tv Washington Journal Gary Samore CSPAN June 12, 2018 6:16pm-6:30pm EDT
a former white house cornet or for arms control from 2009 22013, now with harvard. you have been directly involved in negotiations with north korea .or about a quarter century are you prepared to call today a breakthrough when it comes to u.s./north korean relations? guest: i think it is too early to call it a breakthrough. i think it is the start of a process. kim jong-un has made general commitments as his father and grandfather did before him. all of those commitments turned out to be not valid. either the north koreans lied or never carried out commitments. the question is whether kim jong-un is different. whether he is prepared to take steps toward nuclear disarmament . we will find that out in the course of the next months and years as secretary of state pompeo tries to put some flesh
on the bones of this joint andunique which is general lacks detail on timetable asing reciprit verification, all these critical issues which were not result in the singapore summit itself. host: here are the bones of that agreement. president trump committing to provide security guarantees for north korea. the united states and north korea committing to establish new relations in accordance with desires of teople the two countries for peace and prosperity. the united states and north korea will join efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime. reaffirmed north korea's commitment to work toward a complete denuclearization of the korean peninsula. at the united nd north korea commit to recovering pow mia remains including the repatriation of those already identified. negotiator any u.s.
understand about north korea when they sit down & a document with those specific commitments? specific areas of commitment? guest: i think the biggest challenge for secretary of state pompeo, north korea has not been has notrelinquish -- been willing to really push completely their nuclear program. they have been willing to accept limits on testing and production of some material. but they've never been willing to give it up completely. the question is whether kim jong-un is different. whether he is actually prepared to give up that capability in exchange for security assurances , lifting economic sanctions, economic cooperaon, trade and investment, and so forth. i'm skeptical but we will have a chance to see whether or not he's willing to take steps to limit the program. in particular, any agreement
should begin with a north korean declaration of their full capabilities. their stockpile of weapons, production facilities. on that basis, you can begin to discuss a freeze of further prodtion and a reduction of existing capability asked steps toward elimination. we will have to decide what we are willing to give north korea in return for those initial steps. that will really be the guts of the negotiation that secretary of state pompeo will be engaged in. it could easily take a few years before we see an agreement emerge. the 94 agreement that i was part of that took 18 months to negotiate and another year to negotiate the implementing agreements. i think we are looking at a protracted, difficult, complex negotiation. think it is good that
president trump has personally invested in this process and he may very well need to meet or talk directly with kim jong-un in order to break deadlocks along the way. host: at what point do you think you will see the first sign of whether north korea is serious about this or whether they are slow playing this or using one of the strategies they have used in the past? guest: i think we will have to see how long it takes to complete an agreement. i noticed in the joint statement there's no deadline whatsoever. the agreement talks about subsequent negotiations. proceeding in an expeditious manner. expeditious is one of those big words that has no concrete meaning. i think the u.s. wanted some kind of deadline like six months to try to achieve negotiations but the north koreans were not willing to accept that. we're back here in nine months from now when we really have not made progress in these
negotiations to specify an agreement i think president trump is going to have to get personally engaged to speed things up. host: gary samore is with the kennedy school of government at harvard university joining us from boston. former white house coordinator for arms control and weapons of master structure and from 2009 to 2013, taking calls this ing inhe wake of that agreement signed in the wake of the a stork summit. teresa is up with you from dandridge, tennessee. a republican. go ahead. caller: good morning. all these people calling in about obama and obama's iran deal, they realize obama is not president. he is not the president anymore. donald j trump is. making the comparison between the iran deal and this ,egotiation with north korea
donald trump did not send a plane load of cash to north korea. he did not b t law by going to banks and trying to into breakingm sanctions with iran. i want to know why nobody has rightsp the human problems that still exist with iran when obama was secretly negotiating this deal. obama did it all in secret. nobody knew about it. maki this backroom deal, secret deal. host: terry said, i got your point. gary samore, do you want t compare the agreement we have so far with the iranian deal? guest: of course we don't have a north korea agreement yet. all we have is an agreement to seek an agreement so it's impossible to compare of future
