tv U.S. Withdrawal From Iran Nuclear Agreement CSPAN June 9, 2018 4:53am-6:20am EDT
relations since 1989 from cold war to hot peace and on american history tv, tonight at 8:00 eastern on lectures and history. princeton university professor on the growth of conservative influence over u.s. foreign policy in the 1970's. sunday at 2:30 p.m. eastern, a legal historian and her book stories from trail blazing women lawyers, watch the c-span networks this weekend. >> next a house oversight subcommittee hearing on the u.s. withdrawal from the iran nuclear agreement. and the trump administration's options and strategy for what is next. this is an hour 25 minutes. iran nuclear agreement and how the ambitions can be restrained in the future. this 90 minute oversight committee is chaired by the congressman from florida.
subcommittee on national security will come to order. the chair is authorized to declare recess at any time. may 8, 2018 president trump made a decision by determining the united states participation in the joint conference a plan of action on tracy poa, the iran deal and immediately began to re-impose sanctions on iran. the president made the right decision. we saw the steel for what it was calling it, one of the worst but one-sided transactions the u.s. has ever entered into. the deal has empowered the iranian regime and fueled around ambitions for regional domination. it provided iran with billions and billions of dollars of upfront sanctions relief including airlifting $1.1 billion in cash to the revolutionary guard. iran agreed to a temporary set of restrictions on the nuclear
program at sunset after 10 by allowing the vast nuclear infrastructure and allowing iran to reduce breakout time to almost 0 the deal paved the way for iran to have a bomb. the deal is fundamentally flawed and it allowed around to block inspectors from accessing military sites leaving them incapable of verifying if iran was there -- complying with the deal. it did nothing to stop the ballistic missile program or support for terrorism. is using the financial windfall from the deer to spread money to terrorists and insurgents throughout the middle east. iran firing rob -- rockets into israel and -- bowstring has a lot to unprecedented levels of strength in lebanon and arming rebels in yemen and backing the taliban in afghanistan. thanks to intelligence revealed
by prime minister benjamin netanyahu we know that the deal was built on lies as part of the deal the leaders promised to never build a nuclear weapon and come clean to the iaea about past activities. the foreign minister said iran did not have any program to develop nuclear weapons and consider them a rational as well as a moral. the document exchanged by israel proved that iran had a program and they brazenly lied by denying it. even after entering the jcpoa they kept a secret archive of files on the nuclear weapons program. when the arena on deal was announced president obama's advisor ben rhodes drew on his nsa in writing to create a echo
chamber of false narratives to try to sell the agreement. and despite overwhelming evidence that the deal was not working the foreign policy establishment and enablers in the press are against spending -- spinning a web of deception to undermine the president's decision. they claim that his critics violated the jcpoa by withdrawing. in reality the state department admitted to congress and -- congressman mike pompeo that it was not a foreign agreement and was not a signed document. it reflects political agreements between iran and the eu. the deal would not have been ratified as a binding treaty because it was opposed by bipartisan majorities of the house and senate. including senator chuck schumer and the democratic ranking members of the house foreign affairs committee. the iran deal was effectively a nonbinding commitment between president obama and the ayatollah which imposes no
obligation upon the successor president to follow it. as harvard goldsmith writes you do not get to make an enormously consequential international deal in opposition of congress and skirt the need for congressional consent by making the agreement nonbinding under de smet -- domestic and international law and complain about a subsequent withdrawal. president donald j. trump's opponents said it is reckless and leaves america isolated. but the administrative -- administration conducted a lengthy review to try to correct as many flaws and cleared a deadline for results. secretary pompeo has presented a strategy in which he specified the conditions for a new agreement including a stop to uranium enrichment, a full accounting of past activities, unqualified for -- access for inspectors, halting ballistic missile activity, ending support for terrorism and
releasing all hostages. the door is open for europe to work with the u.s. to reach a better deal that addresses the issues but instead of reaping the spoils of the sanctions relief ran will now face unprecedented financial pressure from u.s. sanctions and companies around the globe will have to decide whether they will do business with the world's biggest economy or the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. many countries in the middle east strongly support president trump's approach. including israel, saudi arabia, the uae and bahrain. they are the ones most at risk from uranian misconduct. by ending u.s. participation in the deal president trump demonstrated that american strength and leadership are back and we should be thankful that the president kept his word that he campaigned on. that he would terminate it if they did not get better terms and he followed through on that
. i would also like to point out that since i did these remarks, there have been reports about whether or not iran was in fact able to access the u.s. financial system that was supposed to be a no go. we had testimony during the tendency and when the deal was agreed to from the obama administration saying that would not happen. this committee obviously will want to investigate what happened because that is a really big deal. i think the witnesses for being here and i look forward to your put glacier testimony. it is my pleasure to recognize the opening statements from my friend from vermont, mr. lynch. >> mr. welch. >> you are wishing. we miss congressman lynch. i think the witnesses and mr. chairman. thank you for having this hearing. i want to say that i listen carefully to your statements and it reflects not just your views but the views of many people
who opposed the agreement from the beginning. i did not hear in your statement , what's next. what is the trump plan? the president has not laid that out. and he is playing a game of high-stakes poker with american national security, and relationships with our allies. president trump decision to withdraw from the agreement that was painstakingly negotiated with our best allies from the united kingdom, france, germany and even china and russia who i would not classify as best friends but they cooperated to get the agreement. may i remind you that many have undermined the national security and it inflames tensions in war zones. while the ran nuclear agreement did not address many of the issues that you expect -- expressed and for which i share
concerns, it addressed one. it required iran to cease and desist from active development of nuclear weapons. that is a huge, strategic achievement. within the four corners of the document the sole purpose was to ensure that under no circumstances will iran ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. and it did also set forth a system of third cup -- third- party verifications. this was distressed, verify immediately. based on the on the ground and -- inspections meditated -- mandated by the agreement, the jcpoa has reported that iran has abided by the program and i don't think the president challenged that. according to the iaea's monitoring report iran has refrained from producing or retaining uranium greater than 3.67%. for less than the 90%
