tv Washington This Week CSPAN June 9, 2018 2:26pm-3:59pm EDT
summit on june 12 in singapore, a discussion about the role japan and other countries in the region could play in future talks and what they think would be the best outcome of the summit. >> all right, well, welcome. first admin thing -- if you've got a phone, if you could turn it off or turn it to vibrate just so we don't get an interruption in the middle. the event today is the u.s.-north korean summit got canceled or postponed, so i guess we got it right. although over the weekend when me thatlists contacted now that trump has said we are officially back on, should we change the title, and i said it will probably change two or three times before our event even, but actually, there's a bit of a story behind the isn't. when i finally lined up the panelists, the first three, and we have a second panel focusing particularly and japan, i had
not gotten around to sending out the notifications flyer, so i like i ame morning going to do nothing else this morning but get that flyer out. just a summit of what will happen, what are the applications, and i get interrupted by a phone call. flyer want to get this out. cnn? ok, yeah, i condone interview in -- i can do an interview in 20 minutes on what? the cancellation. we are running around during interviews, and that night, i said rather than being really let's talkcurve on about the summit, why don't we still have the event, but we will change the title to what are the implications of a canceled summit, and that way instead of looking like i'm hopelessly behind in getting an event flyer out, i'm looking brilliant in that i got six for the canceled
summit, and then we are printing the flyers and someone suggest in case it does come back, why don't we fudge on the title? back story. anyway, is a great pleasure to have three expert colleagues and friends to talk about the u.s. -north korean summit and we will follow with three other expert analysts about the japan aspect. you recognize all the panelists because they are on tv so often, but we have a visiting senior research fellow at the korea research forum, a think tank in seoul. previously she was at the carnegie endowment for international peace. we have a professor for korean studies, assistant professor at
test university. formerly he was a research fellow with the national asia research program. fellow at the center for korean and international studies. before that, she had a long career in the intelligence community or with the u.s. government, she was the director for korea, japan, and oceanic affairs at the national security council. she was the deputy national security officer for east with that element chairs here and i think we will have you go first then we will see who the next panelists is. aboutf them will talk their views of the upcoming summit. concern ashope or well as recommendations are what we hope to see come out of the summit. there is a lot of confusion. we may do some cross panel
discussion or i may ask some questions then we will open it to the audience. 10? >> thank you. thank you for this opportunity and thank you ladies and gentlemen for taking the time to be here. the last time that the u.s. president geared up prepared for a summit meeting with his north korean counterparts, great things accrued for north korea. in 2000, kim jong-il came out of his antisocial shell and engaged the world visit -- vigorously for a series of summit meetings. kim jong-un on affected a very dramatic image maker -- makeover
from a dictator to a reasonable global statesman with whom the world could do business. nuclear negotiations. standardso set a new for international shakedown. extortion. let me explain. in may of 2000, kim jong-un made his first foreign visit as the national leader. he went to beijing. in a fortnight he had a very important summit coming up with south korean president. after having pocketed $500 million in cash secretly wire transferred to the south korean government to kim jong-un owns secret personal accounts, he then received president vladimir
putin on july 19. it was the first ever visit to north korea by the leader of russia or the former soviet union. chinahaving softened up south korea and russian, then he turned to the united states and special envoy to the white house. that envoy came to the white house on october 10, that with president clinton and delivered a personal letter to clinton from his boss inviting clinton to come to north korea. albrightater madeleine .as in pyongyang many people do not remember that bill clinton was very keen on making that historic trip as unprepared and rushed as it was.
is very strong today in the white house. the trump administration i would say in the only reason that that visit by clinton never materialized was due to the uncertainty in the fiasco in the wake of the november 7 pull it -- presidential election, the vote recount. it was not until mid-december that al gore conceded defeat and simply time ran out on clinton. but even in very early january, clinton had not given up hope on a historic moment in pyongyang. trumpent days president choice to takem his time on denuclearization. a song called take it slow, is a
is reminiscent of that egos. . president trump has said that he believes north korea can change and reform its economy under the stewardship of kim jong-un. history suggests otherwise. we see of course a persisting tendency by americans to underestimate rate north koreans. north korea has been weaponize thing its own weight -- weirdness since the 1970's. 1972 as the mood dramatically changed in the region in the aftermath of the traumatic opening between the u.s. and the leader called on the
journalists and reporters to see him. next month he gave an interview to the washington post. the next month he received a harvard law professor to all three parties kim il-sung said the u.s. should leave that they unificationnce to by the korean people themselves. japan was re-militarizing on making south korea and north korea and economic comedy. todayoes kim jong-un seek after having affected what is in my view some of the most dramatic image makeover in
history? in a few months he has gone from , rocket man onan a suicide mission, to a very honorable man. very smart and very gracious. that's what president trump has said of him. that heas said of kim was very well prepared and personable. shermanld days wendy said of kim jong ill that he was smart capable supremely confident and not a lunatic. here's the point. when americans meet with north koreans, they come away impressed. but the north korean dictator is not only not a raving lunatic but actually quite reasonable, gracious, has a self -- since of
humor. [indiscernible] that americans come away totally impressed uniformly certain in the belief that they had made some kind of deep emotional connection with the north korean dictator by virtue of their own charisma intelligence and empathy that they can now trust. seeks isjong-un negotiation process. not a final agreement. not an agreed resolution. with which to buy time and money to perfect his own nuclear posture. for the firstambo installment first blood which was kind of fresh creative and critically acclaimed.
