tv North Korean Nuclear Program CSPAN June 12, 2018 11:06am-12:00pm EDT
discussing the negotiations in singapore and the future of north korea's nuclear program. just got started. we are live on c-span. least, myt not colleague works as a fellow at the carnegie center for global policy in beijing. first, what happened? what happened? >> i had the great joy of being on a redeye for part of the events of last night. i was reconstructing what happened very rapidly having and signing an unknown document. the great mystery that went around that. i will confess that i was somebody who went into events with trepidation. ofse scenarios the same kind
-- at the table. have somebody offending somebody and having a major breakdown. that you scenario was have the illusion of some major grand bargain. everything, rainbows, unicorns, puppies are all given away in exchange for very little. that didn't really happen, either. what we did end up with was a kind of very basic, vague set of commitments. some of those are much less than have been realizing previous theements, in particular, verifications and their. that is a great concern. the word irreversible was not in there.
of -- we have given up so much leverage. the summit was a huge waste as page, all of front these photographs of kim jong-un, world leader, kim jong-un, global rockstar walking around. maximum pressure is over. i know he talked about continuing maximum pressure in his press conference but pressure has been over basically since the agreement to proceed with the summit. the chinese have told governance we up on the pressure but saw chinese officials calling for the security council to begin the process of formally lifting sanctions. we have lost an enormous amount of leverage. another thing that happened is i think it had scratcher at least for me and for several of us.
this question of the exercises. which did not appearn the documents. there wasn't quite reference in the documents to some kind of security guarantee or security assurance being given. i am curious to see if the exercises were part of that. it is unclear what the trump meant by the exercises, pretty clear at this point that it wasn't coordinated with japan. the relationships being absolutely critical. clear if also not trump knows what he committed to and if that is the same thing that kim thinks he committed you. and that potential difference for walking away with different interpretations and understandings -- the problems of walking away with different interpretations of an agreement and what that can quickly turn into -- we will understand the potential vaguery around that is
a problem. that is kind of a wrapup of what i see of what happened. >> president moon said the other night that he was anticipating -- very mu anticipating the summit. could not sleep. you sleep last night? did you sleep well or were you also worried about the outcome? i think i was with president moon on anticipating what would be the outcome of this historic summit. butd not get too much sleep i think there are many things to touch on but as a starter, because we did not really expect this summit to resolve the nuclear issue on north korea once and for all, just for one summit, a kind of met our expectations and we expected a basic framework or set to be agreed upon and that is what we saw today.
starta good start, a fine to begin with. i do have to say that there are many areas that we need to get more details on, concrete action toward the organization. and also what is very critical is to have a specific timeline of how things should go and what can be expected in addition to the verification which is very crucial. there are many areas that will needed to be worked on and i would like to hope that it will be discussed expeditiously as included in the statements. and from what president trump has said, it does seem like secretary pompeo would take on the job without any pause. hopefully, the real work will begin after the summit by these working level officials and
gaps.ats to fill in the one thing that did take me by surprise is that president trump hosted -- iill be think we need clarification on that term of wargames. what does he mean by wargames? definitivelyto say what that would mean because depending on what that means, it would have different ramifications. meanthinking, maybe he deployment of u.s. nuclear tactical weapons for military .xercises not joint military exercises altogether.