enrichment level of weapons grade uranium. and 20% the level of the uranium that iran previously stockpiled. the iaea is also verifying that the compliance to the agreement there are no more than 5060 centrifuges of the fuel enrichment plant and that is in accordance with the commitment to dismantle two thirds of the centrifuges. we have a situation here where all of the experts are in agreement that as far as the four corners of the verification program and compliance of the agreement, iran has been in compliance. the defense secretary matters is widely respected and he testified before the armed services committee in april that the iran nuclear agreement, and i quote, is written with an assumption that iran would try to cheat. that iran would try to cheat. there is no trust on the side of
the u.s. it is about verification. the verification, he said, what is in there is actually pretty robust. if president trump were to get a similar agreement and similar results in his meeting with north korea later this month, it would make the world safer. in my view, i hope he is successful. we will see. based on his public position and statements president trump will likely walk away from such a deal. the u.s. withdraw from the iran nuclear deal has in my view and the view of many others made the world less safe and probably increased the likelihood of military conflict with iran. iran has indicated that it will enhance the uranium enrichment capacity. yesterday, around the atomic energy organization announce that iran completed a new centrifuge assembly some -- center and would increase the
capacity to produce uranium hexafluoride to the centrifuges. our allies, france, germany and the uk are trying to uphold the agreement. without us. but they face a choice. and the potential u.s. sanctions have significant potential to hurt our closest allies. my view is not a good thing. -- it is not a good thing. the president has not provided the american people or congress with any information suggesting he has a realistic plan to replace the iran nuclear agreement that he ripped out. i would be interested in hearing from witnesses as to whether you are aware of a plan to proceed in the absence of the one ripped up. however, the words and actions from his closest advisors, president trump's closest advisors give us a clue as to
the ultimate goal. and it is a fair question. regime change. in january 2018, or to becoming president's national security advisor, mr. gold -- olden said our goals should be regime change in iran. in may 5, three days before the u.s. withdrew rudy giuliani, the president's lawyer confirmed the president is as committed to regime change as we are. if regime change is the goal of the trump administration i will give them this, that is a clear policy. it is reckless. reckless but clear. i would be interested in hearing from witnesses as to your view on that. it is imperative that the administration change direction and work with congress along with our european partners to mitigate the very destabilizing
consequences of our withdrawal from the iran nuclear agreement. i think the witnesses and look forward to your testimony. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you gentleman from vermont. i'm pleased to introduce the witnesses today. we have rich goldberg, senior advisor at the foundation for defense of democracy. we have david albright president of the institute for science and international security. senior fellow at the hudson institute, dr. jim walsh, senior research associate at mit and dr. michael rubin, resident scholar at the american and -- enterprise institute. welcome. pursuant to rules witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. please rise and raise your right hand. >> do you solemnly swear and affirm the testimony is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you god.
all witnesses answered in the affirmative. to allow time for discussion limit your testimony to five minutes. your entire written statement will be made part of the record. the clock in front of you shows remaining times. the light will turn yellow when you have 30 seconds left. and red when time is up. if you hear me banging this, it means wrap it up. also press a button to turn on your microphone before speaking. i will recognize mr. goldberg for five minutes. >> thank you so much. i am honored to be here a few years ago i was sitting behind the desk advising members on how to grow people like me. go easy. i will start off by summarizing my initial remarks. i would like to get recommendations. for many years, we worked iran policy in congress. with the house and senate. the bill moved bipartisan to
pursue weapons and help the people of iran pursue human rights, dignity, democracy inside the country and ensure that iran no longer has -- was ace -- a state sponsor of terror . the idea was partisan and that things i might say during the hearing become partisan and that is a recent phenomenon. my hope is that in this post jcpoa environment, it might take time but we find ways to come together to move things forward for the good of the american people and our country and allies. as for the jcpoa i would say the jcpoa and the decision to move away from the iran deal to withdraw by the president was both legally justified and necessary from a national security perspective. legally justified. you summarized it well. scholars at the time made it clear that the jcpoa was a
political commitment and not a treaty. a:-- political commitment is binding but not legally binding. that was confirmed on a panel with jake sullivan, a former official from the previous administration and key member of the negotiating team that led to the jcpoa. some might say that is true. but there was a un security council resolution 22-31 that reference the jcpoa. and it made it legally binding for the u.s. that, again is not true. if you read the resolution, and this was noted at the time that they used words like urges and endorses and called upon. the only thing that was proactive on the member 27th was the council decide that the
jcpoa was not a matter of international law. this is a political commitment. you may disagree with the decision of the president to withdraw from a legal perspective, domestically and internationally this was a political commitment. and we had a change of leadership in our democracy and many times we see a change of policies. in 2009 when president obama was in his first year of office and decided to change our national security policy with respect to european allies. poland and the czech republic. in the previous year his predecessor, president bush signed executive agreements with those two countries. those two countries had stated their politics domestically and a lot of the security risks on a strategy. president obama and his team had a different direction to pursue. and he did so. they withdrew from the executive agreements.
something that carried more weight than the jcpoa. at the time, brussels was not screaming and protesting. there were not council resolutions deciding how to stop the obama administration from changing the missile defense policy from europe. there was outcry of republicans in congress. i remember there were attempts in appropriations and armed services to pass amendments to stop what president obama was doing. the efforts failed and we moved on. together we have continued to do as best we can with bipartisan efforts.
