needs those lifted. he can begin to implement other elements of the peace regime like cultural and humanitarian exchanges. he's going to hit a roadblock with economic cooperation, to create economic cooperation. with what suegree mi has been saying. china, we were seeing beijing trying to insert itself into this process. cae w i ht pr mond president trump talking about peace.
so peace is a regional order issue. that's where china has the biggest stakes. china will want to try to get a seat at the table for that. that's why it's trying to reinsert itself into the process. eventually with russia as well ater on. lee: at the heritage foundation, i assume, fundraising is a high priority as it is as tufts university, my employer -- bruce: we'll be passing around the hat later. ternional funsirth korea is simply brilliant. you have to look at the scorecard in america, of course, with different sports. yo look at the scorecard on nuclear diplomacy over the past arr century, very conservatively i calculate over $20 billion for north korea. between 1994 and 2010, south korea, this is all on the
record, public record, south korea gave north carolina $11 billion. about 70% of that in cash. between 1995 and 2008, according to the congressional research service, the united states during the clinton and bush years gave north korea in excess of $1.3 billion. so about $100 millioa year. you might be thinking that's not a huge sum. well, in the99s, north korea, had famine. in the mid 1990's, all of north korea, the total export earnings for north korea was a few hundred million dollars. that's half balance. that was a lot of money from the united states as well. after 2005, china has each year given north korea, this is a rough guess, abou $1.5 billion a year. what about team america and its allies? what have they gained? approximately less than nothing.
a nuclear icbm armed north korea. duyeon: excellent qstion. otr thing we're seeing, or some signs we're seeing right now with the reports assad wants to go to pyongyang and meet with kim jong-un, it appears he's not only trying to level out the playing field in northeast asia. seems to be leveling out the entire world including the middle east. when i heard reports about assad wanting to -- if this is true, it poses two problems. one, the diplomatic floodgates are open to the north. goodd thorth to proliferate easier and it could build north korea into becoming of wmd -- w.m.d. wal-mart the world. this ieolitical question you are asking. when the summit happened between moon and kim first, and we saw beijing wanted to insert itself
and we saw russia also, no. that's leveling out the playing field. building leverage before kim walks into a meeting with trump. the other element we're seeing with assad is, maybe, if the reports are true, is gaining more leverage, bringing in more like-minded countries to join team north korea before his meeting with trump. so that has implications going forward. especially when kim jong-un is clearly trying to build up his image as the leader of a normal country. leader of a peace loving country that has nuclear weapons. and to eventually get to a point where it is accepted like india and pakistan that it wants to be reated like india and pakistan sue mi: the missile cooperation between iran and north korea is famously known.
i wouldn't be surprised if hat's the other element. >> thank you for coming. this is excellent conversation. all of you really great. my name is mitsu, heritage foundation. north korea, it seems like north want hey are the ones summit with trump more than the other way around. it seems that way. my question is, what do they want? do they want a peace agreement somehow? douse they dangled the carrots th release the three hostages. they signed a treaty with south korea. he can come in and then how ts treatment? well, what is he willing to give up? for trump to sign the paper.
trump will really say what do you want? but kim hasn't said what he wants. my question is what do you think of that? lee: why is north korea so insistent on a peace treaty when north korea is a country that has, without fail, violated every major international agreement it signed, but it's so big on another agreement. china and the u.s. never signed a peace treaty. china and japan never signed a peace treaty but normalized relations. china and new york never signed a peace treaty. japan and russia never signed a peace treaty. a peace treaty is good so ashere is genuine intent e pa o pursue peace. what's north korea's game? it's transparent, everyone knows it. a peace treaty would call into question with movement of u.s.