by the time you see the fourth installment you have a good idea of how the movie is going to end. time after time u.s. administrations fault for this track. because north korea is dangling before the international community the possibility of the nuclearization. it was president trump's first mistake to agree to the proposition for a date. i think president trump is rushing into this meeting. closing how to salvage this very own a situation? the two men will meet in singapore next week. at the meeting, i suggest president trump needs to use the instead ofver political drama. as you know very
of the gradual suspension and termination of u.s. sanctions against north korea are qualified into law. 402 of the1 and north korea sanctions and enhancement act. president trump should tell mr. kim the truth. -- lawis above the wall in the united states. are tied until you release political prisoners and until you take meaningful steps toward the denuclearization. your chemical biological weapons programs, it's not that much i can do. i cannot even suspend sanctions for one year until you stop counterfeiting our currency, engaging in political elation , and untilaundering
abide by laws of international society. this is the truth and furthermore i call on you mr. kim to tear down the walls of your inhumane [indiscernible] until you do that there's not much i can do. have a nice day. ist kim will call for cyclization of this to act play. provocation and post provocation. he will call for more summits. as you know, as you are courting someone you leave open the of another meeting. even if the first date doesn't work out very well. kim will say come to pyongyang.
he will say i am amenable to visit you in the united dates. trump will be engaged and interested by the possibility of continual dialogue. i believe this is a trap it will not work out. if he can muster up the courage to tell kim the truth, and that will be political drama worth a visit. >> thank you. more background on the government meetings that were occurring before it was decided that clinton would not go to pyongyang, i was attending a white house meeting called the plus one. for the dcisistant and other cia officials talking
about north korea. after north korea invited president clinton to go in 2000, some in the administration were saying we should do this. the force of president clinton's personality is so strong if we get him in the room with the korean leader we will get what we want. the majority of the view was against that and it was predicated on success in meetings and kuala lumpur. the north koreans kept saying sender president he will be happy. said that is not how we do it. we don't deploy a president to negotiate. we deploy a president to sign an agreement that is finalized. the north koreans were not willing to be forthcoming in the
parameters of the deal. it is quite different now where we are going to have a top down approach. trump is seeing himself as the negotiator in chief. that's a little more background. the uncertainty of the election added a cloud over the decision but the main reason was because the north was refusing to be forthcoming about the parameters of that missile deal. to secretary of state -- ight's biography, bruce.k you, for being hereu to have this conversation. -- s hard to go
i will try to be as brief as possible. i think the summit will be successful because trump will define it as success. he will package it as such. , how we't matter what view the text that comes out. that therey clear are strong inclinations by both leaders to have a good show. risky andere it gets dangerous and this is where my concern is. that the two leaders especially trump would want to declare peace because it sounds good. is, even if you declare peace it doesn't mean that peace is on the korean peninsula.
and you have declared peace with a nuclear armed north korea. trump clearly is unconventional. the reality is we need to work with what we have and try to make the best with what we have. because president trump has broken conventional diplomatic orthodoxy, i don't think we can ask -- expect him to be a typical negotiator. like a business tycoon who likes to meet his counterpart first, play some golf, then make a move for a deal later. we may see something or we may not. we just don't know yet. because he is unconventional, we need to have some unconventional expectations as well. suggest that a good
will be aen if this show, it is still a very rare and unique opportunity for a sitting american president to directly clarify from a leader likelf to concepts doeslearization and what kim jong-un want? outcome would be a detailed nuclear deal with key steps on verification but i would be happy with a joint vision statement. -- leads outut goals and a clear picture and
pathways for the experts and negotiators to go in and negotiate a deal and implementation. wouldt vision statement include various components that we have seen in the past and we know are still issues today and would have to be a commitment to denuclearization. it would have to include a piece regime and normalization of relations. what president trump should not do at this time is aim for a peace treaty before denuclearization. jong-un his game plan will be to try to go the peace route. that is another way to get to listening sanctions and another route to rid u.s. forces from the peninsula.
a lot of these negotiations he doesn't have to demand president trump get rid of a truce. that way is the peace process. of course trump should not trade away u.s. forces for north korea's nuclear weapons. i will lay those points out for further discussion later and handed over. >> thank you. excellent job. it was recommended what president trump should do. no one is above the law. i agree with him. the problem is we are dealing with president trump. we have to deal with the reality of what we have.
i don't know if president trump -- while it ised that an ideal goal it is not going to happen. it is interesting there is a competing narratives out there on kim jong-un. you've been hearing about this that he is different. he is different from his father he is different from his grandfather. i'm not saying i agree with this assessment i am just giving out another narrative that is out there that kim jong-un is a young man so he has two rule for the next 30 or 40 years. he cares about what the world henks of him, this is why
wants to be an modern leader of a modern country. he wants to transform into a different ring. so that he could potentially put nuclear weapons on the table. i am putting another narrative out there. the problem is, for all of the reasons that are laid out, i am concerned, first of all before the summit, north korea has gains. kim jong-un has played it very well. ofer seven years accelerating toward the nuclear ,rogram, he stops right before he didn't go all the way.
he quits right before and says he has completed the program. they do you see him engaging about the summit and diplomacy. he had a complete image makeover already. he got to meet with xi jinping twice. now he does appear like a normal person of a normal country. he had all of this makeover. then i am concerned that this maximum pressure is already hard to achieve. we are hearing reports of china not really implementg sanctions. there are reports about north korean seafood surfacing on the border area of china. about transferts
of fuel, i am concerned that there is a relaxation. them wererobably s from china russia and south korea. regardless of how this meeting goes with trump, there is already some activity that will be in violations of u.n. sanctions and there will be more activity toward that front. north korea already has gains. that president trump has agreed to sit down with him, we have given him legitimacy. in terms of what to expect from the summit and what a successful outcome would look like, i agree that what ever we see they will
both show it as a success. failing or anyone walking out. set himselfump has a very high bar. he called the iran deal worse than ever, insane, and embarrassment. you look at the iran deal they agreed to give up a large percentage of their nuclear material. and we are now calling that deal insane meaning what ever deal we have with north korea -- iran accepted in perpetuity very intensive monitoring. including cameras in nuclear facilities.
