tv Manhattan Institute - Future of Work CSPAN June 16, 2018 11:23pm-12:44am EDT
." clergy.were middle-aged it made the public think, if they are against the war maybe i should think about it myself. that was sort of a turning point. theheir actions did not end vietnam war, but i do not see how you can argue that it did not help and the draft. the head of the selective service said publicly he thought they were under attack. clearly, you can draw a line from what they did from the draft ending in 1973. announcer: sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's "q&a." next, from the manhattan institute this is one hour and 20 minutes. >> all right.
if i can have your attention. i'm the editor of city journal. i want to welcome you on behalf of the manhattan institute for the first of what will be too important discussions on the great american the mastic crisis of our time, long-term joblessness. today'she stage for panel with a paper called "the shape of things to come." a half-century ago, 90% of men from ages of 35-54 work. today, only 85% of men and not age group are employed. in many areas of the country, that number is lower. the political elimination of these countries has been central to our politics of the last few years, but what is behind the
joblessness crisis? today's panel brings together an outstanding panel. let me briefly introduce them. senior editor and the exchange columnist at economist. he previously served as news editor. he is the publisher of "the ."alth of humans andrd is a single fellow longtime contributing editor of city journal. also, professor of economics at harvard university. he focuses on the importance of economicve set -- of growth. and, a fellow at the manhattan institute and longtime country at city journal.
she writes about poverty and cultural change. she is the author of "manning up: how -- has turned women into boys." moderator is stephen levine, the future editor of a magazine that looks at politics and economics. he is also a senior fellow at the atlantic council for site and risks initiative and an georgetown.essor at he is the author of several books including "the powerhouse and pollutants labyrinth." to peopleke to thank who help -- i would like to thank those who helped make this possible.
moderate a discussion between panelists and then we will have questions. a recording and transcript will be made available via our podcast. thank you for coming. [applause] steve: good morning. here.you for joining us amazing as an understatement, this panel is a fantastic panel. i am looking forward to the discussion this morning, to digging in. we are in the midst of a debate about the future of work. forces that are stagnanta crisis of
wages and uncertainty about jobs in the future among the elements in the debate -- the question, is the technological cycle we are in right now the revolution in ai, the new age of automation, is it different from prior technological cycles over the last two centuries in which normal economic churn has produced enough jobs to employ everyone displaced by the new technology? stuck? wages how long will the disruption we are in last? prior disruption's have lasted decades. what will our society look like
when the transition has been spent? finally, pivoting off a piece that was in the new york , whata couple of days ago we are watching in the heartland that led to our current politics -- to start with an economic malaise or a status malaise? we are going to start with ryan. you, what door us? cycles tell is it a useful roadmap?
>> thank you, and it's great to be here with what is a pretty fantastic panel. it's an excellent question. i think that the past technological revolutions really are probably a good guide to what we are going through. there's a possibility at some point that as ai becomes capable of doing just about anything humans can do, that this will start to look a lot different from what we've seen in the past, but i think that is decades away at least. for now, we've got a disruption that's built around a general-purpose technology, information technology, and the she and learning that can be used in lots of different places around the economy and that consequently is affecting lots of different industries, lots of different job categories -- and machine learning. what i think the past tells us is that first of all, this kind of thing can cause quite a bit
of disruption over a long period of time. part of what we've seen in terms of the malfunctioning of different institutions, different parts of the economy over the past decade is linked to technological change -- that will intensify for several decades to come. we are in the middle of a very long process of social change. i think that there is also in the perspective looking back on how these things play out, that everything ends up ok. jobs are destroyed, but jobs are also created, and we all end up better off, and that does tend to be true overlong periods of time, but if you look in on shorter periods of time, there can be quite a lot of pain for established workers, whole generations where we just don't upup -- where wages don't go . we need to be hopeful, but not necessarily too optimistic that the problems will solve themselves. the other thing these revolutions teach us is that there has to be quite a lot of devolution in terms of institutions and norms and
governmental policies in order to accommodate new technologies to make sure the benefits of the ,echnologies are broadly shared to make sure that society is kind of ok with the way new technologies are being deployed. we are already seeing a lot of backlash now and a lot of to think about the effects but also facebook's role in our political cycle. there will be a lot of pressure to overhaul our institutions, and that is usually not a very neat process either. i think those are the kind of things we can look forward to, so to speak, in the decades to come. >> thank you very much. that's great. a little bitegin in our modern age. let's say from the 1970's forward.