of course, as my colleague will touch on, or could, is written extensively on it, we talked about the lack of inspections and military sites, the inability to verify section t of the agreement that has to do with weaponization activities. even though the referenced, the iaea on the technical levels of some of the concessions that are in agreement with those was in compliance, she could not say with confidence that the iaea was capable of verifying section t. that wasn't issue that they had raised several times. those three issues, though they
were the bulk of what would be negotiated between the united states and e3, that wasn't the fundamental flaw of the deal. the fundamental flaw was that we handcuffed ourselves from dealing in a non-military way with the rest of iran's activities. the idea that we were allowed to impose nonnuclear sanctions, the nothing in the deal would prohibit us from imposing nonnuclear sanctions, was a myth. the banks that were helping al- assad, never will be allowed to impose sanctions on them again. they were an annex to the jcpoa, immunity for iranian banks to finance aside. total immunity for iran to finance hezbollah and continue the war into syria. total immunity for iran to set up bases in syria and lebanon. and start converting rockets into precision guided munitions to target our allies in israel. total immunity to continue to arm yemen with ballistic missiles that could target
saudi arabia, or commercial merchant vessels that are transiting. this was the fatal flaw. we handcuffed ourselves. to do any of these nonnuclear sanctions, to touch annex to, the europeans would say would drive the iranians out of the deal. in some ways, i disagree with your statement. the jcpoa was making war more likely, not less. we eliminated our nonlethal option. we took a course of economic options off the table. all we were left with was military deterrence. that's why, leading up to the decision, there were so many reports about the need to use military force in syria, elsewhere, and beyond. i have a number of recommendations for the way ahead. i hope that we have time to discuss them today. they have to do with the strategy, which was threefold. political work -- warfare, and
strong military determines. i hope we can do that in a bipartisan fashion to >> thank you. time is expired, mister albright, you're up for five minutes. >> thank you. for holding this hearing and inviting me to testify. although the administration in the e3, german -- cannot fix the deficiencies of the year on deal, they did agree on many issues. in the negotiations, the e3 and the trump administration reached agreements on the need for the iaea to improve its inspections in iran, particularly visiting military sites associated with past nuclear weapons work and centrifuge work , and implanting section t. the u.s. and e3 also agreed that in iranian icbm is intrinsically tied to the nuclear deal, and its development would be sufficient to justify three position of the coney and sanctions by the u.s. and european union. as we all know, they could not agree on the sensitive issue
and every position of sanctions if iran augmented its -- enrichment program. however, the e3 did agree that the growth iran's enrichment program was a great security threat. overall, this negotiation helped clear many points of agreement on the future of underlying issues of the jcpoa. partial agreements can be a basis for ongoing collaborative work with europe as the trump administration build its coalition against iran's most threatening behaviors. one development to confirm the e3 u.s. agreement on the need to improve inspections in iran was israel's revelation on april 30 about iran's hidden nuclear weapons archive. the project, the work, the archive, mostly focused on the ahmad project. it showed that it was halted in 2003 or 2004, but it harry -- carried on in a more research oriented fashion afterwards,
aimed at engineering nuclear weapons and increasing know-how about them. information makes the sunsets far deadlier. as the documents show that iran's nuclear weapons program is more organized and more advanced than previously thought, allowing a faster dash to the bomb. what is new in the archive? i have had two briefings by israel he intones it make intelligence officials as of today, certainly read the public information. i would like to list some of the information that is new that was not known before. the number in kilotons in nuclear weapons sought by iran, the specific amount of highly enriched uranium explosives, that information was not available to the iaea previously. group -- blueprints for the productions of nuclear weapons. the location of planned nuclear weapons test sites.
their were some information on that, but it was more conceptual than concrete. details about a second building at the site in high explosive work related to nuclear weapons and an explosive chamber. called the taliban to side. taliban one is the site where we know well, where the explosive bunker that iaea visited. to has not been visited by the inspectors. there's much more detail about iran's massive work on uranium metallurgy, including ample evidence of iran having all the equipment for all the work needed in a uranium metallurgy program. the information shows that iran made the uranium metal components with surrogate materials. iran did small-scale uranium processing for neutron initiator for a nuclear weapon, that was also not known. there is no direct evidence at the site which was exposed in 2009 was being built to make weapons grade uranium.
there's an image of a device to assemble the central core of a nuclear explosive using a surrogate metal material, but to actually -- the briefing showed an animation of that, and subsequently the israelis found a picture of the actual assembly device. there's additional equipment that iran must declare under section t other the deal, and i could go on. i'm only representing a small fraction of the information, because much of the information would be considered highly classified and not subject to public release. by myself, and certainly not by the israelis. the new information as most of the missing pieces to the puzzle of iran's past nuclear weapons programs, and raises troubling assessments about iran's intention to use this archive to build nuclear weapons in the future. the conditions of the existence of this archive is the extent of the information, and it
suggests that iran has been violating the jcpoa, and the spirit of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. under the npt, iran should be rigorously challenged, white possesses and maintains such an archive, while simultaneously refusing to allow the iaea to visit military sites named in the archive. this new information makes it more urgent to fix inspections in iran, even if the jcpoa falters. iran is still a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, and the safeguards agreement requires iran to cooperate with the iaea, over determining whether it's program is purely peaceful. the united states should works with its allies, and i think they find willing partners in europe, to raise the issue of iran's past and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons program at the iaea board of governors. the new information argues for putting much more pressure on iran to allow the iaea to do
its job under both the jcpoa and the conference of safeguards agreement. if iran refuses, then the jcpoa should be discarded by all, and the world to unite and return to a pressure campaign, including the imposition of all sanctions. sorry for going over. >> the chair recognizes -- >> ranking member welsh and establish members of the subcommittee on national security, on behalf of the hudson institute, i am honored to testify before you today. i just want to say upfront, there would be in iran deal in place today if the iranian regime wasn't so blatant in its violations of existing un security council resolutions. violations fueled by the jcpoa. there would still be in iran deal in place if the regime hadn't continued and accelerated it's illegal ballistic missile program, a violation of existing u.s. security council resolutions. there would still be in iran deal in place if the regime didn't use commercial aircraft to deploy islamic revolutionary
guards force advisors in syria, another violation of the existing un council resolutions. there would still be in iran deal in place today if the regime stopped providing funds and aid to hamas and his -- violation. there would be in iran dealing place today if the regime had not empowered and -- and created new ones that threaten americans in iraq and syria. the regimes activities are the reason the jcpoa is no longer in place. the regime's actions continuously demonstrated a willingness to cheat out in the open on existing un security council resolutions, while defenders of the regime and defenders of the iran deal said they were complying in the shadows with the jcpoa. we would have to believe that the regime is good when no one is looking, and somehow dismiss
its cheating behavior on the international stage and is regarded as an indicator of the regime's actual intentions. pricks will argue that the iran deal was not meant to curb iran's regional destabilizing activities, and that it was simply an arms control agreement. the problem with that argument is iran saw the iran deal as a vehicle to reactivate its destabilizing terror logistics and operations networks. the jcpoa giveaways and annex to that rick mentioned, enabled and allowed the regime to accelerate its destabilizing activities. annexed to the illicit stripping lines that moved weapons to terrorist organization, and asked to delisted custom and other individuals that trained, armed, and direct terrorist groups and building terrorist organizations. pics of the jcpoa were not surprised to see the regime step up its destabilizing activities. all you had to do is look at annexed to. and see what the regime asked for and received. the regime saw the iran deal is a way to fuel its destabilizing