they had allowed a right to challenge inspection for facilities we suspect have covert activities. saying --at deal in , whatever our deal is with north korea has to be better than that. i think if he doesn't come an agreement from north korea of what , it has toation is be permanent and no time limit. the has to be a strict verification regime. andas to include chemical biological weapons and missiles.
if we don't have this kind of agreement that you cannot call it a success. we have talked already about how president trump will call it a success. north korea will be all over it and say it is not successful. i don't think president trump understands that this is not something that can be done on a first try. happen, thereould are two scenarios. nobody knows. one would be some sort of joint statement that is minimal. that talks about inuclearization in principle return for normalization of relations or a peace treaty.
or some sort of statement like that and let someone else work it out. or, president trump could get something out of north korea. might giveth korea something to president trump that looks like a success. oute an agreement to ship of the nuclear program. maybe blow up something. something that looks like it is they can all the media will hyperventilate and say it is a successful summit. that we are heading in the right direction. then, north korea buys time. that is north korea's goal, to buy time. then, even president trump says
it will take time. then north korea can drag out the rest of the inspection or drag out everything and wait out the trump administration until they leave then they will see what they will do. mind is no question in my that we are not going to see irreversiblefiable -- we could see what might look like it is headed in that direction. we will never know if it is something successful or not successful until many years down the road. scenarios.he 26 -- definition. >> thank you very much. ,o pick up on these points
characterizing kim jong-un as better-than-expected. i think we saw that in 1994 when many including some in the u.s. government saying kim jong-il was a bold economic reformer. have made aeople caricature of kim jong-il been kim jong-un, it undermines the assessment of it by making fun of all the missiles that failed. when they have a successful test, people are surprised. say, why were we told that north korea was an actual threat? well, we have been trying. we have all seen the cartoons of
kim jong-un would be funny little guy with the mushroom cloud shaped hair. with like a baby laying nuclear weapon toys, and then when someone meets with him, then they are amazed that he is this great international statesman, and we can do business with him. and then you also see, even this defense officials were replaced in north korea, there is a sort of a automaticn, hotly --replacing the the hardliners. korea is kind of a relative term. corlianig one cor with another. it is a relative term.
and we do not really know why they were replaced. we talked about how we're not an intenseng for statement. every previous north korean statement, it was so vague, some the detailedlike arms control treaty, and we did did not the soviets, we trust the soviets, but by having a really detailed treaty, a contact where we had good responsibility, as it had verification. if you have details and verification, you can have treaties with what you do not like or do not trust. i was always critical of the previous agreements, because they were sort of so vague, so that we could have an agreement, and everybody got to have their own interpretation, so what i was looking for is more of a traditional, you know, i want a
100-page arms control treaty coming out of the summit, or at least a very detailed thing, played kind of also see, mr. president, put the joint statement down, walk away, leave it for the experts. that is another theory -- >> if i could just jump in real quick, i woul am with you on that. i would love to see a detailed agreement as well. if we put them in this context, an early summit so soon with an american president who clearly the not view for understand complexity of these issues, so if you put in that context, the scenario wouldt be to have a simple statement so that there are no mistakes or slippages or slips of the tongue or inadvertent giveaways.
and i think another well,that sue made -- others have said well, it is going to be a success, and then you have very loud responses, and i think it will be very partisan. trump supporters will say "look, i have not read it, but it is better than anything before, because he is a strong president, and he will not do anything flawed like the iran deal." the critic will criticize it just because it is trump was not well prepared, and they will say "it is not as good as the itron deal, which he walked away from." wille analysts and experts say ahead of time what they should be an agreement with, the recommendation, and discuss whatever comes out of it against the merits, or lack thereof, of the agreement, and then picking up on a point that sue
said, because trump has been critical not only of the iran deal but all previous agreements, you know, i put it into kind of a math formula of 1+8+1+b.eater than trump has to be better than me iran deal, the eighth previous attempts with north korea, the imposing penalties on north korea, and the verification has to be equal to or greater than that and the other treaties. that is i think one of the ways we score it. i take off points for contradictory policy statements. i take off points for falling off inalienable, never going to give in on a policy point. but i do not add or subtract things because it is a republican administration. we should assess if the way we would obama or bush or anyone
else. so i think unfortunately it will be a very partisan reaction to whatever comes out of it, and i think what we can hopefully do is put some analysis to it. know,st point is, you just when a lot of the experts looked at the korean summit and pointed out the similarities or even the plagiarism from previous agreements, which north korea had previously violated, i think it is also up to all of us to point out especially where ofre are declarations something new, historic, never done before, to kind of raise our hands and say paragraph two sounds very much like paragraph six of the framework, so it is not breaking new ground. >> may i just add there will be mitigating factors. that will be factors
be put toward kim jong-un. because of the events and factors, well, the pageantry's will go on. if kim not be surprised jong-un visits vladimir putin in moscow. i would not be surprised if he holds a summit meeting with prime minister albabe. of course japan has issues that it has been sidelined. remind you that private assertions on they, the last time he was president -- prime minister shinzo abe, the lesson he was president, u.s. was rate engaging north korea, the escalation of the first nuclear test on october 9, 2006. reformer, ofs a course we heard this even before