troops in north korea and new peacnv ikely be withdrawn. so that's a plus for north korea in changing the balance of power in the korean peninsula in its favor. i think north korea wants more. if you sign a peace treaty, if there is one among the u.s.-china north korea, south korea, the south korean constitution will come under revision. in particular articles three and four. article 3 defines korean r.o.k. territory as the korean peninsula and adjacent island, that is the entire peninsula. article 4 stimulates that north korea, the r.o.k., will pursue a policy of peaceful unification on the principle of freedom and moacy. free democracy. kim ord is anathema to
jong-un. this cause friction in south korean society. south koreans will bicker among themselves, and this is a plus foa beuse korea will insist that all its concerns --s concned with is peace. north korea thinks on multiple veey are not one dimensional, and certainly not crazy. duyeon: just quickly on peace treaty. it's actually one of my biggest fears is that -- because we know kim jong-un want it is f the reason the professor just articulated. because president trump, even before he came into the office, sue mi: questioned why do we even need the troops there. it's too expensive, burdensome. i'm concerned that -- i don't hink north korea will bring up
-- just concluding a peace treaty. we need security. that's translation peace treaty. then eventually the rationale for the president is undermined. over the long term. north koreans know that. they don't need to bring it up. they need to bring up peace treaty. in theory it sounds good, korean war. so technicale vet concluded the war because we don't have a peace treaty. i'm concerned that this is one of the gives that president trink he could put on the table. very concerned about that. duyeon: just to be absolutely clear. i can speak for everybody here that we all want peace. but the sequence is what's most important. there is a reason why in the six party talks, if you look at the negotiations and even the text, hey made it vague, but the discuss peace regime at an appropriate time and forum. the unwritten understanding for that was relevant parties can
begin discussing this issue peace regime at includes the critical element of a peace treaty after the third phase called the dismantlement phase. after there was enough blueprint drawn up on what this might look like, then other relevant parties could start talking informally or formally about peace regime, peace treaty. that's where it's critically important. you want to have formal negotiations, peace negotiations, after enough dismantlement has already taken place. bruce: on the what does north korea want, a lot of what we're going against is what others are saying that north korea wants. well, according to the south korean delegation, i m with kim jong ts t noh rea said. according to chinese press after kim's visit to beijing, this is what north korea said. we're not getting a lot straight from the horse's mouth. but also when north korea has announced things, it's not that it's code words, but it's using
phrases that people have been following it for a long time know what they mean. even in the south korean delegation read out of their meeting with kim, he's willing to talk about denuclearization. and in return for security assurances and they didn't use end of u.s. hostile policy, they used a different phrase. well, security assurance of which they have been provided many times, including in the september, 2005 document, all to no avail. and the end of the u.s. hostile policy is the long list of security and diplomatic and economic demands and even sort of demanding curtailment of south korea's actually protected freedoms of assembly and expression. wh they talk a that, we know what theyean. ven i think yesterday's -- denuclearization is part of global arms control and we along
with other members of the nuclear club will go down to zero when everyone else does. we all knew that. but when kim gwan last month had a stt where he said what was north korea's position for years, the white house was surprised. because they were like, incredulous that, wait aering minute, kim said he was talking about denuclearization which we think means this. they have a different meeting. when we saw the white house talking points of the reebs why -- reasons why they were calling off the sumt,es of broken promises. not only they didn't show up and we sat in singapore for three days, but also the broken promise of going back on what they pledged to do with denuclearization. they didn't go back because they had their own interpretation. i think it's -- if you follow it for a while, you know what they mean. i think sort oolks who don't followtav surprised. on the peace treaty it's -- i
think they are both legal and societal impacts. the legal would be if you sign a peace treaty, it removes the basis for united nations command. it doesn't have an impact on combined forces command or u.s. forces korea, or the level of u.s. troops on the peninsula. that's a result of the u.s.-south korea bilateral defense treaty. if you have a nonbinding peace declaration like moon jae-in agreed to. that has no legal ramifications for anything. in society, both south korea and coy see in the u.s., including the congress, would you have a sense of, oh, the war is over, officially. took longer than we thought, brinthbo home. if the war is over, why are they there? but if you don't address the north korean conventional threat threath korea, then
to south korea, then you will have reduced the allied deterrent and defense capability without taking care of the threat that they were there for. duyeon: just to add real quick, this goes to the question on what china wants. in the late 1990's, when the two koreas, u.s., and china why negotiating a peace treaty. these were formal negotiations. they eventually broke down because -- basically they are complex, but two reasons. one, the north did not want south korea as part of the process. two, north korea kept demanding withdrawal of u.s. troops. this is the cnauestion you are asking, what does china want out of this. in that process, china was also -- my understanding from noshors in -- negotiators in that process, china was demanting the withdrawal of the united nations commands during that process. so when we're hearing -- we're aring from the pat the formal d
end the korea war be a three party process. they defined it as the two koreas and u.s. that's very interesting at the same time to make. speculation behind that is perhapcae hisrical precedents that in the four-party talks, china has tried to get in the way and spoil the pro also demand the withdrawal of th united nations commands and other issues. that's the speculation and astummings that's being made now why south korea might want three parties as part of the declaration to end the korean war. bruce: great presentations from everyone. quick on the pueblo. that would be a symbolic, and a lot of people might like that. i would rather see a substantive action by the north such as
withdraw artillery from the caisson heights. bruce: i'm saying it would be a gesture that would over very well. but wt ha any impact -- >> we shouldn't be taken in by that gesture. bruce:. >> my question for all four of you, put it bluntly. i think you-all talked to this, but have we seen -- we have seen savvy diplomatic action. we have seen a charm offensive. we have seen the regime get something for nothing. in the last few months. ure, litimacy. but have we seen any evidence that the north is changing its fundamental strategy? it's strategy, regime survival. we all know that. but unification of the peninsula under the north's control through subversion, coercion, and if necessary, use of force. of course, the key to that is the splitting of the alliance and getting u.s. forces off the korean peninsula. does ae believe that that
foundational strategy has chged? and thathnorth's objectives to unify the peninsula under its controhas actually changed? anotherarlel question, is there any sense that kim jong-un really believes in a peace process and unification process ordance with president moon's vision? or would that just be part of its subversion efforts to end up ominating theensu? lee: no. bruce: the unification, that also got into sort of the preventive attack discussion and justification for it. i would see it as, when people are talking about preventive attack, they are sort of getting into why does north korea have nukes.