strategy to become an economic powerhouse, become the premier conventional military threat in the middle east, and at the end of the sunset clauses, become a weapon iced nuclear power. annex argue that walking away from the deal will cause iran to increase its destabilizing buddies and rush to avon. not only did the regime increase its activities under the protections of the iran deal, it expanded its reach into lebanon, yemen, and cemented its reach in iraq and syria. iran has been doing for years what the critics say they will do if they walked away from the jcpoa. iran has become more dangerous under the protections of the jcpoa. since the implementation of the jcpoa, they have amassed upwards of 50,000 militia members in syria from lebanon and iraq and afghanistan. there there at the direction to for a fagade and threaten the u.s. and israel. iran has -- with more advanced and precision guided rockets and missiles. hezbollah is operating at a
level where they can do combined operations in this theater because of the coots force. along with lebanese and legal capabilities to the hoodies in yemen's threatened international shipping lanes with missile and rocket attack, iran has increased funding and legal capabilities of used force merit that have killed moses in the past and do so again. the limitation of the jc poa in 2015 some of the kids force has created additional militias of ones that are being sanctioned now by the house and the senate. this as increased and is behind them lamenting divisions with u.s. allies. the entire dc [ indiscernible ] if iran rushes to a bomb, lose europe, they lose russia, they
simply lose. russia will not tolerate a nuclear regime on its border. the u.s., israel, at our sunni regional allies will not allow iran to rush to the bomb. in the preamble of the jcpoa, you have to go down three sections, and you will see this promise by iran. iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will iran ever seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons. basically, you just have to go to the preamble, three references down, to see that the iran deal itself was based on a lie. iran's currency has lost 60% of its value since 2015, in the jcpoa. because they squandered the windfall of cash to promote destabilizing activities instead of focusing on the economy. critics argue that europe will pick iran over the united states. everyday we see european banks and businesses withdrawing from the regime. there picking a $20 trillion economy over a foreign economy. iran is asking for more concessions and promises of
investment. from europe to nora vail, without making any exceptions on his ballistic missiles and adventurism. >> we will let you put that for the record, we are just running over, i want to make sure we get everyone in. thanks for that. doctor walsh? five minutes. >> mister chairman, ranking members of the committee. it's an honor to appear again before your committee work in written testimony, i address a number of issues including the ones raised by my colleagues, but in oral testimony, i want to focus on the negative consequences of violating the agreement for u.s. national security and america's standing in the world. by summary judgment is the jcpoa successfully addressed the single most important american national security interest in the gulf, namely, preventing iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. by violating the agreement and having no real strategy to replace it, the administration has increased the risk of
nuclear proliferation in the middle east, raise the probability of military conflict between the u.s. and iran, undermined america's single most important national security alliance, and likely worsened the very problems the administration said it was trying to solve. iran's regional activities, ballistic program, etc. there are good reasons why secretary defense matus and sim, commander vogel who is responsible for iran in that region, men who may have to respond to what happens next, have both argued for staying in the jcpoa , as have chairman royce and sherman thornberry. number one, the decision was poorly thought out, leaving the u.s. no strategy and unprepared for what would come next. secretary johnson amended that plan b does not seem well- developed at this stage, he said that the day before the president's announcement, for his part, the president admitted that if he were the iranians, he probably wouldn't negotiate with the u.s. under the circumstances. that was president trump who said that. the u.s. has gone from being part of the strongest
multilateral nonproliferation agreement in nuclear history to know strategy, few friends, no timetable for achieving object tips, and iran free to advance its civilian nuclear program. more than one observer has suggested that scuttling the jcpoa would mainly help iran. number two, it increases the risk of war and proliferation in the middle east. by attacking the jcpoa, the administration has improved iran's capability to preserve -- pursue weapons, and has created conditions that might lead to that outcome. the decision has allowed iran out of its nuclear box, and it making demands that no country would make two, increases the pressure on iran to consider its nuclear options. the opposite of what is in u.s. national security interests. if iran begins taking steps, reintroducing centrifuges, reducing iaea access, there will be an immediate public i -- outcry, and many of those who advocated ditching the jcpoa will be the very same people demanding military
action, despite the fact that it was their policies that got us here. number three, undermined european alliances. americans fought and died in world war i and two, wars that resulted in millions of deaths and the destruction of europe. coming out of the ashes of world war ii, the atlantic and the european alliances have been the single most important instrument for america's national security. the administration not only ignored the request of our allies to stay in the jcpoa, it is now threatening to sanction against european firms if they continue to abide the agreement. let me repeat that. united states of america is threatening to punish our european allies if they refuse to violate the agreement. there was a time when america was leader of the free world. leadership is when you take action and are followed by others who share your views and have confidence in your leadership. leadership is not walking away from commitments and then threatening your friends if they don't do the same. not a single country followed us out of the jcpoa. not one.
that's not leadership, that's not making america great. that's making america isolated. number four, the problems of iranian military spending, regional activities, human rights will be worse, not better, as a result of this decision. will iran in the aftermath of u.s. actions, feel more or less threatened? it would seem likely that they will feel more threatened with the reasons discussed above. that appears to be the objective. research and scholarship and security studies would predict that on average, as countries feel more threatened, they are more likely to spend money on their military and to develop weapons like missiles. they are more likely, not less likely, to hold their allies close in anticipation of a conflict, and more likely to undermine their adversaries to prepare for a conflict. mister chairman, ranking members of the committee, i want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on a topic of utmost important for u.s. national security and the security of our friends and
allies. the jcpoa was a singular nonproliferation achievement that was years in the making. in one day, the president has undercut it, letting iran out of its box and setting off a series of events that could bring war and nuclear proliferation to a region that needs neither. these pose new challenges for american national security, the american people will hold congress accountable for those results. i remain committed to working with you to protect the american people and our friends abroad. i look forward to conversations about those dangers and challenges that lie ahead. thank you. >> thank you, doctor rubin, five minutes. >> chairman desantis, ranking members, thank you for the opportunity to testify. my written testimony goes into considerable detail, but in the interest of time, let me just highlight a few points. one, the jcpoa considerably eroded counter proliferation precedents set by both south africa and libya. two, while some might argue
that since the clauses exist in other treaties, what makes the jcpoa different is that it left iran with an industrial scale nuclear program, and more centrifuges at its disposable than pakistan had when it dealt an arsenal. three, what iranian diplomats say in english, i should also note that it was during the so- called dialogue of civilization that iran built the covert aspects and worked on the nuclear warhead design, not at a time when it was under threat, and this is something which a honey bragged about in persian. the jcp away was never meant to be a get out of jail free card on other iranian malfeasance. it is a sense of impunity that his part iranian aggression and heighten the risk of war. there are three major components to a nuclear weapons program. enrichment, warhead design, and delivery. resolution 2231 reversed precedents on ballistic
missiles, it is imperative that the united states stop that program. the precedent for extraterritorial sanctions was set by the clinton administration in congress with the iran libya sanctions act. the same sky is falling arguments were voiced then as now, and happily, there just is false. the detail in my written testimony, there are cases where iran is succumbed to pressure. there is no reason the goals outlined by secretary of state pompeo should not be embraced in a bipartisan fashion. there's no reason to rationalize iranian terrorism or regional aggression. the jcpoa unleashed a cascade of proliferation as regional states recognized the agreement did not achieve its stated goals. is counterfactual to argue that withdrawal from the jcpoa is what motivates saudi arabia to pursue a nuclear option. is silly and an affront to the constitutional process to suggest that the jcpoa is a treaty.