north korean agreement with the iran deal that president obama negotiated because we don't have a north korean agreement yet. the iran deal had strengths and weaknesses. it had a good verification system, a good mechanism for imposing physical restraints on iran's nuclear activities but those restraints faded after 10 to 15 years. one of president trump has main objections is that it did not have permanent constraints. when he withdrew from the iran deal he said he wanted to achieve a better deal with iran that would have, in perpetuity, constraints on nuclear activities. i don't think iran will agree to that. that is president trump's policy. with respect to north korea, we don't have any indication of what an agreement with look like because there's nothing in the
-- thatatement that woulds would specify details. all we have is a vague commitment of kim jong-un to "work toward complete denuclearization of the korean we don't actually know what that means. secretary of state pompeo's job to define precisely what restrictns north korea is willing to agree to accept for its nuclear missile program and how those restrictions will be verified and monitored. those will be huge challenges. we've learned ove30 years of negotiating with north korea that they can't be trusted. they cheat and renege on commitments. i think the north korean government in the past has fundamentally resisted accepting elimination of their nuclear missile capabilities. host: a few more tweaks this morning. the conversation on -- a few
more tweets on twitter this morning. my fear is chain of command on both sides may fumble the ball. carroll writes, can't we feel better about syndication with north korea? none of us want a war. we also want to hear from you this morning. .epublicans, (202) 748-8001 kratz, (202) 748-8000 -- democrats, (202) 748-8000. independents, (202) 748-8002. cindy is a democrat. caller: a couple of things. you can have details and put out bullet points so the skepticism about what this is i think is correct. i have to say after listening to don'tmore i'm so glad you have anything to do it policy anymore. your policies are wh g this country into trouble to begin with. of course you always blame the
other countries. as far as your other color who said it was president obama and its different, opening the trade is the same as sending cash. you know who your partner is before you do those kinds of things. without being over there with them being here you can really know because everyday life determines that kind of stuff. so you are opening up a can of wos and you don't want to end up with another agreement like the iran deal. host: gary samore. guest: i agree with the caller that any agreement with north korea will include economic rewards. i think that is kim jong-un plus primary motivation to accept limits on his nuclear missile program in exchange for an opportunity to refan strengthen the economy. most of that economic cooperation and assistance will
come from south korea and china and maybe japan. certainly the lifting of economic sanctions and opportunities for trade investment from u.s. companies will be part of a final agreement. i don't think there's a ea interest on the part of u.s. industry to invest in trade with north korea. in terms of making it possible for other countries in the region to engage in economic coion th nor korea, the u.s. has some ability to becausete or obstruct of the un security council resolutions which have been passed by the last couple of administrations including president trump. there will be a financial element of any agreement and that will be critical from the standpoint of kim jong-un. host: the caller bringing up the details. can you talk about the details of what you saw from the summit
from a diplomatic perspective. what intrigued you when you saw these world leaders meet? guest: i thought t by language was positive. both leaders and friendly. i completely agree with the earlier caller that we are on a more positive track now with negotiation process as opposed to exchanging personal insults and threats of war. this is an encouraging development. i thought we saw the team on both sides, both on the north korean side in the u.s. side. i thought it was curious that the joint statement identified secretary of state pompeo as the lead u.s. negotiator but on the north korean side they said a negotiator to be named, which struck me as curious because the north korean foreign minister, somebody i dealt with in the
1994 negotiations, a very capable negotiator. i was surprised he was not named as pompeo's counterpart. it makes me wonder whether kim jong-un has not yet quite inided what team to field this negotiation. it will be important to sort that out. we can't begin negotiations until we have a north korean counterpart. how much of the host: team you saw that was at this meeting at this lunch, how many of them were new faces to american diplomats? ules and passing .r. 5327, suspending the rules and passing h.r. 5041. and agreeing to the speaker's approval of the journal, if ordered. the first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote. remaining electronic votes will be conducted as five-minute votes.