you have defined the problem as a war on work. can we dig a little bit in that thesis, and also, can you talk a little bit about your work? >> sure. agree more with brian's sentiments that long-term joblessness is the defining a dire social problem of our age. when we try to understand how we got here, there's a steady and whichg academic debate, concerns if it is purely labor demand, the changes in laborlogy, or has it been supply, which can include two versions. one of which is it is about the welfare state, business centers created by things like disability or the 30% tax on earnings created by food stamps and vouchers, or is it about the cultural side, that we are not
training the next generation to actually want to work. as an economist, i am uniquely disadvantaged to talk about cultural issues, so i will leave that one completely on the plate for right now and say that no matter how important one the labor demand side is going on, the labor supply , and they are particularly badly designed for the most troubled parts of america. one way to see this -- and i think we really do have to rethink our having place-based policies in this country -- i'm not talking about the appalachian regional commission or building people mover monorail. i'm talking about policies that actually recognize that labor markets are very different in different parts of the country. a point i have often made is that having a national housing policy is kind of mad. any housing policy that is
appropriate for new york is not going to be appropriate for detroit and that will not be she -- for for to houston. similarly, aemployment policy targeted for seattle or san francisco bay is going to be a nightmare in eastern tennessee or west virginia. let me be to a concrete about this. the minimum wage in seattle, like an economist, i'm not a big fan of minimum wages, but to make the claim it is catastrophic is a mistake. seattle is an incredibly robust economy filled with highly school -- highly skilled people. if anyone thinks imposing a $15 animal where john west virginia would be sensible, they are out of their mind. that would be an absolutely catastrophic thing. thatarly, to take the view this long diagonal line of despair in the united states which starts in louisiana and mississippi and runs up through northern michigan, this area which is the heartland of industrialization, of former parts of the jim crow south,
particularly low in education and also problematic in terms of its political institutions as well. the eastonly, heartland is weak on rules and schools. this is a -- this is an area in which you routinely see a quarter of work age males that are jobless. we are reforming that welfare will reforming that welfare state bring back 5% jobless rate? it won't. but we sure as heck need to rethink our policies today. if the most sensible thing we can do is to recognize that discouraging work or failing to encourage it is a big mistake in eastern tennessee and eastern intucky and west virginia, mississippi. just to be complete about this, you can either think about what you need meaning that you will
reduce the size of some payments which go to the jobless, and use that money to reduce the tax on work. you could reduce the level of disability payments, but then in able to disable to keep more of their earnings at a higher level. norway has experimented with it and it has worked. have earned more and been more connected to the workforce. or you could say what we need is a tax credit that is targeted in a simpler way towards men who are out of the labor force, and there's a reasonable argument for saying if i have a limited number of dollars to throw on that, let's target it toward areas where joblessness is higher. we have evidence that suggests that things that induce labor demand to go up in these areas reduce joblessness. there are particular areas, and
the easton heartland is its core, where joblessness has risen most and accompanying joblessness has been misery, opioid abuse, suicide, the breakdown of the family. all of these things have gone together in a terrifying cocktail. even though we may not know how to use economic policy to fix all of them, we know that this incentivizing work, having policies that stop work from paying, certainly are not making things better and we should start by trying to reform those policies. >> before we get into digging further in the present, i did not want to leave history completely behind, so i want to ask both of you if there is a period that -- a past period that informs what you are thinking or the audience can think about something that we can look at that helps to understand where we are, where we are going. what is it? when is that time?
>> i think you can think about the late 19th century. it's obviously very different in a lot of ways, but what we faced then was a pretty dramatic technological and ecological shift. a pretty dramatic shift in the geography of the country in terms of where people lived and worked, and it was one that kind of left people much better off, but it was also a pretty tumultuous political period, and it was the beginning of a period in which we start to construct this welfare state, and we did it for good reasons, i think, recognizing that in any industrial economy and in an urban economy, we will often have downturns and will often have people who through no fault of their own could not find good work and we do not want those people to die on the streets. the recognition that there was a need for institutional change, in order to get that
institutional change, there were groups in society who had to mobilize. you had the rise of trade unions, the rise of new political interest groups, and i think that is the sort of pattern we are going to be looking at here. of the think in terms interaction between work and the welfare state and technology it looks the same then as it does in, but i think that pattern which we see, as ed did a good job pointing out, people become unhappy and begin mobilizing for institutional change. that's exactly the set of steps we will be working through over the next few decades. mr. levine: we're talking 1892 the beginning of world war i. mr. avent: and thereafter. i think you could include the interwar period, the pressure to create social security, the welfare state policies, that
whole period is really the one we're thinking about. time,ot a short amount of but that's how long it takes, i think, to arrive at a consensus about what actually should happen, what sort of institutions do need to be in place to develop the political movements to get those things in place and actually to enact them and unveil them. i think if you are looking at a historical keyword to model ourselves on, i think we should go to major periods of that but scandinavia and germany went through over the last 30 years. these are places that had extremely generous welfare states in the postwar period. they realized many of their roles were being deeply harmful in terms of the employment situation and they performed in ways that promoted work and did less to discourage employment. a lot of that divide goes to the fact that it was able to look at