in 2011, andower the reasons for forward have always been solely that he was multiculturalism as a boy in switzerland, unlike his father. his counterpart lived in france for four years, yet managed to his country/3 of members. jong-un first became a reformer when he visited -- kim first became a reformer when he visited china in the 1980's. reborn as a new reformer. i remember in january 2001, so after the flurry of diplomatic activity in 2000, kim jong-il
made another visit to china, to the southern provinces, and he wenzhou,he city, fancy, some processor-making plants, flatscreen tv's, and he visited a software producer in shenzhen. then he visited a telecommunications company, and the media and everyone said look, he is trying to follow in so-calledeps of the southern towards in january or february of 1992. kim, that is the current one, will visit those regions, and i will lend further false credence to the wishful thinking that kim jong-un is a
reformer, so, please, let's be patient. let's not rush to judgment, and give him some time. that will be the narrative we will hear, i would say, in the next six months. bruce: i wonder if one of the gestures that kim might present our signing over the keys to the maxwellbl, that dave thought of before, presenting the ship that north korea captured and is kept as a propaganda tool, that they would just offer to return the pueblo back to the u.s. that would be quite a big gesture. why don't i throw the questions open to the audience? i am not sure if we have a microphone going around. if not, if people would sort of just announced their name and their affiliation and a question. mic.ss no
the question about the next six months to 12 months, what about a way of not necessarily -- stopping further missile for japan or south korea, even though it would require more expenditure of time by trump. he does not seem to have a problem with the. -- that. canada and mexico, both of our traditional allies, we are at a standstill with trade matters. trump has a lot of time to visit with kim jong-un for a second or third summit, to keep
this sort of non-test situation continuing, a freeze, if you want. bruce: i do not know if that microphone is on a not. anyway, does anyone want -- thank you for that question. if i understood quickly, you are asking if a long-term freeze is better than nothing. the problem that i have with kim jong-un's recent announcements that he will no longer test nuclear devices and missiles, sure, it is a step in the right direction, it is the right thing solve aut it does not problem, and it is trying to talk the talk of an advanced nuclear power. am anbasically saying i advanced nuclear power, so i do not need to conduct testing anymore. they do not have to conduct testing. they can refine the technology in what is called lab scale but
critical nuclear testing. that is the problem i have. the other problem i have with a deep freeze, if that is what we thatto call it, is that just says that you can keep your nuclear weapons and can still be a threat to south korea, to japan, and of course to the united states. that, again, does not solve a problem, either. if this problem continues to be intractable indefinitely, it would later lead to the potential for south korea and even japan to flirt with their , that willization then make beijing react. it would lead a bad residence to new nuclear aspirations, and it would lead a laundry list of even bigger headaches for the united states in the future.
yes, sure, we need to stop again, does that, not solve the problem, and that does not lead to any real progress in the nuclear issue. thank you. i do not think kim jong-un needs to conduct another underground nuclear test. the nation has conducted six, as you know, and the most recent one on september 3 to last year was the most powerful, had a yield of one over -- of over 150 kilotons. india has conducted nuclear tests, and the last time was 20 years ago in may of 1998. many of those tests were small in yield, some even smaller than one kiloton. they were controlled, but no one said that is not a nuclear test, and today, no one presumes that
they would give it up. by virtue of not having tested in 20 years. believe,jong-un, i needs to do and will do at a --e of choosing his choosing will follow through threat made in's new york last year is to submit a hydrogen bomb out of earth's atmosphere come into space. of course the soviet union terry out these tremendous tests quite iutinely between 1968 and think kim jong-un at that moment can rule out his people. a, i did not mean it. let's talk. establishhat, he will
credibility that north korea can reach in a major u.s. city across the united states, and he would be in a position to extort the u.s., south korea, and even japan, and get what he wants, sout troops out of south korea and perhaps even japan one day, a peace treaty, and maybe one day overview the south itself. sue mi: i have a slightly different take. i think north korea is done with nuclear testing, you know they burned this administration. i think they might do that. but they are going to wait out this administration. the play right now is all of the aplomacy, display normal guy, a reasonable character, this is a reasonable country, and do not go into show and international acceptance.
you can trust us with nuclear weapons. we are a responsible power. i think that will be play. otherwise we get back the maximum pressure when they are just listening it, china, russia, everybody else, and in the back of a bloody nose preventive strike does not help north korea. i actually give kim jong-un more credit. if he did that, it would make it easier for us to know what to do with policy, right. it is easier when north korea asked. when it is a policy, pressure against us, the united states, as we look like the bad guy, we look unreasonable. to thestand leading rationale, but i think that will be sometime down the road after the change in our administration. excuse me. gerald chandler.
why do you think the south korean leaders have been better negotiators than all of the u.s. presidents? obama, and the secretaries of state. in particular, we heard albright on her book tour, and he does not admit to any faults, but use them to think she has some. why do you think that? secondly, you thought the north koreans benefited greatly by these recent negotiations. what concrete benefits have they gotten? all right, i am sorry, are you saying south korean negotiators are better? gerald: i corrected myself. that the north korean negotiators are better than you, and secondly, you said the north koreans are taking advantage and get by what has happened. sue mi: i did not say the north koreans are great negotiators. i just said kim jong-un, how he
conducted himself the last few months is very smart. test, iogen bomb thought he was going to keep going. to my surprise, he actually stopped himself from keep going. i thought the nuclear tests might be a possibility, but he stopped himself. i thought he needed to show military capabilities, but he stopped himself. then they are engaging in the diplomacy's, and now he has emerged with a better image to the rest of the world and the ones that professor lee was just describing or what bruce was describing, like a baby with a bomb. has emerged himself as a much more likable person. even myself when i was watching the whole inter-korea summit, kim jong-un hopping over the dmz with a smile.