don't trust me on that. assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs unr secretary of state john curry said it was unsigned, and neither treating or executive agreement. to suggest any un security council resolution becomes a treaty equal to senate ratification is dangerous, given the tendency of the un to indulge in the basest anti- americanism. democracy is the best system out there, but the democratic process can be messy. it is ms. analysis to fail to understand a system like israel's, that some people are motivated by personal animus towards israel's leaders, and their own partisan battles. it is not wise to assume that every person who has held a position as qualified. take danny a tom. his tenure at mossad ended in 2001. likewise, when i lived in iran, the iranian pressed constantly brought up from u.s. attorney general ramsey clark's condemnations of u.s. policies. he was a former high-level official didn't necessarily
imbue him with expert judgment. the point is, we can debate whether or not trump should have walked away from the jcpoa , but regardless whether he does or not, it would have been necessary to focus on the future and develop a strategy that confronts the challenge that iran poses on a number of fronts, and fill the loopholes left by the jcpoa. the u.s. should not get sucked into a debate, but should counter the ideological export of extremism, whether it comes in the sunni form or shiite form. i should note that the problem here is that both the iranian constitution and the founding statute of the islamic guard corps define the purpose of iran to export revolution, which in the public debate in persian in 2008 was concluded to mean a more violet -- as opposed to an aspect of power solution. admit supporting terrorist
groups. when it comes to recommendations, i outline these in considerable detail, as to a broader strategy, any strategy should have diplomatic informational military and economic components. in addition to some of the technical issues in the jcp away, we could do much more for example, to support independent trade union movements in iran. i think the bush administration missed a moment back in 2005 when iranian bus drivers created the first independent trade union. we could also invest in anti- censorship technologies, which chairman refugees have created, and we could remove u.s. aircraft carriers from the persian gulf to make them in vulnerable to iranian small boats, while at the same time maintaining the ability to reach out at iran should they engage in hostile behavior. thank you. >> thank you, gentlemen. the chair now recognizes himself for five minutes.
is there any disagreement, perhaps doctor walls, but the rest of the witnesses all agree that, regardless of whether you think the president should have withdrawn or not, that it was not binding on him, it was not a treaty, it was not u.s. law, it was a political agreement that he could withdraw from, correct? >> yes >> yes. >> you don't believe that, doctor walls. you think it was binding. >> you said you violated it, i know you believe that it was good policy to stay in it, but do you have a qualm with us saying he had the right to do it? we live in a representative government, we have a treaty provision, we have executive agreements, that choice was not taken, and we live by the sword, you die by that sort. >> let me say that when i testified last time, i hope you got the message i passed your staff, which i appreciated in these times how i was treated in our last hearing.
i look forward to returning. i was a couple of things briefly. if you ignore the un security council resolution part of that and we can have a legal argument about that, if we ignore that, which i'm willing to do, i would say there's a different between a treaty and a political agreement. but psi was a similar agreement. >> i just want to lay that out there. there was a lot of criticism saying we are violating an agreement, the u.s. -- it wasn't an agreement that was binding. we have a debate in congress, it should have and submitted as a treaty, it should have been an executive agreement, and it wasn't. let me ask you this. you've made the claim that the withdrawal increases the likelihood of proliferation. why do you think that the people in the region were so opposed to the deal? saudi arabia, the mri, the israeli? they cheered the president, because they wanted to see
tougher economic sanctions, then that will make iran less able to dominate the region. i know the european union's, they agree with you. how would you respond to the people in the middle east? in that neighborhood, who think it was a bad deal, and are glad the president took the action. >> i would disagree, not all the mri fees, and i think there are more countries in the region that israel and saudi arabia, although that's where we tend to pay attention to. i think clearly savvy arabia is in a struggle with the wrong. the same thing is going on with, there is a rivalry with israel. those countries wanted sanctions. they didn't care about the nuclear issue, as weakening iran , making it as weak as possible. i understand that as a strategy, but the other states in the region, europe, us, the rest of the world, all thought it would be, despite israel and saudi arabia's problems with iran,
that taking a larger view, it's not about whether their sanction or not, it's about whether they have a nuclear weapon or not. >> they all care about that. can you speak to the middle eastern countries view of this deal, and of the president's action? >> without exception, every moderate regime or u.s. ally was very opposed to the joint conference plan of action. they resented that they were not consulted. to give their expertise on closing some of the loopholes. that was a missed opportunity on the part of the previous administration. were regimes out there, the syrian regime which was much more interested in -- much more favorable to the jcpoa, as were some of the harder line elements inside the iraqi government.
>> mister goldberg, my friend from vermont mentioned regime changes. i've not heard anyone say go in there and forcibly remove the iranian regime. on the other hand, there are swats of iranian society that are dissatisfied with living under an islamist tyranny. those are people that are probably pro-western, and people that we should have common cause with. dealing with the sanctions element, cutting out the money, but trying to empower through social networks or other things those people -- isn't that a good policy? don't we want this regime to be weakened? it's not representative of a society, and his people that are trying to stand up to it, and we should have their back. >> mister chairman, is not as good policy, it's u.s. policy, as voted on by bipartisan majorities in both chambers over many years. we have legislation, we have
congress like which, we have sanctions for these issues, we have funding and the appropriations committee. this is been our policy. the term regime change has become a political term. this is a post iraq war environment, and the words regime change archer try to get some sort of moment of, do you want to invade? like the war in iraq? there is no one on this panel, or any administration, who is coming anywhere near such a policy. that's not the policy. we need to look more at a cold war era policy. what was the reagan administration's victory policy? rollback policy toward the soviets? we wanted behavioral change, we wanted to roll them back to the world, we want to see the same sort of behavioral change out of this regime. we will also benefit greatly if one day, internally, peacefully, the people of iran who are out in the streets, the people who are screaming out for freedom for some sort of government that represents them , that makes their lives better
, a government that doesn't spend money in syria or yemen, but on them, to get them jobs and income. if that happens peacefully through policy, that's great. >> my time expired. let me way then i would like to recognize mister selden and mister donovan, both of new york. though they are not on the committee, they be able to purchase a in the proceedings. without objection, so ordered. it's my pleasure to recognize my friend from vermont, mister welsh for five minutes. >> let me start with you on this question of getting this regime change issue off the table, because no one is talking about that. have you ever heard of josh bolton? >> josh bolton? >> mister bolton? the former chief of staff? on fox news, he said that our goal should be regime change in iran. should i take him
seriously? or you seriously? >> again, -- >> this is a serious question. he's the national security advisor for the president, he said to the american people, that our goal should be a regime change in iran. you want to blow him away and so he doesn't mean it? >> no, -- >> what about rudy giuliani? >> did you want a response? >> i'm asking you to respond whether we should take mister bolton, and now mister giuliani seriously. esther giuliani said that the president is as committed to a regime change as we are. to take mister giuliani seriously? >> congressman, are you for repression of the iranian people, yes or no? >> there is no, there is no one in this congress no one in this country that condones repression anywhere by any dictator in any
country. you know that. i'm asking the questions here. rudy giuliani, or goldberg? could we listen to about regime change? you don't have to answer. >> i would listen to the president of the united states, pompeo, and those empowered by the president. >> does anyone seriously think that trust on the american side of iran had anything to do with his agreement? that obama or secretary kerry trusted the iranians? or do they believe that secretary mattis, who is right, that there is no basis for trust. that's why there had to be very strong, verifiable inspections? anyone disagree with that? >> i disagree. >> i disagree. >> you disagree, mister albright and you disagree. you think this is based on trust.