military exercises altogether is not something that president trump alone can decide on although that could be discussed down the road, when we see a concrete step being taken toward nuclearization, we can't all get what we want. i think that is something that can be difficult along the road, but not at this point, if indeed he means joint military drills altogether. the first statement about the wargames was very definitive but subsequently in the press conference, there is a little bit more detail where he said that in particular the flight did long,.s. aircraft it is very expensive to fly an
aircraft six hours over the korean peninsula. maybe there are elements of the ercises he has picked up on. but it is pretty vague at this point and i gather that the were surprisednt --woefully these details what is your reaction? a step forward but at the same time, where are we? i think two people, mr. trump and mr. kim made an agreement from which we can go anywhere. i have already four different scenarios in my mind. one is ok in which north korea will take the necessary steps for denuclearization. i don't think they will denuclearize quickly and
comprehensively. but they can take steps gradually. the u.s. and north korea can decide to improve directions and isseems that kim jong-un actually very interested in his country's economy. the second scenario i have is a bad scenario in which we go back to crisis situation. trump expects a lot from north korea and if north korea cannot deliver, cannot abandon all nuclear weapons in time, he will and startstrated taking attacks from critics. for exame, the presidential campaign in 2020, he might
decide to take strong action including nuclear action against north korea. there is a diverse domestic difficulty to divert attention from his domestic difficulties. third, similarly bad scenario that i have is what i call the bad scenario in which he says well, there is a piece on the korean peninsula so there is no longer a need for the u.s. to remain committed, so we would leave south korea. and if that happens, that would really undermine the security of the korean peninsula and that might create more situations worse situation than before.
and another scenario i would call the treaty scenario, the gorbachev scenario. if you remember in 1987 on this day, june 12, ronald reagan asked gorbachev to turn on the wall -- to tear down the wall. together with a wall, he toured down the soviet union, his country. he is interested in undertaking this country is a difficult country to reform. it could create these, create more, i don't know. we can go anywhere. we have to wait and see.
jinping has had a two summits with kim jong-un, not in singapore, obviously. out of the xi jinping andim saw jong-un summit and the trump-kim summit? >> all of the summits were symbolic. nevereve president xi expected and north korea to completely surrender nuclear weapons. it is clear that north korea has a two-phase strategy. phase on try to acquire basic nuclear capability and that was achieved by the end of last year. and now begins phase two, the primary objective is to retain the capability to develop a normal relationship with the
outside world. i think north korea is achieving that goal right now. but standing from where kim jong-un is, i think after securing his regime's survival, after addressing theecurity concerns, he is looking at long-term strategy for the country in the future. nds,ink from where he she has a long-term strategic goal of creating a good environment in which north korea can have one condition for creating that good environment, to have a long-term positive relationship with washington. with what kim jong-un says, that he is looking for one opportunity. i think he is looking much
and want a long-term relationship in washington without giving up the core nuclear weapon capabilities. that is very difficult to pull off but he looks like he is marogres the maximum pressure campaign has maxed out and that is why we are having this today. the u.s. before president trump corelready lost its advantage with north korea. after acquiring basic nuclear capability, north korea has no urgent technical need to resume nuclear tests. and north korea is capable of self-restraint, refraining from additional , giving complications an image of a responsible korea wanting to engage with the outside world, wanting to focus
on domestic knowledge. wanting to reach out to everyone. by the end of this condition, cane is no way the u.s. sanction a disarming military strike against korea or to have another sanction on north korea. i think the result is very much expected. point, which is, i think that in some sense, president trump stumbles into , and i think this is a mainstream chinese view. the key problem is not really north korea's nuclear weapon.
towardorea's deep bias the way tontries, address that cause is to engage with north korea, to bring north korea back into the international community to promote communication between north korea and the outside world. to address that north korea paranoia, the best way is to start a good relationship between north korea and the united states. fundamentally transform the relationship. , the first point in this joint statement is that both countries are committed to a new relationship. i think that is important in the long run. eventually, that will help mitigate their paranoia, gradually addressed north korea
insecurity and make north korea less dependent on nuclear weapons in the future. even though he himself might not be aware. that is an interesting question and we have seen this reflected a little bit in the how chinaseer about has engaged this issue and the isrative is china increasingly concerned about being left on the sidelines during those u.s.-north korea responses. to this kind of a set up, maybe set up between the u.s. and china for north korea's favor going forward. after thes north korea-u.s. summit, there was serious concern in beijing worrying about china being sidelined, being marginalized and losing control.