labor market policies and say these are screwed up and we are into fix them, and the south, many people have been looking at labor market policies and saying these are screwed up, and fixing them has proven too hard. macron is trying very hard right now in france, but i think we need to ask ourselves if the future of america will look more like germany or sweden or if it will look more like greece, and we have that choice ahead of us. ok, so, charles murray famously wrote coming apart. you have written quite a bit on the subject of losing status, losing family, an amazing --tistic that you cite unmarried and divorced people make up 32% of the population deaths.of opioid
>> i believe that's men. mr. levine: that's men. ok. can you unpack when we are translating what ryan and ed are talking about into how this affected human people? >> some of you know i have been writing about family breakdown for a long time, and i hope to convince you by the end of today's discussion that that a lot of relevance to the discussion we are having today about these technological changes. when i first started writing about the family breakdown, i was mostly talking about the difference between the way upper income educated people were what -- steve says this is charles murray was writing about, too, of course -- how those people were doing at the top, how people were doing at the very bottom, mostly talking about the poor, and this was and
-- i guess in the early 1990's, mid 1990's. it looked like the white working class for the working class more generally was doing ok, was hanging on, at least in family terms, but since then, there has a catastrophe to the family and community structures of these places where we are seeing a lot of joblessness. what i think we have to keep in mind is that the implications are for the future of these places and of these people because what happens, we've begun to learn, is that boys who are growing up in families where there are no fathers or erratic fathers, father figures, really .uffer even more than girls
that evidence is becoming more and more clear, especially with a recent study that just came about black children and mobility. the study found that boys were having a lot more trouble than girls. is that theknow boys who are growing up in these -- very unstable and fluid we're not just talking about a marriage breaks up and the child goes on to have a good relationship with both parents. many of us in this room have seen many examples of that. we're talking about much more chaos, and jd events describes this, by the way, in his book "hillbilly elegy" -- jd vance
describes this in his book. a lot of coming and going of adult figures. the reason is because children, particularly boys, tend not to do well in school or emotionally when they are growing up under those circumstances. so we have increasing dysfunction among boys -- up,ger boys -- as they grow but they become exactly the jobless men that we are talking about today. a lot of the boys -- and a lot , ofhese young men, actually the jobless young men, when you talk to them, they often came from very chaotic homes themselves and were not able to , of thelearn and absorb any sense of agency over their lives. they instead have this sense that things just sort of do not have much self-control for themselves.
so they are not doing well at home. they are far less likely to go to college than girls. ok, what happens when the time comes for having a baby? women do not marry men who make a lot less money than them and who cannot keep a job. that is just reality. it remains that way even 50, 60 years after the feminist movement. thanks.ne: let's dig in just a little bit on that. to do things go hand-in-hand. one is unemployment, but also employment at a low wage or uncertain, unstable employment. i'm super interested in this malaisey of sort of the that we are in now and that other countries are, to.
is it this economic question, joblessness, low-wage, or is it -- loss oftus status? ms. hymowitz: it's impossible to really answer the question of how much economics plays a role in what happened to the family and how much is cultural, but i can tell you this -- that we still know that married couples have a better chance not just of making more money but of providing more stability for kids, and the kids tend to do better. this is what many decades of research has shown. instance,k at, for non-college-educated men -- actually, no, if you look at high school dropouts who are married, they are doing better
than men with a little bit of college in some of these communities that we are describing, so there is -- we don't know why that is, if there is something about the strengthty, the social of this person who is married, .ut it isn't just income clearly, there is something more involved. reachedne: we have now a point where fully 50% of the long-term jobless men -- that's over 12 years -- had never been married. second thing, about 85% of the long-term jobless men are not living alone. 30% are more than living with their parents. in fact, you have this -- men who are not growing up, and you a number who are living with spouses, or living with
other people and somehow making that household work. ms. hymowitz: i assume they are moving around, with not much stability. to have a bigger picture about this, a lot of guys, it's not that they are thoughtless about their kids. a lot of em are really devoted to their kids or think they are, but what happens is that the relationship with the child's mother -- mother tends to be the custodial parent -- becomes very complex. maybe there's a new man in the picture or a new woman in the picture, new child in the picture, and gradually, the father kind of backs off. blackas happened in the community as well. -- it's not just that a father is not living in the house, although that is a key part of the picture -- it's that it's very difficult to contact and kind of
loving and stable relationship with a father who is not married to the mother. that's just the reality. and mothers are the gatekeepers still. finds at least partial causation in public policy. -- our economic incentives or disincentives to work. what you think about that? do you have a hypothesis? ms. hymowitz: i don't think there is a way to think about this without talking about the changes in social and cultural norms. when you think about why men in the past have held jobs that were not particularly appealing, you do not hear -- they may not have been paid much.