i'm just asking -- >> i disagree that president obama did that, one of the problems in the jcpoa that developed -- became an advocate for iranian noncompliance. they would try to --? here's the question. there's nobody here, and i was in favor of all of the iranian sanctions, by the way. all of the iranian sanctions. i was in favor of this agreement. not that it was perfect, but it got rid of the nuclear weapons. let me ask a question about this. what happens, under the agreement, if iran has the choice to resume its nuclear activities? let me ask this question. what is the option for the united states, should iran aggressively restart its activities toward building a
nuclear weapon? who on the panel would favor the use of military action at that point? just raise your hands. you would. mister rubin? >> in my written testimony, there episodes of overwhelming pressure that has caused iran to back down. that's what led to the release of the hostages in 1981, that's what led to the end of the iranian iraq war, history can be the president on this. >> let me finish. the president has tweeted that it's time for change in iran. the secretary of state wrote the congress must act to change iranian behavior, and ultimately the iranian regime. and doctor ruben, i understand that regime change is the only strategy, short of military strikes that will deny iran a nuclear bomb. this question about what the implications are of a torn up deal, are not idle questions. they are real. we are heading in a different
direction. that's what's happening. >> are you. -- >> i understand that you think assassination is a tool as well, in your writing, that --? that is woefully imprecise, i know the article you are referring to, would you like -- >> my time, my time is running out. >> then the accurate. >> i know many of you have liquidations about what the policy should be. to any of you know what our policy is? >> yes. >> and it is what? where is it? how come i don't know? how, chairman doesn't know? >> mister chairman, mister ranking member, i've heard most of my colleagues talk about why they don't like iran and why they don't like the deal. that's fine, i'm sympathetic. i've not heard anyone talk about the fact that we don't have a strategy, and that this puts us on the path to war, either by design, regime change, where we back into it,
as we respond to them beginning to reinstall their nuclear program. i would like to hear a lot more for my friends about how we will deal with that in the future, because that's what general mattis and the others fear, and have to prepare for, and talking about why i don't like iran isn't going to get us anywhere. and on this issue of the iranians who everyone professes concern for, the iranians are not happy with this, a poll came out last month that said, this was a private pole, how should we respond to the u.s. polling? 67% of the iranians said that iran should retaliate. because they are rallying around their flag. they may not like the corruption or the economy, but if you threaten to attack their country, we are going to help the hardliners who will strike a blow for democracy. >> i think the witnesses.
>> the chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the subcommittee, mister russell, for five minutes. >> thank you mister chairman. thank you for being here today. shortly after the iran deal was concluded and president obama made repeated statements that iran would be denied access to the world's largest financial and economic markets, secretary of treasury reinforced this policy. another treasury official had stated that iran would be unable to deal in the world's most important currencies. that was adams who been. earlier today, america learns your senate investigation that president obama's administration issued a license to deal in u.s. currency conversion at a bank in muscat that they could convert billions of dollars and euros. getting blanket access and
providing key iranian funds that could be used for funding extremism and other troubling activity. fortunately, no u.s. bank wished to comply with such an authorization. they feared fallout in the financial industry, and u.s. sanctions law. my question, as we debate this handshake agreement that was not an agreement with the american people, not done through a treaty, not done through consent of congress when we had bipartisan overwhelming resistance to the iran deal, my question would be this: to doctor walsh, a series of basic questions to frame of activity of iran is important here. should we curtail proliferation of terrorism, or promoted? >> considering mister vice
chair, that i spent virtually all my professional career working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and undermine terrorism, i think my answer is obvious. >> i'm guessing by your answer, it would be to curtail it. i've been a soldier most of my life, and seeing iran kill united states soldiers, i would be in agreement. general mattis, who was committed during that period -- we encourage nuclear cooperation with north korea, and iran, or should we curtail that? ? to my knowledge, and i've testified before congress on this, there was missile cooperation between north korea and iran, but not nuclear cooperation. lots of media reports, but the dni has never said it, the iaea has never said it, the congressional research service has never said it, and i was unable in a survey of 1000 media stories -- >> should we encourage this cooperation? north korea and iran, syria,
there is overwhelming evidence that there was cooperation. >> nuclear cooperation? >> should we strengthen the ability of the iranian republican guard corps to destabilize iran's neighbors? or should we curtail that? >> curtail that. >> absolutely. despite section 2. which had 52 players that identified and put on a deck of cards, and we were able to work with president obama's treasury administration to restore some of these back to the sanctions list. however, listening to all the pundits for this agreement, they stated there was no problem giving sue ahmadi and these industries sanctions relief. >> reporter: the intelligence community has said that sanctions relief did not go in large measure. >> we know the user for peaceful purposes. my last question, should we wave international and national financial standards on monetary
exchange regarding the sanctions, or should we maintain the strength of sanctions rather than creating licenses to undermine financial markets? >> here's what i think. of all the things you listed, only one is the most important. the priority. that is denying iran the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. >> all of the other things notwithstanding, we should undermine the credibility and our record on human rights. we should undermine the credibility of the united states when it comes to standing up for other people. we should undermine our allies, and worse, undermine american soldiers -- >> if i may, reclining desmond reclaiming my time, one thing is crystal clear. when you make an agreement that the american people are overwhelmingly against, 60%, this was a bad deal. it made us less secure, and we
hear testimony after testimony with our neighbors, our allies, and others, and yet we are led to believe that we are making the world less secure. having the u.s. credibility undermined makes the world less secure. i'm sorry, i'm out of time, thank you. >> the chair now recognizes the gentleman from georgia, for five minutes. >> mister chairman. i would like to associate myself with your remarks earlier. i completely agree that presidential made the right decision in this. iran deal was flawed, from the start. we needed a better agreement then, we need a stronger agreement now. we cannot idly sit by while iran continues to build up its ballistic missiles and all the things that you've mentioned today. doctor ruben, let me start with you. what kind of threat does has blah and the islamic