we even heard wide concern from chinese experts in extreme cases chance the ud north korea mighe they collude together against china. because china knows for a long time that north korea doesn't really like china. if conditions were right, they would be more than happy to establish a close relationship with washington. many conservative chinese always believe the u.s. doesn't really worry about north korean nuclear threat. norths. knows very well korean nuclear weapons are simply for survival.
north korea would never use nuclear weapons without being seriously provoked and invading -- invaded. therefore, the u.s. has to begin using north korean nuclear an accused to given the deep chinese disrupt toward the united states, there was extreme concern. both countries might decide to put aside and try to forge a very close relationship. seeing that concern was likely mitigated after kim jong-un came to china twice and had very good x meeting with presidenti. he took air china to singapore and north korean media actually published that picture with kim jong-un walking outside of the airplane away from the big
chinese flag. that show the actual relationship between north kor and china still exist and north korea still relies very much on china. again, another big factor is the strategic rivalry. that made her strategic development gave this background that china and the united states see each other of the most important long-term rivals. if north korea -- if a nuclear capable north korea is going to be a reality for the foreseeable the thinkingieve we wantng might become to make sure a nuclear-capable north korea has a comfortable relationship with china and with the united states.
it is not typically how we do youf things here but see some kind of major geopolitical realignment? trying to pull troops out of south kea and the potential for relations with north korea might really change the picture. work in 2009t of timeframe and we had a variety of different working groups and ire than the working groups, think it has been forgotten in the annals of history. the russians loved having that vision ofnd a similar how we could potentially realign
things to provide some kind of broad system of multilateral institutions, rules, etc.. i'm pretty skeptical of that at this point in time. we never really got very far then and we were in a very different time geopolitically on many different fronts. on, we are0 years even further from that kind of position. a couple of things i want to ,ick up on along these lines first, i completely agree that kim jong-un is playing the long game. of course, so is beijing. xi is playing the long game and what worries me is i don't see trump playing the long game. i see kim jong-un in the driver seat of this round of diplomacy, really choosing his moments for
engaging on the world stage, feelinth he had the deterrent in his pocket and a good enough place with the confidence that he can set out and go for it. there have been many rounds of .otential conversation i think the interest is probably there but having a broader application -- i don't. a verydo see is carefully planned process by the north koreans here. as a mentioned earlier, one of my concerns is a potential lack all signs point to
kim heading back to beijing. i think that really ensuring that we in washington have a good handle on the dynamics of what kim is driving in a much more coordinated way then we seem to be is one of the things i am quite focused on. >> do you think president moon is playing the short game or a long game? i know he does not play golf, we will leave aside the development. political shift as well and he has been personally invested in starting in facilitating this process. at this point, it could take off in ways that might be quite uncomfortable for south korea. moon hask president
been working on peace. i think he is playing the long me of ultimately ushering in peace on the korean p. president become aware of the significance of having a good alignment with the u.s. and the with thetay in sync u.s. policies for any progress to be made in terms of inter-korean relations as well as denuclearization and the analogy quite often used is two
wheels on a barrel. one, therogress on other ot go. it is a matter of sequencing i , the foremost goal is to en if that m take long andion, even if we may not be able to achieve > will have that as a goal. >that will pursue. so, i think this administration is working to put the on track. so we can move slowly towards the end state. in order for that to happen, wait to have the u.s. and alliance.