not that he does something unbelievable, i think kim jong has better position himself where we are now than in the fall and winter of 2017. prof. lee: i he has to they made whatsoever.ns he now has a smile. he is now amenable to talking about denuclearization, but that utterance of attestation from prohibited activities, activities prohibited under the un security council resolutions, so to say that i am going to hold off on missile and nuclear test and be wined and dined for that statement is a bit absurd. this image makeover over the past several months that kim has affected by making gestures likesters
decommissioning the undergroun nuclear site, by releasing three detainees, who never should have been detained in the first place, and by coming out of his shell, kim jong-un has not only transformed himself from an international pariah to a global statesman. but he has reshaped the geopolitical stage on which he being courted by the leaders of the biggest powers in the world, and this trend, i think, will continue. i do not believe that north koreans are better negotiators than americans. equal.r whether it is u.s. negotiators are better or u.s. negotiators are bad, i might define it as the agreements have been flawed in that, again, if you compare with the arms-control treaties ,e had with the war soul pack
and i was part of -- warsaw pact, and i was part of the delegation, if you compare the detailed documents we had with them, very vague, short, not detailed agreements we had with north korea, i think those were flawed because they were so short and last details. by a car from someone eight times and they have cheated you every time, what you want to do is make sure you define what a car is quite it has four wheels, a carburetor, etc. forwant to make very clear all sides what their requirements are, and in talking with some of the u.s. negotiators when some of the talks were under way, when i would talk about, again, the arms-control treaties, north korea is different. we are not going to have a 1000 page document. we have to do it one page at a time.
why are we treating north korea differently from every other country we have negotiated with? if we are going to do one page at a time, at least make sure each page is good, and i would certain provisions. the north koreans would never let us have that, so we are not going to ask for it. that is not how you do negotiations. also when i asked about verifications, well, we're going to ask for this, some of the provisions that we normally have. short notice, inspections of non-declared facilities. the response is "well, they will not let us have it. they are a very proud nation. -- theorea would let us soviet union would let us have it, but they won't." "what would you have us do, destroy all the buildings to the ground?" no, i just want you to have short notice inspections. i think what they are doing is , allowingague texts
north korea to create a separate category for itself that we agree to, so the nonproliferation treaty, all nations that are in it have a where weesponsibility, carved out special exemptions for them. duyeon: north koreans are savvy negotiators, and the reason for that, the simple answer your question is look at the results today. we have come away decades with that or nuclear weapons, more, more advanced. see changing american administrations, changing american policies, changing personnel and policymakers in america as a weakness and as north koreans advantage that is one way he is affecting the system. if you do not want to give us what we want, we would wait until the next administration.
that is the short answer. bruce: one other thing, whether or the text,tions the previous attempts have failed because north korea kept cheating on the agreements. even as they were signing it, they were already in violation with uranium programs, etc. so whether we leave the negotiators or just i think the underlying factor is that north korea cap to doing what they agreed no never to do, even as they were signing the documents. yes, ma'am. cook,nie: stephanie nuclear intelligence weekly. you mentioned how north korea is changing the geopolitics of the region. i wonder if you could look at south korea, japan, china, and whatrussia, and talk about
their expectations are for these talks, in other words, what they actually see coming out of the versus what they would like to see coming out of them. sue mi: again, there are different expectations. south korea's expectations, they ine so invested in this, bringing everyone to this point, but they wanted this occur.to japanese counterparts are the most concerned about the country, what could come out of the meeting, and potential he even a deal -- potentially even a deal. abe is why prime minister would come again, meeting with president trump yet again how much one of the last people to an him again, saying like intercontinental ballistic missile, you cannot leave japan and south korea under threat.