revolutionary guard pose? >> it poses an overwhelming threat. the deputy secretary of hezbollah has said that he welcomes the opportunity for all the jews in the world to relocate to israel, it would save them the trouble of hunting them down and killing them. >> we have a serious threat. what can the u.s. do to support israel? against this threat? >> the iranian strategy tries to overwhelm iranian missile defenses just by sheer number of missiles, which are in hezbollah or hamas hands. the preventive action would be to continue to support the interdiction of any missiles or missile parts. when it came to the aircraft deal, i should note that iran, if you calculate the number of
seats that iran air has, and compared to the boeing and airbus deal, airbus and boeing were prepared to give iran more than three times the annual capacity of iranian flights, putting them on scale of cutter or korean air, so clearly it wasn't about passenger safety. which is why encouraging companies to scale back aid which could go to the guard corps is why our goal is to constrain the enron -- islamic revolutionary guard corps. >> what about the naval aggression? of iran? what should be our goal there? >> with regard to the naval aggression, our presence matters. i differentiate between our presence in general and our aircraft carrier presence, but when president obama, for good reasons, talked about a pivot to asia, what many people in the gulf heard was a pivot away from us, so psychologically, there's a sense of abandonment among some of the gc allies.
the reason i talk about taking aircraft carriers and pushing them into the arabian sea, is to neutralize the threat posed iranian small boats swarming tactics, where they can reach us but we can't reach them. we can reach them from the arabian sea, they can't retaliate. >> a stronger presence, am i hearing you saying that would be a change from the obama administration's approach? >> between 2003 and 2011, we had one carrier strike group in the persian gulf. between 2000 -- twee 1991 and 2003, we had one, between 2003 and 2011 we had to. what i'm saying is, we should continue with the destroyers and cruisers, and amphibian ships in the persian gulf, but the aircraft carriers should remain outside. >> mister goldberg, let me go to you. in your written testimony, you described maximum pressure strategy using
multiple lines of effort. what further sanctions do we need, in your opinion, and how do we know that these sanctions are working? >> i appreciate the question. you for your leadership on this in the past. it will be very important for this subcommittee and other members to conduct oversight to make sure that we do have a maximum pressure campaign is exceeds. we measure this by the liquidity crisis in iran, the axis of the regime to cash, to hard dollars, to hard euros. what we saw in the lead up to the jc poa, the interim deal, was that under the central bank sanctions, the disconnection of iranian banks, the sectoral symptoms that congress enacted, we saw enormous pressure and stress in the regime. because they have so mishandled their economy under the sanctions relief provided by the jcpoa, the economy is
already in crisis. the timing of the real position of sanctions for maximum pressure couldn't be better. the riyal is in freefall, and as we cut off banks from doing business with iranian banks, as we pressure swift to ensure that the disconnect iranian banks as well, as they all come back online, it will be important for congress to conduct oversight to make sure they are being enforced. >> so has the withdrawal had any effect on your opinion companies doing business with iran? >> absolutely. we see on a daily basis more companies, large ones getting out here? have seen today and there was a lot of reports -- oil imports from europe canceled due to our return of the oil sanctions. we've seen that the european investment bank, the europeans were talking about using the european investment banks as a replacement for private institutions to provide financing for companies that wanted to continue in iran.'s leaders said they don't want
any part of that. iran is risky, sanctions are risky. we don't want that. i would point everyone to yesterday's speech by our undersecretary for tsi treasury. she gave a great speech that was an indictment of the iranian regime, financial system. not because of the nuclear deal, but because of the practices and behavior of this regime. that is why most banks and companies don't want to do business there, and with the return of the u.s. sanctions, and our oversight from congress to make sure that it's properly implemented, the iranian regime will be under enormous stress. >> thank you. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from new york, for five minutes. >> thank you mister chairman. thank you for the invitation to today's hearing. we have a diverse group of speakers today. i think it's important for us to learn lessons from what happened with the negotiation, with understanding the text of the deal and moving forward with
we are all concerned with the need to protect america's security at home and abroad. there might be a diversity of opinion of how to get there. if you don't mind, i guess i'll start with doctor walsh. i just want to get some of the perspectives in this. i understand that you are supportive of the deal. what in the deal have you identified as needing to be fixed? >> i agree that several of the provisions, the ideal case would be, had things worked out, for us to have been after a year to enter negotiations for a follow-on agreement. that the common practice in international affairs. a temporary agreement, the npt was that way, you have an agreement, then you build trust between parties, they see that we follow through, we see that
they follow through, and then -- >> what else do you want to see? what would you want to see in the follow-on? >> i would like to see longer, i wouldn't have objected to longer periods on the sunsets. before some of the obligations came up >> anything in regards to the verification? >> david and i are good friends, he and i disagree, when you read with the iaea says, they say they are performing complement three access inspections . that's what they said in their most recent statement. there performing these inspections. can we get better access? i would be in favor of that. their reporting to the international community that they can do their job. you always want more and better inspection if you can. >> two important aspects that we touched on with regards to the sunset provision, the you are the most passionate supporter of the nuclear deal, or you are one of the most
vocal opponents of it, the sunset provisions are problematic. the verification agreement on top of what was said. the iranians have said before and after this negotiation that we will not have access to their military sites. >> and yet we do. >> that's not true. at fortune, we went there, we found particles the required a follow-up, and the rainy and said that the iaea would not be able to go back to inspect those particles further. they have said that we will not have access to the -- >> we didn't have the additional protocols. >> we've not been to any military sites, so to say that -- iranians are saying you're not allowed to gain access to our military sites, and we have not gained access to their military sites. you are shaking your head. >> i can't name them, but i know
-- >> are you saying that -- >> the iaea , some of the stuff is done confidentially. the point is the agency works on cause. if they have reason, if they have suspicions about aside, they have authority under the protocol to demand an inspection. >> they say they've had access to all the sites they wanted to have. that their language, not mine. on sunsets, i would -- >> you're not referring to military sites. >> yes i am. >> the iranians have said >> i know they say stiff, but when it comes to implementation, they follow the protocol like everyone else. >> work and i go to source that? is there something that details all the military sites the iaea has been able to access? >> today, the statement by iaea that it has, had access to every site that it has