three schools of thought. one was the benign interpretation. they only have it because of a response to u.s. policy. it'she small nation that's assaulted by us or threatened by us. they did it even though they promised never to do it. because of us. which calls into question why they signed four international agreements promising never to do it while they were doing it. i would say it's more than just this benign reason. they do have military plans. kim jong-un when he came into office directed that the military come up with a new war plan to be ablto unify the peninsula within seven days. that requires going nuke or bioand chem early. there are plans. it's not just the benign. the other extreme would be those who are saying well, we've got to do a preventive attack as opposed to preemptive or retaliatory. because they want to unify the
peninsula. they are heading south. or some other reasons. yes, they have the plan, but i'd th third school where i wout they are not coming as long as they understand the current correlation of forces. which is why we have u.s. f.k.y., a treaty, all these other things. it's not the benign interpretation. it's not that they are coming tomorrow and therefore we have toit tm and ia a war to prevent a war. it's they are not coming as long as things stay the same. i don't think we have seen a change in that strategy, but i don't see that they are coming any time soon. i think even sort of simpler than that, is there any evidence that north korea is willing to abandon its nuclear weapons in the sense that we think of it given all the statements by north korea, given the history, given all that, when you have kim jong-un on january 1 and april 20 saying, we have made
it. we crossed theinne, and now we will increase exponentially our production of nuclear weapons? that really calls into question that they are willing to put them all on the table. tie go into thsu i'm pretty lee: i think for north korea the ultimate goal to reach a communist nirvana state of unifying entire korean peninsula on its terms of liberating the south is a nonnegotiable proposition. it must happen. if we take a patronizing view of north korea, let's face it almost all of us do, almost all the time, we would presume that pyongyang is simply content to muddle through. yes, go berzerk, lash out, say crazy things, kill cronies and
relatives, and then say i changed my mind, let's talk. and repeat that cycle in perpetuity. i don't think so. it's worked wonderfully for north korea over the past decades because south korea and the united states are understandably risk adverse. there's simply too much on the line to escalate it with north korea. even in the facef egregious attacks, there has never been an instance of the u.s. or south korea resorting to military retaliation. that is the simple truth. how long can that go on? if you are the kim regime, do you take satisfaction, reassurance and that status quo wh the income disparity between the two koreas are increasing each year? south korea is conservatively speaking 50 times richer than the north. this is a problem. it raises the very thorny question of why is the continued
existence of the dprk really necessary? when your own people are crossing the border into that other korean state, you have a problem. you need one day to be able not only sensor and bully the south, but obliterate it. -- ultimate game plan and i think they are making progress. bruce: i think we have time for one or two more questions before our second panel which will focus on japan and the impact that all these mind o boggling changes in the last several months on the korean peninsula have had on japan as well as prime minister abe. we'll bring up our second panel at about 3:00. i think we have time for another one or two. woman way in the back. >> thank you so much for the session. talk a little bit more about u.s.-south korea relations
through this very invested. very confident in this process . to what extent has the white house relied on this mediation, and how much of that is a good thing? and then if the process is eventually being denuclear as many septics think it will be, what is the potential for u.s.-new york- south gap in that? the clerk: i worry. -- sung-yoon i worry. lee: when we ponder wrong congestionwhy did kim jong- change his tune on new year's day, there are four plausible explanations in descending order of irrelevance. asending orlando of relevance.