we often talk about the 1950's of the great industrial period of our history, as if that was always the norm. it was not. many times, these jobs that men were working were really horrible. i had a quotation i wanted to bring in from a writer named connie schultz, who is a and she describes growing up in the cleveland area. her father worked at a factory in the boiler room. she said that when she would go -- she went to visit this place, hell. was some kind of the temperatures were, you know, going up to 140. film -- the filth was unbelievable. the fatigue her father
experienced, but she says her father would come home every day looking like he had just come back from hades, which he had, and would say, "you kids are oing to college." the reason he was willing to put up with this job was because he had people that were really relying on him and to whom he was devoted. when i think about joblessness and the question of how much this is an economic or cultural parallel, these men do not feel, for very complicated reasons, some of them true, that they are needed. nobody is relying on them. they can hang out on the couch and play video games. does it really matter? the kids are going to be ok. sort of. mr. levine: you have an in one ofg statistic
your writings. only 41% of high school dropouts -- maybe this is also men -- only 41% of high school dropouts are working. mr. glaeser: that's not prime age. that includes the whole population. that's right. mr. levine: two questions. this suggests -- and you do suggest that we need in terms of a prescription education, skilling up. i want to ask you to make that argument, but also i want to then -- ryan, if you will follow up right after that, you make the argument -- you trot out the history of the workforce gaining as theill over time technological cycles evolve, unfolded but then you say we may
have reached skilled saturation in the workforce. can you talk about that? ed, you first. mr. glaeser: you got me so interested in the question. the differences in jobless numbers between the educated and less educated are enormous, and i think very clearly america needs to do a better job in terms of educating its children. probably does continue to go through educational institutions, and some of it should be more entrepreneurial and tied to the labor force. we should do more things that feel competitively sourced vocational education the supplements traditional schooling, hopefully bypassing traditional teachers unions, do -- be innovative around
it. the reason why i'm not emphasizing skills as much as i have in the past is that our traditional quality was skills, skills, skills, and that's not wrong, but it's not enough eerie telling a worker in west virginia that you have lost your job and will have no other foreseeable job for the next 30 years, but i got a great pre-k for your granddaughter, we need to have more. we need to be able to say we have a better solution. what we do know about skills for the 50-year-old worker is we also have 50 years of work on job retraining programs for displaced workers, and almost uniformly, the track record is dismal. which leads me to the view that by far the best thing to do for that 50-year-old worker is get him back to work somewhere. find some employer who is going to give this guy a job producing
something someone else wants. give him something that provides structure to his life, something that gives him some degree of dignity and some sense of how the world works. we cannot do it all with pre-k. it just isn't there. we have to do something that encourages entrepreneurs to find some sort of work. something every unemployed or underemployed american is a failure of entrepreneurial imagination. ms. hymowitz: are there other countries that do a better job of job training? retraining? there is some sense in which scandinavian countries do bit better, but the educational systems are so much stronger in lots of dif dimensions. there's a lot to admire in germany's system. i think most of us would have trouble with tracking system that basically looks at a person at the age of 13 and says your job is you are going to be h reid for the rest of your life
or a garage mechanic or whatever it is. but job training and combining that with serious vocational training on top of that. familiesd in which work less, i think we should have other programs. --mr. avent: one second, i just wanted to follow that. one second, i just wanted to follow that. janesville, one of the most interesting parts is the re-skilling section, the survey of those who had been laid off from the gm factory. and follow up with those who had been through reskilling and those who did not, and those who did not work in much higher percentage in ploy to -- employed, compared with those
who had scaled. her answer was reskilling lies with 50 years of research. it is in line with what we have. the point that you need to get these guys back to work is the central point. most of us -- it is true in terms of teaching. most successful teaching is inspiring kids by what you tell them to go to work and that is how you learn. it is even more so for a 50-year-old. it is very hard to get people --h democrat fix demographics like mine to learn new tricks. it is very hard when you're in that structural environment to do so. >> so much to talk about. to get to this saturation point, it is important to know that a
huge part of our response to the industrial resolution was to increase education. at the start most people could not read and write. by the end of it, the vast majority of the working age population had secondary school degree of some point. 40% or so had his degree. that is a huge increase in educational attainment. to thinkgood reasons why education will not be the entirety of the solution this time around. the difficulty in trying to replicate that is another reason why we should not say we can educate ourselves out of the problem. look at thet to fact that, while it is true that you get a big bump to income going from a high school to -- high school degree to a college degree, the premium used to constantly rise. in 2000 or so it has not been rising. the premium to getting an
advanced degree does continue to rise. bar.ises the if we are talking about someone coming from a troubled who perhaps does not have the best primary education, how realistic is it to get them into an advanced degree program in computer engineering? point aboutse people working to get their kids into college, since 2000 or so, real wages for college graduates have been stagnant. some extent,n, to growth under employment among college graduates. a growing share of college graduates are working in jobs that do not require a degree. down effect trickle where you are displacing people with less education into jobs even farther down the ladder. is less of allege guarantee of a significantly
better life is perhaps something playing into the psychology here. >> i also think that when i am looking at the data on college premium, there is such a wide range of college status that we forget -- a lot of people in this room probably think in one kind of college. most americans who go to college it is not just state university and community satellite version, but parts of that university. thesis, you wrote this in 2016 when you publish the book, that the actual percentage of the population that is havege-educated, that we reached the saturation point.