requested access to. and additionally, it is under the additional protocol, legally, to visit any military side. >> just a couple days ago, it was on the latest safeguard reports, said it would be nice if iran started allowing! >> they got the message from the e3 u.s. negotiations, they are not doing enough. they told ambassador healy, they had 50 sites of concern, they had two or 300 sites of interest. they've not visited all those sites. they have not visited any sites that have been named in the nuclear archive that were recently discovered and unknown to the iaea. and probably western intelligence. there are many sites they have not visited, they pulled their punches, and now it's time that they stopped. >> is there anything on the verification front that the
other four, doctor walsh, we had a chance to talk, anything anybody else would like to add? improvements that need to be made? >> one is that it's not true that the jcpoa was fully verified. a lot of these things happen behind the scenes. the iaea doesn't tell the whole story, one of the issues is in section t, which is a ban on nuclear weapons development activities. that is still not verified. there are conditions in there that involve equipment, that is known to exist in iran. additional equipment has been identified in the nuclear archive that is subject to section t, it should be declared by iran, subject to joint commission approval and monitored by the international energy agency, and that is not happening. i hate to say this deal is verified, is the best deal in the world, but that's simply
not true. it's time to end this time to end this talking point of the date! iaea proponents, and find out how we are going to fix this situation. >> i appreciate that. we could go on further here with regards to verification, i is a member of congress, we have not received copies of the verification agreement between the iaea in iran. we read associated press reports the talk about iran collecting some of their own soil samples and inspecting their own nuclear sites, but with regard to verification, as well as the conversation on the sense of provisions, we have improvements to make, and hopefully all of you would agree that we can make this better. >> the chair now recognizes doctor donovan for five minutes. >> think you.
there are a few facts i would like to highlight as a preface to my question. fact, the joint conference of plan of action, according to the obama administration, was a political commitment, not a treaty. as such, the deal employed -- no president after president obama, including president trump, legally bound by the iran deal, because it was a political agreement, not a legal agreement. back to. under jcpoa , iran has gone on a shopping spree, spending money not on its own domestic needs, but on supporting terrorists and dictators. iran has focused its attention on iraq, syria, and lebanon. what iraq, syria, and lebanon hold in common? together, they represent a geographic land bridge for ran that gives it a clear direct path to israel.
fax three. the iran regime wants to destroy israel. at every turn, the iran regime has only fanned the flames of violence in the middle east to serve its own hateful agenda. ayatollah khomeini stated on twitter that israel is a malignant, cancerous tumor, that has to be removed and eradicated. it is possible, and it will happen. president trump's administration has laid out 12 reasonable requirements for a new deal with iran, which include iran ending its support for terrorist organizations, and ending its threat against israel and other nations in the middle east. there are differences in our political beliefs here today, but i call my republican colleagues, the trump administration, and many of my democratic colleagues have at least one thing in common. strong support for our ally,
israel. congressman saw baines stated that israel is one of our closest and most important allies. congresswoman dennings said, israel's security is essential to the future of the jewish people and the security of the united states. congressman lynch stated that the state of israel is one of our most important allies. congressman engel agreed that the biggest agent in israel security, today, the most serious danger israel must confront is iran. it is unacceptable that a country with a history of supporting terrorism and calling for the destruction of israel could have a nuclear weapon. minority leader nancy pelosi has noted that there is no greater political accomplishment in the 20th century and the establishment of the state of israel. as you can see across the aisle, we all want to see israel survive and thrive. we agreed that iran's
aspirations to annihilate israel are not acceptable. given that the large bipartisan support for israel, how does the u.s. withdrawing from the iran deal and hence israel and the u.s. national security issue? >> think the question. it's important to see what russia is doing, and not doing in syria. since i withdraw from the root -- iran deal, we've seen russia sit on its hands while israel conducted airstrikes against the infrastructure that caused -- put in doing that under the protections of the jcpoa. doing that, putting those systems in place over the last three years, that is really air strike that took place, it demonstrated that in a post- tran01 world, iran is shedding
support. we are looking at what russia does in syria, we are looking at what the world bank and the imf are telling private sector businesses from europe and the united states to not do business in iraq, because that's where iran is trying to offset u.s. sanctions, by penetrating iraqi economic sectors. walking away from the deal has made the middle east less dangerous. i argue that if iran takes will lose european support. if they rush to a bomb, they will be lose russian support. russia does not want on its border. i would ask the raining people what they think about regime change. the raining people have said that the regime has squandered the economic benefits of the billion dollars district $50 billion spent on adventurism, stabilize the middle east and
the trying to develop an offensive capability against israel, the regime is in freefall. jcpoa. of them. we are out of iran is in a weaker position. we now have leverage, the think to pick the u.s., especially if iran >> thank you. mister chairman, i yield. >> i want to thank all the witnesses for appearing before us today, the record will remain open for two weeks for any member to submit,
policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning, george mason university senior research fellow in the alliance for american manufacturing paul discuss the administrative's trade and tariff policy. and johnson will be here to talk time-warner merger. be sure to watch c-span'sw" -- c-span's "washington journal." watch -- join the discussion. >> our live coverage from québec, canada begins at 4:00 p.m. eastern. and at 6:30 p.m., vice president mike pence gives the key speech at the faith conference. >> this week marks the 58th anniversary of the assassination of robert f kennedy.
last few weeks, robert francis kennedy was enjoying himself. he really enjoyed getting out among the people and he enjoyed the physical contact. he refused to police protection because he said all the people wanted to do was to touch him. not to hurt him. >> watch the cbs news special report from june 6, 1968, the night robert kennedy died from gunshot wounds. >> they quickly decided to transfer him to good samaritan hospital where the facilities were better for delicate brain surgery. esther kennedy was with him all of the time riding in the ambulance from one hospital to the other. the suspect, now identified as it was ledir hand, by police back to the ballroom. some of the officers had to protect him from the crowd.
several bystanders were close to hysteria and there was concern for the safety of the suspect. america oneel c-span3. >> as president trump was leaving the white house to attend the g-7 summit in canada he talked to reporters about a number of topics including trade issues, north korea, and his presidential pardoning power. this is about 20 minutes.