also, has north korea come to the table. so, up until now, it was working quite well. we have new issues of a alliance, especially with the military. work forhere is more the president as he calls himself theitator. there is more work on his shoulders to make sure this does not go off track or it --. to makingn focused tangible steps towards denuclearization. also progress on enter current relations. cross and reducing
tension on the border. think we will have a bumpy ad ahead. even to this point, having a summit. i think we should prepare seeing that drama pan and front of us are good --. president moon will remain determined to devote himselfs toacilitator andtor resolve issues. critical of the idea of south korea as a mediator. sounds -- and washington. now that there is a potential for thanks to go wrong, bishops
and more time focusing on the alliance. minister has spent a lot of time focused on the trump administration. capital.personal had he look at what is happening , couraging the trump administration to get a harder line. what might be the political consequences at this point? tradeis not winning on and trump -- so forth. >> for his remarks on military exercises, when she talked about the posbility of stopping exercises with south korea, his message was not targeted not
only at north korea but south korea or it -- south korea. to him, south korea is a free rider. south korea is benefiting more than the united states. so we have to renegoti deal. chambliss talking about the u.s. excises with south korea. he is saying we mean a help you anymore with defense. if you do not want that, you have to pay more for the stationing of u.s. forces in so that will become more favorable to the united states.
that said, in terms of a policymakersonse, are generally concerned about the outcome. japan has always been hoping that mr. trump will maintain a task on strong position against north korea. i don't know whether he talked about the addiction issue with kim jong-un. given the overall tone of the think the ofn't dr. these issue-- the advent
abductees issues are easily fit. we have to find a way to get more engaged in the process somehow. >> on the domestic politics, will their hey consequences if she is obvious not able to just hirelationship with trump into policy gains? critics will use criticizetunity to prime minister ovid -- prime minister abe. expectations have been raised to you haveble levels
democrats saying that ishat the administration has said and we will hold them to that standard. and then over the weekend, senator graham is said, great, if we don't achieve this, i expect democrats succumb on board with my approach, which is full of limited lines. one of the things that has made domestic politics 50 -- turkey tricky is not trump has done what he says to ratchet up,
as far as the front that you can, and raises a deal somewhere down the middle. in this case, it is not just about his negotiating printer. it is about us. ago, we werernin about the sige of the military complex. fury. fire and we had signs that the administration had significant a said that comfort the shah's nomination for iran was disapproved.
there was such a collective sigh of relief. we weren't facing conflicts. now we are on a diplomatic check. but what we saw yesterday is not -- like that resembles during the bush or obama administrations in terms of a careful negotiating process i think t eectations piece is something that -- the terms have been set by the president, one way or the other. he will be selling this as a success to his base. the reality is that so many people continue to breathe a sigh of relief. i think the biggest comments i kept hearing overnight yesterday john-john'ss that
fit and the world war. but there is a lot of space and whathat that means rightright now on i see now does not indicate to me that aningful negotiating process diplomacy is a team sport. right now, we have a one-man show on the u.s. side. sustainable and that is not diplomacy and that is not really association. for me, when it comes to the politics of this, we have to focus on what is realistic and whato we set the terms and are those terms really going to be and how do we continue to actually strive for that.
so even if we use force against north korea, if we limited use -- militaryinst force has improved in my opinion. that is good news/bad news, i don't know. of the last year, mr. trump was saying one thing. was saying another. they were engaged in a battle of wars -- but they are not really days in negotiations. that now we are both in really losing side.are --
you have to take tangible, rail action to the -- to change the situation. they are talking. to think,int, we have be careful about military option if they are off the table. did forces strength of the possibility of actually being .igh or not concernedgenuinely about a military conflict breaking out. that is translating the forts in japanese eater to the.
want to maintain that because he enjoysrained soon so it , it mighte for oving the conversation it is not all that bad given that we do not reserve to it. north korea does feel intimidated. of course, things, things college go wrong. it is important to note that president trump and president kim jong-un on has become a relationship that it doesn't guarantee relationships. what president trump
i think it revealed, was a cordial start and they can communicate along the way. be easy.ot it will be a long, protracted process. we will definitely have to work giving up.ut given the vested interests on both parties, president trump personally and can jump on, although we will have to test it it is genuine, about makingogress. i think weeed to give a benefit of doubt because it is a
start. changes on north korea's front, although we cannot be sure or confident 100% if they are there to stay, they are changes. it is surprising to see north korea revealing the reality is .t is a north korean leader would have been ashamed to sell they have -- to show they have the moral every chinese more -- chinese warplane. north korea has a strong countries, including its closest outlay, china.