you actually used the phrase that the other part of the population is not cognitively capable. [laughter] >> if you look at countries like korea, which have managed to raise completion rates for university level schooling significantly above the rest. is that there was a significant reduction in the quality of education that people were getting. not think it is a disparaging remark, college is hard. >> not hard enough. [laughter] >> calculus is hard. these things are not easy and not everyone can do them. that does not mean that they are less valuable or less or the of respect than anyone else, but it does mean we need to be realistic about how we are going to find employment for everyone. wind down inng to
this part of the conversation before we shift to questions. in terms of solutions -- so, we know now that rescaling is a -skilling is are hard thing. is talk about the wages. incentivizing joblessness. are we incentivizing stuck wages? >> maybe. i think the most important thing is working on straight employment subsidies. i think something like a flat wage subsidy targeted towards the end of the labor market is the right answer. make it a are our subsidy so it
is not complex. i am fine if you want to say that those dollars will be larger in west virginia then eyill be in new york. i am also fine if you say it three dollar wage bump will have more of an impact in virginia than it will be in new york. is a question as to whether or not you want to give subsidy directly to the workers, or you want to give it to the firms, which will be cheaper to implement. also more effective in places that have a binding minimum wage. if your goal is to bump up wages , i am more focus on joblessness rather than raising wages. giving it to the firm has a certain amount of sense to it. >> did you have something on that? ofi have a particular view how this is all playing out. i guess i share the diagnosis of what is going on, but i think it will be a bit harder to generate the outcomes we want.
what has happen over the past , and what will happen as technology improves is the substitutability of domestic workers is increasing. it is easier than ever to take a domestic worker here working in howory area warehouses and about job they are doing be done by someone from a different country or by a machine. that substitutability will go up as technology improves. what that means is we are stuck in a place where workers are in wage competitions with machines or without foreign workers. the way that we maintain high employment is by allowing wages to stagnate or fall in real terms. then we run into trouble because we have social safety net programs that means if wages get low enough people say it is not
worth it to work and drop out. we do not want that. an alternative would be to make those programs less generate and to subsidize wages. i think that is what he is os and that should address the issue of joblessness. i am not sure it solves our problems in a few ways. one, if we lined out in a world were they are having massive household staff, it is not clear to me that there is a desirable place to be more politically sustainable place to be. the other thing i worry about is that if we maintain this massive full of cheap labor, that reduces the incentive of technology that are going to raise productivity. you will not automate their warehouse if you have massive numbers of cheap subsidized labor to keep using there. we want to automate the warehouse. those are bad jobs. it raises productivity and
output. i worry we are stuck in a trapper we are not taking full advantage of technologies available to us. we are not getting growth because workers are so cheap. solving a problem is difficult. >> i do not really disagree with that much of what he just said. it is possible to be pessimistic about the future. of hope has never deterred me from taking on part ofhallenges, it is the job of the academic and policy stages. arguingears i have been for a need to reform land used regulations in this country. i am at a point where weiner vail looks like a incredible success. i do not disagree, i just believe in taking on lost causes. [laughter] i do not think this is a lost cause. i do think that regardless of what you think about the possibility of the future, there
-- what we economists call not working. it is associated with the payment and some part creates broader problems as a whole. the way we fight it is to subsidize good he haters and tax bad pavers. i am in favor to do more to subsidize people to work and do less to subsidize them from not working and a combination of the two. it will deter a little bit of i amsaving technology, but not that worried that we will under invest in those. the past 30 years has seen a fair amount of that. the other point is floating around that we probably have not made. historically in the u.s. when places have become less productive we moved. we are a mobile nation. when the farmers of new england saw the rock soil of massachusetts and heard it was some place in the ohio river
valley that was better, they moved. they had neighbors i help them raise a barn and they made housing cheap. latethe farmers in the 19th-century thought their agricultural incomes was low, same as in chicago and new york city when they were even acting homes by the hundreds of thousands to make space. they were hit by does they packed up their car and moved to california and homes were made from them -- for them. we have parts of america that are widely productive including new york city, silicone valley, seattle, boston we do not allow building. that is part of the problem. american mobility rates never cross below 6%. over the last 10 years they have never risen above 4%. income areas has completely stalled. from 1860 to 1980 this was the norm. got richer and rich places have less income growth.
we have ceased to see it because migration has moved from poor areas to rich areas. think about the rate migration of african-americans fleeing jim crow to find opportunity in detroit or chicago. today, we said we want you to leave detroit and moved to silicon valley and then they will ask where are they getting paid for that $3 million starter home. as we know, everything comes down to nighttime. part of the answer is allowing more migration. is aboutice economy household staff. there is a lot to like in the service economy. we think about a world where we will have a brighter world. a lot of answers come in services. a we are going to do lightning round. do want to say something? policies, i think
we need to look at the schools and how they are doing with dealing with police -- bullies. we know they are having a lot of trouble. when you to get to these kids before they drop out and have the failure that leads to skillsness and/or low and becoming part of what they call the per carry it -- precarious jobs that take you in and out -- that are not reliable. one question abouthis mobility issue that i find so interesting is, if you look historically, people, when they move, it is generally due to social networks of some sort. that is, their neighbors moved, or their uncle moved and said there are real opportunities here. it is curious in a place that i
have studied, you have neighborhoods all over of different kinds of social growth. generally ethnic groups. we can have a bangladesh neighborhood or a pakistani neighborhood or chinese, but we never get an eastern heartland neighborhood. i wonder what it is that makes people not see that as a possibility. >> we have just a few more minutes here. i wanted to do a lightning round. why are we having this discussion? why is it important? thee is a sense that society is under threat. that how do you support an advanced democracy with the growth of jobs, $10 an hour jobs and the uncertainty about jobs
period>? is,uestion for each of you is our society under threat? if you can do one thing, what would it be? threat, i it is under think the education based meritocracy is failing a lot of people. also, creating class divisions in so many respects. we are divided, not just in terms of income, not just in terms of education, but in everything from the coffee we drink to places we live, the way andhink about families marriage and children. i think that that division, that polarization has created enormous anger at the lower end.