they would like to have the issue by president trump, which the issue does, so i think japan is most concerned. korea, i think they just -- they are just saying in a way that they have -- i am not sure if they need a specific success. if they had a joint statement am i think south korea would still try to push it along. famous saying, that dealing with north korea is like dealing with a delicate crystal ball. , it is china and russia kind of interesting because i do think that china would give some agreement, like peace treaty or any kind of reduction on u.s. troop presence, reduction on u.s. troop presence in south korea, that would be helpful to china. and they could do join
exercises. they were china asks, doing exercises a couple of months ago. but of course china still does not want my think, is complicated, but they do not want overly like u.s. and north korea to really get into a just china is still trying to have most influence over north korea and the korean peninsula. the numbert is still one priority. duyeon: i agree with what sue said. president trump needs the summit, he needs the trump-kim summit and the diplomatic process to stay alive in the months and years going forward, achieve andeeds to drive his peace process. in order to do that, he needs progress on the nuclear issue, because progress on the nuclear issue will then lead to the
lifting of sanctions. firm president moon's agenda, he needs sanctions lifted. then you can deal with other issues, like the cultural mismanagement and exchanges, and he is going toit april luck -- hitonomic cooperation a roadblock with economic cooperation. china, we're seeing beijing trying to insert itself now,this process, because you have president moon and president trump and kim jong-un talking about peace. e is a regional border issue. that is where china has the biggest states. that is why china will try to get its seat at the table. thinking eventually with russia later on. at the heritage
foundation, i assume, fundraising is a high priority, as it is at tufts university, my employer -- bruce: we will be passing around a half later. [laughter] prof. lee: when it comes to international fundraising, north korea is simply brilliant. you have to look at the scorecard in america -- of course we are not in sports -- but you look at the scorecard conservancy,conservativ conservatively, i calculate $20 billion for north korea between 1994 and 2010, this is all public record, south korea gave north korea $11 billion. and 2008, according to the congressional research service, the united states during the clinton and bush years gave north korea in excess of $1.3 billion, so about $100
million a year. you might be thinking that is not a huge sum, in the 1990's, north korea was under a famine. in the mid-1990's, all of north korea, the total export earnings million --orea is 16 $600 million, less than half $1 billion. china has given about $1.5 billion a year. so what about team america and its allies? what have they gained? approximately less than nothing. duyeon: just to add real quick, it is an excellent question, and we're seeing it with reports wants to meet with kim jong-un -- it appears that kim jong-un is not only trying to level of the geopolitical being field in north korea, --
northeast asia, he seems to be leveling of the world now, including middle east, so when i ssadd reports of a wanting to come and if it is true, it presents problems, one, it could lead the nor to proliferate easier, and it could build north korea into becoming a wmd walmart of the world. , and this problem is is a geopolitical question that you are asking, when the summit happened between monad kim first kim first, and we saw beijing wanted to assert itself as russia, that is leveling out the playing field before kim walks into a meeting with trump. if other thing with assad, the reports are true, is getting more and leverage, bringing in more like-minded countries to
join team korea before team trump, so that has a navigation going forward, especially when kim jong-un is so careful about the image that sue mi was talking about, the leader of a peaceloving country that has been corrupted, and to eventually get to a country where it is accepted like india and pakistan. it wants to be treated like india and pakistan. the missile cooperation between iran and north korea is famously known, and i would not be surprised if that is the other element. >> thank you. this is a conversation. all of you have been really great. i work at the heritage foundation.
north korea, it seems like north ones thaty are the want this summit with trump more than the other way around. it seems that way. now, my question is -- what do they want? do they want a peace agreement somehow? because they dangle the carrot is already. they released the three hostages. they signed a treaty with south korea. i mean, he can come in and say that. what is he willing to give up, you know, for trump to sign the paper? trump already said what he wants, but kim has not said what he wants. so my question is, what do you think of that? why is north korea so insistent on a peace treaty when north korea has, without fail,
violated every major international agreement it signs? now, china and the u.s. never signed a peace treaty. china and japan never signed a peace treaty. china and south korea never signed a peace treaty. japan and russia never signed a peace treaty. the peace treaty is good so long as there is genuine intent on the part of both adversaries to pursue peace. what is north korea's game>? ? well, everybody knows it -- a peace treaty would call into question the removal of u.s. troops in south korea and the theyeaceful environment, would most likely be withdrawn, so that is a plus for north korea in changing the balance of power in the korean peninsula in its favor. but i think north korea wants more.
if you sign a peace treaty, if there is one, among the u.s., china, north korea, south korea, the south korean constitution will come under revision. and 4.ticular, article 3 article three defines korean territory as the korean peninsula and its adjacent islands, that is the entire korean peninsula. article four stipulates that south korea will pursue a policy or peaceful unification under principle of freedom of democracy, a free democracy. is anathema to china, the word "free" for "freedom," so this will cause friction and south korean society, south koreans will be bickering among themselves, and this is the plan for north korea, because north korea will insist that all of is onncern -- north korea
multiple levels, not one-dimensional, and certainly not crazy. sue mi: just quickly, on the peace treaty, it is actually one for theggest fears -- reasons he just articulated -- because president trump, before he came into the office, had a question, why do we even need the troops there? it is too expensive. concerned that -- i do not think north korea will bring up troop presence at all, because they're are too smart to bring up such a sensitive issue. just concluding a he's, because they keep talking about we need region security, and that translates to peace treaty, and then that the rationale of troop presence is undermined. north koreans know that, but they do not need to bring up troop presence. in theory, it sounds good, because there is the korean war,
we have not concluded the war because we have not had a peace treaty. i am concerned that this is one of the gives that president trump thanks he can put on the table. i am very concerned about that. duyeon: just to be absolutely clear, i think what i can speak for everybody here that we want all want e. if you look at the negotiations they maythe text, vague, as was said, but the party can begin to discuss this issue that includes the critical element of the third after phase, called the dismantlement phase, when there was a blueprint drawn on what dismantlement might look like, then the relative parties -- relevant parties can talk about