kim jong-un woke up on new year's day and decided going forward he would be a nice guy. unlikely. second, he was so overcome with gratitude toward president moon for his patience through that barrage in 2017 he decided to reciprocate and send athletes and cheerleaders to the south for wtegames. probably notrue. third, this is the trump administration's take, kim jong-un was compelled by the tough rhetoric and the threat of the use of force and tough sanctions enforcement to change course. i see no evidence to support that. it could be true. probably partially it's true. when you think of the statement 8, resident trump on august fire and fury, which the world has never seen before, three weeks later on the 29th of that same month, which is known in the north and south as national humiliation day, for it was on that date, august 29, 1910 that
the korean peninsula was colonized and kim jong-un kindly explained this was the message to japan. he fired a missile over japan on at day. then came total destruction, rocket man on the suicide mission at the u.n. general assembly in mid september. two months later kim jong-un fired an icbm. the most powerful to date for his nation. it does not strike me as the behavior of a terrified man. my take is, all this has been preordained, preplanned because north korea has shown it goes through cycles of provocations and peace ploys. in 28 after that banner year in 2017, after having established his credibility, was simply too good to pass up on with the winter games and so on. so i would say the trump administration should ask itselu tion ologic. at what point between february 9
and march 8, between mike pence's invalidation of rth korea's outreach to the south a games on february 9, and march 8 when president trump impulsively agreed to a summit proposition by kim jong-un, at what point during that month did north korea's intentions go from fake to genuine? we're being played again. the clerk: what about the alliance -- sung-yoon what about the alliance. lee: i will just say in 16 seconds. president trump, i assume, he's using the troops card to be in the best interest of the united states for two reasons. that is against north korea and south korea. we know that previously president nixon used the troops card against south korea entirely, actually, withdrew an entire division, 20,000 troops,
in 1970 and 1971. and in 1974, before he was ed to seek a job elsewhere, he actually seriously considered, he had made up his mind to withdraw u.s. troops. then jimmy carter talked about it. then in the bush years, gorge w. -- george whereby busch, more american troops were reemployed. let's say withdrawing 5,000 or 10,000 troops, president trump will likely calculate he' accepteding a stern message to both snd pyongyang. you keep cozying up to the north like that, are you on your own. fend for yourself. as he himself said during the campaign. to nor korea president trump will think this is sending a strong message. we're removing our troops from the south. thereby we willlonger allow our troops to stand in harm's way within the range of your
artillery. thereby we will be more prone to strike first. now, it may work, but i think that is a false hypothesis. prt ll work inth rea's vo not u.s. interest. sung-yoon quickly. i'll answer the second part of your question. -- sue mi: quickly. i'll awer e second part of your question. i worry. not in the way that -- not esident moon has invested himself so much that if the summit fails, which i don't think it will, we we just talking about that scenario, i worry interkorea momentum is already there and president moon will want to continue that. that puts president moon in a difficult situation. but i worry about us being on the same page, particularly if the summit fails. bruce: i think the relationship right now is complicated. it's been strained becausof prident trump's comments both
during the campaign and after -- entering office, the f.t.a. it's been strained given the comments about the alliance kind of free riding ungrateful allies, particularly a lot of criticism of japan and south korea. sort of during the campaign seemingly making alliances busiss relationship. we shoul reimbursed 100% or we walk, which has not been appliances are based on. they are based on shared values and history. particularly the u.s.-korea alliance forged in blood. those of us who have children in the military don't see our children there as a money making operation or mercenaries. they are there for principles and shared values with our allies. when itomes to inter-korean relations, there was -- >> the summit set for tuesday in singapore. follow this online at c-span.org.
we'll leave the last few minutes here as the house is gaveling in next to work on two bills dealing witlocal and state anti-gang efforts. and federal water projects for next year. more than 50 amendments may be allowed for the water project bill. the last vote isn't expected until late tonight. live coverage here on c-span. the speaker: the house will be in order. the prayer will be offered by the guest chaplain, the rabbi aaron krupnik, congregation beth israel, voorhees, new jersey. the chaplain: god of our ancestor. you led 12 diverse tribes instructing each to march under their own banner. they did not always seeie to yie but could