we are going to have more and more oppression. this is an importaoint f conservatives to deal with. redistribution or programs that can say that the system can work for people at the bottom. we talk a lot about jobless men, but it is also people who are working pretty hard and still not doing that well and with very few hopes for their children. ed? first answer the question. >> it is a big problem and wage subsidy. [laughter] ed is optimistic about things. i am on the other end of the
scale. the main thing i look forward to is to see which dystopia we will end up in. i am very concerned. as you look back at industrial history, it all worked out ok but there were a lot of points in which it might not have. revolutions,rious there was a century long ideological conflict that led to nuclear war. that ideological conflict had its roots generated by industrialization. there is a lot of ways things can go wrong. inre is not really anyone control saying, here is what we will do so that the worst outcomes do not occur. ofhink we need to be aware the difficulties that are ahead of us. the more we talk about and realize that we are going to have to have radical solutions,
the better prepared we will be in the better we will be to avoid the worst outcome. >> i feel a lot better now. [laughter] shifting to questions. please wait for the microphone to reach you. identify yourself and who you are addressing. i'm director of the forearm. let me take a moment advertising. ed has agreed to step into the debating ring with brian to debate the suspect -- the subject of education on may 14, monday evening. i invited him and he graciously wrote that, "sounds like fun." in, come seeo join me after to buy tickets. we are selling out fast. my question is targeted at ed. it is great tradition that the
formidable thinkers the are prettysubject hopeless and you have hope, but then they taught us that government has been part of the problem not the solution. now you want government to be part of the solution. your solution about wage subsidies, would it be at war and you hope with people move since it induces them not to move? another thing that fascinates me, to what extent has capital actually gone where the cheap labor is? i know if anecdotes, foreigners do it too. is there anything that might be hopeful for that? let me throw another one your way. [laughter] a great set of questions. on wage subsidies
at war with the idea you want people to move out, they don't need to be. it is a question as to whether you see subsidies as a bonus. meaning you are weighing get over the existing one or meaning you will reduce the disability payment in west virginia and allow the people in west virginia to keep more of their earnings from the labor market. conceptually, it is easy to imagine a tilt and there is nothing to keep them in west virginia. they do not need to be at war, but it all depends on the implementation. about the movement of capital, this is where i think ryan's perspective comes in. this is part of the catchup of mississippi after world war ii. mississippitoday, was the poorest state in the union. in 1958, other states had incomes that was twice that of mississippi. today, not a single state has
doubled that of mississippi. mississippi is coming back and part of that is about people moving out and some part is about capital moving in. we have all seen "in the heat of the night" that tells the story of a northern capital coming to a southern town. important real phenomenon. is notson why that working anymore is the nature of work has changed. we see skilled innovators innovating in a way that skilledy requires workers. henry ford innovated in way that made use of tens of thousands of less skilled americans earning five dollars a day. unless we have a change of innovation that goes along with it, that suddenly means you will move capital to workers, you are not see that profit continue. part of thepeful
innovation side of the policy i am proposing. a wage subsidy that encourages employment. it may did to her innovations using cheap labor, but it will encourage other ones. effort intoa little thinking about how i can use less skilled workers in the production product -- process. i think being optimistic about america's future is like believing in the hereafter. you do not do it because you have scientific proof, you do it because life goes better and feels better when you have those beliefs. i will keep being optimistic about america's future not based on scientific evidence, but because life feels a lot better that way. i will group a couple of questions together. let's take a couple rate here. -- right here. with the columnist
hill and foxnews.com. i'm surprised to come to manhattan institute event and have talk about wage subsidies. let's talk about a different approach, which is what is talking- kristen about, the guaranteed jobs programs. since kay talked about how people need to feel worthy, ed, i think you agree that having a job is the basis of nick disney -- the committee. -- dignity. >> who else would like caps on they? let's take this man back here? yes, you. i was particularly intrigued by her observation about the presence of dependence in a household being a motivator of .ork and economic ambition
up until 50 years ago the only way you got access to an intimate partner was to enter and sustain a marriage, which typically resulted in children. we know that is no longer the case. tot is the motivator now create dependence so that there is a reason for a man to go to work and support them? ed, you get that question first. youthe question is whether think the job will come from the private or public sector. i am for the idea. the point of wage subsidies is that they should be -- some of the benefit local to firms and some will go to workers. it will do more to encourage workers to look for a job and looking for entrepreneurs to
create more jobs. this -- iged to keep have mentioned deregulation of land-use control. also rethinking our social welfare state. i am in favor of thinking hard about the disincentive that our programs have put on working. thinking that all these that they dograms, something that can be awful. i want to re-emphasize that the one thing i would like even must than i guaranteed jobs program is universal basic income. the idea that our response to this is that we will give everyone some flat fee and that will be our response. this is a dystopian vision like i cannot imagine. a world in which 40% depends on hands out -- handouts.