the peace treaty. that is clearly important. you want formal peace negotiations after enough dismantlement has already tan place. bruce: what does north korea want? a lot of what we're going against is what a lot of us are saying is what north korean once. wants.h korea according to the chinese press, after kim's visit to beijing, this is what north korea said -- we're not getting a lot straight but alsohorse's mouth, when north korea has announced things, it is not that it is codewords, but it is just using phrases that people who have been following it for a long time know what they mean. even in south korean delegation readout of their meeting with kim, they said he is willing to talk about denuclearization in return for security assurances, and they did not use "end of u.s. hostile policies," but we
know what they meant. including in may 2005 document, it has been mentioned before, all to no avail. the end of the u.s. house of economic the end of demands, the constitutional protected freedoms of assembly and expression. about that,y talk we know what they mean. yesterday it was emphasized that denuclearization is part of global arms control, and we will go down to zero when everybody else goes down to zero. we all knew that. someone had a statement when it basically said what north korea's position was for years, the white house was surprised, because they were incredulous, wait a minute, kim said he was willing to talk
about denuclearization, which we think means this. well, they have a different meaning. so the white house talking points, the reason why they were talking about the summit, -- about calling off the summit, it was a series of broken promises. the broken promise of going back on what they pledged to do with denuclearization. well, they did not go back, because they had their own interpretations. i think if you follow it for a while, you know what they mean, but i think folks who do not follow it have been surprised. on the peace treaty, i think they are both kind of legal and societal impacts. the legal will be if you sign a peace treaty, it removes the basis for united nations command. it does not have an impact on combined forces command or the level of u.s. troops on the peninsula. that is a result of the
u.s.-south korea bilateral peace treaty. if you have a nonbinding declaration like moon jae-in and kim jong-un agree to, that has no legal ramifications for anything. society, both south korea, and i can see in the u.s., including in congress, you have a sense of of, well, the -- waterer, officially hundred and we thought -- but bring the boys home. if the war is over, why are we there? but if you do not address the north korea conventional threat to south korea, then you do not take care of the different threat that they were there for. just to add real quick, and this goes to the question on what does china want, in the late 1990's, around 1999, when the two koreas, u.s., and china were negotiating a peace treaty, these were formal negotiations
for a peace treaty. --y eventually broke down they are complex, but basically for two reasons. one the north, did not want south korea as part of the process. two, over the withdrawal of u.s. troops. this goes to the question you're asking, what the china want out of this. in that process, my understanding of it, from negotiators in the process, was china was demanding the withdrawal of the united nations command during that process. so when we are hearing, we are now hearing from president moon that the formal declaration to end the korean war will be a three-party process. the peace treaty afterwords perhaps can include china, but that is a very interesting statement to make, and the speculation behind that is perhaps because of historical talksence that in the
before, china has tried to get in the way, spoil the process, and also demand the withdrawal of the united nations command, so that is another issue. if that is the speculation and the asmptioneing made now why south korea would want only three parties a part of the declaration to end the korean war. >> great presentations from everyone. a quick comment on the pueblo. that would be symbolic, and a lot of people might like that. i would rather see a substantive action by the north such as withdrawal artillery from the case on heights. bruce: i am just saying it would be a gesture that would be going very well. >> and we should not be taken in by that gesture. bruce: right. >> my question for all four of you, and just to put it bluntly, i think you will talk to this, but have we seen -- we have seen
sadly lamented action, we have seen a charm offensive, we have seen the regime get something last fewng in the months, stature, legitimately, but have we seen any evidence that the north is changing its fundamental? strategy its strategy of courses regime survival, we all know that, but unification of the peninsula under the north's subversion,ugh court in, the use of force, and of course the key of that is splitting the alliance and getting u.s. forces off of the korean peninsula. does anyone believe that that foundational strategy has changed and that the north's objectives to unify the peninsula under his control has actually changed? another parallel question -- is there any sense that kim jong-un really believes in a peace process, in a unification process in accordance with president moon's vision?
or was that just be part of its subversion efforts to end up dominating the peninsula? prof. lee: no. [laughter] sue mi: exactly. bruce: the unification, that also got into sort of the preventive attack discussion and justification for it. you know, i would see it when people are talking about preventive attacks, they sort of koreato why does north have nukes, and that gets into three schools of talks. one is the benign interpretation. vale cap as a response to u.s. -- they only have it as response to u.s. policy, they are insulted by us, threatened by us, they did it because of us.
it calls into question why they signed into international agreements promising to never do it when they did it anyway, i do not know. i would say it is more than just a benign reason. they do have military plans. kim jong-un, when he came into office, directed his military to come up with a new war plan to be able to unify the peninsula within seven days, that calls to going toward nook early. -- nuke early. people saying we have to do a gri preemptive attack opposed to nuclear or retaliatory, because they are heading south, or for some other reasons. yes, they have a plan, but the third school, where i would be, if they are not coming as long as they understand the current correlation of for some of which is why the have the treaty, what we have all of these other things. it is not be benign interpretation, and it is not that they are coming tomorrow,
and therefore we have to hit them and initiate a war to know,t a war, but, you they're not coming as long as things stay the same. i do not think we have seen a change in that strategy, but i do not think they are coming anytime soon. i think even sort of simpler of -- van that is is there any evidence that north korea is willing to abandoning nuclear weapons, the way that we think about it, given the statements of north korea, given the history, all of that, when you have kim jong-un on april 1 and dashed in were a first and april 20 saying we have made it, we across the finish line, and now increase exponentially our production of nuclear weapons. that really calls into question that they are willing to put them all on the table. i am hopeful, but i am pretty skeptical as we go into the summit. i think, for north
toea, the ultimate goal reach a communist nirvana state or to unify the entire korean peninsula on its term, liberating the south, is a nonnegotiable proposition. it must happen. if we take a patronizing view of north korea, and let's face it -- almost all of us do almost all of the time -- we went presume that young young -- pyongyang is simply concerned to muddle through. that they are able to kill cronies and relatives, and then say i changed my mind, let's talk, and then we keep that cycle into perpetuity. i do not think so. it has worked wonderfully for north korea over the past decades because south korea and the united states are, understandably, risk-adverse. there is simply too much on the line to escalate tit-for-tat with north korea.