-- closest ally, china. he is playing the long game. he wants to retain his position in the regime. economy.to improve his to retain his position with the people, he needs to show, demonstra t the people that he is capable of not only developing nuclear weapons, but improving their livelihoods in ways they cannot feel. in order to do that, he does need to engage with the outside world, especially the u.s., because of security assurances. whether it is grounded or not, it is the reality. from his paranoia, he
needs relief in the u.s.. to get that, north korea is willing to have some concessions. a northern to play that further .long, the holding out of military options as a fallback position, particularly if maximum pressure has been dissipated, how busy ?re you >> is a bottom-line premise that is where i was -- i will always be. the needs about the potential nsequences of a military option, i do believe that kim jong-un is rational.
i think that your scenario puts more weight on command and control them i might be comfortable with. itsuldn't want to test unless we were really up against the wall with absolutely no other option. it is -- this scenario worries me, kind of similar to the was puttingt he forward. set upe this system . it is supposedly a crew of the experts working with them who had been working through the other meetings in advance to try to work out some of these details. given the goals that we have was asked in tromp
his comments. he says it's here. it is all good. we mean its. similarly, on his anniversary, gotas like, is probably not - not there." had aou have already meeting at the summit level, frontloaded, peak option, you don't have a lot of runway after . if the cost breakdown and you cannot come to an agreement on thebasic present goals of
verifiable denuclearization machine, let ane everything else, then i do worry that conflict will come back as one of the only options that remain, given the pressure. i'll see how the pressure campaign can return, especially because i also think, in that can do a kim jong-un pretty good job of painting the u.s. as the one who is the spoiler of the deal. that would make it hard to get part -- get china, russia back on board. thoset want to be one of always pointing back to the old agreement, but for historic purposes, we have committed in the past to normalization oppositions as a goal. we have committed as a regime.
we have assurances from north korea. i don't remember the phraseology, but is said not atoreaith conventional or nuclear weapons. these are things we have seen before. that it is mean bacteria from them now. we are in a good place to do that. that just makes the point of the implementation being what matters, the results being what matters all the more important in my mind. segue. is a good as we think about plan b for diplomacy, you don't want conflict. what you left with is the in between space. we have written this report where you can pick up copies
outside. talk about what the deterrence picture might look like. i wanted to get your sense because a lot of our thinking this report is based on the experience of the united states decided with south korea to a missile defense system in south korea and china retaliated for that. you see this feature in front of you or the u.s. in south rear, to ward against future north korean provocations, my do additional things, missile-defense or other actions that will spillover effects were china feels the need to retaliate again say a little bit about what drove the chinese federation. what are you most concerned about. >> in this report, we expected at least some of north korea's nuclear weapons would stay for
the sum -- the foreseeable future. , south korea,. those military deployments will have reactions from japan and china. i focused on how china might likely response to the future military cooperation development. i communicated those military theures that could generate strongest chinese and that a reaction.
one lesson that is particularly , china basically made the physical decision to move out. of --inese threat basically changed. back dispute was not -- not dissolved, but simply show. lesns learned from nextse experts, in the dispute, were neither a military deployment by the united states, -- >> you can see all of this program later. the u.s. house's gaveling into begin their legislative work week next. they will come in for morning our speeches, back at 2:00
legislative business. agendaen bills on the today, all dealing with the open your crisis. on house will spend the week addressing the crisis. toni: good morning. he house will come to order. --the speaker pro tempore: the house will be in order. the chair lays before the house a communication from the speaker. the clerk: the speaker's room, washington, d.c., june 12, 2018. i hereby appoint the honorable warren davidson to act as speaker pro tempore on this day. signed, paul d. ryan, speaker of the house of representatives. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to the order of the ouse of january 8, 2018, the chair will now recognize members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning hour debate. the chair will alternate recognition between the part