it is a horror story. something that does a bit to encourage more job creation and encourages workers to look for viewing still maintains the private sector as the generation of employment seems essential. time, doest the same not think that we will try to army ofpromoting an nonemployed and subsidize. >> how do you motivate dependents? , we dore i get to that have a natural experiment that has occurred with them on working we have been talking about and how did they spend their time. they are making money, they have , family members and various benefits that they do not need to work.
is, are they taking care of the children? are they volunteering their time? there is plenty of evidence that they are spending a lot of time watching televion and playing video games. eric is a lot of work from on this. it is quite interesting. it was a fantasy of mine that when you have it it will be all burning man all the time. people were going to go out and ask -- express themselves creatively. we have little evidence that that is what will happen. to get to the question from back there, there is no question that the changes in sexual morality have shifted the incentives for marriage. has a very interesting book
out called "cheap sex" on exactly this question. add that theto movement of women into the workplace has also complicated this arrangement, the marital arrangement. women can manage on their own. it is tough, but they can do it. and they are. one thing i think we have to be worried about, and i am with ryan on this, the future looking not very right in this way is that women are, as we know, doing much better than men in schools, getting more degrees. there is reason to think that some of the jobs that are better paying jobs are going to emerge in the future economy are going to require a lot of social skills. that has already been the case.
there is evidence from one of your colleagues, i think, on the necessity of social skills. those tend to be women friendly jobs, or benefits that women can bring to a job. good-year-old guys are not at being nice to people. it is not in our skill set. 50-year-old women who you could put in that category. is, this is point an economy that has gradually become more female friendly for a lot of reasons as we move from industrial to arrangements. it is likely to come more that way in the future. the possibilities of men becoming more essential economically do not look good to me. >> how are we doing on time?
gentleman.this let's take both of these questions. jerry lewis, i am an attorney here in manhattan. it occurs to me listening to this panel, by the way, it is excellent. we are missing a panelist who is active in manhattan name peter coles who has run american works, which is an agency that finds employment for hard to employ people. peter has very strong opinions in the area, one of which is, and we are talking about the human capital, is that work workf -- dieter says, first. he has an ex-con who needs a job, put them in a job. the training stuff has not been successful. put the people in the jobs with a combined skills and socialization but get them to
work as quickly as possible. that is peter's position on the human capital issue. i think ed has averted to that end kay as well. >> do have a question? >> yes. i would like the panel's reaction. when ed started talking about mobility in the workforce, there are other historical parallels and one that occurs to me is the homestead act. the very first statute passed by a republican congress giving millions of americans the incentive to become pioneers to move west to the prayer breezy to settle the vast acres of vacant land that the government wanted settled. i guess the question is, why not create some kind of a new homestead act that is not land oriented getting people onto land, but rather is oriented
towards getting into them the new kinds of workplace that we are looking at in the future? i would just like their reaction to the observation. my question is potentially related to what he said. we have talked about jobs being don'tble in places people wish to be. people who need work in clustered areas. you're going to subsidize anything, i think you need to make -- between the two. personme money to the who has the job, but only predicate it if they bring that person to this site and only if they put that person in the job and train them. what do you think about that?
>> do you want to try the homestead act? >> sure. i will speak to the totality of the comment and the job guarantee. point that is important to make is that, from my perspective, good things happen when labor is scarce. when we see when job markets are tight, a lot of ople who we are not employable suddenly become employable. firms become interested in developing their trading house programs and incentive rising workers to get more education. they pay much better, we see more in the way of wage increases. to me, one of the big problems we face now and are going to face more in the future is the fact that labor will not be scarce. it cannot be because you have ofs technological labor robots and whatnot that are waiting in the wings to replace.
what do we do about that? one thing you can do would be to have some sort of a job guarantee. do you have this place absorb excess labor and to give workers some sort of bargaining power that would force the private sector to work hard for -- harder to attract and retain labor. there are all sorts of ways that could go wrong. speaking in those terms leads us to some better conclusions about what we ought to do. we look at a place like germany and it is interestingo know that trade unions are a shock there. trade unions would be another you can engineer scarcity of workers. what is interesting about the germany experience is that while employment rates are high, the hours across the economy have not gone up at all over the past 20 years. what they have done is share out the work more equally.
that is an interesting approach to think about. maybe we cannot expect every workr to put in a 40 hour week, but what we saw across the industrial revolution wasork fe by half. maybe that is a part of the approach. maybe we need to workers be empowered to negotiate their retreat from the battlefield so to speak. we are going to request, we will have wage subsidies. those sorts of things are radical. that is the right sort of debate to have. the other approach to talk about with the homestead act is capital motion. it when i have a negative incentive effect that we might see with other things. sure what form the homestead act could take.