so even on the face of egregious attacks, there has never been a dispute with the u.s. or the south korea resulting in military retaliation. that is the simple truth. but how long can i go on? if you are the kim regime, do you take satisfaction, reassurance and that status quo when the income disparity between the two koreas are increasing each year? south korea, conservatively speaking, is 50 times richer than the north. this is a problem. it raises the very thorny question of why this continued existence of the dprk is really necessary, when your own people are crossing the border into the other korean space, you have a problem. you need one day to be able to not only answer and bully the south but to obliterate it, and that is the ultimate game plan. and i think they are making
progress. bruce: we have time for one or two more questions, before we shift to our second panel, where we will be focusing on japan and e pa on all of these mind-boggling changes over the less several months that the korean peninsula has had on japan and prime minister abe. we will bring our second panel at around 3:00, but i think we time for another one or two. there is a woman in the back. >> thank you so much for this session. i was wondering if you could talk a little more about relations.korea to what extent has the white house kind of relied on this mediation, and how much of that is dipping? if the process is eventually deemed a failure, as many skeptics think it will become a what is the potential for a u.s.-south korea cagap in that?
sue mi: um, why don't you address this? [laughter] i worry, but i would get -- yeah. when kim jong-un went on new year's day, there are four plausible explanations in defending order of relevance. first, kim jong-un will up on new year's day, had a change of heart, decided he going forward would be a nice guy. unlikely, right? second, kim jong-un was so overcome with gratitude from president moon for his patients for the garage in 2017, he decided to reciprocate for the winter games.
probably not true. and third, the trump administration take, kim jong-un one of the tough sanctions to reverse course. i see nothing to support tha cautiously it is true, but when you call the statement by 8esident trump on august "fire and fury which the world has never seen before," three weeks later on the 29th of that known inh, which is the north and south as national humiliation day, for it was on a date, august 28, 1910, that north korea was colonized, and kim jong-un fired a missile over japan on that day. destruction,al "rocket man on a suicide mission" at the you and general assembly. two months later, kim jong-un
fired an icbm. this is not strike me as the behavior of a terrified man. so i think is all of this is preordained, preplanned, because north korea has a cycle of provocation and peace. in 2018, after that banner ballistic year in 2017, after having established his credibility, it was simply too good to pass up on with the winter games and so on. i would say the trunk administration should ask itself atery simple question -- what point between february 9 and march 8, between mike pence's and validations -- in north korea at the games come and march 8, when president trump tentatively agrees to the sum of proposition by kim jong-un, at what point during that month did north korea's intentions go from think
to genuine? we are being played again. >> what about the alliance? i will just say, in 15 seconds, president trump, i to be in the best interest of the united states for two reasons. that is against north korea and south korea. we know that previously president nixon used the troops cardigan south korea, entirely, actually withdrew 20,000 troops in 1970 and 1971, and in 1974, put elsewhere, he seriously considered, he had made up his mind to withdrew u.s. troops, and then jimmy carter talked about it, of course. and then in the bush years, more american troops were redeployed.
withdrawing 5000 or 10,000 troops, president trump all calculate he is sending oulrn message to both se and pyongyang, you're on your own, fend for yourself, as he said during the campaign. korea, president trump thinks it is sending a very strong message, we are removing our troops from the south, thereby we will no longer allow our troops to stand in harm's way within the range of your artillery. thereby we will be more prone to strike first. work, but i think that is a false hypothesis. probably it will work in north korea's favor, not u.s. interests. sue mi: quickly, i will answer the second part of your question about u.s.-south alliance.
i worry about potentially decoupling, not in the way that -- not extreme decoupling, but i do think president moon has invested himself so much that if the summit fails -- which i do not think it will -- i do worry, because i think the inter-korea momentum is already there. want to continue that. that puts president moon in a tryingfficult situation to balance the u.s. and north korea, but i do worry about us being on the same page. bruce: i think the relationship right now is complicated. i mean, it has been strained because of president trump's comments both during the campaign and after entering congress on the chorus, fta. it has been strained against the comments about the alliance, kind of a "free riding, ungrateful allies," particularly a lot of criticism of japan and south korea. sort of during the campaign,
seemingly making alliances a business relationship. "we should get reimbursed 100% or walk," which is not what alliances are based on. values, based on shared shared history, particularly the u.s.-korean alliance, which is forged in blood. those of us with children in the military do not see our children there as a moneymaking operation or mercenaries. they are there for principals and shared values with our allies. and then when it comes to inter-korean relations, there were concerns about president moon, because he is progressive, and how far left would he go. but during his campaign as well as once again the into office, he really shifted more to the center. we saw him reverses policy on kaesong, admitting it would be a violation of u.s. resolutions as they were to reopen it. even said now was not the time
for pressure with the north, because his openhanded dialogue was rejected several times five pyongyang, so there is no strain on the inter-korean aspect. now that moon has sort of taken the bit between the teeth and moving very quickly in trying to improve relations with the north, perhaps due to concern about a u.s. preventive attack, now he has sort of strange further from where we have been. so i think right now, president trump is on board with this positive momentum, but if things do not progress as well either in the summit or subsequent negotiations, then there could be, i think, growing u.s. criticism or suspicion of moon if he continues moving quicker down the path than the u.s. would be willing to. so i think moon, like his progressive predecessors, less willing to demand high conditionality, high reciprocity from north korea, you know,
more so than the u.s. the more we entered a version on the north korean relations, that i think the tensions coming out are largely tapered over along with the special measures agreement negotiations, and of course then they may start coming out. now korean's see the impediment or the reason for failure of the summit, i think we may see more south korean domestic resume of the u.s. as the u.s. is getting a way of improving inter-korean relations and maintaining peace. with that, i think we will have to bring it to a close. we will bring our second panel up. as we do that, if you could join me in thanking our first panel. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]