give me a better sense going forward. the question was that we are doing which studies, what point don't we want to impose employees forgetting that. obviously they are employing someone. it may be that we will require those people who are unemployed to be formally unemployed. those are important details but not one that i have a strong stance on. the key point is getting the conversation that we need to do more to encourage work going forward and that is critical. the one thing that is vaguely related to both of these issues and what ryan said is, we do not want to forget the regulatory side of this. we do not want to forget the downside of excessive occupational licensing that makes it hard for people to climb in the country.
that we regulate the entrepreneurship of rich people. if you want to get started, let's make something up. that has several billion people on in a dorm room, there is no regulation looking over your shoulder for years. 14 years later you get in trouble, but it is a decade and a half of free zone. if you want to start a grocery store that sells milk problems -- products, you have it's -- you have 17 permits to go through. we do not welcome you into doing what we say. god for bid, don't open your food truck here, don't do something creative, that is problematic. >> we have a question right here. let's take both of these gentlemen. you mentioned germany several times, you also mentioned some
of the questions around education, south korea having to drop the level of education for my people having a college degree. and other european country, a system that works well is apprenticeship. someone does not graduate with a college degree from a university but does not feel ashamed and gets trained, not only in the industry but in services. g anding -- bankin programming. i would love to hear your take on apprenticeship? >> second question. >> i have read that in denmark they spend 2% to 4% of their gdp on job training, that is more than we spend on people. job training has been unsuccessful in this country, but is there something different about denmark -- about how denmark is doing it?
in a country the size that would be what we spend on defense. spending is huge, but would it be worth it to keep the populace politicians who want to enact protectionist policies or give away that much in free goodies, keep those politicians at a just by keeping everybody employed? briefly on the question of the german system. my understanding is that that system has been in place for many, many decades. it is kind of built into the education system. this arrangement where you eventually decide, well, i will go into mechanics and become an apprentice. you are shifted into that track very early on, correct? that really is not consistent about thecan thinking
optimism of people talents -- peoples talents. i agree that it is working very well for the german spirit -- germans. in theink there is a gap american education system. something like apprenticeships should go. i share the sentiment that we do not want to track children from a young age, but i do not think it has to be like that. when bmw was looking for a place to put its plant and it ended up going to south carolina, one of the conditions that they had in place there was that they wanted south carolina to invest money in local community colleges and local universities to set up programs where there was very close cooperation between bmw m between the educational institutions so that bmw could be assured of getting people who have the skills they needed.
we need the interaction between private sector and educational systems so we are generating the sorts of people with the sets of skills they need to get good jobs. bit.nd that a we are thinking about important legislation. you might also thinking about the land grant acts in the way they prioritize the developments developments. taking to places that were not at the forefront of technology and helping them learn new techniques. in that way, strengthening their local economies. >> denmark? the extent of which we are thinking about training for younger people, i am all for it. i do not think the right answer is to shut down schools at age 13, that there is a lot of hours and months in a 16 or old's life that is not spent in school. you can do apprenticeship retraining things that are on high school curriculum without batting an eye. in terms of retraining for older
people, i took your question to be, what it politically make sense? maybe, but i don't listen to the some and say, this from populist disaster, it looks like another way that washington waste money. a, you have off to to be sure that you are getting that out of a bad policy before you actually endorse it. >> we have run out of time. [applause] , very much. members of the panel will stick around. if anyone has questions just come on up here in -- come on up. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] on newsmakers this weekend,
our guest is new york congressman jared, the top democrat on the house judiciary committee. he talks about pending legislation and the justice department's newly released inspector general report on how the fbi handled the hillary clinton email investigation during the 2016 presidential election. asks about the molar probe into russia, and the likelihood of president trump facing impeachment. >> if democrats win the majority thehe house he will be chairman. when he won that spot there were a number of stories written in that this was the man that would oversee impeachment. arecratic activists anticipating that. what are you telling them headed into the election and preparing for your stance on impeachment and any plans at this point? >> i think it is much too early there wille whether
be impeachment proceedings or not. first thing is, wait for molars er'sstigation -- muell investigation and see what he finds. the president anticipate in criminal activity or did he? -- didn't he? about obstruction of justice, whatever, much too soon to answer. we have to see what the special counsel fines. also, and i said this 20 years ago during the clinton administration and i will repeat it now and i mean it. it would be very harmful to the country to pursue an impeachment if the case were not so overwhelming and the evidence so overwhelming that, by the end of the impeachment proceeding, an impeachable fraction of the people who voted for the president would agree that you had to do it. if you did it on a partisan
basis, only democrat supporting it, beside the facts that arithmetic does not work, but putting that aside, you turn the country apart. you would have 20 years of people saying, we won the election, you stole it. that is not good for the country. you only avoid that if the case is so overwhelming and the evidence so strong that you get faction of the people who voted for trump to agree that you really had to do that. >> you can watch the rest of that interview tomorrow at 10 :00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. c-span, where history unfolds 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's public service cable company. today, we continue to b